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NUMBER 92

THE AND CAUCASIA

Peter B. Golden

Conference on

"NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CH.~'l'GE IN "

Co-sponsored by Kennan Institute for Ad\:anced Russian Studies, The Wilson Center- and American Association fo.r the Advancement Slavic Studies April 24-25, 1980

Peter B. Golden THE TURKIC PEOPLES AND CAUCASIA

For more than a millenium and a half, the fortunes of the peoples of Transcauce.sia have been c+osely, at times inextri­ cably, bound up with those of the Turkic world. Standing at the "crossroads of ," Transcaucasia was often a major thoroughfare through which the predominantly TJrkic of the Eurasian steppelands entered the zone of sedentary cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean basin. Indeed, recognition of its strategic importance to the limes system that separated from sown was one of the factors which has traditionally drawn the attention of neighboring, imperial powers to this region.

Transcaucasia's relationship with the steppe peoples was, at first, largely transient. In time, however, profound, nomadic interventions into the political life of , and • Sirv4n-Ar~n-Azarbayjan did occur. With the advent of the Oguz Turks and subsequent Mongol and TUrkic invaders, these interven­ tions were regularized, affecting the underlying fabric of society and altering the texture of life. These sweeping changes in- eluded the restructuring of the· ethno-linguistic character of the region (always distinguished by heterogeneity, although never matching that of the "mountain of tonguest• to the North) with the TUrkicization of Azarbayjan. The assessment of the impact of nomadic society on the Transcaucasian polities remains a subject of lively debate. Thus, some scholars today seek in the disrup- tions of political, social and economic life that characterized this period the roots of the backwardness that typified these societies at the time of their absorption into the RUssian .1 (2) Early Armenian and Georgian historical accounts contain a variety of anachronistic notices on the activities of Turkic peoples living in close propinquity to Transcaucasia. It is only with the appearance of the "European" (Hhose antecedants and relationship to the Hsiung-nu of Chinese sources still require elucidation) in the mid-fourth century,. however, that we may be­ gin to speak of a genuine interaction between the TUrkic peoples and the populations of Transcaucasia.2 A Hunnic raiding party, undoubtedly in connection with their activities against sasanid , made its way into Armenia Q.§:_.J6J. Hovses Dasxuranc'i's tale of the victory of Babik of Siwnik', the champion of Sapur• II (309- 3'?9), over the "Hun called Ronagurn in single combat in the late J?O's illustratesthe Hunnic presence here.3 These raids and the devastating campaign of the Huns (apparently brought about by famine in the steppe) of 395 in which they menaced Armenia, Iran and Roman Mesopotamia, induced the Empires to work out a system of joint responsibility for the forts guarding the Caucasian passes.4 ~rhe Buns, thus, became an important consideration in the policy of synarchy by the "superpowers" in Transcaucasia, a po- licy which ultimately led to the abolition of the local monarchies.

Iran, faced with a constant threat from the nomads, regularly summoned vassal Armenian and Georgian forces to fight them. The ":northern ImrHders," however, a.l though a potentially double-edged , could also be exploited by the Transcaucasian polities in attempts to gs.in greater autonomy or indepe::1.dence from their neighboring overlords. Horeover, Sasanid persecutions of Chris- tians ··fluctuated in proportion to their success or lack of it in the wars against the Xion. Thus, when nomadic pressure slackened, sasanid attempts to implant in Christian Transcau­ casia tended to increase. In response, the could and (3) did enter into direct alliance with the 11 Euns" against their

Iranian overlords. This occur'~dr, during the revolt a.gainst Yazdi- gard II (438-457) which ended in the Armenian defeat at Avara.yr

. lJ/1 ~n ·:J • Similarly, the (Aiuan) did not hesitate to bring in the Euns in the course of their revolt against F'eroz (458-484) during the early years of his reign.5 Indeed, the death of Peroz in 484 in vrarfare e.gainst the "nuns" gained for the , Armenians and peoples of Albania. an easing of direct sase.nid rule.

While several patterns in the involvement of the 'rurkic nomads in ·:rranscaucasian affairs up to the early sixth century may be discerned, we cannot distinguish any broader conceptualization on their part of their role in the larger clash of empires to their south. As we are poorly informed regarding the internal workings of the nomadic formations at this time, it cannot be determined whether this was due to the absence of a centralized political command amongst them or the lack of a sustained interest on the part of the Empires to make use of their services in the struggle for dominion in the l'Jear East. Nonetheless, the course of events in the sixth century witnessed some dramatic changes.

A series of nomadic migrations had introduced new Turkic con- federations to the ?onto-caspian . Driven by the movements of tribes in and Central touched off by the expansion of the Juan-Juan in Nongolia, the Ogur TUrkic tribes crossed the into the western Eurasian steppes ~.463 A.D.6 These Ogurs, speaking a variant form of TUrkicJwere part of a

larger tribal union, the T'ie-1~ of Chinese sources. Long in­ volved with commerce (especially the fur trade) and relatively (4) well-advanced in agriculture, metallurgy and technology, they were intermittantly drawn into Byzantine anti-Iran coalitions. This policy became more regularized in the course of the sixth century and the names of the tribal groupings involved, the Ogur, ~ . . . Ono~ur, Saragur, Uturgur, appear frequently in Byzantine and Syriac sources.

In the early decades of the sixth century, the Ogurs were joined in this region by the Sabirs (who were probably directly responsible for their westward migration). The bulk of the Sabir union nomadized in the North caucasian steppelands. Elements of them, however,_ appear to be located on the Volga as vrell { subse­ quently figuring in the Volga Bulgar tribal union: the suwB.r of the Islamic authors?). The Sabirs were soon engaged in the lu­ crative (for them) Byzantine-Iranian wars of (527-565) fought in Transcaucasia. Although not adverse to switching sides, their fickle "loyalties" were more often than not in the Constanti- nopolitan camp. From the Byzantine standpoint, an alliance with a large and powerful steppe confederation located i·n the pivotal North caucasian steppe zone conferred several benefits. such allies not only provided a constant source of pressure on the sasanids, but could also be used to check the movements of other nomads seeking to cross the Volga. With the emergence of the nomads as a consideration in imperial policy, it soon became appa- rent that the Volga, a gateway to the North and , constituted the first line in 's defense. The fate of the peoples of Transcaucasia, as we shall see, came to .be closely tied to the success of Byzantium in this vital region.

Evidence for an "activistJI approach to the question on ( 5) the part of the Transcaucasian Christian peoples as well may be seen in the mission of the bishop of Albania, Kardost, who, ca.

530, went to the 11 land of the Huns" (perhaps the Sabirs). His alleged mission was to minister to the needs of Christianslanguish- in captivity there, but, in fact, he attempted to convert the nomads. In this, he was following a tradition that had begun with Gregory the Illuminator (d.J31)8. This mission and subsequent attempts to bring about the conversion of the nomads undertaken by Armenian/Albanian and Byzantine clerics, had little lasting effect. Nonetheless, growing hostility toward Iran tended to place the nomads in the Byzantine camp and as a consequence their interventions into affairs in Transcaucasia frequently weakened Sasanid rule.

The appearance of the in Western ~·557-558 brought an end to Sabir domination of the North Ca.ucasus. The

Avars, however, were quickly {~.567) driven into by the

Ttlrks who had overthrown the Ju~.n-Juan (Avar) Qaganate in Nongolia in 552. In their pursuit of their erstwhile overlords, the TUrks extended their hegemony to the western steppes.9 Interested in both trade (the silk route) and establishing their dominion over fugitive elements of the Avars, the Tiirks made their initial dip­ lomatic overtures to Iran. When the inherent conflict of interest

between the sasanids and the A~ina became apparent, the T~rks turned to constantinople .10 The history of Byzs,ntino-'.ri:irk rela­ tions, despite the shared hostility towards Iran, is chequered with misunderstandings, fears of deception {not always unjustified) and occasionally devasting raids on Byzantine holdings in the and TrA-nscaucasia. On balance, however, it Has the Iranian hold in the caucasus that was more profoundly shaken. Once again, (6)

Iran was faced with a. noMadic menace on both its northwestern and northeastern frontiers. Unli~e the eRrlier threats, the nomads l'fere now unit under the aegis of the 'I'lirk Qagans. In keeping with an e.lready established pattern, Sasanid difficulties with the TUrks, combined no·N 1vi th Byzantine pressure, permi tt the Transcaucasian states some greater measure of independence. Thus, -ca.588, the F,.,astern Georgians- {Iberia/K'art'li) reestabli- shed their autonomy. 11 A material reflection of the extent of the threat may be seen in the extensive building activity of AnosirvAn (531-578) who carried out a large-scale reinforce-

The Turks also organized the various Sabir, Ogur and other Turkic elements in the Western Eurasian steppes into a powerful tribal confederation under the direct authority of the Yab~u Qagan. The latter was a member of the royal Asina clan and the ruler of the western part of the TUrk realm. In the course of the seventh century, two major tribal unions emerged in this region under the TUrk banner: the {Q'azar) and . Although the latter were not unknown to our Transcaucasian sources, it was the former who figure most_ prominently in the contemporary accounts. Given the understandable confusion in our sources of Khazar and Turk (the two are virtually interchangeable at this time) and the anachronistic attribution of the ethnonym Khazar to a number of nomadic groupings in the early sixth century, it is not until the mid-seventh century that we can trace the outlines of Khazar in- volvement in Transcaucasian affairs with any degree of clarity. Prior to this, they operated in close concert with their Tttrkic overlords. Thus, the Khazars formed the bulk of the Tftrk forces used by the Byzantine Emperor (610-641) in his counter- {?) offensive against the Sasanids in Transcaucasia. Armenian and Georgian sources provide important details on the campaigns of the Jebu Xak'an/Jibgu ( Qagan), in particular his partici- pation in the of T'bilisi in 6zs.l3

