1 Historical Overview
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NOTES 1 Historical Overview 1. Possibly the two best studies of the Kurds in English remain Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State; and McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds. More recently, see Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement; and Natali, The Kurds and the State. Portions of this chapter originally appeared in other articles and chapters I have published including “The Kurdish Problem in International Politics,” in Joseph, Turkey and the European Union, pp. 96–121. 2. For further discussions of the size of the Kurdish population, see McDowall, Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 3–5; Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State, pp. 14–15; and Izady, The Kurds, pp. 111–20. For a detailed analysis that lists considerably smaller figures for Turkey, see Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey,” pp. 517–41. 3. For a solid study of the Sheikh Said revolt, see Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism. 4. For a recent detailed analysis of the Kurdish problem in Turkey, see Ozcan, Turkey’s Kurds. 5. “The Sun also Rises in the South East,” pp. 1–2. 6. For a meticulous analysis of the many problems involved, see Yildiz, The Kurds in Turkey, as well as my analysis in chapter 5 of this book. 7. “Ozkok: Biggest Crisis of Trust with US” Turkish Daily News, July 7, 2003; and Nicholas Kralev, “U.S. Warns Turkey against Operations in Northern Iraq.” Washington Times, July 8, 2003. 8. For recent detailed analysis of the Kurdish problem in Iraq, see Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan. 140 NOTES 9. For Henry Kissinger’s exact words, see “The CIA Report the President Doesn’t Want You to Read,” The Village Voice, February 16, 1976, pp. 70–92. This article contains the U.S. Congress House of Representatives Pike Committee Report, which investigated the CIA in the mid-1970s. The part deal- ing with the Kurds is entitled “Case 2: Arms Support,” and appears on pp. 85 and 87–88. Many years latter, Kissinger explained his position more thoroughly in Years of Renewal, pp. 576–96. 10. Galbraith, “What Went Wrong,” in O’Leary et al., The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, p. 242. In other words, given that Iraq has proved to be a failed state, its inhabitants simply reject further identification with it, identifying instead with their ethnic and/ or sectarian groups. In addition to the series of articles in the O’Leary collection cited here, see Ahmed and Gunter, The Kurdish Question and the 2003 Iraqi War, for background analysis of the results of the 2003 War in Kurdistan in Iraq. 11. For a copy of the TAL, see <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/ government/TAL.html>. 12. Article 61 (c) of the TAL—the so-called “Kurdish veto”— declared that “the general referendum will be successful and the draft constitution ratified if a majority of the voters in Iraq approve and if two-thirds of the voters in three or more gover- norates do not reject it.” Since Iraqi Kurdistan consists of three governorates, this provision gave the Kurds an effective veto over the final constitution. Iraq’s Sunni Arabs also came close to using it successfully to block approval of the permanent constitu- tion in the referendum held on October 15, 2005. 13. Cited in Daniel Williams, “Iraqi Kurdish Leader Demands Guarantees: Minority Seeks Autonomous Region, Expulsion of Arabs under New Government,” Washington Post, January 18, 2004. 14. Cited in “Turkey’s Growing Uneasiness over Iraqi Kurds’ Federalist Aspirations,” Briefing (Ankara), January 19, 2004. 15. What Barzani and Talabani probably really meant was that to declare independence now would be premature. 16. For details see Richard Boudreaux, “Iraq Charter Ratified by Big Margin in Final Tally,” Los Angeles Times, October 26, 2005. NOTES 141 2 The Iraqi Kurds’ Federalism Imperative 1. An anonymous young Kurdish minister in Irbil speaking on April 6, 2004, cited in Karna Eklund, Brendan O’Leary, and Paul R. Williams, “Negotiating a Federation in Iraq,” in O’Lear y et al., The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, p. 138. For further back- ground, see Natali, The Kurds and the State. I previously pub- lished portions of this chapter as “The Iraqi Kurds’ Federalism Imperative,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 29 (Winter 2006), pp. 1–10. 2. For background, see Elazar, Exploring Federalism; King, Federalism and Federation; Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance; and Watts, Comparing Federal Systems. The work of Brendan O’Leary on federalism is particularly important for the current situation in Iraq. See his “Power-Sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy,” in O’Leary et al., Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, pp. 47–91. 