CONCLUSIONS

So far I have developed a parallel discussion of the contexts in which deployed his initiatives. The approach I have used to deal with Sulla’s attitude to the local elites, his contribution to the development of Roman administration, and his development of several ideological motifs, is mainly contrastive. During the late Republic, Italy and the Greek East were in several respects completely different worlds, and it was important to do justice to their differences. It is undeniable, however, that at the beginning of the first century BC there was increasing interdependence within the empire. This was especially the case with Italy, the centre of the empire, and with the Greek East, its richest part. Cicero raised this problem most forcefully in a memorable passage of the de imperio Cn. Pompei which I have already referred to in the introduction (7.19): if taxes are not regularly levied in Asia Minor, the financial stability of Italy is to collapse in a short time. The years preceding the Mithridatic War showed this economic relationship most impressively, and Cicero made the case for ’s extraordinary command in 66BC precisely by claiming that could not afford such a crisis to occur again. In concluding my discussion, I will set out to stress the relations between the initiatives that Sulla took in the East and those that he took in the West. There are two possible approaches to this problem. The first is the biographical one, which I have intentionally avoided in this study, even if some narrative sections have inevitably been included at various stages. The strongest factor that links the impact of Sulla on the Greek East to the impact he had in Italy is of course the relation between the Mithridatic War and the Civil War. Had he not been com- pelled to head back to Italy to face the final fight for supremacy, Sulla may well have chosen to defeat Mithridates completely, and possibly conquer his kingdom. Instead, he offered him a peace deal that left the geo-political situation in Asia Minor as it was before the war. Moreover, when he was back in Italy, Sulla certainly took advantage of the experi- ence he had gained in the East, especially in his relations with the local communities. 226 conclusions

There are, however, several substantial factors linking the destinies of these two areas of the Mediterranean world even more strongly than the chronological and biographical ones. It is on these aspects that I would like to focus here. The central element is the economic and financial relationship between Italy and Asia Minor, which became very close after the creation of the province of Asia. Its trajectory can shed light on many crucial developments that took place before and after Sulla. When the Attalid kingdom came under the control of Rome, the senatorial elite soon realised the importance of the event. Not only was it an advantageous source of revenue, but it represented a formidable chance for the Roman elite too. The nobility used it to finance its internal competition by ruthlessly exploiting the new province, while the members of the ordo equester who were involved in the revenue collection took advantage of their public contracts to increase their wealth and influence. As I have argued at the beginning of the first part, it was this very model of exploitation that alienated much of the support for Rome in the Greek East by the end of the second century BC, and ultimately determined the overwhelming support of the Asiatic cities to Mithridates. When he was sent to fight the King, Sulla had the crucial task to restore the revenue flow from the East to Italy, and he brilliantly achieved that. For this reason some attention has been devoted here to the reorganisation of the province of Asia, which implied a range of fiscal measures. The effects of this reorganisation, however, were not the solution to all problems. The increasing economic ties between Italy and the East started to create a new range of complications. The extension of Roman citizenship to the Italian allies, for instance, implied a different distribution of costs for the maintenance of the Roman army. As soon as the former socii, then citizens, were not expected to finance their contingents any more, the Roman army had to be paid for with new resources. This enhanced the need for further Roman expansion in Asia Minor. Moreover, piracy had not been defeated yet, and apparently the Roman elite did not intend to consider its relations with Mithridates as a settled issue. The Senate’s decision not to ratify the Dardanus agreement was a clear hint that more Eastern campaigns were not being ruled out already in the late 80s. It was in fact with Pompey’s victory in the Third Mithridatic War and the creation of the province of Pontus- that this phase of the Roman expansion in Asia Minor was accomplished. The role of Sulla in this process of increasing integration