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Mar 1020:53 Mar 1708:04 Mar 1712:25 Mar 1712:37 Mar 1712 THE CIVIL WAR (28.1­16.5.1918) • The Red guards occupied key • The absence of a Finnish army or offices in Helsinki and took control of police force resulted in the the urban southern Finland establishment of various armed • The whites declared Vaasa the groups ­ white (civil) and red guards. capital of White Finland and By the end of 1917 the white guards controlled Finland north of Tampere numbered 40 000 and the red 30 000 • The government was 12.1 Mannerheim empowered by the parliament to create a 'strong police authority. The Red troops about 100 000. 70 task was handed over to Mannerheim 000 engaged in battles. The white • 25.1.1918 he declared the civil forces 70 000. guards to be government troops • Red­Paid (Lego)army The war broke out 27­28.1 White­Conscriptions simultaneously but independently in three different places (Ostrobothnia, Helsinki and Viipuri) Kullervo Manner Mar 10­20:53 mar 17­08:04 THE RED FINLAND The civil war was short but bloody • Objectives; a parliamentary • The Red Terror (1600) democracy (not proletarian • The White Terror (8300) dictatorship) based on the principle of • The Prisoncamps (12000) the sovereignty of the people­not very • Casualties of the fighting radical Red­3500, White­3200 Red Army White Army • incompetent leadership • 'russian' officers • shortage of arms • jaegers in late February • some russian volunters • Capital • no official Russian assistance • Swedish voluntars • lack of capital • Germany (von der Goltz) mar 17­12:25 mar 17­12:37 THE FINNISH MONARCHY After the civil war, a struggle broke out between monarchists and FINLAND'S KING republicans over what was the rightful • Friedrich Karl of Hessen form of government for Finland, and • German connections and this badly split the ranks of the bourgeois parties. dependance • Germany's defeat in the Great War placed Finland in an embarressing situation • THE MONARCHISTS THE REPUBLICANS The Entente powers interrupted the • Svinhufvud (temporary regent) • Ståhlberg diplomatic relations with Finland • • Paasikivi (chairman of the gov.) • Finland declared a republic Friedrich luckily abdicated in early • Had lost the confidence of a • december The 'rump'parliament (111/200) • republican constitution Svinhufvud resigned and • Wanted a strong and uninterrupted Mannerheim became temporary leadership regent • 1772 constitution allowed the parliament to choose a new monarchial family in case the former had vanished mar 17­12:47 mar 17­13:00 1 1919 ­ back to normal life • Parliamentaryelections in march THE DOMESTIC SCENE BETWEEN resulting in a representative THE WARS parliament • Continued political polarisation after • Ståhlberg elected first president by the civil war the parliament • Antidemocratic radical rightwingmovements inspired by european fascism • The Worlddepression 1929 • Exportpeace • AKS • The Lapuamovement mar 22­19:46 mar 22­19:51 • Political kidnappings (kyyditykset) • The 'Farmers march' FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE • The 'Mäntsälä rebellion' INTERWAR PERIOD • IKL THE ÅLANDCONTROVERSY • • Language struggle background; The 1st WW, The civil • The prohibition law (1919­1932) war, The languge struggle, Wilson's 14 point programme, Russia • Åland's motives • Sweden's motives • Finland's motives mar 22­19:57 mar 22­20:06 The Geneveconvention 1921 (10 states) RELATIONS WITH SU­RUSSIA • Autonomy (under the League's • The civilwars in Finland and SU­ protection) Russia • Demilitarized zone (no army nor • Finnish expeditions to eastern Carelia conscription) (Aunus 1919) • Own national symbols (e.g flag, • Finnish volunters in the Estonian civil stamp) war • native property rights (hembygdsrätt) • Mannerheim • Worsened relations with Sweden THE TARTU PEACE TREATY • Orientation towards the Baltic • The Baltic states, Poland and Finland • Language struggle's negotiated with SU concerning peace • Trust in the League of Nations and borders mar 22­20:11 mar 22­20:17 2 • 14.10.1920 THE WINTER WAR • The independence recognized • The European development 1933­39 • Petsamo • The fall of 1938, 'The • 'Peace of Shame' or 'A to generous Yartsevnegotiations' Peace' • SU proposed a lease of finnish • Relations with SU remained cold • territories in order to strengthen the 1932 a traty of friendship due to security of Leningrad detoriarating global political situation. • The Molotov­ribbentro pact 23.8.39 The confidence with the League • 5.10.39 ­ SU proposed changes of dropped the border in the carelian isthmus, • The pro­German attitudes of Finland Hanko and the Islands of the Gulf of affected SU relations Finland • The Mainila shooting • SU breaks off all diplomatic contacts • 30.11.39 ­ THE WINTER WAR mar 22­20:29 mar 22­20:34 THE WINTER WAR • SU offensive from land, sea, air THE CONTINUATION WAR • The League of Nations assmbeled for • Improved militarysituation compared the last time and expelled SU and to the Winter War recommended collective aid and • 3 phases; 1) Offensive, 2) Positional assistance to Finland and 3) Retreat • The Finnish army poorly equipped. 1) Lost territory of the Winterwar Mannerheim commander in chief reconquered. Su territory conquered ­ • Kallio replaced by Ryti as president opinions divided in Finland • The Winter War spirit after the first 2) Germany's requests (Murmansk and 'defensive victories' Leningrad) were not met. Finland in • Finnish strengths versus Su War with Britain but the allied powers weaknesses did treat Finland as separated from • French and British military aid Germany. • The War children After Germany's defeats 1942­43 the • 13.3.40 The Moscow peace treaty idea of a separate peace developed, • 'Interim peace' mar 22­20:50 mar 22­20:58 • The Peace recoinneterings were • The Lapland war, Finland's heavely difficult as Germnay also was a threat to Finland. Finland dependant of reduced army (38 000) forced to German military aid. When the combat and drive out Germany's troops (200 000). Continued to april ­45. germans heard of peacetalks they • broke off all aid. SU major offensive The Controlcommission • during the summer of 1944. A The Paris Peace Treaty 1947 ockupation of Finland very close. • Heavy losses • 26.6.44 the Ryti­Ribbentro pact which secured the Finnish military positions. SU turned the focus on Germany. 1.8, Ryti resigned and was replaced with Mannerheim. • 4.9 truce and 19.9 armistice mar 22­21:16 mar 22­21:23 3.
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