Piracy: Lessons from the Past

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2016 Piracy: Lessons From the Past

Trimboli, Michael

Trimboli, M. (2016). Piracy: Lessons From the Past (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27362 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/3185 master thesis

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Piracy: Lessons From the Past

Michael Lee Trimboli

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

GRADUATE PROGRAM IN GREEK AND ROMAN STUDIES

CALGARY, ALBERTA

AUGUST, 2016

Piracy has remained quintessentially the same from its inception to the present day. As piracy has reached all time heights in the past decade since the defeat of the Barbary pirates, there has been much research done in the area of piracy and finding solutions to this age old problem. Modern schools of pirate studies have all but ignored ancient history as a source in this search for a solution. This work outlines the characteristics of piracy in the ancient world, the laws developed in reaction to this menace, and the successful tactics and strategies employed by ancient civilizations in combating this terror which hails from time immemorial. These characteristics, laws, and methods will then be compared to modern piracy, showing the similarities between them and the possibilities for solutions to be incorporated in our present day.

Key words: Ancient Piracy, Modern Piracy, Law, History, Rome, Greece.

ii Acknowledgements

I would first like to show appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. John Vanderspoel. The door to Dr. Vanderspoel’s office was always open to me and his guidance and advice helped me to both focus my thesis and keep on track. Dr. Vanderspoel has been sensitive to the needs of my family and helped guide me on the best path to compete my degree while being able to be with my wife and son. Likewise, there are many at the University of Calgary who have helped me and have made my graduate experience both pleasant and rewarding. Along with their efforts, I would like to thank the administrative staff who have been an invaluable part of my experience here in the Department of Greek and Roman Studies. I would also like to thank the members of my defense committee, Dr. Gavin Cameron, Dr. Lindsay Driediger-Murphy, and Mr. James

Hume, for taking the time to read my thesis and help me reach a new academic level. Their suggestions and comments have been instrumental in expanding my understanding of the realities of implementing solutions for piracy on an international level.

I offer my appreciation to the Government of Alberta, their grant and scholarship support has allowed me to complete a degree for Master of Arts while raising my family. I also offer my gratitude to the University of Calgary for scholarship support and the opportunity to gain experience in teaching at the academic level.

Finally, I express my profound gratitude to my family, in particular my wife, Grace, and my son, Alexander, for their constant and continued encouragement throughout my years of study and through the research and writing of this thesis. I could not have accomplished this without their support. Thank you.

iii Dedication

I dedicate this to my loving wife and son;

sine vobis nihil sum.

Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iii Dedication ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v List of Abbreviations ...... vi

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER ONE: SOURCES AND APPROACHES ...... 6

CHAPTER TWO: THE NATURE OF PIRACY ...... 17

CHAPTER THREE: PIRACY – FROM HOMER TO ALEXANDER ...... 36

CHAPTER FOUR: HELLENISTIC PIRACY ...... 58

CHAPTER FIVE: POMPEY AND THE PIRATES ...... 78

CHAPTER SIX: LESSONS FOR TODAY ...... 94

CONCLUSION ...... 105

APPENDIX ...... 108

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 112

v List of Abbreviations

CAH Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd edn. (1961– ; 1st edn. 1923–39)

FGrHist Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, F. Jacoby, (1923– )

IG Inscriptiones Graecae (1873– )

MRR The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, T. R. S. Broughton, (1951–2); Suppl. (1986: supersedes Suppl. 1960)

SEG Supplementum epigraphicum Graecum (1923– )

SIG Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, 3rd edn., W. Dittenberger (1915–24)

Introduction

Polyphemus, cyclops and son of the Greek god Poseidon, caught Odysseus on the island of the Cyclops (Sicily) and asked him this question:

ὦ ξεῖνοι, τίνες ἐστέ; πόθεν πλεῖθ᾽ ὑγρὰ κέλευθα; ἦ τι κατὰ πρῆξιν ἦ μαψιδίως ἀλάλησθε, οἷά τε ληιστῆρες, ὑπεὶρ ἅλα, τοί τ᾽ ἀλόωνται ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι κακὸν ἀλλοδαποῖσι φέροντες;1

O strangers, who are you? Whence do you sail the waterways? Are you either on business, or thoughtlessly roaming, such as pirates, over the sea, who roam risking their lives and bringing evil to other lands?

In one of the oldest Greek texts we find the pervasiveness of piracy in society. It is clear that even before the time this text was written, commonly agreed to be sometime during the 8th century BCE,2 that piracy was commonplace. According to Diodorus Siculus, a Greek historian from the first century BCE, when writing about the first peoples to settle the island of Sicily:

οἱ δ᾽ οὖν Σικανοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν κωμηδὸν ᾤκουν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχυρωτάτων λόφων τὰς πόλεις κατασκευάζοντες διὰ τοὺς λῃστάς.3

The Sicani, then, in times past inhabited villages, building their settlements upon the strongest hilltops on account of the pirates.

All writings from antiquity are filled with mention of pirates and piracy. These works give us insight into the affect of piracy on ancient society and the methods and laws employed in antiquated times to deal with this menace. Today, we share a very similar threat. Of all the

1 Homer, Odyssey, 1. 9. 252-255. 2 Although the works attributed to Homer, namely the Iliad and the Odyssey, are believed to have been composed in the 8th century BCE, modern scholars have used information in the Odyssey to determine the date that these events took place. According to this research, which has been cross examined with the archeological evidence from the site of the city of Troy, the fall of Troy took place in 1188 BCE. For further details, see Constantino Baikouzis and Marcelo O. Magnasco, “Is an Eclipse Described in the Odyssey?” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 105, no. 26 (June, 2008), 8823. And St. P. Papamarinopoulos, et al. “A New Astronomical Dating of Odysseus’ Return to Ithica.” Mediterranean Archaeology & Archaeometry, vol. 12, no. 1 (2012), 117-128. 3 Diodorus, The Library of History, 5. 6. 1

studies occupied with solving modern piracy few have taken the time to seek answers from the classical Greeks and Romans, thinking that ancient piracy is too different and too far removed to be of adequate benefit.

In reality, piracy has evolved very little and remains similar in many ways. I contest that the study of ancient piracy can be beneficial to the understanding and combating of piracy today.

This work will analyze in greater depth the nature of piracy in the ancient world, how the fear of piracy effected the creation of laws to deal with its growing affects, giving examples of both successful and unsuccessful cases of anti-piracy campaigns, and how these historical successes can be applied to modern deliberations in the creation of programs and laws to deal with recent piracy. The outline of this thesis will be as follows.

In the first chapter, I begin by defining piracy and the importance of the definition in the context of both ancient and modern piracy, arguing that the most significant aspect of piracy is not included in modern definistions of piracy. Next, I explain the purpose of the chosen parameters of the work and the reasons for the limitations in both time and place. I continue by giving an overview of ancient approaches to piracy, highlighting some of the most influential views which have been put forward on this topic. I argue that the focus of most scholarship has been to determine the origin of piracy, focusing on social and economic causes, which has given little attention to the laws and methods employed in order to combat piracy. In this there is a clear lack of scholarship in applying the laws and methods of combating piracy in antiquity to modern counter-piracy programs. I then outline the scholarship on modern piracy and its approaches to solving present-day challenges. I will show that modern scholarship has also overlooked the events of antiquity as a plausible solution to modern anti-piracy programs.

In the second chapter, I begin examining the nature of ancient piracy by explaining the etymology of the word in both Greek and Latin. This shows through written literature how the

Classical and Hellenistic societies viewed piracy and how it evolved as time went on. Next I outline the sources of pirate crews by showing how pirates typically begin their careers. I will argue that piracy thrives during periods of warfare where there is economic and political instability, as well as opportunity. This will lead into a discussion of the general locations in which piracy was common, focusing on the geography and accessibility of the areas as a factor in the rise and success of piracy. Subsequently, I will outline the ships most commonly used by pirates and the methods employed in their application to achieve successful pirate raids. While showing how these methods were at times used in war, I will argue that piracy differed from the mainstream methods of naval warfare in both the Classical and Hellenistic periods, making the important distinction between piracy and warfare. I will conclude the chapter by addressing the economic ramifications of piracy as it pertains to the sustainability of both the economy and piracy itself.

In the third chapter, I address piracy in the pre-hellenistic era and outline the methods used to combat piracy. I will argue that, due to the weakness of political structure during the period, piracy was able to run relatively unchecked. The lack of powerful states required rudimentary methods of protection against piracy. I will then show how the rise of the polis led to a growing separation of piracy from warfare in a political and legal atmosphere, although not in practice. I argue that the rise of the polis made more productive methods of combating piracy possible, such as patrols and campaigns, but also permitted the growth of piracy due to the competition of states and the employement of state funded piracy, ultimately leading to a more developed and widerspread piracy than in previous ages.

In the fourth chapter, I deal with Hellenistic reactions to piracy and the methods employed by Rome and her allies to deal with the high seas menace. I will argue that the growing power of states made it possible to not only perform defensive measures against pirates but also offensive ones in the shape of pirate campaigns. A push for this was the political image that the greatest nations policed the seas in order make trade safe and the area stable. This is best seen in the War between Philip and Athens and in the pirate campaigns of Rome.

In the fifth chapter, I focus on the anti-piracy campaign of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus.

His campaign is a prime example of all the elements of this work, from fear and insecurity to laws and methods of dealing with pirates. I will begin by outlining the state of the Roman

Republic in the decade before Pompey’s appointment and show the public support for the campaign. I will then give a statistical analysis of Pompey’s resources and planning for the campaign. This will lead into a chronological account of the methods employed and conclude with Pompey’s ultimate plan in solving Mediterranean piracy. Throughout this analysis I will indicate that the single most significant factor to Pompey’s success was in the combined land and sea operations of the campaign, an aspect often overlooked by modern scholars, especially when it comes to solutions for modern piracy.

In the sixth chapter, I discuss the similarities between ancient and modern piracy, reviewing the information discussed in chapter two on the nature of piracy and comparing it to modern studies. I will argue that piracy has changed in only a few technological and legal ways and remains quintessentially the same. I will then proceed to incorporate the successful laws and methods employed by ancient maritime societies, as discussed in chapters three through five, into a modern context and show how they have been employed in today’s fight against piracy and what laws and methods may yet be employed to help combat the modern piracy crisis,

noting the advantages and difficulties of such an endeavour. I will argue that the most significant aspect of fighting piracy is in a coordinated attack against pirates at both sea and land and show how the minor implementation of this method has yielded results today.

The conclusion will begin by showing the progression of anti-pirate methods, how they fit into a larger picture, the significance they play today, and the importance of referring back to classical material as a tool for dealing with modern piracy. I end this work by calling for further scholarship in this field and its connection to modern circumstances and for a broader range of scholarship to work with Classical Studies and History in exploring possible solutions for modern issues across many different fields.

Chapter One: Sources and Approaches

I define piracy as the practice of armed robbery which utilizes ships.4 It is important to define piracy in this way for a number of reasons, especially in ancient context. First, the Latin and Greek word for piracy, in earlier texts, is often synonymous with bandit. In fact, ancient sources sometimes employed the word bandit in conjunction with the word sea to clarify that the subject in question was actually piracy. Second, the fact there is no mention of the sea is also essential to this definition. Although this makes the definition broader, it is important to realize that piracy often occurs on land by means of ships, not just as an act of one ship against another ship on the open seas. It is this very nature which makes piracy all the more dangerous. While banditry takes place exclusively on land, piracy is more versatile and far reaching, being able to attack both land and sea, making piracy harder to anticipate and defend against. It is also significant in that ships require harbours or anchorages to refit, resupply, and sell plundered goods. They require special materials to maintain them and crews to operate them, making piracy a more expensive but more coordinated and effective method of armed robbery. Third, this definition separates piracy from banditry, allowing piracy to be discussed in isolation from the other, narrowing the scope of this work to a more practical subject that has implications in both the ancient and modern world.

4 Defining piracy is a difficult task, one which even modern scholars and states have problems with. The most influential definition by previous scholars for this work is from Barclay, Law and Usage of War: “An act of violence done upon the ocean or unappropriated lands or within a territory of a state through descent from the sea by a body of men acting independently of any political organized society.” This definition, unlike many others, recognizes the flexible nature of piracy of attacking both land and sea. The shortcoming of Barclay’s definition lays in the grouping of piracy as independent of a political organized society. This, especially in the ancient world, is not accurate, as many nations promoted piracy, even outfitting pirate groups to aid in creating instability. This is also known as state sponsored piracy. Although some have argued that this is privateering, as will be discussed later in this work, this is not true in either the ancient or modern world and has only been the case during Europe’s colonialism. 6

Within this broad subject area, I have chosen to concentrate on particular themes and explore them through detailed analysis of specific periods. As I could not possibly hope to cover all aspects of piracy over all periods from the Bronze Age to the Modern with equal satisfaction, the process of selection has been guided, in part, by the demands of time and space. This selection process has also been aided by the work of previous scholars who have concentrated their studies on particular periods and/or societies.5 This work, therefore, will focus on the

Greeks during the Classical and Hellenistic Periods and the Romans during the Republic, with reference to pre-Classical and Roman Imperial periods. Both cultures possessed large empires and held great influence over portions, or even all, of the Mediterranean during these time periods, and as such, are ideal examples to analyze.6 The extended period of influence which these two cultures held allows for a more detailed analysis of how these two peoples dealt with piracy over time and space. Lastly, as stated above, there are many similarities between the pirates of western antiquity and those of the modern era which also makes the Greeks and

Romans a good case study for this work.7

Piracy, as much as it is in the present day, was pandemic in the ancient world. As such, piracy has affected ancient society in a major way and can be found in almost every type of source for the ancient world: archaeology, historical record, epigraphy, economic records, laws, personal correspondence, legal proceedings, epic literature, even poetry and plays. As such, this thesis will pull from a variety of sources; however, the majority of sources will be drawn from

5 The Hellenistic Period has preserved the most abundant literary sources of all the periods which will be covered, and, therefore, will receive the most attention. 6 This is especially true in the case of the Romans at the end of the Republic and most of their Imperial period. 7 This study will focus on the Greeks and Romans but has many applications throughout the world in both time and place. There will always be differences between events across the world, and this includes piracy, but this type of phenomenon is similar enough in a majority of instances that it can be of benefit to the study of piracy in its entirety. 7

the historical and legal accounts. The reason for this choice follows the purpose of the work, to outline the laws and methods employed in fighting piracy in the ancient world, determining why some were successful and why others were not, and applying these methods to the modern crisis.

Sources from other types of records will be in support to these as far as they give a better understanding to why these laws were created and their methods employed.

Since the vast bulk of the evidence comes from the Classical period and after, I have concentrated my research here and made only brief references to the Bronze Age and Archaic periods. The truly historical sources only begin to appear after the development of history as a form of literature, in the fifth century BCE. As a result, although previous scholars have devoted a great deal of effort to the period before 500 BCE, I have been very brief in my treatment of it.

Considerations of length have also played a part here.

The bulk of our historical records on piracy come from Polybius, Thucydides, Livy and

Appian. Both Polybius and Thucydides are our best sources for classical and early Hellenistic periods, especially from the Greek point of view – Thucydides because he wrote during that time, and Polybius because his account is more detailed and generally considered more trustworthy than authors such as Appian. Livy and Appian give us a better look at the later

Hellenistic and Roman Imperial Periods. Authors, including Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo,

Herodotus, and others will be referenced, but their focus is less on history and more on other supplementary subjects.8

8 Plutarch’s lives are biographies that focus more on the sensational than on history. Strabo wrote primarily on geography and ethnography, as did Herodotus. This gives us glimpses at more popular views of piracy as well as unique perspectives and uncommon accounts not found in the primary histories. 8

Cicero is one of our primary sources for legal proceedings in the late Roman Republic, as a large portion of his work has survived, at least in comparison to other contemporary authors.

Although his writings cover only a small period of what we are reviewing in this work, Cicero is an invaluable source for much of the legal proceedings of one of the most turbulent periods of pirate activity in the ancient world. He is invariably connected to the Cilician pirate campaign of

67 BCE and began his career in major politics by prosecuting Verres in 70 BCE, whom he often referred to as a pirate. Cicero is also a primary source for personal communication, as over 900 letters survive from his correspondence.9

The earliest studies on piracy in antiquity were primarily a collection of references from inscriptions and literary sources. Arranged in chronological order, these early works constituted the groundwork from which future scholars could begin their research. These works, such as that of Sestier, 1880, and Kroll, 1921, forwarded the view that piracy was the product of uncivilized states, which was supressed by the rise of civilizing powers such as Athens, Rhodes, and Rome.

Scholars like Henry Ormerod, 1924, and Erich Ziebarth, 1929, built upon the foundations set by

Sestier and Kroll and were the first to study the subject of Ancient Piracy in greater depth. In his work, Piracy in the Ancient World, Ormerod expanded both the scope (extending from the

Bronze Age, where he looks for early manifestations of piracy, to late antiquity) and the source material (especially inscriptions) concerning ancient piracy. The general consensus by these authors at this phase of pirate studies was that geography and war, as opposed to uncivilized society, were the cause of piracy. They also viewed piracy as unchanging between the Bronze

9 While only 37 books of his letters survive today, 35 books, containing letters to Caesar, Pompey, Octavian and others, have been lost. Chisholm, Hugh, ed. "Cicero". Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press, 1911. 9

Age and Imperial Age of Rome. Ziebarth’s analysis of ancient piracy was in many ways simplistic, as he assumed that piracy was mainly conducted against seaborne trade. This limits the ability to fully study piracy, which had many connections to the coasts and land.10

The work of Ormerod and Kroll was fundamental in making available a wide ranging and historically detailed account of piracy for other scholars to draw upon. After their work, there has been no work published on such a broad scale. The next phase of scholarship narrows the scope of the subject and increases the detail of analysis of the sources. Such scholars include Benecke,

1934, who focuses on the Aitolians, and Rostovtzeff, 1957, with his two monumental works which narrow the field in which piracy is viewed.11 The next step in scholarship begins with

Jackson, who, in 1973, published “Privateers in the Ancient Greek World,” which considers the nature of piracy and its connection to contemporary warfare. During this phase, piracy is often assessed through social and economic perspectives. Brulé’s work, 1978, discusses the role of piracy in the slave trade and as a means for aristocracy to obtain external wealth. Gabbert, 1986, furthers this view by showing the connection between pirates and Hellenistic rulers, often seeing pirates as synonymous with mercenaries.12

The most recent scholarship in this field has been from Philip de Souza and H. Pohl, whose research has been focused on the political ties of piracy to Rome and the image of piracy in the classical world. In his work, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 1999, De Souza argues against many previous theories on ancient piracy by putting forth the idea of propaganda.

Although a compelling argument, this approach advances the theory that piracy was a minor

10 Philip De Souza, Piracy in the Ancient World: From Minos to Mohammed (PhD Dissertation, University College, 1992), 19-20. 11 Other scholars who follow this method of scholarship are Dell, 1967; Ducrey, 1968; Garlan, 1972; Gauthier, 1972; and Magie, 1950. 12 Philip De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 20-22. 10

concern in the classical world, using the image of piracy as a means of discrediting political rivals and creating excuses for conflict and conquest, especially by the Romans in the later

Hellenistic and Republic periods.13 Piracy was certainly used as a means of propaganda, but probably not to the extent which De Souza suggests. Pohl, 1993, likewise, views piracy from a political point of view, focusing on Rome’s involvement with piracy. Both scholars outline classical and Hellenistic methods of dealing with piracy, but again, focusing on politics and propaganda.

It is not surprising that these last scholars would have aspects of how entities from antiquity dealt with threats from piracy, as they write in a time where piracy begins to pose a problem in the modern world. Yet, none make a concerted effort to link classical piracy with that of the modern. It is this gap in the scholarship which I wish to address. The work that has come before is significant in its contribution, both in collecting into one place a majority of the sources dealing with piracy and in setting the groundwork for classical methods of dealing with this ancient menace. Building upon this work, I will focus upon these methods and connect them to the modern phenomenon.

According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), pirate attacks and hijackings have intensified in the past decade. In 2006, there were a total of 20 Somali pirate attacks, resulting in only 5 successful hijackings. In 2010, the total number of attacks by Somali pirates had increased to 828 of which 180 hijackings were successful,14 an over 4000 percent increase in just four

13 Other scholars who attach themselves to this view of politics and propaganda in classical piracy are A. Avidov, 1997 and D. Braund, 1993. 14 Hugh Williamson, “Protection of Canadian Ships Against Piracy,” Canadian Naval Review, vol. 9, no. 2 (2013), 17. These statistics apply only to confirmed piratical acts by Somali pirates. Piracy has taken place in many other parts of the world. These statistics are to express the point of the growing activities of pirates. More information 11

years.15 Due to these ever increasing threats from pirates, Piracy studies, as coined by Derek

Johnson and Erika Pladdet in 2003,16 has become a new and rapid growing field since the 1990s.

The speed at which this field of study has grown can be seen in a recent bibliography which counts over 200 articles and books published recently.17 In such a globalized world, Piracy

Studies have included many diverse disciplinary approaches. These disciplines can be categorized into about six main groups which follow a certain approach to their research.

Security and Strategic Studies, as can be expected, have approached the subject in terms of seeing piracy as a problem and threat to things such as economy, trade, environment, and free navigation at sea, all of which can be solved with strategic responses. This group also associates piracy with failed states and security challenges such as terrorism, which further increases the complexity of the subject.18 Legal scholars translate piracy into the sphere of international crime that requires legal and law enforcement apparatuses. They try to address the conceptual problems of prosecuting pirates or concurrence of laws.19 The majority of the laws pertaining to acts of piracy are from the pre 1990s, before piracy began to get out of control, displaying an obvious inadequacy of legal devices to deal with the problem. Technical disciplines, including economics and computer science, approach piracy as a management and technical dilemma. They work to make shipping more efficient by optimizing shipping routes, surveillance, transit corridors, self-

about other areas of the world and their piratical activities will be discussed later in this work. As such, it should not be assumed that Somali pirates are the only pirates in the world. 15 Although the success rate of pirate attacks has diminished, thanks to increased policing efforts, the number of attacks has increased substantially. 16 Derek Johnson and Erika Pladdet, “An overview of current concerns in piracy studies and new directions for research,” Paper presented at the People and the Sea II Conference, International Institute for Asian Studies, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1 August, 2003. 17 Christian Bueger, “Piracy Studies: Academic Responses to the Return of an Ancient Menace.” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 49, no. 3 (September, 2014), 406. This field of study is for modern piracy and should not be confused with the study of ancient piracy by scholars since the end of the 19th century. 18 Germond and Smith, 2009; Murphy, 2010; Vreÿ, 2009. 19 Azubuike, 2009; Guilfoyle, 2010; Menefee, 1990; Treves, 2009. 12

defence measures, and even insurance solutions.20 Sociologists and psychologists study the humanitarian effects, specifically focusing on assistance for victims of pirate attacks.21 Research from other disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology and criminology, has viewed piracy as a form of organized crime or social banditry, generally trying to determine the structure of piracy within both a global and local society.22 Still other fields have approached piracy as a question of trying to determine the underlying causes of piracy and how the root causes can be solved for a more permanent solution, seeing weak government, corruption, poverty, and unemployment, all of which lead to lawlessness, as sources of principal concern.23

These six categories show both the variety of the disciplines and the problems faced by the field of piracy studies. All these disciplines, however, work toward two main goals: better understanding of piracy and the development of responses to it. Of all the previously mentioned approaches to the study of piracy there are three main areas that have attracted the most attention and scholarship: origins of piracy, organizational structure and methods, and responses from official organizations; in other words, how did it start, how does it work, and how can it be fixed.

Researching the causes of piracy allows for important research in adequate responses to and prevention of piracy. This is furthered by research into its practices and organization, which allow responses to be customized to more regional and even local areas and determines the threat level that piracy in those regions and areas has escalated to. Research into institutional responses

20 Bendall, 2010; Bensassi and Martínez-Zarzaso, 2012; Jakob et al., 2011. 21 Kleinman, 2011; Leporatti, 2012, to name a couple. 22 Hansen, 2009; Klien, 2013; Vagg, 1995. 23 Coggins, 2010; Hastings, 2009; Samatar et al., 2010. These six approaches are described in greater detail by Bueger, “Piracy Studies,” 407-414. 13

make use of the first two areas of research and puts them into legal, political, and strategic circumstances that will fulfil their respective agendas. 24

In the modern deliberation preoccupied with solving the question of piracy, as is almost always the case in scholarship, there are two opposing views. These two views deal with the issue of ransom, there being a pro- and anti-ransom stance. The pro-ransom stance hopes to both mitigate hostility in the present and diminish hostility in the future. Pro-ransomists hope to accomplish this by encouraging the better treatment of hostages through willful payment of ransoms. The hope is that this will result in better treatment and safeguard of hostages by their captors and, therefore, less loss of life. The possible repercussions of this stance are an increase in both the number of ransoms and the amount demanded for ransoms.25 The anti-ransom position seeks for a more permanent solution by finding either a way to guard against piratical activity, lessening the effects of piracy to a more controllable level, or to eliminate piracy at its roots.26 The latter of these two solutions focuses on economic and legal applications that will, hopefully, have long lasting effects both locally and regionally. What has made answering this question more difficult, legally, is the question of whether piracy should be considered terrorism.27

24 Bueger, “Piracy Studies,” 408-409. 25 According to The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) report of 2011, entitled “Organized Maritime Piracy and Related Kidnapping for Ransom,” page 10, “Piracy has now become a financially lucrative criminal activity. In five years the average amount demanded for each captured vessel has increased from USD 150 000 (2005) to USD 5.2 million (2010). All indications suggest ransom payments will continue to rise.” 26 Eliminating piracy has generally been ruled out, opting instead for the more realistic goal of limiting piracy within a more acceptable parameter. This view can be seen in almost every report on piracy in the last three decades. 27 Alfred S. Bradford, Flying the Black Flag: A Brief History of Piracy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2007), xi. 14

The reason for this difficulty stems from the fact that terrorism is governed under different laws than piracy, which in turn would change how pirates would be dealt with.

