The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva III Peace Talks on Syria

Master Thesis

The exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva III peace talks on Syria

Causes and Consequences

Lisa Gotoh

Student number: 10118330

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Master: Politicologie

Track: Internationale Betrekkingen

Supervisor: Said Rezaeiejan

Second reader: Liza Mügge

Date: June 24, 2016

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

TABLE OF CONTENT Table of Content ...... 2 List of Abbreviations ...... 4 Abstract ...... 5 1 Introduction ...... 6 2 Academic and Societal Relevance ...... 8 3 Theoretical Framework ...... 10 3.1 Conflict Resolution and the Hourglass Model ...... 11 3.2 Ohlson’s Causes of War and Peace ...... 14 3.3 Mutually Hurting Stalemate ...... 15 3.4 Mutually Enticing Opportunities ...... 17 3.4.1 Commitment Problems and the Security Dilemma ...... 18 3.4.2 Form of Government ...... 19 3.4.3 Fragile Environment: Violence During Peace Processes ...... 21 3.5 Actors ...... 23 3.5.1 Primary Parties ...... 23 3.5.2 Third-Party Involvement in Peacebuilding ...... 24 3.5.3 State Support and Diaspora Support ...... 25 3.6 Diplomacy ...... 26 3.6.1 Negotiation ...... 27 3.6.2 Timing ...... 27 3.7 Concluding ...... 30 4 Methodology ...... 31 4.1 Process Tracing ...... 31 4.2 Data and Variables ...... 32 4.3 Actors ...... 34 5 Analysis ...... 36 5.1 Part 1: Status of Kurds in Syria: From Repression to Autonomy ...... 36 5.2 Part 2: Actors, Interests, Relationships ...... 39 5.2.1 PYD ...... 39 5.2.2 High Negotiations Committee ...... 44 5.2.3 Syrian Government ...... 47

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

5.2.4 Turkey ...... 50 5.2.5 The United States ...... 54 5.2.6 Russia ...... 58 5.3 Part 3: Exclusion of the PYD (consequences) ...... 61 6 Conclusion ...... 63 7 Discussion ...... 67 Bibliography ...... 69 Primary sources ...... 69 Secondary sources ...... 73 Appendix I ...... 76 Appendix II ...... 81

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FSA – Free Syrian Army

HNC – High Negotiations Committee (Syrian Opposition)

IS – Islamic State also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh

ISSG – International Syria Support Group

KNC – Kurdish National Council

MEO – Mutually Enticing Opportunities

MHS – Mutually Hurting Stalemate

PKK – Kurdish Worker’s Party

PYD – Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat also known as the Democratic Union Party

SDC – Syrian Democratic Council

SNC – Syrian National Coalition formerly known as Syrian National Council

YPG – Yekîneyên Parastina Gel a.k.a. the People's Protection Units (Military branch of PYD)

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

ABSTRACT How come the political party of Syrian Kurds that has received significant outside support from diaspora as well as states is excluded from the Geneva peace talks organised by the United Nations in February 2016? This thesis addresses this question departing from conflict resolution theory. Through qualitative process-tracing, causes of the exclusion of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) are analysed. The analysis is divided into three parts: 1) the changing status of Kurds in Syria; 2) actor analysis of the six most relevant parties (PYD, High Negotiations Committee, Syrian government, Turkey, United States and Russia); 3) the consequences of excluding the PYD. Russia, the U.S. and Turkey play a significant role in the conflict. The continuous support of these three states to the combatting parties is resulting in escalation of war instead of promoting peace. Despite of Russian and American support to the PYD, Turkey managed to exclude the party from the peace talks. Reflecting on the literature of conflict resolution theory, the current setting for peace talks does not provide an fortunate setting in order to come to a sustainable peace agreement. We find that outside support plays a significant role in the possibilities for peace negotiations. In the virtue of this, in order to start a successful peace process it is more important for the key suppliers of resources to perceive a stalemate and negotiations as a better way out than for the belligerents, in contrast to what the literature suggests. In addition, the literature seems to focus too much on the role of one third-party while this case shows there is no one third-party which can influence the conflict dynamics in such way guaranteeing a proper conduct of conflict resolution. Rather, in an internationalized civil war, diplomatic pressures to shift the focus to conflict resolution should be put on outside supporters providing resources to continue fighting. This case is especially complex due to the presence of at least three conflicts within the Syrian war and key parties all setting their priority on a different part of the conflict.

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

1 INTRODUCTION Syria’s civil war began in 2011 when government forces responded with violence to nonviolent civilian protests. Soon the conflict escalated and resulted in the rise of armed rebel groups. In an already instable region and without the national army nor opposition forces making major advances, the beginning of 2014 showed the rise of terrorist group Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria followed by the proclamation of the new Caliphate in June 2014 by Abu Bakr al Baghadadi. The United Nations responded with the adoption of Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014) which led to the formation of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, further referred to as IS). Sixty coalition partners reaffirmed their commitment in fighting and defeating IS (U.S. Department of State, 2014). In the midst of the chaos little attention was given to the declaration of a de facto autonomy in November 2013 in northern Syria by a Syrian Kurdish group called the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat also known as the Democratic Union Party (PYD). The national Syrian army had withdrawn from the Kurdish populated North in July 2012 which opened the window for the long repressed largest ethnic minority in Syria to mobilize, organize and gain control over significant territory. Following the ideology and political strategy close to PKK leader Adbullah Öcalan’s philosophy, the group started building institutions (Federici, 2015). The YPG, the military branch of the PYD, is fighting IS most successfully on the ground in North-East Syria which has led to legitimacy and support from several actors including the U.S., Russia and factions of the Free Syrian Army (Banco, 2014). This support instigated a continuing discussion between NATO-partners Turkey, who perceive the PYD as a terrorist organization, and the U.S. who perceive them as a partner fighting a common enemy. Turkey has been a key backer of the Syrian opposition since the beginning of the civil war. The expansion of the PYD on its border has engaged Turkey into the conflict mainly fighting Kurds on its border with Syria. Simultaneously, Russia has engaged militarily since October 2015 after the Syrian government requested support. Russia claimed cooperating in the air campaign against IS but hits in the provinces of Idlib and Hama controlled by U.S.-backed rebels suggest they have another agenda. Russia has also supported the PYD politically by opening a representative office for them in Moscow and militarily through aviation support in Syria (Ekurd Daily, 2016). Iran provides military and financial support to the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates support the Syrian opposition and have expressed their 6

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

preparedness to participate in the U.S.-led coalition and send ground troops to Syria with a chance of running into Iranian military and expanding the conflict over the region. Tensions have been rising between Saudia Arabia and Iran after the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr in Riyadh in January 2016 (Krever, 2016). France and the United Kingdom have also started an air campaign in November and December 2015 respectively, mainly targeting IS’ de facto capital Raqqa (BBC, 2015). This brief summary of events shows the civil war in Syria has intensified and internationalized over the years. At the same time efforts have been made to initiate a dialogue between the warring parties and analyse possibilities for conflict resolution. In June 2012 the Geneva I Conference on Syria was initiated by the UN peace envoy to Syria at that time Kofi Annan. Representatives from eight countries, the Arab League and the EU agreed that a transitional government body was needed including members of the present Syrian government and the opposition to end the war. However there was disagreement about the inclusion of President Bashar al-Assad mainly between Russia and the U.S.. During the conference key steps were outlined for the process to end violence in the Geneva communiqué (UN, 2012). The Geneva II conference followed with the aim to bring together two delegations representing the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition to discuss the implementation of the Geneva communiqué (UN, 2013). After protracted discussions on which parties should be included and on which terms, the conference was finally held on January 22, 2014 in Montreux, Switzerland. The question of keeping President Assad in the transitional government was again the main topic of disagreement which led to the deferment of the peace negotiations after the second round in February 2014 (the Guardian, 2014). On November 14th 2015 the Arab League, the European Union (EU), the United Nations, and 17 countries held its first meeting as the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and “… agreed to support and work to implement a nationwide ceasefire in Syria to come into effect as soon as the representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition have begun initial steps towards the transition under UN auspices on the basis of the Geneva Communiqué.” (UN, 2015i). In December 2015, the High Negotiations Committee was formed, a coalition of Syrian opposition groups to engage in peace talks with the Syrian government. On February 1 2016 formal talks officially started and on February 27 a ‘nationwide cessation of hostilities’ was established with the primary purpose of opening the roads for humanitarian aid. While progress has been made, the fighting continues and talks

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh are held in a fragile environment influenced by several actors affecting the course of action. This thesis will analyse the current peace process, the parties involved and excluded, their interests and possible outcomes/consequences for continuing the peace process in the current course. We will look specifically into the role of the PYD, their exclusion in the peace talks and the outside support they receive. This is a significant party in the conflict since the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Syria and this party has been excluded so far from negotiations while they have been ruling over a de facto autonomous area in northern Syria and continue to expand their controlled territory. Additionally, they are being supported by two major powers, the United States and Russia. We will look into the relationships of the most important parties that may influence the peace process and their relationship with the PYD and what consequences these might have for the peace talks. The central research question is: How was it decided to exclude the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD) in the Geneva III peace talks on the Syrian Arab Republic and what are the consequences for excluding the party? The outline of this thesis is as follows. First, the academic and societal relevance of the topic is discussed followed by the theoretical framework for the analysis. This thesis will offer a broad analysis of the key parties involved in the peace talks and their relationships and interests vis-a-vis the Syrian civil war. The analysis will be done through a qualitative approach both through literature review and process-tracing, a common methodology in political science research to understand the causal mechanisms of specific events. A short summary of the history of Kurds in Syria will be given as background knowledge to understand the rise of the PYD. The analysis will then start by discussing every relevant actor, its role in the Syrian peace process and its relation with the PYD. Six actors will be subject to analysis: the PYD; the High Negotiations Committee; the Syrian government; Turkey; the United States; and Russia. We will closely look at the context and events since January 2016 when the peace talks were set up which started in February without the PYD. After having the overview of the actors and their position we will discuss the consequences of the exclusion of the PYD by looking at their behaviour since the start of the talks.

2 ACADEMIC AND SOCIETAL RELEVANCE Academic relevance is first of all found in the continuous need for reassessment of conflict resolution theories due to the uniqueness of violent conflicts. “[W]hile the specific instances of social conflict change so rapidly, the attempt to capture the essence of the process for

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

academic discourse is a necessity for the sake of future generations.” (Korzenny & Ryan, 1990:9). However complex conflict dynamics are, it is necessary to keep on studying them in order to understand positive and negative ways to handle them which contribute to knowledge for international security and peace. Hayes (2012) argues that the research on democratic peace has been dominated in quantitative studies and therefore created a lacuna in understanding the underlying mechanism of the concept. He calls for more research dedicated to the understanding of how the observed peace is generated and calls this field democratic security (2012:768). Until the past decade most studies focused on demonstrating the existence and focus on democratic structures of the concept. Through case studies democratic peace can be studied focusing on the understanding of what it is that makes this polity form peaceful and how it can be implemented in a variety of ways such as power-sharing, depending on what form best fits to the needs of a society. In addition, theories on conflict resolution, peacebuilding and negotiations have with few exceptions focused much on two parties, the government and a rebel group. However often and especially in contemporary civil wars there are multiple parties engaged in conflict. As will become clear in this analysis, multiple parties impact negotiations and the possibilities for conflict resolution. Another aspect that needs more attention in the field of peacebuilding is the role of spoilers as there is still no consensus on the effect of exclusion of actors in negotiations. This study will analyse these dynamics by looking at a big insurgent movements involved in the Syrian conflict but excluded from the peace talks and its relation to other relevant parties. As the theoretical framework will show, peacebuilding is a relatively new phenomena that has been exercised extensively by the UN since the end of the Cold War. As over two decades have passed the literature is evolving, creating a better understanding of how the international community can best respond when intervening or mediating in civil wars for conflict resolution (Menocal, 2014; Stedman, 1997; Ohlson, 2008; Walter, 1999 and many more). The key question however is how often these studies are used in practice and what the relationship is between actual diplomacy and peacebuilding theory. As a result this research will also have an inductive component to deviate from standard conflict resolution theory and see what empirical evidence there is confirming and deviating from the theories. A constructivist and realist perspective to peace negotiations are presented in the theoretical framework in order to analyse which perspective may form a better explanation for the

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

current dynamics in the Syrian peace process. The Syrian case is relevant for several reasons. It is a civil war that is continuing for over five years and has become internationalized. IS has expanded its operations over several nations and created a spillover effect which has reached Europe, the Brussels bombing in March 2016 being the most recent one. On top of that, there is a refugee crisis which is alarming the European Union and calls the international community to act immediately to relieve people from inhumane circumstances and the only way to stop the refugee flow is by solving the problem at the core which is the conflict in Syria. Apart from this significance, the role of the PYD is interesting within the case since the Kurdish people in Syria have been repressed for decades by the al-Assad regime. Since the outbreak of the civil war many analyses have focused on the ethnic conflict between Sunni Arabs and Shia Arabs, paying little attention to the Kurds in the region. The Syrian conflict has opened up the opportunity for Syrian Kurds to mobilize and organize themselves successfully. At this stage it is important for the international community to carefully assess which parties and concerns are legitimate and should be listened to as this will inevitably influence the prospects for sustainable peace in Syria. In addition, the PYD has so far made some interesting allies varying from the government, other opposition parties to states. The question is whether they will get the support needed to secure a spot in the negotiations on future Syrian governance and what consequences the current course of action has for conflict resolution.

3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK “Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change. It is an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs that arise as new formations generated by social change come up against inherited constraints. But the way we deal with conflict is a matter of habit and choice. It is possible to change habitual responses and exercise intelligent choices.” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:13)

This theoretical framework will begin with a brief discussion on the grounds of conflict resolution theory. We will focus on the stage of war limitation, peacekeeping and peace- making that are relevant for the Syrian case. Departing from Ohlson’s framework on understanding causes of war and peace, the current stage and its possibilities and obstacles will be discussed. Subsequently, three main problems are outlined which arise during these

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

stages. These are a) commitment problems; b) deciding on the form of government; and c) peace-making in a fragile environment. The latter part will also discuss consequences of excluding parties and how they can affect the peace negotiations. Next, outside support from states and diaspora to insurgent movements and its effect on conflict is discussed. The theoretical framework will then move on to theories on diplomacy in peace negotiations shedding light on a more realist perspective. This will form a counter-argument to the previously discussed theories as it will argue for the importance of priorities, power and trust relationships and interests in practice which theories of peacebuilding often neglect or emphasize too little. From this framework the analysis will be done to study and understand the causal mechanism of why the PYD was excluded from the Geneva III peace talks on Syria. The theoretical framework will be used to understand the behaviour of the involved parties and its consequences for the Syrian peace process. The peace process in this thesis refers to the Geneva III Intra-Syrian Talks which have started on February 1, 2016 by the United Nations to come to a political solution for the Syrian civil war.

3.1 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THE HOURGLASS MODEL The academic field of conflict resolution was established in the late 1960s with the work of John Galtung (1969) who proposed a model of conflict analysis that both encompassed symmetric and asymmetric conflict. He perceived conflict as an actual or perceived incompatibility of goals between conflicting parties generated by a difference of social values and structure. A symmetric conflict has a contradiction defined by a clash of interests between the conflicting parties of relative equal status, while an asymmetric conflict derives from the very structure of the parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of each other, their relationship and the conflict of interest inherent in the relationship. Attitudes are influenced by these conflicts through emotions such as fear and anger, and behaviour is characterized by threats, coercion and attacks. Conflict is a dynamic process in which these three components, structure, attitudes and behaviour continuously influence one another. Conflict intensifies when conflicting parties start to organize around the structure developing hostile attitudes and conflictual behaviour. Subsequently, intensification of the process may draw in other parties or generate secondary conflicts within the initial conflicting parties, drawing focus of the core conflict. Eventually for sustainable conflict resolution to succeed, a change in attitude, de- escalation of conflict behaviour and transformation of relationship and conflicting interests need to be addressed (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). The hourglass model shows the escalation

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh and de-escalation phases of conflict resolution responses (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999). The model shows the political space which narrows and widens as conflict dynamics change leading to different conflict resolution responses. Conflict containment refers to war limitation, post-ceasefire peacekeeping and confidence building and security enhancing measures. Conflict settlement includes negotiations and mediation among protagonists also referred to as elite peace-making discussing constitutional reform, and conflict transformation involves the deepest level of cultural and structural peacebuilding with the purpose of reconciliation (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). It is important to remember that in reality “[t]o some, the ultimate goal or result is conflict transformation, meaning that the conflict issue, the incompatibility, is eliminated. More often, the parties agree to place the conflict within bounds, that is, they find a way to manage or regulate the conflict without resorting to violence over an issue that will remain in some form.” (Ohlson, 2008:145).

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

(Hourglass model by Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999).