The Tfirko-Khazar involvement played a decisive role in the Byzantine victory. At the war's conclusion, however, Transcaucasia once again found itself partioned into ttspheres of influence." Armenia was placed within the Byzantine orbit while Iberia/ K'art'li enjoyed an uneasy "independence ... In Albania-Azarbayjan, the situation was somewhat more complicated, The south was firmly in the Sasanid orbit. The northern zone, controlled by the l1ihranid dynasty (which was related to the Iranian royal house) was a vas­ sal state. The degree of its dependence, however, was in large measure determined by the Khazars who frequently raided its north­ ern regions and periodically occupied various territories. The !1ihranids, of course, attempted to exploit this situation with re­ sults that were occasionally devastating to their lands,l4

Iran and Byzantium had been exhausted by the long contest, a factor which greatly facilitated the Arab conquest of Transcau­ casia in the mid-seventh century. The only effective opposition to the new invaders was provided by the Turkic nomads under Khazar leadership. Needless to say, their involvement here was hardly altruistic. In the steppe, too, major changes had taken place. The Tftrk Qaganate, long caught up in domestic strife, had submitted by 659 to T'ang . The TUrk hold in the western­ most part of the steppes, the Ponto-caspian zone, had actually begun to fade in the decades preceding the final collapse. The

period 630-640, then, marks the full emergence of the Khazar and (8) Onogur/Onogundur-Bulgar conf.ederations, successor states of the

Ttlrk, ruled by rival clans of the ~vestern Ttlrk (On Oq). Although faced i-'li th Are.b attacks on their North caucasian territories as early as 64215, the Khazars, in a protracted struggle with the Bulgar union, one which largely escaped the notice of our sources, completely defeated their rivals by the 670's. Those Bulgars that did not migrate west1-vard to Danubian and the Ball{ans were absorbed into the Khazar union.

As early as 661-662, the I\hazars, taking advantage of the slackening of the Arab hold in Transcaucasia brought about by the struggle between cAl! and Nucrtw!yah (65?-661), unleashed a series of devastating raids into Albania. Juanser (d.680), the Albanian ruler and his successor Varaz-Trdat (680-699) tried to maneuver between the Khazars, and Byzantines through an elaborate system of marital ties and timely submissions to one or another authority. It did little to restrain the incursions of the Khazars e.nd their subjects, the "North Cauce.sian Huns" and resulted in placing the Hihranid realm further into the Arab camp. An interest­ ing episode of e, more pacific \-ras the dispatch, in 681, of a religious mission headed by the Albanian bishop Is·ray~l to Alp' Ilit'uer (=Alp 11-tever/il-teber, a Turkic title designating a vassal ruler in the Old Tflrk system) of the ttN"orth caucasian :nuns." The account of this cleric's sojourn amongst the nomads is pre­

served in l'·Tovs~s J)B.sx:uranc' i and provides us with many valuable details regarding their shamanistic practices.16

Following the geo-political policy lines already established by Beraclius, Byzantium encouraged Khazar attacks on the Arab­ domin_ated regions of Transcaucasia. Thus, the 680 's vii tnessed (9) destructive assaults on Armenia, Iberia/K'art'li and Albania. ·rhe early decades of the eighth century 1-'iere marked by a sharp in- crease in the scale of Arabo-Khazar warfare for control of Trans­ caucasia.17 The use of '::.:'ranscaucasian forces by the Arabs in these campaigns only compounded local difficulties. A dramatic denouement to this phase of the Arabo-Khazar confrontation took

place in 737 when the UmayyB.d commander, i·1arw~n, in a surprise drive on the Khazar capital on the Volga, Atil, captured the Qagan. The latter was forced to embrace , signal. ing there­ by his submis'sion to the . This, however, was a transient victory. The Umayyads, r;rho were soon overthrow·n and replaced by

the 'Abb~sids (750), did not have the resources to station a per­ manent army of occupation in Khazaria. The Qagan, discarding

Islam, resumed his independence. ~he old Sasanid limes at B~b al­

Abw~b (Darband-i Xazar~n) became the border between the two empires and the northernmost extension of Arab power in this region.l8

The ¥~azars were now full partners in a kind of tri-dominium that was established in Transcaucasia. Their full integration into the state system here was reflected in a series of marital ties with the Byzantine and Western Georgian royal houses as well as with the local Arab governors. Striking evidence that Khazar policy did not necessarily coincide with that of Constantinople may be seen in several incidents involving the Georgian lands. In 780, the Khazars refused to aid the Iberian/K'art'lian prince Nerse against his Arab overlords. Some six years later, however, the Qagan supported his kinsman (grandson) Leon, the erist'avi of Ap'xazet'i (Western Georgia) in the latter's successful bid to end Byzantine hegemony there.l9 The Khazars, thus, were instru- (10) mental in reestablishing Georgian independence. Not long there­ after, ~-799, the last major Khazar raid against the Arabs in T.ranscaucasia took pla.ce. 20

The ninth century -vri tnessed a weake~ing of both the Caliphate and ru1azaria brought about by centrifugal forces and a concommi­ tant resurgence of Byzantium. The Khazar decline had serious re- percussions in 'I'ranscaucasia. The destabilization of the western steppe zone which resulted from the end of the Pax Chazarica, per~itted the entnlnce of new nomadic forces into the region. The Byzantine response was a shift away from the Khazars and an attempt (ultimately unsuccessful) to transform the Pecenegs into the guardians of Ponte-caspian steppes.21 At the same time, the poli­ tical fragmentation of the caliphate, in which the large-scale introduction of Central Asian Turkic gul~ms22 in the latter half of the ninth century played a significant role, permitted a Byzan­ tine reconquista in the East. These same forces helped to bring about the revival of the Armenian and Georgian monarchies, in the course of the 880's, under the ubiquitous Bagratids. In 1008, Bagrat III (975-1014) united Eastern and Western Georgia {K'art'li and Ap'xazet'i) thereby paving the way for subsequent Georgian ex­ pansion throughout Transcaucasia. Concurrently with this, Azar­ bayjan was experiencing what Hinorsky has felicitously phrased the "Iranian Intermezzo,n the brief emergence of local Iranian dynasties in the wake of the Arab retreat and TUrkic advance.23 The greatest immediate danger to the restored monarchies, however,

was posed by Byz~)ium whose territorial acquisitions in the course of the tenth and early eleventh centuries came to include Armenian and Georgian lands. These Byzantine gains, culminating in the annexation of the Armenian kingdoms of vaspurakan {1021) and (11) (1045), proved illusory. Byzantine rule not only removed the Armenian ''buffer" against steppe forces which had already made themselves in the region as early as 1016, but did much to dismantle the Armenian armed forces.24

Heanwhile, a complex concater..ation of events in the Central Asian steppes galvanized a number of Turkic tribes into motion. The Oguz confederation which he.d formed on the in the last quarter of the eighth century in the aftermath of the col- lapse of the Second Ttirk '~aganate in 741 Has unstable. In the course of the latter half of the tenth century, some of its elements v-:rere dra~vn into the web of Byzantine anti-Illie.z:otr coali- tions (there is evidence that some of these Oguz had been rlliazar vassals). They appear to have joined t

Kimek union (these buffetings also brought the Pe~enegs to the ), their eastern elements were increasil1gly caught up in the troubled of Husl1m . Here, Oguz group- ings, including the followers of the house of Seljuq, were con- verted to Islam e,nd drawn into the Gaznavid-¥ Qaraxanid rivalry. Subjected to a number of' reversals at the ha.nds of their more powerful.. neighbors, some Seljuqid (fmd other Oguz) bands migrated to Gaznavid-controlled Khur~s~n. In 1034, the main mass of the Seljuqid-led Oguz fled thither as well. ed with starvation, they took to brigandage. Their raids and depradations resulted (12) • a~ainst in a Gaznavid offensive v them. Knowing that they must either prevail or face extinction, the Seljuqs scored a resound­ ing victory over the Gaznavids at Dandanaq~n in 1040. All of

IrE>n noV>T lay open before them. 26 'Ehe 'Ab~sicl Caliphs, seeking

a means to rid hemsel ves of the Si 't BO., v-i ere induced to legitimize this new force. Thus, the resultant Seljuqid Sultanate was provided with a program that would make ~hem masters of a good portion of the Islamic world.

The precise identity and political/tribal affiliations of the TUrkic raiders who troubled Vaspurakan in 1016 and the r!ig region in 1021 are st5.11 in dispute.27 In any event, their ac­ tivities induced Senek'arim, ruler of vaspurakan, to. transfer his kingdom to Byzantium in exchange for estates in the region of Sebasteia (Sivas). Bands clearly associated with the Seljuq dy- nasty may be placed in Azarbayjan as early as 1029. Elements of these Oguz subsequently raided Armenia (~.1038) and were soon giving little to the Sadd~did rulers of Ganja/Gandzak.28

'rhe size and pace of the Turkic attacks increased as the events of 1047-1048 show. Thes-e raids may be termed "Seljuq'' only in so far as they were carried out by bands nominally under the leadership of the Seljuq dynasty. In reality, the Seljuqs (whose actual interests were focused on establishing their supremacy with- • in the Islamic world) were often compelled by their "subjectstt to · undertake these ventures against the surrounding Christian states.

