A BEIEF EXPOSITION

OF THE SANIHTA AND VEDANTA SYSTEMS

OS INDIAN PHILOSOPHY-

SUBMITTED TO MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL, AS A THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF LITERATURE.

EDWARD CARRUTHERS--WOODLKY, &.A,, M.B.A,S,,

Member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal^ Fellow of Calcutta University\ Principal^ London Missionary Society[s College^ Calcutta.

Calcutta: 1907. *[K M wi^-^cn

MS GILL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

\27257

A BRIEF EXPOSITION

OF THE SANKHYA AND VEDANTA SYSTEMS

OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

EDWARD CARRUTHERS WOODLEY, M.A., M.R.A.S.,

Member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal^ Fellow of Calcutta University\ Principal^ London Missionary Society's College^ Calcutta.

Calcutta: 1907. BEIEF EXPOSITION

OF THE SANKHYA AND VEDANTA SYSTEMS

OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

1277.51 CONTENTS.

I. Sketch of the rise of Speculative Thought in India. II. The Sankhya Philosophy. III. The Vedanta Philosophy. IV. Appendices. I. The Yoga or Theistic Sankhya of Patanjali. II. The Purva-Mimansa of Jaimini. V. Bibliography. ,Index. PREFACE.

I wish to point out a seeming ambiguity "in my references to the Tattwa Samasa, in the Section on the Sankhya Philosophy. I have re­ ferred to tMs work and the commentary published with it, by Dr. Ballantyne, indifferently as the Tattwa Samasa. This may not be, in the strictest sense correct, but the commentary is anonymous, and Dr. Ballantyne treats it as practically forming one book with the Tattwa Samasa. Even Profesor Max Muller was unable to identify it. This, I think, justifies my method of referring to it.

Ccdeutta, August 1907. E. C. W. A BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE SANKHYA AND VEDANTA SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Section I. Introduction—The Rise of Speculative Thought in India. When the Aryans entered India through the passes of the North-West, they were a simple, nature-loving people. The Vedic songs still charm us with their vernal freshness.1 They are the natural expression of a strong, buoyant race, living under simple social conditions and not, as yet, oppressed by a priestly hierarchy. There is only one reference to the caste system in the Rig Veda2 and that is in a late book. The doc­ trine of metempsychosis is not even suggested3. 1. A well-known Indian writer, in a recent book, has described the Vedic age in these words. "The early Vedic hymns are redolent with the fragrance of a bright and genial spring-time, reflecting the joy of a simple pastoral life in the golden age when the children of men played with mother nature in her kindest moods and the earth and the stars sang together."—Haveli "Benares, the Sacred City, page 3." 2. Eig-Veda X : 90. 3. It is allowable to regard such passages as X : 16 : 3, X : 58 :7 as containing the germ of the idea of metempsychosis ; but the actual doctrine had not yet been developed. [ 2 ]

The early Aryans were Polytheists or to use Max Muller's more exact term, Henotheists1. To them the forces of nature were the manifesta­ tions of various gods, but the gods were thought of only one at a time. Hence arose that strange confusion and frequent contradiction in the func­ tions ascribed to them, which meets one con<- tinually in the Big Veda. We find the same powers ascribed in different hymns to Indra, Varuna, Mitra, Agni, and even to lesser gods2. A strong belief in a future life3 prevailed and the Pitaras were worshipped. There was little time or inclination for specu­ lation. Life had few problems. The people were engaged in winning the land from its earlier pos­ sessors and, when won, it afforded them a liveli­ hood only after considerable labour had been expended upon it. It was in later years, when they had left the Punjab and settled along the Ganges, that they began to speculate on the gr

1. Max Muller "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" p. 40. 2. Eig-Veda. 5 : 3,1 ; 1 : 164 (quoted by Macdonell). 3. Whitney "Oriental and Linguistic Studies," Kaegi. "Eig- Veda" page 69 ; Eig-Veda. 10 : 14 See summary of Vedic view of the hereafter by Dr. Roth., Am. Oriental Soc. Jourp, 3: 343. Ath.-Veda 6 : 24. C 3' ] few who were not entirely satisfied with the be­ lief of the majority of their countrymen. Here and there in the Hymns one may note a yearning after some unifying conception which would bring order in the chaotic Theogony. At times several gods were thought of as one1, and this conception has led to some remarkable compounds. Max Miiller has also drawn attention to the idea of Visve Devas2, which, may be regarded as the first step in the direction of unity. Visve is a class name comprehending all the gods, greater and less, including even such beings as the Ma- ruts. Thefinest expressio n of this tendency towards Monotheism is found in a Hymn of the Tenth Book3 of the Big Veda, which ascribes oreation to Prajapati, lord of creatures. A further ad­ vance still is evident in another Hymn of the same Book4, in which a fundamental Existence is postulated. One cannot designate this Exis­ tence in personal terms. It is an indefinable Power lying behind all things that appear, and is regarded as preceding even the gods. "The gods came later than this Creation, who then

1. Rig-Veda, 1:2, 1:7, 2 : 27, 7 r85, 2. Max Muller "Six Systems," p. 39. Kaegi 'Rig-Veda' p. 34, also note this epithet applied to Indra,- Eig-Veda 8 : 87. 3. Rig-Veda 10 : 121. 4. Rig-Veda 10 : 12ft. [ 4 ] knows whence it arose ?" It is, in other words, the germ idea, from which Indian Philosophy, especially the Vedanta, subsequ ently developed. The similarity of ideas in this Hymn and in the famous definition of the Eternal found in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad1 is striking. This latter definition contains one of the fundamental views of the Vedantia philosophy2. The second stratum in /Indian literature is -f formed by the Yajur Veda. There are two chief schools of this Veda3 and it exists in several re­ censions. It is a production unique in literature. Nothing more dreary or unattractive can possibly be imagined. The transition from the Rig to the Yajur Veda can only be likened to passing from the bright sun-light into a darkened room in which weird shapes flit to and fro, engaged in seemingly inexplicable movements and uttering formulae, which are often absolutely meaningless. This great work contains the most minute direc­ tions for the performance of the sacrifice which had become the all—important thing in Indian life. From birth to death life had become a burdensome and weary journey. A single mis- i i n m , _ . 1. Brhad. Ar. Up. 3 : 8, 8. 2. Vedanta Sutras with Sankara's Commentary, 1st Adh. 1st Pada ; 22 ; 2nd Pada 1 : 13, 21. 3. I. Black Yajur-Veda, (a) Taittiriya Sanhita of the School of Apastamba. (6) Maitrayani Sanhita. II. White Yajur-Veda, (a) Madhyadina. (5) Kanva. [ 5 ]

r take in the performance of the daily sacrifice was* believed to have the most far-reaching results both in the present life and in the long succes­ sion of lives which were thought to follow. The Yajur Veda is the work of the priestly caste which had come to occupy the chief place in the Indian social fabric following the settle­ ment in the Ganges valley. This caste gradually assumed a position of power and prerogative to which history presents no parallel. It was in the interest of the Brahmans that the people should believe in the efficacy of the sacrifice, as without their aid no sacrifice was valid. The hold thus obtained over a superstitious people has never been relaxed, and the Pessimism and Fatalism which have prevailed in India for more than two thousand years are largely its fruits. The various recensions of the Yajur Veda and the attached Brahmanas, which explain the Veda, contain little fresh speculative thought. The Gods are much the same as in the Rig Veda although certain Gods who formerly occupied an unimportant place in the Theogony, now come into prominence (e. g. Vishnu, Brahman). There are many legends1 which show a real desire on the part of some to account for the

1. Maitrayani Sanhita 1 : 5, 12. Satapatha Brah. 2 : 5. Note also the account of Creation in the Satapatha Brah. 10 : 1, and the story of the Flood, Sat. BraU 1:8. [ 6 I phenomena of the Universe. The ideas of Vis- vedevas1 and Visvekarman are also found. The Yajur Veda was probably composed between 800-600 B. C. The Fifth century B. C. witnessed some great movements in the East generally.2 It was the time of Zoroaster in Persia and of Confucius in China. In India a strong attempt was made to break the fetters welded by the priestly hierar­ chy. Brahmanism was shaken to its foundations. A reaction was inevitable after centuries of spiri­ tual oppression and, as might have been expected, took a violent form. The teaching of Sakya Muni threatened at one time to supplant Brahmanism altogether. Pessimistic as it was, Buddhism must have seemed a voice of freedom to oppress­ ed India. It began by rejecting the caste system entirely. It is true that Buddhism had little of positive good to offer. The Doctrine of the Wheel did not encourage individualism. All men were equal and all were compelled to travel the same long way which ended in Nirvana ; although by acquiring merit some of the many stages might be passed through rapidly or omitted altogether. Yet Buddhism was eminently humanitarian, and rapidly gained a large following. It had another characteristic which meant

1. Aitareya Brah. 1 : 24, 3 : 30. 2. Monier Williams 'Hinduism' p. 47. [ 1 ] much for India. Being more a philosophy of life than a religion, it encouraged learning, and under its influence monasteries were established in many places. These became centres of great intellectual activity and far-reaching influence.1 Buddhism also stirred the Brahmans to vigor­ ous action. They realized perfectly that if the new faith prevailed, their own hold on the people would be lost, and, in contesting the claims of Buddhism a wholesome intellectual activity was awakened. This activity found literary expres­ sion in the later Upanishads and in the texts and commentaries of the philosophical schools. Chief­ ly through the vigorous propaganda of Sankara- charya and his disciples, Buddhism was finally driven from India.2 But the struggle w7ith Bud­ dhism affected Brahmanism in many ways. It became much more speculative and philosophical, and lost a certain amount of its former arrogance. It did not revive in its purity. "The term Brah­ manism3 is more properly restricted to the purely pantheistic and not necessarily idolatrous system evolved by the Brahmans out of the half-mono­ theistic, half-pantheistic religion of the Veda."

1. Cf. the ruins of Sarnath near Benares, which the writer once visited. When Buddhism wasflourishing this monastery must have been very extensive. It stood in the Deer Park, where Buddha began to preach. 2. Julius Eggeling, article 'Brahmanism' Ency Britt. 3. Monier Williams 'Hinduism,' p. 83. [ 8 ] There can be little doubt that the later Upani- shads are the literary monuments of this great struggle between Brahmanism and Buddhism, although most of the early Upanishads were produced as a first fruits of the re-action against priestly Brahmanism which also produced Bud­ dhism. Some students of Buddhism go so far as to state that the theories of the Vedanta must have reached their full development before Buddha began to preach.1 Max Mliller in­ clines to the belief that Buddhism would not have existed had it not been for the Upanishads2. It is an interesting question, not as yet exhaus­ tively treated, how far Sakya Muni was influenc­ ed by the doctrine of the Upanishads. It seems certain, however, that the later Upanishads and the philosophical systems, with their many texts, represent the triumph of Brahmanism over a foe which at one time threatened to exterminate it.3 It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine the Upanishads in any detailed manner. It is our desire simply to trace the history of speculative thought in India to the point when the philosophical schools emerge. But some-

1. Kern 'Manual of Indian Buddhism' p. 11. (Grundriss der Indo Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde). 2. 'Six Systems' p. 24. 3. Cf the manner in which the Doctrine of the Wheel is treated in the Svetasvatara Upanishad, 1 : 4, 1 r 6. [ 9 3 thing must be said regarding these remarkable productions which form the store-house whence the philosophers of ancient India drew the mate­ rials with which they constructed their various systems.1 The Upanishads are speculative treaties attach­ ed to the Brahmanas. There is a considerable difference of opinion among scholars regarding the meaning of the term "Upanishad." The most generally accepted derivation connects the word with the root ilsad" to sit, yet Indian authorities explain ifcby rahasyam, which means "secret." The probable explanation is that of Deussen2 who understands it to mean, secret instruction impart­ ed at a sitting. The suggestion that the word is derived from Upa+As {upasana), meaning worship, or drawing near, cannot be accepted as it rests on rather fanciful grounds, and is not regarded favourably by Indian Pandits. The numjber3 of Upanishads is very consider-

1. All the philosophical systems are related to the Upanishads, the Vedanta most nearly of all. "Whatever we may think of these Upanishads, it ctfnnot be doubted that they represent the soil which contained the seeds of philosophy which sprang up and had their full growth in the great systems of philosophy of a later age/* Max Muller "Six Systems, p. 140." 2. Deussen 'Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 13. 3. Deussen 'Philosophy of the Upanishads, p. 36. Max Muller' Introduction to his Translation of the Upanishads SJB.E. Vol. 1. p.68 Max Muller, article in "Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft" 19 : 137. 2 •[• 10 ] able. Weber reckoned 235, Max Muller 149, Burnell 154, Haug 170. There are two famous collections known to Indian Scholars, the collec­ tion of Narayana containing 45, and the Muktila collection containing 108. There is also a collec­ tion known as the Oupnek'hat which possesses considerable interest in that it was the source of Schopenhauer's knowledge of Indian thought. This collection, which contains .50 Upanisads, was translated into Persian by Prince Dara, son of Shah Jehan, and late from Persian into Latin by Anquetil Duperron. Many of these Upanishads are unimportant. Only thirteen1 can be regarded as of high value. These are attached to the various Vedas as follows. The Rig Veda has two, the Black Yajur Veda four, the White Yajur Veda two, the Atharva Veda three, the Sama Veda two. The Atharva Veda has the largest number of attached Upanishads and the fact is suggestive, for this Veda is the most recent. Max Muller has pointed out that in later times when a new