(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005:24)

Table 1.1 shows an overview of the conflict phases and the strategic responses with examples of tactical responses. The asymmetric nature of the conflict in Syria already rules out some of the classical conflict resolution theory that focus on conflict of interests between relatively similar parties. The only way to resolve an asymmetric conflict is through structural changes which is always in the interest of the underdog and never in the interest of the top dog who is in our case

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

Bashar al-Assad and his regime. As a structural conflict calls for structural change “it may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict.’’ (Ramsbotham et al., 2005:21). A severe asymmetric conflict can open up the possibilities for conflict resolution when the costs of the relationship becomes unbearable for all parties. Third parties play a key role in this type of conflict to assist transformation from an unbalanced relationship to a peaceful one (Ramsbotham et al., 2005). We will focus on the War, Ceasefire and Agreement stage of conflict as these are relevant to the Syrian case and move into theories focused on these stages. Thomas Ohlson’s (2008) framework is used in which many theories fit. Within this framework we will mainly focus on the de-escalation, negotiation and mediation stage.

3.2 OHLSON’S CAUSES OF WAR AND PEACE

Thomas Ohlson (2008) provides a framework relating theories on the causes of war and theories on conflict resolution. To study the outbreak of violent conflict he suggests a triple R triangle composed of Reasons, Resources and Resolve. These three clusters interact with each other and influence conflict attitudes and behaviour. Reasons arise from background conditions, usually bound on an asymmetric character of structural dynamics of the international system leading to weak state structure and low capabilities of governments to provide public goods. These conditions provide reasons for conflict and generate inequality on the political, economic and identity level and create a legitimacy gap. A legitimacy gap is the difference between citizens and their expectation from the state i.e. vertical legitimacy, as well as the difference between mutual acceptance and tolerance of elite and mass levels i.e. horizontal legitimacy (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1993). Resources are also essential to the causes of armed conflict, more specifically the military and organizational capabilities and opportunity structure such as a sudden political instability, a supply offered by foreign support e.g. money, weapons, training but also fixed structures such as jungle familiarity to the parties are important resources (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr, 1970; Tilly, 1978). Important to note here is the role of greed which can sometimes explain the continuation of armed conflict due to opportunities for looting and groups profiting from the war (Ohlson, 2008). Finally, resolve is the concept in the last stage to the outbreak of conflict in which groups make a cost-benefit analysis and consider alternatives. It is “... essentially, a black-boxed process, an aggregated cognitive concept that refers to the degree of collective mobilized mental readiness for and willingness to use 14

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

resources for a particular reason to achieve a particular goal.” (Ohlson, 2008:141). We will now look into the causes of peace i.e. opportunities for peacebuilding and how they relate to the triple R triangle. Ohlson proposes three phases to conflict resolution: Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEO) and Mutually Obtained Rewards (MOR). We will explicitly outline the first two stages as these are relevant to our case study. MOR is the final phase in which the new relationship between the elites and the people are consolidated and normalized. Mutual rewards can help this process by for instance improving political participation and access to political influence and improving civil security and the rule of law (2008:151). This stage is not relevant to our case.

3.3 MUTUALLY HURTING STALEMATE The conflict resolution process starts with the dialogue phase in which negative pressures come out of the conflict process usually related to uncertainty about victory and rising costs or constraints in resources to continue the war. The parties come in a situation where they perceive a deadlock derived from the escalation of the conflict without one party having the winning hand or prospects of a catastrophe which is perceived too costly for both parties to continue fighting, i.e. a Mutually Hurting Stalemate. This phase is important because “[p]arties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so - when alternative, usually unilateral means of achieving a satisfactory result are blocked and the parties feel that they are in an uncomfortable and costly predicament.” (Zartman, 2001:8). Simultaneously, Zartman notes that ripe moments have to be recognized and worked with creatively since there is rarely ever a perfectly ripe time for conflict resolution. Jeong argues that attempts can always be made to change the current status of the conflict, but there is a risk of losing face if a peace attempt fails. Nevertheless, it is important to focus on creating better circumstances in which new offers can be made rather than waiting for a natural opportunity to arise. The focus in such occasions should be on tension reduction measures to prevent the institutionalization of hostilities and create space for de- escalation (2008:193). Another way to describe the MHS and to look for ‘ripe’ moments is by looking at the life cycle of asymmetric conflicts which implies that conflict between equal or highly unequal powers have reduced likelihood of escalation or failure to de-escalate while moderate inequality of power increases escalation (Pruitt, 2005).

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

“Impact of asymmetry in power on the likelihood of escalation or failure to de-escalate” (Pruitt, 2005:24) There are two explanations for this conflict spiral. With a moderate inequality in power, the stronger party insists on having the negotiations his way while the weaker party is not that impressed and will try to overwhelm the opponent by attacking. In addition, the weaker party rather acts upon his emotions which he would not dare in the high inequality case. In the escalation phase, something happens that affects the disadvantaged group(s) which increases their power and changes their perception of success. Something clearly reflected in the demonstrations that spilled over during the Arab Spring when many people started protesting due to a shift in the belief to change circumstances. Initial escalation usually begins with nonviolent demonstrations and when these acts are put down violently the violent conflict is likely to break out. De-escalation is likely when either one side gets the upper hand and ends the conflict in victory or when protagonists perceive their power to be equal and perceive a MHS and start negotiating, which also relates to the balance-of-power theory, that parties of equal capabilities are unlikely to engage in violent conflict in this case, unlikely to continue fighting (Pruitt, 2005). Blainey (1998) enhances the argument of perception as he argues that the main influence which can lead to the breakdown of diplomacy is a contradictory sense of bargaining power. The key factor which made enemies reluctant to continue fighting and or persuade to negotiate in the first place is the agreement about their relative bargaining position. Thus it is not the actual distribution or balance of power which is vital, it is rather the way in which leaders think that power is distributed. According to Blainey, war is a dispute about the measurement of power. A diplomatic crisis is personal and emotional. This 16

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

can for example lead to an actor refusing to believe that it is weaker. When each side believes that it will win the war the appeal to war is greater. Blainey mentions seven main factors that influence nations in assessing their relative strength: 1) Military strength; 2) Predictions of how outside nations would behave in war; 3) Perceptions of internal unity and unity of enemy; 4) Memory of forgetfulness of the realities/suffering of war; 5) The ability to sustain the war economically as envisaged; 6) Nationalism and ideology; 7) Personalities and mental qualities of leaders who decide peace or war. Each of these factors can either promote peace or war and can lead to a disagreement of relative strength. In this first phase to conflict resolution a behavioural change takes place often characterized by power politics, force, coercion and fear, hence not voluntary. A stalemate can be recognized through several events such as external military pressure or a change in leadership, however most often it is non-military pressure such as diplomatic actions or sanctions as well as a combination of both that produce ripeness (Ohlson, 2008). This reflects the role of the international players producing pressure for de-escalation of a conflict. The most important part in this phase for the parties to start and stay in negotiations is a perceived way out: a believe that a mutually acceptable agreement is possible through negotiation (Pruitt & Kim, 2009). The MHS however does not address conflict attitudes which means that if an agreement is reached, the negative pressures must be complemented by constructive incentives which should emerge during the negotiation and/or mediation process (Ohlson, 2008). Thus the process starts with awareness of disincentives to continue fighting for both parties which may then lead to a cease-fire and initial peace talks. The MHS mainly addresses resources of the triple R-triangle, because ripeness is produced often due to a lack of resources and reduced opportunities to victory. However, this phase is never enough to keep the peace.

3.4 MUTUALLY ENTICING OPPORTUNITIES Constructive incentives are part of the second phase where Mutually Enticing Opportunities are explored. This is the stage in which third parties play a key role. Especially in war-torn societies, parties rely on external assistance in most stages of the conflict resolution process meaning that these third parties can “... have a number of political, economic and military ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ at their disposal.” (Ohlson, 2008:147). We will further discuss the role of third parties in a later section. When an agreements is signed the implementation phase starts. According to Peter

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

Wallensteen (1994), the components of a peace agreement are often similar, falling into two categories. One is military to regulate and terminate the armed violence e.g. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former soldiers, while the other is political, aimed at regulating the distribution of power e.g. constitutional changes (cited by Ohlson, 2008). As mentioned before stopping the fighting is not enough, the parties need positive incentives to keep the peace during the implementation period. MEO’s are selective incentives which can come in different forms and combinations such as a power-sharing agreement, immediate material benefits or the opportunity to gain power with legitimate means. During this phase the commitment to the agreement by the parties should be affirmed by concrete action. The horizontal relationship between the party elites are central to this phase. The elites are concerned about security, political power, recognition of identity or economic well- being, also called the fears of peace which can be expressed in security dilemmas, commitment problems or misperceptions. These might also influence the dynamics within a party where disagreement arises on the negotiated compromise. MEO’s help change the conflict attitude and change the perceptions of the parties about themselves, each other and the issues. The MEO’s mainly deal with reasons by addressing grievances and constructing joint objectives and therefore complement the negative pressures from the MHS by making the temporary change of behaviour more structured and insured. However, for parties to successfully start the MEO phase, they have to overcome three problems: 1) they have to deal with mutual insecurity; 2) they must implement the political mechanisms for future distribution of power and; 3) implementation takes place in a fragile environment full of challenges and threats that can lead them back to violence (Ohlson, 2008:149). Possible solutions to these problems will be discussed in chronological order.

3.4.1 COMMITMENT PROBLEMS AND THE SECURITY DILEMMA

The first problem, distrust between the parties, could be addressed by constructing the negotiated agreement around credible guarantees and offering third party security guarantee. Barbara Walter studied the failure of civil war negotiations between 1940 and 1990 and concluded that it is not the incompatibility of underlying issues and resolving them but the lack of “designing credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement” that leads to failure of negotiations (1999:129). The role of third parties is crucial in overcoming the commitment problem because negotiations in civil wars need to address consolidation of the belligerents unless a partition is the outcome. To successfully implement the negotiated settlement the 18

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

warring parties need to demilitarize and demobilize at some point and hand over power to the administration agreed upon. A civil war causes an internal security dilemma in which actors are rapidly guided by the logic of a preemptive strike i.e. ‘I believe you will attack so I better attack first’ (Wallensteen, 2011). This offers opportunities for post-treaty exploitation such as a surprise attack after disarmament or one party taking over governance. This position of not being able to defend oneself and not having a central authority to rely on drastically complicates prospects for cooperation (Walter, 1999). The peace treaty therefore should be designed addressing the security dilemma and committing the parties to the terms by implementing guarantees on obtaining the benefits of long-term peace. All parties could disarm step-by-step giving neither side a relative advantage. However two problems remain, monitoring is extremely difficult and reciprocal implementation strategies ensure only that neither side get the advantage but cannot guarantee arms, soldiers, resources to be held back for future offensive. Then, there are costly and credible signals such as unilateral disarmament which may be convincing but often not favoured by any party. Moreover parties can always hide information - therefore demobilizing leaves parties vulnerable while refusing triggers the security dilemma which needs to be avoided. “Ultimately … the warring parties cannot credibly commit to the safe consolidation of their forces by themselves.” (Walter, 1999:137). A third party is needed to help enforce or verify this stage. When parties start to build up trust again and negotiations can move on they need to agree on a new political mechanism for future governance which also gives rise to commitment problems.

3.4.2 FORM OF GOVERNMENT

There is little consensus on this matter as no particular type of governmental system has proven to be significantly favourable to peace on the short term. There is however empirical support that majoritarian democracy is ill-advised in war-torn divided societies which clearly presented itself in Iraq after the invasion by the U.S. in 2003 as diplomat Ghassan Salamé put it in an interview: “[Paul] Bremer came with this large strategy of Tabula Rasa. That anything that exists should disappear and we should rebuild a new Iraq as soon as possible. That was sort of the obsession with some neoconservatists in America with the German and Japanese model of 1945, that you go there, you throw everything and start rebuilding.” (Ghassan Salamé, 2016). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that combatants are much more likely to sign an agreement if it reduces uncertainty by the inclusion of guaranteed positions in the 19

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh future government (Jarstad, 2008:106) More conceivable is decentralization and various forms of power-sharing because the more parties get included in the implementation process, the smaller incentives are for them to become spoilers. In addition agreeing on a political system in which parties can live with if they lose by it, significantly reduces the risk of conflict recurrence on the short term (Ohslon, 2008:182). Regarding the security issues, a settlement must be reached on political terms and parties need to agree on a new central government. Here another commitment problem arises as parties know that tolerating the other in government or elections will be costly since they will pursue competing policies. The belligerents need to convince each other of not taking over power once their party is elected and gets control over instruments of government (Walter, 1999:138). According to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, it is expected that great instability will be present in countries with a wide variety of subcultures through mutually reinforcing differences. The deviant cases of fragmented but stable democracies are defined by Arend Lijphart (1968) as “consociational democracies”. Consociationalism rejects the principle of majority rule because in fragmented societies many decisions have different values to the parties which make the stakes higher and therefore require more consultation than simple majority rule. In times of crisis even homogeneous and consensual democracies grasp to consociationalism as shown in many grand coalitions that were formed during the Second World War. In consociational democracies political contest is discouraged and the focus on inter-elite cooperation should become a habit (Lijphart, 1968). Scholars agree on the fact that divisions in societies present a major obstacle to countries that are not yet democratic or not fully democratic. There is also a wide consensus on the idea that to successfully implement a democracy in divided societies, power sharing and group autonomy are key requirements (Lijphart, 2004; Gurr, 1993; Jarstad, 2008). “Power sharing denotes the participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy ‘means that these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture.” (Lijphart, 2004:97). These two characteristics are primary attributes to “consociational” democracy. Scholars on democratic theory have advocated power sharing as a school in democracy, socializing opponents into compromises and moderation, and as the only option for democratic governance for many divided societies. While the former two problems have rather specific solutions namely third party

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involvement for security guarantee and looking for a form of governance based on inclusiveness to address long-term concerns of the conflicting parties, the third problem is much broader.

3.4.3 FRAGILE ENVIRONMENT: VIOLENCE DURING PEACE PROCESSES

Conflict resolution of armed conflict always takes place in a fragile environment. While much of the characteristics of a fragile environment for a conflict is context specific, the topic of spoilers cannot be neglected as it can significantly influence the peace process and possibilities for negotiations. A peace process always has the potential of creating spoilers since there may be parties that do not profit by peace or by the terms and conditions being created for peace. Spoilers are the main reason why we have violence in peace negotiation and they form the greatest source of risk during civil war termination (Stedman, 1997:7). Stedman (1997) first proposed a framework categorizing spoilers and suggesting matching third-party strategies to manage them. Spoilers are differentiated by their goals and their commitment to achieving them. Depending on which type is diagnosed, Stedman offered three strategies to manage spoilers ranging from a focus on conciliation to the use of coercion. A distinction is also made between inside spoilers and outside spoilers based on whether they are participating in negotiations or not with different strategies used by the parties depending on their position. Inside spoilers often use the strategy of stealth, convincing others of their goodwill but simultaneously keep their military capabilities. Outside spoilers often use overt violence such as the assassination of moderates and looking for alliances to sabotage the peace process (Stedman, 1997). Stedman however mainly focuses on the key warring parties in his analysis disregarding potential spoilers. Again in managing spoilers, third parties are key players as they have the task of including and excluding parties into peace negotiations as well as to identify and include the broadest possible range of actors and interests in society to prevent excluded groups of becoming spoilers. Therefore one needs to look beyond the warring parties and also include potential parties to a conflict (Blaydes and De Maio, 2010:22). Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs (2011) define potential spoilers as former warring parties during the civil war, both state-related and non-state actors, splinter factions from these groups and new armed groups. They argue that when advocating for a wider definition of actors almost any actor may be viewed as a potential spoiler with the risk of undermining the concept itself (2011:610). 21

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Spoilers can either use violent or nonviolent means and tactics to spoil peace negotiations which can call for different responses from the intervening/mediating party (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011). It is important to keep in mind that, “[s]poiling is thus part of the bargaining process, yet all parties have different goals in mind, make different calculations of costs and risks of various methods of achieving those goals, and not all attempt to maximize their own potential gains.” (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011:614). Scholars differ in explaining spoiling behaviour. Whereas some say that focus should be on inside the party such as level of leadership and to focus on spoiler type (Stedman, 2002:14), others argue to focus on the structural environment of the peace process (Greenhill and Major, 2007:8). Key determinants are the relative power balance of parties and prevailing opportunity structures. Therefore it is argued that all parties are potential spoilers if they believe their interests are not furthered in the peace process. Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs argue that there is no use in distinguishing spoiler types since opportunity structures change over time and therefore parties continuously adjust behaviour based on calculations on risks and costs. Peacemakers thus should concentrate on influencing structural circumstances to prevent the emergence of spoilers. Eventually we need to look at both factors since both explanations are not mutually exclusive, e.g. if a party has the resources to spoil effectively it may still not do it due to its primary interest of stopping the fighting (Nilsson & Södberg Kovacs, 2011:616). The literature suggests three important reasons for inclusion of the PYD. The first is the security dilemma, which cannot be overcome with the exclusion of the YPG. Second, the form of government, which will lack legitimacy without any inclusion of the representatives from the PYD-controlled area and third, by excluding the PYD and its affiliates, there is a risk of increasing spoilers to the current peace talks. Apart from the spoilers phenomenon there are domestic and international dynamics that harden the peace process both through obstacles during negotiations affecting actors positions or interest, or during the implementation of new standards agreed upon in the peace process. Rebuilding a state after a civil war is a long-term process inevitably with ups and downs along the line of development due to compromises and negotiations that have taken place (Menocal, 2011:1723). So what actors play a significant role in conflict resolution?