Terrorism, as defined by the Oxford English dictionary, is:

The unofficial or unauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims; (originally) such practices used by a government or ruling group (freq. through paramilitary or informal armed groups) in order to maintain its control over a population; (now usually) such practices used by a clandestine or expatriate organization as a means of furthering its aims.

The definition of terrorism has changed throughout history. Rome did not even have a word for the modern equivalent of terrorism or terrorist. Defining terrorism is, in itself, difficult, as it changes from person to person, being based on one’s own perspective and experience. As some may call a group “terrorists,” others may call them freedom fighters. Piracy, however, is primarily driven by economic motivations. This does not mean that pirates do not employ terror as a means of accomplishing their goals, only that piracy is generally not run by terrorist organizations.28 This is a significant point to consider. The use of terror has existed for most, if not all, of human history. It has been used officially and unofficially, by nations, governments, religions, and other groups. If the use of terror is the only consideration for the classification of terrorist then most countries, if not all of them at one point or another, can be classified as terrorists. Modern views on terrorism and terrorists extends more to political or religious groups employing terror to accomplish their aims, tending toward unofficial employment of terror. Yet,

28 Although the majority of piracy is not run by terrorists, piracy is employed by terrorists to accomplish their goals, such as direct terrorism on the high seas or simply for funding. FATF has received reports of this which is discussed in further detail in their 2011 report, pages 9-10. The fact that terrorism is employing piracy makes the question of classifying piracy as terrorism more relevant. However, the bulk of piracy still remains outside the scope of terrorist groups. 15

state-sponsored terrorism has been a reality for decades.29 State-sponsored piracy was a commonality in antiquity, especially among the Hellenistic Kingdoms, a topic which will be covered in greater depth below. How much this state-sponsored piracy was used as a form of terrorism is debatable, but it lends itself to comparison with modern state-sponsored terrorism, and in turn, to terrorist-sponsored piracy.

One last approach to piracy, that of the historical, attempts to approach this problem in a slightly different manner but is no less important than other fields of study. In fact, as Christian

Bueger states, “History is crucial to piracy studies,” in that it is does three essential things: it raises awareness that piracy is not a new problem, connects the past with the present, and links piracy to broader intellectual domains by addressing how piracy shapes our understanding of global order, international law, trade, legitimate violence, non sovereign spaces, and more.30 This approach can be seen in the works of scholars such as Janice Thompson, 1994, and Heller-

Roazen, 2009.31 Bueger, although declaring that the historical approach is essential in raising awareness for pirate studies, states that “it is certainly not the strength of this pillar to propose or suggest coping mechanisms for contemporary piracy.”32 Though it is true that certain modern problems have no equivalent in historical context, this statement by Bueger underestimates the benefit of history beyond the three points he makes above. A common cliché is that those who do not remember the events of the past are doomed to repeat them. Although this is not always true, there is some wisdom in looking to the past for answers to the present.

29 The United States of America annually publishes a Report called “Country Reports on Terrorism,” which has a subsection detailing state sponsored terrorism. 30 Bueger, “Piracy Studies,” 412. 31 Janice Thompson, 1994, argues that piracy stands as both a legal and social challenge to state sovereignty’s monopoly over violence; Heller-Roazen, 2009, argues for an historical piratical paradigm where pirates are viewed as the universal foe throughout history. 32 Bueger, “Piracy Studies,” 414. 16

Chapter Two: The Nature of Piracy

Since there is little to no evidence of piracy through archaeological sources, literary evidence is our only source in antiquity for this phenomenon.33 Due to reliance on literary sources in this work, it is necessary to briefly explore the vocabulary for piracy in both Greek and Latin. Knowing the origin of the word pirate in Greek and Latin is essential to understanding how the Greeks and Romans viewed piracy. How these ancient cultures viewed piracy changed over time, resulting in a shift in terminology employed in surviving texts. This can be traced through time and is important to consider when understanding the nature of piracy in the ancient world.

The first terms employed in the Greek for pirate are far more ambiguous than might be expected. The first word used in Greek was λῃστής (leistes), derived from the word λῃíς (leis), meaning booty and/or plunder. This term was first used in the compositions attributed to Homer in the 8th or 9th century BCE, and from 500 BCE in its written form, and refers to one who plunders or commits armed robbery. Similar to Greek, the first word, and most commonly used, in Latin for pirate is praedo, derived from the word praeda, meaning booty or plunder.34 And just like in the Greek, praedo came to mean both bandits and pirates. The difficulty encountered with these terms are their broad meaning, as they are used for both pirate and bandit.35 Context, therefore, is required to determine which group is being implicated, although this is not always clear in the text. For instance, in the passage from the Odyssey, 1. 9. 252-255, quoted at the

33 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 2. 34 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 3, 12; Henry A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World: An Essay in Mediterranean History (Liverpool, Great Britain: The University Press of Liverpool Ltd., 1924), 59. 35 In English, bandit is used to describe those who commit armed robbery on land while pirate is used to describe those who commit armed robbery by means of ships. 17

beginning of this work, Homer uses the word ληιστῆρες to refer to those who roam the seas performing acts of piracy, as it is implied. We know from this context that pirates are being referred to because of the association with the sea. The primary difficulty with this term comes from similar use in warfare, where it was common and expected to take loot, or plunder, from your enemy, or even to attack anyone and take their possessions. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

The next term commonly used by the Greeks was the word πειρατής (peirates), derived from the Greek world πειρα (peira), meaning a trial or an attempt at something. This appears in literary sources from 330 BCE. The second most common word for pirate in Latin, most likely derived from the Greek peirates, is pirata and carries the same meaning.36 Peirates never replaced leistes but continued to be used in the literary sources side by side. The meaning of these two words evolved as time went on. The first mention of peirates is in an Attic inscription from Rhamnous, but the context, like many texts from antiquity, does not clearly identify if they are actually pirates or enemy forces performing a legitimate raid.37 This deficiency in clarity has been further analysed by scholars such as D.S. Potter, who argued that the earliest form of peirates, found in Diodorus, referred to legitimate naval mercenaries, and not pirates, in the employ of the Antigonid king.38 De Souza, in his work Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, refutes this claim by quoting an earlier text from Diodorus which clearly shows peirates as an unlawful group which the Rhodians made their fame fighting against.39

36 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 3, 13. 37 Two examples of this can be found in SEG 24, no. 154, lines 21-23; IG 12. 7. 386, lines 4-5, 15-17. 38 Diodorus, 20. 82. 4; D.S. Potter, “Athenian Involvement in the War of Agis III,” Annual of the British School at Athens, vol. 79 (1984): 229-235. 39 Diodorus, 20. 81. 3; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 6. 18

The problem in reading texts mentioning piracy in antiquity is best shown through a passage from Achilles Tatius:

Καὶ ὁ στρατηγὸς πείθεται καὶ ἵστησι τὴν ναῦν: καὶ δύο τῶν ναυτῶν ἀκοντίζουσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἔξω τῆς νεὼς καὶ ἁρπάσαντες τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρουσιν. Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ οἱ λῃσταὶ μᾶλλον ἐρρωμενέστερον ἤλαυνον: ὡς δὲ ἦμεν πάλιν πλησίον, ὁρῶσιν οἱ λῃσταὶ ναῦν ἑτέραν καὶ γνωρίσαντες ἐκάλουν πρὸς βοήθειαν: πορφυρεῖς δὲ ἦσαν πειρατικοί. Ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ στρατηγὸς δύο ναῦς ἤδη γενομένας ἐφοβήθη καὶ πρύμναν ἐκρούετο: καὶ γὰρ οἱ πειραταὶ τοῦ φυγεῖν ἀποτραπόμενοι προὐκαλοῦντο εἰς μάχην.40

The commander agreed, and stopped the ship; two of the sailors jumped overboard, got hold of the trunk and, brought it back to us. Meanwhile the pirates rowed with still greater vigour; we were again nearing them when they sighted another ship, and, on recognising it, called to it for help; its crew were purple- fishers, also pirates. When the commander saw that there were now two ships against him, he became disquieted and ordered the rowers to reverse; the pirates indeed had already desisted from their flight and were challenging us to give battle.41

It is clear from this passage that the terms leistes and peirates are used synonymously to mean pirate. We know for a certainty from the context that pirate is implied as the event took place on open water. One passage from Polybius is far more ambiguous:

συνδραμόντων δὲ πειρατῶν, καὶ παραγενομένων πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν Φιγάλειαν, οὐκ ἔχων τούτοις ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαίου συμπαρασκευάζειν ὠφελείας, διὰ τὸ μένειν ἔτι τότε τὴν κοινὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς Ἕλλησι τὴν ὑπ᾽ Ἀντιγόνου συντελεσθεῖσαν, τέλος ἀπορούμενος ἐπέτρεψε τοῖς πειραταῖς λῄζεσθαι τὰ τῶν Μεσσηνίων θρέμματα, φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον ἠδίκουν τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐσχατιὰς ποίμνια, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προβαινούσης τῆς ἀπονοίας, ἐνεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγρῶν οἰκίας ἐκκόπτειν, ἀνυπονοήτως τὰς νύκτας ἐπιφαινόμενοι.42

A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea; and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on the border

40 Achilles Tatius, 5. 7. 6-7. De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 6. Bolding added for emphasis. 41 Translation by S. Gaselee. For another example of peirates and leistes being used synonymously in Achilles Tatius see passage 2. 17. 3. 42 Polybius, 4. 3. 8-10. Bolding added for emphasis 19

lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious, they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at night.43

From this passage we gain very little sense of the idea of piracy, as all the acts of armed robbery takes place on land with no mention of ships being used in the act. Instead, this passage would seem to suggest bandits instead of pirates, yet the word peirates is used to describe the perpetrators.44 This does not mean that the culprits of these crimes were not in fact pirates, as they were known to attack inland and retreat to their ships and flee, a point which will be explained in greater depth below.

The Greeks did have a word which specifically meant pirate, καταποντιστής

(katapontistes), which is derived from the verb καταποντíζω (katapontizo), meaning to throw into the sea. Although it is useful to differentiate between bandit and pirate it was rarely used.45

According to De Souza, this is most likely due to the fact that the word was “long and rather inelegant.”46 Unlike the Greeks, the Romans never seemed to have developed a word which specifically meant pirate. The only other word used by the Romans was latrocinium, shown most often as latro, and was seldom used;47 although its earliest use by Plautus seems to have implied mercenary, its meaning mirrored that of praedo.48

It is clear that the Greeks in early antiquity did not distinguish between piracy and banditry but saw them as the same act. This means that scholars who study piracy need to be careful not to mistake banditry for piracy in passages they use to support their conclusions.

43 Translation by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. 44 For more examples of leistes and peirates being used synonymously see: Strabo, 14. 3. 2; Polybius, 4. 8. 11 and 4. 9. 10. 45 Katapontistes was used by Isocrates, Panegyrikos, 115; Panathenaicus, 12 and 226. Demosthenes uses both katapontistes and leistes: Demosthenes, 23. 166. 46 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 9. 47 Cicero, II Verres, 1. 89; Livy, 37. 13. 11-12. 48 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 13. 20

Luckily, as time went on, authors of antiquity began to use the terms more specifically. An example of this can be found in the Byzantine Lexicon “The Suda” written in the 10th century

CE:

Λῃσταί: Λῃστὴς, μὲν ὁ ἐν ἠπείρῳ, πειρατὴς δὲ ὁ ἐν θαλάσσῃ.49

Leistai: leistes, [a raider] is one [operating] on land, a pirate one [operating] on the sea.

Πειρατῶν: καταποντιστῶν, κατὰ θάλασσαν λῃστῶν. Πεῖρα γὰρ ὁ δόλος, καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ τέχνη. ὅθεν καὶ πειραταὶ οἱ κατὰ θάλατταν κακοῦργοι.50

Peiraton: katapontistai, those who throw [people] into the water, raiders by sea. For peira [means] trickery, and deceit, and art[fulness]. And so peiratai are knaves [operating] by sea.

These definitions are from a much later period and thus, as has been established above, do not reflect the attitudes and thoughts of the Greeks of early antiquity.

We also see that the word katapontistai is mentioned in the entry which clearly defines piracy. The only historical author to make extensive use of the term katapontistai is Dio Cassius, a third century CE Roman historian.51 Dio especially separates pirates from bandits in his narrative of Pompey’s campaign against the Cilician pirates, giving us many reasons and examples as to why piracy was both worse than banditry and distinct from it.52 Although using the term katapontistai more often than other authors, Dio still prefers to use the term leistes over katapontistes when discussing piracy, utilizing context to express meaning and only using katapontistes when absolutely necessary. The defining characteristic lies in the use of ships to

49 The Suda, 474. 50 The Suda, 1454. 51 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 10. 52 Dio, 36. 20-27; 39. 56. 5. 21

determine the difference. Below is an example of Dio’s methods of differentiating between the two:

καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἠπείροις λῃστικά, ἅτε καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν δήμων μᾶλλον ὄντα, καὶ τήν τε αἴσθησιν τῆς βλάβης ἐγγύθεν καὶ τὴν σύλληψιν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπὴν ἔχοντα, ῥᾷόν πως κατελύετο, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῇ θαλάσσῃ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐπηυξήθη. τῶν γὰρ Ῥωμαίων πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιπολέμους ἀσχολίαν ἀγόντων ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤκμασαν, πολλαχόσε τε περιπλέοντες καὶ πάντας τοὺς ὁμοίους σφίσι προστιθέμενοι, ὥστε τινὰς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν συμμαχίας λόγῳ συχνοῖς ἐπικουρῆσαι.53

Now the operations of the bandits on land, being in better view of the towns, which could thus perceive the injury close at hand and capture the perpetrators with no great difficulty, would be broken up with a fair degree of ease; but those on the sea had grown to the greatest proportions. For while the Romans were busy with their antagonists, the pirates had gained great headway, sailing about to many quarters, and adding to their band all of like condition, to such an extent that some of them, after the manner of allies, assisted many others.54

Leistes is used to discuss both bandits and pirates, but Dio qualifies pirates as those leistes on the sea. This way of qualifying the difference between pirate and bandit is exemplified in a Latin passage from Nepos:

Qua celeriter effecta primum Corcyraeos fregit, deinde maritimos praedones consectando mare tutum reddidit.55

This being quickly achieved, he first humbled the Corcyraeans, then, by pursuing the pirates, he made the sea safe.

The pirates’ main source of strength was their ability to strike over great distances, operating all over the Mediterranean.56 Pirates could only operate on such a large scale, as Dio portrayed it, if they had bases of operation on land where they could refit their ships, sell stolen goods, and recruit new pirates into their ranks. This also created a unique condition that is both essential to pirate success and pirate suppression. Pirates move between both land and sea in

53 Dio, 36. 20. 3-4. 54 Translation by E. Cary. 55 Nepos, Themistocles, 2. 3. 56 Dio, 36. 22. 4. 22

their operations and attacking one will not eliminate the other. Only attacking pirate bases and pirates at sea simultaneously will result in pirate suppression.

What drives someone to enter into an illegal and fundamentally dangerous occupation?

One of the most studied aspects of piracy today, especially concerning modern piracy, is the source of piracy. Answers have varied from economics and politics to traditions and convenience. Possibly the most significant factors lie in war and politics. Like all things, piracy does not form due to one factor but to many, varying in their influence. I will speak of war and politics as the most instrumental to the rise of piracy, but it must be remembered that without other contributing factors this would not be the case.

War has always been the military arm of politics. War can only exist if there are two organized groups, whether that be on a familial, tribal, or national level. War carries with it a legitimacy that is otherwise absent in almost all other forms of violence. Nevertheless, the violence promoted in war is often illegitimate. A clear and distinctive pattern can be seen in periods of time when piracy was at its zenith. In most cases, piracy thrives when war rages.57

Piracy has never been truly eradicated, nor could it be. As long as the reward outweighs the risks, piracy will continue to exist, therefore, piracy will exist even when there is peace, it will simply do so on a much smaller scale. War, however, creates a chaotic atmosphere in which piracy can thrive. In the ancient world this was especially true, as both sides would promote piracy against the other in an effort to injure their rivals.58 Some scholars have considered this to be a form of

57 An obvious time when piracy does not thrive is when the war itself is waged against piracy or is primarily fought on land, although the latter can lead to a translation of violence on the sea. 58 Good examples of this are found in Thucydides, 3. 51; 4. 41; 7. 26; 8. 34. In these examples we find pirates joining Sparta during the Peloponnesian War. This should not be seen as pirates taking a political side, as pirates do not care about such things, instead, there are many economic reasons for why pirates would have preferred to attack Athens over Sparta: first, Athens, unlike Sparta, had curtailed pirate operations for many years. Second, Athens had 23

privateering as opposed to piracy. The main problem with this view is that privateering as a concept did not truly exist in antiquity, at least not in the way that we understand it today.59

Piracy during war is ultimately created due to the chaos, and in turn the inability of a state to effectively police its waters, as mentioned above. This leads us to the next most significant factor in the rise of piracy, political instability. Although war is a chief factor in political instability, and is the most significant factor in the rise of piracy, a state can be in political turmoil even without war. In any place where the government is weak, unstable, or indecisive piracy will grow. Due to the inability of a state to effectively police its territory all forms of crime will increase, not just piracy, but piracy is one of the most dangerous forms of crime that can grow, as it requires more initial investment and organization than most other forms of crime, making it more effective and longer lasting.

Another major contributor to piracy is economics. When poverty reaches a certain level, the benefit of piracy begins to outweigh the risks involved. The devastations of war cause great economic turmoil for the bystanders that are caught in-between. Armies would raid enemy territory for supplies, profit, etc. Eventually those who lose the most are the poorest of people who are then driven to crime after they have lost what little they had. Politically tumultuous and/or weak states are also breading grounds for economic instability, which in turn creates the conditions of desperation that lead some to risk all for the opportunity of survival, at its basic, and fortune, if luck aid them. One example given from our sources shows pirates joining due to their poverty:

the much larger shipping fleet which pirates could take advantage of. Athens was clearly the more logical choice as an economic target. 59 Ormerod, 61. 24

ὡς δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐμηκύνετο, πλέονες ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ναυσὶ μεγάλαις ἐπέπλεον. γευσάμενοι δὲ κερδῶν μεγάλων, οὐδ᾽ ἡττωμένου καὶ σπενδομένου τοῦ Μιθριδάτου καὶ ἀναχωροῦντος ἔτι ἐπαύοντο: οἱ γὰρ βίου καὶ πατρίδων διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἀφῃρημένοι, καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσόντες ἀθρόαν, ἀντὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκαρποῦντο τὴν θάλασσαν.60

As the war lengthened they became more numerous and navigated larger ships. Relishing their large gains, they did not desist when Mithridates was defeated, made peace, and retired. Having lost both livelihood and country by reason of the war and fallen into extreme destitution, they harvested the sea instead of the land.61

In some instances, we see those too poor to pay their taxes were sold into slavery, and as a result, they rose up and turned to banditry and piracy to free themselves.62 Pompey Magnus saw this as one of the causes of piracy during his campaign against the Cilician pirates, a subject which will be addressed in chapter five.

The last major contributor to creating piracy, and the weakest of them all, is opportunity.

This is subject to many of the above factors but can be used even without them. It may be as simple as a fisherman who sees ships pass by on a regular basis, knows the waters well, and sees his opportunity to take a big prize with little risk to himself. It may even be that there is simply a shipwreck that the person takes advantage of to improve their own situation. Taking advantage of shipwrecked or abandoned cargo was common enough that the Greeks and Romans developed laws around this very occurance.63

There are other minor factors which can lead people to participate in the act of piracy, but none of them can be seen as primary. For piracy to rise to any kind of threatening level these factors must all be working together: War, political and economic instability, and opportunity.

60 Appian, Mithridates, 92. 61 Translated by Horace White. 62 Diodorus, 36. 3; Dio, 36. 20; Cicero, Verres, 2. 3. 85; Ormerod, 207. 63 Digest, 2. 9. 25

These factors combined, or in some varying combination, will bring about pirates in one form or another.

We have discussed above the many different factors which lead to piracy. And although piracy can exist anywhere where these factors exist, it is geography which determines where piracy will best flourish. According to Sir Henry Keppel, a nineteenth century admiral who conducted multiple expeditions against pirates in Asian waters: “as surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands.”64 Geography, as much in the early modern period as in the ancient, has been the

“sinister ally” of pirates during both ancient and modern times.65 The Mediterranean, like many places around the world, contains a plethora of islands from which pirates can establish their operations. Greece is one of the most ideal locations for this. Greece, as can be seen in Figure 2, is an assortment of islands, chokepoints, inlets, and rivers, all of which aid, geographically, pirate activity. How geography aids piracy will be discussed shorty.

Piracy does not need islands to thrive. One of the best examples of this is the Cilician pirates, considered the worst pirates in the ancient world. The Cilician coast has remarkably few islands, with the minor exception of Cyprus which lies not far from its shores – Figure 3. The location of the pirate strongholds of Cilicia were instead located on the southern slopes of the

Taurus mountain range where they were closest to the sea. The Cilician coast offers many strategic advantages for pirates. It is jagged, with many estuaries, rivers, and cliffs which make approach very difficult. The mountains stretch almost the entire distance from the Amanus to the

64 Philip Gosse, The History of Piracy (New York: Tudor Publishing, 1946), 1. 65 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge of Piracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 72. 26

Sporades.66 This rugged, mountainous, and relatively barren land, does not permit the expansion of a very large agricultural base, instead lending itself to the creation of a hardy people that can raid at will and retreat to the defensible shelter provided by such a topography. In both cases, pirates require areas that are defensible, more easily used by smaller ships, promote ambushes and raiding, and are close enough to trade routes or settlements while remaining at a sufficient distance to not easily be located. Where you can find a location like this there are almost surely pirates. All these factors, including geography, contribute to piracy today.

The types of vessels used by pirates varied greatly during the classical world, as it does during any era. This is partly based on the type of participants that make up the bulk of pirate crews. As has been discussed above, pirate crews varied from fisherman who took advantage of opportunities to those who made a living as professional pirates and built entire fleets. This in turn determines the type of vessel used by pirates. These vessels varied from small river craft to massive warships like those which were used during the Mithridatic Wars and the subsequent pirate campaign waged by Pompey Magnus. It would be impossible to cover all vessel types used by pirates in this work, given the nature of pirates to use whatever vessel was available. I will therefore focus my analysis on the most common pirate vessel used.

Like the present-day, the majority of ancient pirates, since their impoverished natures did not normally permit otherwise, used smaller craft to conduct piratical activities. The most widely used pirate craft, and for the longest period of time, was the liburnia,67 named so after the region

66 Strabo, 14. 668; Ormerod, 190-202. Ormerod gives a much more detailed description of all the geographical features of the region where I cannot do it justice in so short a work. 67 Ormerod, 29. Other types of common pirate craft included the hemiolia, celes, triakontoros, and the myoparo, all commonly used in major fleets as scout vessels. Examples of this can be found in: Arrian, Anabasis, 6. 1. 1; Polybius, 5. 101; Appian, Punic Wars, 75; Diodorus, 19. 65; Livy, 38. 27; Xenohpon, Hellenica, 1. 6. 36; Aeschines, 1. 191; Theophrastus, Characters, 25. 27

in which it was built.68 Liburnia, Figure 4, is located on the Dalmatia coast in the eastern

Adriatic. Rome, between 229 BCE and 168 BCE, had fought three wars with the peoples of this region – the Illyrians. This was a name given to all those who lived northwest of the Greeks and should not be seen as a reference to a kingdom or nation. Although our sources refer to this area as belonging to the Illyrian Kingdom, this is an outside construct enforced upon them by the

Greeks and Romans, who are our only sources for the history of this region. It is highly doubtful that any of these tribes viewed themselves as anything other than individual kingdoms. This is reinforced by the fact that many of the tribes often went to war with each other, conquering their neighbors and raiding their lands. 69 This hardly portrays a unified kingdom suggested by our sources.

The three wars fought against the Illyrians were in fact fought against the Ardiaei tribe, whom some scholars believe lived inland till the late 4th century.70 By the mid 3rd century, the

Ardiaei had built up a powerful navy and began a reign of terror and piracy. This rise in piracy is often attributed to King Agron of the Ardiaei. Under his rule he took advantage of the power vacuum left by the weakened kingdoms of Macedon and Epirus. Virtually unchallenged, Agron expanded in all directions, conquering other Illyrian tribes and invading Greek territory to the south, making it as far as Corcyca.

The success of the Ardiaei can in part be attributed to the vessel they employed with great skill in both their military conquest and their piratical activities. The liburnia, known also as

68 Ormerod, 29. As Ormerod notes, most pirate craft were named after the region of their original creation. These included the samaina of Samos, liburna, pristis, etc. 69 Harry J. Dell, “The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy,” Historia: Zeitschrift Für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 16, H. 3 (July, 1967), 350. 70 For more on this see Dell, 1967. In his article he puts forward a couple of theories which attempt to show the migration of the Ardiaei in the 4th century and that piracy was not common in the eastern Adriatic till the mid 3rd century, at least in as far as it concerns Illyrian piracy. 28

lembos/lemboi in Greek and lembus/lembi in Latin (I will use the Latin term from hereon out), was an expertly built craft that was small, fast, and maneuverable, yet was capable of carrying up to 50 soldiers,71 could be outfitted with a mast for sailing, and could perform ramming tactics.