1. The following are the important Upanishads. Eig-Veda. I. Aitareya. White Yajur-Veda. 1. Brihadaranyaka. 2. Kaushitaki. 2. Jed. Sama-Veda, 1. Khandogya. Atbarya-Veda. l. Mundaka. 2. Kena. 2. Prasna. 3. Mandukya. Black Yajur-Veda, 1. Taittiriya. 3. Svetasvatara. 2. Kathaka. 4. Maitrayaniya. [ I'l' ] sect arose, and desired to support its tenets by an! appeal to Sruti, an Upanishad was often written and attached to one of the Vedas.1 The Atharva Veda being the most recent and, if anything, a little loss- sacred than the other Vedas may be presumed to have the' largest number of these vagrant writings. This is probably the true explanation of the number of Atharva Veda Upanishads. It is quite impossible to assign dates to any of the Upanishads. One can only determine their age roughly with relation to one another. The older prose Upanishads- certainly antidate Bud­ dhism, while the most important Verse Upani­ shads may be contemporary with it, and the Atharva Veda Upanishads later. Various at­ tempts have been made to classify them but the attempt tofrx their dates is rightly characterized as almost hopeless.2 So far as Philosophy is- concerned the Upani­ shads are the most important productions of the Indian mind. They represent the search after ultimate truth and enshrine the results of the most profound meditation upon the problems of life. One may not be prepared to go so far as

1. Max Muller 'Ancient Sanskrit Lit/ p. 317. Deussen. 'PhiL of the Upanishads' p. 33. 2. Max Muller. Introduction-to Vol. 1 of his translation of the the Upanishads (S. B. E.) p. 69i [ 12 ] Schopenhauer1 in their praise, but no one who has studied them carefully can have failed to re­ cognize in them the sincere reaching forth of the human mind after the eternal realities. The chief philosophical doctrines of the Upa­ nishads are three, and we mention them briefly here because of their great importance in some of the systems, especially the Vedanta. 1. BRAHMAN.—By this term is signified the eternal, immutable, all-embracing power, not to be described in personal terms, lying behind, all seeming phenomena. Perhaps the best defini­ tion is that found in the Brihad Aranyaka Upa- nishad,2 but all the Upanishads contain attempts to describe in human speeoh that which really transcends human thought. "It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid(lik e water) \ it is without shadow,, without darkness, without air, without ether, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, with­ out mind, without light (vigour), without breath, without a mouth (ort door), without measure, having no within and no without, it devours nothing and no one devours it." (Max Muller's Translation.)

1. Schopenhauer's 'Parerga.' 3rd Ed. Vol. II. p. 426. (Quoted Max Muller). 2. Brihad Arany. Up. 3:8, 8, Cf. Svetasvatara Up. 6 : 11,12,13. Maitrayaniya Br. Up. 6 : 17. [ 13 ]

2. ATMAN.—This is the term used for the universal soul when expressing itself in man. The common statement that Brahman and Atman are synonymous terms is incorrect.1 The Atman is the Ego, the self. It is true that the Atman ultimately returns to the Brahman, but for a time it is limited by the restrictions of man's bodily constitution. The great goal of Hindu philosophy is the union of Atman and Brahman, the return of the soul of man to the eternal soul whence it had its origin. This union constitutes salvation. In order, however, that the idea of union may be intelligible at all, one must postulate the inde­ pendence for a time of Brahman and Atman. This view seems to be justified by such a passage as Svetasvatara Upanishad 1, 7, 8, 9.2

1. Macdonell 'Sanskrit Lit.' p. 219. 2. "But what is praised (in the Upanishads) is the Highest Brahman, and in it there is the triad. The Highest Brahman is the safe support, it is imperishable. The Brahma students, when they have known what is within this (world) are devoted and merged in the Brahman, free from birth. The Lord (Isa) supports all this together, the perishable and im­ perishable, the developed and the undeveloped. The (living) self, not being a lord, is bound, because he has to enjoy (the fruits of works) but when he has known the god (deya), he is freed from all fetters. There are two, one knowing (iswara), the other not-knowing (giva), both unborn, one strong, the other weak ; there is she, the unborn, though whom each man receives the recompense of his works ; and there is the infinite seZf (appearing) under all forms, but himself inactive. When a man finds out these three that is Brahma." M. M. [ u j

2. MAYA.—The doctrine of Maya is ao attempt to explain the phenomena of the natural world in accord with the above conceptions. The formula "tat tjim asi," if true at all, must be- all comprehensive. How then are we to account for the existence of the objective world ? The objective world declare the Upanishads exists only in the mind of the subject observing it. It is Maya, illusion. Nothing is real but Brahman "Know then, Prakriti (nature) is Maya, and the great lord the Mayin ; the whole world is filled with what are his members."1 Things do not exist. Brahman alone exists. Maya is that which prevents man from beholding the eternal and absolute unity of all that is. When Maya slips' away from the soul then is salvation obtained,. and the way to this salvation is knowledge. "By continuous contemplation the aspirant refunds each entity into the entity from which it emanat­ ed, till he passes, beyond illusion, to the fontal unity of undifferenced spiritual existence.2 Deus­ sen dwells on the similarity of this doctrine to the idealism of Plato and Parmenides and, in modern times, of Kant and Schopenhauer. These treatises which represent the brooding of Indian thinkers on the problem of life, afford

1. Svetasvatara Up. 440. 2. Gough, article, ''Vedanta," Ency, Britt. 3. Deussen, Phil, of Up p, 41, r is ] the texts of some of the most important Philoso­ phical Schools, while they are respected by all. In his work, the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha, Ma- dhava Acharya enumerates sixteen philosophical systems current in India in the Fourteenth centu- ary A. D. Of these systems we only propose to examine the two which are best known and most widely accepted, The Sankhya and Vedanta. These two systems are in many respects -opposed to each other. The Sankhya is dualistic and atheistic, al- though the Yoga System of Patanjali which is closely associated with it admits the existence of a Divine Power, and for this reason is some­ times called the Theistic Sankhya. The Vedanta, the most widely accepted of all the systems, is strictly monistic. Its chief text is, "There is one god without a second." It treats of the Jnanamarga or way of knowledge by which a man may attain freedom from re­ birth and its attendant evils. The knowledge necessary to this freedom is the identity of the individual Atman with the eternal and im­ personal Brahman. Each system has its Sutras which are regard­ ed as containing the essence of its particular doctrines. These Sutras represent language in the utmost degree of compression compatible with intelligibility. Sometimes the process of com- [ 16 ] pression is carried so far that the Sutra cannot be understood except with the aid of a comment­ ary, and then the question of the ability of the commentator arises. Speaking generally the com­ mentaries are reliable. In the case of the Vedan­ ta especially, we have every reason to trust the interpretation of Sankara.1 One fact pointed out by MaxMUller ought to be borne in mind, namely, that the Sutras cannot possibly claim to represent the very first attempts at a systematic treatment : they are rather " the summing up of what had been growing up during many generations of isolated thinkers."2 In addition to the Sutras there are many works expounding the tenets of the various philo­ sophical schools. Some of these, as the Tattwa Samasa, in the case of the Sankhya, may have preceded the Sutras by a considerable period. The most important treatises on the Sankhya and Vedanta systems will be noted later. 1. Thibaut Introd. to Translation of Vedanta Sutras, p. 13. (S. B. E.) 2. Max Muller "Six Systems" p. 75.

4* Section IT. The Sankhya Philosophy.

This philosophical system is certainly the* fullest expression of Indian Rationalism. It ignores the idea of God completely. "The exis­ tence of God is not proved" it says, and, this being the case, the Sankhya philosophy gives no further thought to the idea of a divine origi­ nator, but sets itself the task of explaining the universe and man on some other hypothesis. A more thorough-going atheism than that of the Sankhya is difficult to imagine. Yet its very thoroughness compels one's respect. Max Muller lias expressed his appreciation of the frankness of Eastern philosophers, in words worth re-calling, and he had the Sankhya especially in mind when he wrote, "There are even living philosophers whose words often leave us in doubt as to what they mean, whether they are materialists or idea­ lists, monists or dualists, theists or atheists. Hin­ du philosophers seldom leave us in doubt on such important points, and they never shrink from the consequences of their theories." * This perfect willingness to follow a line of thought to the very end, regardless of where it leads is refreshing indeed to the scholar who often 1, Max Muller, "Six Systems," Iotrod. p. IX. 3 [ 18 ] becomes very weary of the quibbling and trepidity of many modern philosophers. We may not accept the conclusions of the Sankhya but, at least, we must admit its logical development from certain premises. The difficulty concerns the ac­ ceptance of those premises. The Sankhya system is of interest for various reasons. It bears a close relation to the work of other Indian thinkers both of early and more modern times. It was known to Buddha and the early teachers of Buddhism, although the exact measure of indebtedness of that system to the Sankhya can never be fully determined. The Sankhya doctrine of prakriti and purusha is the origin of the Tantric worship of to-day, which is so wide-spread in India, sometimes in a very de­ graded form. Manu also in his cosmogony clear­ ly had the Sankhya in mind. For modern philosophers the system is of particular interest, as it is one of the first ex­ pressions of the idea of evolution. It starts with two principles and from these evolves the universe. It is from this fact that it has derived its name, for Sankhya means number, reckoning. It is the systematic enumeration of the steps in the process which resulted in the production of man and the world. As in the case of the other philosophcal sys­ tems it is impossible to state when this system [ 19 ] was first promulgated, or even to state its relation chronologically to the other systems, with any definiteness. Dr. Weber regards it as tht oldest of all the systems, and his view is generally ac­ cepted. It probably originated earlier than Buddhism, though its earliest form was somewhat different from that met with in the Sutras. It may best he regarded as one expression of that intellectual activity which during several cen­ turies, found expression in the Upanishads and Buddhism. The original promulgator of the Sankhya was the sage Kapila. We know nothing about him historically, though traditions are abundant. In the Harivamsa1 he is said to be one of the sons of Vitatha. Some have supposed that he is referred to in the Svetasvatara Upanishad2 but Max Mtiller3 argues strongly against this inter­ pretation, which would make that work very sectarian. Kapila is also mentioned in the Vishnu Purana4 as an incarnation of Vishnu, "for the welfare of all creatures and to confer on them the highest knowledge." In the Mahabharata5 also his name occurs in a list of Brahmans, the mind-born progeny of Brahma. Tradition states 1. Harivansa, 32 : 1732. 2. Svetasvatara Up., 5 :2. cf. Muir's Old Skt. Texts, 3 :185. 3. Vol. XV. Sacred Books of the East, Introd. 4. Wilson's Transl. p. 270. cf. Muir's Old Skt. Texts, Pt. 3: p. 21. 5, XII : 13078-9. [ 20 ] that he was born at Pushkara1 near Ajmere and lived at Ganga Sagar and at Indraprastha. A story regarding him, which is a fine illustra­ tion of the luxuriance of the oriental imagination is found in the Ramayana. This is probably an attempt to explain the name Kapila which means fire2. Other instances of such fanciful etymology will oecur to any one familiar with Indian literature. The Sankhya philosophy is expounded in the following texts and commentaries. This list is not complete but contains the works mentioned by Dr. Fitzedward Hall, in his Bibliography,3 arranged systematically. I. Sankhya Sutras, on which there are the following commentaries. (a) Aniruddha's Commentary. {b) Sankhya-Vritti-Sara of Mahadeva. (c) Sankhya-Pravachana-Bhashya of Vijnana Bhikshu. (d) Laghu-Sankhya-Sutra-Vritti of Nagogi Bhatta. (e) Sankhya-Taranga of Visweswaradatta Misra.