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3.5 ACTORS The theory discussed so far is drawn from conflict resolution theory and centralizes the role of third parties in overcoming violence during peace negotiations and conflict recurrence. In addition, a third party can decide on the legitimacy of groups involved in combat and who should be included in the negotiations. In this section we will look closer at the actors in the conflict resolution and their influence on peace negotiations.

3.5.1 PRIMARY PARTIES

Parties in a conflict may be reluctant to recognize another party as legitimate to negotiate with during the escalation phase. “Differences among actors can be identified by their goals, attitudes toward particular issues, motivations to realize their interests, and capacities to manage relationships with other actors.” (Jeong, 2008:24). As with spoilers, parties differentiate in their commitment and goals. Mobilization is an important aspect for a party’s level of expectation. Parties anchor their values in shared beliefs and ends and a common understanding on how to reach those ends. Shared values justify and legitimize certain group behaviour which is important to convince the third party when they intervene. The more parties involved in conflict, the harder it is to reach a solution (Tsebelis, 2002; Cunningham, 2006). The bargaining range will become smaller as more parties join; information asymmetries increase; every actor has incentives to hold out to sign the agreement last to get a better deal and; the more parties, the more shifting alliances which prevent negotiating blocs from emerging to get an agreement sooner (Cunningham, 2006:875-6). However, not all parties need to agree on a negotiated settlement. Parties involved in violent conflict act strategically. It may be that an agreement is reached with not all parties included. Nilsson (2008) studied this problem and found that the parties involved agree to commit to peace based on their agreement risking the left out party or parties to continue violence, which is often the case. So partial peace is possible but the peace agreement reduces the chances for reaching overall peace in the conflict and thus is less sustainable when not all parties to the conflict are included. Walter (2003) researched the influence of multiple parties in ethnic and territorial conflict and concluded that the government is less likely to give concessions when many ethnic parties are involved as it would want to build a strong reputation to prevent future challengers from arising. Nilsson (2010) studied the presence of several rebel groups and its influence on the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. She found that while the government is 23

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much more likely to settle with a stronger rebel group than a weak one, when more parties are included this significantly reduces. The problem of multi-party negotiations can be overcome by forming coalitions, however this will bring other challenges such as representativeness as negotiators speaking on behalf of a group risk the chance that the outcome might not be accepted. These are consideration third parties need to take into account when assisting in the peace process.

3.5.2 THIRD-PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN PEACEBUILDING

Peacebuilding emerged in the 1990s with the United Nations taking the leading role in assisting post-conflict states to solidify peace in society and prevent war from recurring. Soon the international community realized that the early strategy with a focus on stopping the violence on the short-term, organizing elections and promoting a market-oriented economy did not result in sufficiently good results. Therefore the peacebuilding concept needed to be revised. Peacebuilding should focus on participatory politics such as strengthening civil society and building more formal institutions that ensure the protection of human rights and security, in other words state building is essential to peacebuilding. Recognition for the need of state building within peacebuilding has shifted the process to be more focused on the long term in line with a more realistic timeframe for structural changes and developmental needs in fragile states (Menocal, 2011:1717-20). Peace- and state building both share a fundamental concern for legitimacy. Here the focus lies on the state-society relationship. Legitimacy is defined as “the normative belief of a political community that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”; states are legitimate when ‘key political elites and the public accept the rules regulating the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth as proper and binding.”(Menocal, 2011:1721). Legitimacy can be understood in many ways. It can be bestowed by international recognition through the United Nations or based on populism with the support of the people as the source of their right to rule. Legitimacy based on clientelism derives from the exchange of material benefits for political support and is based on personal relations rather than formal institutions. Traditional forms of authority create legitimacy based on norms and reciprocity grounded in social and cultural practices and is common in rural communities. Legitimacy can also be based in performance for example when an actor or group is able to provide primary goods where the government fails to do so. Finally, there is procedural legitimacy which is often found in developed countries and depends on the rule of law and accountable decision making 24

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processes (Menocal, 2011). The biggest challenge of including these matters in peacebuilding is not writing it down in an agreement but implementing it in reality which was outlined earlier in the section on implementing Mutually Enticing Opportunities in a fragile environment. International involvement in peacebuilding has been more focused on creating inclusive, responsive and representative polities and societies over time with the aim to make structural changes in the system with new legitimate rules. Peace- and state building are internal processes but also very much affected by the context like geostrategic interests, multinational interests, the media or regional integration issues. These external factors can have a significant impact on the peace process by shaping the interests of the actors involved and thus also the agenda and options for state building (Menocal, 2011:1721). To add more complexity, there is another important factor which influences peace-making and peacebuilding namely, outside support. During the Cold War it was common that insurgency groups were supported by the United States, the Soviet Union and several regional powers backed by one of these world powers. The end of the Cold War resulted in the emergence of peacebuilding changing the dynamics of outside support to insurgents significantly (Byman et al., 2001).

3.5.3 STATE SUPPORT AND DIASPORA SUPPORT

As the support from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. declined, support from neighbouring countries, diasporas and other types of non-state actors such as refugees or religious organizations, started playing a significant role in creating and sustaining strong insurgencies. This has also shifted motivations and the identity of supporters/providers in the Post-Cold war era (Byman et al., 2001). Neighbouring states primarily support insurgents motivated by realpolitik, to increase regional influence or destabilize neighbourhood rivals (Byman et al., 2001; Kathman, 2011). Supporting insurgencies often creates chain reactions with rival states supporting insurgencies in each other's countries. However, concern about payback may also lead states from restraining support as aggressive policy abroad may lead to rebels at home. Other motivations for state support are inter alia to support co-religionists or to gain material benefits. Often states have multiple reasons for supporting a particular insurgency. Strategic motives are common but states also support out of domestic concerns or to help the battle of their ethnic kin. States have a wide range of resources and forms of assistance to offer to insurgents such as money, arms, safe haven, diplomatic assistance and training. While 25

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insurgencies rarely defeat a national army, state support often resulted in the protraction of a conflict increasing the possibilities of political settlement more favourable to the insurgents. The geopolitical emphasis however makes a state an unreliable supporter, therefore groups also seek other forms of support with more reliable partners (Byman et al., 2001:40). Another form of support which has become increasingly important after the Cold War era is diaspora support. Diasporas are more reliable than states in their support as the motivation is largely ethnic affinity related instead of strategic. Above all cooperating with diaspora does not involve the risk to exert control over a movement. The main form of support of diasporas is financial assistance but diasporas can also exert political pressure at host governments to help insurgents or oppose the government fighting them. Blocking diaspora support thus requires action by host governments. Palestinian movements and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) have been relying on diaspora support for decades. Diaspora support often increases after success of an insurgent movement and may dry up as campaigns are perceived as a lost cause (Byman et al., 2001:41/55). Support is most valuable during the early development of insurgent movements as it will get a chance to organize before it is wiped out by its enemy. State and non-state support can effectively change the dynamics of a war, increasing violence, extending the conflict or turning a civil war into an international war (Byman et al., 2001). Apart from support in internationalized wars, states also make use of diplomacy in conflict resolution. In the next part a review on the role of diplomacy in international peacekeeping will be given and the literature’s perspective on positive and negative effects of diplomacy on peace negotiations will be discussed.

3.6 DIPLOMACY The primary purpose of diplomacy is “to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda, or law.(…) Together with the balance of power, which it both reflects and reinforces, diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states.” (Berridge, 2005:1). As pointed out in this quote diplomacy is associated with Kenneth Waltz’ balance of power theory (1979) which states that in a world without a central international institution governing, there is anarchy and states are units wishing to survive. To prevent a hegemon from arising that can attack and control them, states will try to balance the power in the international system by forming alliances. But diplomacy is not only

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valuable as a defence mechanism but also in pro-actively supporting and promoting peace through negotiation.

3.6.1 NEGOTIATION

An important part of diplomacy is negotiations on the international level. It is a complex process as it includes amongst others, cultural factors, historical interrelationships, contextual influence and most of all it is related to power. As mentioned before conflict may arise between two parties with relatively equal power which can be studied with for instance game- theory which focuses on the strategies to get the best outcome. The other form of conflict may arise from structural differences which often is reflected in a difference between power. Similarly, as the graph from Pruitt showed the impact of asymmetry in power on conflict, power relations are an important part of negotiations. It is also important to note that diplomatic negotiations are a long process with both pre-negotiations and post-negotiations and relations are always prone to change due to changing political circumstances (Casmir, 1990:41). “Negotiations … are heavily influenced by both the participant’s perceptions and the environment in which they are conducted.” (Casmir: 1990:43). The complexity in diplomatic negotiations often leads to indecisiveness from the belief that a ‘wait-and-see attitude’ may in the long-run produce better outcomes. It is often difficult to understand the real position and topic considered important by negotiators on the basis of what they state publicly as those statements are addressed to the bystanders i.e. mass media consumers and their needs which can differ from what is said in diplomatic interactions (Casmir: 1990:44). Furthermore, timing plays an essential role for negotiations to succeed.

3.6.2 TIMING

As discussed so far, the peace process is a complex process which needs to entail decisions on power transfers, providing political and military security and overcoming commitment problems. Timing plays a crucial role in these military and political interventions in conflict. Developments in peacebuilding theories have resulted in the perception that timing is a central component for effective conflict resolution as it reduces inaction (Pinfari, 2010:37). The literature suggests that at least on these three moments time matters: for conflict resolution related to ripeness theory; in effective military and diplomatic interventions; and when negotiations have started, timing is important for negotiations to succeed (Pinfari, 2010). 27

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Ripe moments to start conflict resolution have been discussed as part of the Mutually Hurting Stalemate. Since the development on ripeness theory, diplomats and policy advisors, especially in the Clinton administration, have increasingly taken into account the role and use of time pressure on peace negotiations. Setting deadlines to effectively guide withdrawal of troops would help nations rebuild more resolutely (Pinfari, 2010:35). This has also been picked up by current Secretary of State John Kerry when he advocated for more deadlines for conflict resolution and state building in Iraq after the U.S. intervention argued with “So far, Iraqi leaders have responded only to deadlines” (Kerry, 2006). The diplomatic momentum, the moment in which there appears to be favourable circumstances such as a perceived mutually hurting stalemate for possible negotiated settlements, is important in prolonged conflicts. While it cannot on its own generate successful agreements, keeping the momentum can certainly advance negotiations as compared to not taking the conditions into account (Berridge, 2005:58). Time pressure and deadlines can be used to keep the diplomatic momentum. There is a consensus on this reflected in contemporary diplomacy and conflict resolution as it influences the parties’ position, expectations and pressures them to produce agreements (Pinfari, 2010). However, there is also some critique towards deadlines in relation to diplomatic momentum as some deadlines may not be credible to all parties or parties may exaggerate their positions shortly before a deadline to try and get the best result. This might in turn lead to another party withdrawing from negotiations. Nevertheless, the role of time pressure and deadlines are generally perceived as positive tools by diplomats (Pinfari, 2010:42). Pinfari points out to the lack of reflection however in diplomatic manuals and papers on conflict resolution as they miss out on two crucial questions. The first is the assessment of results in using time pressure and deadlines in negotiations. The focus is rather on the agreement reached instead of the quality and durability of the agreement. Second, ‘the range of alternatives available to negotiators under time pressure is portrayed as limited to either ‘favourable’ or ‘agreeable’ solutions’ (Pinfari, 2010:43). Prolonged conflicts are often asymmetric conflicts, derived from structures and conflict inherent to a relationship. This means that there are significant differences in what outcome parties want. In such cases, time pressure may hinder the negotiating parties to interact effectively and overcome these relational problems. This is confirmed by studies in social psychology when looking at cognitive dynamics, time pressure is associated with low-quality decision making and suboptimal negotiated outcomes, simultaneously it is hard to draw conclusions on the impact

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh of time pressure without reference to the specific context and characteristics of decision makers. Social experiments on time pressure and decision making criticize the combination as it would lead to “... an increase in ‘selectivity of the input of information’, where ‘information that is perceived as most important is processed first, and then processing is continued until time is up’; a decrease in the ‘accuracy of human judgments’; increased importance being paid to ‘negative information’; a ‘tendency of locking in on a strategy’ and a ‘decreas[ing] competence of finding alternative strategies in problem solving’.” (Pinfari, 2010:45). The closest consensus today from the political and social psychological perspective is that the context plays a role and time pressure in negotiations have different effects depending on situational factors. Situational factors are “the distribution of payoffs and the negotiations’ goals’; task or context variables and the personal characteristics of bargainers” (Pinfari, 2010:46). The first debate is important as there is significant difference in time pressure in negotiations with cooperative goals and competitive goals. Time pressure can have positive effects on negotiations in a cooperative context but intensifies competitiveness in a hostile context which is demonstrated through social experiments. In reality and in the international politics context, negotiations are rarely held without competitive goals and more importantly, in real life the conditions in which the negotiations take places have an impact on the choice for cooperation or competition. Therefore it is important to highlight task or context variables that influence a “negotiator’s cognitive process in determining the effect of time pressure on negotiation” (Pinfari, 2010:48). Particularly on three task or context variables time pressure has a negative impact on decision-making: “when the issues at stake are complex; when the task and/or the information available are highly ambiguous; and when group dynamics come into play.” (Pinfari, 2010:48). For the first problem Pinfari researched the Camp David Agreement and concluded that “even when a negotiation in its entirety can be described as very complex, time pressure can produce positive results if the structure of the issues at stake, the strategies of the actors involved and the skill of the mediators all concur in effectively sequencing issues evenly throughout the talks.” (2010:220). Time pressure has a negative impact on negotiators speaking on behalf of a group risking the chance that the outcome might not be accepted. Moreover, having no deadlines will give room to more opinions and perspectives that can be taken into account.

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The third situational factor which has an impact on time pressure and its effect on decision making is personal characteristics of the negotiator. On the one hand individual characteristics and the approach to the negotiations affect the impact of time pressure on outcomes. On the other studies have shown the effect of individuals’ cultural background in relation to time. As most North European cultures are more concerned with time management and schedules while Arab and Latino cultures are more characterized by doing many things at once by involving people and completion of transaction rather than adherence to pre-set schedules (Hall, 1983:46 cited by Pinfari, 2010) Concluding, it is important to realize that the diplomatic manuals presented over the past two decades which say something about time pressure on negotiations are often misrepresented and downplay the detrimental effect. Pinfari’s study finds that while time pressure may have a positive effect on conflict resolution in the short-term, it often does not in the long term as the agreement tends to lack in sustainability (2010:226).

3.7 CONCLUDING As the theoretical framework shows there are several theories for conflict resolution in divided societies in an internationalized civil war. The Syrian civil war is an asymmetric conflict with multiple parties and is continuing for over five years due to a moderate inequality of power between the belligerents. Third party involvement is necessary to overcome the internal security dilemma between warring parties in order for them to act in line with their commitments. Scholars also agree that power sharing may be the only form of democratic governance that may succeed in highly divided, heterogeneous societies. Finally, for peace negotiations to succeed, parties need to deal with a fragile environment including (potential) spoilers. Third parties again play a key role in assessing which parties should be included in negotiations and what legitimate demands are. Simultaneously, outside support can significantly influence the belief of warring parties that they will end the war in victory. Over the years the Syrian conflict has become internationalized through state support but also diaspora support dragging the Kurdish question into the conflict. The question arises whether conflict resolution theory is applicable in reality as the executers, diplomats, have their own interest next to the interest of peacebuilding. We will analyse the relevant parties to test the theories and get an understanding of why the PYD was excluded from the 2016 peace talks.

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

4 METHODOLOGY A qualitative case study will be done through a combination of literature review and process tracing. To answer the central question to this thesis the analysis is split in three parts: 1) analysis of the evolving status of Kurds in Syria; 2) analysis of actors, interests and relationships; 3) analysis of consequences of the exclusion of the PYD in the Geneva III peace talks. The first part will focus on the changing status of Kurds in Syria by reflecting on their history and the influence of recent events including the civil war on their position in Syria. The second part will be the main part of analysis and addresses the causal mechanism on how it is that the PYD was excluded from the Syrian peace talks. Through the analysis of multiple sources an overview of the actors will be given to which the theoretical framework is mirrored to understand decision-making processes. Finally, departing from the spoilers mechanism outlined in the theoretical framework a process-tracing analysis will be done on the PYD’s behaviour since its exclusion at the start of the peace talks in February 2016. The analysis in this thesis is done for the purpose of theory-testing and theory-building meaning that the variables from the theoretical framework will be discussed per actor and in addition the analysis will contribute to theory-building in the study of similar topics in future research.