3. Kanan Makiya, “A Model for Post-Saddam Iraq,” October 3, 2002, accessed on the Internet at <http://www. benadorassociates. com/article/140>; and Dawisha and Dawisha, “How to Build a Democratic Iraq,” pp. 36–50. 4. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 563–652. 5. Donald L. Horowitz, “Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron,” in Shapiro and Macedo, Designing Democratic Institutions, p. 259. 6. Brancati, “Is Federalism a Panacea for Post-Saddam Iraq?” pp. 7–21. 7. Wimmer, “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq,” pp. 111–34. 8. Yavuz, “Provincial not Ethnic Federalism in Iraq,” pp. 126–31. 9. The Shiites, of course, are far from being totally united. 10. For details, see Gunter, “Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq,” pp. 9–23. 11. In the following section on Quebec and the Canadian federal system, I owe a great debt to the lucid arguments made by John McGarry, “Canadian Lessons for Iraq,” in O’Leary et al., Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, pp. 92–115. 12. Although as recently as 1995, the Quebec separatists came within a single percentage point of winning a referendum on sovereignty, a 142 NOTES special type of self-government for the province has not led to the break-up of Canada and the separatists are now in retreat. Indeed, the federal government in Ottawa finally passed a law that would require Quebec’s approval before any constitutional change could be enacted in Canada. Since this Quebec veto could be rescinded by a mere majority vote, however, it still does not completely sat- isfy Quebec’s demand for recognition as a “distinct society” as the failed Meech Lake Accord in 1990 would have granted. The Kurds certainly would want their own Meech Lake Accord in the Iraqi Constitution that would grant them a veto over any future constitu- tional amendment they would consider fundamental to their existence. 13. For background to the concept of consociational politics, see the writings of Lijphart: The Politics of Accommodation; “Consociational Democracy,” pp. 207–25; and Democracy in Plural Societies. 14. For background, see Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers. 15. Recently, however, significant deposits of oil and natural gas have been verified in the Sunni area in a line that runs from Ninewa province in the north through Anbar province west of Baghdad and near the Syrian border all the way to the frontier with Saudi Arabia in the south. This development has the poten- tial to change the Sunni disillusionment about their future in a decentralized Iraq. It would take years, however, before these new deposits could be tapped. See Glanz, “Iraqi Sunni Lands Show New Oil and Gas Promise.” 16. See, for example, Galbraith, The End of Iraq; and Cockburn, “Kurdistan: Birth of a Nation?” 17. See, for example, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 2672 C (XXV), in UN Chronicle, 1971, no. 1, 46; 3236 (XXIX), in UN Chronicle, 1974, no. 11, 36–74; and 33/23, in UN Chronicle, 1978, nos. 11, 80. 18. See, for example, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions 2396 (XXIII), in UN Chronicle, 1969, no. 1, 94; and 31/61, in UN Chronicle, 1976, no. 1, 79. 19. For an analysis of Ozal’s initiatives, see Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, pp. 61–79. NOTES 143 20. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan, p. 6. Also see Gareth R.V. Stansfield, “Governing Kurdistan: The Strengths of Division,” in O’Leary et al., Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, pp. 195–218. 3 The Changing Dynamics in the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq 1. Two useful recent studies of the Kurds are Natali, The Kurds and the State; and Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement. I published por t ions of th is fol low ing chapter earl ier as “The Chang ing Dynam ics in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 30 (Fall 2006), pp. 1–14. 2. For an interesting and revealing profile of Jalal Talabani, see Jon Lee Anderson, “Mr. Big,” The New Yorker, February 5, 2007, pp. 46–57. 3. For a list, see “Ministers of the New Unified Cabinet,” <KRG. org>, May 7, 2006. 4. For further analysis, see chapter 2, in this book. 5. The following data and citations are taken from “Iraq: Oil and Gas Rights of Regions and Governorates,” <KurdishMedia>, June 14, 2006. With an estimated 1.5 million inhabitants, Irbil is the largest city in the KRG. 6. Vwienne Walt, “A New Oil Plan for Iraq,” <www.time.com>, January 12, 2007; and Glanz, “Draft Law Keeps Central Control over Oil in Iraq.” 7. See <www.Kurdishmedia.com>, May 2, 2006. 8. See the Turkish Daily News, January 23, 2006. 9. The following data and citation are taken from “Kurds Approve Foreigner-Friendly Investment Law.” 10. The following information is largely based on “Foreign Investors See Northern Iraq as Gateway to Rest of Country.” For further background to business opportunities in Iraqi Kurdistan, see Kurdistan Development Corporation (KDC), Iraqi Kurdistan Business & Investment, 2004; and Gunter, “Kurdistan’s Revival,” pp.