The Loss of the Bismarck: an Avoidable Disaster Carl O
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Naval War College Review Volume 55 Article 23 Number 4 Autumn 2002 The esD truction of the Bismarck; The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster Carl O. Schuster Holger H. Herwig David J. Bercuson Graham Rhys-Jones Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Schuster, Carl O.; Herwig, Holger H.; Bercuson, David J.; and Rhys-Jones, Graham (2002) "The eD struction of the Bismarck; The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 , Article 23. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/23 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Schuster et al.: The Destruction of the Bismarck; The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avo BOOK REVIEWS 127 until 22 June 1941, had to be shipped via the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the final analysis, Sander-Nagashima concludes, Herwig, Holger H., and David J. Bercuson. The naval cooperation between the two allies Destruction of the Bismarck. Overlook, N.Y.: Over- was restricted to “the limitation of the look Press, 2001. 314pp. $35 operational zones through 70 degrees Rhys-Jones, Graham. The Loss of the Bismarck:An east longitude.” Avoidable Disaster. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti- Part III, written by Niestlé, a business- tute Press, 2000. 272pp. $32.95 man and author of numerous works on During the early evening hours of 22 German U-boats, details the meager lo- May 1941, the German battleship Bis- gistical exchanges between Berlin and marck departed Bergen, Norway, to face Tokyo. In terms of passengers traveling the might of the Royal Navy with only by transport ship, a mere twenty-one the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in com- people went from Europe to Japan, and pany. It was to be the battleship’s first not quite nine hundred from the Far and only operational deployment. Five East to Europe; by submarine, the totals days later, the ship went down with over are ninety-six and eighty-nine, respec- a thousand of its crew. tively. In terms of material exchanges, in Considered then to be the world’s most 1941–42 Japan shipped 104,233 tons to powerful battleship, Bismarck entered Germany, of which 19,200 were lost; in the Atlantic when Britain was stretched 1942–43 half the 104,700 tons shipped almost to the breaking point. With the was lost. Of the goods shipped in both critical Battle of the Atlantic hanging in directions by submarines, only between the balance, the pursuit and sinking of 20 and 40 percent ever arrived. While Bismarck was one of the war’s most dra- the Germans were anxious for deliveries matic episodes; many books and a movie of rubber and precious metals, the Japa- were dedicated to it. Those early works, nese requested industrial products, tech- written mostly within twenty years after nical equipment, and chemical goods. the war, focused almost entirely on the Part IV consists of a conclusion by operation itself. None devoted attention Sander-Nagashima. to the strategies, political aspects, or My criticisms of this superb work are operational and politico-strategic back- but two. First, the fact that it has four grounds that shaped the battleship’s de- authors writing separate sections has re- ployment and the Allied responses to it. sulted in a good deal of overlap, retelling That void has now been filled by the various aspects of the story. Second, the two books under review, The Destruc- title does not do the book justice; it was tion of the Bismarck, by Holger Herwig hardly a “reluctant” alliance but rather a and David Bercuson, and The Loss of the hollow, empty, or wasted one. Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster, by Gra- HOLGER H. HERWIG ham Rhys-Jones. Both books bring new University of Calgary information and fresh perspectives to the tale, putting Bismarck’s operation in its strategic context. In doing so, the au- thors highlight the strategic impact of the potential outcomes of Operation RHINE, the code name for Bismarck’s Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2002 1 128 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 23 sortie. Perhaps more importantly, these decisions made and executed at the time. books expose the domestic political, the The book reflects the background of its operational, and the military-strategic author, Graham Rhys-Jones, a retired considerations that drove much of the Royal Navy officer whose career spanned protagonists’ decision making. The books, from ship’s operations to strategic naval however, differ in their approaches. planning. He is not without academic Holger H. Herwig and David J. Bercuson credentials, however, for he both at- are prominent, widely published