4.1 PROCESS TRACING Process tracing is the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier, 2011:823). On the one hand, it offers causal analysis of the peace process that unfolds over time based on careful description of changes and causation. On the other hand, process tracing looks at sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables (Mahoney, 2010:125-31). Process tracing will be used in this thesis as interpretivist analysis of the internal reasons actors give for their actions. A case study is done to give more insight into the dynamics of the Syrian civil war and attempts for conflict resolution by the international community. Process tracing investigates how initial conditions are translated into a particular outcome (Vennesson, 2008). Since “[p]rocess tracing is particularly useful for the analysis of decision-making processes, especially in multi-level settings and when there is no clear separation between ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’ variables” (Zeitlin, 2016), it seems the right method for analysing the Geneva III peace talks. An interpretive case study will be done using the theoretical framework to provide explanations for the Syrian case with the purpose of evaluating and refining theories. “Process tracing is a fundamental element of empirical

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh case study research because it provides a way to learn and to evaluate empirically the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification of the situations that face them. Process tracing helps the researcher to uncover, directly and indirectly, what actors want, know and compute” (Simon 1985: 295 cited in Vennesson, 2008:233). We will analyse the international context, the roles and interests of the relevant actors involved in the peace process, the decision-making process and the outcome. The primary purpose for using process tracing as a method is to gain insight into the causal mechanisms of when and why a group like the PYD is excluded from peace talks, evaluate prior explanatory hypothesis from the theoretical framework and discuss the consequences based on the theoretical framework. We will analyse the evolving relationships of the actors with the PYD, research how events unfold over time since the beginning of the peace talks and analyse what characterizes key steps in the process. For the analysis a timeline is made noting key events that influence interests and actions of the actors involved (see appendix 1). The timeline shows events since January 2016 until the end of the second round of peace talks on April 27 and the announcement in the beginning of May by the U.S. of a new approach if the Syrian government does not cooperate to set a political transition in motion and move out President Assad before the deadline of August 2016.

4.2 DATA AND VARIABLES The data for the analysis is retrieved from several primary sources such as official government statements but also news articles containing interviews with spokespersons of parties, as well as secondary scientific sources such as books and previous research on the topic. The first part of analysis will provide relevant background knowledge for the evolving position of Syrian Kurds and the resulting establishment of the PYD. The data for this part of the analysis is mainly collected from secondary sources such as books and historical studies on Kurds in Syria. The second part of analysis will outline the involvement of each actor in the Syrian conflict, its interest and its role related to conflict resolution theory discussed in the theoretical framework. For this part of the analysis we have outlined the following variables and indicators for operationalization:

Variable Indicator Question Ripeness Events leading to a MHS Are there disincentives to

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continue fighting for the actor? Ripeness Perceived MHS Does the actor see peace negotiations as necessary to a way out of the conflict? (What are the perceptions of the relative power compared to other parties?) Security Dilemma Security guarantee Are there third parties who can give a security guarantee to the actor? Security Dilemma Commitment problem Does the peace process address consolidation of the belligerents with the aim of demobilization and demilitarization in the eyes of the actor? Form of Government Preferred form of What is the preferred form of government future government? Form of Government Power sharing agreement Is the form of government based on inclusiveness? Spoiling Spoiling mechanism What is the relative power balance of the PYD to included parties? Spoiling Spoiling mechanism Are there opportunity structures to spoil the Geneva peace talks? Support Legitimacy (How) is the group legitimized? Support Motivation What are the motivations to support the government, the HNC and/or the PYD? Support Influence What influence does support have on the conflict and the prospects for a good outcome of the peace talks? Power Politics Balance of Power Are alliances chosen to balance power? Diplomacy/Timing Diplomatic momentum Is there a diplomatic momentum according to the actor? Or does the complexity of the subject lead to a ‘wait-and-see’- attitude? Timing Deadlines Has the actor been subject of deadlines in the peace process and how may this have influenced their actions? 33

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Timing Situational factors What goals; task or context variables; and personal characteristics of negotiators are there that impact the use of deadlines in negotiations? These variables derive from the theoretical framework and help explain the dynamics of why the PYD was excluded from the Geneva talks and analyse the current setting for peace talks. The variable ripeness will be measured for each actor based on primary sources such as news articles presenting events that influence the actors position towards ripeness but also data from interviews with spokespersons that state an answer to the questions. The security dilemma will be mainly analysed for the negotiating actors, the High Negotiations Committee and the Syrian government but form of government will be analysed for each actor. While the security dilemma is something arising at implementation of agreement and therefore not sufficiently discussed yet, the analysis will be done through inferences made based on how the negotiations currently proceed and what according to theory is expected. Questions related to the form of government will be answered as far as actors have discussed this topic, from primary sources such as interviews. The spoiling variable will be measured in part 3 of the analysis by looking at the behaviour and actions of the PYD since the beginning of the talks and their official exclusion. Support will be measured for each supporter: Turkey; The United States; and Russia. Diaspora support the PYD receives will be discussed in their section while the support states offer to the PYD, HNC and/or Syrian government will be outlined in the state analysis. The influence of support will be measured for the PYD, HNC and Syrian government by looking at actions of the actors during negotiations and changing attitudes combined with changing support, expected from the theoretical framework. The motivations for support also answers the question concerning the Balance of Power. Simultaneously, when looking for the MHS we will look at the perception of power balance of the direct belligerents and its effect on the conflict. Finally, the role of deadlines so far will be analysed by looking at events that may have incurred deadlines on the actors. We will discuss the situational factors for each actor involved in a deadline to analyse the impact of deadlines on the current peace process.

4.3 ACTORS These actors will be subject to analysis: PYD; High Negotiations Committee (HNC); Syrian government; Turkey; the United States; and Russia. The analysis of the PYD will also include the relationship of the PYD with other Syrian opposition groups. Subsequently we 34

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will study the HNC and the Syrian government, their position in the negotiations and their relationship with the PYD. Turkey has played a significant role for the Syrian opposition since the beginning of the conflict by offering them political and financial support. Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have also expressed their support towards the opposition and hosted several meetings concerning the Syrian peace process including the meeting which formed the HNC. This analysis however will only include Turkey as it is a direct neighbour of Syria and is to a much broader extent involved in the conflict due to a shared Kurdish population and the rise of the PYD on the Turkish border. The United States and Turkey oppose the current Syrian regime and are part of the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The coalition exists of 60 partner states which reflects the international dimension of the conflict. However, as this study is limited to a time frame a selection of most important relevant actors in a position to influence negotiations has been made. The United States has long awaited its involvement but now that it is engaged can have significant influence on the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Russia has been the most important international backer of the Syrian regime together with Iran. Their support has significantly influenced the bargaining position of the Syrian regime in the peace process as will be reflected in the analysis. The increasing involvement of the United States and Russia into the civil war is significant of this case and therefore will be closely analysed. The United Nations is deliberately not included in the analysis because it is the mediating party. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura calls on behalf of the United Nations for states to enhance the peace process as it lacks independent military power and therefore has less ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ to directly influence the conflict dynamics. In addition, the institution is controlled by some of the main actors subject to analysis and states can make faster decisions followed by action compared to the United Nations that can influence the peace process. From all actors first their involvement in the Syrian conflict and their relationship with the PYD will be outlined. For the PYD, their establishment and relationship with other opposition groups will be outlined. Subsequently, the analysis based on the proposed variables follows. To answer the third question we will look at the activities of the PYD to influence negotiations since preparatory talks have started without them in February 2016 but first we will closely look at the establishment of the PYD and the history of Kurds in Syria.

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

5 ANALYSIS

5.1 PART 1: STATUS OF KURDS IN SYRIA: FROM REPRESSION TO AUTONOMY In 1916 the United Kingdom and the French Third Republic with the assent of the Russian Empire signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The agreement shaped the Middle-Eastern region and defined the borders of Iraq and Syria. Russia, France and the UK were all assigned control over areas and free to decide on state boundaries within their areas. Syria fell under control of France. During the French rule the Kurds, Bedouins, Assyrians and Circassians requested regional autonomy as they feared that once the French authorities would leave, the minorities in the government would be replaced by Muslims Arabs from the capital. Their request was denied (Gorgas, 2009). Attempts to foster Kurdish nationalism could not keep up with the more nationally conscious Sunni Arab majority that led the way to the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936. The treaty resulted in an independent Syrian Arab state following the Second World War. The first two decades of independence was a turbulent period marked by several military coups and coup attempts. In 1949, Adib al-Shishakli, ironically from Kurdish origin, enunciated Syria as a unified Arab-Muslim state and started the process of Kurdish discrimination by banning Kurdish organisations and garb (Gunter, 2014). In 1962 a governmental decree classified around 20 per cent of the Kurdish population in Syria +/- 120,000 Kurds as ajanib (translated: ‘Foreigners’) and issued them separate identity cards stating that they were not Syrian citizens. Ajanib were not allowed to vote, own property and not allowed to work for the government. Since the status of ajanib is inherited, the number has risen to at least 300,000 today. 75,000 other Syrian Kurds were classified maktoumeen (translated: ‘Hidden’ in Arabic) who were even worse off than the ajanib and given virtually no civil rights. The lack of identity documents for these Kurds meant they were rendered non-existent and condemned to live in a legal vacuum, with children not being able to enrol in secondary school or university and people being exploited by their employers and having no right to public (health care) services (Gunter, 2014:19-20). The purpose of this census was for the government to identify ‘alien infiltrators’ and discover how many people had illegally crossed the border from Turkey. Therefore Kurds in the Hasaka governate had to prove they lived in Syria before 1945 or lose their Syrian citizenship. The decree was part of a larger plan to Arabize the resource-rich northeast of

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Syria as it contains the largest concentration of non-Arabs in the state (Human Rights Watch, 1996). As Kurds who migrated from Turkey after a failed uprising in the 1920s had been granted citizenship by the French authorities this was a clear violation of international law i.e. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The pan-Arab Ba’ath party came to power in 1963 in Syria. Three years later school books left out the mention of Kurdish existence. Hafez- al-Assad came to power in 1970 turning the focus of the Ba’ath party to his own Alawite family’s property. The oil discovery in the region furthered discrimination of Kurds by the creation of an Arab Belt i.e. al-Hizam al-Arabi, which repopulated northern Syria with ‘loyal’ Arabs who took over lands of Kurds from 1973. The Kurds had to leave to Lebanon or migrate to the South of Syria. Kurdish regions were given Arabic names in an attempt to cleanse their historical presence and while the Arab Belt only operated for three years it was never reversed. Measures to repress the Kurds in Syria expanded over years with the more recent being Decree 29 from 2008 that regulates ownership sale and lease of land to dispossess Kurds of their property (Gunter, 2014). Another reason for the long invisibility of Syrian Kurds is the weak and fractured Kurdish political party system. It was not until 1957 that the first Kurdish political party was established called the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS). However this party soon became subject of a conservative and progressive internal rivalry. Kurdish parties in Syria continued to split into obscure entities over the years. Significant is that numerous Kurdish parties in Syria have never used Kurdistan in their names out of fear to incite government fears of secession and they have never taken up arms against the Syrian government, even when the civil war began in 2011. The majority of the Kurdish parties preferred to follow a middle road between the government and the opposition, something which has not troubled Kurdish parties in Iraq, Turkey or Iran. (Gunter, 2014:25/26). More Kurdish parties emerged over the years with linkages to other parties outside Syria or tactical differences all reflecting the heterogeneity of the group. However, since the outbreak of the 2011 civil war it became clear that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) established in 2003 had the strongest support, while a series of others were represented by the Kurdish National Coalition (KNC) (Gunter, 2014:27). Prior to the civil war there have been developments and events that have influenced Syrian Kurds significantly. The Iraqi Kurds have played an important role from the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in 1992 to the constitutional

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh recognition as a result of the U.S.-led coalition that intervened Iraq in 2003. The President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Massoud Barzani could for the first time openly express support to Syrian Kurds and demanded their rights to be granted. In 2005, the Syrian Kurds even saw the first Kurd become president of Iraq, Jalal Talabani. In addition, there were two events in Syria that contributed to the changing role of Syrian Kurds. The Qamishli uprising (Serhildan) in March 2004 and the assassination of Mishaal Tammo on October 7, 2011. The Qamishli uprising was instigated by a soccer match between Sunni Arab fans supporting one team and Kurds supporting the local Kurdish team. Demonstrations soon spilled over to other Kurdish populated areas such as Hama, Aleppo and Damascus leading to thousands on the street. Government forces responded with violence and Kurdish protestors responded by attacking government buildings and toppled the statue of Hafez al-Assad in Damascus (KurdWatch, 2009). This spontaneous demonstration that escalated quickly to other Kurdish quarters affected Kurdish self-awareness which can be marked as a turning point because all Kurds in Syria were united for the protest and eliciting support from Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. A year later, Sheikh Maashouq Khaznawi, a Kurdish Sufi leader who had been calling for political reform for Kurds and justice was murdered. The Kurds accused the state who claimed he had been killed by a criminal gang. 25,000 people demonstrated on the funeral in Qamishli chanting slogans for Kurdish autonomy (Gunter, 2014:95). On October 7, 2011 the widely respected leader of the ‘Kurdish Future Movement’ in Syria Mishaal Tammo (1957-2011) was assassinated in Qamishli. The Syrian Kurds blamed the government who denied involvement and pointed to Turkey. Others suspected Iran that would have used the assassination as a means of supporting Syria and to suppress uprisings from its own Kurdish minority. Remarkable however is that after a previous attempt on Tammo’s life, Tammo himself claimed the PYD and its PKK ally to be behind the attack. Motives would be that the PKK was seeking to secure backup sanctuary in Syria in case they got pushed out of Iraqi Kurdistan. Tammo also made it clear that he believed the Syrian regime to be behind PYD’s actions. 50,000 people gathered to protest on his funeral in Qamishli, people also gathered in suburbs and in several European states Kurdish diaspora protested at Syrian embassies. “Ironically, … the embattled Assad government had only recently rescinded the notorious Decree 93 passed in 1962 which had denied citizenship to some 120.000 Kurdish ajanib and another 75.000 Syrian Kurds known as maktoumeen. As the famous French scholar Alexis de Toqueville once observed: revolutions seldom start when things are at their worst, but rather when they are getting better.” (Gunter, 2014:101).

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Turkey kept a close eye on the empowerment of Kurdish nationalism in Syria and decided to support the Syrian National Coalition – the main opposition. This support withheld the Kurds however to join the opposition as they believed Turkey had no interest in empowering Syrian Kurds after the war. In addition, the Kurds in Syria did not trust the Sunni Arab successors of Assad to grant protection of Kurdish rights. The PYD took a stance in this. When Assad retreated its forces in July 2012, the YPG took most Kurdish cities by August. Due to their incredible fast expansion of control in the North, speculations occurred on agreements between the regime and the PYD. The Hasaka province turned out to remain free of fighting for a while giving the party the opportunity to grow and build governmental structures and institutions (Gunter, 2014:111). Since November 2013, the Rojava region gained its de facto autonomy. Ever since the YPG has been cooperating with amongst others, the U.S., France and NATO in the fight against IS (Watson and Tuysuz, 2014). On March 16 2016, the administration of Rojava declared the establishment of the Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava. This was not recognized by any of its supporting parties (Said, 2016). As the analysis on the history of Kurds in Syria shows, the status of Kurds has changed significantly due to important events and developments in the past 25 years. Simultaneously, it becomes clear that unifying has been a struggle itself for the Kurdish community, especially after Syria became independent. Having said that, the establishment of the PYD and the sequence of events including the Syrian civil war seems to have finally paved a way to mobilize, organize and unify a big part of the Kurdish community in Syria. How the PYD has evolved will be discussed in the next part of the analysis.

5.2 PART 2: ACTORS, INTERESTS, RELATIONSHIPS

5.2.1 PYD

5.2.1.1 ESTABLISHMENT AND LINK TO PKK

To understand the creation of the PYD, their relationship with the PKK and the relationship between the PKK and Syria need to be addressed. The PKK was established in 1978 in Turkey and had its headquarters in Syria from 1979 – 1998. After this period they moved to Iraq where they are still situated today while also active within the Kurdish diaspora in Europe. The PKK has played an essential role in the establishment and success of the PYD through diaspora support. In 1979, the Assad regime made a strategic alliance with PKK leader Abdullah

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

Öcalan, in order to use the PKK as a bargaining tool in negotiations with Turkey concerning the finishing Southeast Anatolia Project that affected a river flowing in Syria. Another argument for the cooperation was that the Syrian government made an agreement with the PKK that they would keep the lid on Syria’s Kurds. The regime allowed Syrian Kurds to join the PKK army to fight Turkey. The collaboration however stopped in 1989 as Turkey threatened to go to war if the Syrian regime would not expel the PKK. The PKK was shut down in Syria and Abdullah Öcalan was imprisoned with several members, but the majority moved to the Qandil mountains in Iraq (Gunter, 2014:41). After having been active in Syria for almost 20 years a potential base remained among the sympathetic population and since October 2003 a new Syrian branch of the PKK was brought to life called the Democratic Union Party (PYD), strategically leaving out any Kurdish term in the name. Fuad Omar was the first leader. He was succeeded by Salih Muslim (Muhammad), the current leader of the PYD since 2010. Muslim fled immediately for political prosecution to the Qandil mountains in Iraq until the Syrian authorities allowed him to return to Syria in April 2011. Although the connection between the PKK and the PYD is not trumpeted, it is indisputably found in the institutional structure of the two organisations. The PYD is a member of the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK), an umbrella organisation established by the PKK to unite Kurdish organisations internationally (Çandar, 2012:82). However this relationship may be interpreted, “… those parties with links to the PKK in Turkey or the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq today, contain the largest number of militants, level of finances and thus, in part, legitimacy.” (Gunter, 2014:43). The PKK and the PYD distinguish themselves from other Kurdish groups through their emphasis on women’s rights. Since August 2013, the PYD is co-chaired by a man Salih Muslim and a woman Asia Abdullah. In Turkey the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has the same governing structure and a 40 per cent gender quota for the whole organization (Gunter, 2014:29-33). In accordance with the philosophy of Abdullah Öcalan, the now de facto autonomous region of Rojava is ruled emphasizing gender equality. Women are often found in leader positions and for the police force and army of the PYD there is a separate women’s faction. A representative for the Movement for a Democratic Society a.k.a. Tev-Dem, which is a coalition of six political parties that the PYD has formed to help govern Rojava stated: “As a repressed minority in Turkey we know the importance of giving everyone an equal role in government” (Salih, 2015). On March 13, 2015 the first elections

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh were held for municipal councils. Out of 565 candidates, there were 237 women, 39 Assyrians and 28 Arabs, from a multitude of political parties (Enzinna, 2015). This raises even more questions about why the PYD, organized with significant support was not invited to the Geneva peace talks. To get a better understanding we need to look at the stance the PYD took from the start of the Syrian civil war and look at its alliances and refusal of cooperation with other opposition groups. We will not look at the relationships between states yet, but to the relationships with other Syrian opposition groups and the position taken by the PYD towards the Syrian regime.