1. Cf. Davies "Hindu Phil." p. 6. Hall's Introd. to the Sankhya Sar, p. 20. 2. Hall, lntrod. to Sankhya Sar, p. 18. 3. "A Contribution towards an Index of the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems" published at Calcutta, 1859. [ 21 ] TL Tattwa Samasa, with the undermentioned treatises. (a) Sarvopakarini. (b) Sankhya-Sutra-Vivarana. .(c) ^Sankhya-Krama-Dipika. (d) Tattwa-yatharthya-Dipana of Bhava Ga- nesha Dikshita. (e) Tattwa-Samasa-Vyakhya of Kshemananda. III. Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna, and its commentaries &c, (a) Sankhya-Karika-Bhashya of Gaudapada. (b) Sankhya-Tattwa-Kaumudi of Vachaspati Misra. Connected with this are the follow­ ing works, 1. Tattwa-Kaumudi-Vyakhya of Bharati Yati. -2. Tattwarnava or Tattwamrita-Prokasini of Raghavananda Saraswati. 3. Tattwa-Chandra of Narayana Tirtha Yati. 4. Kaumudi-Prabha of Swapneswara. 5. Sankhya-Tattwa-Vilasa of Kaghunatha Tarkavagisa Bhattacharji. (c) Sankhya-Chandrika of Narayana Tirtha. (d) Sankhya-Sara-Viveka of Vijnana Bhikshu. IV. Sankhya-Tattwa-pradipa of Kaviraj Yati. V. Sankhyartha-Tattwa-Pradipika ofBhatta- Kesava. Dr. Hall also mentions several other works of which he had heard, but copies of which he [ 22 ] had not seen, such as Sankhya-Tattwa-Vibha- kara, Sankhya Kaumudi, and Raja-Vartika. Of the above works four are of chief impor­ tance. 1. Tattwa-Samasa1—This work is simply a compendium of the doctrines of the Sankhya, in aphorisms. It is probably the earliest statement of the system. Colebrooke knew of it, but had never seen it and doubted whether it had survi­ ved the centuries. In 1850 Dr. Ballantyne of Benares found a copy of it and published it with a translation. 2. Sankhya-Karika of Iswara Krishna. This is a popular exposition of the system in verse, containing seventy-two distichs, and has given Hse to many commentaries (vide sup). 3. Sankhya-Sutras, an outline exposition of the system, in aphorisms. It is commonly assign­ ed to Kapila but his authorship has rightly been questioned. 4. Kapila- S ankhy a-Pravachana - S astr a- Bh a- shya of Vijnana Bhikshu. This is one of the best known commentaries on the Sankhya, Its author also composed the popular Sankhya-Sara or Es­ sence of the Sankhya. A brief exposition of the system is given by

1. It was published in 1850 at the Orphan School Press, Mirza- pore, under the title "A lecture on the Sankhya Philosophy embracing the text of the Tattwa Samasa/7 [ 23 ]

Madhava Acharya in the Sarva-Darsana-Sangraha^ This is based on the Sankhya-Karika of Iswara Krishna, and contains no reference to the Sutras. Madhava's work was written in the fourteenth century A. D. and from this fact it has been arg­ ued that the Sutras could not have been in exis­ tence then. Such an argument from silence is hardly safe. It will be noted that in enumerating the chief works dealing with the Sankhya, I have mentioned the Tattwa-Samasafirst, followed by the Sankhya- Karika and the Sankhya-Sutras. This, I believe to be the historical order. For years the Tattwa- Samasa was regarded as unimportant by Oriental scholars. Colebrooke1, from what he had heard was inclined to attach some value to it, but Dr. Hall described it as "of slight importance, a mere in­ dex of the topics of the Sankhya." It was left to Max Mliller2 to point out that the Tattwa Samasa is probably the earliest work we have on the San­ khya. He regards it as less atheistic than the Karika or Sutras, and thinks that it formed the source of both the Sankhya-Sutras, and the Yoga- Sutras, which embody what is sometimes termed the Theistical Sankhya. The development of the system seems to have been from some early statement of the doctrine^ I. Colebrooke, Essays. 1 : 244. 2, Max Muller, "Six Systems." p. 224. [ 24 J Bow lost, of which the Tattwa Samasa is an' epf- tome, to the Karika and finallyt o the Sutras. It is proposed in the present thesis tocare4- fully examine the Tattwa-Samasa, referring to the Karika, the Sankhya Sutras and the Commentaries when these afford any help. The Tattwa-Samasa is extremely eompressed, and before actually entering upon an examination of its categories, it will be well to explain the purpose of the Sankhya as defined by Iswara Krish­ na and the Commentators. They declare that the object of this philosophy is the removal of the three kinds of pain. These are :— (1) Pain which has its origin in oneself

(2) Pain due to the creatures of the world in which one lives (^nfwifcra?) I (3) Pain due to the untoward influence of beings^ of a supernatural order, and to planets &c..

By the removal of the pain is meant not merely the temporary cessation of it, but the absolute and complete eradication of its causes, so that it may never again trouble the soul. Such a task as this is not to be accomplished by the ordinary means whereby pain is removed2' 1. Aniruddhas Comm. I. ~ 2. Davies Transl. of Sankhya Karika, II. "^farCta: ^VJ% *9w*nirarfTOraT«i ti [ 25 J

UA contrary method is better, and this consists in a discriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing (Soul)." This knowledge will secure Freedom (*fr^f) I By the "Manifested" is meant the forms of matter with which man is familiar. The Sankhya makes no attempt to explain away the existence of matter. In this it is directly opposed to the Vedanta. The existence of matter is recognized1 and the Sankhya in concerned with the manner of its production. The "Unmanifested" is Prakriti or Nature, which is the producer of all that exists. Nature is itself unproduced. The "Knowing Soul" is the third object of knowledge. Regarding the nature of the soul the Sankhya has much to say. "The soul is neither producing nor produced2. It has no part in creation though allied with created things3. It is in a state of constant freedom4. "The self (or soul) is neither bound, nor is it being liberated ; but it is eternally free. But the destruction of the non-cognition of this freedom is brought about by meditation &cV? Of this more later. The Tattwa-Samasa begins with a tabulated statement of the twenty-five Principles with which

1. Sankhya Sutras, 1 : 42,43. 3. Sankhya Sutras, II.: 8. 2. Sankhya Karika, 3. 4. Do. Do. I : 162. 5. Aniruddhars Commentary, I : 160, Transl. Garbe. 4 [ 26 ] it is concerned, and then proceeds to a succinct definition of each of them. I. The eight forms under which Prakriti be­ comes a producer are 1. The unapparent, imperceptible Power of which it is impossible to form any clear idea C?TcEr*fi) It is thus described ^TlT^T^",S^^ti^

lantyne translates. " The inaudible, intangible, and likewise eternal, devoid of savour and odour without beginning or middle, anterior in order to mind, firm and chief—thus do the learned designate it. Subtle, devoid of characteristic attributes, un­ conscious, without beginning or end—so too whose nature it is to produce, without parts, one only, the common (source of all) such is the Undiscrete." It is declared to be appropriately designated by the following terms. •ildfcfc—The unmanifested, unevolved. JPfIT—Original or primordial matter. g^T—The absolute. "cnc;—The complete. y •%—The immutable. mCTTSi—Unevolved matter. ^T^;—The imperishable. This term is applied to the Syllable "Om." [ 27 ] ^of— The existent, lit, a "field.'* ^i^[—The imperceptible, lit, "darkness." Tr^rf^f^—The producer. 2.* Intellect, 1J% By Intellect is meant the power which enables one to form a distinct idea of an object, so that he may be able to differentiate it from all other objects. Intellect is declared to have eight expressions. 1. ^—Duty, established order. 2. ^T^—Knowledge. 3. srcPST—Indifference to worldly objects due to a recognition of its own superiority, 4. Tj^W*—Supreme control. 5. ^n**T—Opposite of 1. 6. ^T^T«T—Opposite of 2. 7. mmi^—Opposite of 3. 8. ^nf^r—Opposite of 4. The firstfou r forms an associated with a pre­ dominance of the guna, 'goodness' the latter four with the guna 'darkness'. Of intellect the follow­ ing terms may also be used, ^T^—Mind. ?f%—Perception. i^lrf—The great one. ^rj—The eternal. ^rtfa—Apprehension. $r^j—Discrimination. *r f^T—Knowledge derived through hearing. ^•—Firmness. [ 28 ]

TT^TT ^ffa—Undisturbed knowledge. j$ %—Knowledge derived through tradition or memory. ^—Conception, through meditation. 3. Self-Consciousness—^3iTT- This means the perception of the Ego, as distinct from others, The "Karika"1 says. "^fWT*ft^ K

3jfa—Organ of hearing. ^3f—Organ of touch. •tp^"—Organ of sight. fsr^T—Organ of speech. WTii—Organ of smell. II. Organs of Action, <*W fa& I TT^f—Voice. "?^T—Hands. m^—Feet. tnf—The end of the digestive tube. ^^T—Sexual organs. III. The Mind, JTTO I The five gross elements, are the elements of nature, which are regarded as the material ex­ pressions of the cT«*na' i Efafa—Earth. SEPT—Water. ^W—Light. ^T§—Air. WPRTSI—Ether, 'the subtle and ethereal fluid supposed to fill and pervade the Universe and to be the peculiar vehicle of life and sound' (Wilson). The last of the twenty-five principles is Soul: [ 31 ] which is next treated. Soul1 (U^) is defined as etern­ al, unqualified, non-productive. It views the pro­ cesses of nature but is not itself an agent in them. The term soul, however, is generic, for there are many souls. In this view the Sankhya is directly opposed to the Vedanta and the commentators dwell on this fact at some length. The arguments for the existence of soul, in the generic sense, and for the multiplicity of souls are succinctly stated in the "Karika," 17, 18.

Translated by Davies2, "Because an assem­ blage (of things) is for the sake of another ; because. the opposite of the three modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist; because there must be a superintending power ; because there must be a nature that enjoys ; and because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation (from material contact); therefore souls exist." "From the separate allotment of birth, death, and the organs ; from the diversity of occupations at the same time, and also from the different condi- 1. Note the peculiar etymology of the word g^ in Aph. 35.

2, ID loc. [ 32 ] tions (or modifications) of the three modes, it fc proved that there is a plurality of souls." The soul is in essence distinct from prakriti, but through illusion is associated with it. The object of the Sankhya philosophy is to effect the liberation of the soul from this undersirable union. Before passing on to state the way in which the Principles act, the writer of the Tattwa Samasa, deals with the three gunas or qualities inherent in nature. Nature (Prakriti) could not exist apart from' these qualities. It is really the result of a union of them. In all material objects the three are found in varying proportions, The difference in objects is the result of variety in combina­ tion. Nature works by means of these gunas. "It does so by mixture; as the confluence of three streams forms one river : for example the Ganges \ or as threads interwoven constitute a piece of cloth ; and as a picture is a result of the union of pigments. It operates, "by modification," too : as water drop­ ped from a cloud, absorbed by the roots of plants, and carried into the fruit, acquires special flavour so are different objects diversified by the influence of the several qualities respectively1." It will be thus seen that the gunas are not mere attributes but are integral parts of nature, without which nature could not exist, any more than the cloth

1. Colebrooke 'On Phil, of the Hindus,' p. 161. [ 33 ] apart from the threads which form it. The three Gunas are *w—The quality of "Goodness." TW—The quality of "Passion." *iw—The quality of "Darkness." The method of operation followed by the Principles is next stated and it is a definite evolu­ tionary process. Nature, or primordial matter, is the source of Intellect, this, in turn, of Self- Consciousness, and from this have come, in various ways—the Gods, the Senses, the Rudimentary Principles (cr**rra"). These last have given rise to the Grosser Elements1. The elaboration of this process naturally sug­ gests the next topic which is re-absorption, the inverse of evolution. Beginning with the lowest forms or principles there is a regular refunding of each to that higher source whence it originated. The Grosser Elements are re-absorbed by the Rudi­ mentary Principles, these by Self-Consciousness and so on until finally Nature has gathered again to her­ self all to which she gave birth. Nature, however remains. For her there is no re-absorption. During all this process the Soul has stood apart. She has been the silent, disinterested spec­ tator of the great processes of Nature. It is her

1, Aph. 54. [ 34 ] misfortune to be associated with nature and to be regarded as taking some part in her actions. This however, in reality, she does not do. Thus Sankhya Sutra, II. : 8.

The commentator on this Sutra declares, "Even though there be conjunctions with nature, there be­ longs to Soul no creativeness, 'immediately', i. e. directly. An illustration of this is 'like the burn­ ing action of iron/ as iron does not possess, directly, a burning power, but this is only fictitiously attri­ buted to it, being through the fire conjoined with it; such is the meaning." The direct agents in the process of develop­ ment are next enumerated. They are termed, wt^cT which has been aptly translated by Ballantyne, "ministers of the Soul." This translation is good because it keeps prominent the idea that Nature is not working on her own behalf, but for the Soul. Each of these 'ministers of the Soul, is under the control of some superna­ tural power. 1. Intellect under Brahma. 2. Self-consciousness under Kudra. 3. Mind under the Moon. 4. Hearing under the Ether. 5. Touch under the Air. 6. Sight under the Sun. 7. Taste under Varuna. [ 35 ]

8. Smell under the Earth. 9. Voice under Saraswati or Fire. 10. Hands under Indra. II. Feet under Vishnu. 12. Organ of excretion under Mitra. 13. Sexual Organs under Prajapati. This list is interesting because of the attempt which is evidently made in it to connect the Sankhya, at least to some extent, with Sruti. The Powers mentioned as ruling over the various agents of Nature are most of them Vedic gods. Section 571 contains one of those great pro­ mises to the learned which abound in Indian litera­ ture and which were held out as inducements to study. The person acquainted with the principles and processes dealt with in the preceding sections, is declared to be in a position to enjoy the present life and at its conclusion to secure liberation for his Soul. To the weary student chancing suddenly upon them, these promises must have been like oases in the desert. The next few sections contain a full enumera­ tion of the various functions and powers of an intelligent being, and attempt to account for cer­ tain actions connected with man's physical exis­ tence. These sections do not contain anything of great importance but are analyzed for the sake of completeness. 1. CI Aph.'37. [ 3G ]