Ibn al-At~r gives us some insight into the internal dynamics of the •'seljuq movement." In connection with the events of 1048 he notes that the Seljuqid Ibr~h!m Yinal (Yinal/fnal is a high­ ranking Oguz title), finding himself inundated with newcomers (13'- ) from and not having enough land to provide for them,

suggested that they raid 11 RUm."29 The wretched state of the Oguz entering the Near Bast accounts for their particular rapacious- :ness, frequently remarked upon by our sources. Thus, Aristakes Le.sti vertc 'i notes that they "fell on the Christians like hungry ."JO

The 'rurks launched several attacks into the Basean valley and defeated a Byzantine-Armenian-Georgian army. The Georgian magnate, Liparit, who had been exploiting the Byzantine presence

in Vaspurakan and Ani to resist the centralizing polici~s of Bagrat IV (1027-1072), was captured and carried off to Iran. After a

Byzantine-Georgian counter-offensive had ~riven the Turks from the Ganja region, Liparit was released (Byzantium continuing its inter­ ference in Georgian affairs paid his ransom) and resumed his di­ visive activities.31 Aristocratic opposition to the centralizing monarchy, a perennial problem, was, as we shall see, ultimately strengthened by the nomadic presence.

In 1054, the Togrul-Beg brought about the submission of the Raww~did rulers of Southern Azabayjan and the Sadd~dids of Dvin and Ganja. This 1-ras preparatory to an invasion of Christian Transcaucasia. Marauding expeditions were directed thither in 1054-1055, resulting in widespread destruction, especially in the Armenian territories. The pressure continued in 1055-1056 when

the Sadd~did Abu'l-AsvAr, now a vassal of the Sultan, attacked Armenia, thereby contributing to the growing number of refugees.32 Famine and in the lands recently acquired by the Oguz added to the ferocity of their assaults on their neighbors. Internicine strife in Byzantium and Georgia lessened the resistence encountered by the raiders. Indeed, in Georgia, they were even called in by (14) rebellious magnates.

Bagrat IV sought to relieve some of the ssure by calling in the ossetins (with Nhose ruling house he had ensive ties) to attack Sadd~did Arr~n in 1062 and 1065.33 These measures, how- ever, were of little avail for a massive Seljuq force was now di­ rected at Transcaucasia. In 1064, Togrul-Beg's successor {1063-1072) entered the region. Although all of Transcau- casia the impact of the T~rkmen, the principal target was Ani, the onetime capital of Bagr0.ticl Armenia. It fell Gagik of abandoned his lands shortly thereafter. Bagrat IV, despite his attempts to 'li'i~'trd off approaching danger with tal alli- anoes and , could not save Georgia from attack in 1067- 1068. His neighbor, the Kaxet'ian king Agsart'an, who was fearful of Bagrat's efforts to "unite 11 his lands with those of K'art'li, chose a different course. accepted Isls.m and submi ttecl to Alp Arslan. The reso~ceful Bagrat, however, parried these blow·s, suo- " oessfully defending himself the Fadlun who often agai~1st Sadd~clic: • functioned as Alp Arslan•s agent in Georgia. Bagrat, thus, managed to evade formal to~ens of submission (payment of the xar~j).J4

At the same time, the Seljuq hold in Sirv~n was established when FEtri burz of the Ya.ztdt/Nazyadid dynasty ruling there submit- ted to the Sultan in 460/l067-lC68 follov.;ing the appearance of Oguz ra.iding parties in his realm. Fariburz then joined Alp Arslan's campaign against Georgia which had often been a trouble­ some and aggressive neighbor.J5

One of the main thrusts of the Seljuq Transcaucasian campaign thus far had been the securing of Azarbayj~n as a staging area. for future activities to be directed largely against opponents in (15) the T·:uslim '"IWrld. The campaign also provided a necessary safety- valve for the restless energies of the Ttlrkmen. This latter fac- tor was probably the main consideration behind the raids into

Anatolia. The Seljuqs ~vere really little terested in this area

this time, hoping only to maint.s,in Ft secure flank for their operations in . The Tftrkmen raids, however, forced a con- frontation with the Byzant culminating in the dramatic clash at Nanazkert (Hantzikert/Halazgirt) in 10?1. Continual probing of Christian defences, both Byzantine and r~ranscaucasian had shmvn how weak these actually were. As a consequence, raiding would now give 1/lay to invasion and settlement. After the I·:anazkert de- bacle, Byzantium withdrew from the region. Armenia, undermined by Byzantine aggression and shattered by the Turkish raids, was already experiencing the more permanent presence of the Turks with- in its borders. Georgia, isolated and surrounded, was noY

Giorgi II (1072-1089) succeeded his father Bagrat IV to the Georgian throne at approximately the same time that Alp Arslan

1.;as assassinated. The latter's son and successor, Haliks~h (1072- 1092) proved to be one of the dynasty's strongest figures. Giorgi, whose compassion and justice is extolled by the Georgian chronic­ lers (in contrast to his father)38, ~'las plagued by domestic strife and despite valiant efforts could not effectively deal with the

Turkish threat. r·Ialiks~h unleashed a series of assaults against both Georgia and the semi-independent Huslim rulers in Sirv~n and (16)

Arr~n. The latter were brought under Seljuq control in 1074-1075 and Arr~n, in particular, 1-'las now thickly settled by Ttirkmen. Giorgi was initially successful in fending off the Seljuq forces led by Sautegin that were sent against him in the late 1070's.

In 1081, however, Ealiks~h began the didi t'urk'oba and Giorg~ was compelled to submit. The renewal of resistance on the part • • of the Sadd~dids and Sirv~ns~hs brought another large-scale Seljuq invasion in 1086 and a consequent strengthening of Turkish control throughout the region.J9 Transcaucasia had been.incorporated into the Seljuq system.

Seljuq rule in Transcaucasia was not uniform in its duration or impact. On the whole, in keeping with practices, they were relatively tolerant in religious matters. The negative aspects of their rule surfaced, rather, in the area of economic development. The invasions alone were enough to seriously disrupt the local economy. This was compounded by the Turkish settlements and resultant transformation of agricultural lands into nomadic pasturages. Paradoxically, this regression provided a temporary hiatus in the enserfment of the local peasantry. The great es- tates tended to be broken up As the Tfirkmen economy was little interested in large-scale agriculture and lands were needed to be

alloted as ~t~( to the local begs and servitors of the dynasty, Thus, a less dependent peasantry supported by a system of small holdings was encouraged. This, of course, only benefitted those peasants who had not fled and had survived the raids.40 The ~~ac system41, unwittingly tended to fuel centrifugal forces which greatly contributed to the Seljuq decline. These same forces of regionalism-separatism undoubtedly diluted the impact of Seljuq rule. Horeover, the Old Turkic practice of viewing the conquered (17) lands as the common property of the ruling dynasty and the conse­ quent division of this terri tory to provide for "mini-states'' Nithin the larger Nhole, permitted considerable local autonomy in those regions (such as Georgia) ~vhere the native rulers, noit·T vas- sals of the Sultan, survived. Indeed, this theory of goverru.7J.ent, despite the brilliant statesmanship of Nizltm al-Eulk (the principal • minister of Alp Arslan and I-·:alikstlh) who attempted to create a centra.lized system, probably contributed to the survival of the Christian caucasian polities. In practice, it also coincided 1vi th older Near Eastern traditions of superstratification in which the ''" was no~r the --·Sult~ .. n-1 A~zam.·- The rapidity of the Seljuq decline after the death of r:Ia­ liks~h prevented the Turks from achieving a stronger foothold in regions like Georgia. This decline, in part the result of internal dynastic struggles, was greatly exacerbated by the hostility of the Ttlrkmen towards the dynasty. An echo of this hostility could still be felt centuries later.42 Those regions, however, like Azarbayjan (where large-scale politico-territorial units had ,not existed} became tribal reservoirs and Nere dr~u'm into the very heart of the post-Maliks~h system. In the process, they were per­ manently Turkicized.43

As Seljuq authority became fragmented and diffused, particu­ larly after the death of Berkyaruq (d.ll04), the opposite tendency is observable in Georgia. Giorgi II was forced to relinquish the actus.l governance of the country to his energetic son Davit'

Agmasene• • b eli ( ''the Builder" ) • The latter became co-king in 1089 and promptly embarked on an ambitious program of domestic reform and foreign expansion. This policy laid the groundwork for a pan-