The lembus varied slightly in its design, ranging from small river craft to biremes (two rows of oars) that were suited for war.72 This variance allowed the lembus to be employed in an assortment of situations based upon the needs of the crew/state.73 The effectiveness of the lembus can be seen when it was used by the Ardiaei to defeat an Aetolian fleet during this period.74

One of the reasons why pirates favoured smaller craft was due to their ability to be carried over land, either by hand or by wagons.75 This made evasion from larger warships easier, as well as pirate attacks far less predictable. This tactic was also ideal due to the rugged nature of Greece itself as mentioned above. The craft was so effective that many nations integrated it into their own fleets.76

An account from Polybius gives a detailed description on how the lembus would have been used to greatest effect:

71 Polybius, 2. 3. This is based on the number of soldiers and ships that the Ardiaei brought when coming to the aid of the Epirotes when they were being invaded by the Aetolians. In the subsequent battle at Medion, of which the Ardiaei were the victors, against what was commonly considered the strongest Grecian league at the time, Agron amassed 100 lembi, carrying 5000 soldiers, equating to 50 soldiers per ship. 72 The question of ship numbering has been highly debated for the last century. It is undetermined whether the numbering of a vessel suggests the banks of oars or the banks of rowers. There is no evidence which proves that ships with more than three banks of oars ever existed. The most logical argument suggests that the number was a mixture of the two, where a quinquereme could be a ship with three banks of oars and have more than one rower per oar, the total banks of rowers numbering five. For a thorough examination of this debate see: Lionel Casson, 1995; J.S. Morrison, 1996; Michael Pitassi, 2011. Pitassi’s work is the most convincing and both compiles all previous arguments while using his own method, namely mathematics, to prove that a ship with more than three or four banks of oars is physically impossible. 73 Appian, The Illyrian Wars, 3; Livy, 24. 35, 44. 28; Michael Patissi, Roman Warships (Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell press, 2011), 106. 74 Polybius, 2. 3. 75 Thucydides, 4. 67. 76 Lucan, Civil War, 3. 534. The Roman altered the liburna design into their Bireme warship, but they also used liburnae in their natural form. 29

εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ μεταξὺ τῶν καταφράκτων νεῶν ἔταξαν οἱ Μακεδόνες τοὺς λέμβους, ῥᾳδίαν ἂν καὶ σύντομον ἔλαβε κρίσιν ἡ ναυμαχία: νῦν δὲ ταῦτ᾽ ἐμπόδια πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τοῖς Ῥοδίοις ἐγίνετο κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους. μετὰ γὰρ τὸ κινηθῆναι τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τάξιν ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συμβολῆς πάντες ἦσαν ἀναμὶξ ἀλλήλοις, ὅθεν οὔτε διεκπλεῖν εὐχερῶς οὔτε στρέφειν ἐδύναντο τὰς ναῦς οὔτε καθόλου χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις προτερήμασιν, ἐμπιπτόντων αὐτοῖς τῶν λέμβων ποτὲ μὲν εἰς τοὺς ταρσούς, ὥστε δυσχρηστεῖν ταῖς εἰρεσίαις, ποτὲ δὲ πάλιν εἰς τὰς πρώρρας, ἔστι δ᾽ ὅτε κατὰ πρύμναν, ὥστε παραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τὴν τῶν κυβερνητῶν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐρετῶν χρείαν. κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀντιπρώρρους συμπτώσεις ἐποίουν τι τεχνικόν: αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπρωρρα τὰ σκάφη ποιοῦντες ἐξάλους ἐλάμβανον τὰς πληγάς, τοῖς δὲ πολεμίοις ὕφαλα τὰ τραύματα διδόντες ἀβοηθήτους ἐσκεύαζον τὰς πληγάς. σπανίως δ᾽ εἰς τοῦτο συγκατέβαινον: καθόλου γὰρ ἐξέκλινον τὰς συμπλοκὰς διὰ τὸ γενναίως ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων ἐν ταῖς συστάδην γινομέναις μάχαις. τὸ δὲ πολὺ κατὰ μὲν τοὺς διέκπλους παρασύροντες τῶν πολεμίων νεῶν τοὺς ταρσοὺς ἠχρείουν: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἐκπεριπλέοντες, καὶ τοῖς μὲν κατὰ πρύμναν ἐμβάλλοντες, τοῖς δὲ πλαγίοις καὶ στρεφομένοις ἀκμὴν προσπίπτοντες οὓς μὲν ἐτίτρωσκον, οἷς δὲ παρέλυον ἀεί τι τῶν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀναγκαίων. καὶ δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μαχόμενοι παμπληθεῖς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς διέφθειραν.77

Had not the Macedonians placed their galleys [lembi] between the opposing lines of decked ships, the battle would have been quickly decided; but, as it was, these proved a hindrance to the Rhodians in various ways. For as soon as the first charge had disturbed the original order of the ships, they became all mixed up with each other in complete confusion, which made it difficult to sail through the enemy's line or to avail themselves of the points in which they were superior, because the galleys [lembi] kept running sometimes against the blades of their oars so as to hinder the rowing, and sometimes upon their prows, or again upon their sterns, thus hampering the service of steerers and rowers alike. In the direct charges, however, the Rhodians employed a particular maneuver. By depressing their bows they received the blows of the enemy above the water-line, while by staving in the enemy's ships below the water-line they rendered the blows fatal. Still it was rarely that they succeeded in doing this, for, as a rule, they avoided collisions, because the Macedonians fought gallantly from their decks when they came to close quarters. Their most frequent maneuver was to row through the Macedonian line, and disable the enemy's ships by breaking off their oars, and then, rowing round into position, again charge the enemy on the stern, or catch them broadside as they were in the act of turning; and thus they either stove them in or broke away some necessary part of their rigging. By this manner of fighting they destroyed a great number of the enemy's ships.78

77 Polybius, 16. 4. 8-15. Bolded words have been added for emphasis. 78 Translation by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh. 30

Although the translator of this passage does not directly state the type of vessel which was used, opting for a more generic description of the ship,79 the type of vessel described by Polybius was the lembus. Had it been a different vessel Polybius would have used another name. It is clear that

Polybius meant this type of vessel and not another, the lembus being a specific type of vessel, different from triremes and such, which would have been commonly known at the time. The tactics favoured by lembi, and for that matter any craft attacking a ship larger than itself, were the περιπλους (periplous, a sailing around), the διέκπλους (diekplous, a sailing through), which is described in the passage above, and the subsequent ἀναστροφή (anastrophe, inverse or U-turn), later called the ἐπάνοδος (epanodos, coming back around or reversion). These maneuvers were employed to obtain ideal ramming angles. Each of the maneuvers mentioned above place the attacking ship on the flank or stern of the enemy vessel. In the case of the above passage, the lembi performed the διέκπλους in the hopes of both breaking the enemy’s oars/rudders and placing them on the stern of the enemy’s ships to follow up with a series of ramming attacks.80

These tactics, however, would only have been used if the lembus was participating in a battle against larger ships, and, therefore, a naval battle between two fleets. It was not until piracy became strong enough to challenge the power of states that they would have been used in this manner.81 Pirates primarily opted for the tactic of fleeing from military vessels and waiting for more vulnerable targets. We read of one such instance in Livy:

79 The word galley means a vessel rowed by three banks of oars or less. This description would represent anything from a trireme or smaller. 80 J.S. Morrison, Greek and Roman Oared Vessels (oxford: The Alden Press, 1996), 361. 81 This can be seen with Agron at the battle of Medion and the Cilician pirates during the 1st century BCE. According to Alfred S. Bradford, Flying the Black Flag: A Brief History of Piracy, 2007, there have only been seven primary periods in which piracy was strong enough to attack on both land and sea and threaten the security of nations, ranging from the 8th century BCE to the Barbary pirates of the Early Modern Period (xii). 31

cum derexissent ad terram proras, quindecim ferme eis naves circa Myonnesum apparuerunt, quas primo ex classe regia praetor esse ratus institit sequi; apparuit deinde piraticos celoces et lembos esse. Chiorum maritimam oram depopulati cum omnis generis praeda revertentes postquam videre ex alto classem, in fugam verterunt. et celeritate superabant levioribus et ad id fabrefactis navigiis, et propiores terrae erant;82

As they were steering for the land some fifteen ships came into view off Myonnesus. The praetor thought at first that they were part of the king's fleet and began to pursue them, then it became evident that they were piratical barques and cutters. They had been plundering along the coast of Chios and were returning with booty of every description. When they saw the fleet they took to flight and owing to their vessels being lighter and built especially for the purpose and also because they were nearer the land, they outsailed their pursuers.83

Piracy, like any business venture, tries for the path of least resistance and greatest reward.

Already filled with plunder there would have been no need to attack a Roman fleet. Even had the pirates not had plunder it is doubtful that they would have attacked a war fleet which outnumbered them.84

Another favorite tactic for pirates was to play innocent. Since many pirates made use of commonly employed vessels, it was normal for pirates to pretend to be normal sea traders to attack their unsuspecting prey. In one passage from Pausanias we see the brazen treachery of

Illyrian pirates:

οἱ δὲ Ἰλλυριοί, ἀρχῆς τε γεγευμένοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀεὶ τοῦ πλείονος, ναῦς τε ἐπήξαντο καὶ ἐληίζοντο ἄλλους τε ὡς ἑκάστους τύχοιεν καὶ ἐς τὴν Μοθωναίαν σχόντες ὡρμίσαντο οἷα ἐς φιλίαν: στείλαντες δὲ ἄγγελον ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἄγειν σφίσιν οἶνον ἐπὶ τὰ πλοῖα ἐδεήθησαν. ὡς δὲ ἄγοντες ἀφίκοντο ἄνδρες οὐ πολλοί, τόν τε οἶνον ὠνοῦντο ἐπιτιμώντων τῶν Μοθωναίων καὶ αὐτοί σφισιν ἐπίπρασκον ὧν ἐπήγοντο. ἐς δὲ τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἀφικομένων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πλειόνων παρέχουσι καὶ τοῖσδε κερδᾶναι: τέλος δὲ γυναῖκες καὶ ἄνδρες κατίασιν ἐπὶ τὰ πλοῖα οἶνόν τε ἀποδόσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν βαρβάρων ἀντιληψόμενοι. ἔνθα νῦν ἀποτολμήσαντες οἱ

82 Livy, 37. 27. 4-5. 83 Translated by Rev. Canon Roberts. 84 Livy, 37. 28-29. 32

Ἰλλυριοὶ καὶ ἄνδρας πολλοὺς καὶ ἔτι πλείονας τῶν γυναικῶν ἁρπάζουσιν: ἐσθέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἔπλεον τὴν ἐπὶ Ἰονίου, Μοθωναίων ἐρημώσαντες τὸ ἄστυ.85

Now the Illyrians, having tasted empire and being always desirous of more, built ships, and plundering others whom they fell in with, put in to the coast of Mothone and anchored as in a friendly port. Sending a messenger to the city they asked for wine to be brought to their ships. A few men came with it and they bought the wine at the price which the inhabitants asked, and themselves sold a part of their cargo. When on the following day a larger number arrived from the town, they allowed them also to make their profit. Finally women and men came down to the ships to sell wine and trade with the barbarians. Thereupon by a bold stroke the Illyrians carried off a number of men and still more of the women. Carrying them on board ship, they set sail for the Ionian Sea, having desolated the city of the Mothonaeans.86

The passage begins to outline the primary methods employed by pirates in the ancient world.

Although the capture of goods was valuable, there was much to be done when they were obtained. If pirates captured goods, those goods then had to be taken to port and sold or traded.

Since piracy was not well thought of, especially in the later Hellenistic Period, this was actually more difficult than it may seem. Pirates would need to find a port that was willing to trade with them. We know from our sources that there were cities which traded with pirates, especially some of the major trade cities such as Delos and many of the cities in places like Crete.87 Trade with pirates became a large enough problem in some areas that nations passed laws against offering pirates safe harbors and trading with them.88

The one type of merchandise which pirates sought after more than all others was people, a commonality shared with modern piracy. As described in the passage above, the Illyrians took people from the city of Mothone, in such great numbers that it actually crippled the city. An

85 Pausanias, 4. 35. 6-7. 86 Translated by W.H.S. Jones and H.A. Ormerod. 87 Strabo, 11. 496; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 57-58. De Souza mentions that the largest cities for pirate trade were Delos and Aigina, but even this status did not save them from being sacked by pirates in the first century BCE. 88 M.H. Crawford et al., Roman Statutes, I (London, 1996), pp. 231-270; Avidov, 29-30. 33

inscription on a monument at Amorgos, dated around the year 300 BCE, gives us a clear idea of the plight people faced by piracy: “Pirates came into our land at night and carried off young girls and women and other souls, slave and free, to the number of thirty or more. They cut loose the boats in our harbour [no doubt to prevent pursuit] and, seizing Dorieus’ boat, escaped on it with their captives and booty.”89 This is the most common occurrence of pirate activity that is found in our sources, and the greatest source of fear in the ancient world. As De Souza puts: “murder, pillage and kidnap by seaborne raiders were familiar terrors for many of the inhabitants of the

Mediterranean in Classical times.”90 Kidnap resulted in one of three options: ransom, slavery, or death. If a captive was worth enough, as was the case with Julius Caesar who was kidnapped by pirates in the first century BCE,91 then he/she would be returned after the ransom was paid.92 If the captive was unable to procure a ransom, then he/she would be sold into slavery at a slave market.93 Delos was ideal for this, having both a slave market and a willingness to trade with pirates.94 If either option was not available then he/she was likely to be killed to make room for more valuable cargo.

Whether piracy and the slave trade were closely connected has been a topic of much debate among scholars. We do find instances in our sources that this was the case, at least in part.95 Yet some scholars believe that piracy added little to the slave trade.96 I will not attempt to

89 Casson, The Ancient Mariners, 200. 90 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 1. Here are just a few mentions of people being kidnapped by pirates: SIG, 520, 521; Herodotus, 1. 2, 11, 54; IG, 12. 7. 386; Homer, Odyssey, 15. 427, 386; Homeric Hymns, 2. 123, 7. 1-12. 91 Plutarch, Julius, 2, Crassus, 7; Suetonius, Julius, 4. 174; Velleius, 2. 41. 92 SIG, 520. De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 65. For a general survey of ransoming in the Greek world see W.K. Pritchett, The Greek State at War – Volume 5 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 245-299. 93 Ormerod, 31. 94 According to Strabo, 14. 5. 2, as many as 10,000 slaves could be brought and sold in a day at Delos. 95 Menander, Sicyonioi, lines 3-7, 335-339; Plautus, Poenulus, lines 896-897; Miles Gloriosus, Line 118. 34

answer this question, as it is neither the topic of this work nor is there proper room to address such a debated subject. It is clear that pirates were connected to the slave trade, it is simply not certain to what extent.

In conclusion, pirates were often an economically deprived, opportunistic people who took advantage of politically unstable areas, often due to war, and which were located near islands or defensible locations. Using light and fast ship, pirates primarily raided small settlements in search for loot, but largely for inhabitants to kidnap and ransom or to sell into slavery. In the rare occasions when they grew to unmanageable sizes, they reigned in terror, attacking cities and nations, but still preferring to hit the easiest target for the quickest profit and flee before authorities could confront them.

96 Scholars in opposition to piracy as a major component of the slave trade in Rome are: De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 64; W.V. Harris, “Towards a Study of the Roman Slave Trade,” Memoirs of the Roman Academy in Rome, vol. 36 (1980), 118-120, 123-124, 134. Scholars in accordance with piracy being a major factor to the Roman slave trade are: Bradford, 30; M.I. Finley, The Ancient Econcomy (London, 1973), 156; Avidov, 21; Pohl, 186-190. This is just a small list of scholars. Generally, the scholarship favors the later authors, but opposition to this is more in the new scholarship. 35

Chapter Three: Piracy – From Homer to Alexander

The earliest mention of piracy in the western tradition is found in the writings attributed to Homer, namely the Iliad and Odyssey. During these early periods it is difficult, given the scant sources, to determine the difference between acts of piracy and acts of war. Chronologically,

Minos is our first mention of piracy, as his story, recorded in both the Iliad and by Thucydides in his work The Peloponnesian War, takes place roughly three generations before the siege of Troy by the Greeks.97 In this passage, King Minos of Knossos is attributed with both building the first navy and clearing the seas of piracy:

Μίνως γὰρ παλαίτατος ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν ναυτικὸν ἐκτήσατο καὶ τῆς νῦν Ἑλληνικῆς θαλάσσης ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐκράτησε καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἦρξέ τε καὶ οἰκιστὴς πρῶτος τῶν πλείστων ἐγένετο, Κᾶρας ἐξελάσας καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας: τό τε λῃστικόν, ὡς εἰκός, καθῄρει ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐδύνατο, τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ.98

Minos is the first to whom tradition ascribes the possession of a navy. He made himself master of a great part of what is now termed the Hellenic sea; he conquered the Cyclades, and was the first coloniser of most of them, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons to govern in them. Lastly, it was he who, from a natural desire to protect his growing revenues, sought, as far as he was able, to clear the sea of pirates.99

The main motivation attributed to Minos by Thucydides is the increase in revenues through maritime trade. We know, in this case, that pirates are referred to and not bandits due to the clear correlation to the sea. Yet, this is a unique case. The majority of settlements before the classical period were too small to have amassed the wealth necessary to create a fleet to run counter-

97 Homer, Iliad, 13. 450; Odyssey, 11. 321. Herodotus, 3. 122. 2. Homer makes mention of Minos but it is in both Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ account that Minos is credited with building the first navy. 98 Thucydides, 1. 4. 99 Translation by Benjamin Bowett. 36

piracy operations. It is possible that Thucydides was projecting upon the past aspects of his present, but it is far more likely that he was simply quoting popular tales, as no records survive from that time period from which Thucydides could have factually based his account. There is some evidence to suggest that this statement by Thucydides may be true. Of all the cities found in Crete there have been no walled cities, suggesting that the Minoans had a powerful enough navy to protect themselves from pirates, therefore not needing walls to protect their city from either pirates or invading forces.100

The primary problem with studying piracy during the pre-classical era, especially before

500 BCE, is that the distinction between pirates and regular warfare was blurred.101 This is primarily due to scarcity of sources from that period, making it difficult to fully analyze and determine if the accounts reffered to either piracy or warfare. As we shall see, even later on at the end of the Hellenistic Period, piracy was a form of warfare that states employed to economically injure their enemies. The concept of piracy does not start to truly form until between 800 and 500

BCE, around the time that the Homeric Poems were being written.102

Another problem faced by scholars studying this period lies in the social acceptance of piracy as a form of warfare, particularly for heroes in epic literature.103 The theme of piracy is prominent in the writings attributed to Homer, particularly the Odyssey. In one passage,

Odysseus describes himself as a pirate:

‘ ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἀλάπαξε Κρονίων—ἤθελε γάρ που— ὅς μ᾽ ἅμα ληϊστῆρσι πολυπλάγκτοισιν ἀνῆκεν Αἴγυπτόνδ᾽ ἰέναι, δολιχὴν ὁδόν, ὄφρ᾽ ἀπολοίμην. στῆσα δ᾽ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ ποταμῷ νέας ἀμφιελίσσας. ἔνθ᾽ ἦ τοι μὲν ἐγὼ κελόμην ἐρίηρας ἑταίρους

100 Ormerod, 80. In addition to this, the amount of trade revealed through archaeology suggests that trade routes were relatively protected. 101 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 16. 102 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 17. 103 Xenophon, Anabasis, 4. 1. 7-8; Homer, Odyssey, 3. 71, 9. 252; Ormerod, 68. 37

αὐτοῦ πὰρ νήεσσι μένειν καὶ νῆας ἔρυσθαι, ὀπτῆρας δὲ κατὰ σκοπιὰς ὤτρυνα νέεσθαι. οἱ δ᾽ ὕβρει εἴξαντες, ἐπισπόμενοι μένεϊ σφῷ, αἶψα μάλ᾽ Αἰγυπτίων ἀνδρῶν περικαλλέας ἀγροὺς πόρθεον, ἐκ δὲ γυναῖκας ἄγον καὶ νήπια τέκνα, αὐτούς τ᾽ ἔκτεινον:104

But Zeus the son of Cronos ended that – such was his pleasure – when he prompted me to my ruin, sailing the long voyage to Egypt, as a wandering corsair. There in the Nile I moored my curved ships. Then I told my loyal companions to stay and guard them, while I sent scouts to find the highest ground. But my crews, feeling confident, and succumbing to temptation, set about plundering the Egyptians’ fine fields, carrying off women and children, and killing the men till their cries reached the city.105

Yet Odysseus was never socially viewed as a pirate, nor at any time is he directly called a pirate in the Odyssey by another. In fact, there many instances where heroes, performing blatant acts of piracy, are praised for their deeds.106 It is clear in the writings attributed to Homer that heroes are always treated differently and better than normal individuals. This idea is transferred over into warfare, where amounting swag and women in war was a task to be honored and expected.107

But I digress. This topic deserves more room than there is to treat it in this work and I will say no more, save only that this topic deserves more attention and that it muddles the study of piracy during this period.

While the Homeric epics were being composed, the Greek city states were colonizing around the Mediterranean. Piracy, according to our sources, was very common among these new and growing colonies, who were relatively unprotected.108 One Phoenician colony, Alalia

(Corsica), was so notorious for their acts of piracy against their neighbors that some of the more powerful of these injured parties banded together and forced their departure:

104 Homer, Odyssey, 17. 424-434. 105 Translated by A.S. Kline. 106 Homer, Odyssey, 14. 222-234; Homer, Hymn to Apollo, 452-55. 107 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 18, 20. 108 Thucydides, 1. 13, 6. 4. 5; Strabo, 1. 3. 2; Herodotus, 2. 152, 1. 163, 166; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 22. 38

ἐπείτε δὲ ἐς τὴν Κύρνον ἀπίκοντο, οἴκεον κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν πρότερον ἀπικομένων ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα πέντε, καὶ ἱρὰ ἐνιδρύσαντο. καὶ ἦγον γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔφερον τοὺς περιοίκους ἅπαντας, στρατεύονται ὦν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοὺς κοινῷ λόγω χρησάμενοι Τυρσηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, νηυσὶ ἑκάτεροι ἑξήκόντα. οἱ δὲ Φωκαιέες πληρώσαντες καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ πλοῖα, ἐόντα ἀριθμὸν ἑξήκοντα, ἀντίαζον ἐς τὸ Σαρδόνιον καλεόμενον πέλαγος. συμμισγόντων δὲ τῇ ναυμαχίῃ Καδμείη τις νίκη τοῖσι Φωκαιεῦσι ἐγένετο: αἱ μὲν γὰρ τεσσεράκοντά σφι νέες διεφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ εἴκοσι αἱ περιεοῦσαι ἦσαν ἄχρηστοι: ἀπεστράφατο γὰρ τοὺς ἐμβόλους. καταπλώσαντες δὲ ἐς τὴν Ἀλαλίην ἀνέλαβον τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην κτῆσιν ὅσην οἷαι τε ἐγίνοντο αἱ νέες σφι ἄγειν, καὶ ἔπειτα ἀπέντες τὴν Κύρνον ἔπλεον ἐς Ῥήγιον.109

And when they came to Cyrnus they lived there for five years as one community with those who had come first, and they founded temples there. But they harassed and plundered all their neighbors, as a result of which the Tyrrhenians and Carthaginians made common cause against them, and sailed to attack them with sixty ships each. The Phocaeans also manned their ships, sixty in number, and met the enemy in the sea called Sardonian. They engaged and the Phocaeans won, yet it was only a kind of Cadmean victory; for they lost forty of their ships, and the twenty that remained were useless, their rams twisted awry. Then sailing to Alalia they took their children and women and all of their possessions that their ships could hold on board, and leaving Cyrnus they sailed to Rhegium.110

In another instance, a group of colonists failed to found a settlement at their planned destination.

As a result, the group seized the Lipari Islands instead. While there, they were attacked by

Tyrrhenian pirates to such a degree that the inhabitants were forced to learn warfare at sea to protect themselves. This skill, once the pirates were defeated, was turned to piracy against their neighbors, due to the poverty of the settlements.111 This is one of the pirate havens and states that was created during this time.112 No state, at almost any time during the Archaic, Classical, and

Hellenistic Periods was innocent of piracy; even Rome practiced piracy in her early history.113

109 Herodotus, 1. 166. 110 Translated by A.D. Godley. 111 Livy, 5. 28; Bradford, 13-14. 112 Herodotus, 3. 39-60. 113 Polybius, 3.24, a treaty between Carthage and Rome, possibly as early as 509 BCE, specifically states that Rome was forbidden to raid certain lands, which would have required the use of ships given their locations. 39

The primary methods employed by pre-classical settlements in the Mediterranean to combat piracy were far more rudimentary than those used later on. Since most settlements did not have the means to defend themselves at sea, defence against pirates was of necessity on land.

Although it is clear from archaeological evidence that trade took place over the sea in this age, it was as yet limited compared to subsequent periods.114 We have discussed above how pirates were most feared for their attacks on land, where they would raid and kidnap the inhabitants of coastal settlements. The earliest method of defence against any type of aggressor was simply to settle inland and atop defensive locations. According to Diodorus:

οἱ δ᾽ οὖν Σικανοὶ τὸ παλαιὸν κωμηδὸν ᾤκουν, ἐπὶ τῶν ὀχυρωτάτων λόφων τὰς πόλεις κατασκευάζοντες διὰ τοὺς λῃστάς. 115

The Sicani, then, in times past inhabited villages, building their settlements upon the strongest hilltops on account of the pirates.