In Section 58 the five functions of the in­ tellect (f fl) are set forth. They are— ^re^FF—determination, which is described as the act of mind whereby one discovers that a cer­ tain action ought to be done. wfwnf—conceit, knowledge of one's own in­ dividuality, and recognition that one exists apart from everything else. The perception of the dis­ tinction between Ego and Non-ego. s^T—decision, the definite assertion of purpose to follow what one has ascertained to be the truth. ^vfrsrcn—the suiting of each sense to its object. f^T—the actual operation of the senses. This operation is regarded as intelligent. Section 59 contains a definition of the five possible conditions of the subject acting, namely— ¥fcr—adherence to purpose when once formed. 3*!T—faith or that condition which one attains through asceticism, the study of the sacred writings, sacrifice &c. Here again the Sankhya shows its desire to keep in touch with the orthodox faith, by recognizing the value of the old religious exercises. This is evident also in the next men­ tioned condition. 3prr—the state of the one seeking happiness through the performance of religious duties. wf^M^ri—a state of indifference to all higher pursuits, and acceptance of sensual pleasure as the end of life. [ 3- ] fafafOT—a state the opposite of the last men­ tioned, to be defined as the desire for true know­ ledge above all other objects. The nature of true knowledge is described in keeping with the Sankhya theory. An interesting section follows wrhich contains a view of the constitution of man, very suggestive of the theories current among the School-men of Europe. The natural functions are declared to be due to the presence in the body of five airs. These are the following— TOT—breath which is associated with the mouth and nose, the external organs of breathing. ^HTTT—the vital air which goes downwards. It is associated with the navel. Ballantyne thinks it refers to flatulence. ^TTPT—the vital air essential to the digestive process. It is associated with the heart. ^1T—the vital air which "rises through the throat and passes into, the head" (Wilson). Bal­ lantyne connects it with arterial pulsation in the upper members of the body. ^i«f—the vital air diffused throughout the system, probably associated with nervous action. These 'airs* working conjointly keep the bodily frame in its natural condition. Section 61. enumerates the five ^OTTWIT or founts of action. 1. WlfT3\—The modifying power, f 38 I

2, ssNra—The passionate power. 3. ^Tf^—The source of the elements. 4. srnjfifT—The power associated with infer­ ence. 5. fTcgrnT—The power unassociated with in­ ference 1:3:4 are connected with good ; 2: 5. are connected with evil. Section 62, Treats of the question of Ignor­ ance, and shows a keen power of discrimination*. Ignorance wf%3n is of five kinds. crere—Darkness, the quality in Nature which perverts and obscures the Intellect. Under the influence of this power, a man believes that libera­ tion does not consist in the discrimination of the Principles, but in absorption, as the Vedanta teaches. JTtf—Bewilderment, distraction. irfuftw—An intensified form of the second. ciTf?l¥—Anger, wrath, which blinds- the one under its influence, causing him to think that libe­ ration is possible by some physical act or by ^^w, superhuman power. ^Rfcnffl^r—The condition of one overtaken by death, while still holding that liberation may be effected by crrfirer. It might be rendered in English by 'utter dismay.' 'The horror of great darkness/ The state of mind in which one would be who had held a certain view throughout life and trusted to [ 39 ] it, but who at the moment of death, when be could no longer change, suddenly realized that he had made a mistake. Ballantyne translates it 'utter darkness.' The next Sections, 63-67 describe the various attitudes which ought to be taken by the one desir­ ing to be liberated, and also enumerate the wrong attitudes possible. True to the usual habit of Eastern thought the negative precede the positive. Twenty-eight kinds of disability are enumerat­ ed, eleven being the imperfection of the physical organs, and seventeen the possible wrong attitudes of the Intellect. These latter are declared to be the opposites of the nine kinds of tjfa, indifference, and the eight kinds of fell, indisputable know­ ledge. The kinds of c[fe enumerated are W (lit. water)—The condition of the man who has come to the conclusion that nature and soul are identical. ^t^ra" (water)-—The state of one who has come to believe in the identity of intellect and soul. wfa (lit. stream)—The state of one to whom self-consciousness and soul are identical. 3fe (lit. rain)—The state in which one identifies the crore (rudimentary principles) with soul. These four kinds of indifference are termed in. ternal, the followingfive kinds are external. fprnc— This state results when a man has per- r 10 ] ceived the folly of attachment to mundane thing: but has not yet understood the discriminative pro­ cess inculcated by the Sankhya. 3JTO—This is the state of one who has become indifferent to property of any kind, but has not yet understood the saving Principles. 3F^—The condition of the man who has be­ come indifferent or disinterested, through perceiving. the passing nature of all things, yet who has not a saving knowledge of the Principles. 3jWtv%3iT—The state of one indifferent through the observation of the temporary, and deluding nature of sensual pleasure, yet who has not per­ ceived the Principles. wfa^T—The state of one who has reached a condition of indifference through the observation of the ills which attend those possessing property, but who has not a correct knowledge of the Principles. Section 67, states the eight varieties of ftitw. Jhe word fafl literally means 'hitting a mark.' Ballantyne translates it 'perfectness.' In the Peters­ burg Lexicon it is defined as "Vollkommenheit des Person und Machterlangung des Geistes uber die Nature." These are realized according as the individual arrives- at his knowledge of the Prin­ ciples by one of the following eight ways. 1. By Reason, the resultant f^iti being known as cor; 2. By Hearing, resulting in icrrc; 3. By Study resulting in m^nft; 4-5-6. By removal of the three [ 41 ] varieties of pain, internal, external, and that due to supernatural beings, resulting in spfffe, swtf^, y*iW*u«i; 7. By Association with suitable persons, 8. By impartation, on the part of a teacher who has been treated with respect. Section 68 contains a summary of the essen­ tial facts in the Sankhya system. They are 1. The existence of Soul and Nature. 2. The independence of Nature, from Soul. 3. The reality of Nature's works. 4. The power of Soul over nature. 5. The independence of Soul from Nature. 6. The indifference and inactivity of Soul. 7. The temporary union of Soul and Nature. 8. The distinction of Soul from the body in which it resides. 9. "The peculiar habit of the body its dura­ bility" (Ballantyne). Max Miiller has rightly drawn attention to the fact that No. 3 (wt^M) equally belongs to Soul and Nature, but is. connected here especially with Nature because of the desire of the writer, to,

make the distinction between the Sankhya • ant& Vedanta as great as possible. This is one «fif the views which differentiates the former from: the latter system. The Sankhya declares that the pro-: cesses and products of Nature are real, the-Vedanta that they are illusory. The Sutras are also insists ent on this difference. (1: 42 -t 1: 78. II: 6). 6 [ 42 ] These essential facts are next supported by various arguments, upon which we need not dwell, except in the case of No, 9., which, is not very clear­ ly expressed in Section 68. By the durability of the human frame is meant the continued existence until death of the body of the man who has perceived the Principles and as such is entitled to liberation. This is compared to the whirling of the potter's wheel, after the impulse which set it in motion has ceased acting, and the wheel continues to revolve through its own impetus. In Section 71, 72, we find a statement of the reason why the universe was created and also of the various orders of creation. The universe was created by Brahma in order that the senses might have a field of action. It is the product of the cT^n^. Because of the kindly disposition of Brahma which prompted this act, the creation is, termed t^M^ii (Benevolent). The orders of creation, are arranged in three divisions; superhuman ; non human ; human. They are—• I. Superhuman. 1. mrre:—demons. i 2. TT5TO—Monstrous, superhuman creatures, maliciously disposed to man. 3. *rr^:—A class of demons. In the Puranas the Yakshas are spoken of as the guardians of the treasures of Kuvera, god of wealth. [ 43 ]

4. JTT*R:—Musicians of the gods. They are very numerous and are said to inhabit the world of Indra. 5. ^t—Agents of Indra. 6. srwnra:—Agents of creation. II. Non-human. 1. trsj—Tame animals. 2. trfg—Birds. 3. ^JT—Wild animals. 4. ^ft^T—Reptiles. 5. ^TRT—Inanimate things. III. Human. «T^"—Man. The limits Of each class are defined as in the case of animals, from the cow to the mouse ; birds, from the bird of Vishnu to the gnat &c. Sections 73, 74, treat of Bondage (w) and Liberation. (tft'g). The nature of Bondage is dealt with fully in the Sutras (cf. 1:17, 18, 19 &c.) and Commentaries. It is due not to anything in Soul itself, but to the fact that Soul has been conjoined with Nature, or thinks itself so conjoined. Anirud- dha's comment on 1: 19 is "without non-discrimin a tion bondage never belongs to the self, but from non-discrimination springs the egotizing delusion (abhimana) that there is bondage and this (delu­ sion), forsooth, is to be removed by instruction in (our) doctrine.' The Tattwa-Samasa declares that Bondage is three fold. [ 44 ]

1. sufcW—Bondage of Prakriti. This is the condition of one who confuses Na­ ture and Soul, believing that Soul can be absorbed by Nature. 2. ^^nft^r^f—Bondage of things produced This is the state of one who has given way to his senses, and lost self-control, or who has been blind­ ed by passion. 3. ^t^TR^—Bondage of Gifts. This is the condition of one who thinks that he will gain free­ dom by giving presents to the Brahmans. The inclusion of this last as a kind of Bondage shows how radical the Sankhya philosophy is. It must have required considerable boldness to thus denounce one of the most prominent tenets of the current faith. The Brahmans were regarded in ancient India as divinities and as such were entitled to gifts form those of lower caste, in return for which they acted as family priests &c Without their aid no sacrifice was regarded as valid or at all effective. Hence arose the popular con­ ception that the Brahman is all powerful, and the idea that through his agency even continued exist­ ence might be avoided. This idea the Sankhya: denounces as Bondage. Such a conclusion in a system of philosophy which Brahmans themselves shielded is very remarkable. As Max Muller has i pointed out "That this feeing of a priest should have been considered one of the three bondages [ 45 ] shows at all events that the followers of Kapila were above superstition and looked upon sacrifice and priestcraft as hindrances rather than as helps to true freedom and Moksha of the spirit"1 As Bondage is threefold so also is Liberation (*fr^«). It is defined in respect of its three sources. 1. Due to an increase of knowledge. 2. Due to the subjection of the senses. 3. Due to the destruction of all that is not Soul. These three so far as Soul is concerned may be regarded as progressive steps in the process of Liberation. Bondage is due to the illusion,, under which the Soul labours, that it is inseparable from Nature. When the superior knowledge has been attained and the Soul perceives its "indifference" to all that is not Soul, then liberation is accomplished

"Liberation consists in the removal of (the soul's) hindrances," or as the concluding Sutra3 states.

"Be that the one way, or the other, the cutting short thereof [viz., of the relation between Nature and Soul.] is Soul's aim; the cutting short thereof is Soul's aim" (Ballantyne). 1. "Six Systems" p. 273. 2. Sankhya Sutra VI. 20. 3. „ „ VI. 70. [ 46 J

Two other matters are dealt with by the writer of the Tattwa Samasa, before he concludes his survey. They are (1) The Sankhya theory oi knowledge, (2) The nature of pain. In regard to the former see Sections 75-79, Knowledge is said to come through three channels. 1. "&Z—or Perception through the Senses. The importance of this source is rightly insisted upon in the Sankhya. In one Sutra it is even stated that the other two sources alone are not capable of conveying to the soul the knowledge which is libe­ ration.1 2. ^njfrrc—or Inference. This is the source of knowledge regarding things which are beyond the experience of our senses?, for example, the knowledge that there must be fire, when we see smoke, though the fireitsel f may be imperceptible to us. 3. WTCnr^T^"—Tradition, the testimony of good and wise men. Things accepted thus are such as could not have been known by either perception or inference. Some of these are enumerated, viz., the existence of Indra, the Northern Kurus; Mount Meru ; the Heavenly Nymphs. The recognition of the validity of such knowledge, means the readiness to accept the Veda, and this again is one cf. the reasons why the Sankhya was able to maintain its

1. Sankhya Sutras 1 ; 59. 2. do. 2 ; 60. [ 47 j position as an orthodox system. In the Sutras this fact is made much of.1 In Section 80 the writer turns to the problem which, after all, is the practical one in life, the problem of pain. Iswara Krishna opens his treatise with this subject, and the first Sutra in the Prava- chana is concerned with it, declaring its cessation to be thefinal goal of man's efforts (Tj^srrsr). I have already adverted to this subject and need not do so again. The classification of the sources of Pain is the same in the Tattwa Samasa as in the Karika. We are now in a position to form some idea of the Sankhya system as a whole and to consider its philosophical affinities. It has been shown that the Sankhya Philoso­ phy is a dualistic system, accounting for the exist­ ence of the universe on the hypothesis of two eter­ nally existing elements, Prakriti or Nature and Purush or Soul. No attempt is made to relate the two essentially to one another. Prakriti is conceived as consisting of three qualities (gunas) in equilibrium. These are Good­ ness, Passion, Darkness. They are not merely attributive, but are integrally part of Nature, so much so that Nature could not be conceived as existing without them. At the beginning these gunas were in perfect equipoise, and so long as they continued in that state, Nature remained inac- 1. Sankhya Sutras V ; 51. Cf. Aniruddhain loc. [ 48 ] tive* ihit in some manner, • how the Sankhya philosophers do not tell us, the equipoise was dis­ turbed and then the creative work of Nature began* Intellect was first created, then Self-Consciousness. From this" in turn were evolved Mind and the sub­ tile and grosser Elements, which gave rise to the material universe. Intellect and Mind are thus purely material products and have no relation to Soul. They are the resultants of a disturbance in the elements constituting primordial matter. Surely materialism can go no further than this. Purush or Soul, however, is also eternal and immutable. It stands apart from the process o£ creation which it views with utter indifference, despite the fact that the work of Nature is purely for its benefit. It exists in multiplicity but every soul is in essence identical with every other, hence the term 'soul' is generally employed in a generic sense. It is the misfortune of Soul to be intimately associated with Nature, so much so, that frequently Soul imagines Nature's actions to be her own. This is the fatal error which results in her, so-called Bon­ dage, and which it is the object of this philosophy to destroy. Inasmuch as this bondage consists in a wrong idea of her relation to Nature, the only' way for the Soul to end it is to acquire the knowledge of the true relation. Right knowledge is liberation. The [ 49 ]

Soul that perceives her independence of Nature, ceases any longer to be in bondage to her, with all the pain and unrest that involves. But what is the final goal ? The Sankhya answers, every product of nature must return ulti­ mately to that which produced it. The process of retrogression will last until the entire material world has been re-absorbed into primordial matter. This matter or nature will exist forever. It cannot it­ self be absorbed.

