DOCSLIB.ORG

Chronological Appendix: Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Chronological Appendix: Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy Chronological Appendix: Seventy Years of Gunboat Diplomacy This Chronological Appendix is not a complete list of all the examples of the application of limited naval force during the last seventy years; that would need a separate book. The instances listed below have been chosen to show the different ways in which, year by year, many governments have employed this expedient in various parts of the world. Because it is meant to illustrate the range of gunboat diplomacy, and to avoid tedious repetition, the choice made does not reflect the actual distribution of gunboat diplomacy in parti­ cular years or geographical areas. The number of incidents in China during the late 1920s, for instance, was far larger than the selection included here. This chronology does not, therefore, present a historically or geographically representative cross-section of the actual employment of gunboat diplomacy during the last seventy years, and cannot be used as a basis for mathematical conjectures. The choice of examples has been guided by the definition reached in Chapter 1: gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state. Naval action in time of war has been excluded, unless this took place against allies or neutrals, and actions resulting in war (whether declared or not) have only been quoted as examples of failure - and on the assumption that only limited force was originally intended. The description 'assailant' is given to the government that initiated the use or threat of naval force. Assailants are not necessarily aggressors. Similarly, the 'victim' is the other party to the dispute or, in the absence of a specific dispute, the government whose sovereignty was infringed, whether or not this government invited or acquiesced in the action taken. Victims are not necessarily innocent. The classification of incidents is in accordance with Chapter 2: D stands for definitive force, P for purposeful, C for catalytic, and E for expressive. Finally, an attempt has been made in the summary of each incident to indicate whether the action taken was successful or not. The only judgement implied is whether or not the results achieved corresponded with the intention of the assailant, and no attempt has been made to take account of wider considerations. For instance, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974 is described as successful because it secured the slice of Cyprus sought by the Turkish government. The adjective 'successful' does not imply any 158 Chronological Appendix 159 judgement that Turkish acquisition of this territory was in the long term advantageous either to Turkey or to anyone else, or that the decision to take it by force was necessarily correct. The whole of this chronology is intended only to illustrate the uses of gunboat diplomacy as an instrument of governments, and the merits of the foreign policies that promoted its employment are beyond the scope of this book. 1919 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type 1918-21 Britain Russia After the armistice with c German Germany in November 1918, forces a British squadron was sent in area to the Baltic to support British policy. When withdrawn in 1921 it had failed to overthrow the Soviet regime, but had helped to secure independence for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (see Chapter 2). Partly successful. Note: French, US and Italian warships were involved to a lesser extent, and limited naval force was much used by various powers at this time in the seas around Russia. 14May United Greece/ uss ARIZONA lands marines p 1919 States Turkey to guard US Consulate at Constantinople during Greek occupation of that city. 1 1920 14May United Mexico 'Bandits in charge p States Manzanillo since II a.m. 14th. Destroyer THORNTON, Commander Stirling, arrived 4 p.m. and saved town from violence. Standing by.'2 ISMay Soviet Iran/ Bolshevik destroyer and c Union Britain motor-boats seize White Russian ships in Enzeli harbour, bombard and occupy town, and expel small British contingent. 160 Chronological Appendix 1920 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type Although Persian territory occupied has later to be given up and attempted conversion to communism fails, operation later enables Soviet Union to improve its political position in Persia at British expense. Partly successful. 3 17 November Britain Greece After the electoral defeat D of the pro-British Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, he leaves the country hurriedly on a yacht that was escorted by HMS CENTAUR to prevent any attempt by the new Greek government to arrest Venizelos. Successfui.4 Note: British naval activities in the Baltic and the use of limited naval force against the Bolsheviks continued. 