Transcaucasian state. Thus, by 1097, Georgia ceased paying the (18) xar~j and had made significant progress in expelling the Turks beyond its borders. 4 L~ FollovJing his vic tory over the Sadd~did Fadlt!n of Ganja at ?:rcuxi in 1104, Davit' established control over • Heret'i and Kaxet'i. From 1110 until his death in 1125, he was continuously at 'iJar ~-;i th his Turko-nuslim neighbors. By the end of his reign, Georgia had been cleared of the Turks and its borders greatly expanded. The lands of the former Armenian kingdoms I-T ere incorporated into the Georgian state. The predominantly Euslim realm of the Sirv~nsfths Has brought under Georgian jurisdiction45 and a I'Tas extended to the Osetins. On 12 August, 1121, Davit' defeated a coalition of Sel juq-It:uslim forces at Didgori, thereby confirming Georgian supremacy in Transcauca­ sia.46 T'bilisi which had been in and out of Georgian hands, was taken in 1122 and became the capital of the greatly enlarged Georgian state,

These successes in foreign affairs were preceded and accom- panied by domestic reforms aimed at strengthening central authority. Here too, a Turkic component is much in evidence. Davit' seeking to free the government from the stranglehold of the great aristo- cratic clans, brought in lesser nobles and non-Georgian elements (the displaced Armenian figured prominently here) who would be beholden to the crown. Taking advantage of his marital ties to the Qlpcaq- of the Ponto-caspian steppes (his wife, Guranduxt, was the daughter of At'rak'a (otrok of the Rus' sources), the son of Saragan/Sarukan). Davit' invited some 40,000 Cumans to settle in Georgia (many regions of which had been depopulated) and serve in a special military force tied directly to the crown.47 This measure, 't'l'hen viel'l'ed in the context of the role Turkic groups had played in the Islamic world, was not a radical innovation for (19) the region. Even in Rus' (with which Davit• ~pparently had some contact). rurkic elements were brought into the border-guard .,. system in the mid-twelfth century (£!. the Cernye Klobuki). Those Qtpcaqs that ultimately chose to stay on permanently in Georgian service (others returned with otrok to the steppes) were Chris- tianized and Georgianized. They were joined by other Qtpcaqs in the course of the twelfth century and some of t~mcame to occupy leading positions in the state. Georgian sources distinguished between the "new Qtpcaqs" (g.. !:~rc 'e.g_ni axalni) and "former '.::ttpca.qs"

(the na~ivc'aqaras).

Georgia had been trFtnsformed into the leading pm'ler in Trans- caucasia. Davit''s successors would now be hard pressed to retain ... their Armenian and Sirv~ian possessions. Indeed, the nature of the relationship of the Georgian crown to these subject territories was not only poorly defined (to some extent the Georgian kings functioned as .. kings of kings") but vle.s continually in the process of being re-defined by the changing fortunes of war. The surround­ ing Turko-Muslim amtrates (the Saltuqids, Artuqids, Mengttjikids, the ~h-i Armens/S5kmenids of Axl~t/Xlat, Il-Degfizid/Il-Dengizids)48 • and their nominal Seljuq overlords (particularly the Iraqi Sul­ tanate) were not reconciled to the loss of these lands and bitter- ly contested them. Thus, Demetre I (1125-1156) and Giorgi III (1156-1184) were occupied almost totally with the question of con­ trol over Ani and e.djolning Armenian le,nds and !3irvan. 49 On the whole, Demetre and Giorgi were relatively successful in maintaining a Georgian presence in the areas acquired by Davit' Agmasenebeli. Nonetheless, a qualitative change in Georgia•s relationship with some of these regions may be noted. The policy of outright anne- xation was largely abandoned in favor of what became an often (20) unstable vassal relationship. The weakening of the Georgian hold was attributable, in part, to the resurgence of aristocratic op- - position to the crm·m which exploited strife :,o.ri thin the Bagratid e. 7hus, Giorgi III had to a serious rebellion in

1177 ( ~vas greatly aided by the ~'1. never resolved the problem of aristocratic opposition which was bequeathed to his daughter and successor T'e.m:=tr {1184-1213). The other factor militating against a more dynamic realization of i's program. was the rise of

HE~s a Qtpcaq gulftm 1·1ho had begun his career in the service of the

Iraqi juq . In 1133, he was appointed atabe~ of Arrdn and married into the Seljuq royal house. 1-ii thin several years, he had control over most of Azarbayjan and become the leading figure in the Sultanate.50 Despite the extraordinary turbulence of Seljuq domestic politics, Il-Dengiz -.;..;as able to mount an ef- fective opposition, in both Western Azarbayjan and Armenia to Georgian encroachments, This policy·was continued by his son

Jah~n Pahlav~n {1172-1186). After his death, various centrifugal elements (local am!rs) reasserted themselves. s brother Qtztl Arslan (1186-1191) tried to combat these di ive forces as well as the resurgent Iraqi Seljuqid, Togrul III, his nominal overlord.

Allied to the t'Abb!!sid Caliphate w-hich vlas also 1 a bid to regai11 its secular authority, he was proclaimed Sultan, but was murdered in 1191. The ~ Sultanate did not long survive him.

In 1194, To~rul III, the last of his line perished fighting the

Xwdrazms~h Teki~ who had increasingly injected himself into the ever-widening strife. Thereafter, the Il-Dengizids went into a sharp and irreversible decline.51

Thus, one of the principal roadblocks to a continuation of (21) Georgian expansion had been removed. T'amar•s early years, how- ever, were also filled with domestic strife. The ailing snasalari and mandaturt'uxuc'esi, QubP..sstr, her father's loya.l

servitor, was purged by anti-crown forces.

Qutlu Arsl9,n, the mecurclet 'uxuc f esi I With the support of the aris- tocratic opposition, put forward a proposal to create a kind of parliament which would have greatly limited the power of the crown.52 The plan was dropped but concessions to the magnates were made. T'ae latter so made their influence felt in the question of her

marriage. Against her will, 'J:' aruar was married to the Rus' prince Giorgi (=Jurij, son of Andrej Bogoljubskij ) • 'l'he marriage soon collapsed and T'amar took another husband, the Osetin prince Davit' Sosla.n (of Bagratid origin) in 1189. Giorgi "the Russian" now be­ came the rallying point for a revolt (1191) and subsequently at­ tempted to use the I1-Dengizids to regain the throne. Although the insurrections failed, they were further warning signals of what proved to be fatal, centrifugal forces.

Foreign expansion provided a positive outlet for the energies of the restless Georgian nobles and much of T'amar's activity {as well as that of the darbazi, "council of state" that governed with her) focused on the acquisition of neighboring lands. The series of impressive victories won by Georgian arms underscored Georgia's paramountcy in the region. Thus, the defeat of the Il-Dengizid Abu Bakr at Samxor"' in 1195 and subsequent taking of Ganja gave con-

vincing evidence of Georgia's supremacy in Sirv~n and brought some

am!rs of Ar~n and TUrkmen begs into the Georgian orbit.54 Atten- tion now shifted to the Armenian lands. The Armeno-Kurdish gene- rals in Georgian. service, the Hxargrdzeli brothers, took Ani (1199) which was then given to them as a fief {1201)?5 Dvin was taken in (22)

120.3. These victories led to a confrontation with the Seljuqid Sultan of Rdm, Rukn ad-D!n, at Basean (in either 1203 or 1204) which ended in a Georgian victory. Georgia now began a protracted struggle (1204-1209) to gain control of the southern Armenia.n lands under the domination of the SBkmenid Although -·Ax:l~t-s~hs. -- ultimately unsuccessful in achieving all its goals, some new ter­ ritories (such as Kars, taken in 1206) came into Georgian hands. This was followed by a massacre of the inhabitants of Ardebil (in retaliation for their attack on Ani) ·which led, in turn, to a spectacular raid into Azarbayjan and Iran proper (1210).56 ',L1huS, by the end of T'amar*s reign, the Georgian state extended from

Osetia and Dagistan to Armenia. Sirv~n and a series of lesser Turkish statelets ringing her borders were vassals, while the By­ zantine-Georgian Empire of Trebizond was a client-state.

This "golden age" quickly came to an end. Giorgi IV Lasa (121.3- 1222) managed to suppress the attempts by T'amar's newly acquired vassals to regain their independence. He was unable to deal, how­ ever, with a new steppe fore e, the 1-1ongols, who appeared here in the winter of 1220-1221. Il-Dengizid Azarbayjan, greatly weakened by internal strife and Xwarazmian , initially bought off the newcomers while attempting to join forces with the Georgians. rrhe I<:ongol force led by Jebe and snbe' etay' 1-'fhich he.d come westward

in pursuit of the Xw~razr.as~h Huha!fu"Uad and to gather intelligence, • quickly moved against Lasa.. Various regions of ~rranscaucasia were devastated in a series of lightning fl.ttacks, a preview of future events. The invaders then crossed the Caucasus into the Qtpcaq steppes. 57

Recovery was prevented by the visitations of still other steppe

forces set in motion by the !-Tongol whirlwind. In 1222-122.3, Qtpcaq (23) refugees caused disturbances in Azarbayjan. The was soon followed by the appearance of ,ral~l ad-Dtn, heir to the nm·.r destroyed X"lv~­ razms~h state, in 1225.58 A brilliant general but myopic statesman,

,Jalftl ad-D!n, rather than c e an anti-Uongol coalition, s out

conquer and plun(3,_"-~r the on. Georgia, novi ruled by (1223-1245), Lasa's sister, s to welcome the confrontation.59

The Xi'l'~razrnians destroyed the Il-Dengizids and repeatedly re.vaged

Georgia. Halted by a coalition led by the Seljuqs of Rnm, Jal~l

acl-D!n died (1231) in Ku11 di ther hs.d had flecl ing

Hongols. The Xv.r~razmian nint udeu 1.;J'as entirely negative in its

consequences, precluding the ssibility of effective resi e

to the Jiongols in lands already thoroughly scourged by war.