5.2.1.2 PYD AND SYRIAN OPPOSITION GROUPS

Although the PYD was also critical of the regime it got an alienated stance hostile to the majority of organized opposition in Syria. While they perceive the Syrian National Coalition as a proxy of Turkey and Qatar, a member of the Syrian National Coalition compared the YPG with IS and stated that the PYD only serves the goals of the Assad regime and Russia who seek to fuel ethnic tensions between the Kurds and the Arabs (Anadolu Agency, 2016). This is problematic as the Syrian National Coalition represents a significant part of the High Negotiations Committee. In addition, the PYD has refused to combine forces with the Kurdish National Council (KNC), a coalition of major Kurdish opposition parties which was established in 2011 comprising thirteen Syrian Kurdish parties under the sponsorship of President Massoud Barzani of Iraqi Kurdistan. It is argued that the PYD refused to cooperate due to long-standing tensions between Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Öcalan (Federici, 2015). The PYD has weakened the position of the KNC thanks to their strong leadership and military presence on the ground. However, important in this matter is that the KNC did join the High Negotiations Committee and thus is represented in the Geneva peace talks. PYD leader Salih Muslim said in an interview that the Kurds represented in the Coalition were handpicked by Turkey to follow their agenda and the KNC was pressured by Western countries to join the Syrian opposition (Reuters, 2012). KurdWatch, a NGO monitoring human rights violations against Kurds in Syria, has reported human rights violations in multiple occasions by the PYD. Certainly, these violations will be present on all sides during a war but significant are the reports on violence amongst Kurdish parties in Syria. KurdWatch reported in 2013 the kidnapping and torture of members of the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria by the PYD, who were accused of being responsible for explosions at a PYD office. In the same year demonstration escalated into

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh violent conflict between the YPG and demonstrators demanding the release of kidnapped activists, subsequently the YPG stormed the party office of the Kurdish Union Party, kidnapping several members in ‘Amudah in July 2013. More recently the Kurdish National Council held a protest against attacks by supporters of the PYD against its members and intuitions (KurdWatch, 2016). These reports again reflect disunity amongst Kurds in Syria which despite of the civil war have been unresolved and even created violent conflict amongst Kurdish parties in Syria. The disunity between the PYD and the Syrian National Coalition reflects the extension of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK into the Syrian civil war and the influence of alliances. Important to note is that the PYD is not the sole player in the de facto autonomy in northern Syria. The administration in 2013 was formed by 11 political parties and 47 civil society organizations including Arab and Assyrian organizations. Human Rights Watch has openly expressed its support of the administration and stated: “We believe this to be the key to end violence in Syria and to lay the groundwork for a political solution to the crisis.” (HRW, 2014). The declaration of the establishment of the Federation of Northern Syria on March 17 2016 included Syrian Turkmen, Arabs, Christians and Kurdish officials. We will now analyse the actions of the PYD reflecting on the theoretical framework to understand their exclusion from the Geneva peace talks.

5.2.1.3 THEORY ANALYSIS

The PYD has significantly grown since its establishment in mobilization, organization and support. Currently there seems to be no disincentives to continue fighting if there are no prospects on their inclusion in the Geneva peace talks. Salih Muslim (2016) has said that they would like to be included in the talks and that the PYD sees their inclusion as necessary for the talks to succeed and come to a political solution. They do not perceive a Mutually Hurting Stalemate however because they continue to expand their control over territory and their exclusion from the peace talks are rather an incentive instead of a disincentive to continue fighting. They do not however reject negotiations since it is important for their regional administration to be recognized by the future government of Syria. Since they are not included, there is no third party who can offer a security guarantee to the PYD nor does the peace process address consolidation of the belligerents in the eyes of the actor due to their exclusion. However, concerning security zones in Syria that were discussed Salih Muslim (2013) stated the PYD would feel more safe under United Nations

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh protection: “What we really want is to fight IS together with Turkey, America and the other coalition forces. Moreover, we are not opposed to a security zone. What we are opposed to is a Turkish-controlled security zone. The no-fly zones that were established in Iraq in 1992 could be applied in Syria as well. If the whole of northern Syria were under United Nations protection, we would feel more secure.”. The political objective of the PYD is to “be part of future democratic federal Syria”, thus not declare independence but to have regional autonomy (Goudsouzian & Fatah, 2016). Salih Muslim (2016) added: “We want Syria to be democratic confederalist through decentralization.”. The Syrian National Coalition responded by warning against: "any attempt to form entities, regions, or administrations that usurp the will of the Syrian people" (MEE, 2016). Nevertheless, the PYD has gained significant legitimacy. With their rapid expansion of control over territory and the declaration of the federation of North Syria – Rojava they are showing the world their capabilities of organizing, building institutions and governing the region in Syria. By building institutions the PYD proofs to be able to provide goods where the government fails to do so. They also receive a form of legitimacy based on norms and reciprocity grounded in social and cultural practices from the Kurdish community in- and outside Syria. Finally, the PYD has also gained legitimacy by states. They have so far opened a representation office in Russia, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Denmark and in February 2015, French President Hollande hosted a diplomatic meeting with the PYD co-chair Asia Abduallah (Taştekin, 2016). Their broad legitimacy has led to support from many different actors. Very crucial is the support of the PKK for its establishment and developments in organization and support. While the relationship with the PKK is criticized it was highly unlikely, given their fragmented political organization in the past, for Syrian Kurds to establish such a strong organization without the support of the PKK. This support however, may have influenced the bargaining position of the PYD as reflected in accusations by Turkey claiming the PYD to be a henchman of the PKK and the PYD accusing the Syrian opposition to be a henchman of Turkey. The conflict in neighbouring Turkey between the government and the PKK therefore cannot be neglected in understanding the Syrian conflict and the role of the PYD. The state support the PYD receives will be discussed in the analysis on the respective states. The refusal of combining forces with the KNC reflects the influence of the PKK on alliances. However, when it comes to alliances with states that provide support the PYD has

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

been fairly indiscriminate. Rather they focus their strategy on receiving as much support from significant actors to build their case against the current peace process. Due to the exclusion from the talks, the PYD sees no diplomatic momentum and has not been subject to deadlines in the peace process. They have strategically timed the announcement of the Democratic Administration of the Federation of Northern Syria on March 17 2016, three days after the second round of the Geneva peace talks started which were announced to be more substantive and with no change in prospect for their inclusion.

5.2.2 HIGH NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE

5.2.2.1 ESTABLISHMENT

In December 2015 the government of Saudi Arabia organized a two day conference meeting in Riyadh to unite the opposition to the Bashar al-Assad regime. Next to the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, representatives from armed revolutionary factions and Syrian opposition groups gathered from all parts of Syria including Arabs, Kurds, Turkoman, Assyrians, Syriacs, Circassians, Armenians, and others to reach a common vision for a negotiated political solution to the Syrian conflict based on the Geneva Communiqué. Participants clearly stated their common vision for public governance in Syria:

“The participants expressed their commitment to the unity of Syrian territory and their belief in the civil character of the Syrian state in addition to its sovereignty over all Syrian territories based on the principle of administrative decentralization. They also voiced their commitment to the mechanism of democracy through a pluralistic system in which all Syrian groups, including both men and women, are represented, without discrimination or exclusion on the basis of religion, denomination, or ethnicity and to be based on the principles of nationality, human rights, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law as applied to all.” (Final Statement of the Conference of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces Riyadh, December 10 2015)

The participants also agreed to form the High Negotiations Committee, a single committee to negotiate with representatives of the regime in peace negotiations. In addition they outlined some principles for negotiation such as the removal of Bashar al-Asssad and all of his supporters at the beginning of the transitional period. The PYD was excluded from the

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh meeting because Turkey rejected participation due to their link to the PKK. The Islamist group Ahrar al-Sham walked out of the meeting stating that the opposition was too close to the Assad government. However, the opposition this time did entail armed groups on the battlefield which made it more representative than the opposition formed for the 2014 Geneva talks. Riyad Hijab was appointed coordinator of the HNC, he was prime minister of Syria in 2012 for two months before defecting to the opposition. The chief negotiator is Salem Muslet, also vice president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces a.k.a Syrian National Coalition. This group has received support from a list of states including the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (Global Security, 2016). The committee exists of 33 members with 15 people in the negotiating team for the Geneva peace talks. The HNC sent 30 delegates to attend the Syrian peace talks consisting of 9 members from the Western-backed Syrian National Coalition, 5 from The National Coordination Body (Domestic Opposition), 10 from rebel factions, and 6 independent opposition figures (Global Security, 2016).

5.2.2.2 THEORY ANALYSIS

For the HNC and the Syrian opposition parties it represents there is a disincentive to continue fighting as they are not making major advances on the battle ground and they are included in the Geneva peace talks. They strongly believe that negotiations are necessary to solve the conflict however partly due to continuous outside support, they keep a hard stance in negotiations on the matter that Assad and his supporter cannot be part of the transition period. While their support from outside states is mainly directed at the fight against IS, the opposition also enjoys a higher popular support and legitimacy compared to the Syrian regime. Their inclusion in the peace talks gives them legitimacy and therefore may result in a peacekeeping operation by the UN offering them a security guarantee during the implementation of a peace agreement. The HNC is carefully selected to comprise the different ethnicities and religions of the Syrian people and therefore believes that, under the condition that President Assad and his supporters will be excluded from the transitional government, the peace process will consolidate the belligerents and prevent major commitment problems. In their statement the HNC calls for an inclusive pluralistic democratic system, which may not differ so much from the system the PYD is using in northern Syria. However, this proposal does not include the PYD and its affiliates who represent a significant part of the Syrian population and control a significant part of the

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

Syrian territory. While this may be presented on paper as inclusive it is remarkable that there is no mention of the PYD and northern Syria and their role in a political solution openly stated. The outside support of the HNC clearly reflects how support can be necessary to make a credible opponent to the government. Key supporters have been Turkey and other Arab states supporting the removal of President Assad. These states have been vital to the establishment of the HNC and its development. While Turkey has supported mostly financially and offered safe havens, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have announced their preparedness of sending ground troops to Syria as part of the U.S.-led coalition to fight IS (Araujo, 2016; Krever, 2016). In March 2013, the Arab League expressed its support by giving Syria’s seat to representatives of the Syrian opposition. Saudi Arabia even stated that Assad should, if necessary, be removed by force expressing its support to the opposition and enhancing their bargaining position (Krever, 2016). For the Arab states in the region the support is motivated by regional influence as well as ethnic kin. The Sunni majority of Syria that has been ruled by a Shia minority receives significant support from other Sunni states. The major support from Turkey, especially received at the beginning in order to develop, influences the position of the Syrian opposition towards the PYD. The Syrian opposition has accepted support from states indiscriminately. As will become clear in the state analysis the states are more concerned with balancing power. For the HNC there was a diplomatic momentum to start negotiations but during the talks they have on numerous occasions threatened to withdraw from the talks due to continuous targeting of civilians by the government. On April 18, several opposition leaders have withdrawn from the peace talks after an increase in violence since the cessation of hostilities started in February. "Our decision to postpone participation in the Geneva talks was taken to highlight the cynicism of the regime in pretending to negotiate while escalating the violence," Salem al-Meslet (2016) said. "It is not suitable, neither morally nor on the humanitarian side, to be part of negotiations when Syrians are dying daily from sieges, hunger, bombings, poisonous gases and barrel bombs." Riyad Hijab (2016) added. The main point of discussion between the two parties is still maintaining Assad in power or not. This way the HNC also tries to set deadlines for the Syrian government however currently without result. Despite these events the United Nations has insisted the talks have not collapsed. The PYD shortly after the announcement stated that it still believed in a change to settle the Syrian conflict through negotiations. As a response to the PYD’s announcement of a federal system in northern Syria in March 2016, head of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces Anas al-Abda (2016) said: "One of the main fixtures of the

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Syrian revolution is the unity and integrity of the Syrian territory and people. Any proposal that undermines this is not acceptable.". Kurdish officials in the HNC stated they backed the idea of an autonomous political federation in northern Syria, however not in the illegal way the PYD is seeking it. "We would pressure to have a federal state at that time (when the Syrian people have been consulted and Assad has stepped down), but the federal area announced now (by the PYD) is not agreed among the people," and "It will make public opinion work against the Kurds, because we have always been seen as separatists and this decision will reinforce this vision." Kurdish representative of the HNC Abdul Hakim Bachar (2016) said. Concerning representativeness he said: "If representation comes at gunpoint then of course the PYD is representative of the Kurds, but I am sure we represent 70 to 80 percent of Kurdish people, (…) If representation is determined by gunpoint then we could also say Islamic State represents half of Syria.". The international community has set a deadline for an agreement for a political solution to the Syrian crisis in August 2016. As the goals between the HNC and Syrian government are highly competitive this deadline may have negative consequences on the resolution. In this case the topic is very complex, the task to form a transitional government and new constitution is in a way clear but very complicated, and group dynamics play a key role. While it is hard to say something about the characteristic of the key negotiators of the HNC, there are enough situational factors that show that deadlines in this case may impact the peace process negatively as it already locks in the strategy of the HNC with their main concern being the leave of Assad and its supporters excluding other opinions and perspectives on topics that also matter like the Kurdish question in Syria. Concluding, the Syrian Opposition does not approve PYD’s actions nor does it try to engage in discussion on a political solution for the Syrian conflict with them. The HNC is the legitimized opposition formed by states supporting the removal of the Assad regime. The opposition perceives a mutually hurting stalemate because no party is making significant advances. However, as the regime continuous to fight and supporting states have announced their preparedness to send military support, they have some leverage and use this by threatening to leave the talks. Thus, on the one hand they receive support which strengthens their bargaining position but on the other this has not been enough for the war to be decisive. Especially with the Syrian government also receiving support.

5.2.3 SYRIAN GOVERNMENT

The relationship between the Syrian government and the PYD has been fluctuating. While there are numerous reports on battles between the YPG and the national Syrian army these

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh battles have not been the focus of both parties. In Hasaka the two coexisted for a while and battled IS together in July 2015. Concerning Assad remaining in power Salih Muslim said in an interview in 2013: “Assad cannot remain in power as before. He may stay on during a transition period, during a period of dialogue between the conflicting parties, but in the long term it seems inconceivable that the majority of the Syrian people would accept his leadership anymore.”. It is clear however that if there was any type of agreement between the PYD and the Syrian government it has been a secret one. Nevertheless, the opposition and Turkey have been pointing out to cooperation between the PYD and the Assad regime although this has been denied to date. The Syrian government rejected the declaration of the federation of Rojava in March by the PYD and stated immediately: “anyone who dares to undermine the unity of the land and the people of Syria under any title. (..) Creating a union or a federal system ... contradicts the Syrian constitution and all the national concepts and international resolutions,” (Aljazeera, 2016). The Syrian government and the PYD do share a common alliance with Russia which will be discussed more in depth in the Russia analysis.