Soul also wTill endure, distinct form Nature, immutable, impassive. It will be recognized at once that this system has certain affinities with Western Metaphysics. In the "Timaeus" Plato advances a dualistic theory tc* account for the universe ; and seems to postulate eternal matter. He, recognizes however the existence of an all-direeting mind, which the Sankhya philosophers do not. Some have doubted whether Plato really did hold this view of the eter­ nity of matter or even of the existence of matter at all, in the ordinary sense of the term. "In the place of an external matter we must therefore suppose the mere form of materiality, the form of existence in space and motion : and when the Timaeus speaks of a matter restlessly moved, before the creation of the world, this only expresses the thought that separa­ tion and becoming are the essential forms of all [ 50 ] sensible existence." Zeller (Alleyne and Goodwin, Transl. p. 311-312). If this is a correct interpretation of Platonic thought, then matter can hardly be said to exist at all in his view of the world. In the works of many metaphysicians since Plato's time one finds speculations somewhat akin to those expressed by these ancient Indian thinkers. For example Aristotle's idea of primordial matter ; the Cartesian view of matter, as that possessing extension; Hartley's dualism. The pessimism of Schopenhauer and Von Hart- mann also is due to a conviction of the great preponderance of pain over pleasure in the experi­ ence of the human race. Pleasure and pain are the result of action, action of desire. But desire and action are inextricably associated with life. Hence life itself is an unmixed evil, and the highest good is its extinction. This is one of the conclusions most frequently dwelt upon in the Upanishads; it appears again in the Sankhya, and is one of the most prominent tenets of Buddhism. It is not surprising to find the apostles of Pessimism in modern Europe referring in most eulogistic terms to the pessimistic Philosophy of ancient India. Schopenhauer speaks in this way of the Upani­ shads, and it is not presumptuous to suppose that he would have used similar language regarding the Sankhya had he known of it. "From every t 51 ] entence, deep, original and sublime thoughts arise, nd the whole is pervaded by a" high and holy and lamest spirit. Indian air surrounds us, and the •riginal thoughts of kindred spirits. In the whole porld there is no study, except that of the originals o beneficial, and so elevating as that of the Oup- tekhat. It has been the solace of my life, it will e the solace of my death." Section III The Vedanta Philosophy. The Vedanta is the leading philosophical system of India and has held this position for many centuries. Its adherents are found from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and belong to all clashes, though the particular type of doctrine accepted varies in difierent parts of the country. It is more attractive than most of the systems, and gives its sanction to the most popular forms of worship. Added to this is the fact that it is the great ortho­ dox system, and has the unwavering support of the Brahmans. As the name indicates it is the end or scope of the Veda. It is an attempt to systematize the the teaching of the Upanishads, which, in turn, con­ tain speculations based on the Vedas. The Vedan­ ta philosophers seek sanction for their doctrines in all the Upanishads. The great Upanishads naturally are most used because of their unsectarian character.1 Deussen2 has attempted a classification

1. Aitareya, Kaushitaki, Chandogya, Taittiriya, Isa, Brhad- Aranyaka Upanishads. 2. Pure Vedanta Upanishads— Mundaka, Prasna, Mandukya (with Karika). Garbha, Pranagnihotra, Pinda. Atina Sarvopanishatsara, Garuda. Yoga Upanishads— Brahmavidya, Kshurika Culika. [ 53 ] of the less important Upanisads, with reference to the support they lend to various Vedantic Schools ; and the classification suggests at once the opportu­ nities for sectaries which the Vedanta afforded. The system commonly termed Vedanta is more exactly described as the Uttara-Mimansa. This implies the existence of an earlier system which is found in the Purva-Mimansa of Jaimini. The Purva-Mimansa is concerned with the correct observance of Vedic rites and sacrifices, or as it is generally described the Karmakanda, while the Uttar-Mirnansa or Vedanta treats of the Jnanakanda or way of knowledge. The former is regarded as the inferior way which cannot lead to the cessation of individual existence. It is by knowledge alone that the soul of man can break the law of Karma, dispel Maya, and thus attain liberation from re-birth. The East knows of no

Nadabiodu, Brabma-bindu, Amritabindu, Dhyanabindu, Tejobihdu Yogasikha, Yogatattva, Hamsa. Sannyasa Upanishads— Brahma Sannyasa, Amneya, Kanthasruti. Paramahamsa, Jabala, Asrama. Siva Upanishads— Atharvasiras, Atharvasikha, Nilamdra. Kalagninidra, Kaivalya. Vishnu Upanishads— Maha Narayana, Atmabodha. Nrisinhapurvatapaniya, Nrisinhottaratapaniya, Kama- purvatapguiiya., Ramottaratapaniya. [ 54 ] salvation by works. Knowledge is the only way of life, and the life to which it leads is not con­ tinued individual existence, but life in the eternal immutable, impersonal Brahman. Yet the Purva- Mimansa serves a purpose even in relation to the Vedanta, for it teaches a man how to acquire that perfect self-control, and self-mastery without which perfect knowledge cannot be attained. It may be regarded as Purva (earlier) in the sense of preparatory as well as in the sense of earlier in time. It is impossible to state when the Vedanta first took form. The general opinion of scholars is that it was the latest of the great systems. Like the other systems it has its Sutras, which are ascribed to Badarayana of whom something more will be said shortly. In the case of the Vedanta, the Sutras probably represent the earliest form of the philosophy. They are more compress­ ed than the Sutras of the other systems, and in many instances could not be understood at all without the aid of a commentary. Dr. Thibaut bears testimony to this fact. "There (in the Vedan­ ta ) scarcely one Sutra is intelligible without a commentary. The most essential words are habi­ tually dispensed with ; nothing is, for instance, more common than the simple omission of the sub­ ject or predicate of a sentence. And when here and there a Sutra occurs whose words construe [ 55 1 without anything having to be supplied, the phrase­ ology is so eminently vague and obscure that without the help derived from a commentary we should be unable to make out to what subject the Sutra referred.1 There are many commentaries on the Vedanta Sutras, but two are pre-eminent the-w^commentary of Sankaracharjya and that of Ramanuja. That of Sankara is the most widely accepted. These men did not expound the Sutras in the way we understand exposition in the West. They took the Sutras as a basis of speculation, and were not satisfied with simply explaining them. The ex­ planations they give, in many cases, contain their own ideas, which sometimes are only distantly related to the subject of the particular Sutra. The interpretations of Sankara and Ramanuja often differ very greatly. So great is this difference that we find Madhava Acharya classifying Eamanu- ja's interpretations as a separate philosophical system. Into the question of their differences we cannot now go, but shall refer to both commentaries, where they afford help. Of the author of the Sutras and his two chief exponents we know very little. Badarayana is also known as Vyasa, the compiler. Many works in Sanskrit literature are attributed to him, far more than he could ever have had anything to do with*

1. Sacred Books of the East Vol. 34 p. XIII. •[ 56 ]

He is the reputed compiler of the Vedas and also the author of the gigantic, and, as we now know, composite, work, the Mahabharata. Other works also are attributed to him. It is very evident however,, even on a cursory examination that the same man could not have compiled the Vedas and written the- Mahabharata. The ideas and setting of the epic belong to a very much later age than the Veda.. The prior claim to have been the compiler of the Vedas is the more reasonable of the two. The knowledge of the Veda, which a compiler would possess, might well lead him to write such a sum­ mary of its philosophical sections (Upanishads), as •we find in the Sutras. Of Sankara we know more. He was born in Malabar of a Namburi Brahman family.1 The exact date of his birth has not been ascertained but he must have flourished in the eighth or ninth centu^ry A. D. Hindu tradition of course, places him much earlier, but it cannot be accepted as trustworthy. He seems to have led a wandering life chiefly in the South and West of India, dis­ seminating advaitic doctrine ; and gaining a con­ siderable following. In the popular opinion he was an incarnation of Siva and as such is worshipped especially by a sect known as the Dasnami Dandis which is said to owe its origin to himx. His latei

L Bhattachargya "Hindu Caste and Sects'" p. 108, 2, Ibid p. 367. [ 5T ]i years were spent in Northern India and he is declar­ ed to have died in Cashmere in his thirty-second year. He wrote a large number of philosophical works, some of which, exhibit great depth of view and power of argument. All are concerned with Advaitism, Among them may be mentioned his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras (Brahma-Sutra- Bhashya), his commentaries on the Upanishads, the Hastamalakam, Atmanjanopadeshavidhi, Ajnanab odhini, Prapanchasaratantram. Of Ramanuja, we know little beyond the fact that he lived in the twelfth century of our era, in Southern India. He is regarded as the incarnation of Sesha, the serpent, and led a life similar to that of Sankara. He is said to have finallysettle d at Sri Ranga on the Kaveri and to have spent his last years in strict retire­ ment from the world. As already stated his interpretation of the Vedanta differs greatly from Sankara's and is known as the Vasistha-Advaita. It tends strongly to dualism, and contends that individual souls continue to exist as such. The literature of the Vedanta is very exten­ sive, and new treatises are continually appearing.. In the Bibliography which follows I wish again to confess my indebtedness to Dr. Fitzedward Hall's work, which forms my chief source of inform­ ation. The following, are the principal works on the VecU-iiia. [ 58 ]

L Vedanta-Sutras, ascribed to Badarayana. 1. Brahma-Sutra-Bbashya of Sankaracharya- Commentary on I. a. Bhamati-Nibandha, or Sariraka-Bhashya. Vibhaga of Vachaspati Misra Commen­ tary on 1. b. Brahma-Vidyabbarana of Adwaitananda, c. Sariraka-Bhashya-Ny ay a-Nirnaya]of An- anda Giri. d. Bhashya-Ratna-Prabha of Ramananda Saraswati. e. Sankshepa-Sariraka of Sarvajnatma Muni (verse). y. Sariraka-Sastra-Darpana. 2. Sri Bhashya of Bamanuja Acharya. 3. Vignanamrita of Vignana Bhikshu. 4. Brahma-Sutranubhashya of Valla bha Acharya. 5. Vedanta-Sutra-Muktavali of Brahmananda Baraswati. 6. Subodhini of Gangadhar Matradakara. 7. Brahma-Siitra-Bhashya of Ananda Tirtha, There are also many treatises on the Vedanta system generally. Among the chief are II. Vedanta-Chintamani of Suddha Bhiksu. III. Panchadasi of Madhavacharya. IV. Viveka-Sara of Ramendra Yati. V. Siddhanta Muktavali of Prakasananda, VI. Siddhanta-Dipika of Nana Diksita. [ 59 ]

VII. Upadeshasahasri of Sankaracharya. VIII. Vedanta-Paribhashya of Dharrnaraja, Dikshita. IX. Vedanta-Sara of Sadananda Yogindra. X. Aparokshanubhuti of Sankaracharya. XI. Atma-Bodha of Sankaracharya. XII. Laghu-Vaky a-Vritti of Sankaracharya. XIII. Hastamalaka of Hastamalaha Acharya. XIV^ Adhyatma-Chintamani of Saumyaja- matri Muni (Ramanuja's interpretation). XV. Dasaloki of -Nimbarka (Madhava's in­ terpretation). This list contains only the most important works on the Vedanta, and does not include treatis­ es on the Bhagavadgita, or those written in sup­ port of particular tenets. Dr. Hall in his Biblio­ graphy mentions three hundred and ten works, and the list might be greatly extended. It will be recognized that in the case of a philosophical system with so abundant a literature, the most satisfactory way to obtain a general view will be to select some work as a basis and expound it, referring to other works when these afford informa­ tion on the subjects treated. Accordingly we have selected the Vedanta-Sara, and propose to examine this work carefully, referring to the Vedanta-Sutras, the Brahma-Sutra-Bhashya of Sankara, the Sri- Bhashya of Bamanuja, and the Panchadasi and other works when these prove helpful. FT-60 J

The reasons for the selection of the Vedanta- Sara are its recognized place as an exposition of the orthodox Vedanta, its succinctness, - and its accessibility. The Vedanta-sara* opens with the usual salu­ tation to Ganesh, found at the beginning of most Sanskrit books, This is followed by the author's state ment that he takes refuge in the infinite soul, imply­ ing bis consciousness of his own un worthiness to deal with such high themes as he intends to treat. Yet he intends to make known the Vedanta as he has grasped its meaning, and he describes the Vedanta as the doetrine of the Upanishads, contained in those works, and in such supplementary works as the Vedanta (Saririka) Sutras. He then declares the qualifications of one who would enter upon this abstruse study, and also states the categories of the system. A person fit for such a study (^rflrarpft) must possess the following qualifications. 1. He must have a knowledge of the Vedas and Ved-angas. This knowledge need not be ex­ haustive but must be such as will afford him a general idea of their meaning. 2. He must also have renounced all desire, and by scrupulous attention to ordained rites, ceremonies, penances and devotional exercises have

* The Vedanta Sara is the work of Sadanauda Yogindra, a dis­ ciple of Advaitanandu the author of jthe Brahma-Vidyabharaua. r ei 3 purified his soul and made it a fit abode for true knowledge. 3. He must also possess the following indis- pensible qualifications. 1. f^nfTPrajna. They are as the trees of a* forest regarded in the mass and separately, or as the ether displaced by the trees of a forest, which is equal in amount to the volume of the trees whe­ ther we regard them separately or together. This figure carries him a step further still.