In the following decade ( 1231-1240), the r·~ongols, spreading everyNhere "like clouds of locusts," took control of Transcaucasia.

"'Ehe entire country," Kira.kos Gandzakec 'i notes, n~ms filled with the corpses of the dead and there were no people to bury them."6o 'Vli.th their defeat of the Seljuqs of Rtlm at K8se Dag in 124J, the !·iongols became masters of much of Ana tolia as well. 1,Ji thin the Georgian realm, the Armeno-Georgian military aristocracy fled to their castles or the impenetrable mountains and forests and soon

submitted. Queen Rusudan found sanctuary in the difficult terrain

of t.Jestern Georgia. From here she sought to take advantage of in­

ternal r-:ongol eli visions, preferring to offer her submission to the

more distant Batu. The I•Tongols, ho';;rever, were better able to ex-

ploit Georgian domestic disputes by playing off against one another

Ulu D9.vit' (Lasa's illegitimate son) and Rusudan's son Davit' Narin.

Current scholarly opinion discerns two tendencies that were operative during the period 1·1ongol domination. One, termed the

"Old Hongol" or "Nomadic" tradition, vie't'led the conquered lands as (24) occupied territory to be mercilessly and quickly exploited. This ·Nas a policy of "instant gratification" 1r1hich often led to sizable pockets of anarchy. The other tendency, represented in the Hear East by the Iranian bureaucracy (and in China by the Uygur and Qitan traditions of statecraft) sought to create a centralized monarchy which would regulate the "shearing of the flock". This not only curbed centrifugal elements within the nomadic tribal confederation, but prevented the rapid exhaustion of the resources.of a region and mad~possible a long and leisurely harvesting of the local riches.

The Nongol ideology, about which our local sources were well­ informea,62 was premised on the belief that it was God's 1·¥ill that

¥ • the Cinggisids rule the earth. On a more concrete level, Cinggisid domination was best realized by encouraging regional and separatist forces in the conquered kingdoms. This policy was pursued with con- siderable success in Rus' and Transcaucasia. Basic political and social structures were left intact and the local church, often the only surviving truly national institution, was subtly coopted. The insecurity of the subject rulers and their often semi-independent vassals was heightened by the requirement to journey to the distant supreme Qagan to personally receive the yarltq confirming their sta­ tus and by sudden and inexplicable shifts of favor. Neanitrhile, re- gardless of the mode, the conquered lands were systems.tically de- spoiled by !'!ongol tax-collectors and their henchmen who were often recruited from the traditional enemies of the land in which reve- nue was being collected.

The Eongols and the sizable Turkic elements they brought in with them from Inner and Central Asia were numerically inferior to the local Georgian and Armenian forces. Hence, the 1·:ongols sought

to incorporate into their armies the large number of TUrkic nomads (25) and semi-nomads concentrated in Azarbayjan and Anatolia, whose num­ bers had been SitJ"elled by the arrival of Oguz and other TUrkic groups from Central Asia. This Nas in keeping with traditional techniques of nomadic state-building. It was some11J"hat less successful here than in the Qtpcaq or Transoxanian steppes as Ttirkmen resistence, flight to the frontiers and general lawlessness attest. In part, this was undoubtedly the result of the breakdown of the tribes them­ selves, reflected in a diffused pattern of settlement stretching from

Xur~s~n to the Byzantine borders, to which Sel juq rule had contr1butec

The Il-xanid ("Xan of a subject polity") realm established by

7P1e~H.d-t~ 6u. lnftv::c er 12~6)::; in.. t'n e nenr S8.st and Trnnsct:wcHsia did little to change this pattern. Indeed, local centrifugation was further encouraged. 6J ~vhile rapacious tax~collectors bore off the material wealth of the region, Armenian and Georgian forces were forced to participate in the relentless drive to acquire new territories and later in the struggle of the Ilxanids against the • In keeping with steppe tradition64, vassals newly joined to the tribal confederation, were placed in the front ranks to absorb the heaviest losses in combat. Thus, ?·Tongol rule, while allmring for considerable autonomy {which furthered its policy of "divide and conquer") took a great toll in lives and treasury.

J:.~ongol interventions in Georgian dynastic politics further

splintered the already ~v-eal~ened monarchy~ Some of the princely domains, such as Same 'xe under the Jaqeli• family, ·Here evincing

ominous signs of virtual secession by the late thirteenth century.

C:Jntinuin3 st1··L~,:;c;les at the Il-xanid court also ha.d negative rever-

berations in Georgia and Armenia. \H th the mass conversion of the ;.:ongols to Islam (their Turkic subjects were !·:uslims of long-stand- • ing) during the reign of Gazgn (1295-1.304), the last barriers to (26) religious persecution fell. Disturbances in Georgia followed (1297).

Serious persecutions too~ place during the reign of Bljeyttl (d. 65 1317) but appear to have slackened under his successor Abu sat!d (1317-1335), the last Il-xanid ruler of any note. It is unclear >Jhethe:r the Georgian king, Giorgi V 3rcqi:nvsle, "the 1.-lesplenclent" {1314-1346), who worked closely with the am!r Goban, a leading fi- gure under Arm SA. ,:-~d, actually succeeded in reuniting the GeorgiA-n

~I' real~.oo In any event, his and the neighboring lands could not es- cape the anarchy that accompanied the Il-Xanld collapse Hfter the In the morass of the Cobanid-.Jalayirid• struggle for control of the Il-xnnid legacy, a contest which vas further exa- cerbated by the brief invasion of Azarbay·jan by .Janibeg of the Gold­ en Horcle (in 1357-58), the ruination of the region and further dis- integration of authority continued. The Armenian magnate families

(~ the Zak'arids/Hxargrdzelis), who had kept ali·ve the idea of Armenian statehood within the Georgian pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, now fade from the scene. They were reple.ced by Turkish begs. 67

The brief period of Jalayirid ascendancy under Sultan Uways (1356-1374), undistinguished by any growth in stability, soon gave way to the wholesale slaughters Hhich attended 's invasions (1386-87, 1394-96, 1399-1403).68 These incursions were immediately followed by those of the TUrkmen tribal confederations, the Qara Qoyunlu and .69 The Georgian kingdom experienced still further fragmentation, leading to the development of the 1'avadni or independent princes as the most important element in the land.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had begun to encroach on the Abxaz coast. Transcaucasia was soon transformed

into the battleground of two new Turkic states: the Sunn1 Ottomans

.... and the Si~r 9afavids. The region was alternately or simultaneously (27) dominated by one or the other, with the Ottomans predominant in the western zone and the Safavids. in the east. The C8.ucasus as a whole became an important. source for Ottoman and especially Safavid military slaves. Indeed, the Safavid Qullaragast was • usually a Georgian. 70 All of Christian Transcaucasia riJas now sub­ jected to profound Turkic cultural and linguistic influences.71 In keeping with Turkic and Islamic traditions, the Christian states retained considerable autonomy. 'This was, perhaps, more true of

Safavid• ·rule which was less stable and not as centralized • * * * The history of Turko-Transcaucasian relations may be divided into three broad ods. The first {nunno-Khaza.r se) , charac- terized by destructive raids and brief occupations of certain re- gions, most seriously affected the·weakest of the three Transcauca- sian polities: Albania. It undoubtedly contributed to the more complete integration of this region into the Caliphate. The second

(Seljuq phase) saw the complete absorption of Azarbayjan, ~ its Turkicization. The Seljuq presence also crushed any hope for a re- vival of Armenian statehood, the loss of which, however, should be ascribed to Byzantine policies. The surviving state, Georgia, in responding to the shock underwent a remarkable recovery. For a brief period it created a pan-Transcaucasian monarchy, dominating the entire region. The third (Mongol phase) proved fatal to it as well. Hongol rule, by encouraging centrifugation on the part or the great aristocratic houses, a factor which had always been barely controlled by central authority in Armenia and Georgia, fatally un­ dermined national unity in Georgia and ultimately destroyed those same magnate clans in Armenia.7Z The Ottoman-Safavid period, thus, • although extremely significant in terms of cultural ~nfluences, constitutes, in effect, a protracted post-script to the history of the 4§cline and fe.ll of the Transce,ucasian Christian polities. {28) NOTES 1. A.P. Novosel'cev, V.T. Pasuto, L.V. Cerepnin, Puti razviti a feodalizma (Zakavkaz'e, Srednjaja Azi ·a, :aus', Pribaltika Noskva, 1972 , pp. O, 12 -5. A useful historiographical es­ say on this and related themes is that of R.A. Gusejnov, "Istoriografija istorii Za.kavkaz'ja XI-XII vv.n Tjurkologiceskij Sbornik {1976), pp.26-5J.

2. ·On the Hunnic migrations, ~ K. Czegledy, A nomad nepE9k vandorlasa napkelett8l napnlugatig (Budapest, 1969), pp.25-9· For the Huns in Europe, see o. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns (Berkeley, 197Jr;-on the controversial auestion of the ·rurkic speech of the European Huns, see Gy. Nemeth, nA hunok nyelve,. in es Hunjai, ed. Gy. N~meth (Budapest, 1940), pp.217-26 and Maenchen-Helfen, Huns, pp.J76-44J. Ja. A. Fedorov and G.S. Fedorov, Rannie TJurki:n.a:-severnom Kavkaze (Hoskva, 1978), pp.25-27,57 have attempted to prove that Turkic peoples were present here before J5o A.D.