This method of settlement allowed for both a better defensive position and an early warning system, as it gave a higher vantage point for detecting pirates. Although Diodorus mentions pirates specifically, it is probable that inland settlements were set up due to economic advantages, defence against warring neighbors, and even roving bandits, not just for defense against pirates. The above passage also refers specifically to villages but applies to larger settlements as well. Looking at the more archaic cities in the Mediterranean, it is plain to see that many are located inland. Prime examples of this are Acrocorinthos, Athens, Knossos, Rome,

Sparta, and so on.116 Each of these cities, along with many others of older foundation, were

114 CAH, 3. 3. 115 Diodorus, 5. 6. 116 Ormerod, 39. 40

situated a few kilometers inland, affording sufficient warning against attacks while still being close enough to gain access to the sea.117

The wealthiest of these settlements could afford to add an additional perimeter of protection, either in the form of walls, lookout towers, or in the guise of watch dogs.118 Besides these, there was another method of early warning system for cities that could not afford walls or towers – fire signals. We find multiple mentions of fire signals being used in the ancient world.

One such instance is in the Helena by Euripides: “Why should I tell you about our losses in the

Aegean, and Nauplios' beacons on Euboia, and my visits to Crete and the cities of Libya, and the mountain-peaks of Perseus?”119 Another passage from the Odyssey is yet more convincing: “for nine days we sailed, night and day alike, and now on the tenth our native land came in sight, and lo, we were so near that we saw men tending the beacon fires.”120 Although these passages do not directly mention pirates they do inform us that these “beacons” existed and were widespread.

They were obviously built for a defensive purpose, most likely a warning system against invasion from neighboring settlements, but it is highly plausible that they would also have been used to warn against any form of hostile incursion, including pirates.

The effectiveness of these early methods has also been recorded. Odysseus related his experience when dealing with one of these early methods:

Ἰλιόθεν με φέρων ἄνεμος Κικόνεσσι πέλασσεν, Ἰσμάρῳ. ἔνθα δ᾽ ἐγὼ πόλιν ἔπραθον, ὤλεσα δ᾽ αὐτούς: ἐκ πόλιος δ᾽ ἀλόχους καὶ κτήματα πολλὰ λαβόντες δασσάμεθ᾽, ὡς μή τίς μοι ἀτεμβόμενος κίοι ἴσης. ἔνθ᾽ ἦ τοι μὲν ἐγὼ διερῷ ποδὶ φευγέμεν ἡμέας ἠνώγεα, τοὶ δὲ μέγα νήπιοι οὐκ ἐπίθοντο. ἔνθα δὲ πολλὸν μὲν μέθυ πίνετο, πολλὰ δὲ μῆλα ἔσφαζον παρὰ θῖνα καὶ εἰλίποδας ἕλικας βοῦς: ‘τόφρα δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ οἰχόμενοι Κίκονες Κικόνεσσι γεγώνευν, οἵ σφιν γείτονες ἦσαν, ἅμα πλέονες καὶ ἀρείους,

117 Thucydides, 1, 7; Bradford, 12; Ormerod, 38. 118 Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, 3. 2. 2; Ormerod, 44-45; Bradford, 15. 119 Euripides, Helena, 767. Translation from E. P. Coleridge. 120 Homer, Odyssey, 10, 29-30. 41

ἤπειρον ναίοντες, ἐπιστάμενοι μὲν ἀφ᾽ ἵππων ἀνδράσι μάρνασθαι καὶ ὅθι χρὴ πεζὸν ἐόντα. ἦλθον ἔπειθ᾽ ὅσα φύλλα καὶ ἄνθεα γίγνεται ὥρῃ, ἠέριοι.121

But let me tell you of my sad voyage back from Troy, that Zeus had willed. The wind carried me from Ilium to Ismarus, city of the Cicones. I sacked the city and slew the men, and the women and riches we split between us, so that as far as I could determine no man lacked an equal share. Then as you might imagine I ordered us to slip away quickly, but my foolish followers wouldn’t listen. They drank the wine, and slaughtered many sheep and shambling cattle with twisted horns. Meanwhile the Cicones rounded up others, their neighbours further inland, more numerous and braver, men skilled at fighting their enemies from chariots and on foot, as needed. At dawn they came, as many as the leaves and flowers of the spring.122

Odysseus did not raid the settlements inland, instead opting to attack a more vulnerable settlement along the coast. The effectiveness of the inland settlements is also displayed through the time they had to gather their forces and repel the pirate attack. This passage also brings to attention another important method of pre-classical defense against pirates, agreements of mutual aid.

This is one of the methods which continues even onto today. If a single state was too weak to effectively protect itself from pirate raids, making agreements of mutual protection with surrounding neighbors, as shown in the passage above, would permit multiple cities to combine their resources for a more effective defense, coming to one another’s aid should there be an attack on any of the participating states.123 This is an example of a treaty between Hierapytna and

Rhodes for mutual protection:

121 Homer, Odyssey, 9, 39-52. 122 Translation by A.S. Kline. 123 SIG, 37, 38, 535. 1-20; SEG, 24. 154. 19-23; Bradford, 22; Michael Austin, The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation – 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 205-206. This passage specifically states that all freemen, from the respective cities, that are captured and sold into slavery must be freed by both parties and outlines the different situations and laws regarding that. 42

εἰ δέ τινές κα τῶν ὑποδεχομένων τοὺς λαιστὰς ἢ συνεργούντων α̣[ὐ]τοῖς, συστρατευσάντων Ἱεραπυτνίων Ῥοδίοις ἐπὶ τὰν κατάλυσιν τοῦ λαιστηρίου, πόλεμον ἐξενέγκω̣[ν]τι Ἱεραπυτνίοις διὰ ταύταν τὰν στρατείαν, βοαθούντων Ῥόδιοι Ἱεραπυτνίοις παντὶ σθένει κατὰ τὸ δυ[να]τόν, καὶ ὁ ταῦτα πράσσων πολέμιος ἔστω Ῥοδίοις.124

And if during a campaign which the Hierapytnians are waging with the Rhodians to destroy a pirate base, any of those who provide shelter or assistance to the pirates, wage war on the Hierapytnians because of this campaign, the Rhodians shall come to the help of the Hierapytnians with all possible strength, and anyone who acts in this way shall be an enemy of the Rhodians.125

Although only a small section of the treaty outlines agreements concerning piracy, the parameters extend to both pirates and those aiding them.

In all this, the fear of piracy was still rampant. This fear led to a common occurrence in our sources – mistaken identity. The fear of piracy, only enlarged due to the frequency of pirate attacks, has caused the deaths of more than a few innocent bystanders.126 Pirates attacked any location and at any time. According to Herodotus, this ranged from individuals to groups and even towns and cities. They especially preferred attacking during festivals and celebrations, most likely due to the diminished awareness of their victims.127 None were immune to mistaken identity either, heroes and commoners alike. One passage from Apollodorus describes Catreus, son of Minos, being mistaken as a pirate and slain:

ἀποβὰς δὲ τῆς νεὼς σὺν τοῖς ἥρωσι κατά τινα τῆς νήσου τόπον ἔρημον ἠλαύνετο ὑπὸ τῶν βουκόλων, λῃστὰς ἐμβεβληκέναι δοκούντων καὶ μὴ δυναμένων ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὴν κραυγὴν τῶν κυνῶν, ἀλλὰ βαλλόντων κἀκείνων, παραγενόμενος Ἀλθαιμένης ἀκοντίσας ἀπέκτεινεν ἀγνοῶν Κατρέα.128

124 SIG, 581. This entire treaty outlines all the instances where both nations must assist the other in times of war or raid by pirates. 125 Translated by Michael Austin. 126 Herodotus, 6. 16. This incident lead to the deaths of the Chians who were recently defeated and beached their ships in Mykale to escape. The local inhabitants killed them all believing them to be pirates making an inland raid. 127 Herodotus, 6. 138. 128 Apollodorus, 3. 2. 2. 43

And having landed from the ship with the heroes at a desert place of the island, he was chased by the cowherds, who imagined that they were pirates on a raid. He told them the truth, but they could not hear him for the barking of the dogs, and while they pelted him Althaemenes arrived and killed him with the cast of a javelin, not knowing him to be Catreus.129

Rome also dealt with her fair share of mistaken identity. After putting off Etruscan rule, Rome sent envoys to the oracle at Delphi, 394 BCE, to commemorate her victory over the Etruscan city of Veii. While travelling by sea, the envoys were intercepted by the Laparans who mistook them as Etruscan pirates. This was probably because they either captured an Etruscan vessel or copied its design. When the mistake was realized, the Laparans guided them both to the sanctuary and back, so others would not make the same mistake.130 The Romans were lucky that this episode ended as well as it did, unlike other individuals which have been mentioned above. No system of counter-piracy is perfect, but some are more efficient than others.

As the polis became more powerful and politically stable, sometime durning the 7th century BCE,131 the methods employed against piracy changed as well. This is in part due to the rise in warfare scale which increased the gap between piracy and warfare.132 It is also during this time that piracy became more villainized in literature. This may simply be the reporting of previous attitudes towards piracy due to the increase in literature at the time, but it is more likely due to the increased participation of the Greek aristocracy in overseas trade.133 The aristocracy in

Homer’s works often committed acts of piracy. Now that they were running the bulk of the trade market, piracy no longer added to their prestige but hindered their profit. Earlier states, which

129 Translated by James G. Frazer. 130 Dradley Workman-Davies, Corvus: A Review of the Design and Use of the Roman Boarding Bridge During the First Punic War 264-241 B.C. (Lulu.com, 2006), 9. 131 The Development of the Polis in Archaic Greece, edited by Lynette Mithchell and P.J. Rhodes (New York: Routledge, 2003), 30. 132 Herodotus, 3. 39, 1. 166, 5. 97-101; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 25. 133 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 23. 44

were weaker, were forced to perform the most basic methods of protecting themselves against pirate incursions. This is not the case in the classical period. We see a larger number of cities being founded along the coast.134 The increase in power and wealth afforded the poleis the means of both building greater fortifications, which would have been almost unassailable by the majority of pirates, and the construction of more powerful fleets which could patrol territorial waters. This method was employed in the pre-classical period, but as mentioned above, was the exception and not the norm, and became far more common during the height of Greek power.

Along with this growth in power came an expansion in territory. Many of the Greek city states built new colonies in the Black Sea, North Africa, Italy, Sicily, the North Western

Mediterranean, and so on.135

With increase in political stability comes the creation of ever more laws. Laws concerning piracy began to abound, especially the punishments regarding pirates. Most Roman laws, which are heavily influenced by Greek laws, have only survived from literary accounts, such as Cicero, and from compilations of laws during the Roman Empire. The Digest, compiled under Justinian in the 6th century CE, is the greatest source of Roman law to date. The majority of the documents which the Digest was compiled from have not survived or have not yet been found. The laws contained in the Digest date back to the early republic, and as such, may have been interpreted incorrectly or altered due to the passage of time.

134 Ormerod, 39. Appian, Civil War, 4, 14, 107-108. 135 Bradford, 12. 45

The official punishments for piracy, as dictated by the Romans, were crucifixion, beheading, and being fed to beasts.136 One example of crucifixion can be found in an account from Plutarch when he describes Julius Caesar’s kidnapping and ransom by pirates:

ἐκείνου δὲ καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἐποφθαλμιῶντος ῾ἦν γὰρ οὐκ ὀλίγα καὶ περὶ τῶν αἰχμαλώτων σκέψεσθαι φάσκοντος ἐπὶ σχολῆς, χαίρειν ἐάσας αὐτὸν ὁ Καῖσαρ εἰς Πέργαμον ᾤχετο, καὶ προαγαγὼν τοὺς λῃστὰς ἅπαντας ἀνεσταύρωσεν, ὥσπερ αὐτοῖς δοκῶν παίζειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ προειρήκει πολλάκις.137

But since the praetor cast longing eyes on their money, which was no small sum, and kept saying that he would consider the case of the captives at his leisure, Caesar left him to his own devices, went to Pergamum, took the robbers out of prison, and crucified them all, just as he had often warned them on the island that he would do, when they thought he was joking.138

It is not certain how justified Julius Caesar was in taking it upon himself to execute the pirates which held him captive, but the method he used would have been acceptable in Roman eyes.

There is some support for Caesar’s actions. According to Roman law pirates were considered communes hostes gentium (the enemies of all nations) and, therefore, were not subject to protection under the law.139 It was also the duty of all governors to actively prosecute all pirates.140 Furthermore, Romans permitted individuals to defend themselves against pirates, taking whatever steps were necessary.141 Very little Greek law survives on this subject. The best source would most likely be Rhodian law, since they were famed for their stance on piracy in the ancient world, a subject which will be discussed in greater detail below. Fortunately, the few

136 Cicero, Verres, 2. 5. 71, 78-79; Velleius, 2. 42; Digest, 9. 2. 28. 137 Plutarch, Julius, 2. 4. 138 Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. 139 Cicero, Verres, 2. 5. 76 and 4. 21; Cicero, de officiis, 3. 107; Digest, 1, 18, 3, 9. 2.4, and 14. 2. 3. 140 Digest, 1. 18. 3. 141 Digest, 9. 2. 4. 46

remaining fragments of Rhodian law have been preserved in Justinian’s Digest, and it is often theorized that the bulk of Rome’s naval laws are based on these.142

Possibly the most important aspect to punishment of pirates, and for that matter any criminal, was its public display. This accomplished two things: gratifying the injured parties and deterring future crimes. We read in Cicero’s speech against Verres that the people of Syracuse felt disappointed when they were deprived of seeing the execution of the arch-pirate.143

Punishments were often given in a “manner that befitted their villainy.”144 This meant that there were more methods of punishment than has been outlined above, but what they are we do not know for certain. All these punishments, being made public, would have been to serve as both a warning and deterrent to other pirates who may have seen or heard of the punishments. How much this deterrent worked is debatable. Clearly it was not enough to stop piracy from occurring, given that the worst period of piracy was yet to come, but it may have deterred a small portion of prospective pirates. According to Ormerod, the punishment of pirates has changed little throughout history,145 suggesting that they must have been the most effective deterrents.

Another important aspect to anti-piracy in the classical period is derived from the increase in naval power of individual states. As fleets grew in size and strength, gradually nations took an active role in not just protecting trade against pirates but ultimately bringing the fight to them. These anti-pirate campaigns, although not a new idea, as they were used earlier,

142 John W. Cairs and Paul du Flessis, Beyond Dogmatics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 158; Robert D. Benedict, “The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law,” The Yale Law Journal, vol. 18, no. 4 (February, 1909), 223. 143 Cicero, Verres, 2, 5, 65-66. The words iucundissimum spectaculum (most delightful spectacle) are specifically used. Cicero seems to suggest that public punishments were very gratifying to the populaces which were directly effected. At the same time, many feel a sense of satisfaction, even today, when seeing “justice” fall upon the deserving. In many places in the world, including some first world countries, public executions are still carried out. 144 IG, 12, 3, 171. This is an inscription from Ephesus concerning the punishment of pirates which had been captured. 145 Ormerod, 54. 47

became the hallmark of the greater states. These states included Athens, Macedon, Sprata,

Rhodes, and later, Rome.

According to Herodotus, hostilities between the Greeks and the Persians began with piracy committed by Phoenicians.146 It was the Persians, after their conquest of Ionia and subsequent defeat of the Phoenicians, that curtailed piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean. When the Ionians revolted, asking for aid from both Athens and Sparta, this opened up a series of events leading to the Persian Wars which left Persia weakened and Athens the premiere naval power of the East.147 This culminated in the Delian League, which many scholars have come to believe was created with the purpose of committing acts of piracy against the Persian Empire.148

Ultimately, this league became the basis of Athens’ maritime empire.149

The imperialism of Athens led to an increase in suppression of piracy in the east. Athens, set up choke points throughout the extensive Greek islands and fortified them, restricting movement and making it so there were fewer safe havens for pirate bases.150 This was only possible after the creation of the Delian League due to the increased collective resources, which any one nation could not have mustered, as well as the coordination of so many poleis over the whole of the Aegean.151 Athens, under the reign of Cimon,152 and by the blessing of the

Amphictyoni Assembly, constructed a powerful navy and went about reducing Greek piracy:

146 Herodotus, 1. 1-4. In this tale, Herodotus relates the kidnap of princess Io and the retaliatory kidnap of princess Europê. 147 Bradford, 15-18. 148 Bradford, 2007; Sealey, 1966; Jackson, 1969; De Souza, 1999. 149 Bradford, 18. 150 Bradford, 19. The island of Euboea was one of the more valuable and rich islands which Athens sought to protect from piracy, as it was located so close to the Attic coast. 151 Ormerod, 108. 152 Plutarch, Cimon, 8. 48

qua celeriter effecta primum Corcyraeos fregit, deinde maritimos praedones consectando mare tutum reddidit. in quo cum divitiis ornavit, tum etiam peritissimos belli navalis fecit Athenienses.153

This being soon constructed, he first reduced the Corcyraeans, and then, by vigorously pursuing the pirates, rendered the sea secure. In acting thus, he both supplied the Athenians with wealth, and made them extremely skilful in naval warfare.154

As the most powerful of the maritime states in the Delian League, Athens headed much of the deliberation and campaigns against the pirates, setting up a council with all other Greek states to determine what should be done about the constant threat.155 Under this watchful league, with

Athens at its head, piracy was diminished for a time and only rose again under the umbrella of war, the Peloponnesian War.156

The primary cause of the increase in piracy during the Peloponnesian War lies in the employment of “privateers” during the conflict. In truth, privateering did not exist, not in the way we think of it. The act of piracy which is sanctioned by the state was simply the regular mode of warfare for the Greeks of antiquity. Thucydides is our primary source for this war, and there is no lack of piracy in his accounts, being employed by both poleis to attack the other.157 This also led to increased counter measures employed by both parties. Many islands in the Greek

Archipelago were occupied during the war in order to intercept ships, both from the enemy and from pirates. Along with these new naval bases came fortifications to reinforce against pirates and enemies alike.158 Just because pirates were being employed on either side does not mean that

153 Nepos, Themistocles, 2. 3. 154 Translated by Rev. John Selby Watson. 155 Plutarch, Pericles, 17. 156 The Peloponnesian War was caused primarily through Athens’ imperialism, or, that is to say, the reaction of other states to Athens’ Imperialism, Sparta being the primary opponent which feared Athens’ ever increasing power. 157 Plutarch, Alcibiades, 29.3; Diodorus, 13. 69. 5, 13. 73. 158 Thucydides, 2. 32, 6. 9. 49

all pirates joined a side, nor does it mean that the pirates employed would not take advantage of the situation and raid both factions anyways. That said, Athens received the worst of it. Since

Athens was a sea trading city state, they were the most vulnerable, and the most tempting target, to pirates.

When Sparta was victorious, Athens was required to pay an indemnity. Being unable to pay the indemnity, many nations began employing piracy against Athens in order to make up for the unpaid debts.159 This only further weakened Athens, who had lost the bulk of her fleet, territory, and was bled dry by reparations. With no fleet actively working against the pirates which had grown exponentially towards the end of the war, piracy began to rage across the

Mediterranean. According to Isocrates, pirates controlled the seas: “and, furthermore, not even the present peace, nor yet that ‘autonomy’ which is inscribed in the treaties but is not found in our governments, is preferable to the rule of Athens. For who would desire a condition of things where pirates command the seas and mercenaries occupy our cities?”160 Piracy would not be put in check again in the east till the rise of the Hellenistic states.

In the west, the Romans differed greatly in their methods of dealing with piracy. Rome had many threats on the sea, such as her neighbor, Antium, who began to raid Rome’s settlements along the weastern Italian coast. After taking Antium’s cities with her legions, Rome dismantled Antium’s naval forces.161 This is a significant reaction in her treatment of enemy naval forces, including pirates. Rome, through almost the entire history of her Republican period, instead of simply absorbing ships into her fleet, decided to dismantle them. Rome would rather

159 Lysias, 30. 22; Xenophon, Hellenica, 2. 1. 30; Thucydides, 5. 115. 160 Isocrates, Speeches, 4. 115. There are further mentions of how unsafe the sea was during this period: Isocrates, Speeches, 17. 35-36; Xenophon, Hellenica, 5. 1-2; Demosthenes, 52. 5. 161 Dradley Workman-Davis, Corvus: A Review of the Design and Use of the Roman Boarding Bridge During the First Punic War 264-241 BC (Lulu.com, 2006), 10. 50

eliminate a threat to her shores than protect them, a pattern which will continue until her transition into Empire. In 349 BCE, Rome was plagued by the increased activity of Greek pirates along the Italian coast. Instead of building ships to counter the pirates and defend their coasts from future aggression, the Romans decided to station troops along the coast to keep the pirates from landing and raiding settlements.162 Rome saw the seas more as a barrier than a road. As part of this view, Rome signed her first treaty with Naples in 327 BCE, making them the first Roman socius navalis (naval ally). The terms of this treaty were that Rome would defend Naples with her legions if Naples defended Rome’s coasts with her ships.163 This offered the protection that

Rome sought at sea while not being directly involved with its operation.

Rome eventually decided to build a fleet in 311 BCE, but it consisted of only 20 ships under two admirals, given the special office of duoviri navales, who commanded ten ships each.

This early Roman fleet, which would not grow in strength till the First Punic War, was met with nothing but defeat. Admiral Publius Cornelius fought against the Nucerians in 310 BCE and was decisively defeated. The Roman legions had to siege the city and win the war on land. Again in

282 BCE, the Roman navy was defeated by the Tarentines with the support of Pyrrhus of Epirus.

According to Livy, all ten ships from one of the fleets were destroyed. With their naval defeat and the coming of Pyrrhus to aid the Tarentines in their war against Rome, the Romans were compelled to ally with Carthage for mutual protection. The treaty signed in 279 BCE proposed that Rome would produce the armies to fight Pyrrhus while Carthage would fight all the naval engagements.164

162 Livy, 8. 14; J.H. Thiel, A History of Roman Sea-Power Before the Second Punic War (Amsterdam: North- Holland Publishing Company, 1954), 7. 163 Workman-Davies, 8, 11. And Livy, 7. 25. 3-15. 164 Workman-Davies, 11-12. 51

This was not the first treaty made with Carthage, the earliest of which was in 509 BCE, around the founding of the Republic.165 The treaty stipulated that Carthage would not interfere with Rome’s sphere of influence. Rome was to limit her trading by sea and not to land troops, or settle, on the island of Sicily. This was an advantage to Carthage, who would have gained more control over naval matters and trade. Rome, although expanding to the extants of Italy and looking beyond her shores, was relatively content with leaving the majority of naval matters to

Carthage. These terms were again ratified in the treaty of 279 BCE when dealing with Pyrrhus, all of which came to an end when Carthage and Rome went to war over the conflict in Sicily between Syracuse and the Mamertines of Messene. 166

Before Rome began building a naval force, and at the end of Greek power in the east, the

Macedonians would make their mark against piracy in the Mediterranean. By the time of Philip

II, Athens was no longer able to keep piracy in check on her own.167 The islands which had been cleared during the Peloponnesian War were again occupied by pirates. Yet, even though piracy had returned, it is unclear how much of this was political propaganda or actually piracy. This episode shows how the Athenians were less concerned with piracy and more with Philip II:

Φίλιππος γὰρ ἄρχεται μὲν περὶ Ἁλοννήσου λέγων ὡς ὑμῖν δίδωσιν ἑαυτοῦ οὖσαν, ὑμᾶς δὲ οὔ φησι δικαίως αὐτὸν ἀπαιτεῖν: οὐ γὰρ ὑμετέραν οὖσαν οὔτε λαβεῖν οὔτε νῦν ἔχειν. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοιούτους λόγους, ὅτε πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπρεσβεύσαμεν, ὡς λῃστὰς ἀφελόμενος ταύτην τὴν νῆσον κτήσαιτο, καὶ προσήκειν αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι.168

Philip begins by saying that he offers you Halonnesus as his own property, but that you have no right to demand it of him, because it was not yours when he took it,

165 John Serrati, “Neptune’s Altars: The Treaties between Rome and Carthage (509-226),” The Classical Quarterly, New Series, vol. 56, no. 1 (May, 2006), 114; Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners: Seafarers and Sea Fighters of the Mediterranean in Ancient Times (New York: MacMillan Company, 1959), 159. 166 Brian Caven, The Punic Wars (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 4. 167 Demosthenes, 7. 14-15. 168 Demosthenes, 7. 2. 52

and is not yours now that he holds it. Moreover, when we ambassadors visited him, he used similar language, to the effect that he had captured the island from pirates and that therefore it belonged absolutely to him.169

This island, strategically located near the Attic coast, had been overrun by pirates, which Philip

II had captured during a campaign against the pirates. An embassy was sent to Philip asking for the return of the island which rightfully belonged to Athens. It is odd that Athens itself did not attempt to retake the island, given that she was previously the main protector against piracy. This would suggest one of two things: either Athens had truly grown too weak to clear this island of piracy or piracy was not as bad as our sources make it out to be and there was little worry about the pirates on the island. If it is the later case, then piracy has been exaggerated by our sources in order to play upon the political gains of counter-piracy campaigns, or possibly to mask strategic and political positioning as a counter-piracy campaign.

It is important to note that states which stood against piracy did so, in many instances, as a political maneuver. As piracy was so terrible a menace, any state which stood against piracy, either in word or in deed, was seen as the protector of civilization and afforded great honor. The attack on this island by Philip, or indeed Philip’s entire campaign against piracy, may have been a ploy to increase his own standing in the Greek world and take the place of Athens as the protector of the seas and, therefore, the protector of civilization. This idea, argued by many modern scholars such as De Souza and Avidov, can be applied to many of the states during this time and, therefore, holds some merit, as will be seen from an analysis of the Hellenistic

169 Translated by J.H. Vince. 53

Period.170 The difficulty of such a theory is that it is impossible to determine how much is political maneuvering and how much is actually practical application against a pirate menace.