1921 28 February Britain Soviet British warships evacuate D -19 March Union British subjects and sympathisers from Batum before this capital of the ephemeral (now renascent) state of Georgia falls to the Bolsheviks. Successful.5 5 August United China The US Navy establish a p States Yangtse river patrol 'to protect US interests, lives and property and to maintain and improve friendly relations with the Chinese people'. The success achieved in the first objective was more conspicuous than in the second.6 18 August United Panama 400 US Marines embarked p States by USS PENNSYLVANIA to induce Panama to conform to Chronological Appendix 161 1921 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type US decision regarding her border dispute with Costa Rica. 7 Successful. 1 November Britain Austria/ HMS GLOWWORM and other D Hungary British ships of the Danube Flotilla collect the ex- Emperor Karl of Austria- Hungary after the failure of his attempt to regain the throne and convey him to Rumania, whence HMS CARDIFF takes him to Madeira. This intervention by the Royal Navy was approved by the principal European governments and the use of naval force was needed only to prevent the ex-Emperor being rescued by his partisans, or kidnapped by his opponents, while on his way to exile.8 1922 l4August Britain China President Sun Yat Sen D rescued from Canton after his defeat by Chinese rebels and taken to Shanghai in British gunboat. Successfui.9 September Britain Turkey British and other warships p United (including HMS IRON DUKE) States sent to Smyrna (being France evacuated by Greeks and Italy occupied by Turks after their war) to maintain order and protect foreign nationals and property until Turkish authority established. Warships also gave some help with the evacuation of over 200,000 mainly Greek civilians. Partly successfui.IO September/ Britain Turkey British fleet sent to the p November Dardanelles and Bosphorus 162 Chronological Appendix 1922 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type to help prevent Turkish forces from crossing into Europe. Successful. II 18 November Britain Turkey The Sultan of Turkey D rescued from his rebellious subjects by HMS MALAYA and taken to Malta. SuccessfuJ.l2 1923 January Britain/ Lithuania British cruiser and French p France gunboat sent to Memel after Lithuanian seizure of that port (then under temporary French control). French garrison was rescued and face saved, but Lithuania kept Me mel. Only partly a success. 13 27 August Italy Greece Italian fleet bombarded and p occupied Greek island of Corfu in order to extract concessions from Greek government (see Chapter 2). Successful. 6 December Britain China Warships sent by these p France governments to Canton to Italy protect Customs House Japan (then under foreign control Portugal for recovery of debt) against United seizure by Chinese States government. Warships withdrawn the following April. Successful. 14 1924 llJanuary Britain Mexico HMS CAPETOWN sent to p Minatitlau to protect a British oil refinery during a Mexican revolution. She was successively p relieved by other British cruisers, and it was the commander of HMS Chronological Appendix 163 1924 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type CONSTANCE who, after the arrival of various Mexican gunboats, informed the belligerents that he could not approve of the firing of the ships' guns in his vicinity, so he suggested their battle should take place elsewhere. Successful. 15 27 February United Honduras US Marines landed at p States Puerta Ceiba to protect US interests in civil disturbances. Successful, but US warships had again to intervene in later months. 16 18 December Italy Three Italian destroyers sent p Albania/ to Albanian ports when the Yugoslavia Albanian government was threatened by insurrection that was allegedly sponsored by Yugoslavia. UnsuccessfulY 1925 23June Britain China An armed detachment p landed by HMS TARANTULA to protect the British concession at Shameen opens fire when the bridge is attacked by Chinese troops. Successful. 18 4 August United Nicaragua US Marines withdrawn p States from many areas, but trouble soon prompts Nicaraguan government to solicit help, and uss DENVER sent to Corinto and uss TULSA to Bluefields, both on 13 September. Their presence did not prevent a coup d'etat. UnsuccessfuJ. 19 12 October United Panama US Marines land in Panama p States at the request of the 164 Chronological Appendix 1925 Date Assailant Victim Incident Type President of Panama to restore order after rioting. Successful. 20 5 November United France Two US destroyers sent p States to Beirut for the reassurance of US nationals endangered by disturbances in the French mandated territory of Syria and the Lebanon. They stayed one month. Successful.21 1926 6May United Nicaragua Cruiser USS CLEVELAND p States lands marines at Bluefields to protect US nationals and property from civil war. This was the first of many instances and the marines were not finally withdrawn until 1933. Although successful in its immediate objective, this intervention developed into military occupation of the entire country.22 4 September Britain China British gunboats break an D anti-British boycott at Canton and Swatow by clearing the harbour of the picket-boats maintained by the strike committee, and landing marines to clear pickets from British-owned wharves.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • ESPS Santa María Frigate EUNAVFOR Med GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