—'•' ' • • ' J i • i i ,-; - — • •—•Ill • i-.. . •-. . ..-. , -lt-~ !• Cf. Dhole, ia LOG. [ 65 ]

He seeks for something which corresponds to the enveloping ether, something which is all inclusive, comprising in itself both Ignorance and Intelli­ gence. This he finds in Pure Intelligence, which is simply described as "^r (the fourth). He treats this later. Two powers are- attributed to Ignorance. 1. <*il«UMf!R—Covering, obstruction. This is the power which Ignorance possesses of blinding the possessor to the real conditions of his Soul's existence. He thinks that the Soul is in some way connected with the visible universe and is unable to perceive its true-relation to the eternal Soul. This' power also makes the one under its influence imagine that he is an agent, a?nd, as such, capable if feeling and acting ; the idea which is the source of bondage, and of which it is the duty of every man to disabuse himself,- through obtaining true knowledge. 2. f^THfrfi—Power of projection, i.e., thef power making th# universe appear real whereas it does not actually exist at all. The old illustration of a snake and a rope is employed to make this plain. By the projective power of ignorance the rope is conceived to be a snake. There is a trans­ ference in the mind of the qualities of the snake to the rope, because of a general similarity in their appearance. So the idea of the universe originated in the projective power of Ignorance. It does not re- [ 66 ] ally exist, any more than the snake exists, because the rope has been mistaken for it. A quotation is given, from the Vakyasudha (5:13) in support of this view "tW^f^fiwrfS*^^8^*^ ^%f^fcJ"1 The next twenty sections of the Vedanta- Sara contain the theory of the evolution of the universe and man which this philosophy advances. They form rather dreary reading, and the theory advanced nearly accords with that of the Sankhya already stated. The difference, is in the starting point rather than in the process. The Sankhya starts with two fundamental existences, Matter and Soul, recognizing the reality of each. The Vedanta^ on the other hand, attributes the universe to In­ tellect overlaid by Ignorance. All that is, exists purely as the projection of Ignorance, that is to say, it does not exist at all. Yet the Vedanta traces the stages in which the universe was projected. These stages we will tabulate so far as possible. The first projection was ether, from which came air, heat, water, earth in this order. These elements are termed the ^Hffrif'T or the subtile elements (in the. Sankhya, a*n?nfaf) and are the origin of the fine or subtile bodies (^^5 jrffrlfw), and the gross bodies (^rercgfrrfa).

1. "The projective power (of Ignorance) can create the world, beginning with subtile bodies and ending with the terrine orb." (Jacob.) [ 67 ]

The members of these two classes are next enumerated. The subtile bodies are seventeen in number, as follows. 1. Five Sense Organs.—Ear, skin, eye, ton­ gue, nose. 2. Mind—(*m) 3. Intelligence—(f%) 4. Five Organs of Actions-mouth, hand, foot, arms, and several organs. 5. Five Vital Airs. TOr^-exhaling. ^nrrtsr-^inhaling. WTT—the air diffused throughout the body. ^TlT—the air supposed to reside in the throat and expelled thence "Expiration" (Jacob). r '•HUHf—the air necessary to digestion. Here again the idea of the 'sheaths' is found. The intellect and the organs of sense form the •pFWFnre^ts, or intellectual sheath. The mind and the organs of action form the Sffifasnifa, or mental sheath. The vital airs and the organs of action form the snwrre^fa or respiratory sheath. The three are described respectively as agent, instrument and effect. Together they form the ^TSlfte or subtile body. With this subtile body the Soul is associated until its final absorption in Brahma. [ «8 ]

Now the writer again generalizes. Subtile bodies may be regarded either collectively oa dis*- tributively. When Intelligence is associated with them in the former sense it is described as ^TW[ (soul like a thread) or I^TPITOT (womb of the light) or srrer (breath). Regarded collectively the subtile bodies form the subtile body of Brahma. When Intelligence is associated witht the subtile bodies regarded distributively it is known as ^^re (the glowing). Ballantyne -says that it is so called because it dwells in man's inner nature which is ' 'formed of illumination (light being the type of knowledge." But there is really no difference between ^rrgrl and

^IWT *rcr t^w^r, ?ft f T^rpfff wwrat TOrff *ft*rr§ WCTT trft-'

1. Vedanta Sara, 44. Thus translated by Jacob. "Quintupliea-. tion is on this -wise. After dividing each'of thefive subtile elements, ' ether and the rest, into two equal parts, and then sub-dividing, each of [ G9 ]

From these bodies so divided arise the following 1. The upper worlds. Bhur. Bhuvar. Svar. Mahar. Jan as. Tapas. Satya. % The lower worlds. Atala. Vitala. Sutala. Rasatala. Talatala. Mahatala. Patala. 3. Brahma's egg—3%T*g" i 4, The four kinds of organisms, and the things necessary to them. These four kinds are— 1. Viviparous. 2. Oviparous. 3. ^*nfa—Creatures supposed to be due to moisture, such as, gnats. 4. ^f^nfT—Those things which the earth gives rise to, such as grass &c. tkefirst five of the ten moieties into four equal parts, mix these four parts with the others, leaving the (undivided) second moiety of each. As it has been said, (Panchadasi 1 : 27) "After dividing each into two parts, and thefirst halve s again into four parts, by uniting the latter to the second half of each, each contains the five." t 70 ]

Again the writer generalizes. As with the subtile so with the gross bodies, it is possible to re­ gard them either collectively or distributively, and in each case to associate Intelligence with them. In the former case, Intelligence is known as WTRT (Vaisvanara). This word literally means "fit for all men," and is variously translated as the "general consciousness "(Benfey) ;" the spirit of humanity* (Ballantyne and Jacob). It is probably intended to convey the idea that this Intelligence is likely to regard itself as the producer and ruler of the uni­ verse and man. The collective aggregate is the gross body of Vaisvanara and because it is depen­ dent upon food is sometimes termed the nourishing sheath (^ra'T^'^t^). In the latter case Intelligence is known as t%*^ Visva, translated by Benfey ,,"the faculty perceiving singleness." The distributive aggregate is his gross body and is also known as the nourishing sheath. Intelligence which may be regarded in this twofold manner is the source of all our knowledge of the external world. But this intelligence is really one, not two. Vaisvanara and Visva are one and the same. There is no more difference between them than between a forest and the trees which form it. The next seven sections are concerned with the true meaning of the great Vedantic phrase '^1^1 ^ srwW — "Verily all this is Brahma" and the various wrong explanations of it made by [ n ) different sects, notably the Charvakas. All the pre­ viously enumerated elements, gross and subtile, may be regarded collectively as forming the world. Intellect also in its various forms, (Vaisvanara to Isvara) may be regarded collectively as the great Intellect. Both these, in turn, are to be regarded as one with the supreme and unassociated Intellect, and this is said to be the meaning of the phrase *'Verily all this is Brahma." The,absolute iden­ tity is conveyed by a figure which is very sugges­ tive. There is no more difference between the world with its associated Intellect and the supreme unassociated Intellect than between the heat and the iron to one observing a heated ball of iron. But this identification is not always made, and the word 'This' in the sentence is given meanings which imply either its distinction from Brahma, or which give a narrow connotation to the latter term.Some of these false attributions are mentioned. A simple man declares that his son is his Soul, judg­ ing from his feelings toward him. The Charvaakas propound various theories, identifying the Soul Bomtimes with the Gross Body, sometimes with the Organs of Sense, sometimes with the Vital Airs, sometimes with the Mind. The Buddhists identify the Soul with Intellect. The Prabhakaras and Tarkikhas declare that Ignorance and the Soul are one. Some of the Bhattas identify the Soul with a mixture of Ignorance and Intellect. Some Bud- '[ 7'2 1 dhists teach the oneness of the Soul and nihility, Each of these views is supported by appeals' to Sruti, but the Vedantists refuse to accept them,- arguing that the very existence of so many variant passages in the sacred literature, which are opposed to one another, is proof that none of these interpre­ tations can be correct. Yet the Vedantist himself appeals to Sruti in support of his own views claiming a superiority for the passage to which he refers over those quoted by his opponents. His chief appeal, however, is not to scripture but to experience and he findsth e strong­ est support for his contention in the experience of the wise man who has, through thought and medi­ tation, become conscious of the fact that he is Brahma. The comes then' definite dogmatic state­ ment. cm fa fa ^wrfa^w. i1 This illusory character of the world and the reality of Brahma alone are insisted on in the Sec­ tions which follow (58, 59). The world is merely the Vivarta (fa^) of Brahma, that is its difference from the Absolute is only apparent. The distinct tion between fa^ and fa«RK is dwelt upon, the latter being a real change in form though not necessarily in substance. This distinction is an important one as Col. Jacob has pointed out "The 1. Sect. 57. r 73 j old Vedantists, as already stated, regarded the phenomenal world as a Vikara or evolution from Brahma,, a view which is stremously rejected by the moderns or Mayavadins." Sections 60—70 contain a fine example-of the minute and careful exegesis of the Indian pundits. They are concerned with the significance and right understanding of the Vedantic text 'That art Thou.' The word 'That" is said to have two meanings, a literal, and an indicated meaning. According to the former it means the sum total of Ignorance, Isvar and the Fourth state when regarded as one. As the latter it indicates unassociated or absolute Intellect, which underlies the former. "Thou" also has two meanings, the literal and indicated. The literal meaning is distributive Ignorance, Prajna and unassociated Intellect, the indicated meaning is the absolute Intellect. The words 'That' and 'Thou' thus refer to one and the same thing Brahma, the Fourth, the One without a se­ cond. The sentence 'That art Thou', may be re­ garded in three different ways, according to the emphasis laid on its different members. These three ways are lr ^TOCTTtsRTOBr—or allusion to the same thing. For example, in the sentence 'This is that Devadatta.' The words 'This' and 'Devadatta' refer to one and the same thing. There is between- 10 [ 74 } them the relation of identity of significance. So in this sentence there is between the word 'That' which denotes the Soul with the attributes of im- invisibility &o. and the word 'Thou' which denotes the Soul with the attributes of visibility &c. the relation which consists in their referring to one and the same Intelligence1." 2. fa^TOfa^tSOTR'—relation to each other as subject and predicate. This has reference to the evident exclusion of a time difference between 'That* and 'Thou.' The same sentence quoted before is again used to illustrate this relation. ''That is this same Devadatta." Tbe Devadatta referred to by 'That,' as existing in a former time is asserted to be the same object as the Devadatta referred to by name in the sentence, as existing at the present time, that is to say there is an exclusion of the rela­ tion of past and' present between them, hence they are one and the same. So also are the Intelligence associated with visibility and the Intelligence asso­ ciated with invisibility, identical. 3. or^i^rgw*TR—the relation of the one indi­ cating and the object indicated. Again the sen­ tence "That is_this Devadatta" is used for illustra­ tion. 'That' is the indicator, 'the Devadatta' is the object indicated. But the use of the words in this manner implies the essential identity of the

1. Cf. Ballantyne, in loc. [ 75 ] objects signified by 'That' and 'This.' If we substitute "Intelligence associated with visibility" for "That," and "Intelligence associated with invi­ sibility" for "This," the oneness of the two becomes evident. This substitution is warranted in the opinion of the Vedantist by what has been previous­ ly stated1. That this is the only possible meaning of the sentence 'That art Thou," the writer insists upon, and supports his view by showing the erroneous nature of certain current explanations. The treatment now becomes very subtle. First the writer declares that in the sentence ''That art Thou" the literal (^rresreTi^) meaning cannot be taken. It is impossible because the relation between "That" and "Thou" is one of identity, and the literal interpretation would imply a distinc­ tion. Thus in the sentence "The lotus is blue," the word blue is used predicatively of the lotus, the lotus being the thing that we call "blue" and the "blue" thing being what we call "lotus." But it has been shown above that we cannot regard "That" and "Thou" as qualifying one another, inasmuch as they are identical. Again the sentence is not an example of what is known as ww^l which is thus described in the Kavyaprakasa.2" "When the literal meaning