5.2.3.1 THEORY ANALYSIS

The Syrian government has continued a firm stance since the beginning of the peace talks. When the first round of talks were about to start senior Ba’ath party official Hilal Al Hilal said about the government’s position: “We are not going to give today what we did not give over the past five years,”, he continued: “This year will be the year of victory for Syria because of the heroic acts and sacrifices by its army and people.” (Al Hilal, 2016). These quotes reflect the actions of the Syrian government in their battle on the ground and their believe that there is still a way to end this conflict in victory. Clearly, the Syrian government, despite of their participation in the Geneva peace talks, perceives no mutually hurting stalemate yet. Thanks to the support the government receives from Russia and Iran, their resources have not declined enough to perceive negotiations as the only or a better way out. Especially, the support from Russia affects the governments perception of relative power compared to its enemies. Nevertheless, in the event that the Geneva talks will end up in a peace agreement the government will certainly need a security guarantee due to the violent acts it committed against its own citizens during the conflict. A third party security guarantee of the United Nations during implementation therefore is indispensable considering the amount of armed groups involved and necessary to overcome the commitment problem of the Syrian

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

government. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the Geneva talks the chief negotiator of the Syrian government Bashar al-Ja’afari has refused to enter into direct negotiations with the opposition. In addition, parliamentary elections were held on April 13, 2016 in government- held areas in Syria independent of the UN peace process. This reflects the position of the Syrian government in the peace talks. While they are included and talk separately to UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura, the elections show that they do not wish to proceed to any type of transitional government or political solution with the opposition. The Syrian government holds on to the position that Assad’s fate is not up for discussion, however after members of the HNC walked out of the talks in mid-April the regime said they were prepared to discuss the creation of “a broader unity government” (Harper, 2016). So far the government has not expressed any other form of concession to show that they are willing to reform the government. The main reason why the government can and still is taking a firm stance is thanks to the military support they have been receiving from Russia since the fall of 2015. This support has significantly influenced the position of the Syrian government in the peace talks and prolongs the conflict because, as long as the Syrian government keeps receiving outside support, as the top dog they will try to win the war in order to restore the status quo ante. The government has officially requested the military support of Russia to fight domestic terrorists (Chappell, 2015). This could be seen as a response to balance power as the U.S.-led coalition has entered the state territory without consent. By requesting Russia’s support to help fight terrorism, Russia is acting more in line with international and domestic law compared to other outside states that engage in combat on Syrian territory. The Syrian government does not perceive a diplomatic momentum and presumably does not worry about deadlines because it does not see the peace negotiations as the only way out i.e. their number one priority. In addition to the Russian support, the government has an important alliance with Iran. Together Syria and Iran have been the most important parties spoiling U.S. backed peace efforts in the region between Arabs and Israel to promote their own interests and they share the Shiite background. In June 2015, President Rouhani announced: "The Iranian nation and government will remain at the side of the Syrian nation and government until the end of the road,”. Reports of the death of four high-ranking officers from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps of Iran in October 2015 in Syria, indicates a possibly growing role of Iran’s involvement in the Syrian civil war (Bastani, 2015). The Syrian government did express its support for the cessation of hostilities:

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

“…[W]e are in favour of the Russian and American initiative to cease hostilities in Syria. We call on the UN force countries who are looking to increase the conflict to immediately end their actions.” (Delegation of Syria to UN, 25 February 2016). Simultaneously, in March the chief negotiator stated that Assad’s presidency was not up for discussion saying: “President Assad has nothing to do with the intra-Syria talks.” (Bashar Ja’afari, 2016) and called the head of the High Negotiation Committee Mohammed Alloush a terrorist: "We will not engage with this terrorist in direct talks," (Bashar Ja’afari, 2016a). These quotes reflect a firm uncooperative position taken by the Syrian government in the peace talks. Considering the same situational factors mentioned in the HNC analysis, it is interesting to see how this position will evolve as the deadline of August set by Russia and the U.S. approaches.

5.2.4 TURKEY

Turkey has always had an apprehensive attitude towards the Kurdish question out of fear that their national claims would break up Turkish territory. As early as the 1920s Turkey has been pressing domestic Kurdish uprising and taken measures against Kurds such as the closing of Kurdish organizations and schools. But it also kept a close eye on Kurdish activities on its borders. The concern of neighbouring countries about the Kurds was reflected in the 1955 Baghdad Pact, which aimed at containing Soviet expansion but also included the implicit obligation of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria as silent partners, to cooperate in preventing Kurdish transnational activities that might challenge the international borders of the region. Turkey got to militarily intervene continuously in Iraq due to this agreement, most recently in 2011 (Butler, 2011). Exploring possibilities for cooperation with the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq have been only recent developments for Turkey, as well as formal negotiations with the PKK which started in 2013. “The Syrian National Council (later called the Syrian National Coalition) was founded and largely based in Istanbul, while the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA) maintains its nominal headquarters in south-eastern Turkey. However, in indiscriminately supporting the FSA, Turkey also has been aiding Jabhat-al Nusra and the Islamic States of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), armed groups affiliated with al-Qaeda that are part of the Syrian opposition, but opposed to the Syrian Kurds.” (Gunter, 2014:37). This clearly reflects Turkey’s priority in the Syrian conflict. In 2013 minister of foreign affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu stated that Turkey was expecting three basic things from Syrian Kurds first, for them not to co-operate with the regime; 50

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh second, for them not to declare a de-facto administration based on ethnicity or religion; and third, for them not to engage in activities that could endanger the security of the Turkish border. The PYD responded by emphasizing that the Syrian Kurds continue to consider themselves part of Syria and therefore would not threaten Turkish borders but a temporary serving administration was necessary until the Syrian crisis was over (Bostan, 2013). Turkey is a key party in supporting the Syrian opposition involved in the Geneva peace talks. It has played an active role in preventing the PYD from getting involved in the UN led peace process. Turkey insisted the PYD not to be invited to the UN Geneva peace talks and even stated that it would boycott the meetings if the PYD was invited. The prime minister said that Turkey does not distinguish between the PKK and its representatives in Syria, the PYD and the YPG. Nevertheless, he added that Kurds should be included at the negotiation table, but not represented by these organizations. If the PYD were to join the peace talks, he added, they should sit on the same side as President Assad due to their cooperation (Ünal, 2016). The establishment of the PYD, their link to the PKK and their success in controlling ground on the border of Turkey, is perceived as a great threat because of the risk of fuelling separatist sentiment in Turkey.

5.2.4.1 THEORY ANALYSIS

Turkey regards the PYD as a terrorist organization and has called the international community to do the same (Daily News, 2015). It has been targeting Kurds in northern Syria in multiple occasions since last summer (BBC, 2015). The PYD and Turkey do share the same interest which lies in continuing fighting rather than de-escalation due to their deeply conflicting objectives in the war (International Crisis Group, 2016). As this is a conflict within the wider Syrian civil war including different actors, separate negotiations would need to take place to solve this conflict. However, currently the international community is focusing on the Syrian civil war. Turkey believes the peace process is necessary for the Syrian conflict to end and is a proponent of including Kurds. But due to the link between the PYD and the PKK and their expansion approaching the Turkish border, Turkey has written off the participation of the PYD in the peace process. In other words, Turkey will not perceive any time soon a mutually hurting stalemate with the PYD leading to negotiations and the possibility for inclusion of the PYD in the Geneva peace talks. As discussed before, the relations between Syria and Turkey have been tensed since the Syrian regime supported the PKK in the 1980s. Soon after the events of 1998 with Turkey

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

lining troops on its border the Syrian regime ended its support to the PKK. Relations improved between the two countries until the Arab Spring. Turkey attempted to introduce a reform program to the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprisings which was dismissed. From this point on Turkey became more critical to the regime. In 2012 it closed down its embassy in Damascus and hosted a meeting for the “Friends of Syria”, a coalition of Arab and Western countries to provide support to the Syrian opposition and oust Bashar al- Assad (Balci, 2012). Finally, Turkey started to support and aid Syria’s political and armed opposition and established a de facto ‘no fly zone’ for Syrian aircraft beyond its border as a response to the shoot down of a Turkish jet in Syria in June 2012. Turkey has established a special relationship with the Syrian National Coalition. The support can be explained by Turkey’s attempt to develop strong ties to enable them to influence the construction of a new Syria that enhance the regional political and economic interests of Turkey and of course the handling of the Kurdish question. Therefore, they are in favour of an inclusive government but under the condition of having some influence especially regarding the future of Syrian Kurds. Turkey has put much effort in legitimizing the current Syrian opposition involved in the talks. They have supported and to a certain extent shaped the High Negotiations Committee. By doing this they highlight the illegitimacy of the PYD as it is not included in the opposition group which is acknowledges by the international community. Additionally, the SNC is largely a Sunni Muslim organization which for Turkey as a predominantly Sunni country is easy to support. Around 25% of the SNC are Muslim Brothers, an organization Turkey also openly has sympathized with (Balci, 2012). Furthermore, there is the Ankara-Washington cooperation since 2011 to manage the transitions from autocratic regimes in the Middle East. The U.S. has worked closely with Turkey in helping improve relations between the U.S. and the Islamic world. “As Islamist activists and others previously shut out of long-ossified political systems have risen up against autocratic rulers in the region, the two countries have been encouraging the revolutionaries to seek power through the ballot box. The policy convergence between Washington and Ankara has built on the experience of working together as NATO allies for six decades. They also share a joint vision to spread, throughout the region, democracy, freedom, a free market economy, and the rule of law, which have come to form the basis of the Turkish system.” (Aliriza and Aras, 2012:8). This same NATO alliance however is currently complicating relationships between

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

the U.S. and Turkey due to their relationships with the PYD. As the host and key backer of the HNC, Turkey was able to win the ‘diplomatic battle’ against the U.S. that had stated its support for the PYD at the negotiation table in January (Çandar, 2016). The exclusion of the PYD also provides a form of legitimacy for Turkey to continue fighting them at their border. Turkey has also openly expressed its role as potential spoiler to the Geneva peace talks if the PYD should be included. Since a state is generally more powerful than an insurgent movement, this statement significantly influences the Geneva peace talks. Concerning the cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG Turkey’s minister of foreign affairs said: “We cannot excuse any NATO ally, including the U.S., of having links with a terrorist organization that strikes us in the heart of Turkey,” (Economist, 2016). However, the U.S. responded again by pointing out their effectiveness in fighting IS. This analysis clearly shows the complexity of the Syrian conflict and how the Turkish-Kurdish conflict is intertwined with the Syrian civil war. For Turkey the current setting for the peace talks is preferred while it is questionable whether it will work out. Their motivation of support derives from handling the Kurdish question according to their preferences and expanding regional influence in general, this support influences the prospects for a good outcome of the current peace talks. As mentioned earlier, without the inclusion of the PYD and its affiliates, it can be assumed that the implementation of any agreement made with the current negotiating parties will not be accepted by a large group living in North-East Syria, making the agreement unsustainable. Turkey is in an advantageous position due to their relationship with the U.S. and other Western countries and the bridging function it potentially has for the Western and Islamic world which is now, more than ever pursued in international diplomacy by Western states. But at the same time Turkey has to abide to the NATO agreement and cannot just intervene militarily in Syria without deliberation with its NATO partners. In this sense, the NATO alliance so far is preventing the war to escalate further over borders and balances the power. Concerning the expansion of the PYD over the past years and their announcement of the federal administration Turkey held a joint press conference with regime-supporter Iran. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu (2016) responded by saying that the PYD have shown their “real faces”: “They want to divide Syria. With Iran, we support the territorial integrity of Syria.”. However, Turkey is complicated by the support of the Russians to the Assad regime and several Western countries, including the U.S., who do not share the same vision concerning the PYD. Therefore a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude is in place for Turkey. Turkey

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh has actively used deadlines in their advantage. When in January it was decided upon which parties to join the negotiation table, the PYD was having talks with both the U.S. and Russia but as the talks needed to start soon, Turkey pressured the United Nations not to include the PYD. Turkey’s support to the Syrian opposition has significantly influenced the peace talks. Turkey perceives the Syrian Kurds and Assad as greater threats than IS. This has also caused a gap between Western foreign policy towards the region and Turkish foreign policy. Regarding situational factors, the peace talks are the result of a conflict with competitive goals. Especially, when it comes to the inclusion of the PYD, for Turkey this was the most important condition to support the opposition as it is now. In addition, the issue is even more complex as for Turkey it is not only about the Syrian civil war but also about the Kurdish issue in the region. Since there also have not been any mention of what place the PYD and its supporters get in the agreement, it seems the deadline of choosing negotiating parties has also had a negative impact on the peace process.

5.2.5 THE UNITED STATES

As became clear in the previous analysis, the United States has come to take a more active role since the Arab Spring in the Middle East. U.S. foreign policy stayed away from the Kurdish question for a long time. The 2003 Iraq invasion which was supported by Iraqi Kurds however changed this and the establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) to a large extent was accomplished by the U.S.. The U.S. has however opposed Kurdish independence as they believed partition would lead to greater instability in the region. A stance not up for discussion considering the strong opposition of states in the region that perceive Kurdish independence as a threat to their own territory. Also clear is that while the KRG is an ally of the U.S., Turkey is as well and when the parties would clash, the U.S. will stand behind Turkey. This is reflected in the NATO alliance between the U.S. and Turkey which forms U.S. foreign policy towards Kurds. The U.S. has assisted Turkey in their battle against the PKK, in and outside Turkey. In 2007 for instance they offered intelligence on PKK’s location in Iraq to Turkey which led to the first military incursion in northern Iraq against the PKK since the 1990s (Jenkins, 2008). “Clearly however, the Kurdish question holds only a minor position in relation to the national security of the United States and the democratization process it pursues in the Middle East.” (Gunter, 2014:74). In the U.S. for instance the cause of Turkish Kurds has not prospered as well as in Iraq. The U.S. has also paid little attention to Kurds in Iran that could potentially also serve as 54

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh an ally. The Syrian Kurds came only to attention when it became clear that they were fighting a common enemy successfully on the ground. Security Council Resolution 2170 (2014) legitimized the military involvement of the U.S. in the Syrian conflict. On September 10, 2014 President Obama announced the formation of a global coalition to counter ISIL and five lines of efforts: “providing military support to our partners; impeding the flow of foreign fighters; stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; addressing humanitarian crises in the region; and exposing ISIL’s true nature.” (U.S. Department of State, 2014). In October that year, the U.S. started dropping arms and medical supplies to regions where the PYD was fighting IS. State Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf (2014) stated in a response to Turkey’s allegations of supporting a terrorist group: “The PYD is a different group than the PKK legally, under United States law”. She added: “We made it clear to Turkey that we believe it’s incredibly important to support groups like the PYD, these Kurdish fighters and a small number of non-Kurdish fighters on the ground are pushing back against ISIL,”. This clearly reflects the priority of the U.S. in contradiction to Turkey in handling the Syrian crisis. The support to the PYD even reaches out to the call of the U.S. to urge Turkey to halt strikes against the YPG (Biden, 2016). In February 2016 the U.S. State Department described their relationship with the YPG as follows: “[W]e still view them as an effective fighting force that’s taking on Daesh1 in many respects and many areas and parts of Syria very effectively, and we continue to support those efforts, but that’s always been with the understanding that they’re not going to seize territory or hold onto territory, but rather, liberate territory that then can be returned to the groups that have been displaced.” (Toner, 2016). The March declaration of the federal administration therefore was opposed by the U.S. with a statement that they would not support "any" self-ruled, semi-autonomous zone in Syria (Goudsouzian & Fatah, 2016). The U.S. support has been and still is essential to the PYD, its expansion and legitimacy as reflected in a recent analysis:

“The roles here of the U.S. and, to a lesser extent, Russia are crucial, as YPG officials appear more concerned with how any step may affect their geopolitical backing than they are by the threat of Turkish escalation. In their view, support from Washington is a game-changer: U.S. military backing reversed IS’s momentum just as it was on the verge of capturing the Kurdish

1 Daesh refers to IS. 55

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh town of Kobane in late 2014 and has enabled the YPG to consolidate and expand control throughout much of Syria’s northeast. A comparable increase in U.S. political support, their thinking goes, would go a long way toward securing a haven for their party and fighters in northern Syria and so be a critical step toward their larger goal of Kurdish autonomy in a decentralised Syria, whether in the context of a broader political resolution or otherwise.” (International Crisis Group, 2016:4).

5.2.5.1 THEORY ANALYSIS

For the United States the number one priority is the fight against IS. Therefore, while they believe in a political solution to the Syrian crisis through negotiations, they will keep supplying support to armed groups including the YPG that prove to fight IS successfully on the ground. As long as IS continues to be a threat, there is no disincentive for the U.S. to stop their support i.e. stop the fighting in Syria. However, the battle against IS is in this case perceived as a separate problem to the Syrian civil war. This is reflected in the slow or lack of U.S. intervention into the Syrian conflict compared to the uprisings in Libya. When the Syrian uprisings started in 2011 the U.S. offered the rebels humanitarian aid and non-lethal military gear. However the U.S. decided not to provide heavy weapons and help in a more serious way for four years. The strategic interest was not vital which made the conflict low priority and the recent history of America’s involvement in other conflicts in the region had led to the majority of the people opposing the idea of sending troops to Syria. In addition, the rebels were fragmented and not well organized and the U.S. was afraid that weapons would end up in the wrong hands, which also happened with some equipment from the train-and- equip programme which was designed to help opposition fighters fight IS, not Assad (McKelvey, 2015). The United States has expressed its support for the inclusion of the PYD in the Geneva peace talks. U.S. State Department Spokesperson John Kirby (2016a) said that they would search for a way to include the PYD in the peace talks but decisions will be taken by Staffan de Mistura: “As the broader political process takes shape, as we’ve talked about in the past, we’ll look for the right opportunities for how they can be a part of that process.”. The U.S. hopes for the next Syrian government to be based on democratic values where they can build a good relationship with to improve their regional ties. However their engagement in the Syrian conflict is primarily based on the fight against IS. The YPG did not participate in the train-and-equip program of the U.S. because it was

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh opposed by one of the host countries, Turkey (Toner, 2015). But the U.S. also made it very clear that support will continue to parties fighting IS: “when fighters are being effective against Daesh, they do benefit from air power, and as I’ve said before, that support will continue. But it’s not just Kurds. (…) there are other effective counter-Daesh fighters in Syria which continue to benefit from coalition air power, and they will as long as they’re being effective. And that is why the President approved additional Special Operations Forces to go into Syria to do advise and assist, to help those forces that are being effective against Daesh become more effective against Daesh.” (Kirby, 2016). The U.S. is legitimizing the PYD by giving them support even though motivated by combatting the same enemy. This however does influence the current peace process as they strengthen the position of the PYD as outsider of the peace talks by supplying them with resources. Together with Russia the U.S. can significantly influence the peace talks. While they have so far not prioritized to actively support the opposition, this might change in the near future. The increasing support of Russia to the Assad regime and violations of the cessation of hostilities has forced the U.S. to reconsider their support to the Syrian opposition fighters as reports on a so-called plan B to counter Russia in Syria have claimed (Entous, 2016). If the U.S. were to significantly increase its support to the opposition, opposition forces may make advances on the ground, improving their bargaining position in the Geneva peace talks. The response of the U.S. to the Russian involvement in the conflict reflects the balance of power theory. If they would not act, the Assad regime might win the war in victory with Russia as its closest ally impeding relations with the U.S. and increasing Russian influence in the region. Due to a lack of geostrategic motivation, the U.S. decided to wait at the beginning of the conflict with full support to parties. Eventually the rise of IS and increasing involvement of Russia’s support to the regime has drawn the U.S. into the Syrian conflict. The diplomatic momentum to bring the belligerents together for peace talks has been encouraged by agreements such as the cessation of hostilities between the U.S. and Russia. These states have significant influence on the diplomatic momentum and on setting deadlines. Russia and the U.S. have set the deadline on August 2016 to reach an agreement to end the Syrian civil war (Meyer and Arkhipov, 2016). Unfortunately, it does not seem as if the setting will change significantly making the deadline an effective and positive tool to enhance the peace process before that time.