    NAVAL ASSET ESPS Santa María Frigate EUNAVFOR Med GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS Frigate: Santa Maria class Lenght: 137,7 m Beam: 14,3 m Draft: 7,8 m Displacement : 4,100 t Speed : 29 kts OVERWIEW Spanish Frigate SANTA MARÍA (F-81) is the first of the Spanish Fleet’s 41st Escorts Squadron, and she takes her name after the Flag Ship of Cristobal Colón expedition, who discovered America the 12th of October of 1492. SANTA MARÍA home port is Rota Naval Base in the southwest of Spain. She is fitted with an AB-212 helicopter that completes her crew capabilities and ensures she conducts missions and tasks assigned by EUNAVFOR MED Force Commander. “Santa María” class frigates are escorts with the main task of protecting other units and maintaining sea lines of communications. However, their versatility allows the F-80 frigates to carry out a wide range of missions, which can be grouped into two broad categories: • Maritime Interdiction Operations: known as “MIO”, these consist of shipping control in a given area to ensure the maintenance of safe passage within any given restrictions or regulations as ruled by International Organisations. This is achieved by identifying, inter- cepting, boarding, searching, and if necessary, the detention of suspect vessels; • Protection of High Value units: the intended task for the “Santa Maria” class was to act as the ocean escort for battle groups or merchant ships. Contact details European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation Sophia Media and Public information office Tel: +39 06 4691 9442 ; +39 06 46919451 (IT Office hours) Mobile: +39 334 6891930 (Silent hours and weekend) Email: [email protected] ; [email protected] WEBSITE: www.eeas.europa.eu/eunavfor-med.
    [Show full text]
  • USS CONSTELLATION Page 4 United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service National Register of Historic Places Registration Form
    NPS Form 10-900 USDI/NPS NRHP Registration Form (Rev. 8-86) OMB No. 1024-0018 USS CONSTELLATION Page 4 United States Department of the Interior, National Park Service National Register of Historic Places Registration Form Summary The USS Constellation’s career in naval service spanned one hundred years: from commissioning on July 28, 1855 at Norfolk Navy Yard, Virginia to final decommissioning on February 4, 1955 at Boston, Massachusetts. (She was moved to Baltimore, Maryland in the summer of 1955.) During that century this sailing sloop-of-war, sometimes termed a “corvette,” was nationally significant for its ante-bellum service, particularly for its role in the effort to end the foreign slave trade. It is also nationally significant as a major resource in the mid-19th century United States Navy representing a technological turning point in the history of U.S. naval architecture. In addition, the USS Constellation is significant for its Civil War activities, its late 19th century missions, and for its unique contribution to international relations both at the close of the 19th century and during World War II. At one time it was believed that Constellation was a 1797 ship contemporary to the frigate Constitution moored in Boston. This led to a long-standing controversy over the actual identity of the Constellation. Maritime scholars long ago reached consensus that the vessel currently moored in Baltimore is the 1850s U.S. navy sloop-of-war, not the earlier 1797 frigate. Describe Present and Historic Physical Appearance. The USS Constellation, now preserved at Baltimore, Maryland, was built at the navy yard at Norfolk, Virginia.
    [Show full text]
  • The British Commonwealth and Allied Naval Forces' Operation with the Anti
    THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND ALLIED NAVAL FORCES’ OPERATION WITH THE ANTI-COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS IN THE KOREAN WAR: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OPERATION ON THE WEST COAST By INSEUNG KIM A dissertation submitted to The University of Birmingham For the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of History and Cultures College of Arts and Law The University of Birmingham May 2018 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. ABSTRACT This thesis examines the British Commonwealth and Allied Naval forces operation on the west coast during the final two and a half years of the Korean War, particularly focused on their co- operation with the anti-Communist guerrillas. The purpose of this study is to present a more realistic picture of the United Nations (UN) naval forces operation in the west, which has been largely neglected, by analysing their activities in relation to the large number of irregular forces. This thesis shows that, even though it was often difficult and frustrating, working with the irregular groups was both strategically and operationally essential to the conduct of the war, and this naval-guerrilla relationship was of major importance during the latter part of the naval campaign.