Part of this political maneuvering was the attempt to name one’s foe a pirate, or at least accuse them of employing pirates. As discussed above, pirates were, and still are, the enemies of all states. By associating a state with piracy, that state is undermined politically in both their image and foreign affairs.171 In effect, this would isolate them from potential allies who would not wish to be associated with pirates, and it places them in the same category as the worst sort of enemies. In response to the Athenian attacks against Philip for the capture of Halonnesus, we can see this political maneuver tactfully employed:

οὓς ἐγὼ μὲν ἐτιμωρησάμην ἐνδεεστέρως ἢ προσῆκεν, ἐκεῖνοι δ᾽ εἰρήνης οὔσης καταλαβόντες Ἁλόννησον οὔτε τὸ χωρίον οὔτε τοὺς φρουροὺς ἀπεδίδοσαν πέμψαντος ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἐμοῦ πολλάκις. ὑμεῖς δ᾽ ὧν μὲν ἠδίκησαν ἐμὲ Πεπαρήθιοι, τούτων μὲν οὐδὲν ἐπεσκέψασθε, τὴν δὲ τιμωρίαν, ἀκριβῶς εἰδότες. καίτοι τὴν νῆσον οὔτ᾽ ἐκείνους οὔθ᾽ ὑμᾶς ἀφειλόμην, ἀλλὰ τὸν λῃστὴν Σώστρατον. εἰ μὲν οὖν αὐτοί φατε παραδοῦναι Σωστράτῳ, λῃστὰς ὁμολογεῖτε καταπέμπειν: εἰ δ᾽ ἀκόντων ὑμῶν ἐκεῖνος ἐκράτει, τί δεινὸν πεπόνθατε λαβόντος ἐμοῦ καὶ τὸν τόπον τοῖς πλέουσιν ἀσφαλῆ παρέχοντος;172

I actually punished them less rigorously than they deserved, for they seized Halonnesus in time of peace and refused to restore either the fortress or the garrison in spite of my repeated remonstrances. But you, with full knowledge of the facts, ignored their offences against me, and only considered their punishment. Yet I robbed neither them nor you of the island, but only the pirate chief, Sostratus. Now, if you say that you handed it over to Sostratus, you admit that you employ pirates; if he captured it against your wishes, why this indignation against me for taking it and making the district safe for traders?173

170 Demosthenes, 7. 14-15; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 134-135; Avidov, 23; Catherine A. McPherson, The First Illyrian War: A Study in Roman Imperialism (MA Thesis, McGill Univeristy, 2012), 76. 171 Demosthenes, 16. 34. Demosthenes often called Philip “the Pirate of the Greeks” as a means of attacking Philip during his speeches. 172 Demosthenes, 12. 12-13. 173 Translated by J.H. Vince. 54

This is just one example of the many bouts that will be seen below when dealing with the

Romans. The importance of this runs into the severity of piracy, and therefore, the knowledge of the people about pirate activity. If the people of a nation are led to believe that piracy is far more of a threat than it is, then this misled fear and insecurity could be used to pass laws, which otherwise would not have been, in the best interests of the political figure in question.

Yet, as mentioned above, piracy was often employed by states as a method of reprisals,174 funding future campaigns,175 forcing others to declare war, and weakening states which one plans on waging war with:

καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Πύλου Ἀθηναῖοι Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὴν λείαν ἔλαβον: καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι δι᾽ αὐτὸ τὰς μὲν σπονδὰς οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἀφέντες ἐπολέμουν αὐτοῖς, ἐκήρυξαν δὲ εἴ τις βούλεται παρὰ σφῶν Ἀθηναίους λῄζεσθαι.176

Meanwhile the Athenians at Pylos took so much plunder from the Lacedaemonians that the latter, although they still refrained from breaking off the treaty and going to war with Athens, yet proclaimed that any of their people that chose might plunder the Athenians.177

This was a method used during the Peloponnesian War, and it continued to be used during the

Hellenistic Period. Obviously each side would use piracy as a means of plausible deniability, so as to seem the innocent party should war begin. This similar “privateering” continued during the peace between Athens and Macedon in the fourth century BCE.178

174 Ormerod, 62. 175 Aristotle, Politics, 1.1256a; Plato, Laws, 7. 823; Ormerod, 69. According to some ancient authors, piracy is viewed as a method of production, similar to war, farming, mining, etc. Due to this perspective, it is understandable why nations would employ it and why some cultures did not see it as deplorable, but rather an acceptable, and sometimes honorable, profession. 176 Thucydides, 5. 115. 2. 177 Translated by J.M. Dent. 178 Ormerod, 118. Each side often accuses the other of piracy as a means of legitimizing their own attacks upon the other’s shipping. Bradford, 25-26. 55

The son of Philip II, Alexander III, known more widely as Alexander the Great, also ordered an anti-piracy campaign in the Mediterranean in 331 BCE, commanded by admiral

Amphoterus.179 Since Alexander fought the majority of his campaign in the interior of the

Persian empire, it is far less likely that he worried about his political image as a maritime power but rather did it out of tactical and logistical necessity. While the great conqueror was away he needed a steady line of supply, which would have been threatened by pirates that sprang up when

Persia was in such a weakened state. We know from the accounts of naval activity in that region that piracy was still feared and that mistaken identity was still a concern:

XII triremes cum suo milite ac remige, praetor eas XXX inanes et L piratici lembi Graecorumque III milia a Persis mercede conducta. His in supplementum copiarum suarum distributis piratisque supplicio affectis, captivos remiges adiecere classi suae.180

Twelve triremes with their soldiers and oarsmen, and besides these, thirty ships without crews, and fifty piratical boats and 3000 Greeks serving as mercenaries with the Persians. These last were distributed as a reinforcement of the Macedonian forces, the pirates were put to death, and the captured oarsmen were enrolled in the fleet.181

The account by Curtius continues with another detachment of lembi arriving in the night, not realizing that the city and port had been taken by the enemy, and being taken prisoner by the guards of the port. It is unclear whether these men were pirates under the employ of Persia or if they were legitimate forces. The lembus was a popular pirate vessel during this time that made its way into the naval forces of many nations, including Philip II himself.182 This would suggest that

Alexander had lembi in his fleet during this juncture, but the association of the lembus with

179 Quintus Curtius, 4. 8. 15; This is also confirmed by Arrian, Anabasis, 3. 3. 4. 180 Quintus Curtius, 4. 5. 18. 181 Translated by J.C. Rolfe. 182 Polybius, 16. 4. 8-15; Lionel Casson, Ships and Seamanship in The Ancient World (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 127. 56

piracy would still have been very strong. This may have simply been the case of assuming that any person sailing in a lembus was a pirate. More detail on the lembus will be discussed later on when examining the Hellenistic Period. Ultimately, Alexander died and his empire crumbled, being torn apart by his generals in a bid for power. Any headway into diminishing the pirates under his reign would have been reversed as conflicts increased among his successors, which led to near constant warfare in the subsequent years until the rise of Rome.

Chapter Four: Hellenistic Piracy

As the Diadochi struggled against one another in an effort to control the entirety of

Alexander’s empire, each Hellenistic Kingdom employed all means and methods to overcome the other. Piracy was one of the many tools used to weaken opposing states. Hellenic rulers would often form alliances with pirates to attack their opponents indirectly, thereby not officially breaking any treaties between the two kingdoms.183 One example of this is an agreement between Demetrius of Macedon and King Agron around 233-232 BCE, the event being described by Polybius as part of the reason for Rome’s first entry into Greek affairs:

Ἄγρων ὁ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν βασιλεὺς ἦν μὲν υἱὸς Πλευράτου, δύναμιν δὲ πεζὴν καὶ ναυτικὴν μεγίστην ἔσχε τῶν πρὸ αὐτοῦ βεβασιλευκότων ἐν Ἰλλυριοῖς. οὗτος ὑπὸ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φιλίππου πατρὸς πεισθεὶς χρήμασιν ὑπέσχετο βοηθήσειν Μεδιωνίοις ὑπ᾽ Αἰτωλῶν πολιορκουμένοις. Αἰτωλοὶ γὰρ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμενοι πεῖσαι Μεδιωνίους μετέχειν σφίσι τῆς αὐτῆς πολιτείας, ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν αὐτούς.184

The circumstances which decided them to cross were as follows: Agron, king of Illyria, was the son of Pleuratus, and was master of stronger land and sea forces than any king of Illyria before him. Demetrius, the father of Philip V, had induced him by a bribe to go to the assistance of the town of Medion which the Aetolians were besieging. The Aetolians being unable to persuade the Medionians to join their league, determined to reduce them by force.185

While it is uncertain if Demetrius did in fact make that deal with Agron or if this is a fabricated scenario, it would not be an implausible scenario, given that Macedon was weakened at this time and would not have wished for the Aetolians, who were their enemies, to grow stronger and pose a threat to her interests. Although the forces employed by Agron at Medion were soldiers, this does not mean that they did not participate in acts of piracy before and after the events in

183 Diodorus, 20. 110; Polybius, 4. 16; Livy, 31. 22, 34. 35-36, 37. 11. Egypt and Seleucia often hire pirates to harass one another during and in-between wars. 184 Polybius, 2. 2. 4-6. 185 Translated by W.R. Paton 58

question. Agron’s queen, Teuta, when she came to power, escalated Illyrian piracy. From this it can be understood that piracy was a common among the Illyrians and, therefore, was practiced under the reign of Agron. It is likely that Demetrius knew that he was employing pirates as well as soldiers to weaken his foes.

Other instances where Hellenistic Kingdoms employed piracy shows that these kingdoms sometimes financed piracy in the first place, giving them the vessels with which to plunder and not merely going to already established pirates. In this passage, Philip V of Macedon arms pirates against his enemies:

Ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ τῶν Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς Δικαίαρχον τὸν Αἰτωλόν, ἄνδρα τολμηρόν, πείσας πειρατεύειν ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ναῦς εἴκοσι· προσέταξε δὲ τὰς μὲν νήσους φορολογεῖν, τοῖς δὲ Κρησὶ παραβοηθεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Ῥοδίους πολέμῳ. Οὗτος δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοὺς μὲν ἐμπόρους ἐλῄστευε, τὰς δὲ νήσους λεηλατῶν ἀργύριον εἰσεπράττετο.186

Philip, the king of the Macedonians, induced Dicaearchus of Aetolia, a bold adventurer, to engage in piracy, and gave him twenty ships. He ordered him to levy tribute on the islands and to support the Cretans in their war against the Rhodians. Obedient to these commands Dicaearchus harried commercial shipping, and by marauding raids exacted money from the islands.187

The primary difficulty with passages such as this is the authenticity of the author’s account. No state would ever make a record of their dealings with pirates. What is more difficult is judging whether or not these were pirates or mercenaries in the employ of Philip, which would make their attacks legitimate acts of war. Even in this period the difference between piracy and warfare is blurred at times. Yet, each of the respective Hellenic Kingdoms, although they employed piracy, sought equally to limit piracy in their own realms.188

186 Diodorus, 28. 1. 1. 187 Translated by C.H. Oldfather. 188 IG, 12. 3. 1291, 650. 15-16. 59

Only one Hellenic state at this time actively fought against piracy, never employing it against its enemies – Rhodes. Rhodes’ reputation as a bulwark against the pirates is acknowledged by all in contemporary times, and from an early period, even before the

Hellenistic Period.189 It is easy to see why Rhodes would have taken this position. Rhodes, as an island state, was ideally situated at the gateway of trade between the Lavant and the rest of the

Mediterranean. All grain which came from Egypt went through Rhodes’ trade port.190 This meant that the majority of her revenues came through trade with other nations. Relying on trade for her prosperity, Rhodes would have greatly desired to limit piracy, not only in her local waters, but throughout the Mediterranean.191 To this end, Rhodes provided both escorts for merchant ships, regular patrols of trade routes, and often performed anti-piracy campaigns.192

Diodorus describes Rhodes as taking piracy on by herself.193

Rhodes had a clear economic motivation for her stance on piracy. This is not better displayed than when Rhodes entered into a war with Byzantium over imposed shipping tolls through the Hellespont. Many nations requested Rhodes’ aid in this matter, but her involvement was most likely in the best interest of her personal gain.194 Rhode’s fleet was well funded and effective, being primarily designed as an anti-pirate fleet.195 Many small islands sought her protection and offered honors to Rhodes, such as one inscription from Delos concerning three

189 Strabo 14. 2. 190 Diodorius, 20. 81. 4. 191 In one instance, Rhodes, with some of her allies, led campaigns against Tyrrhenian pirates. This meant that Rhodes went as far as Italy to supress piracy. Although she did not focus on the Western Mediterranean, Rhodes did see pirates from that area as a threat to be dealt with whenever they made incursions into the east. 192 Diodorus, 20. 82. 2. 193 Diodorus, 20. 81. 3. 194 Polybius, 4. 47. 1. 195 R.M. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (Ithaca, 1984), 98. This is because Rhodes used many different kinds of ships in her fleet. She made the best use out of the trihemiolia, a decked warship with one bank of oars which was faster than a trireme. Since most pirate vessels were designed to be swifter than warships, Rhodes, being the naval power checking piracy, would require many smaller, faster vessels to deal with pirates. 60

trierarchs “appointed by the people of the Rhodians for the protection of the islands and the safety of the Greeks.”196 But naval operations were expensive. A ten ship expedition cost roughly

40 talents to maintain, 90 talents to purchase rations, and 90 talents to pay the soldiers and crews.197 To this effect, Rhodes had a toll to pay for her fleet. All those who wished for her protection paid this fee when trading in her port,198 a price which many would have gladly paid.

Of all the different pirates in the Mediterranean, three groups were the chief amongst them: Cilicians, Cretans, and Tyrrhenians.199 The Tyrrhenians were pirates most likely from the

Italian coast and Tyrrhenian Sea, hence their name. It is never clear which peoples these pirates come from, possibly being a term to suggest any pirate that comes from that area, which would include Etruscans, Romans, Greeks, and Carthaginians.200 The cruellest and vicious of the three were the Tyrrhenian pirates.201 The most effective of the three were the Cilician pirates,202 which will be discussed in more detail later on. The majority of Rhodes anti-pirate campaigns were directed toward Crete, possibly one of the longest lasting pirate islands in the Mediterranean. As one saying holds: “who has ever heard of an honest man in Crete? They have always practiced piracy, theft, and deceit.”203 Their reputation for piracy dates back even to the time when the

Odyssey was written. According to this epic, Odysseus proclaims himself to be a Cretan and gained his experience and wealth from performing what appears to be pirate raids on others

196 Rhodes received many other inscriptions honoring them for their actions against pirates and protecting Greece and her commerce, here are just a few: SIG, 582; IG, 11. 4. 596. 197 Bradford, 27. 198 Bradford, 30-31. 199 Ormerod, 127. 200 Ormerod, 128-129; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 52. Strabo, 10. 479 suggests that the name Tyrrhenian was almost synonymous with any pirate one came across. 201 Valerius Maximus, 9. 2. 10. 202 Ormerod, 127. 203 Anthologia Palatina, 7. 654. 61

before the Achaeans attacked Troy.204 This is obviously a lie, something which Odysseus did frequently in this tale, but he chose to be called a Cretan for their fearsome reputation. Even

Alexander’s admiral, when he had been ordered to clear the Mediterranean of piracy, first attacked Crete to fulfill this mandate.205

It becomes no small wonder that Rhodes would focus on this island for many of her campaigns, being the champions of trade and protection for Greece.206 The geography of Crete breeds a population of warriors good at guerrilla warfare and piracy.207 Their skills were highly sought after and were often employed as mercenaries when they were not actively going about as pirates.208 Cretan piracy had at one point gotten so bad that the trading world appealed to Rhodes for aid, leading to the First Cretan War (206-203 BCE).209 The Rhodians won this war, as indicated by the treaty drawn up afterwards. This treaty showed a particular interest in Cretan based piracy and in trying to reduce it by reducing aid to the pirates from the cities of Crete.210

Although Rhodes would always remain in reputation as the protectors of trade against pirates, their power and position in such regards would wane with the rise of the greatest power in the

Mediterranean – Rome.

This city on the Italian Peninsula would expand till it controlled the entirety of the

Mediterranean. No other power before or since has ever achieved such a feat. After taking Italy,

Rome entered into a war with the greatest naval power of the Western Mediterranean, the

204 Homer, Odyssey, 14. 199. 205 Curtius, 4. 8. 15. 206 Diodorus, 20. 81-82.2; Polybius, 4. 47.1. 207 Polybius, 4. 8. 46; Aristotle, Politics, 1271b. 208 Polybius, 5. 65; SIG, 581. 209 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 80. Diodorus, 27, 3. This is possibly due to the promptings of Philip V, who had given them ships for the very purpose of committing piracy to fund his campaign and weaken his foes. Polybius, 13. 4-5, 18. 54; Diodorus, 28. 1. 210 SIG, 581. 62

Carthaginians. The Carthaginians were a Phoenician people whose empire was based on trade, and so it is with little surprise that Carthage set about protecting the seas from pirates.211 Rome’s exploits at sea and her tactics at facing pirates have been discussed previously. Needless to say,

Rome was ill equipped to face any foe on the sea, let alone the greatest naval power in the west, and arguably in the whole of the Mediterranean. The First Punic War showed Rome how necessary a navy was for her expansion. After defeating her foe, Rome was left with the responsibility of protecting the seas from pirates, even if she did not want the task.212 Rome relied heavily upon her naval allies, mostly consisting of Greek cities which fell under her influence in Magna Graecia, to patrol the seas and protect the Italian coast against piracy. But as

Rome’s power grew, the power of the states around her diminished, further increasing Rome’s position in protecting her own shores.

The first campaign which Rome undertook against pirates was just before the Second

Punic War against the Illyrians. In the second half of the third century, after the might of both

Macedon and Epiros had diminished, a power vacuum was left in northern Greece. This hole was filled by King Agron of the Ardiaei, a tribe of Illyrians, or so everyone dwelling northwest of the

Greeks were called,213 who began raiding and conquering territory along the eastern coast of the

Adriatic.214 The political chaos which had allowed the Ardiaei to grow, almost unhindered, ended when Epirus’ royal succession was concluded.215 Yet, the Illyrian tribe had grown too powerful to be supressed by Epirus, who was also dealing with attacks from the Aetolians. Upon first unsuccessfully eliciting aid from Demetrios II of Macedon for their campaign against the

211 Polybius, 3. 24. 212 Ormerod, 162-163. 213 Appian, 3. 3. 6; Strabo, 7. 5; Pliny, 3-6. 214 Polybius, 2. 7; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 76; Bradford, 35; Ormerod, 171. 215 Dell, 353. 63

Aetolians, the Epirotes were forced to turn to the Ardiaei for help.216 Agron replied by sending

100 lembi, carrying 5000 soldiers.217 The succeeding battle at Medion against the Aetolians was a huge success for the Ardiaeans, who had now proven themselves an equal to even the mightiest of the Grecian leagues.218 It was shortly after this great victory that the Illyrian king died. Teuta,

Agron’s wife and queen of the Ardiaei, took her husband’s place and continued her kingdom’s expansion. Under queen Teuta, the Ardiaei began widespread piracy in the Adriatic.219

It was during the reign of Teuta that Rome was drawn into the Eastern Mediterranean and first introduced into Greek politics. The pirate attacks by the Ardiaei were so successful that the

Greeks called on Rome for aid.220 Rome herself was being attacked at this time and it was most likely these attacks along the Italian coast and upon her own shipping which spurred Rome into action.221 Some scholars have argued that Rome’s attack against the Ardiaei was motivated primarily for political reasons.222 Although there is some merit to this argument, Rome’s action was not solely for this reason. The Ardiaei had taken the city of Phoenice, the capitol of Epirus,

216 Philip V was unable to send aid due to his own conflict with the Achaeans. 217 Polybius, 2. 2. 218 Polybius, 2. 3. 219 Dell, 353. 220 Polybius, 2. 5, 8, 9; Pausanias, 4. 35; Dio, fr. 49; Appian, Illyria, 7. Scholars have debated whether the Issians had actually went to Rome to plead for aid against the Illyrians. The argument against this stems from both the inaction of the Romans at releaving Issa from siege and the inconsistency between Polybius, who does not mention the Issians, and Appian concerning these events. Most scholars consider Appian’s account to be the more trustworthy, although Polybius’ account is the more detailed. It is impossible to determine which is the more accurate account. It is likely that the Issians approached the Romans, but it may have been for reasons other than receiving aid against the Illyrians. Regardless of the Issian controversy, Rome was approached by both Greek and Roman merchants and officials to deal with this problem. For more information on the Issian Contraversy see P.S. Derow, “Kleemporos,” Phoenix, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer, 1973), 118-134. 221 Polybius, 2. 2. 222 McPherson, 75-77; Gabrielsen, 390-391; Pritchett, 317. One of the theories I have discussed previously in this work. The idea that those who protect the sea from pirates have the most political power and increase their standing amongst other nations is given as one reason for Rome’s willingness to enter into this war. It may have introduced them into Greek politics and began their image as protectors of the Mediterranean, but the risks to Rome’s trade routes cannot be overlooked. This combined with the fact that the Greeks were recently defeated at sea by the Illyrians, both at Medion and Paxos, meant that only Rome was powerful enough to deal with the Ardiaei at the time. It is plausible that Rome, who had left patrolling the seas to her allies, would have done nothing had another state been able to challenge Illyrian hostility. 64

which lay very close to the trading routes of the Romans from Brundisium. If the Ardiaei were to overtake that region they could seriously inhibit Rome’s trade with Greece, most likely a great source of wealth for her, since she was not on good terms with Carthage in the West. Whatever the reason, Rome became involved in the conflict and dealt with it accordingly.

According to Polybius, Rome first sent two ambassadors to Teuta in an attempt to resolve the situation by halting Illyrian pirate attacks on Rome and her allies through diplomatic means.

Although the accounts between Polybius and Arrian differ for this event, both have the same result: Rome’s envoys were killed at the hands of Illyrian pirates. This blatant attack on Roman delegates was all the excuse that Rome needed to declare war, and In 229 BCE, Rome did just that. While Teuta’s forces besieged Corcyca and Epidamnus, Rome sent a fleet of 200 warships, under the command of the Roman consul Gnaeus Fulvius, along with a contingent of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry commanded by co-consul Aulus Postumius.223 After subjugating three

Illyrian tribes, liberating the Greek cities, and capturing the bulk of the Illyrian pirate vessels,

Teuta capitulated and the bulk of her territory was divided amongst Rome’s allies.224

Possibly one of the most significant gains from this war was the ships used by the

Illyrians. The Illyrian pirates used the lembus, known for its speed and maneuverability. Rome incorporated this ship into her fleet, in a similar fashion to Philip II over a century before. The lembus was used in its original form and also in a modified form called the bireme by the

Romans, making it a more effective warship. The significance of such a vessel will be dealt with later on. It is sufficient to say at this time that Rome’s first expansion into the East was in no

223 Polybius, 2. 11. 224 Polybius, 2. 12. 65

small way due to piracy, making a name for herself politically as the defender of the seas. As

Rome continued to expand her mission to police the waters also expanded.

In the subsequent centuries, it would be Rome, not Rhodes, which would stand against the growing tide of piracy. Rome would prove this by launching campaigns against the Balearic

Islands,225 Crete, and Pontus. Rome expanded throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, subjugating many of the Hellenistic Kingdoms along the way. Rome’s power was almost absolute by this point. Possibly the most poignant example of this power is an anecdote from the Sixth Syrian

War:

ὅτι τοῦ Ἀντιόχου πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον ἕνεκεν τοῦ Πηλούσιον κατασχεῖν ἀφικομένου, ὁ Ποπίλιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγός, τοῦ βασιλέως πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένου διὰ τῆς φωνῆς καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν προτείνοντος, πρόχειρον ἔχων τὸ δελτάριον, ἐν ᾧ τὸ τῆς συγκλήτου δόγμα κατετέτακτο, προύτεινεν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἐκέλευσε πρῶτον ἀναγνῶναι τὸν Ἀντίοχον, ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μὴ πρότερον ἀξιώσας τὸ τῆς φιλίας σύνθημα ποιεῖν πρὶν ἢ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐπιγνῶναι τοῦ δεξιουμένου, πότερα φίλιος ἢ πολέμιός ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀναγνοὺς ἔφη βούλεσθαι μεταδοῦναι τοῖς φίλοις ὑπὲρ τῶν προσπεπτωκότων, ἀκούσας ὁ Ποπίλιος ἐποίησε πρᾶγμα βαρὺ μὲν δοκοῦν εἶναι καὶ τελέως ὑπερήφανον: ἔχων γὰρ πρόχειρον ἀμπελίνην βακτηρίαν περιέγραφε τῷ κλήματι τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐν τούτῳ τε τῷ γύρῳ τὴν ἀπόφασιν ἐκέλευσε δοῦναι περὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων: ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ξενισθεὶς τὸ γινόμενον καὶ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, βραχὺν χρόνον ἐναπορήσας ἔφη ποιήσειν πᾶν τὸ παρακαλούμενον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ποπίλιον τότε τὴν δεξιὰν αὐτοῦ λαμβάνοντες ἅμα πάντες ἠσπάζοντο φιλοφρόνως. ἦν δὲ τὰ γεγραμμένα λύειν ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸν πρὸς Πτολεμαῖον πόλεμον. διὸ καὶ δοθεισῶν αὐτῷ τακτῶν ἡμερῶν, οὗτος μὲν ἀπῆγε τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν Συρίαν, βαρυνόμενος καὶ στένων, εἴκων δὲ τοῖς καιροῖς κατὰ τὸ παρόν.226

When Antiochus had advanced to attack Ptolemy in order to possess himself of Pelusium, he was met by the Roman commander Gaius Popilius Laenas. Upon the king greeting him from some distance, and holding out his right hand to him, Popilius answered by holding out the tablets which contained the decree of the Senate, and bade Antiochus read that first: not thinking it right, I suppose, to give the usual sign of friendship until he knew the mind of the recipient, whether he were to be regarded as a friend or foe. On the king, after reading the despatch, saying that he desired to consult with his friends on the situation, Popilius did a

225 Strabo, 3. 167; Diodorus, 5. 17. 18; Ormerod, 166. 226 Polybius, 29. 27. 66

thing which was looked upon as exceedingly overbearing and insolent. Happening to have a vine stick in his hand, he drew a circle round Antiochus with it, and ordered him to give his answer to the letter before he stepped out of that circumference. The king was taken aback by this haughty proceeding. After a brief interval of embarrassed silence, he replied that he would do whatever the Romans demanded. Then Popilius and his colleagues shook him by the hand, and one and all greeted him with warmth. The contents of the despatch was an order to put an end to the war with Ptolemy at once. Accordingly, a stated number of days was allowed him, within which he withdrew his army into Syria, in high dudgeon indeed, and groaning in spirit, but yielding to the necessities of the time.227

The final kingdom to oppose Rome was Pontus, led by the warrior king Mithridates. In a series of wars, as the Romans always seemed to fight wars in threes, Mithridates was eventually defeated. Yet the rise of piracy is often attributed to the conflict between Rome and Mithridates.