1. Cf. Sect. 60. 2. Quoted by Jacob p. 92. I 76 ] is incompatible [with the rest of the sentence] and either from usage or from some motive, another meaning is indicated in connection with the pri­ mary one, that imposed function is called "Indica­ tion." The above word may thus be understood as designating the indication of some other mean­ ing than that primarily intended. For example "The herdsman lives on the Ganges." The primary cf the word Ganges is not meant but the meaning, is "The herdsman lives on the bank of the Ganges." The wTord "Ganges" used in this sentence, indicates something other than itself, namely the "bank." In the sentence "That art Thou" the terms are not intended to convey any such secondary mean­ ing. The word "bank" is not uttered and no clear idea of it is given. "That" and "Thou" are uttered and the mind conveys to us a perception of their identity. Again the sentence "That art Thou," cannot be regarded as an example of ww^rr. This is the opposite process of interpretation to the one just considered and may be described as a yielding up of the primary meaning. Thus in the sentence "The red gallops" it is evident that "red" cannot be understood in its primary sense of colour, for a quality cannot gallop. This meaning must be given up in. favour of a secondary or implied meaning "horse," in order to make the sentence intelligible. But in this case [ 77 ] the word "red" yields its meaning to the implied word "horse." This method of interpretation cannot be applied to the sentence "That are Thou" because the terms have been shown to be identical. "That" does hot imply something else, nor does "Thou." The latter part of Section 70 which sums up the conclusions arrived at, is very involved but its general sense has been given by Ballantyne in these words. "This view of the matter may be illustrated algebraically. Not being able to admit as an equa­ tion the expression "Devadatta + past time = Deva­ datta + present time," we reflect that the conception of time is not essential to the conception of Deva- datta's nature ; and we strike it out of both sides of the expression, which then gives "Devadatta = Devadatta," the quality being that of identity. In the same way, not being able to admit as an equation the expression. "Soul + invisibility" =, "Soul + visibility," we reflect that the visibility &c. are but the modifications of ignorance, which we were told, is no "reality." Deleting the unessential portion of each side of the expression, we find "Soul = Soul," the equality being here also that of identity." Having exhausted the examination of the great sentence, and having shown the identity of "That" and "Thou" the writer proceeds to state the effect which the correct- knowledge of the sen- [ 78 j tence has upon the one possessing it. A change is produced in his organ of understanding, which results in the perception of his oneness with the supreme. The illusion of his separateness is dis­ pelled. He says "^ ftm %g$3yi^^H^TOiR^T- TnTT^r* ^if" "I am the eternal, pure, intelligent free, true, constant, most glorious Brahman whose •existence is everlasting." The process whereby this condition is attained is next, described and is if special interest and im­ portance because it is a statement of the Vedanta theory of knowledge. This, I think, is unique in the history of philosophy. Knowledge of an object is the result of a fancied outgoing of the organ of understanding (f^rrtfcr) towards that object. In some subtle way, this organ takes the form of the object to which it is directed and then illuminates it. This illumination dispels the ignorance in which the Intellect was previously shrouded, and true know­ ledge of the object follows. The illustration used to make this theory clear has reference to the percep­ tion of a jar. I quote Col. Jacob's translation. "For example, (in the cognition.) 'This is a jar,' the modification of the internal organ which as­ sumes the shape of the jar, being directed towards the unknown object, jar, first removes the ignorance resting on it, and then illuminates it, being insen­ tient, with the light if its own indwelling Intelli­ gence. As it has been said, "The internal organ [ 79 ] and the light of Intelligence abiding in it, both pervade the jar; the ignorance resting there disappears by means of the former, whilst the jar bursts forth by means of the latter." In the case of the perception of Brahma only the first two steps in the above process are taken. The organ of understanding is modified, and as usual there is an outgoing towards the object per­ ceived, in this case Brahma. But the organ finds that it cannot take the form of Brahma much less illumine it, and these facts suddenly make the organ of understanding in the individual realize the real character of that which it is trying to grasp. In a flash illusion disappears. The indivi­ dual realizes that he cannot grasp the idea of the supreme Brahma, for the simple reason that it is himself. He is Brahma. The idea that he possessed a separate, individual existence is recognized as erroneous. There is no such thing as individualism. It is illusion. Brahma alone exists and he is Brahma. Various aids to arriving at a right understand­ ing of the truth of the great sentence are next enumerated. They may be described, in the aggre­ gate, as perfect self-control. The aids are the follow— sm—Control, restraint of the senses. fsrsw—Engaging in religious exercises. ••dmm—Assuming certain postures during medi­ tation. [ 80 ]

trpiri^m—Restraining, suppressing the breath.- wrtrc—With-holding the senses- from their objects. srTOT—"Keeping the mind collected, the breath suspended, and all natural wants restrained.'7 (Benfey) WPT—Meditation. ^Srarrfsr—Contemplation. We are not surprised to find this last aid treated at greater length than the others, because it occupies the most important place in the Oriental- view of the life of the wise man. The obstacles to- meditation are— 3HT—Slackness of mind. t%%T—Confusion of objects of thought. cirara—Lust. wrerr^—Distracting effect of pleasure. A man absorbed in meditation is compared to3 the flame of a lamp, when sheltered from the wind. The writer quotes the Bhagavadgita to his effect "As a lamp sheltered from the wind fhkereth not, to such is likened the Yogi of subdued thought, absorbed in the Yoga of the Self."1 The last matter dealt with in the Vedanta Sara is the condition of the man who, by following the rules already ennunciated, has attained freedom, while still living. He is decribed as ^

"But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere,—being Brahman, he goes to Brahman1." The Vedanta system, as thus exhibited is seen to be in the last analysis a simple one. A very familiar Sanskrit sloka, the authorship of which is not known, succinctly states the basal idea of the system in these words ww *t<£ ^nrij faun sfcft wm? irons n8 The whole system is simply the expansion of the idea of a single existence contained in. these lines. There is but one reality, Brahma. This reality cannot be defined in personal terms. It has no kind of personality. It possesses no qualities, and is not to be isolated, or distinguished from any­ thing else. It knows nothing and has no desire to know. It is undisturbed by desires of any kind. Its condition is compared to that of a man in dream­ less sleep. The world is an illusion. It is the creation of Avidya or Ignorance. Man owing to his ignorance

1. Brihadavanyaka Up. 4:4:6. 2. "In half a sloka I will tell you what has been made known in millions of books. Brahma is true ; the world is false ; the Soul is Brahma, and nothing more." [ 84 ] of the sole-existing Brahma, thinks that the world exists apart from Brahma. This is the great and fatal mistake which is the source of all man's pain and misery. The dissipation of this illusion by true knowledge is the object which the Vedanta sets before it. The illusory view of the world may best be grasped by a reference to the stock analo- gy of the snake and the rope. A man looking at a rope in certain positions and in a certain lighjb may mistake it for a snake. The snake has no actual existence though for the moment the illu­ sion that it does exist may be so real that the man may start back in fear on beholding what he subse­ quently finds to be merely a rope. So is the world to us. It has no more real existence than the fancied snake. It is the illusory appearance of the eternal reality Brahman, who in this analogy may be compared to the rope. Ignorance is thus the material cause of the world. Brahma is himself the illusory material cause. In the Vedanta-paribhasba, the matter is expressed in these words.

sro^w trfonra TTPTR* mm «r sr^f fa fairo: i "Let it not be said, that, of two heterogeneous things, one may be a material cause, and the other [ 85 "J a material effect, then Brahma himself may be the material cause of the world. For this, Brahma as a material cause, is admitted for such in the sense of his being the substrate in misapprehension of the world, i.e., the substrate of the world, the ob­ ject misapprehended : since that material causati- vity which consists in evolving is impossible in Brahma, he being without parts. Thus, then, the, established doctrine is, that the evolutional mate­ rial cause of the world is illusion, not Brahma"1. Brahma however, while not the material cause, is rightly described, as the illusory material cause. As already indicated the goal of this system is the freeing of the Soul from illusion. This it seeks to do by imparting * a knowledge of the real nature of the Soul and the Universe. Both are Brahma. All is Brahma. This is the highest knowledge, the knowledge which leads to liberation from re-birth, and to finalabsorptio n in the eternal Soul. There is no higher duty than reflection, for it is by reflection that the truth dawns upon one. Hence it is that the familiar figure of Buddha, with eyes set, and features undisturbed by a trace of emotion, is the fitting symbol of the ' brooding spirit of Eastern philosophy. When we turn to the philosophy of the West in search of systems akin to this great Eastern one,

1. Cf. Goreh's "Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical Systems." p. 180. t 86 ] we may be rather startled at the close similarity it' bears to several of the best-known systems of Western metaphysics. Its best analogue is the pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza, While there are many points of contact between the Cartesian system and the Sankhya, there exist even more between the system of Spinoza, one of Descartes' greatest disciples, and the Vedanta. Spinoza declared that there was only one reali­ ty, one .noumenon underlying all phenomena, and this he termed 'substance'. His third definition is 'By substance, I understand, that which exists in itself and is concieved per se : in other words, the conception of which does not require the concep­ tion of anything else antecedent to it." This is exactly what the Vedanta philosophers claim for Brahma, only expressed more succinctly and clearly. Brahma is the something, underlying all things that appear, of which, in fact, they are merely the shadows. Spinoza called his infinite substance God, and regarded everything else as merely a mode of God. Modes be defined as 'the accidents of substance.' The infinite substance, or God, has the power of infinite extension and the universe is simply God in extension. The corollary to Proposition X of the "Ethics" is, 'Hence it follows1 that the essence Of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God. For the being of substance does [ 87 1 not belong to the essence of man. That essence therefore is something which is in God and which without God can neither be, nor be conceived, whether it be a modification or a mode which ex­ presses God's nature in a certain conditional manner." This is an acosmic view which is almost iden­ tical with the Ved antic one. The close agreement is seen when such a- passage as the following from the Svetasvatara Upanishad is compared with it. "This whole Universe is filled by this person (Purusha), to whom there is nothing superior, from whom there is nothing different, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger, who stands alone,fixed, like a tree in the sky"1. Whether called Brahma or Substance makes no difference whatever. To Spinoza as to Sankara there is one God, without a second, and no difference in essence between man and God. Some of the great idealistic philosophers have also advanced views of soul and matter, almost as Pantheistic as the Vedanta philosophers or Spinoza. Schilling in his treatment of the problem of sub­ ject and object, which he regarded as both ex­ pressions under different conditions, of absolute reason approaches the pantheistic position. The similarity of Hegel's absolute idealism to the Ve- dantic view is so evident as hardly to need point- 1. III. 19. [•88 ] ing out. To him the individual is the .result of absolute Being limiting or negating itself. But ab­ solute Being is the only real existence. Hegel will not recognize the real existence of anything else. Even the idea of human development and progress is an illusion. We live in illusion. One of Hegel's best exponents has described his position in these words, "The consummation of the infinite end con­ sists merely in removing the illusion which.makes it seem still unaccomplished. This illusion it is under while we live and it alone supplies the ac­ tualizing force on which our interest in the world depends. In the course of its process, the idea makes itself that illusion by setting up an anti­ thesis to confront itself and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created"1 In other words we are blinded and misled by Maya, but when we have, through knowledge dis­ pelled the mist amid which we now blindly grope, then we shall have accomplished «what Hegel calls the infinite end. We shall recognize that life was an illusion, that God alone exists and we. are in and of Him.

:One of the finest expressions of the panthSstic conception, with which I am familiar, is, strangely enough, the utterance of that noble idealist, Johann Fichte, a man whose great desire, in.the closing years of his life,- was to show that Christianity was

1, Wallace 'Logic of Heg'.l' p. 304. [ 89 ] essentially an idealistic system. In one of his posthumous sonnets occur these li&es.

"The undying one Lives as thou liv'est, and sees in all thou see'st Nought is but God ; and God is nought but life. Quite clear the veil is raised from thee, and lo ! *Tis self ; let die, then, this destructible : And henceforth God will live in all thy strife. Consider what survives this strife below. Then will the veil as veil be visible, And all revealed thoult see celestial life"1.

1. Quoted Schwegler "Hist, of Phil." p. 277. APPENDICES. I. Note on the Yoga system of Patanjali or the Theistic Sankhya.

While the Sankhya has always been regarded as an orthodox system of thought, despite its atheistic views, it must have been felt very early, that to the majority it could never be a popular system, because of its tacit assumption that a God did not exist. Most men could not rest content with the purely rationalistic explanation of the universe and man which the Sankhya advanced. The Yoga system, has as one of its objects, the remedy of this defect in the Sankhya. It is frankly theistic. Yoga Sutra I : 24 states, "God is a particular Soul which is untouched by afflictions works, deserts and desires," and again in I : 26. "He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not , defined by time." He is also declared to be Omniscient, and Merciful. Yet He is not God is the sense we understand the Divine Creator, and Preserver. Rather is he a kind of superior Purush, differing from other Souls only in degree, not in kind. The seeond and great object of the Yoga sys­ tem is the instruction of the man xlesiring to ac­ complish union with the Supreme, in the various C 92 ] devices-which aid contemplation, and thus hasten the freeing of the Soul. It must not be thought, however, that these devices actually effect the union. They do not. They are only intended to help the devotee to acquire the knowledge of his identity with the Supreme, by dispelling the illu­ sion in which he is enveloped. The Soul and Brahma are identical, only man in his blindness does not recognize this fact. The great object of the Yoga is to lighten his darkness. There are no injunctions in the whole range of Indian religious law so strange as the rules laid down for the guidance of the Yogi. They are so utterly alien to Western ways of thought, that at first they seem repulsive, and even ridiculous. Thus the exercise of inhaling through one nostril, holding the breath: for a certain time, and then exhaling it through the other nostril ; the assuming of strange and often painful postures ; the fre­ quent repetition of the single syllable 'Om' ; these seem purely mechanical acts and in no way related to the spiritual end they are intended to serve. But it will be found on examination that all these de­ vices have one object, namely the development of absolute self-control, and utter indifference to everything external to the self. They are intended to produce the condition of 'non-attachment' when the Yogi, with his mind fixed on God, lives his natural life on earth as in a dream, unconscious of [ 93 ] his immediate surroundings and undisturbed by a single earthly longing. The man in this state of trance is supposed to possess unusual powers, such as ability to look into the future, to know the thoughts of others, to float in the air unsupported &c. Of course the claims made are extravagant, yet we know so little about the relation of the Soul to Matter that we should be very careful not to condemn even the extreme claims of the Yogi without examination. Max Muller has truly said "The real relation of the Soul to the body and of the senses to the Soul is still as great a mystery to us as it was to the ancient Yogins of India, and their experiences, if only honestly related, deserve certainly the same careful attention as the stigmata of Roman Catholic saints."1 This system was first promulgated by Patan- jali, of whom we know nothing further. It must have appeared later than the Sankhya, but was probably contemporary with Buddhism, though scholars are inclined to regard the systematic ex­ pression of it in the Sutras as post-Buddhistic2.