    [Show full text]
  • Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Bias, Trade Policy, And
    Gunboat Diplomacy Political Bias, Trade Policy, and War∗ Brendan Cooley† 13 November 2019 Abstract Countries with deep trading relationships rarely ght wars with one another. Here, I develop a theory of trade, war, and political bias, in which both trade and war are endogenous objects. Governments can rectify poor market access conditions abroad through war and subsequent regime change, in which the victorious country installs a liberal “puppet” government abroad. Trade policy bargaining is therefore conducted “in the shadow of power,” with counterfactual wars shaping the policy choices that prevail in times of peace. When peace prevails, militarily weak countries are more open to trade than powerful ones, all else equal. Equilibrium trade policies balance domestic interests against military threats from abroad. War is less likely between liberal governments because they prefer less protectionist trade policies. As a result, trade ows and the probability of peace are positively correlated in equilibrium, even though trade does not cause peace. JEL Classication Codes: D72, D74, F13, F51, F52, F54 ∗Ph.D. candidate, Department of Politics, Princeton University. Previous versions of this paper were circulated under the titles “Trade Wars, Hot Wars, and the Commercial Peace” and “Trade Policy in the Shadow of Power.” For helpful comments and discussions on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Timm Betz, Adrien Bilal, Tyson Chatagnier, Rob Carroll, Andrew Coe, Noel Foster, Erik Gartzke, Kishore Gawande, Dan Gibbs, Joanne Gowa, Gene Grossman,
    [Show full text]
  • Gunboat Diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire
    Journal of International Eastern European Studies/Uluslararası Doğu Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Vol./Yıl. 2, No/Sayı. 2, Winter/Kış 2020) ISSN: 2687-3346 Araştırma Makalesi Gunboat Diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire: With Particular Reference to the Salonika Incident (1876) and Armenian Reform Demands (1879-80) Fikrettin Yavuz* (ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3161-457X) Makale Gönderim Tarihi Makale Kabul Tarihi 01.12.2020 08.12.2020 Abstract Throughout history, gunboat, a small vessel of a naval force, has been turned into a term of coercive diplomacy. Gunboat diplomacy, associated with chiefly the activities of the Great Powers, means the use of naval power directly or indirectly as an aggressive diplomatic instrument. It seems highly probable to see many examples of this coercive diplomacy in the world history, particularly after the French Revolution. Naturally, the Ottoman Empire, always attracted attention of the Great Powers, was exposed to this policy of the Powers. During the nineteen century, the rivalry among the European Powers on the Ottoman territorial integrity became a common characteristic that led them to implement gunboat diplomacy on all occasions. In this context, this article firstly offers a critical analysis of gunboat diplomacy of the Great Powers on the Ottoman Empire within the dimension of two specific examples: The Salonika Incident and Armenian reform demands. In addition, it aims to contribute to the understanding of gunboat diplomacy of the Great Powers and Ottoman response by evaluating it from native and foreign literatures. Keywords: European Powers, Ottomans, Gunboat Diplomacy, Salonika, Armenian, Reform * Assoc. Prof. Dr., Sakarya University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of History, Turkey, [email protected].
    [Show full text]
  • Fig. 1. Frigate Believed to Be Pallas. Painted by Charles Brooking, 1759
    149 APPENDIX A FIGURES Fig. 1. Frigate believed to be Pallas. Painted by Charles Brooking, 1759. From Brooking, 8 Fig. 2. Frigate entering Portsmouth. Painted by Thomas Mitchell, 1780. From Brooking, 100 150 Fig. 3. Ship’s lines for frigate HMS Pallas. Based on NMM: ADM 2042 - Admiralty drawings for Pallas’ sister ship HMS Brilliant Fig. 4. Keel and keelson assembly detail. From White, 31 151 152 Fig. 5. Interior profile plan for frigate HMS Pallas. Based on NMM: ADM 2196 Admiralty drawings HMS Pallas 153 Fig. 6. Various types of scarfs used in construction of Pallas. 154 Fig. 7. Stem assembly detail. After Goodwin, 37 Fig. 8. Bow construction detail of frigate Pandora. From McKay and Coleman, 30 155 Fig. 9. Stern construction detail of frigate Pandora. From McKay and Coleman, 31 Fig.10. Stem boxing detail. From White, 31 156 Fig. 11. Interior construction detail for frigate HMS Pallas. © 2005 by P. Erik Flynn. All Rights Reserved 157 Fig. 12. Frame assembly detail. From White, 39 Fig. 13. Hawse pieces detail. From Ollivier, 57 Fig. 14. Midship section detail frigate HMS Pallas. © 2005 by P. Erik Flynn. All Rights Reserved 158 Fig. 15. Spirketting and quickwork detail. From Ollivier, 57 159 160 Fig. 16. Gun deck construction detail for frigate HMS Pallas. © 2005 by P. Erik Flynn. All Rights Reserved 161 Fig. 17. Lower deck construction detail for frigate HMS Pallas. © 2005 by P. Erik Flynn. All Rights Reserved 162 Fig. 18. Fore and aft orlop construction detail for frigate HMS Pallas. © 2005 by P. Erik Flynn. All Rights Reserved 163 Fig.