This seems most unlikely as piracy clearly existed before this time, but the greatest pirate threat in some ways stemmed from these conflicts. One theory that has arisen to explain the sudden growth in pirate activity is the relationship pirates and the slave trade. With Rome’s expansion came an ever increasing demand for slaves, readily available during the many wars throughout the Mediterranean. Since some evidence suggests that pirates dealt in the slave trade, it has been assumed that Rome was tolerant of pirate activity because it fed its need for slaves. This connection will be covered in greater detail below.

Rhodes, an ally of Rome at this time and still the ever vigilant protector of the seas, was struggling under the pressure of piracy. Though she could cope with this menace in times past, the fall of all other naval powers, the constant warfare which disrupts trade and breeds piracy, and the unwillingness of Rome to support her in this duty made it impossible for Rhodes to keep this menace at bay. This was proven in one of the last Cretan Wars, 155-154 BCE, where Rhodes

227 Translated by W.R. Paton. 67

was unable to defeat them and called for aid from Romans and Greeks alike.228 Part of this decline in power is often attributed to Rome’s mistreatment of Rhodes after Pydna in the Third

Macedonian War. Rome, angered at Rhodes’ unsolicited interference, made Delos a free trade port. The extant of the damage to Rhodes’ economy can be seen in this passage of Polybius where Rhodes sends delegates to protest their ill treatment at Roman hands:

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα προσκαλεσαμένη τοὺς Ῥοδίους διήκουε τούτων. ὁ δ᾽ Ἀστυμήδης εἰσελθὼν μετρίως ἔστη καὶ βέλτιον ἢ κατὰ τὴν πρὸ ταύτης πρεσβείαν: […] καὶ προσθέμενος ἐξηγεῖτο τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, κεφαλαιωδῶς διεξιών, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν ἀπολωλέκασιν, εἰς ἣν ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐδαπάνησαν χρημάτων ἱκανὸν πλῆθος, τριττοὺς πολέμους ἀναγκασθέντες πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς, νυνὶ δὲ προσόδων ἐστέρηνται πολλῶν ὧν ἐλάμβανον παρὰ τῶν προειρημένων. "ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως" ἔφη "ταῦτα μὲν ἔχει λόγον: καὶ γὰρ ἐδώκαθ᾽ ὑμεῖς αὐτὰ τῷ δήμῳ, μετὰ χάριτος διὰ τὴν εὔνοιαν, καὶ ἀφανίζοντες αὐτὰ κατὰ λόγον ἐδοκεῖτε τοῦτο πράττειν, ἐμπεσούσης τινὸς ὑποψίας καὶ διαφορᾶς ὑμῖν. ἀλλὰ Καῦνον δήπου διακοσίων ταλάντων ἐξηγοράσαμεν παρὰ τῶν Πτολεμαίου στρατηγῶν καὶ Στρατονίκειαν ἐλάβομεν ἐν μεγάλῃ χάριτι παρ᾽ Ἀντιόχου τοῦ Σελεύκου: καὶ παρὰ τούτων τῶν πόλεων ἀμφοτέρων ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα τῷ δήμῳ πρόσοδος ἔπιπτε καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔτος. τούτων ἁπασῶν ἐστερήμεθα τῶν προσόδων, θέλοντες πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ὑμετέροις προστάγμασιν. ἐξ ὧν μείζονα φόρον ἐπιτεθείκατε τοῖς Ῥοδίοις τῆς ἀγνοίας ἢ Μακεδόσι τοῖς διὰ παντὸς πολεμίοις ὑμῖν ὑπάρξασι. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον σύμπτωμα τῆς πόλεως: καταλέλυται γὰρ ἡ τοῦ λιμένος πρόσοδος ὑμῶν, Δῆλον μὲν ἀτελῆ πεποιηκότων, ἀφῃρημένων δὲ τὴν τοῦ δήμου παρρησίαν, δι᾽ ἧς καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα καὶ τἄλλα πάντα τῆς πόλεως ἐτύγχανε τῆς ἁρμοζούσης προστασίας. ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀληθὲς οὐ δυσχερὲς καταμαθεῖν: τοῦ γὰρ ἐλλιμενίου κατὰ τοὺς ἀνώτερον χρόνους εὑρίσκοντος ἑκατὸν μυριάδας δραχμῶν, νῦν ἀφῃρήκατε πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας, ὥστε καὶ λίαν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ῥωμαῖοι, τὴν ὑμετέραν ὀργὴν ἧφθαι τῶν κυρίων πόρων τῆς πόλεως.229

After this the senate summoned the Rhodians and gave them a hearing. Asymedes on entering took up a more moderate and better position than on his last embassy. […] He then proceeded to sum up the losses which Rhodes had suffered, mentioning first of all that of Lycia and Caria, on which provinces they had spent from the outset a considerable sum, having been compelled to undertake three wars against them, and now they were deprived of the large revenue derived from them. “but perhaps,” he said, “in this you are justified; for it is true that you gave these districts to our people as a favor and token of good will, and in revoking your

228 Polybius, 33. 4. 13. 15-16; Diodorus, 31, 38. 43, 45. 229 Polybius, 30. 31. 68

gift now that we incur your suspicion and hostility you may seem to have acted reasonably. But as for Caunus, you will confess that we bought it from Ptolemy’s generals for two hundred talents, and that Stratoniceia was given us as a great favor by Antiochus and Seleucus. From these two towns our state derived an annual revenue of a hundred and twenty talents. We have lost the whole of this revenue through our ready compliance with your orders. From this you see that you have imposed a heavier tribute on the Rhodians for a single mistake than on the Macedonians who had always been your foes. But the greatest calamity inflicted on our town is this. The revenue we drew from our harbor has ceased owing to your having made Delos a free port, and deprived our people of that liberty by which our rights as regards our harbor and all the other rights of our city were properly guarded. It is not difficult to convince you of the truth of this. For while the harbor dues in former times were farmed for a million drachmae, they now fetch only a hundred and fifty thousand, so that your displeasure, men of Rome, has only too heavily visited the vital resources of the state.230

This severe diminishment of Rhodes’ income would definitely have made it more difficult to maintain a sufficient fleet to combat the ever rising wave of piracy at this time. Although some scholars argue against the significance of these losses, there is little evidence to support their claims while the losses stated above cannot be considered anything less than catastrophic to an economy.

It is not long after this that the Rhodians seemed unable to compete with the pirates. Due to this, Rome subsequently waged anti-piracy campaigns against the largest pirate threat to ever face the ancient world – the Cilicians. Serious piracy in Cilicia began under Diodotus Tryphon in the mid 2nd century BCE, who desired to wrestle control of Syria from the Seleucids. The pirate forces he commissioned were already well established, having been funded by the Hellenisitc

Kingdoms to attack their rivals, especially in the case of the Ptolemies, who were employing pirates to harass the Seleucids. Tryphon had managed to unite many of the local tribes into a pirate force. After his defeat, the kingdom split apart, leaving the area in political turmoil, but

230 Translated by W.R. Paton. 69

piracy remained intact. This political disorder gave the opportunity for these pirate groups to create their own pirate states. The speciality of these Cilician pirate kingdoms was slavery, something which the Romans had a demand for and something which these Hellenic Kingdoms, including Rhodes, could not stop. As mentioned above, these kingdoms had been weakened by

Roman expansion in the previous decades.231

The region of Cilicia was ideal for piracy. Although there were few islands, the coast was jagged, with many inlets, ravines, rivers, cliffs, and mountains, which made defending the coast easy while still making surprise attacks on shipping feasible. The area offered few resources, but the one abundant resource to be found was timber ideal for shipbuilding.232 With all the timber to build their fleets, and the necessity of surviving off raiding due to lack of other resources, Cilicia was the perfect breeding ground for pirate activity. Pirate opportunities were further increased with the Mithridatic Wars fought in neighboring regions. It is during this time that Rome attempted to subdue the Cilician pirates.

Before going into detail on the Roman campaigns, I will address the subject of the rise of

Cilician pirates with the Mithridatic Wars. According to Appian, and others, Mithridates helped to set up piracy and is directly responsible for their rise from local pirates to large and organized groups:

Μιθριδάτης ὅτε πρῶτον Ῥωμαίοις ἐπολέμει καὶ τῆς Ἀσίας ἐκράτει, Σύλλα περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πονουμένου, ἡγούμενος οὐκ ἐς πολὺ καθέξειν τῆς Ἀσίας, τά τε ἄλλα, ὥς μοι προείρηται, πάντα ἐλυμαίνετο, καὶ ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν πειρατὰς καθῆκεν.233

231 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 98-99; Bradford, 38-39. The raids by these pirates were so successful that Appian, along with a few other ancient authors, began to refer to them as tyrants and kings: Appian, Mithridates, 92. 117; Strabo 14. 5. 7; Cicero, Verres, 2. 5. 77. This success was permitted because it aided some Hellenistic Kingdoms in hurting their rivals: Strabo, 14. 5. 2. 232 Bradford, 38-39. 233 Appian, Mithridates, 92. 70

When Mithridates first went to war with the Romans and subdued the province of Asia (Sulla being then in difficulties respecting Greece), he thought that he should not hold the province long, and accordingly plundered it in all sorts of ways, as I have mentioned above, and sent out pirates on the sea.234

Whether or not this is true is debatable.235 It is entirely possible that Mithridates hired pirates to raid his enemies, as this was a common tactic among the Hellenistic Kingdoms.236 How much this would have affected the growth of piracy in the area is less certain. The many wars which ravaged the region would certainly have promoted piracy, but it may not have grown to the extent it did without Mithridates’ backing, of how much we cannot be certain. In either case, the pirates continued to grow even after the war was over:

οἳ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀλίγοις σκάφεσι καὶ μικροῖς οἷα λῃσταὶ περιπλέοντες ἐλύπουν, ὡς δὲ ὁ πόλεμος ἐμηκύνετο, πλέονες ἐγίγνοντο καὶ ναυσὶ μεγάλαις ἐπέπλεον. γευσάμενοι δὲ κερδῶν μεγάλων, οὐδ᾽ ἡττωμένου καὶ σπενδομένου τοῦ Μιθριδάτου καὶ ἀναχωροῦντος ἔτι ἐπαύοντο: οἱ γὰρ βίου καὶ πατρίδων διὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἀφῃρημένοι, καὶ ἐς ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσόντες ἀθρόαν, ἀντὶ τῆς γῆς ἐκαρποῦντο τὴν θάλασσαν, μυοπάρωσι πρῶτον καὶ ἡμιολίαις, εἶτα δικρότοις καὶ τριήρεσι κατὰ μέρη περιπλέοντες, ἡγουμένων λῃστάρχων οἷα πολέμου στρατηγῶν.237

In the beginning they prowled around with a few small boats worrying the inhabitants like robbers. As the war lengthened they became more numerous and navigated larger ships. Relishing their large gains, they did not desist when Mithridates was defeated, made peace, and retired. Having lost both livelihood and country by reason of the war and fallen into extreme destitution, they harvested the sea instead of the land, at first with pinnaces and hemiolii, then with two-bank and three-bank ships, sailing in squadrons under pirate chiefs, who were like generals of an army.238

The two and three banked ships would most certainly have included lembi and even triremes.

Although not as large as other military vessels, they were still effective in combat, and still

234 Translated by Horace White. 235 According to Dio, 36. 20. 1-2, piracy is pandemic and not caused because of just one conflict. But further in his account he does agree that the constant warfare during that time allowed piracy to grow beyond local venues and become a multinational threat that spanned a larger area. 236 Strabo, 14. 5. 2; Cicero, De Domo, 22. 65, Pro Sest, 60; D. Avidov, 30. 237 Appian, Mithridates, 92. 238 Translated by Horace White. 71

permitted the use of pirate tactics. We know that their numbers, strength, and even the size of their vessels had grown significantly by the feats they were able to accomplish even after the war was concluded:

ἔς τε ἀτειχίστους πόλεις ἐμπίπτοντες, καὶ ἑτέρων τὰ τείχη διορύττοντες ἢ κόπτοντες ἢ πολιορκίᾳ λαμβάνοντες, ἐσύλων: καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας, οἷς τι πλέον εἴη, ἐς ναυλοχίαν ἐπὶ λύτροις ἀπῆγον. καὶ τάδε τὰ λήμματα, ἀδοξοῦντες ἤδη τὸ τῶν λῃστῶν ὄνομα, μισθοὺς ἐκάλουν στρατιωτικούς. χειροτέχνας τε εἶχον ἐπ᾽ ἔργοις δεδεμένους, καὶ ὕλην ξύλου καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου συμφέροντες οὔποτε ἐπαύοντο: ἐπαιρόμενοι γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους, καὶ τὸ λῃστεύειν οὐκ ἐγνωκότες ἔτι μεθεῖναι, βασιλεῦσι δ᾽ ἤδη καὶ τυράννοις ἢ στρατοπέδοις μεγάλοις ἑαυτοὺς ὁμοιοῦντες, καὶ νομίζοντες, ὅτε συνέλθοιεν ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες, ἄμαχοι γενήσεσθαι, ναῦς τε καὶ ὅπλα πάντα ἐτεκταίνοντο, μάλιστα περὶ τὴν τραχεῖαν λεγομένην Κιλικίαν, ἣν κοινὸν σφῶν ὕφορμον ἢ στρατόπεδον ἐτίθεντο εἶναι, φρούρια μὲν καὶ ἄκρας καὶ νήσους ἐρήμους καὶ ναυλοχίας ἔχοντες πολλαχοῦ, κυριωτάτας δὲ ἀφέσεις ἡγούμενοι τὰς περὶ τήνδε τὴν Κιλικίαν, τραχεῖάν τε καὶ ἀλίμενον οὖσαν καὶ κορυφαῖς μεγάλαις ἐξέχουσαν.239

They fell upon unfortified towns. They undermined or battered down the walls of others, or captured them by regular siege and plundered 85 of them. They carried off the wealthier citizens to their haven of refuge and held them for ransom. They scorned the name of robbers and called their takings the prize of warfare. They had artisans chained to their tasks and were continually bringing in materials of timber, brass, and iron. Being elated by their gains and determined not to change their mode of life yet, they likened themselves to kings, rulers, and great armies, and thought that if they should all come together in the same place they would be invincible. They built ships and made all kinds of arms. Their chief seat was at a place called the Crags in Cilicia, which they had chosen as their common anchorage and encampment. They had castles and towers and desert islands and retreats everywhere. They chose for their principal rendezvous the coast of Cilicia where it was rough and harborless and rose in high mountain peaks, for which reason they were all called by the common name of Cilicians. 240

The fact that so many settlements, even fortified ones, designed, no doubt, to ward off pirates, were falling before pirate forces is significant. All the safety measures which these states would have had in place, including early warning signals (such as fire signals, towers, and dogs), patrols, fortifications, and mutual protection treaties were all but useless before the onslaught.

239 Appian, Mithridates, 92. 240 Translated by Horace White. 72

Some scholars have viewed this scale of warfare, as described in the passage above, as proof that the Cilicians were in fact a political kingdom and not pirates at all, suggesting that the name pirate was attributed to them as a means of attacking them and undermining them politically.241

Possibly the most interesting nature of this piracy was the multiculturalism that it displayed:

ὅθεν δὴ καὶ πάντες ὀνόματι κοινῷ Κίλικες ἐκαλοῦντο, ἀρξαμένου μὲν ἴσως τοῦ κακοῦ παρὰ τῶν Τραχεωτῶν Κιλίκων, συνεπιλαβόντων δὲ Σύρων τε καὶ Κυπρίων καὶ Παμφύλων καὶ τῶν Ποντικῶν καὶ σχεδὸν ἁπάντων τῶν ἑῴων ἐθνῶν οἳ πολλοῦ καὶ χρονίου σφίσιν ὄντος τοῦ Μιθριδατείου πολέμου δρᾶν τι μᾶλλον ἢ πάσχειν αἱρούμενοι τὴν θάλασσαν ἀντὶ τῆς γῆς ἐπελέγοντο.242

Perhaps this evil had its beginning among the men of the Crags of Cilicia, but thither also men of Syrian, Cyprian, Pamphylian, and Pontic origin and those of almost all the Eastern nations had congregated, who, on account of the long continuance of the Mithridatic war, preferred to do wrong rather than to suffer it, and for this purpose chose the sea instead of the land.243

There was never a time when pirates had banded together across so many different nations to act as a single entity. This was the danger Rome faced, a danger which would bring the

Mediterranean to its very knees. Compounding this problem was Rome’s diminishment of

Seleucia after Apamea in 188 BCE. Rome had done to the Seleucids what she had done to all of her previously defeated enemies, that is, dismantled her fleet:

ἀποδότω δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μακρὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ἄρμενα καὶ τὰ σκεύη, καὶ μηκέτι ἐχέτω πλὴν δέκα καταφράκτων: μηδὲ λέμβον πλείοσι τριάκοντα κωπῶν ἐχέτω ἐλαυνόμενον, μηδὲ μονήρη πολέμου ἕνεκεν, οὗ αὐτὸς κατάρχει. μηδὲ πλείτωσαν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Καλυκάδνου καὶ Σαρπηδονίου ἀκρωτηρίου.244

241 Avidov is one of the main protagonists of this view. In a paper entitled “Were the Cilicians a Nation of Pirates?” he argues that they could actually have been a nation which allied with Mithridates against a common foe, Rome. He argues that it was an anti-Roman bloc which worked with many of the eastern nations in a bid to repel Roman expansion into the east. This is not the popular view and does have a few problems with it, although it does make a few interesting points. 242 Appian, Mithridates, 92. 243 Translated by Horace White. 244 Polybius, 21. 43. 73

He shall surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more than ten undecked ships of war, of which none is rowed by more than thirty oars, and those not for a war in which he is the aggressor: his ships shall not sail beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory.245

This weakening of the Seleucid fleet would have greatly diminished her ability to subdue pirates in the region. Since neither Egypt nor Seleucia could supress this area, Cilicia was allowed to go unchecked. Rome, as always, after she had eliminated opposing naval forces, took no thought for subduing piracy in the local regions. But as piracy grew to unmanageable proportions so too did the call to Rome from her allies to deal with this menace.

In 102 BCE, Rome sent Marcus Antonius (the grandfather of the famous Marc Antony) to deal with this growing threat.246 This was primarily under the pressure of Rome’s allies in the east who had been directly attacked by these pirate kingdoms. Although there are almost no details concerning the campaign, we know that it was successful enough to get Antonius a triumph when he returned.247 Whether or not he truly supressed piracy in that region is another matter. Within two years of that war, piracy had run rampant again. It is clear that whatever

Antonius did during his campaign in 102 BCE, it had no lasting effects.248 Yet this period did not permit the Romans to focus on eliminating piracy from the Mediterranean, instead being preoccupied with the social war, civil wars, and Mithridatic wars.

The Lex de Provinciis Praetoriis of 100 BCE designated Cilicia a praetorian province.

We know that the law had some focus on piracy as the beginning outlined provisions for the safety of navigation for Romans, Latins, and Rome’s allies on the seas. It was also this law that

245 Translated by W.R. Paton. 246 IG, Rome, 4. 1116. 247 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 107. 248 Diodorus, 36. 3. The fact that only a couple of years later we read of accounts where the inhabitants are complaining about piracy and taxes is evidence that the problem was not dealt with. 74

declared all pirates enemies of Rome. The most significant detail in this law was the provision of how to deal with pirates:

ὁμοίως τ]ε̣ καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἐν τ̣[ῇ ν]ήσῳ Κύπρωι βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλ[έα τὸν ἐν Ἀλε]-|ξανδρείαι καὶ Αἰγύπ̣[τωι βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα τὸν ἐπὶ Κυ]ρήνῃ βασιλεύοντα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς τοὺς ἐν Συρίαι βασιλεύον[τας, πρὸς οὓς] | φιλία καὶ συμμαχία ἐ[στὶ τῶι δήμωι τῶι Ῥωμαίων, γράμματα ἀποστελλέ]τω καὶ ὅτι δίκαιόν ἐστ̣[ιν αὐ]τοὺς φροντίσαι, μὴ ἐκ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτ[ῶν μήτε] τῆ[ς] | χώρας ἢ ὁρίων πειρατὴ[ς μηδεὶς ὁρμήσῃ, μηδὲ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἢ φρούραρχοι οὓς κ]αταστήσουσιν τοὺ[ς] πειρατὰς ὑποδέξωνται, καὶ φροντίσαι, ὅσον [ἐν αὐ]τοῖς ἐσ[τι] | τοῦτο, ὁ δῆμος ὁ Ῥωμαίω[ν ἵν’ εἰς τὴν ἁπάντων σωτηρίαν συνεργοὺς ἔχῃ.249

And likewise] to the king ruling in the island of Cyprus, and to the king [ruling at] Alexandrea and in Egypt [and to the king] ruling in Cyrene and to the kings ruling in Syria [who have] friendship and alliance [with the Roman people, he is to send letters] to the effect that it is also right for them to see that [no] pirate [use as a base of operations] their kingdom [or] land or territories [and that no officials or garrison commanders whom] they shall appoint harbour the pirates and to see that, insofar as [it shall be possible,] the Roman people [have (them as) contributors to the safety of all…].250

The implications of this section of the law applies not only to attacking bases inside allied territory but also to the practice of working with pirates for military and economic gain. This may have been the greatest concern for the Romans when dealing with piracy. As stated above, piracy can be seen as an economic activity. In the case of Malta, located 100 km off the coast of

Sicily, piracy was a welcome guest. Isolated from the rest of the Mediterranean and from any of the main trading routes during Antiquity, the Maltese would have benefitted from both the protection and increased trade that the pirates would have offered, protection from the pirates because they would not have attacked the place where they both trade and receive shelter, and protection from other pirates who may attack the island. Economically, the pirates could have

249 Roman Statues, In Two Volumes. Translated by M.H. Crawford (London, 1996), 253-257. Cnidos Copy, col. II, lines 6-11. 250 Translated by M.H. Crawford. 75

acted as a go-between Malta and Sicily where the poor inhabitants of Malta were unable to do so themselves.251 In this case, and in many others, piracy could be a mutually beneficial arrangement.

Sulla’s campaign of 92 BCE against the Cilicians was similarly ineffective. It was

Murena, Sulla’s successor for the campaign who had modest success. By the end of his tour he had annexed some territory for Rome and removed Moagetes, a local ruler. He did so by attacking by land in the north and by sea in the south, in the hopes of taking the pirate bases and pirate fleets at the same time. Murena was recalled in 81 BCE. Another campaign was waged in

77 BCE under Servilius and lasted till 75 BCE. Again, there is very little detail on any of these campaigns, and, therefore, it is difficult to gauge how successful they were. Historians of the time focused on the conflicts with Mithridates, not surprisingly, more than on the pirate campaigns. We do know that the invasion led by Servilius focused primarily on Lycia and

Pamphylia, two kingdoms which had very little association with the Cilician pirates. It can be assumed that, since the campaign was on the edge of Cilician territory, Servilius’ campaign had little effect on supressing piracy in the area.252

One final campaign would be waged in Cilicia before the third Mithridatic War, led by

Marcus Antonius in 74 BCE.253 Marcus was given a three-year command to clear the

Mediterranean Sea of piracy. Unfortunately for him, due to the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic

War, land operations were indefinitely cancelled due to manpower demand in Asia Minor.254

Without the ability to attack the pirate bases on land, Marcus would not have been capable of

251 Ayse Devrim Atauz, Trade, Piracy, and Naval Warfare in the Central Mediterranean: The Maritime History and Archaeology of Malta, Dissertation (Texas A&M Univeristy, 2004), 59-61. 252 Ormerod, 220. 253 Sallust, Fragments., 3. 8. 254 Ormerod, 219. 76

supressing piracy in the Mediterranean. In 72 BCE, Marcus invaded Crete, earning him the cognomen Creticus, but the campaign was a complete failure.255 Likewise, Marcus abused his powers and used it for extortion and personal profit, similar to the case of Verres around the same time.256 By this point the shores of Italy and Sicily were declared not safe by Cotta, consul in 75 BCE.257 Verres’ successor, Lucius Metellus, drove the pirates from Sicily and would later lead a campaign against them in Crete, while Pompey led a campaign against the Cilician pirates.258

255 Dio, Fragments., 108; Diodorus, 40. 1; Livy, Ep. 97; Velleius, 2. 34; Appian, Sicily, 6; Florus, 3. 7. 256 Ormerod, 224-225. 257 Sallust, Fragments., 3. 47. 7; Appian, Mithridates, 93; Florus, 3. 6. 258 Orosius, 6, 3. 77

Chapter Five: Pompey and the Pirates

The series of pirate campaigns waged from 102 BCE till 67 BCE, in addition to the

Second and Third Mithridatic Wars, culminated in the most famous anti-piracy campaign in the ancient world. War had disrupted economic and political stability in all of the surrounding areas, allowing piracy to thrive even against the strongest powers of the Mediterranean. Although maius imperium infinitum (infinitely greater command) had been granted to others before in order to supress piracy, such as the case of Marcus Antonius in 74 BCE,259 the level of power which would be granted to Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus was beyond anything which had been bestowed in the past.260 The conditions which led to this unusual bestowal of command caused even the people of Rome to clamour for what the senate might have called unconstitutional laws.