histori- tended and taught at the U.S. Naval War ans who coauthored an earlier book on College. (See Graham Rhys-Jones’s “The an Atlantic Ocean engagement in World Loss of the Bismarck: Who Was to War II. Prior to their recent collabora- Blame?” in the Winter 1992 issue of this tions, they had specialized in German journal.) His combined academic, plan- naval history and Canadian military his- ning, and operational background en- tory, respectively. Both live and teach in ables him to provide an operational Canada, and for the most part they write context for the battleship’s destruction. from a western Atlantic perspective; as a More importantly, he demonstrates how result they have incorporated U.S. plan- Germany’s and Britain’s lessons learned ning and activities related to Bismarck’s in previous twentieth-century naval op- deployment and how U.S. naval opera- erations shaped their actions in and re- tions affected the planning of the Ger- sponses to Operation RHINE. man navy’s commander, Grand Admiral The Loss of the Bismarck contends that Erich Raeder—a heretofore unexplored Admiral Raeder was a man totally topic. They also provide detailed, com- wedded to the idea of major surface prehensive treatment of the domestic combatants operating as “raiders,” political considerations behind Raeder’s attacking an enemy’s ocean commerce. thinking and the staff’s response to his Raeder’s naval vision called for “surface direction and requirements, recounting raiding groups” operating on the high the German naval staff’s extensive objec- seas, powerful enough to overwhelm tions to Operation RHINE, its timing, most convoy escorts but fast enough to and the results of their predeployment escape fleet engagements. The two-ship gaming of the operation. The book then Bismarck class was to be Germany’s shifts to a lively but traditional narrative initial post–World War I class of battle- of the battleship’s deployment and loss. ships; the Bismarck and Tirpitz were The Loss of the Bismarck takes a more designed with the raiding mission in Euro-centric view of the battleship’s de- mind. These ships were fast and ployment, focusing on the overall Anglo- powerful and had a long cruising range German strategic picture, with special but were of a design that essentially rep- emphasis on Russia and the Mediterra- resented an update of late World War I nean. Moreover, it presents the pursuit practices. The never-built follow-on H and engagement of Bismarck from a naval class was to have been the primary class command perspective, highlighting the of German battleships, optimized for operational picture, available to the raiding operations against the full range commanders on both sides. The con- of modern naval threats. Unfortunately tending naval doctrines and missions are for Admiral Raeder, the war started too explained and provide context to the soon for his dream battleships to be https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/23 2 Schuster et al.: The Destruction of the Bismarck; The Loss of the Bismarck: An Avo BOOK REVIEWS 129 built, and the war’s early operations do the tactical and operational impacts found the much cheaper U-boats of those decisions on the other players, enjoying far more success at commerce such as Admiral William Wake-Walker raiding than his surface ships. He saw aboard the cruiser HMS Norfolk, trailing the prospects for his “surface raiding the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Britain’s groups” retreating into the background. naval operations and heavy losses This feeling was reinforced in 1941 by around Crete, the German invasion of the need to transfer nearly half of his which was under way concurrently with carefully husbanded fuel reserves to the Operation RHINE, were weighing heavily German army for the invasion of Yugo- on British commanders. They could not slavia and Greece and the planned afford a mistake in either the Mediterra- invasion of the Soviet Union, as well as nean or the Atlantic. German decision the sudden requirement to supply fuel to making was hampered by inconsistent the oil-starved Italian navy. His hopes and unintegrated intelligence support, were revived, however, in late March and it was inhibited by a complex naval 1941 when Vice Admiral Gunther command structure in which Vice Ad- Lütjens returned from Operation miral Lütjens worked for no less than BERLIN, a surface-raiding sortie three admirals in seven days—Admiral involving the two battle cruisers Scharn- Raeder and Admiral Saalwächter, who horst and Gneisenau that destroyed over coordinated operations in the Atlantic, 115,000 tons of British shipping. Em- and Admiral Carls, who was responsible boldened by Lütjens’s success and for naval operations in the North and believing that the future of his surface Norwegian Seas.