    [Show full text]
  • The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles
    The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles The Chinese Navy Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Saunders, EDITED BY Yung, Swaine, PhILLIP C. SAUNderS, ChrISToPher YUNG, and Yang MIChAeL Swaine, ANd ANdreW NIeN-dzU YANG CeNTer For The STUdY oF ChINeSe MilitarY AffairS INSTITUTe For NATIoNAL STrATeGIC STUdIeS NatioNAL deFeNSe UNIverSITY COVER 4 SPINE 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY COVER.indd 3 COVER 1 11/29/11 12:35 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 1 11/29/11 12:37 PM 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 2 11/29/11 12:37 PM The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Christopher D. Yung, Michael Swaine, and Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Washington, D.C. 2011 990-219 NDU CHINESE NAVY.indb 3 11/29/11 12:37 PM Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited. Chapter 5 was originally published as an article of the same title in Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009), 144–169. Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. Used by permission. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The Chinese Navy : expanding capabilities, evolving roles / edited by Phillip C. Saunders ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index.
    [Show full text]
  • China's Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations
    China’s Logistics Capabilities for Expeditionary Operations The modular transfer system between a Type 054A frigate and a COSCO container ship during China’s first military-civil UNREP. Source: “重大突破！民船为海军水面舰艇实施干货补给 [Breakthrough! Civil Ships Implement Dry Cargo Supply for Naval Surface Ships],” Guancha, November 15, 2019 Primary author: Chad Peltier Supporting analysts: Tate Nurkin and Sean O’Connor Disclaimer: This research report was prepared at the request of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission to support its deliberations. Posting of the report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this commissioned research report. 1 Contents Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 4 Methodology, Scope, and Study Limitations ........................................................................................................ 6 1. China’s Expeditionary Operations
    [Show full text]
  • Andrew Hull Foote, Gunboat Commodore
    w..:l ~ w 0 r:c Qo (:.L..Q r:c 0 (Y) ~OlSSIJr;v, w -- t----:1 ~~ <.D ~ r '"' 0" t----:1 ~~ co ~ll(r~'Sa ~ r--1 w :::JO ...~ I ' -I~~ ~ ~0 <.D ~~if z E--t 0 y ~& ~ co oQ" t----:1 ~~ r--1 :t.z-~3NNO'l ............. t----:1 w..:l~ ~ o::z z0Q~ ~ CONNECTICUT CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL COMMISSION • ALBERT D. PUTNAM, Chairman WILLIAM J. FINAN, Vice Chairman WILLIAM J. LoWRY, Secretary ALBERT D. PUTNAM (CHAJRMAN) .. ......................... Hartf01'd HAMILTON BAsso .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...... .. Westport PRoF. HAROLD J. BINGHAM ................................... New Britain lHOMAs J. CALDWELL ............................................ Rocky Hill J. DoYLE DEWITT ............................................ West Hartford RoBERT EISENBERG .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Stratford WILLIAM J. FINAN ..................................................... W oodmont DANIEL I. FLETCHER . ........ ... ..... .. ... .... ....... .. ... Hartf01'd BENEDICT M. HoLDEN, JR. ................................ W est Hartford ALLAN KELLER . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Darien MRs. EsTHER B. LINDQUIST .................................. ......... Gltilford WILLIAM J. LoWRY .. .......................................... Wethersfield DR. WM. J. MAsSIE ............................................. New Haven WILLIAM E. MILLs, JR. ........................ ,....... ......... ........ Stamford EDwARD OLSEN .............................. .............. .. ..... Westbrook.