1. 'Six systems' p. 312. 2. Ibid p. 316. II. The Purva-Mimansa System of Jaiminl.

As its name implies this system is associated with the earlier, or Brahmana portion of the Veda, in contrast to the Vedanta or Uttara Mimansa which is based on the later portions, the Upa­ nishads; The propriety of calling the Purva Mimansa a philosophical system has rightly been question­ ed. It is really a system of interpretation, and its chief claim to its position as a philosophical system rests upon the nature of its categories. (Inference, Perception, Comparison, Supposition, Authority.) It is concerned with the right interpretation of the Veda, with a special view to the correct per­ formance of the sacrifices, and religious duties. It treats of,the Karmakanda, not the Jnanakanda. The claim made for the Veda by Jaimini is the loftiest ever made for any work. It is not an inspired record since it existed from all eternity, and is now as it was in the beginning. Its words have a sanctity of the highest order, and its pre­ cepts are binding, because of the nature of the work in which they are enunciated. . Among the most remarkable of Jaimini's viewrs is the one he holds regarding the relation of a word to the thing it designates, and the eternity of sound. The former view is somewhat similar to t 95 ] that held by Aristarchus and the Analogists of Alexandria.1 Jaimihi has, not unreasonably, been accused of atheism. His system does not recognize a God. _ Oft -* To him the Veda was Divine. It need-no authen- •A tication. The Veda was regarded as all sufficient both as a rule of life, and as a source of power. No such claim has ever been made for any other book.

1. Cf. Sayce 'Science of Language' Vol. I p. 15, Bibliography. 1. GENERAL. A History of Indian Literature—Albrechft Weber. (Trtibner and Co.,, London.) History of Sanskrit Literature—A. A. Mac- donell. (Wm. Heinemann. London.) The Religions of India—Edward Washburn Hopkins (Ginn and Co.) Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus—H. T. Colebrooke. (Wil­ liams and Norgate) 1858. A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philoso­ phical Systems—Nehemiah Goreh, translated by Dr. Hall. (Calcutta, 1862.) Original Sanskrit Texts—Dr. J. Muir, Five- vols. (Triibner and Co.) Hinduism—Prof. Monier-Williams. (S.P.O.K.) The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy—Prof. Max Muller. (Longmans, Green & Co.) The Sarva-Darshana-Sangraha of Madhava Acharya—translated by E. B. Cowell and A. E. Gough. (Triibner & Co.) A Contribution towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philoso­ phical Systems—Dr. Fitzedward Hall. (Calcutta, 1859.) [ 97 ]

II. SANKHYA. The Sankhya Sutras—Translated by J. R. Ballantyne, edited by Dr. Fitzedward Hall. (Triibner and Co.) A Lecture on the Sankhya Philosophy em- bracing the text of the Tattwa Sa- masa—J. R, Ballantyne. (Mirza- pore 1850.) The Sankhya Sara, edited by Dr. Fitzedward Hall. (Bibliotheca Indica. 1862.) Hindu Philosophy (The Sankhya Karika of Isvara Krishna translated) by John Davies, (Triibner & Co.) Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedantin Mnhadeva's Com­ mentary on the Sankhya Sutras- Translated by R. Garbe. (Biblio­ theca Indica, 1892.) The Sankhyasara (Sanskrit Text)—edited by Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagar. Calcutta, The Sankhya-Tattwa-Kaumudi of Vachaspati Misra—edited by Pandit Taranatha Tarkavaspati. (Sanskrit Text.) Calcutta. The Sankhya-pravachanabhasya—edited by Pandit Jibanauda Vidyasagar, Cal­ cutta. (Sanskrit Text.) r ss ] III. VEDANTA. The Vedanta Sutras, with Sankara's Commen­ tary—translated by Dr. Thibaut, 2 Vols. (Sacred Books of the East.) The Vedanta Sutras, with Ramannja's Com­ mentary.—Translated by Dr. Thib- aut. (Sacred Books of the East). The Upanishads ( selected )—Translated by Prof. Max Miiller, 2 Vols. (Sacred Books of the East). The Philosophy of the Upanishads. A. E. Gough (Triibner & Co.) The Philosophy of the Upanishads. Deussen (T. and T.) Clark). • A Hand-Book of Hindu Pantheism. (Vedanta Sara) Jacob. (Triibner & Co.) A Lecture on the Vedanta. J. R. Ballantyne. (Allahabad, 1850.) Three Lectures ' on ' the Vedanta Philosophy. Max Miiller. (Longmans Green & Co.) Theosophy or Pychologial Religion. (Gifford Lectures 1892) Max Miiller. (Long- mans Green & Co.) The Vedanta Sutras (Sanskrit text) published by Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagar. -Calcutta. The Vedanta Sara (Sanskrit Text) edited by Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagar (Cal­ cutta). The Panchadasi, translated by N. L. Dhole (Calcutta.) The Panchadasi, (Sanskrit Text) published by Pandit Jibananda Vidyasagar, Cal­ cutta. INDEX. Pages.- Action/Founts of ... .„ 37 „ Organs of ...... 30, 67 Ag™ ...... 2 Air ...... 34 Air, Vital ... ,..37, Q? Aniruddha ...... 43 Aristotle ...... 50 Arjuna ...... 81, 82 Aryan, Invasion ...... 1 Avidya ...... 83 Badarayana ...... 54 Ballantyne (Dr. «L R.) .... 22, 34, 39, 40, 41, 45,, 63, 68, 70 Benfey ...... 70, 80 Bhagavadgita ...... 59, 80, 81 Bhattas ...... 71 Bodies, Gross ...... 68, 69 Bondage .,. ... 43, 44, 48 Brahmanas ...... 5, 9 Brahman ...... 14, &c. Brahma ...... 19, 34, &c. Brahmanism ...... 68 „ Monier-Williams on ... 7 Buddha, Spirit of Eastern Philosophy. 85 Buddhism ... 6, T, 8, 18, 19 [ ii ] Pages. Buddhists .. 71 Burnell .. 10 Cartesian system .. 86 Caste, in Rig-Veda .. 1 Charvakas .. 71 Colebrooke .. 22, 23 Confucius .. 6 Creation, Orders of .. 42 Dara, Prince .. 10 Davies, John .. 31 Descartes .. 86

Deussen, Prof. • • y, O/J Duperron, Auquetil .. 10 Earth .. 35 Elements, Gross .. 30, 33 „ Subtile .. 67 Ether .. 34 ' 'Ethics/ of Spinoza .; 86 Evolution, Process of .. 66 Fichte .. 88 Fourth, the .. 73 Freedom and Liberation... 25, 43, 45; 48 Future life, Belief in .. 2 Gangasagar ... .. 20 "•'•••• Ganges .. 32 Gunas ... 27, 32, 33, 47 Hall, Dr., Bibliography ... .. 20, 57, 59

;> Opinion of Tattwa Samasa .. 23 [ "i ]

Pages. Haribamsa ...... 19 Hartley ...... 50 Haug ...... 10 Hegel ... - ... 87, 88 Henotheists ...... 2 Ignorance, Nature of ...... 38 „ Powers of ...... 65 „ Vedanta view of ... 63, 83 Indra ...... 2, 35 Indraprastha ...... 20 Inference ...... 46 Intellect ...... 27, 33, 48 „ Disabilities of ...... 39 „ Functions of ...... 36 „ Terms for ...... 27 Intelligence ...... 67 Isvara ...... 64*, 71 Isvara Krishna ...... 22, 47 Jacob (Col.) ... ^63, 64, 67, 70, 72, 78 Jaimini ...... 53 Jnanamarga ...... 15, 53 Kant ...... 14 Kapila ...... 19, 20 Karma ...... 53 Karmakanda ...... 53 Kavyaprakasa ...... 75 Knowledge, Sankhya Theory of *,, 46 „ Vedanta Theory of ,„ 79 f iv ]

Pages. Madhava .., ... 15, 23, 55 Mahabharata ...... 19, 56 "Manifested/'The ... 25 Manu .„ ... 18 Maruts ...... 3 Matter, Cartesian view of ... 50 Max Muller, Prof ... 3, 10, 16, 17, 23, 41, 44 Maya ; ~. ... 14, 53,64 Mayin ...... 14 Mayavadin ...... 93 Metempsychosis ...... 1 Mimansa Purva ...... 53,54 „ Uttara ...... 53 Mind ...... 30, 48, 67 Mitra ...... 2, 35 Moon ..* ... 34 Monotheism ...... 3 Muktila, Collection of Upanishads **.••. 10 Narayana, Collection of Upanisads ... 10 Nirvana ...... 6 Om [• ...... 26 Oupnek'hat, Collection of Upanishads. 10, 51 Pain, denned by Sankhya ... 24 „ Removal of ...... 24, 47 Panchadasi ...... 64i Parmenides ...... 14. Patanjali ...... 15 Perception, Organs of ...... 30 [ v ] Pages. „ through Senses ... 46 Pessimism, Indian ...... 5, 50 Philosophy, Schools of ...... 15 Plato ...... 14, 49, 50 Prabhakaras ...... 71 Prajna ...... 64 Prajapati ...... 3, 35 Prakriti ... 10,18,25,32,44,47 „ as Producer ...... 26 Principles, The ... 25, 32, 33, 40 „ Rudimentary ...... 28, 33 Punjab, Aryan settlement in *... 2 Purana, Vishnu ...... 19 Purusha ...... 18,47, 87 &c. Pushkara ...... 20 Ramanuja ... .., 55, 57, 59 Ramayana ...... 20 Rationalism, Indian ' ...... 17 Big-Veda ...... 10 Roer ...... 63 Sakya Muni ...... 6,8 Sankara ... 7, 15, 55, 56, 59, 87 Sankhya System ...... 16, 17 ,„ Texts ...... 20,21 Meaning of name ... 18 if

)> Essential facts of ... 41 „ Final goal of ... 49 Karika, ... 22,23,24,28,31 [ vi ]

Pages.

„ Sara • • • • ... 22

„ Sutras • • • ... 22

„ Theistic • « • ... 15, 23 Sarva-Darshana Samgraha ... 15, 23

Saraswati • • • ... 35

Schopenhauer • • • 10, 12, 14, 50

Sentence, The great • •• ... 73, 76, 77

Self-Gonsciousness • • • ... 28, 33, 48

Sesha • • * ... 57

Shah Jehan • • • ... 10

Sheaths, Theory of • • • ... 67

Siddhi • • • ... 40

Soul • • * ... 34, 41, 48

„ Nature of • • t ... 31

„ Knowing » » * ... 25

Spinoza •- • ... 86,87

Sruti • • • ... 35, 72 Subject, Conditions of aeting ... 36 Substance, Spinoza's view of ... 87

Tantric Worship • • • ... 18

Tarkikhas • • • ... 71

Tattwa-Samasa • •t 16, 22, 23, 24 &c. Timaeu3 J r • ... 49

Theogony, Chaotic # • • ••• o

Tradition at* ... 46

Tranquillity, Means to • •• ... 62

Undiscrete, The • • • ... 26

Upadeshasahasri • • • ... 81 [ vii ]

Pages. Upanishads ... 8, 10, 19, 52, 56, 60 Upanisbad, Brihadaranyaka ... 4, 12 „ Atharsa Veda ... 11 „ Philosophical doctrine of... 12 „ Svetasvatara .... 13, 19, 87 „ Derivation of name ,,. 9 Vachaspati ...... 28 Vaisvanara ...... 70, 71 Vakyasudha ...... 66 Varuna ... ,„ 2, 34 Vasistha Advaita ...... 57 Vedanta Texts ...... 58, 59 „ Sara ...... 59, 60 &c. „ Sutras ...... 59 „ Qualifications of student ... 61 „ Categories ^. 62 Veda, Rig ...... 1, 3, 10 „ Atharva ...... 10 „ Bama ...... 10 „ Yajur (white) ...... 4, 5, 10 „ „ (Block) ...... 10 Vedangas ...... 60 Vignana Bhiksu ... -.22 Vishnu ..c „. 5, 19, 34 Visva •.* ... 70 Visve Devas ...... 3, 6 Visve Karman ...... 6 Vitatha „. ... 19 [ viii ] Pages.-

Vivarta, World as ... ,.. 7%73>

Weber (Prof.)., ...... 10, 19

Wilson (Prof.) ... «: 30

Wheel, Doctrine of ... o-r. 6

Yoga, System, ... •.-.. 15

„ Sutras ...... 23

„ of self ...... 80;

Zeller ...... 6

Zoroaster *i • ... 3U