ISSUE 151

March 2014

HMAS /Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/ USS Frank E Evans collision) Vernon Parker Oration 2013 Fixing ’s incredible defence policy – Lowy Institute Analysis Reflections on four decades in the profession of Naval Engineering – and Jacky Fisher got it right! The Australian Navy Fleet Review and Future Intentions The Second World War and the Impact of Modern Amphibious Warfare Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

Journal of the Sponsorship_Ad_Outlines.indd 1 30/11/2013 10:43:20 PM Issue 151 3 Letter to the Editor Contents

Dear Editor, and, I think, Wainright (correct HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: I was delighted to see my old ship spelling?) are standing by. Cause Theories and Inquiries (with Queenborough in the Visions from the But the real treasure in Jan’s material is aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Vault section of the December Headmark an English translation from the ’s Frank E Evans collision) 4 having been the navigator during her epic memoirs, relating to his meeting with and perilous trip to Europe in 1955. General Douglas MacArthur prior to the Vernon Parker Oration 2013 21 I must take you to task about the Signing Ceremony. I quote in full: statement that she completed a global General Douglas MacArthur received circumnavigation as her trips over and me in his room. As in my previous Fixing Australia’s incredible defence back were both via the . meetings with him, he was lively, sharp, policy - Lowy Institute Analysis 30 In fact, on the return trip and at the trim- looking in his single field- khaki, request of the Scottish canal pilot, we courteous, obliging and understanding. World Naval Developments 40 transited the Great Bitter Lake at 28 What must have gone through his mind knots. I seemed to be the only one on the stepping on enemy soil? As in , I Reflections on four decades in the bridge who had reservations about this congratulated him but somewhat more profession of Naval Engineering - and procedure. effusively because this was ‘the end’. Jacky Fisher got it right! 44 With respect to the kangaroo, it “You are the representative for [they] were modeled on the kangaroo ‘Netherlands’?” Obituary – Eternal Patrol – on the reverse of the Australian penny “I am sorry Sir, I am the Representative Bryan Cleary, RAN (Rtd) 50 and were manufactured onboard by the for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” shipwright. “ I understand. But my instructions The Australian Navy Fleet Review Yours, from Washington told me that you are a and Future Intentions 51 John Smith, Senior Researcher Representative for Netherlands.” Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc “ The instructions of the Netherlands The Second World War and the Impact Government told me that I had to sign of Modern Amphibious Warfare 53 Dear Editor, the Surrender as Representative for ‘the I read with fascination the article in the Kingdom of the Netherlands’.” Moral Autonomy in Australian December issue, on the late Admiral “ After some moments of silence: ‘I see Legislation and Military Doctrine 55 F ront page : A Toll Conrad (Emile) Helfrich. the difference. But everything is ready. I’ll During the 1960s and 1970s, I worked see what I can do’ “. Confuse or Conceal - The Art of paramedic is lowered very closely for some years with his son “ On the Instrument of Surrender, Camouflage inH is Majesty’s Australian on to the aft of Jan (John) at the Australian HQ in I have signed as ‘ Kingdom of the Ships during World War II 68 HMAS Diamantina of the famous Royal Interocean Lines. Jan Netherlands representative’.” during winching training off the coast subsequently joined another company, Jan’s book expresses some obviously Sea Chaplains: Serving Their Country of however we remained in close touch and interesting views involving his father’s With Pride 74 in 2006, some four years before he passed association with the very controversial on Operation Render Safe 13. Photo by away, he kindly gifted me a copy of a loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston. On Sandy Woodward 80 limited edition of the Familieboek Helfrich. If it would assist further ensuring the Sergeant Hamish Whilst mainly in Dutch, there is a good accuracy of history, I’d be pleased to Paterson Unmanned Maritime Surveillance 1st Joint Public English summary. Moreover, Jan sent me, loan all the material from Jan, to you or and Weapons Systems 86 among other writings etc., a most splendid colleagues. Affairs Unit photo of his father signing the Japanese A tale untold until now? Book Reviews 93 Surrender Document onboard Missouri Kind regards, in 1945. General Douglas MacArthur Warwick Abadee, Sydney. Israeli Sub 107 Issue Number 151 Printed in SPONSORS: Australia Style Notes for Headmark 109 DMS Maritime – Lockheed Martin – Austal – Saab Systems ISSN 1833-6531 QinetiQ – Australian Defence Credit Union – Raytheon Australia ANI Membership Application Form 111 Design & DTP by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Australia – Thales Naval Group Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E Evans collision)