    [Show full text]
  • The Royal Institution of Naval Architects and Lloyd's Register
    The Royal Institution of Naval Architects and Lloyd’s Register Given their common roots in the UK maritime industry, it is not surprising that throughout the 150 years in which the histories of both organisations have overlapped, many members of the Institution have held important positions within Lloyd’s Register. Such connections can be traced back to 1860, when the joint Chief Surveyors, Joseph Horatio Ritchie and James Martin were two of the 18 founding members of the Institution. The Lloyd’s Register Historian, Barbara Jones, has identified others who either worked for Lloyd’s Register in some capacity, or who sat on its Committees, and had a direct connection with the Institution of Naval Architects, later to become the Royal Institution of Naval Architects. Introduction would ensure the government could bring in regulations based on sound principles based upon Martell’s The Royal Institution of Naval Architects was founded calculations and tables. in 1860 as the Institution of Naval Architects. John Scott Russell, Dr Woolley, E J Reed and Nathaniel Thomas Chapman Barnaby met at Scott Russell’s house in Sydenham for the purpose of establishing the Institution. The Known as ‘The Father of Lloyd's Register’, it is Institution was given permission to use “Royal” in 1960 impossible to over-estimate the value of Thomas on the achievement of their centenary. There have been Chapman’s services to Lloyd's Register during his forty- very close links between LR and INA/RINA from the six years as Chairman. He was a highly respected and very beginning. The joint Chief Surveyors in 1860, successful merchant, shipowner and underwriter.
    [Show full text]
  • Philip Wilcocks CB DSC DL ‒ Onboarding Officers Super
    Philip Wilcocks CB DSC DL – OnBoarding Officers Super NED Joining the Royal Navy in 1971, Philip Wilcocks graduated from the University of Wales in 1976 and assumed his first command of the minesweeper HMS STUBBINGTON in 1978. Qualifying as a Principal Warfare Officer in 1981, he served in the frigate HMS AMBUSCADE as Operations Officer, which included the Falklands conflict in 1982. Following his promotion to Commander, he assumed command of the destroyer HMS GLOUCESTER in 1990. The ‘Fighting G’ fought in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm when his ship destroyed 7 enemy warships and a Silkworm missile targeted against the battleship USS MISSOURI. He was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for gallantry and sustained leadership under fire. In 1998, he assumed command of HMS LIVERPOOL as Captain 3rd Destroyer Squadron. While Director of Naval Operations, in 2000 he was the Crisis Director for UK Operations in support of the UN in Sierra Leone. In 2001, he formed and then commanded the Royal Navy’s largest training organisation the Maritime Warfare School responsible for a budget of £120M and a capital build programme of £30M. On promotion to Rear Admiral in 2004, he became Deputy Commander of Joint Operations at the UK’s Permanent Joint HQ; as well as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was the Crisis Director for the UK response to the 2005 Tsunami disaster. In this appointment he had oversight of an annual budget of £540M and a £1.5Bn PFI contract. Following a short tour as Flag Officer Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland and Flag Officer Reserves, he became Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Fleet assuming responsibility for generating current and future UK maritime capabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Dyndal, Gjert Lage (2009) Land Based Air Power Or Aircraft Carriers? the British Debate About Maritime Air Power in the 1960S
    Dyndal, Gjert Lage (2009) Land based air power or aircraft carriers? The British debate about maritime air power in the 1960s. PhD thesis. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/1058/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Land Based Air Power or Aircraft Carriers? The British debate about Maritime Air Power in the 1960s Gjert Lage Dyndal Doctor of Philosophy dissertation 2009 University of Glasgow Department for History Supervisors: Professor Evan Mawdsley and Dr. Simon Ball 2 Abstract Numerous studies, books, and articles have been written on Britains retreat from its former empire in the 1960s. Journalists wrote about it at the time, many people who were involved wrote about it in the immediate years that followed, and historians have tried to put it all together. The issues of foreign policy at the strategic level and the military operations that took place in this period have been especially well covered. However, the question of military strategic alternatives in this important era of British foreign policy has been less studied.
    [Show full text]