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

5.2.6 RUSSIA

Russia’s involvement to the Syrian conflict started in the fall of 2015 when the Syrian government officially requested support in the fight against terrorism. Russia followed the procedures of international and domestic law, responded to the request and began offering aviation support and later also warships and troops to protect its military installations and assist government forces (Chappell, 2015). Russia’s support to the Assad regime can be explained by an important geostrategic interest. Currently Russia has its only Mediterranean navel facility in Tartus, Syria based on an agreement signed with the Syrian government during the Cold War in 1971. Ever since, Russia was allowed to develop their base and strengthen its naval presence in the Mediterranean. Currently the base provides technical maintenance to warships deployed in the Mediterranean (RT, 2012). While the Russians have not actively used this base in their involvement to the conflict, many analysts agree that Russian presence in the Mediterranean is essential to them: “Having a presence in the Mediterranean so you can play in the same court as NATO and everyone else is absolutely a priority to Russia, both from a military perspective and a symbolic [one],” (Delman, 2015). If Assad would be removed it is likely the new government will develop strong ties with the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, leaving Russia behind, leading to the loss of its geostrategic spot in the region. Furthermore, Russia has had good ties with the Assad regime that has been a loyal customer of the Russian arms industry. Russia also has good ties with Iran that also supports the regime and adversarial relations with Turkey since they shot down a Russian jet in 2015 which supports the opposition. Other reasons for Russia’s engagement in the Syrian conflict is a response to Western interventions in the region reducing Russia’s influence but also to suppress similar revolutionary ideas at home. Most recently, Russia expressed its support to the regime by recognizing the elections of 13 April 2016: "We believe the parliamentary elections started today in Syria ensure the functioning of the Syrian government institutions set by the current constitution of the country," (Lavrov, 2016). Reasons to support the Assad regime are clear but why have they decided to support the Syrian Kurds? Between the 40s and the 50s given the lack of any Kurdish nationalist parties, most Syrian Kurds belonged to the Syrian Communist Party. Radio broadcasts from Armenia spread the message that the Soviet Union would be the best party to collaborate with to achieve Kurdish nationalist goals (Gunter, 2014). Much further however the historical

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh relationship between Russia and Kurds do not go. As became clear earlier, the U.S. supports the YPG in their fight against IS. However, the political objectives of the PYD reach further than that and that is where Russia found an opening:

“Washington’s objection to YPG designs on the territory between Afrin and the Euphrates, however, conflicts with immediate YPG priorities, as does U.S. support for rebel groups around Aleppo with whom the YPG often clashes. That has opened space for Moscow, whose relations with Turkey have been adversarial since Ankara downed a Russian jet that it accused of violating its airspace on 24 November 2015. Moscow has taken advantage and developed its own cooperation with Kurdish forces via airstrikes that aid intermittent YPG advances against U.S.- and Turkey-backed rebels north of Aleppo. According to YPG officials, it has floated the prospect of additional military support to help the YPG seize further ground to the east.” (International Crisis Group, 2016:4).

The Russians, like the U.S. have been supportive of the PYD and their inclusion into the talks. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov (2016) said: "Without this party, without this participant the talks cannot achieve the results that we want, a definitive political resolution in Syria,". They however also added that it was up to de Mistura to decide which groups should attend the talks. Also important to note is that Russia does not consider the PKK a terrorist organization opposed to Turkey, the U.S. and the EU.

5.2.6.1 THEORY ANALYSIS

For Russia there is no disincentive to continue their support because their preferred outcome is the Assad government ending the war in victory because Russia has good ties with the current regime and their continuance in power would secure Russian interest in the country and region. Russia does however also support the United Nations peace process. In April Russia proposed the inclusion of the Syrian Kurds in a draft resolution in the United Nations Security Council. The draft resolution guaranteed the representation of all elements of Syrian society at the upcoming round of inter-Syrian talks on April 11th and was vetoed by Western member states (Yegorov, 2016). This decision certainly relates to the NATO alliance between Turkey and Security Council members. It clearly reflects the complexity of the subject leading to a wait-and-see attitude by diplomats instead of making decisions while not all are opposed to the inclusion of the PYD. From the actions Russia but also the U.S. have taken it is hard to understand their 59

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh

priorities and perspective on the peace talks. On the one hand, they cooperate to enhance the talks to come to a political solution. On the other hand, they provide significant support and thereby contribute to an impasse to the peace talks currently have fallen into. This behaviour reflects balancing of power between the U.S. and Russia as neither party is willing to make concessions and increase pressure on the groups they can influence. While Russia’s priority is to keep regional influence and not necessarily keep Assad in power, this seems necessary for them to accomplish the former. Russia also supports the Geneva communiqué which endorses a form of political transition in the form of a mutually acceptable national unity government. It does not however address the fate of President Assad, a point stressed many times by the Syrian government and Russia. Russia and the U.S. have some common grounds when it comes to the PYD. Both states agree that the PYD ultimately should be included into the Geneva peace talks. Thus currently, it is only Turkey taking a hard stance in blocking their involvement. In addition, they agree that a form of decentralisation within Syria may be promising as a means to overcome political and security dilemmas. This means that if Russia can avoid further escalation with Turkey and the U.S. can convince Turkey to adjust its transborder security strategy, a broad political ground can be build. The support to the PYD from Russia however is more motivated from a balancing power perspective as PYD leader Salih Muslim put in an interview about Russia’s support: “Turkey’s Syrian policy is totally bankrupt. Two years ago I was talking to a Russian official and he asked me, “What do the Kurds most fear?” “Possible Turkish intervention,” I replied. He laughed and said, “That is not Turkey’s border [with Syria], but NATO’s,” to which I responded, “In that case you have given me relief, thank you.” Turkey cannot intervene in Syria without the blessings of the big powers.” He added: “The Russians will not meddle in the North. But should Turkey attempt to intervene, then they will. Russia has a joint defense agreement with Syria. They will prevent Turkish intervention not to defend us [Kurds] but to defend Syria’s border.” (Salih Muslim, 2013). This clearly states Russia’s alliance with Syria opposed to the NATO alliance between U.S. and Turkey and the potential consequences for escalation which may arise from these alliances. Remarkable is how the U.S. on the one hand legitimizes the PYD by supporting and collaborating with their military branch the YPG to fight IS, and Russia complements this by providing political support and support to battles with the aim to fight other opposition forces leading to an expansion of control over territory. Russia has provided significant political

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh support by providing the PYD with their first official representative office in Moscow in February 2016 (Ekurd Daily, 2016). In addition, the Russians have not openly condemned the announcement by the PYD of the federation of Rojava while all other parties have. Before the announcement they actually stated that a federal state in Syria might work: "If as a result of talks, consultations and discussions on Syria's future state order ... they come to an opinion that namely this (federal) model will work to serve the task of preserving Syria as a united, secular, independent and sovereign nation, then who will object to this?" Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov (2016) said. In March 2016, Russia decided to withdraw the major part of its forces from Syria because it believed it had succeeded in turning the conflict in favor of the regime. The military support had certainly influenced the bargaining position of the government which took a firm stance on the fate of Assad. On the other side, the withdrawal may have led to the confidence for the opposition to walk out of the talks in April when the government continued to refuse to make concessions and attack civilians. It was the first time the government responded by saying it was willing to discuss a unity government and Russia has showed its good will to the international community by withdrawing it forces. As a response to the walking out of the opposition from the talks minister Lavrov said: "No one can win the war. All experts recognize this. There are some external players who dream about deposing the regime by force and try to do everything including disrupting the talks in Geneva." (Harper, 2016). It is interesting that the minister openly states that no one can win the war, but even with this recognition Russia continuous its aviation support to the regime keeping with their priority of regional influence in mind which indirectly also disrupts the talks. Russia’s support to the regime and acknowledgement of the elections are contradictory to its support to the Geneva communiqué which involves a political transition period and the review of the constitution. With the PYD receiving sufficient military support from the U.S. it enjoys political support from the Russians leaving them currently practically immune to Turkish escalation.

5.3 PART 3: EXCLUSION OF THE PYD (CONSEQUENCES) In response to their exclusion during the Riyadh meeting where the High Negotiations Committee was formed, a Kurdish-Arab coalition was created fighting IS called the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC). This would be the political branch of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which was established in October 2015 and grouped the YPG with smaller Arab and

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Christian armed groups with the aim to fight IS. Haytham Manna, the co-chair of the SDC was invited to the Geneva talks but refused to engage unless Salih Muslim (PYD) and Ilam Ahmed (Syrian Democratic Assembly) were also invited. As a result they are currently not represented. The first consequence for their exclusion is that it results in no disincentives to continue fighting for the PYD while they are an important military power in the region. The announcement in March 2016 on the Democratic Self-Administration in the ‘Federation of Rojava Northern Syria’ is a clear second consequence of the exclusion of the PYD from the peace talks as stated in an interview with a representative: “ Do they really expect us to sign up for something we had no opportunity to have any say in it? We cannot sit down and wait until others decide over us, nobody would accept that and neither will we.” (de Jong, 2016). Taking into account that the PYD-controlled area in the North is the largest controlled area, by any opposition force in Syria (see appendix II for map) and that they have been excluded from the political solution to end the Syrian conflict, it is not surprising that they have made this announcement as a response to their exclusion. However the announcement raised opposition from all parts including the Syrian government, the opposition, Turkey and the U.S.. Nawaf Khalil, a former PYD official downplayed the parallels between Kurdish aspirations in Syria and Iraq by saying that the announcement was a joint move taken together with the region's other ethnic communities (Said, 2016i). The PYD has consistently said it wants decentralized governance in Syria and not partition. Nevertheless, a member of the Syrian National Coalition saw the announcement of the PYD on federal governance in northern Syria as a serious attempt to sabotage the negotiations as it coincided with the start of the Geneva Talks (Goudsouzian & Fatah, 2016). As reflected in the reports from KurdWatch, the PYD is the strongest military power of all Kurdish parties in Syria. The PYD has gained legitimacy by their military power and successful battle on the ground against IS. Simultaneously, in the midst of the civil war they have managed to keep relative stability in parts of their controlled territory and due to state and diaspora support from sympathizers, they have had the opportunity to develop and structure a real federal government making much faster steps to rebuilding the country compared to the UN peace talks. The literature points out to the third party as important player in preventing and handling spoilers. The best way to do this is by including legitimate warring parties. While the international community agrees on the exclusion of terrorist groups such as IS in the negotiations due to their illegitimate cause, there is significant disagreement concerning the

The Exclusion of the PYD from the 2016 Geneva peace talks on Syria Lisa Gotoh exclusion of the PYD. The announcement of the federal administration was an attempt to influence the peace talks by showing the legitimacy of the PYD and its affiliates. Structural circumstances prevent the emergence of spoilers, but in this case it is clear that the peacemakers themselves, the U.S. and Russia have created the opportunity structure for spoiling by supporting the PYD but not including them in the peace talks.

6 CONCLUSION To understand the exclusion of the PYD from the Geneva III peace talks and its consequences, this analysis has studied the history, relationships and behaviour of the PYD in the peace process. The history of Kurds in Syria and the analysis of the PYD show a tremendous shift of the position of Kurds in Syria caused by the civil war. Simultaneously, the current disunity between multiple Kurdish groups in Syria is reflected in their history. The PYD owes its successful establishment to the initial support from the PKK and the continuous support from the U.S., Russia and diaspora. Turkish support to other Syrian opposition groups has greatly affected the decision for the exclusion of the PYD in the High Negotiations Committee. While the United Nations is often referred to as the third party that gets involved for conflict resolution, this analysis clearly shows that in this case there is no one third-party that gets involved and can influence the peace process as described in the theory. This is due to the fact that the United Nations does not have the military power to influence conflict dynamics while states do. There are in essence, two third-parties with great power, the U.S. and Russia with conflicting interests, drawing the focus of the initial conflict away. It is also questionable whether they even fit in the third party role as described by the literature as they are also outside supporters, providing resources to the war. In other words, there is no one third party that influences the peace process to refer to as the literature suggests. The High Negotiations Committee was formed by an initiative of Saudi Arabia already stating the context and established through invitations to parties selected by states that shared a vision as to how the Syrian opposition should be formed, excluding the PYD. Regarding theories on ripeness, we have found that it is important not only to look at the direct belligerents but also their supporters or suppliers and their perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. As long as the resources keep coming, because a supporter is convinced that fighting is necessary, the belligerent will keep on fighting. While Ohlson does make the link between resources and the perception of a MHS, the role of supporters is underexposed

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in the ripeness theory although it is as important for the supporters to have disincentives to continue fighting as it is for the belligerents. This also suggests that as the amount of actors including supporters increase, ripeness theory loses its relevance. It is rather the most influential parties who have the resources that need to perceive a mutually hurting stalemate and peace negotiations as favourable compared to fighting, which in our case, the U.S. and Russia, show that they do not necessarily have to be the main belligerents. This case study also reflects how the relative strength is assessed according to the seven factors mentioned by Blainey. Especially the predictions of how outside nations would behave in war, perceptions of internal unity and unity of enemy, and the ability to sustain the war economically affect the belligerents perception of a mutually hurting stalemate which in this case is not present and therefore promotes the continuance of war. Concerning the commitment problem, it is clear that without the inclusion of representatives for the PYD-controlled territories in the peace talks, credible guarantees for a sustainable peace agreement cannot be offered during the negotiations. The support from several states to the warring parties have increased the military resources of all parties enlarging the internal security dilemma and opportunities for post-treaty exploitation. A UN peacekeeping mission would be necessary to accomplish implementation of an agreement but it is questionable if the UN states would agree to deploy peacekeepers to areas controlled by the PYD and its affiliates when they are not included in the agreement and do not cooperate with the implementation of the agreement. This would significantly increase the risk for a peacekeeping soldier and therefore would be a legitimate reason for states not to engage in such mission. Instead of giving third party security guarantees, the third party involvement enlarges the security dilemma by increasing the volume of resources available to belligerents. While the power sharing aspect is pointed out by the PYD and the HNC who both advocate for a pluralistic democratic system in Syria, group autonomy is rejected by all parties except for Russia. Some form of group autonomy however does not seem excludable in pluralist societies and is necessary for democracies to work in divided societies. The U.S. and Russia are both focused on their foreign policy in securing regional influence. For the U.S. the priority is the fight against IS, but currently they have increasingly been showing support for the Syrian opposition considering the August deadline to achieve a framework for a political transition by August 2016. For Russia, it is the regime with or without Assad which will guarantee their presence and developments for their naval facility and continue and improve regional influence. It is remarkable how the U.S. and Russia both have been

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supporting the PYD for their own reasons but the PYD still has not received enough legitimacy from the international community to be included in the talks. It has been the task of the U.S. and Russia to come to an agreement for the Syrian crisis but both parties assist other groups and have different priorities. Their support however is significantly fueling the conflict and the stalemate between these two parties is protracting the conflict. While the literature suggests a changing role for support due to the lack of involvement of the U.S. and Russia today compared to the Cold War era, this case clearly reflects the remaining opposition between these two states. Due to their involvement the amount of support is high, meaning that there are also bigger consequences. The financial and military support that all involved parties receive from outside irrefutably protracts the Syrian conflict. This balancing of power also leads to an undecided outcome and diminishes the possibility for one party to win the war in victory resulting in a protracted conflict. Russia and the U.S. are the most important players in the initiative for the peace talks and may have the most influence on the course of the conflict and therefore the peace talks. For instance, if Russia would stop offering military support, the regime will not be able to continue expanding its control and probably even lose control over territory in the conflict. This could significantly influence the bargaining position of the Syrian government by having them perceive a mutually hurting stalemate and negotiations as an important manner to be included in some form in a transitional government. The same goes for the outside support the opposition receives and announcements of sending ground troops by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. However, instead of de-escalating the conflict, involvement of third parties are further escalating and keeping the violence in tact because no party will compromise or try to come to a common solution. Turkey seems to have had the most influence on the course of the peace process up till now. They have aggressively called for exclusion of the PYD by making threats if the party were included. While the U.S. keeps a firm stance in providing military support to the PYD in the fight against IS, they have been more careful with stating political support, keeping the NATO alliance in mind. The PYD strategically execute their actions in order to secure support by also giving priority to the fight against IS. Finally, it should be noted that there are at least three major conflicts intertwined in the Syrian civil war. First, is the Syrian civil war between government forces and opposition forces, which are not all united in one force, and both sides receiving significant outside support from states. Russian foreign policy is mainly focused on this conflict. Second, is the fight against IS led by the U.S.-coalition which engages military involvement and support to groups for the