Fear and insecurity has the effect of making people do what they would not have even considered in normal circumstances. The greater the fear and insecurity the more willing a person or a people is to give up freedoms to attain that security. One such time was the decade preceding Pompey’s pirate campaign. According to our sources, entire towns, cities and islands were deserted, and as many as 400 cities, both fortified and unfortified, were said to have been sacked. Piracy had been allowed to run with such impunity that even the Appian Way, Rome’s oldest highway, located less than 30 km from the western shore of Italy, could not be used

259 Ormerod, 219. Maius imperium infinitum was not an official term used by the Roman Senate, terms such as imperium aequum and imperium maius quam are the most commonly used. Maius imperium infinitum is more of a description, used in somewhat exaggerated manner by men such as Cicero, to describe the type of command that men such as Pompey were being given, which to many would have seemed like unlimited power. For more on the imperium of Pompey and its legal definitions see Shelach Jameson, “Pompey’s Imperium in 67: Some Constitutional Fictions,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 19, H. 5 (December, 1970), 539-560. 260 The position of dictator in Rome, an official office which was conferred in Rome’s direst need, granted the elected individual unlimited power for a short period of time, which power was to be relinquished upon completion of the task appointed by the senate. Pompey Magnus was given an almost equal power, but his term of appointment was far longer than was ever awarded to any previous dictator in Roman history. 78

safely.261 The terror employed by the pirates created widespread fear and panic. Our sources describe this as a time where pirates attacked everywhere throughout the Mediterranean,262 working together as a massive, cohesive organization, insomuch that Cilician pirates became the general term for all pirates across the Mediterranean.263

It has been argued that Rome did not intervene because she was not directly affected by these pirate attacks, but this was not the case in the decade preceeding Pompey’s appointment.

We have literary evidence of the attacks on Rome and her citizens which would have made the threat pirates posed all the more potent. Pirates kidnapped many Roman citizens during this time, including both the daughter of Marcus Antonius264 and Julius Caesar himself.265 Beyond this, two Roman praetors were also kidnapped, along with their lictors. In addition, many places, such as Caieta, Claros, Epidauros, and the temple of Juno Lacinia, to name just a few, were sacked while under Roman supervision. Closer to Rome, Ostia, Rome’s main harbour and link to the sea, was attacked and a consular fleet was overcome, the bulk of its vessels being either destroyed or captured by pirates.266 It is possible that pirates attacked Roman territory due to the abundant riches along the Italian coast or due to the wish to spread terror, in order for the pirates to move more freely against Rome’s provincial territories.267

261 Appian, Mithridates, 93; Plutarch, Pompey, 24; Dio, 36, 20-22; Cicero, de imperio Gnaei Pompei, 31-33; Cicero, Verres, 2, 5, 42; and Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 227-228. 262 Appian, Mithridates, 92; Plutarch, Pompey, 24; Dio, 36, 20-22; Zonaras, 10, 3; Plutarch, Sertorius, 7; Plutarch, Crassus, 10. 263 Ormerod, 222. 264 Plutarch, Pompey, 24; Cicero, de imperio Gnaei Pompei, 32. The irony can be seen in the fact that this is the same Marcus Antonius who led the anti-pirate campaign of 102 BCE. His daughter, along with a number of other Roman ladies, was kidnapped from Misenum, located just under 30km from the city of Naples. 265 Plutarch, Julius, 2; Plutarch, Crassus, 7; Suetonius, Julius, 4, 174; Suetonius, Velleius, 2, 41. 266 Cicero, de imperio Gnaei Pompei, 32; Dio, 36, 22. Appian, Mithridates, 92; Florus, 3, 6; Velleius, 31, 2. 267 Ormerod, 231. The specific targeting and treatment of Roman citizens can be seen in passages from both Plutarch, Pompey, 24 and Zonaras, 10, 3. In different examples they make Roman citizens walk the plank, and treat them worse than non-Roman captives. 79

Greece was hit the hardest in 69 BCE, only a few years before Pompey’s appointment. It is in this year that many Greek towns and temples were sacked, Aegina was overrun and Delos was sacked a second time by pirates.268 One inscription from Tenos, situated in the Cyclades, paints the grimmest picture for us. The inscription describes the island as being devastated from continual attacks by pirates and economically broken due to insurmountable debt.269 Possibly the most threatening aspect to Rome was the diminishment of trade. Rome was finally spurred into action when trade upon the sea was nearly closed. Since no Roman fleet dared to venture beyond

Brundisium, except in the dead of winter, trade was almost at a standstill.270 Rome relied upon trade to provide the city with grain. With the grain trade halted, Rome was faced with famine.271

Confronted with starvation, extraordinary measures were put into place.

It was tribune Gabinius who first proposed that a special command be given to save

Rome from this menace. The senate of Rome opposed this proposal, maintaining that this admonition would lead to a revival of the ancient monarchy, and the amount of imperium which would be bestowed would make the candidate more powerful than any other man in the western world.272 According to Plutarch, all save Caesar “vehemently attacked Pompey.”273 As the senate was striving to limit the power of Pompey by giving him a colleague that would co-command the expedition, the people were outraged and shouted down the opposition to Pompey. The people of

Rome were so set on Pompey being the leader of this expedition that, when one of the consuls

268 IG, 4, 2, 2; Cicero, Legibus Manilius, 55; FGrHist 257, Fr. 12. 13; SEG 1, no. 355. 269 IG, 12, 5, 860. 270 Plutarch, Pompey, 25; Dio, 36, 23. 271 Livy, 49; Dio, 36, 31. 272 Plutarch, Pompey, 25; Dio, 36, 25-36; Cicero, On the Manilian Law, 56. 273 Plutarch, Pompey, 25, 4. 80

openly opposed Pompey “he was near being torn in pieces by the multitude.”274 This is a perfect instance where the fear and insecurity of the people prevailed to create a law that met extreme measures, for after this, Pompey was awarded not only the conditions originally set forth for the campaign but up to double the armaments which he expected.275

It was clearly the flow of grain that troubled Rome the most. This can be seen in both our literary sources as the purpose for the creation of this law and in the first stages of the campaign itself. According to Plutarch: “this was what most of all inclined the Romans, who were hard put to it to get provisions and expected a great scarcity, to send out Pompey with a commission to take the sea away from the pirates.”276 This statement is supported by the fact that, at the beginning of Pompey’s campaign, he focused his efforts on clearing the seas around the Adriatic.

As stated by Cicero:

atque haec qua celeritate gesta sint, quamquam videtis, tamen a me in dicendo praetereunda non sunt. quis enim umquam aut obeundi negoti aut consequendi quaestus studio tam brevi tempore tot loca adire, tantos cursus conficere potuit, quam celeriter Cn. Pompeio duce tanti belli impetus navigavit? qui nondum tempestivo ad navigandum mari Siciliam adiit, Africam exploravit, inde Sardiniam cum classe venit atque haec tria frumentaria subsidia rei publicae firmissimis praesidiis classibusque munivit.277

For who, however eager for the transaction of business or the pursuit of gain, has ever succeeded in visiting so many places in so short a time or in accomplishing such long journeys at the same speed with which, under the leadership of Pompeius, that mighty armament swept over the seas? Pompeius, though the sea was still unfit for navigation, visited Sicily, explored Africa, sailed to Sardinia and, by means of strong garrisons and fleets, made secure those three sources of our country’s corn supply.278

274 Plutarch, Pompey, 25, 4. 275 Plutarch, Pompey, 25-26. 276 Plutarch, Pompey, 25, 1-2. 277 Cicero, On the Manilian Law, 34. 278 Translated by H.G. Hodge. 81

We see in the early stages of the campaign, even before the sailing season had arrived, that

Pompey was fixated on securing Rome’s grain supply.279 This suggests that the pirates had indeed brought trade in the Mediterranean to almost a standstill, insofar as it affected the flow of grain to Rome in the Western Mediterranean, and it was for this reason that Rome used such extraordinary measures in the creation of the Gabinian law.

Some scholars have argued against this motivation in contemporary sources. The fact that maritime loans continued to be employed in Asia Minor at this time suggests that the risks were not as great as they are made out to be, and, therefore, piracy was not as bad as we are led to believe. To support this claim, we can determine the state of emergency based on the price of grain. Looking at the price of grain would be the most important factor as it is the scarcity of grain that supposedly pushed Rome into action against the pirates. Between the years 130 and 50

BCE there was never a dramatic change in the price of grain, suggesting that the grain was never in jeopardy of running out as is stated.280 Yet, it is still possible that Rome, knowing that grain would become scarce, pre-emptively fixed the prices of grain, to ensure that the citizens were taken care of and that there was no profiteering during times of hardship. This was made even more available in 123 BCE after the Lex Sempronia was passed by Gaius Gracchus.281 In either case, there was never a scarcity of grain since Pompey had a very successful campaign.

It is also important to realize the economics of such numbers in the grand scheme of things. Piracy thrives off of trade, even if it is just in slave merchandise. There comes a point

279 Plutarch, Pompey, 26. 4. Also mentions these same locations and the seas which were cleared first, claiming it was done inside 40 days. Appian, Mithridates, 93. Other sources that offer this as the main purpose for the commission are Dio, 36, 23, 2; Appian, Mithridates, 93; Livy, Per, 99. 280 P.D.A. Garnsey and D. Rathbone, “The Background to the Grain Law of Gaius Gracchus,” Journal of Roman Studies, vol. 75 (1985), 21. 281 Appian, Civil Wars, 1. 8. 82

where too much piracy becomes counter productive. There is always, in economics, the risk versus profit margin for any venture. During this time, when, according to our sources, piracy had nearly halted trade over the whole of the Mediterranean, piracy would have been counter productive and actually hurt itself. With no shipping or trade, there could be very little activity for pirates.282 It is true that pirates raided settlements, but unless there were places to trade the goods and captives taken then the attacks would have had little to no profit. If Delos, which the pirates sacked, could not buy slaves from the pirates, then they could not sell them either.

Likewise, once enough settlements had been raided only the stronger settlements would have remained and made it impossible for pirates to make a profit. The cost of running ships, especially as many as the pirates possessed, would have been enormous, as stated previously. For these reasons, some scholars believe that piracy was not as bad as the literary sources suggest.

The difference, as stated above, was that pirates began attacking Rome directly.

Now that Pompey was commissioned “to take the sea away from the pirates,” there was much planning and preparations to be made for such a large undertaking. According to the law,

Pompey was given a total of three years to accomplish this goal. To aid in this endeavour,

Pompey was also given 15 legates, although Gabinius originally proposed 25 legates for the commission.283 The legates would be placed in charge of both ground and naval forces and were given pro-praetor powers. The exact numbers of soldiers, ships, and funds given to Pompey differs slightly depending on which account is read. Appian suggests that 12 legions were assembled, totalling around 120,000 infantry, 4000 cavalry, and 270 ships. Plutarch offers the same number of infantry for the campaign but states that Pompey was given 5000 cavalry and

282 Avidov, 17. 283 MRR 2, 148-149. 83

only 200 ships. The estimates are close enough that either account could be correct, or perhaps somewhere in-between. In either case, Pompey was awarded 6000 talents of silver to raise these forces and was given concurrent authority with all governors 50 miles inland; this authority encompassed all client kingdoms, who were ordered to cooperate to their fullest. We know that this did not make up the entirety of the forces during this campaign.284 According to multiple sources there were many allies who participated in this campaign, especially in the naval aspects.

The pirate fleets consisted of up to 10,000 vessels which would all come to each other’s aid. A mere 200 ships could never have stood against such a large force. Up to 500 ships participated in the campaign, many of which, at least half, would have been from Rome’s socii navales (naval allies).285

With all the resources of Rome and her allies at Pompey’s disposal, it was only a matter of planning the campaign. The Mediterranean was divided into 13 regions or commands. These

13 regions were divided among Pompey’s legates who each commanded a legion inside their respective territories.286 The key to Pompey’s success lay in the coordination and speed in which the attacks against the pirates would be executed. Working together to attack all pirate bases and fleets simultaneously, no one pirate fleet was able to render aid to another. By attacking both land and sea, pirate bases were reduced and pirate fleets had to flee further east to find a safe birth. The first stage of the campaign, focused on the western Mediterranean, took no more than

40 days. Pompey, along with a contingent of 60 ships to make up his personal fleet, drove the pirates from the pillars of Heracles to the western Mediterranean, where the fleets of Metellus

284 Appian, Mithridates, 94; Plutarch, Pompey, 26, 2; Dio, 36, 37, 1. 285 Florus, 3, 6, 8; SIG, 749; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 167; and Ormerod, 234. 286 Florus, 3, 6; Appian, Mithridates, 95. 84

and Varro both waited to ambush them and blockade Cilicia from sending reinforcements. The speed and coordination of the campaign caught the pirates unawares and placed them into a state of panic and chaos. Any ships that fled to shore were captured by the legions. All pirate bases in the west were captured leaving no safe harbour for pirates fleeing the relentless pursuit of

Pompey. With attacks in all directions, the pirates were neither able to mass into a coherent force nor effectively reinforce other pirate fleets who were being engaged.287

Overwhelmed by this swift and decisive action, pirates began to surrender to Pompey and his forces. In exchange for information on other pirate bases and locations, Pompey offered leniency in order to speed the process of finding other pirates and make surrender more appealing in the future, thus completing the campaign faster and with far less bloodshed. This tactic paid off. The second half of the campaign was marked with quick surrenders. A few pirate fortresses, such as Tauras in Cilicia, attempted to resist. As Pompey prepared by both land and sea to besiege these fortresses, the pirates made an unsuccessful attempt to break free off the coast of Coracesium. Shortly after this, the remaining pirate forces and fortresses surrendered.

The second half of the campaign took only 49 days.288 Pompey had cleared the Mediterranean of piracy in three months, something which over 30 years of Roman campaigns had been unable to accomplish.289

The campaign was a huge success. Pompey had captured 71 ships in battle, with a grand total of 300 ships surrendering to him. He took 120 cities, forts, refuges, and killed up to 10,000

287 Livy, 99; Appian, Mithridates, 95; Florus, 3, 6; Plutarch, Pompey, 26; Ormerod, 235-239. 288 Cicero, On the Manilian Law, 31-36; Livy, 99; Strabo, 14, 3, 3; Velleius, 2, 32, 4; Plutarch, Pompey, 26-28; Appian, Mithridates, 95-96; Florus, 3, 6, 15; Dio, 36, 37; Eutropius, 6, 12; Orosius, 6, 4. 289 Technically, it took Pompey four months to complete his campaign. The reason for this discrepancy is due to the period of time that Pompey remained in Italy at the end of the first phase of his campaign, which took multiple weeks. He remained in Italy for so long because the governor of Gallia Narbonesis refused to allow Pompey to recruit in his province, in direct violation of the Gabinian Law (Dio, 36. 37. 2). 85

pirates, even though he had captured and spared the vast majority of them.290 If these numbers are correct, there were a great many pirates active at this time, numbering in the tens of thousands. If we are to believe our sources, the pirates had controlled up to 10,000 ships across the Mediterranean. Given that the average ship would be manned by 100 people, this number including both marines and rowers, then the highest estimate would place pirate populations in the Mediterranean during Pompey’s campaign at roughly one million. This number seems a little excessive. Given that Rome only possessed 1000 ships at the height of her naval power,291 during the last civil war of the Republic between Antony and Octavian, it is difficult to believe that the pirates were able to amass ten times that number. This is made the more implausible as many of the ships, up to half or more, that took part in that civil war would have belonged to

Rome’s allies and not Rome herself. Rome might only have possessed 400 ships.292 With the bulk of allied nations in both the east and west (those with sufficient naval power anyways) contributing their fleets, there would be few ships, other than those meant for trade, that would have remained to be used. As is often the case in ancient history, the numbers of the captured enemy vessels may have been exaggerated. The number of surrendered captives in Cilicia, after

Pompey had won the war, was only, according to Plutarch, 20,000 men.293 This constituted only the second half of the campaign and, therefore, only about half of the combatants. If 10,000 were killed in total, with 20,000 surrendering in Cilicia, it would be reasonable to say that another

20,000 had surrendered or had been captured in the first half of the campaign. This totals about

290 Bradford, 51. The bulk of the captured ships would have been redistributed across Rome’s allies and to herself to bolster their fleets. This was a common practice after a major conflict. The remaining ships which could not be used would have either been stripped for parts, dismantled for their wood, or burned. 291 Avidov, 17. 292 Avidov, 17. 293 Plutarch, Pompey, 28. 86

50,000 pirates. If each pirate ship was manned by only a crew of 100, then there would have only been 500 pirate ships, a much more believable number, especially if Pompey had captured up to

371 ships. This would mean that about 129 ships were sunk. Since no exact numbers exist in our records there can be no precise estimates given, but these numbers seem far more logical. If the

Roman fleets consist of only 400 ships, and piracy was such a problem, then 500 pirate ships is entirely plausible and realistic.

Possibly the most interesting aspect of Pompey’s campaign is how he dealt with the pirates afterwards. Pompey acts in a completely opposite manner to all previous and contemporary methods.294 In fact, it is this unusual method that brings him in direct conflict with

Metellus, who was waging a war against the pirates of Crete. Pompey, after clearing the

Mediterranean of pirates adopted a program of clemency, which marked the attitude of the entire campaign. Pompey, instead of killing the pirates, as was being done by Metellus and all previous leaders before him, decided to spare and resettle them inland. Many scholars, both contemporary and modern, have praised Pompey for this maneuver.295 Plutarch is possibly the most praising, offering, in his opinion, the purpose for Pompey’s clemency:

κατελύθη μὲν οὖν ὁ πόλεμος καὶ τὰ πανταχοῦ λῃστήρια τῆς θαλάσσης ἐξέπεσεν οὐκ ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ τριῶν μηνῶν, ναῦς δὲ πολλὰς μὲν ἄλλας, ἐνενήκοντα δὲ χαλκεμβόλους παρέλαβεν. αὐτοὺς δὲ δισμυρίων πλείονας γενομένους ἀνελεῖν μὲν οὐδὲ ἐβουλεύσατο, μεθεῖναι δὲ καὶ περιϊδεῖν σκεδασθέντας ἢ συστάντας αὖθις, ἀπόρους καὶ πολεμικοὺς καὶ πολλοὺς1 ὄντας, οὐκ ᾤετο καλῶς ἔχειν. ἐννοήσας οὖν

294 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 171. 295 Plutarch, Pompey, 28; Appian, Mithridates, 96, 115; Strabo, 14. 665; Dio, 36. 37; Florus, 3. 6. 14; E.G. Saeger, 1979, 37-38; Leach, 1978, 66-74; Greenhalgh, 1980, 91-100; Pohl, 1993, 278-280. It is interesting to note that some scholars, such as Cicero, later criticized Pompey for his leniency against the pirates. Cicero, Officiis, 3. 49. This can be explained possibly through both convenience and topic. Cicero’s Officiis deal with the proper way in which duty should be carried out. Cicero may have believed that pirates should be dealt with more harshly as an ideal. The rise of Pompey, especially during such a turbulent time would have made it more convenient to attach oneself to whatever actions Pompey undertook at the time. Even Julius Caesar, Pompey’s primary opponent in the next civil war supported Pompey and his actions. 87

ὅτι φύσει μὲν ἄνθρωπος οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ᾽ ἔστιν ἀνήμερον ζῷον οὐδ᾽ ἄμικτον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξίσταται τῇ κακίᾳ παρὰ φύσιν χρώμενος, ἔθεσι δὲ καὶ τόπων καὶ βίων μεταβολαῖς ἐξημεροῦται, καὶ θηρία δὲ1 διαίτης κοινωνοῦντα πρᾳοτέρας ἐκδύεται τὸ ἄγριον καὶ χαλεπόν, ἔγνω τοὺς ἄνδρας εἰς γῆν μεταφέρειν ἐκ τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ βίου γεύειν ἐπιεικοῦς, συνεθισθέντας ἐν πόλεσιν οἰκεῖν καὶ γεωργεῖν.296

The war was therefore brought to an end and all piracy driven from the sea in less than three months, and besides many other ships, Pompey received in surrender ninety which had brazen beaks. The men themselves, who were more than twenty thousand in number, he did not once think of putting to death; and yet to let them go and suffer them to disperse or band together again, poor, warlike, and numerous as they were, he thought was not well. Reflecting, therefore, that by nature man neither is nor becomes a wild or an unsocial creature, but is transformed by the unnatural practice of vice, whereas he may be softened by new customs and a change of place and life; also that even wild beasts put off their fierce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life, he determined to transfer the men from the sea to land, and let them have a taste of gentle life by being accustomed to dwell in cities and to till the ground.297

The passage continues on with the locations of where Pompey placed the pirates for rehabilitation and why he chose those locations.298 This passage would have us believe that

Pompey did not simply want to stop piracy in the immediate but wished for a longer lasting solution, seeing their poverty and vices as the source of their drive towards piracy.

This lead to the instance of where Pompey challenged Metellus’ jurisdiction over Crete.

Metellus waged his pirate campaign against Crete in the typical fashion and then some. His campaign was marked by brutality, refusing surrenders from pirates and killing every pirate captured. Even for the Romans he was brutal and unforgiving. Due to this policy, Metellus gave

296 Plutarch, Pompey, 28. 2-3. 297 Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. 298 For more sources on Pompey’s relocation program see: Appian, Mithridates, 96, 115; Dio, 36. 37. 6; Strabo, 8-7. 5, 14. 3. 1, 3, 5. 8. De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 176, notes that none of these settlements were very far from the sea, nor from rivers, nor from Cilicia, the furthest settlement inland being Epiphaneia, only 15 km from the sea. He argues that this was a hasty resettlement and that they could easily have returned to piracy. The only problem with this argument is that Pompey had confiscated all the pirate ships, so even if they wanted to return to piracy, they did not have any ships with which to do this. It would have taken some time before anyone could afford to get more ships built, and if they did, they would not have been as powerful as they were before. 88

the pirates no other choice than to resist with all their might. Pompey, on the other, had offered the Cretans another solution. Lasthenes and Panares both decided to surrender to Pompey, in the hopes of receiving clemency as other pirates had and avoiding the eventual slaughter offered by

Metellus. Pompey accepted their surrender, interfering in Metellus’ campaign and jurisdiction.299

Some theorize that Pompey wished to end both of the pirate campaigns as quickly as possible in order to take command in the third war against Mithridates, which was passed by the Manilian

Law, even though another was already called to oversee it.300

After all was accomplished, Pompey had plans for the future security of the Republic. He knew that his campaign was only a temporary solution and wished to set up measures to help prevent piracy from ever getting out of hand again. What he proposed was not entirely new, just new for the Romans. Rome had relied, up to this point, on her naval allies to patrol the seas and defend against pirates. As shown above, this was not very effective, especially as Rome diminished her allies and refused to take on their responsibilities. With Rome as the last remaining power of any significance in the Mediterranean after the fall of Mithridates, Pompey, possibly, saw Rome’s place as the protector of the seas. He suggested to the senate that fleets be set up in the east, the Adriatic and the Tyrrhenian sea, costing about 4,300,000 sesterces, to protect trade against pirates.301 This was ultimately refused by the senate and Rome once again took a back seat in policing the Mediterranean.

There are many elements in this campaign which have combined aspects from all previous methods of dealing with piracy and a few new ones. Many of the previous campaigns

299 Dio, 36. 19, 45; Appian, Sicily, 6. 2; Livy, Periochae, 99; Velleius, 2. 40. 5; Cicero, On the Manilian Law, 35. 300 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 172, 176. Manius Aulius Glabrio was supposed to replace Lucullus in Asian Minor but tribune Gaius Manilius and Marcus Cicero passed a law which handed command over to Pompey, who was already in Cilicia. 301 Cicero, Flaccus, 29-30; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 180; Ormerod, 248. 89

were unsuccessful, or at least only successful to a point. Pompey’s campaign is a prime example of how an anti-piracy campaign should be run. Borrowing from previously successful campaigns, Pompey used both a land and sea approach through his entire campaign. Since pirates rely on bases of operation to be successful, it is necessary, and to a point far more important, to attack pirates’ means of selling, resupplying, and safety in order to truly defeat them. This was further compounded by the fast and coordinated approach which Pompey incorporated into his strategy. By hitting all bases and fleets at once there was no time for the pirates to warn others of the attacks, throwing them into chaos and causing mass surrenders with the overwhelming force, a blitzkrieg, if I may use the term. Pompey also promoted the use of leniency in exchange for information, a tactic often used by policing forces today, as a means of both accelerating the campaign and decreasing future resistance. Pompey then tried to deal with piracy in the future by trying to solve the base causes of piracy. By giving these pirates a new living and occupation, as well as new places to live, he hoped to reform them from their old ways. Likewise, he suggested regular patrols to limit pirate activity, as piracy is never truly eradicated. The last factor to the success of Pompey’s campaign actually took place after the defeat of Mithridates. We have discussed previously one of the causes of piracy being political instability and war. With the fall of Mithridates came the defeat of the last enemy who could challenge Roman power in the Mediterranean. I am not stating that Pompey had this in mind when he defeated Mithridates, but it is one of the reasons why piracy did not flare up again until the civil wars. The only wars which pirates could thrive on after this were those fought between

Romans.