By Commodore David Ferry

ith discussion likely at commemoration of this Waccident I review theories as to its cause – including one I advanced in this journal in 2004 – and incorporate opinions I have encountered since. The review extends earlier assessment of the investigations and adds related experience from the Melbourne/Evans collision.

T he Accident

On 10 February, 1964, the HMAS Voyager collided with the F rank E Evans HMAS Melbourne off Subsequently there were two data record of her track, speed, helm or pictured post- , . The two inquiries by Royal Commissions, the engine orders. collision were positioning themselves for night first into the accident and the second R oyal Commissions and the (Courtesy USN) landing practice by aircraft based into allegations that Voyager’s , Port Side Theory ashore. Melbourne was in tactical Captain DH Stevens, RAN, was command. The night was almost physically unfit for command. There The first found windless, clear and moonless, with a have been numerous cases of claims that Voyager was responsible for the slight swell. With Voyager leading, fine since by survivors from Voyager and collision, though Melbourne should on Melbourne’s port bow (at position 1 also crew of Melbourne. The cause of have given her warning. Its findings in figure 1), Melbourne ordered a turn the collision remains undetermined as to how the accident occurred were together of 40° to port and into wind since none of those on Voyager’s bridge unpersuasive. for flying. About halfway through this familiar with stationing manoeuvres The second Royal Commission turn, with Voyager now ahead (position survived and there was no voice or found grounds to re-examine the F igure 1. 2), Melbourne signalled a flying course of 020, the effect of which was an order Collision for Voyager to take up station to port N and astern of her, for rescue of aircrew from any aircraft which might ditch. Turning Circles 3. 0 Voyager swung to starboard as depicted Voyager, 1000 yds (10 deg rudder) 020 200 850 yrds (15 deg rudder) before reversing in a long turn to port, 2. Turns to starboard 400 Melbourne, 2800 yds to manoeuvre to new station 600 accidentally crossing Melbourne’s 1. Turns to 020 800 bows. Despite going full ahead and Speed Averages 060 1000 Yards Voyager, 19 knots VOYAGER 1200 attempting to turn away at the last Melbourne, 21 knots 1400 2. Orders Voyager to new moment – and Melbourne going full station port quarter 1600 1800 astern – Voyager was cut in two. Her 1. Turns towards 020 060 2000 bow section sank quickly, the stern MELBOURNE some hours later. Eighty two died, all onboard Voyager. Melbourne’s bow was Fig. 1. The Collision stove in though she remained afloat. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 5