J. P. Vaczy, "A hunok Eur6paban 11 in Attila. es RunJa1, ed. Nemeth, p.64; Novs~s Das:x:uranc'i, Patmut'iwn AXuanic' : ·rhe History of the caucasian Albanians by I"'ovs~s Dasxuran<;i, trans. C. Dowsett (oxford, 1961), pp.63-64. Contra Dowsett (p.6Jn.4) Honagur is probably not a reference to the Onogurs who did not appear here until the middle of the fifth century. 4. Maenchen-Helfen, Runs, pp.5lff.; J.B. Bury, History Sf the Later -(LOndon, 1923, repr. : New=-=y~o-rTk~,~l~9~5~8~)-, II, p.6r N. v. Pigulevskaja, Sirijskie isto~niki po istorii narodov SSSR (Moskva-Leningrad, 1941), p.56.

5. Etise, Vasn Vardanay ev Hayoc' Paterazmin : Egi~e, 0 vardane i vojne armjanskoj, trans. I.A. Orbeli (Erevan, 1971), pp.27- JI,58-80, 92, 107, 116-18, 127-8, 169-170. 6.

7. Sabir settlements : : Hovs~s Xorenac • i : Geographie de I1ofse de Corene, ed. trans. A. Soukry (Venise, 1881), p.27; Ibn Xur­ dadbih, Kittlb al-f.Tas41ik wa'l-Mam~lik, ed. H.J. de Goeje (Lei­ den, 1889), p.124; Ibn al-Faq!h, Kit~b al-Buld~n, ed, ~.J. de Goeje (Leiden,l885), p.297; Ibn Fa~l§n, Ris~lat ibn Fadl~n, ed. s. ad-Dah~n (, 1959), p.140, These 3abirs also"gave Their name to a grouping within the Proto-Hungarian tribal union which later settled in Transcaucasia. These were the t: ...:p .. ~c-tH ;.d-*f'.t.. >-•" noted in constantine Porphyrogeni tus, , ed. Gy. Moravcsik, trans. R. Jenkins, {Washington, D.c., 1967),p.170 and in Arab sources (of. al­ I~ta:x:rt, Kitltb Has411k al-Mam~lik, ed. r~r.J. de Goeje (Leiden, 18?0),pp.l9l-2; al-Ba!IO:uri, Futl!b al-Buldl!n, ed. :a.H. Radw~n (Cairo, 1959), p.206) as ·Siy~warot, Mwai'd!. In Armenian they were called Sevordik' = Hung. szav~rd. In the ninth and tenth centuries they were noted for briga.nuage along the Ganja-T'bilisi route, ~ ?~~meth, h1·1K, pp,J17-19 and the Ta'rfx al-B~b : v.F. l

text, p.?, Eng. trans. p.lJ, commentary pp.26n.?,41. _8. Pigulevskaja, Siri skie istocniki, .166-167; H.I. Arta.monov, Istorija Xazar Leningra , 19 2 , pp.92-4; Gy, !·:ora:vcsik, "Byzantine and the Magyars in the Period of Their Higration" The American Slavic and Fast European Review, s (1946), p.Js.

9. on the ,Juan-Juan-Avar connection, see czegl~dy, Nomad ~neuek, chaps.IV-VI where all the availabre-data is gathered and A. Kollautz, E. Miyakawa, Geschichte und Kultur eines vBlker­ wanderungszeit11chen Nomadenvo1kes {Klagenfurt, 1970), I, pp.lJ4ff. 10. !vienander in Dexi 1, Eunapii, Petri Patricii Prisci, Nalchi, I•1enandri historiarum quae supersunt, ed, er, Niebuhr, pp. 294,JOOff. JBOff.; E. Chavannes, Doclli~ents sur les Tou-Kiue (Turcs) Occidentaux (St. P~tersbourg, 1900, repr. Paris, 1941), p.2JJ. 11. C. Toumanoff, Studies in Christian Caucasian History (George­ town, 1963), pp,J82-4. _f4 ther 12. Efforts to strengthen this system had begun under his Kavad. Al-Bal~durf, ed. Ra~w~n, pp.198-9; al-YatqQbf, Ta'rfx, ed, 1·1. Th. Houtsma (Leiden, 1883), I, pp.20J-4; al-l·ras 1lidf, Murllj ag-~hab wa Mat~din al-Jawhar. ed. c. Pellet (Beirut,l966-!970), I, pp.205-7; see also R.A. Gusejnov, "O tjurkax IV-VIIvv .. v zone Kavkazsk~Albanii" Voprosy istorii Kavkazskoj A1bani1, ed. I. Aliev (, 1962), pp.181-8. lJ. W. Barthold, P.B. Golden, "Khazar" (Leiden, 1960-),IV, pp.l172=j; P.B. Golden, Khazar studies (Budapest, 1980), I, pp.J9-42, 49-50, 187-190; Dasxuranc'I, trans. Dowsett1 pp.8J,86, 87, 100,106; K'art'lis C'xovreba, ed. s. Qauxc'isvili (T'bilisi, 1955,1959}, I, pp.22J,225; K. czegledy, nn:erakleios tt5r8k szOvetsegesei" !•Ta!3y:ar Nyel v, XLIX (1953), pp.J19-20. 14. R. Grcusset, Histoire de l'Armenie (Paris, 1947, repr. 1973), p.276; Z.I1. Bunijatov, AzerbaJd~an v VII-IX vv. (Baku, 1965), pp.5J-60.

15. A~-·rabar!, Ta 'rfx a~=.~bart, ed. Hui;tammad Abu '1-FacJ.l Ib~hfm (cairo, 1962-1967), IV, p. 158. 16. Dasxuranc'i, trans. Dowsett, pp.l53-171; Golden, Khazar Studies, I, pp.90-9J. 17. see D.M. Dunlop, The History of the Jewish Khazars (Princeton, ~4), chaps. III-IV for a detailed analysis of the course of this war. 18. Dunlop, Khazars, pp.81-4; Artamonov, Ist. Xazar, pp.ZlB-222; Bunijatov, Azerbajdzan, pp.l06-112. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.251; I. Javaxisvili,v .. K'art'veli eris is- toria (T'bilisi, l9b5-1966), II, pp.82,92-3. Tfie conversion of the Khazar ruling house to in the late eighth cen- (30)

tury (~ al-r1as 1rld!, Hurrlj, ed. Pellat, I, p.212) may also be viewed as a sign of Khazar independence of both BagdAd and Constantinople.

20. A~-t-abar!, ed. IbrAhim, VIII, pp.269-70 21. P.B. Golden, "The l·!igrationl'5 of the Oguz" Archivum otto­ manicum,IV (1972), pp.75-7· 22. Z.V. Togan, Umum! TUrk tarihine giris, 2nd ed. {Istanbul, 1970), pp.l74-9; I1.A. Sfia'6an, .Islamic Histotay. A New Interpretation A.D. 750-1055 (A.H. 132-~48)(camEridge, 1976), pp.6)-6. An im­ portant Turkfc general { of Khazar origin ) who figured promi­ nently in Transcaucasian affairs was Buga the Turk. He suppres­ sed the rebellious Muslim am!r of Tiflis in 833 but was later recalled when the Caliph began to suspect him of subversive contacts with his Khazar kinsmen (V.F. Hinorsky, 'I'he ;:Ustor~ of Sharv~n and Darband, cambridge, 1958, Arab text p.J, trans. p.25; K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.256-7; A.N. Ter-Gevondjan, Ar- menija i arabskij xalifat ; Erevan,1977, pp.143-7). -- 23. Hinorsky, studies, pp.llOff. ·On events in Armenia and Georgia, see Ter-Gevonajan, Armenija i arabskij xalifat, pp.149-l50, 237ff.; Toumanoff, Studies, p.20J.

24. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, Patmut 1 iwn : Povestvovanie vardapeta Aristakesa. Last~vertci, trans. K.N. Juzbasjan O.'foskva, 1968) pp. 64-5,79-8 5; C. Toumanoff, "Armenia and Georgia'' cambridge Hedieval History, IV, ed. J.I1. Hussey (cambridge, 1956) ,pt. 1, p.620; Grousset, Histoire de l'Armenie, PP•551ff.

25. Golden, 11 Migrat1ons of the Oguz" AO, IV {1972), pp.77-80. 26. The literature on the origins of the Seljuqs is too extensive to be cited here. A good introduction to the problem may be found in S.G. Agad~anov, Ocerki istorii 0 uzov i Turkmen Srednej Azii IX-XIII vv. (Asxabad, 9 9 , esp. chap. IV;-r;.E. Boswor h, The {Edinburgh, 1963), chap. IX; Cl. cahen, "Le i.Jalik-namah et l'histoire des origines Se1jukides" Oriens, 2 (1949) and in his Pre-ottoman , trans. J • .rones-~..Tilliams (New York, 1968),pp.l9ff. I. Kafesog1u argues for their Se1juq origins in his nDogu Ana­ dolu'da ilk se19uklu aktnt (1015-1021) ve tarih! ehemmiyeti" Fuad Kaprttln Armagant, ed. o. , H. Eren et al. (Istanbul, 195J), pn.259-274. Opposed to this are S.G. Agadzanov and K. N. Juzba~jan, "K istorii tjurkskix nabegov na Armeniju v XI v.u Palestinskij Sbornik, 13 (76) {1965), pp.147-157· See also discussion in N.N. Senge11a, Se1c'ukeb1 da 8ak'art'Ve1o XI saukunesi (T'bilisi, 1968), pp.l65ff.