Lepidus, along with Octavian and Marcus, formed the second triumvirate in 43 BCE, after a civil war between the three. Sextus Pompey, son of Pompey Magnus, was raiding Italian

shipping and made it difficult to move grain to Rome. This prompted the triumvirate to grant

Sextus control over Sicily and position as commander of Rome’s naval forces in the Pact of

Misenum of 39 BCE in exchange for halting his pirate attacks against Rome.302 After the pact was signed, Octavian continued to accuse Sextus of committing acts of piracy, giving Octavian cause to invade Sicily and ultimately defeat Sextus, along with the opportunity of removing

Lepidus as a political opponent.303 Another reason for labelling Sextus a pirate may have been for legal reasons. Acording to Roman law, no citizen was required to honor oaths made to pirates. This meant that the Pact of Misenum was nullified and Octavian could attack Sextus without legal repercussion.304

It is not certain if Sextus actually continued to commit acts of piracy against the Roman state after the signing of the Pact of Misenum. It is possible that Octavian had used, as was used in the past, the label of pirate as a political tool to attack Sextus and wrestle power from him.

Sextus, at the time, was far more popular than Octavian and presented a major obstacle to his plans.305 On the other hand, it is possible that Sextus was still committing acts of piracy, or, possibly, individuals under his command acting without his knowledge. Many of Sextus’ naval commanders may have been pirates. His fleet had already shown that they were capable and efficient at pirate tactics and methods, and some passages suggest that the leaders of his naval

302 Dio, 48. 36; Appian, Civil War, 5. 7d; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 188. Appian suggests that Sextus had hoped to replace Lepidus as the third member of the triumvirate. 303 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 191-193. 304 Cicero, De Officiis, 3. 107; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 194. 305 Dio, 48. 31; Appian, Civil War, 5. 67. Labelling Sextus a pirate may have also been a political move by Octavian to erode Sextus’ support in Rome, as many had a poor view of pirates, especially since the reign of terror in the 60’s and 70’s BCE. It is interesting that Sextus would be accused of piracy when it was his father who was made famous for ridding the seas of them. Almost every nation employed pirate tactics against their rivals, and it was considered just another form of warfare. The key was to make Sextus’ “war” seem illegitimate so that he could not claim to be waging regular warfare. Only then could Octavian accuse him of being a pirate. This, of course, is what regularly happened, even between rivals. One side accuses the other of piracy but commits the same acts and calls it legal warfare. 91

forces may have been freedmen from his father’s campaign in 67 BCE.306 The two main commanders in question were Menekrates and Menodoros, both of whom had won many naval battles against Octavian and nearly captured him on one occasion. Sextus’ ultimate defeat came when his greatest naval commander, Menodoros, defected to Octavian.307

Only Antony stood in Octavian’s way of supreme rule of Rome. In a battle that would decide the fate of Rome, Octavian employed the combined fleets of Sextus and himself, of which the majority were lembi and biremes, based off of the pirate designs during the Illyrian Wars, and defeated Antony in 31 BCE at Actium. From this point on the Roman fleet would never be the same. Now that the Mediterranean was under Roman rule, with no challengers to her power, there was no more need for large war vessels. The fleets of the Empire, now tasked with actively patrolling the seas in different zones, similar to the suggested methods put forward by Pompey at the end of the Cilician Campaign in 67BCE, were comprised of smaller vessels, primarily lembi and other similar vessels, in order to carry out anti-piracy patrols. Many praise the security of trade under the Principate. Piracy seemed to have reached an all time low.308 Although piracy was not eliminated it was severely diminished, never coming back as a true problem until the

Third Century Crisis.309 Many of the barbarian tribes employed piracy, causing piracy to became rampant as Rome destabilized, 310 Yet, before this, there was almost 260 years of relative peace, called the Pax Romana, when piracy was held in check and the seas were safer than they had been in centuries.

306 Dio, 48. 46; Velleius, 2. 73; Appian, Civil War, 5. 79; Strabo, 5. 243; Lucan, 6. 421; Florus, 4. 8; Orosius, 6. 18. 19. De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 192; Ormerod, 251. 307 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 192. 308 Strabo, 3. 2. 5; Pliny, 2. 118. 309 IG, Rome, 4. 1057; De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 218; Ormerod, 91. 310 De Souza, Piracy in the Greco-Roman World, 225-240. 92

Why was this time so successful for the suppression of piracy? As we have seen, piracy thrives where there are wars, political instability, insufficient resources to counter piracy, poor economic situations, and opportunity. The empire brought the whole of the Mediterranean under the rule and influence of one polity. Due to this, there were no wars of sufficient size and geographical placement that could cause political instability, harm the economy, or make for opportunity for pirates to grow to a considerable size.311 The added resources of the Roman nation made active and continuous patrolling of trade and suppression of piracy a reality. In fact,

Rome prospered economically, further decreasing the pool for pirate recruits and increasing the funding for patrols.

311 The majority of Rome’s conflicts during the Empire took place inland, along the Rhine, Danube, and Persian frontiers. Although banditry may have been commonplace during these conflicts, piracy would not have been as common. 93

Chapter Six: Lessons for Today

For as long as there have been ships sailing the seas there have been pirates determined to take what others possess. The complete suppression of piracy has only occurred at rare intervals, and never at the same time across the world. As such, piracy has always been part of peoples’ lives. As historian Henry A. Ormerod has stated, “If we remember that piracy was for centuries a normal feature of Mediterranean life, it will be realised how great has been the influence which it exercised on the life of the ancient world.”312 This statement can be extended beyond the ancient world; as shown above, piracy has left its mark on the modern world as well. While it has evolved in some areas with technology, piracy has remained quintessentially the same from ancient to modern times, therefore, the core activities of pirates can be compared across all time periods.

Following this logic, we can gain helpful insight into modern piracy by the study of piracy in antiquity. This is an aspect that has not been adequately employed by modern analysts dealing with piracy. The Interpectoral Workshop Group (ISWG) of The Dalhousie Marine Piracy

Project (DMPP) “brought together many leading authorities on piracy from the international legal, military, commercial shipping, academic and NGO [Non-Governmental Organizations] communities”313 but focused only on modern information. It is often beneficial to look back on historical events and use examples from the past to both aid more modern conditions, and sometimes even help predict how certain situations or events will unfold. This is not a new approach and has been practiced by many different nations at various times. As one example, a

312 Ormerod, 13-14. 313 Dalhousie University Marine Piracy Project, “Intersectoral Working Group Workshop,” i. 94

private study in the early 2000’s, sponsored by Donald Rumsfeld, who at the time was the

Secretary of Defense under George Bush, was commissioned with the study of ancient empires, which included that of the Roman Empire, “asking how they maintained their dominance and what the United States could learn from them.”314 Although it is necessary to have experts on modern aspects of piracy, I believe that, due to the similarities between ancient and modern piracy, there is much we can incorporate into modern solutions from ancient sources.

The aspect of state sponsored piracy in the ancient world makes this connection with the modern world even more real. Although most pirates are not trying to further political or religious aims, being primarily motivated by economic reasons, pirates do employ terrorism in their methods. Modern analysis has shown that some pirate groups are directly funded by terrorist organizations or even states in an effort to spread terror and destabilize entire regions.

This seemingly modern approach was frequently employed during antiquity by warring states.

Previous examples given above are Mithridates and the competing Hellenistic Kingdoms.

Terrorism, as we know it today, did not truly exist in the ancient world. This does not mean that similar methods were not used, only that those in antiquity did not view it in the same way.

Regardless of how each era viewed the use of terrorism, and for what goals, there are many similarities between them.

The goal of piracy has not changed these past few millennia. A pirate’s primary goal is to obtain profit at another’s expense. For this reason, most pirates, even if they be state sponsored, are normally economic/social outcasts, especially in regions where the local economy struggles.

314 Neil Faulkner, Rome: Empire of the Eagles (New York: Routledge, 2013), xi. 95

These conditions can be caused by lack of employment, drought, low income, and poverty.315 As stated previously, many scholars believe that pirates in the ancient world were originally fisherman who turned to piracy when their trade was insufficient to provide for their needs, there is some evidence for this in today’s piracy. Nigerian piracy has tended to be the most violent of all piratical areas of the world. According to some reports, piracy has almost destroyed the

Nigerian fishing industry due to fisherman both becoming pirates and to these same individuals attacking the fishing of other countries who compete in the fishing industry.316

I have previously established that many pirate actions are associated with the coast, whether as staging grounds for raids or as the target of raids. It is a common misconception that pirate activity is only a ship to ship occurrence, as is portrayed in many romanticized images of pirates in popular culture and even in modern legal frameworks. Only recently has there been a move to look at piracy as also a land based crime.317 That said, it should be no surprise that the capture of ships and cargo are not the main source of profit for pirates. The main source of income for piracy is actually the ransom of ships and personnel.318 This follows the same pattern that we find in ancient sources, where pirates primarily kidnapped and ransomed their targets, or sold them into slavery. Although slavery is not as widespread today as it was in classical times, it

315 Psarros, 310. 316 Uzer, 6-7. 317 Jesus, 2003; Roach, 2004; Murphy, 2007; Beckmas, 2009; Matison, 2009; Kaye, 2009; Hong and Ng, 2010; Baniela, 2010; Psarros, 310. 318 Uzer, 4. Although kidnaping and ransom are the most common and lucrative methods employed by pirates today, and for that matter in antiquity, there are other methods of piracy as well. The two others which are categorized today are opportunistic attacks (attacking ships at berth or anchor) and Phantom ships (capturing a ship, changing its identity, and using it to sell the goods on board). These last two methods have been generally supressed with more modern systems of protection and detection. In the case of phantom ships, electronic security identities for every ship is required before any trade can be made at ports, limiting the ability for profit to be made by stolen vessels and increasing the chances of being caught by security forces looking for missing ships. 96

still exists. In the ancient world, piracy contributed to many nations’ economies, most famously that of Rome; today, Somalia’s economy has benefitted greatly from the same practice.319

Geographically, piracy occurs more commonly in parts of the world where there are chokepoints, rugged shorelines, or archipelagos. This may be due in part to the economies, political situations, and even the history of the regions, but the most common factor is the geographical locations themselves. The Mediterranean coasts are generally rocky and barren, unable to support large populations.320 The difficulty of travel, the many islands, rivers, inlets, and numerous choke points made for easier raiding by pirates, both on sea and land. The major areas where pirates are active today are in similar types of locations. The Gulf of Aden, a choke point for international shipping, has been an area of especially high pirate activity. Other main areas of the world where piracy is the most successful are the Indian Ocean, East Africa, the

South China Sea, West Africa, the Malacca Strait, South America, and the Caribbean. All of these areas are typified by narrow passages, archipelagoes, and political instability accompanied by poverty.321 Part of the reason for this success lies in the inhibiting of early warning systems due to the geographical features. It has been found that shipping vessels which travel further out to sea are easier to protect as the early warning systems are far mor effective.322

War and political instability have no less bearing on the rise of piracy today as it did in the ancient world, often making piracy easier amid the chaos. A modern example of this can be seen through the rise of Somali piracy in the mid 2000’s during a period of war and political

319 According to the FATF report of 2011, page 10, up to 40% of the money obtained through ransoms leaves Somalia (it is theorized that it is used to fund terrorism). In 2010, over USD 238 million was paid in ransoms to Somali pirates. If 60% stays in country, that means over USD 143 million has been poured into the Somali economy in 2010. 320 Ormerod, 14. 321 Uzer, 13; Psarros, 310, 317. 322 Psarros, 317. 97

chaos.323 Somalia has been relatively a stateless society for over 19 years, leaving the country fractured between warring clans and tribes. The fact that it controls waters which are near the ideal energy trade routes between Asian and Europe made piracy almost impossible to avoid with such a turbulent society which sees piracy as a communal income.324 According to one study by Donna Nincic, 2008, 98% of pirate attacks occur in the waters of failed, or close to failed, states due to opportunity and economy.325 Likewise, Justin Hastings has concluded that weak states (ones that are incapable of sufficiently policing their populace/waters) breed more organized forms of piracy, while failed states lead to more opportunistic and less organized piracy.326

Legally, piracy takes advantage of both loopholes and the inability of some nations to inforce anti-piracy laws. According to the IMB (International Maritime Bureau) which is the specialized crime division of the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce), created in 1982 in conjunction with the UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas), the definition of piracy is “any violence, detention, or act of depredation committed by a person on board a vessel or aircraft against another person, property, vessel, or aircraft on the high seas or in an exclusive economic zone.” It further defines all similar acts that take place in territorial waters or harbors to be acts of armed robbery, not piracy. Since pirates require harbors, docks or landfall to operate, this definition does not account for the wide ranging activity of pirates and adds to the legal hindrances inherent to institutional responses against piracy. This problem is beginning to be addressed as laws, such as the United Nations Security Council Resolution

323 Psarros, 310; Uzer, 7. 324 Piazza, 2008; Hansen, 2009; Dagne, 2009; Baniela, 2010. 325 Bueger, “Piracy Studies,” 409. 326 Justin Hastings, 213. 98

(UNSCR) 1816, passed unanimously in 2008 with approval from the Somali Government, are being created and implemented. Resolution 1816 stipulates that warships are permitted to combat pirate vessels within territorial waters. These laws, however, are only regionally applicable.327

Pirates from both ancient and modern periods use small, light, fast, and maneuverable craft, which can be transported easily over land. The only real difference between modern and ancient pirate tactics lies in the distance pirates today can strike. Modern pirates have the ability to use “ghost ships” that act as a mother ship for the smaller craft. This means that pirates can strike further than the smaller craft is capable, something not required of ships powered by oar and sail.328 This also means that they tend not to engage military vessels. Since the presence of naval vessels in high risk areas has increased, the tactics employed by pirates have changed as well. Pirates have begun moving to less defended areas or simply waiting for military vessels to pass by and attack the next vulnerable target, a tactic which ancient pirates utilized as mentioned above.329 The main tactic of these vessels are to board other ships, take them over, steal their cargo, and ransom the passangers, exactly what was done by pirates of old.330

One of the final similarities between the modern and ancient lies in dealing with piracy.

In both ancient and modern times, responses to piracy have varied and have not always been successful. Normally, extraordinary action is required to deal with piracy. Cyrus Mody states that

327 Douglas Guilfoyle, “Piracy of Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly vol. 57, no. 3 (July, 2008), 692-698. 328 "Analysis: Examining Modern-Day Piracy." Talk of the Nation (Nov. 2005) Academic OneFile (May 2016) http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.ucalgary.ca/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA161881719&sid=summon&v=2.1&u=ucal gary&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&asid=8dac82f55dac3128d184be3512e1db54 329 Psarros, 329; Percy, 2009; Rosenberg, 2009; Osler, 2010; Matthews, 2010; Shortland, 2010. 330 Dalhousie University Marine Piracy Project, “Intersectoral Working Group Workshop,” 10 99

when piracy got out of hand historically, there was a campaign which solved the problem. He continues by stating that “piracy can be defeated; however, it requires political will.”331

As piracy affects more and more of the world, the fear of piracy also grows, leading to more determined action against it. This often results in the alteration of existing laws, or the creation of new laws in order to deal with the growing problem. One example given above is the

UNSCR 1816. It is the fear of piracy and its effects on every aspect of society that drives the creation of these laws. The most famous example from antiquity is the creation of the Lex

Gabinia, which has been discussed in greater depth above. As piracy had almost completely halted trade in the Mediterranean, Rome gave extraordinary powers to Gaius Pompeius Magnus, such as was unprecedented at the time and, in some ways, unconstitutional. This was prompted in no small manner from both the fear instilled in the people and their hungry bellies. No trade meant no grain. Yet, desperate times called for desperate measures. It was no different then as it is now.

Can these ancient models be applied to our modern dilemma? In many cases yes, and modern governments and other political entities are beginning to do so, although not knowingly.

The ideal example of an anti-pirate campaign is Pompey Magnus, who carried out possibly the fastest and most successful campaign in history. The pirates he faced, and the situation he overcame, have many similarities to our present age. He was forced to deal with piracy that was organized, worked with many different states (state sponsored in some cases), and was spread over a large area. An important factor to Pompey’s victory was a unified action across the entire

Mediterranean, coordinated and fast, employing all of the nations across the Mediterranean to

331 Uzer, 1. 100

participate. This meant that this was the “world” against the pirates. Piracy in South China Sea and Malacca Strait has decreased since 2003 due to a multinational cooperation between

Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.332 Unfortunately, today, there is nowhere near the political cohesion of nations working against piracy, focusing instead on local piracy only. This is similar in many ways to the mutual agreements of protection which nations made in the ancient world and does not aim to reduce piracy over a larger area. Since this is a global problem and not just one that needs to be solved in a particular region, the world would need to be unified in this goal.

Likewise, wars would need to be brought to a minimum, or completely ceased, in order to effectively combat piracy and limit its growth. Stopping all conflicts across the world, or at least getting all nations across the world to agree to work together to eliminate piracy, is a lofty goal, and in many cases unreasonable. Many leaders today have realized that piracy can never be eliminated and have opted to supress it, a far sounder goal.

The key to Pompey’s success, capitilazing on this multi-national cooperation between states was attacking all the pirates across the entire Mediterranean, on both land and sea, simoutaneously. Many of our international laws today do not permit the attack of piracy on land.

The main problem that faces anti-piracy forces today is the legal inability to attack pirates in territorial waters and on land. As mentioned above, in June, 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 1816, which, in conjunction with the Somali government, states that foreign vessels are permitted to enter Somali territorial waters to combat pirate

332 Uzer, 5; Psarros, 320. 101

activity, and later that year in December, resolution 1851 was passed which sets out provisions for land based operations against pirates in the same area.333

Since this law has been put in place, piracy in Somalia has been decreasing, suggesting that the methods employed in the ancient world actually have merit for combating today’s pirates.334 Although the overall decrease in piracy cannot be attributed solely to this one factor, there can be no doubt that this resolution enbled UN forces to more efficiently combat piracy in

Somalia. The main problem with its implementation globally is its multi-national nature. The

Romans ruled the entire Mediterranean relatively unopposed when they were able to effectively supress piracy. There is no power today that holds that same position. This means that individual agreements must be made with each individual nation, as in the case with Somalia, in order to employ this method of anti-piracy. Since there are some nations which profit from this piracy it is unlikely that they will be easily persuaded to agree to these conditions. In addition, these laws could be abused by other nations, permitting the potentially hostile forces of another nation to land on national soil. This could lead to attacks on a sovereign power which are disguised as attacks on piracy. False accusations could be used politically as they have been in the past.

Piracy was also hindered during the time of the Roman Empire by the economic boom and security that the Principate offered. This is likewise an almost impossible goal to achieve in our modern age, as the constant wars, terrorist actions, ethnic cleansings, etc., lead to economic and political instability. Although solving the root causes of piracy would make for the best solution, it may not be possible today. Pompey realized that pirates were a product of their

333 Uzer, 26. 334 Christian Bueger, The Decline of Somali Piracy – Towards Long Term Solutions (September 1, 2013) www.piracystudies.org/the-decline-of-somali-piracy-towards-long-term-Solutions/ 102

situations – poor and desperate individuals, driven to piracy as a means of survival in the aftermath of war and poverty. Pompey gave pirates a livelihood in an effort to fix their economic situations so they would be less prone to piracy. It is not certain if it actually worked, but it does show that even in antiquity they were trying to solve the problem of piracy at its roots. Today, especially in our turbulent economic situation, it is very difficult to resolve the poverty of so many across the world. Wars and political instability only further exasperates problems, making solving the root issues an almost insurmountable task, and one that would require the cooperation of most nations around the world.335

Pompey did not rely on relocation to solve the problem of piracy, he well knew that piracy was impossible to eliminate forever and put forth measures to limit piracy in the future.

As mentioned above, Pompey advised the creation of permanent fleets whose sole task was to patrol the seas and defend trade from pirates. To do this he suggesting deviding the seas into multiple regions for more effective distribution and coordination. Although this method was never ratified by the senate, it does suggest one more aspect to combating piracy. Piracy as a whole across the globe is increasing, but piracy in Somalia has been decreasing. When it gets to an acceptable point it cannot be ignored or forgotten, or, as stated in a UN security report, it will return again.336 Many nations from around the world put money into patrolling pirate waters.

This method is not enough to bring piracy down to an acceptable level, but it is capable of keeping piracy under a certin level once it has been adequately reduced.

335 “Delegations in Security Council Note Progress in Combatting Piracy, But Warn ‘Pirates Will Quickly Be Back in Their Skiffs’ if Attention Diverted,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (November, 2012) www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10820.doc.htm 336 “Security Council Renews Action to Fight Piracy Off Somali Coast, Calling for Delpoyment of Vessels, Arms, Military Aricraft,” UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (November 2014) www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11643.doc.htm 103

Studying piracy in antiquity certainly has application to the present and offers interesting insights into dealing with piracy in a modern setting. The most effective methods of dealing with piracy in the ancient world were swift and multi-nationally coordinated campaigns, in which pirate fleets and bases where attacked simultaneously. This success was only capitalized on when wars were brought to a minimum, the economic and political situation was stabilized, and sufficient resources were allocated to policing the seas. That said, of all the successful campaigns, the most extreme measures were the most successful, but were only used when piracy had gotten to the point where it threatened a nation, or nations. In our modern context, where piracy has been increasing in range and intensity across different parts of the world, unless more significant measures are taken it will grow until it reaches a breaking point where extreme measures will be required to end this threat. Some measures have been taken to supress piracy, such as allowing attacks on pirates’ bases of operation, more could be put into practice which would further decrease pirate activity.

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Conclusion

From hindsight we can see the struggle of antiquity against the menace of piracy. From the earliest written accounts to the end of the imperial period, laws and methods have evolved to deal with piracy, and through written record we can discover the best solutions which have stood the test of time. The early warning systems developed during the archaic and classical periods, although different technologically, have been adapted to our needs. Now, similar to the towers, fortifications, signal fires, and inland settlements, modern systems of radar, vessel identification, and conscious distancing from coasts and islands have given modern shipping an early warning system to avoid encountering pirates, or the time to prepare for their coming to increase their chances of escape/resistance.

The patrols and mutual agreements of protection developed in the classical period, and subsequently used in the Hellenistic period, are not unlike our modern efforts to patrol the shipping highways and cooperate between local nations to combat piracy for mutual benefit. Yet, similar to the Hellenistic kingdoms, state sanctioned piracy, used either to attack political enemies or simply to bolster the economy, has both increased the efficiency of piracy and decreased the effectiveness of these countermeasures. This leads to one conclusion, like in antiquity, piracy, funded and efficient, grew to heights beyond what individual nations could cope with and required massive intervention. Before the Romans, and before Pompey, piracy was a problem which was combated with relatively little success. The world today has followed this same pattern of dealing with piracy. As has been shown above, piracy has reached heights which have not been seen in over a century.

105

Yet, history has shown a solution, one that will work even today. Instead of looking to the past to find answers, scholars and polities of today have learned through trial and error what has been done millennia ago. Pompey’s success relied on a massive, coordinated, multi-national campaign which employed the strategy of attacking pirates on both land and sea. This could be done quickly, given the modern ability at instant global communication, if all attacks were to be coordinated simultaneously. This success was capitalized on with the creation of stability, the limiting of wars, the prosperity of unhindered trade, and the protection of better funded and properly supported preventative measures. Although some of these things have been employed with successful results on a local scale, piracy has become a global concern which requires a global solution.

The single greatest difficulty which impedes full implementation of this ancient model is the division among the many nations of the world. A true multi-national campaign would require almost unanimous global cooperation to accomplish. In the time of Pompey this was accomplished through the sheer might of one polity which had control or influence over the entire Mediterranean, and for all intent and purposes, their known world. Today, there is no singular power which has this type of influence, but this does not mean that cooperation between nations cannot be accomplished on this scale. As stated previously, it will take political will. This cooperation between nations would permit the second hardest aspect to be implemented, the legal ability for international forces to attack pirates by both land and sea, which even today has shown to be among the most effective methods of countering piracy. It may be that this will not occur till there comes a crisis point which presses the issue and requires radical action do deal with this global crisis. The more extreme the situation, the more extreme the measures taken to overcome it.

106

The implementation of such a program would have significant global effects, both broad and specific. By subduing piracy, the costs of shipping would decrease, in turn alleviating the costs of transported goods, which would then help stabilize many economies across the globe.

The problem with this program is the immensity of its implementation, as it requires a significant change in global politics, relations, and laws which is made nearly impossible due to the drastic differences and contentions between states.

There are many aspects of how solutions to piracy can be applied today which have not been covered, primarily due to time and space. I would call for scholarship to explore the solutions already created and adapt them to modern situations. This applies not only to piracy, but to a plethora of fields and social concerns. If solutions already exist, it would be better to refer to these before expending both time and money in developing programs which closely follow what has already come before. This has the advantage of saving time and money, as well as reminding us that our past both shows us who we are and can help us determine who we will become.

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Appendix

Figure 1 – Mediterranean Sea

108

Figure 2 – Greece and Asian Minor

109

Figure 3 - Cilicia 110

Figure 4 – Illyrian Coast in Relation to Italy 111

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