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primary purpose of fighting IS regardless of their political stance, the number one priority of the United States. Third, is the Kurdish question which engages primarily Turkey into the conflict which is an important partner to Western states in the region while there is significant discussion on the actions and priorities of Turkey. The analysis clearly shows that the most important players in international context have very different priorities. This is a good reason for why there is currently not a perceived mutually hurting stalemate between the negotiating parties because the parties do not address the same conflict. According to the analysis there is currently no diplomatic momentum as the warring parties continue fighting and do not perceive a mutually hurting stalemate to prioritize the peace talks. Therefore it does not make sense to come up with deadlines in order to “keep the diplomatic momentum”. Rather the international community should realize that outside state support is significantly fuelling the conflict and therefore that they have significant influence on the perceptions of a mutually hurting stalemate. However, with the involved states all having different priorities it is hard to accomplish such common objective. It certainly seems that the international community is more focused on reaching an agreement rather than being concerned about the content and sustainability of an agreement. The proposed deadline set for August to reach an agreement by the U.S. and Russia encourages a tunnel vision for the parties engaged in the peace talks neglecting even further what is going on outside the talks and reconsidering the inclusion of the PYD. Reflecting on the current relationship of the PYD and the negotiating partners, the deadline will not contribute to prospects for the inclusion of the PYD in the Geneva talks. Interesting is that the PYD does not spoil the peace process by directly sabotaging it or increasing violence but strategically uses the non-violent but politically loaded announcement of the democratic administration of the federation of Rojava. The analysis has shown that it is essential to look at the priorities of supporters in a conflict to understand the peace process. It has become clear that the international community, in particular the U.S. and Russia which initiated the talks have a significant influence on the dynamics of the conflict but also that alliances play a significant role. The NATO alliance between Turkey and the U.S. has so far discouraged the discussion of inclusion of the PYD by Western countries. With all three parties focused on their regional influence however, they themselves seem to be in a impasse but due to their secondary involvement have less sense of loss and therefore less incentives to adjust their behaviour. The peace process is in this case very much shaped by geostrategic and multinational interests which influences the agenda and options for peace- and state building.

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Currently the exclusion of the PYD is mainly attributed to the interest of Turkey instead of the interest of Syria. The international community needs to shift this and bring back the attention to the core of the conflict which is the civil war over government. In order to solve this issue, all legitimate domestic parties should have a chance of saying without an outside state deciding on their in- or exclusion. The current setting, with the exclusion of the PYD while they continue to expand control over territory, is not beneficial for the peace process and its credibility. The international community needs to realise that they need to take one step back and reconsider the setting of the peace talks in order to move on from the current impasse the peace process has gotten in to. However, seeing that the last announcement was the deadline proposed in August to come to a resolution, prospects for a sustainable political solution are not promising.

7 DISCUSSION Clearly more research is needed in the field of conflict resolution on the engagement of multiple states in conflict and their influence on the peace process. Future studies should clarify when referring to third-party involvement whether the scholar refers to a third-party such as the United Nations or multiple third parties referring to states that may organize and or influence the peace talks. This distinction needs to be taken into consideration when testing and constructing theories as well as what consequences being a supporter of one side in a conflict has for taking the role of third party in conflict resolution. In fact, the literature suggests a third party neglecting its own interest in the conflict. While this role might be best given to the United Nations, the analysis has shown that the expected influence the third party should have according to the literature is unrealistic except if this third party, the UN, is supported by the most influential actors involved, the P5. The analysis has also highlighted the importance of alliances and the power it distributes. Turkey could only take a firm stance to exclude the PYD with other states giving in, because of their relationships with the other states involved in the peace talks. Simultaneously, Russia and the U.S., although supportive of the PYD, prioritized in getting the peace talks started and carefully assessed that at the time the negotiating parties were selected it was not the right time to take a hard stance to include the PYD. It is not clear however, given the analysis on how it was decided to exclude the PYD, what is needed to include the PYD. That would be an interesting follow-up research. This analysis, although case-specific, calls for more research on outside state involvement in civil war conflict

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resolution. A follow-up research on this case can test the expectations raised in this analysis. From the six actors under analysis, the least data was found on the High Negotiations Committee, because it is a new group and a coalition of several opposition groups. The statements have been collected from the opposition groups that are part of the HNC but may differ slightly within the HNC. For the Syrian government the data was also lean compared to the other actors. This surely has to do with their position and strategy, only presenting the information to mass media consumers. Another research based on primary data collection in the form of interviews with spokespersons of the subjects under analysis in this thesis would give better insight in the motives and interests of the actors, especially in light of the fact that diplomats announce different statements towards the mass media than in internal discussion. While this analysis has brought new insights, it deserves a critical reflection. It may be argued that the reduction of the amount of actors to six of the most relevant actors leaving out the influence of other actors on the conflict dynamics such as Iran or Saudi Arabia may have influenced the conclusions. Yet, the analysis concludes the importance of researching the most influential actors which has been done in this thesis. It should also be noted that this case is a civil war which has become internationalized due to outside state support. Many of the literature provide theories of conflict resolution for intra-state conflict i.e. civil war, but do not address the impact of outside state engagement into civil war. This case is an internationalized civil war, the analysis has shown that therefore a different approach is needed.

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APPENDIX I

TIMELINE SYRIA PEACE TALKS 2016 (GENEVA III)

January Following the execution of Sheikh Nimr Al-Nimr in Riyadh and the storming of the Saudi Arabian embassy in Iran, Saudi Arabia and later Bahrain, UAE and Sudan cuts its diplomatic ties with Iran raising sectarian tensions in the region. the Free Syrian Army supports this2

January 26 UN envoy Staffan de Mistura announces start of intra-Syria peace talks in Geneva as of 29 January 20163

January 27 Haytham Manna, elected joint chairman of the Syrian Democratic Council, political representative of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a Kurdish-Arab coalition led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), states he will not take part in the Geneva peace talks unless two Kurdish leaders, Saleh Muslim (PYD) and Ilam Ahmed (Syrian Democratic Assembly) were also invited to participate4

February 1 Formal talks start with two day delay. PYD leader in Geneva awaits inclusion to peace talks, - exclusion so far mainly attributed to Turkey - talks have been held with the U.S. and Russian delegation, who have indicated that ‘timing is important’ and continue military alliance on the ground5

February 6 Syrian government warns for a foreign ground intervention saying that any troop entering Syria without the government’s consent will ‘return home in wooden coffins’6

February 7 Saudi Arabia and UAE announce their readiness to send ground troops to Syria if US accepts7

February 10 Rojava Kurdistan Democratic Autonomous Administration Representation Office has opened in Russia’s capital city Moscow8

2 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/01/allies-saudi-arabia-showdown-iran-160104130416688.html retrieved on February 10, 2016. 3 http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=4334 retrieved on February 10, 2016. 4 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-manna-idUSKCN0V513I retrieved on May 4, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0VA2OT retrieved on May 4, 2016. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/12/11/kurdish-arab-coalition-in-syria-forms-political-wing.html retrieved on May 4, 2016 5 http://www.kurdishinfo.com/pyd-co-chair-moslem-we-wont-recognise-a-geneva-3-excluding-kurds retrieved on February 10, 2016. 6 http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/any-foreign-troops-sent-to-syria-will-return-in-coffins-says- damascus retrieved on February 10, 2016. 7 http://www.dailysabah.com/syrian-crisis/2016/02/07/uae-ready-to-send-ground-troops-to-syria-to-fight-as- part-of-coalition-against-daesh retrieved on February 10, 2016. 8 http://ekurd.net/syrian-kurdistan-office-moscow-2016-02-10 http://en.hawarnews.com/rojava-democratic-self- administrations-representation-office-opens-in-moscow/ retrieved on February 10, 2016. 76

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February 11 the ISSG announced that all members will put effort in establishing a nationwide cessation of hostilities within one week and full implementation of UNSC Resolution 22549

February 13 Turkish forces strike Kurdish YPG target in northern Syria10 Saudi Arabia says Bashar al-Assad will leave either by political process or by force and expresses preparedness to contribute ground troops to the fight in Syria as part of the U.S.- led coalition11

February US and EU urge Turkey to halt strikes against YPG, France reaffirming priority 14/15 should be IS and US continuing support to the YPG12

February 19 Turkish President Erdogan calls on US to take sides between Turkey and YPG after attack in Ankara targeted on military personnel killing 28. Turkey starts targeting YPG in North-Syria close to the border. PKK and YPG deny allegations. The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks -- known as the TAK claim responsibility for Ankara bombing13 US continues to support YPG in the fight against IS. Netherlands concerned with Turkey trying to get NATO members to be involved in Syrian War.

February 22 US and Russia agree on terms for cessation of hostilities, inter alia: - all included parties have to agree before Friday (except for IS/Al-nusra) - Russian and Syrian air strikes stop striking opposition14

February 23 Kurdish militias expand control over areas as rebel groups are weakened by both IS and Russian backed government attacks15

February 24 Syrian opposition (HNC) ready for two week cease-fire to see if the government will commit to the U.S.-Russia plan16

9 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252428.htm retrieved on February 16, 2016. 10 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-shelling-idUSKCN0VM0Q0 retrieved on February 16, 2016. 11 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/13/middleeast/saudi-arabia-assad-force/ retrieved on April 5, 2016. 12 US: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/14/readout-vice-president-bidens-call-prime- minister-ahmet-davutoglu-turkey EU:http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160215_03_en.htm retrieved on February 23, 2016. 13 http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_turkeys_slippery_slope_to_syria_6009 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/02/19/middleeast/turkey-ankara-attack/ http://www.yenisafak.com/en/news/turkish-president-to-us-are-you-on-turkeys-or-pyds-side-2407645 retrieved on February 23, 2016. 14 https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/22/readout-presidents-call-president-vladimir-putin- russia retrieved on February 23, 2016 15 http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2016/02/9714/chaos-aleppo-creates-opportunity- kurds/?utm_source=Syria%20Deeply&utm_campaign=b51e0ea645- Syria_Deeply_WEEKLY_UPDATE_02_272_26_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d84f3fd103- b51e0ea645-117425105 retrieved on February 23, 2016. 16 http://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0VX24W retrieved on February 25, 2016. 77

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February 25 There are currently 4.719.605 Syrian refugees registered by the UNHCR of which around 10% seek asylum in Europe17

February 26 Security Council unanimously endorses Cessation of Hostilities that starts 00:00 (Damascus time) on 27 February 2016 for two weeks, de Mistura intends to reconvene peace talks on March 7.18

February 29 Russian and Syrian government forces continue air strikes on alleged terrorists targeting areas controlled by the Free Syrian Army19

March 13 Terrorist car bombing in Ankara kills 37. There are no claims for the attack20

March 14 Putin announces withdrawal of Russian troops from Syria because the goal set out for the armed forces has been in large part fulfilled and calls for intensification of Russian effort in Syrian peace talks21 Erdogan calls for broader definition of terrorists including supporters and abettors who made the terrorist attack possible22 Turkey starts air strikes targeting Kurdish militant camps in northern Iraq after blaming the Ankara bombing on the PKK23

March 17 Three Kurdish controlled regions agreed to establish a self-administered “Federal Democratic System of Rojava - Northern Syria”. The Syrian government and Turkey condemn the declaration. PYD official stresses that the federal system would "guarantee the unity of Syrian territory"24

March 18 First week of new round of peace talks end and de Mistura says the talks are moving forward. Talks coincide with a “substantial reduction of violence” due to the ceasefire agreement of February. The HNC has reportedly already produced substantive papers. Next week is the last week of talks of the second round of the talks, de Mistura has the aim to build a minimum common platform that could lead to a better understanding of the direction of political transition25

17 http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php retrieved on February 25, 2016. 18 http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12261.doc.htm retrieved on February 26, 2016. 19http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2016/02/9775/violations-syrians-skeptical-ceasefire/?utm_source=Syria%20Deeply&utm_campaign=9c18229931- Syria_Deeply_WEEKLY_UPDATE_03_053_4_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_d84f3fd103- 9c18229931-117425105 retrieved on February 29, 2016 20 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/13/people-killed-explosion-ankara-park-turkey-reports retrieved on March 14, 2016. 21 http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/mar/14/vladimir-putin-announce-withdrawal-russian-troops- syria-video retrieved on March 14, 2016. 22 http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2016/mar/14/erdogan-broadening-definition-terrorists-ankara- turkey-bomb-video retrieved on March 14, 2016. 23 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-idUSKCN0WF0PP retrieved on March 14, 2016. 24 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-federalism-idUSKCN0WJ1EP May 2, 2016 25 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53489#.Vu-z9-IrLGg retrieved on March 19, 2016. 78

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March 19 Suicide bomb attack in shopping street in Istanbul killing 426

March 21 The Syrian government representative announced that Assad’s presidency is not up for discussion27

March 22 Two terrorist attacks claimed by IS in Brussels at the international airport and at a metro station close to the European Union institutions killing 34 and 240 injured28

March 24 Syrian state media reports retaking city of Palmyra from IS supported by Russian airstrikes29 U.S. and Russia aim for a draft resolution by August 201630

March 25 Russia and U.S. announce that they have agreed to accelerate the Syrian peace process31

April 7 UN Special Advisor to the UN Special Envoy for Syria, Jan Egeland tells coming out of an ISSG meeting on humanitarian access that despite progress in past year the current impasse between the Government and opposition groups obstructing further expansion to access besieged places in need. He calls upon all countries that have influence to help the UN32

April 10 President Assad announces a new offensive to take Aleppo backed by Russian forces bringing the cessation of hostilities agreement at risk33

April 13 Parliamentary elections are held in government controlled areas of Syria independent of UN peace process34

April 15 U.S. urges Russia to halt major offensive by the regime on Aleppo as both parties pledged not to participate in any attacks on groups which are adhering the truce35

April 17 Syrian Kurdish administration of Rojava opens representation office in Stockholm, Sweden36

April 18 HNC put participation in Geneva peace talks on hold after increase of violence, blaming the government for many violations of the cessation of hostilities37

26 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-blast-idUSKCN0WL0D5 retrieved on March 20, 2016. 27 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/21/assad-president-excluded-syria-peace-negotiations retrieved on May 11, 2016. 28 http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/Livecenter/1.2607821 retrieved on March 23, 2016. 29 http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/24/middleeast/syria-war/ retrieved on March 24, 2016. 30 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35897667 retrieved on March 25, 2016. 31 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35897300 retrieved on March 25, 2016. 32 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=53597#.VwO9mbj5jGg retrieved on April 10, 2016. 33 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0X70GE retrieved April 14, 2016. 34 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKCN0XA2C5 retrieved on 9 May, 2016. 35 http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1936579/us-urges-russia-halt-bashar-al-assads-assault-aleppo- fragile-syrian retrieved on 18 April, 2016. 36 http://aranews.net/2016/04/syrian-kurds-inaugurate-representation-office-sweden/ retrieved on May 10, 2016. 37 http://www.france24.com/en/20160418-syria-peace-talks-near-collapse-opposition-calls-pause retrieved 10 May, 2016. 79

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April 19 The PYD announces it opens a representative office in Denmark in a few weeks38

April 24 A permanent representative of Russia to the UN office in Geneva demands the participation of the Syrian Kurds in the Geneva talks39

April 27 End of round of intra-Syrian talks. Staffan de Mistura is less optimistic compared to the end of the previous round due to the deterioration of the cessation of hostilities and many reported killings of civilians. He calls the Russian Federation and the U.S. to restore the cessation of hostilities as the next round of talks “ will be meaningful only if and when the cessation of hostilities is brought back to the level we saw in February and in March”40

May 3 Secretary of State John Kerry warns the Syrian government and its supporters to start a political transition to move President Assad out before the August deadline, “or they risk the consequences of a new U.S. approach towards ending the 5-year- old civil war”41

38 http://www.b.dk/nationalt/kurdisk-selvstyre-aabner-repraesentation-i-danmark retrieved on May 4, 2016. 39 http://sputniknews.com/politics/20160420/1038308467/kurds-russia-turkey.html retrieved 30 April, 2016.. 40 Transcript of press remarks by Staffan de Mistura, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geneva, 27 April. Retrieved on 2 May, 2016. 41 http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2016/05/03/kerry-warns-assad-start-transition-aug-1- else/83889770/ Retrieved on June 10, 2016 80

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APPENDIX II

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