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China's Nuclear and Missile Espionage Heightens The No. 1303 July 2, 1999 CHINA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ESPIONAGE HEIGHTENS THE NEED FOR MISSILE DEFENSE RICHARD D. FISHER, JR., AND BAKER SPRING Developing and deploying a credible defense gence make clear, China’s missile program has against ballistic missiles for Americans now must benefited significantly from U.S. technology. In become an even higher national priority following fact, China’s new nuclear revelations in the May 25, 1999, Cox Report that missiles may have not been Produced by China soon will have the ability to threaten the possible without access to The Asian Studies Center United States with new nuclear missiles based U.S. solid-fuel rocket largely on stolen or purchased U.S. technology. motor technology, modern Published by U.S. technology in the areas of missile motors, small nuclear warhead and The Heritage Foundation nuclear warheads, nuclear reentry vehicle design, nuclear reentry vehicle 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. and perhaps even warhead penetration aids are design, and missile-guid- Washington, D.C. enabling China in the near future to begin to field ance technology. 20002–4999 at least three new modern intercontinental-range (202) 546-4400 http://www.heritage.org ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching cities These disturbing revela- inside the United States. tions, especially when According to the Cox Report, by as early as viewed in light of the vola- 2002 China could begin deployment of its new tility of U.S.–China rela- 5,000-mile-range DF–31 ICBM. From northern tions and China’s record of areas of China, this missile could reach the states conducting provocative of Washington and Oregon. Around 2005, China missile tests to pressure could field an 8,000-mile-range variant of this Taiwan and the United missile, the DF–41, which could hit most of the States, make it imperative continental United States. Both ICBMs are that the United States expected to be modern, mobile missiles with develop and deploy a national missile defense solid-fuel motors, possibly armed with multiple (NMD) system as soon as possible. This means the warheads. China also is expected to deploy a sub- Clinton Administration should abandon its adher- marine-launched ballistic missile similar to the ence to the defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile DF–31. As the Cox Report and an earlier report (ABM) Treaty, which prevents the United States issued by the Senate Select Committee on Intelli- from developing effective missile defenses, and No. 1303 July 2, 1999 increase funding for existing national and theater to be made available to NMD programs in FY missile defense programs. 2000 to resuming the development of this technology. Congress also should require that To counter China’s new missiles, the United the Department of Defense conduct a test of an States should: SBI against a target missile that resembles the •PPPeeerrrfffooorrrmm aann iiininnttteeerrrccceeeppptt tteeessstt ooff aann upupgggrrraaadddeeedd vveeerrr-- long-range missiles China currently has under ssiiiiooonn ooff tthhhee NNaaavvvyy TThhheeeatatateeerrr---WWWiiiidddee ((NNNTWTWTW)) mmiiiissssssilililee development. In this case, the test should ddeeefffeeennnsssee ssyyyssstttemem iiinin a wwaaayy tthhhaaatt rreeessspppooonnndddss ttoo tthhhee occur before the end of FY 2003. As with the tthhhrrreeeaaatt ffrrrooomm CChhhiiiinnnaaa.... The NTW system envisions test for the upgraded version of the NTW sys- 650 interceptor missiles to be deployed on 22 tem, this test should demonstrate the capabil- existing U.S. Navy Aegis cruisers around the ity to destroy long-range missiles in their world. Congress should require that the ascent phase. Department of Defense conduct an intercept test of this version of the NTW system against The Clinton Administration’s policy of observ- a target missile that has the flight characteris- ing the ABM Treaty, in effect, blocks much-needed tics of the long-range missiles China currently progress in both the NTW and SBI programs. In has under development. Considering the the latter case, there is no program at all. The urgency of the threat, Congress also should alarming developments regarding China’s use of require that this test take place no later than U.S. nuclear and missile technology to modernize the end of fiscal year (FY) 2001. Finally, Con- its strategic forces means there is no time to waste. gress should demand that the test demonstrate The United States urgently needs to develop and the capability of the NTW system to intercept a deploy these two systems to address the emerging modern, long-range missile in the ascent phase threat, or it runs the risk of being blackmailed by of its flight before it can release multiple war- China with missiles designed with stolen U.S. heads, decoys, and penetration aids. technology. •RRReeevvviiiivvvee tthhhee sspppaaaccceee---bbbaaassseeedd iiininnttteeerrrcececeppptttooorr ((SSSBBBIII)) pprrrooo-- ggrrraaammm.... The Clinton Administration canceled —Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is Director of The Asian the SBI program in 1993. The emerging missile Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. Baker threat from China reveals this cancellation was Spring is Senior Defense Policy Analyst in The Kath- a mistake. Congress should revive the SBI pro- ryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International Studies gram by allocating $250 million of the money Center at The Heritage Foundation. No. 1303 July 2, 1999 CHINA’S NUCLEAR AND MISSILE ESPIONAGE HEIGHTENS THE NEED FOR MISSILE DEFENSE RICHARD D. FISHER, JR., AND BAKER SPRING Early in the next decade, China will begin to ducting provocative missile tests to pressure Tai- field modern, long-range ballistic missiles that will wan and the United States, be capable of reaching the continental United make it imperative that the Produced by States. Two recent reports from the U.S. Congress United States develop and The Asian Studies Center explain in disturbing detail the ways in which deploy a national missile China’s missile programs have benefited from the defense (NMD) system as Published by theft of U.S. nuclear and missile technology secrets soon as possible. This The Heritage Foundation over many years. The most comprehensive report means the Clinton Admin- 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E. is that of the Select Committee on U.S. National istration should abandon Washington, D.C. Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with its adherence to the defunct 20002–4999 the People’s Republic of China, chaired by Repre- 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (202) 546-4400 http://www.heritage.org sentative Christopher Cox (R–CA), which was (ABM) Treaty, which pre- issued on May 25, 1999.1 A second important vents the United States report was released in April by the Senate Select from developing effective Committee on Intelligence.2 missile defenses, and increase funding for exist- The sobering revelations in these reports, espe- ing national and theater cially when viewed in light of the volatility of missile defense programs. U.S.–China relations and China’s record of con- 1. U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999). This paper will refer to this publication as the Cox Report. 2. Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, Report on Impacts to U.S. National Security of Advanced Satellite Tech- nology Exports to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Report on the PRC’s Efforts to Influence U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1999). This paper will refer to this publication as the Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. No. 1303 July 2, 1999 CHINA’S NEW LONG-RANGE tainside caves, China’s new missiles would be BALLISTIC MISSILES much more difficult to find, thanks to these TELs, and could be launched with much less warning for Today, China may have 18 to 26 DF–5 intercon- the United States. Both of the new ICBMs are tinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs).3 These expected to incorporate multiple independently missiles, with a range of 8,000 miles, are unwieldy targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. This due their use of liquid fuel, which takes a long means a single missile based in China could time to fill. To remedy this deficiency, China’s Peo- threaten a number of cities or military targets ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) is developing two new inside the United States. ICBMs and one submarine-launched ballistic mis- sile (SLBM). Its most advanced missile program is Impact of U.S. Technology on the solid-fueled, 5,000-mile-range DF–31 ICBM, China’s New Missiles which would be capable of hitting the western China’s potential near-term ability to threaten United States. The Cox Report estimates this mis- 4 the United States with modern, solid-fueled sile could be deployed by 2002. The DF–31 is ICBMs armed with multiple warheads is a direct expected to be nearly identical to China’s next consequence of its access—illegal and legal—to SLBM, the JL–2, which recent reports indicate 5 U.S. technology. The Cox Report and the Report of China intends to test this year. If the test is suc- the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence out- cessful, it will enhance the likelihood that the DF– line several areas in which stolen U.S. technology 31 will be deployed by 2002. Deployment of the probably has assisted China’s nuclear missile JL–2 itself will take longer because China must development programs and enabled them to complete building a new class of nuclear-powered advance much more rapidly than they otherwise ballistic missile submarine that will be quieter and could have. China has obtained U.S. information faster and reach greater depths than China’s cur- or technology in the specific areas of solid-fuel rent submarines.
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