28. Ibn al-Attr, Al-K~m11 f!'t-T.a'rtx, ed. c.J. Tornberg (Leiden, 1851-1876, the Beirut, 1965-1966 reprint used here has a dif­ ferent pagination), IX, pp.J81-J; F. Sttmer, Oguzlar (Ankara, 1967), pp.81-2; T

30. Aristakes J~stivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, p.87. Muslim sources (31)

speak ;n similar terms, cf. al-Eund~r!'s slighly abridged ver­ sion Ol ~Imad ad-D!n al-I~fah4ni, Taw~r!x Al saljng, Kit~b Zubdat an-Nu~rat vm Nuxbat al- ~Usrat (Recueil de Textes Relatifs a l'Histoire des Selqjoucides, ed. H.TH. Routsma, Leiden, 1889), II, pp.9-l0. 31. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J02-4; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan,.pp.86-88, 94-5; Minorsky, Studies, pp.57, 60-2J Hatt'~os Urhayec'i, Patmut'iwn : Urfalt Hateos Vekayinamesi (952,..1136) ·ve Pap~z· Grf br·•tm-_zeyli {1136-1162), Turk. trans. H. Andreasyan Ankara, 19 2 , pp. 7-90. Liparit, upon his re­ turn, took part in a rebellion against Bagrat, was captured, tonsured and subsequently sent off to Byzantium (I('art'. C'xov •• I, p;p.304-5). The SEijuq house was also troubled by discontented magnates. Ibr~htm Yinal revolted in 1050. Agad~anov (Ocerki, pp.216-7) has argued that the result of these revolts 1vas the expansion of the ~~a' system as a means of keeping the TUrk­ men aristocracy weil=ciisposed toi'rards the dynasty.

32. Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzba~jan, pp.97-106; Hatt'eos Urhayec'i, trnns. Andreasyan, pp.l00-3; Ibn al-.4.-~tr, ed. Torn­ berg, IX, p.599; I·olinorsky, Studies, p._54. 33. Hinorsky, studies, Arab text, pp.l4-15, trans. 20-1 and pp.74-5. 34. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.306-14; Aristakes Lastivertc'i, trans. Juzbasjan, pp.l28-9; Matt'~os Urhayec'i, trans. ~dreasyan, pp.118ff.; al-Husaint, Axb~r ad-Dawlat as-Salj~giyyah, ed. M. Iqbal (Lahore, "1933), pp.39-40, 4J-6; Hinorsky, Studies, Arab text, pp.l5-16,trans.21,23 and pp. 58, 64-7; M.H. Yinan9, Tttrkiye tarihi Selcuklular devri, I, Anadolu'nun fethi {Is­ tanbul, 1944), pp.~?-9. 35. )1inorsky, Sharvan and Darband, Arab text, P'J.l2-l4, trans • .35-8 al-~usaini, Axbar, p.44.

'w' 1 36 . Kt ar t' . ('tv xov., I , p. )20, , see a 1 so 0en~en 1"la, 0e'""'1"' c u.x:e b"l, pp •..J·Q1.c>f ~.L • . 37. See G.G. Mikaeljan, Istori.ia kilikijskogo armjanskogo gosudarstva {Erevan, 1952). Lesser Armenian statelets in inaccessible re­ gions continued to exist as semi-independent or independent units, but with no real political effectiveness, see R. Bedrosian, The Turco-Mon~ol Invasions and the Lords of Armenia in th~-14~ Centuries (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1979), pp.68-~. A smaller "Armenia in exile" was established in the Crimea, probably in connection with the Byzantine conquests and strengthened by new arri~als in the Seljuq period. This .. colony later adopted the ~ipcaq Turkic language of the Cumans~nd has left behind a rich literature in Armeno-Cuman from the areas of their further in the and , cf. E. Schutz, •· Armeno-kiptschakisch und die Krim" Hun:.:;aro-Turcica. Studies in Honour of Julius Nemeth, ed. Gy. Kaldy-Nagy (­ pest, 1976), pp.l85-205; J. Deny, L'Armeno-Coman et les Les "Ephemerides" de Kamieniec, 1604-1613 (Wiesbaden, 1957J;T.I. -Grunin, Dokumenty na poloveckom ,jazyke XVI v. (Moskva, 1967); E. Try jarski, ••La li tterature armeno-kiptchak" Philologiae Turcicae Fundamenta, II (Wiesbaden, 1964) and Ja. Daskevy6, ;y~h~Jn£3R~~~~~c~~~i~~~K~ 1 ~p~ai!rg~~1 H*~ft~f196~~k~~~2:n~~~~~:73. (32)

JS. K'art'. C'xov., I, p.Jl5 which so (p.Jl6) terms I-!a-liks~h .....vne ' enemy o f a 11 vnr~s,..,, ; t 1ans. . " J"\rmen' i Hn sources, hm.J"ever, have a positive viel'l of Naliks~h (of. :t·:att'eos Urhayec'i, trans. Andreasyan, p.l46; Kirakos,Gsndzakec'i, Patmut'iwn ~ayoc' : Ki s Gandzakeci, Istorija Armenii, trans. L.A. :.canlarjan, skva, 1976, p.89}. '

J9. Hinorsky, Sharv~n and Dn.rband, Arab text, pp.l6, , trEms. pp. 40, commentary pp.54-5; Kafesoglu, r~elikyah, pp. -7; K'art'. C'xov. I,pp.Jl?ff. --

40. L.o. Babajan, Social'no-~konomiceskaja i politiceskaja is­ tori a·Armenii v XIII-XIV vekax (Voskva, 1969),p.J9; ~A. Fies:x:iR, Didgors aJa bitva , 1972), pp.5J-5. '-n. Ags.dzanov, Ocerki, pp.220-2; , Turkey, pp.l80-l,2JR-44; A.K.S. Lambton, "The Internal Structure of the juq Empire" The Cambridge , V, ed. ,T.A. Boyle (Cambridge, l9b8), esp. pp.2Jl-9.

J ' M.P •. '1 :!: j!" /4 ~ • • r1 ~· • I . , • ~· i d ~2. i"'.L. l"ibU -uaZ.J. 1 .:~aJHra-yl .J.art"~.K:lrr:a; B.onoslo'ITnR.J:=l <:UrKmen, eq trans. A.H. Kononov (Eoskvs.-Leningrad, 1958), Turkic text,p.64: "The Seljuqs said 'we are Tt1rkmen, we are brothers,"' but no benefit came to the polity {il) or people. Before becoming ffid-i s~hs, they said 'we are6f the ~~tntq Ttlrkmen,' but after becoming P~d-i s.t~hs they said ' a son of Afr~s~yAb fled from Kayxusraw to the Tt1rkmen clan of the Qtntq and he grev.r up and remained (with them). We nre his sons, from the lineage of Afr~styab ••• "

4J. R.A. Gusejnov, "Irakskie sel'd~ukidy, Il'-degizidy i Zakav­ kaz'en falestinskij Sbornik, 21 (1970), pp.l86-7. 44. Sengelia, Selc'ukebi, pp.J40ff.; ]':Iesxia, Didgorskaja bitva, pp.26-7,56; K'art'. C'xov., I, p. 326 : "He neither paid the xaraj to the Sultan nor could the Turks winter in l{' art' li ... A good account of Davit' 's activities r:tay be found in I-'T.D. Lord­ kipanidze, Istorija Gruzii XI-nacala XIII veka (Tbilisi, 1974), pp.88-126. His political program is analyzed in v. Abasmadze, Harkvevebi Sak'art'velos politikur modzgvrebat'a istoriidan (T'bilisi, 1969), chap. III. K'art'. c'xov., I, pp.344-5. On the thorny question of the nature of ~irvanian-Georgian relations, see :'T. Asat'iani, nsa,k'art'velo­ • Sirvanis poli tikuri urt' iert 'oba :{II sau1mnesi If XII saukunis Sak'art'velos istoriis sakit'xebi, ed. S.A. I-!esxia (T 1bilisi, 1968), pp.7-51¥ and z.r,.r. Bunijatov, Gosudarstvo atabekov Azerbaj­ dzana (Baku, 1978), chap. IV. 46. Hesxia, Didgorskaja. bitva, pp.69-85; V.F. Minorsky, ncaucasica in the History of H.ayy§fltriq~n·• Bulletin of the School of Orien­ tal and African Studies, XIII (1949), pp.27-J5. K'art'. C'xov., I, pp.J35-7. The horde of At'rak'a/Otrok was part of the confederation known in Rus' as the Polovci dikii, see P.B. Golden, uThe 'Polovc1 Dik1i'" Eucharister1on {Omeljan Prltsak Festschrift},ed. I. ~evcenko (1n press). 48. on the eastern Anatolian belliks, ~ o. Turan, Do5u Anadolu (JJ)

Ttlrk devletleri tarihi (Istanbul, 1973). The Il-Dengizids are exhaustively treated in Bunijatov's Gos. atabekov. 49. The complexities of the struggle for Ani have been meticulously analyzed by !•:inorsky, Studies, esp. pp.B0-106. Although the struggle was occasionally marked by savagery (e.g. the of Arzan, Qurtt b. , is reputed to have-built a-IDinaret of Georgian skulls, see ruran, Doiu Anadolu, p.8), 11uslim rule, such as that of the ~dadids in ni, was often characterized by significant cultural and material advances, see I.A. Orbeli, Gorodisce Ani e e5o raskopki in his Izbrannye-frudy (F.revan,l96J) p.7. On Sirvan, see the studies of Asat'iani and Bunijatov, n.45.

50. H. Aly~r!, Azerbaycan atabe leri Il-deniz ogullarl (1146-1225) (Istanbul, 19 , pp.l2-1Jr Bunijatov, Gos. atabekov, pp.27ff.; Gusejnov, "Ira.kskie sel 'dzukidy ••• " PSb. ,21 (1970), pp.l90-4, on the atabegate (Hhich was introducea:-Tnto Georgia in 1212),see R.A. Gusejnov, ''Institut atabekov" Palestinskij Sbornik,l5 (19'bb}" 51. Bunijatov, Gos. a:tabekov, pp.77-95· 52. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.J0-1; .Abasmadze, Narkvevebi, chap.IV; I. I. Surguladze, Istori ja gosudarstva i prava Gruzii {'l'bilisi, 1968), p.471 Lordkipanidze, Istorija, pp.14J-4. 53. K'art'. Cxov., II, pp.J5-6. Ee Y.ras at that hiding from his uncle savalat' (Vsevolod "Bol'soe Gnezdo") in the city of the Cuman xan Sevinc. Jurij's paternal grandflother was a cuman prin­ cess; another example of the complex Qtpcaq-Georgian ties.

54. K'art'. C'xov., II, pp.65-78; al-Husain!, Axb~r, pp.186-8; Javaxi~vili, K'art'veli eris istoria . ---- , · II, p.271 for dating. Bunijfl.tov (Gos. atabekov, p.97) has :1194.

Minorsky, Studies, pp.102-0). on the conquests of the Mxargrdzeli~ see Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans • ./:anlarjan, pp.ll8-9. Babajr-m "[Si'rPist. Arm., pp.l4-23) has argued that this was actually an Armenian kingdom vihich the Georgians helped to revive and vri th ~vhich they had a suzerain-vassal relationship. 'L'his thesis has been questioned by 3unijatov (Gos. ats.bekov, p.l4) ancl Lordkipan- ,(Istorija, p.l74). 56. javaxisvili, K'art'. eris ist., II, pp.27J-88; ·2urRn, Dogu Ana­ dolu, pp.lOJ-108; K~art'. C'xov., II, pp.lOJ-09; al-~usaini, Axb~r, pp.188-9. In the Iranian tmvn of Eiyltne, Zak 'are r,:xargrdz had the local malik and his children ski~~ed and hung on the minaret. Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, pp.137-8, see discussion 57· 11 in A. Galstjan, "Zavoevanie Armenii mongol' skimi vojskami Tate.ro· Hone;oly v Azii 1 Evrope, ed. S.L. Tixvinskij, 2nd rev. ed, (Nos­ kva, 1977),pp.166-9; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.85-92. 58. our most important source is Jal~l ad-Dtn's biography, strat as­ Sul~~n Jal~l ad-Dtn Mank~birt! by Sih~b ad-D!n an-Nasaw!. A critical edition of the text prepared by Z. rr,. Buni jatov which will supercede the edition of 0. Houdas (P~ris, 1891) has not yet appeared. Bunijatov's Russian translation, however, is available (34)

!1zneo isa.nie ~. Dzalal ad-Dina Jv!a.nkburn (Baku, 1973). Important data is also foun in Ata Ha ik Juvain!, Ta'r!x-i Jah~n-s:u~a : History of the 1?orld Conqueror, trans. .T .A. Boyle (cambridge, T·Iass., 1958), esp. II, pp.426-59 and K'a.rt'. €''xov. II, pp.~68-185. 59. According to Ibn al-At!r (XII, p.43.5), the Georgians wrote to cTal~l acl-D!n, commenting that the r'iongols had destroyed his father's realm but t•~ve, however, did not Attribute great signi­ ficance to them and that which they thought about m10st was to get away from us entirely ... 60. Kirakos Gandzakec'i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.l_56. See also Galstjan, uzavoevanie Armenii,", pp.l?0-4 and the sources gathered in his Armjanskie istocniki o mongolax (Hoskva, 1962).

61. I.P. Petru~evskij, nRa.~!d ad-D!n's Conception of the State 11 Central Asiatic Journal,XIV (1970), pp.l48ff. and the literature cited there; Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.142-3. 62. Grigor Aknerc'i : History of the Nation of the Archers (the I(ongols) by Grisor of .Akanc', Arm. text, Eng. trans. R.P. Blake, R.N. Frye in the Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, 12 (1949), Arm. text, p.JOO, trans. JOl ; "It is the will of God that 1ve take the earth and maintain order and impose the (y)asax (= yasag,/yasa) ••• " Cf. the comments of Kirakos. Gandzakec • i, trans. Xanlarjan, p.173 :"They usually say the foJlowing : their sovereig: is a kinsman of God who has taken heaven as his appanage a.nd given the earth to the Xak'an (=Qagan ) ••• " See also the dis­ cussion in K. SAgaster, "ITerr.schaftsideologieu:fl.d Friedensgedanke bei den Hongolen'' Central Asiatic ..Journal, XVII (1973), pp.223- 242. Kirakos Gandzakec'i apparently learned some Mongolian (~ L. Ligeti, "Le Lexique mongol de Kirakos de Gandza.k" Acta Orien­ talia Hungarica, XVIII, 1965, pp.241-97) as did the anonymous author of the Georgian Ghronograph (Zamt'aasmcereli : IC'art'. C'xov., II, p.l59). Ba.bajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.ll9-J?. On the Ilxanids, see B ... Spuler, Die Hongolen in Iran (Leipzig, 1939); I.P. Petrusevskij, Zemledelie i a rarn e otnosenija v Irane XIII-XIV vv. U~oskva.:. Leningrad, 19 0); A.A. Ali-zade, Social no-~konomiceska·a 1 oli­ ticeskaja istorija Azerbajd~ana XIII-XIV vv. Baku, 19.5 64. Nemeth, HHK, pp.l9-20, 234-.5.

6.5. K'art'. C'xov., II, p.303; Rastd ad-D!n, J~mit at-Tav~r!x, III, Pers. text ed. A.A. Ali-zade, Russ. trans. A.K. Arends {Baku, 1957), Pers., p.324, trans. p. 182. Revolts had also occured in the 1240's and 1250's. ~azan Xan is generally favorably portrayed by contemporary Christian sources, cf. A.K. Sanjian, Colophons of Armenian Nanuscripts 1301-1480 (Cambridge, r"ass. ,1969) ~· 1)04, p.48. This was not true of CljeytU (Sanjian, Colophons , pp • .50-2). 66. D.N. Lang, ''Georgia in the Reign of Giorgi the 3rilliant (1319- 1346)" Bulletin of !{he School of Oriental and African studies, XVII (1955), pp.?9-91. 67. Babajan, SEP Ist. Arm., pp.l69-86; Sanjian, ColoEhons, pp.90-91 describes the general anarchy. (35)

68. See 1L Tabatadze, K'art 'veli 'CI'iiaa • rnd e XTiT- XV -::s::::a:-:-u:ik~u:-:n::-:e=-e='brri::::s~m:'ii~n=-=a:-:z::-:e:-=-~,r~b7J..""l-ii=-:s:-:;i-=,:..:::..;1~9~.r.-;:=.~?8~-~a:.r:a.:-c~t z:::e indicates pp.27-37 that Georgia, at this time, was reunited under ]3.-':l.grat V ( 1360-1393) and relatively prosperous.

69. On the Qara Qoyun1u, ~ F. Stirner, I\ara Koyunlular, I (Ankara, 1967). On their rivals, the Aq Qoyunlu, see J. E. 'doocls, The Aq Quyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire {Einneapo1is, 1976)

70. K. Kuc'ia,· 11 Kavkasiuri elementi Sep'ie.nt'a Iranis politiJtur sarbielzeu J.Iaxlobe1i A··osavlet'is istoriis sakit'xebi.ed. v. Gaba~vili et al. T'bilisi, 19o3 , pp. -75. 71. P.B. Golden, "The Oguz Turkic (Ottoman/Safavid) Elements in Georgian : Background and Patterns" 'Tlhe !,:utual Effects of the Islamic and Judea-Christian Worlds : The East ID~ro ean Pattern , e • ·-. Ascher et al. r;ew York 0 1979 ; C. Abuladze, Sultan-Saba Orbe1ianis lek'sikonis sitqvanis t'urk'uli t'e.rgmanebi ('r'bilisi, 1968).

72. C. Toumanoff, "~he Fifteenth-Century Bagre.tids and the Insti­ tution of Collegial in Georgia" 7raditio,VII (1949}, pp.l69-221, emphasizes, rather, the effects of the Byzantine system of collegial sovereignty as the "decisive factor" in Georgia's decline and fall.