accident cause, determining that warned of this innovation. to port.(6, p129, 314) He canvassed the Melbourne carried no blame and Melbourne’s navigator and her psychological aspects which might that Voyager may have believed she air operations had have led to mistaken perception was still to port of Melbourne, when circled the carrier by boat in Jervis of Melbourne’s inclination1, which manoeuvring to her new station, Bay beforehand to check the new he believed(6,p48)central to likely this explaining her turn to port. lights did not shine or reflect collision cause possibilities. This view was shared by the Naval outboard. Even so it is possible Even so there are counters to the above: Board which believed that Voyager that the direction of the lights • The pilot’s observation could have was disorientated. Both thought the was altered after this check, to been at longer range than Voyager carrier’s lighting might have played optimise them for flying. Besides, had been, at least as she had been a part, a view shared by retired Vice ship roll and manoeuvring heel at when closing with Melbourne Admiral Harold Hickling, RN.(1) .More sea might have yielded a different during her final port turn. As to recently retired RAN impression, as might height swell, being slight on the night Chris Oxenbould AO, a navigator, above the sea of Voyager’s bridge of the collision would reduce its ascribed to this, while noting that, “we and her distance. During a later potential to play a part. Likewise, will never know why” the checks and flight at low level across any effect of Melbourne heeling balances which should have prevented Melbourne’s bow in which the first during the joint turn would be the the collision failed.(2) Royal Commissioners were shown less since Voyager was ahead. There are good reasons supporting what Melbourne’s lighting looked • Generally, despite any misleading this theory, these being: like, one of the pilots, initial impressions, as the two • Melbourne’s captain, Captain R Albert Riley, remarked(5) that all he vessels closed during Voyager’s J Robertson, DSC, RAN, gave could see was red light when he final turn Melbourne’s starboard evidence that her navigation lights, should have been able to make out light would have been more including her the green. apparent and she would have been side lights, were dimmed. As • When Voyager was signalled to out of Voyager’s funnel gas haze per figure 1,Voyager would have take up station, Melbourne was and the radar blind arc, so there entered the arc of her starboard in Voyager’s funnel haze and in should have been warning; even light about half way into their turn her radar blind arc, increasing though any inclination reversal in unison onto the flying course the chances her red lights would illusion (see below) would give and the flying course signal was mislead Voyager as to her course, the appearance of her starboard sent after this “when Melbourne at least at that stage. light being aft of her island. Two was just steadying on her new • Had indeed she remained to or more on Voyager’s upper deck course.”(3) Had the dimmed port, or even thought she was noticed Melbourne’s starboard starboard light, visible for a mile,(4, ahead, a 90° turn to port followed light as the two converged.(6, p4) been evident to Voyager she by a like turn to starboard (a p321) There were several officers would have known she was to “fishtail”, see later) would have her qualified as -of-the-watch starboard of Melbourne. However in her new station quickly (my (OOW) on her bridge and one Melbourne like other carriers 2004 article, p 11), there being a could expect that more than one displayed undimmed masthead straightening between the two. or two would take an interest in and other red lights to warn The first Commission’s opinion Melbourne’s initial position and aircraft of her presence and to was that she had straightened in approach. indicate that manoeuvrability that general direction before the • From this alone it is unlikely she was restricted. There was the collision, (4, p10, p23) though this was should remain under any belief possibility that being dimmed disagreed by the second.(7, p212) that she was on Melbourne’s port the green light might have been Commander AI Chapman RAN side. Furthermore, if to port, dominated by these. (Rtd), a wartime captain, wrote a Voyager as she turned would • Melbourne also was experimenting thorough cause and investigation with red floodlights. analysis published as an RAN 1 Inclination is the angle between the course of a ship and the line of sight to her. Melbourne’s captain had given training manual(6). His best-fit A vessel heading directly away has zero instructions that Voyager be theory was an attempted fishtail inclination. Chapman addressed inclination illusions.(6, fig 43) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 6 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries

have experienced Melbourne’s close–quarters manoeuvring; and it was that Voyager first turned true bearing swinging rapidly the circumstances placed them under one way then reversed into the wrong way. no particular pressure. collision; that sequence not • Having been fine on Melbourne’s • Part of the theory entailed an being integral to a signal mix–up port bow before the joint turn, undetected transposition in explanation. Voyager’s should have pictured a signal received by Voyager, • The above characteristics are herself to starboard after such a changing the signal’s intent. additional to those basic to joint 40 degree port turn, from However the transposition other theories, namely mistaken simple geometry. Frame had in mind would lead to perception of inclination of • The joint 40° course alteration unnecessary convolution where a Melbourne and an ineffective to port mirrored a starboard much simpler signal would have lookout. turn 6 minutes earlier(4,p6) from done, leading to a likely query To my mind the first four points above 020 to 060, Voyager in the same from Voyager. render this theory implausible. station. Any difficulty with side • Also, Frame believes this light visibility should have been transposition would have led The Fishtail Theory apparent then. Voyager to turn to back to port • Voyager’s initial starboard turn believing she would be doing so in There is also the possibility espoused would require explanation still. concert with Melbourne, though in my 2004 ANI article that Voyager Some have postulated that her in fact it would have required that had understood her instructions, knew captain might have overruled a she turned to starboard. which side she was on, had elected to helm instruction by the OOW, • Moreover a prerequisite in the change station using a ‘fishtail’ and who had intended a full turn theory was a coincidental second had misjudged the room needed. The to starboard to take up station. part to the mix-up. This entailed fishtail is more formally known as an However even had Captain Voyager confusing the extent of even-speed manoeuvre. I add below Stevens reversed the turn, of itself the turn to port which Melbourne a figure to illustrate and a discourse, it would not explain why she had signalled though again several some of which extends to other turned some 45° before reversal. sets of ears would have heard the theories. This starboard turn also suggests transmission on the two bridges; Voyager was obliged to keep clear of not all thought she was to port. and Voyager would have been Melbourne. The safe and standard way Chapman thought the turn was a party to signals from Melbourne for her to change sides was by crossing station adjustment independent of to the aircraft on the way for deck under Melbourne’s stern. To effect the final turn to port, explaining landing practice, advising them this using an even-speed manoeuvre how this might arise.(6, p142) also of the flying course. Voyager had to swing away wide from F igures 2. and 2a. • As before, it leaves open why Melbourne’s track then reverse her turn T yhe Frame Theor Voyager towards station 3. Melbourne here when Voyager crosses track In his comprehensive and informative APPROACH book on the accident published in 020 (8) 3. 1992 Dr Tom Frame came to the Voyager swings wider VOYAGER conclusion that its cause was most N sees starboard light, either case likely a double signal mix-up, leading double MELBOURNE inclination Voyager to misunderstand Melbourne’s 020 illusion 2. Turns to starboard instructions. to manoeuvre to new station 1. Turns towards 020 This theory suffers from several 060 VOYAGER weaknesses: MELBOURNE appearance, either case 2. Orders Voyager to new • Communications between the station port quarter

two ships were clear and amongst 1. Turns to 020 Fig. 2a.Inclination Illusion

trained individuals. The two MELBOURNE ships’ communications staffs Fig. 2. Successful Fishtail (above using 10 deg port wheel) included supervisors, befitting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 7

such that she gave Melbourne time to get past before crossing her wake to her new station, while leaving her propeller speed unaltered. The misjudged fishtail theory is that this was the manoeuvre Voyager was attempting but she did not gain enough room, that is she did not swing out wide enough to starboard initially (fig 2). There is more than one possibility as to why she would have swung back early but the most likely is that those on the bridge, during her starboard turn, thought that she was already abaft Melbourne’s beam. Seeing Melbourne’s starboard light, they misinterpreted where she was within the light’s arc. Sidelights extend over 110½°, so the course of a vessel with a side light visible can range over the same, about a third of a circle. Chapman comments Fleet subsequently issued a warning in Voyager, Melbourne and a Voyager HMAS Melbourne, with that, “on a dark night...it is often about it (“...exceptionally difficult... sister ship. He has described an initial flying, escorts Sydney hard to tell whether a ship is angled to judge inclination and varying turn swing of 70° from a carrier’s course on passage to Vietnam away from you or towards.”(6, p63) and rate of a carrier...”).(8, p102) Even spotting as a minimum, as in fig. 2, depending (Courtesy RAN) inclination assessment is more difficult what Voyager was doing was difficult, on starting room. Robertson, who in a swinging ship. Figure 2a depicts a Melbourne’s captain misjudging her had similar experience in the same possible “double inclination” illusion direction of turn at one point.(4, p14) sister ship, also described a fishtail in Voyager. An inclination reversal, the Captain JP Stevenson, RAN, captain as a “normal method of changing Melbourne silhouette in 2a heading of a Voyager sister ship and of the station in the circumstances” after the left, is part of the port side theory, the destroyer squadron that included accident.(3, Para 26) Chapman describes it sidelight now being overlooked. Voyager, has told me(9) he relied more as, “the most efficient and expeditious While large vessels normally have on vessel shape than lights to ascertain method.” (6, p66) Stevenson sees it as white steaming lights at different inclination, using binoculars, though a possibility but a full turn offering heights fore and aft, the separation of on this occasion there was no moon. a more predictable outcome(9). He which help clarify their course, this worked closely with Robertson in separation is impractical in a carrier’s Likelihood of a preparing reconstructions for the first layout. They do not help with “double Fishtail Selection Commission, being a close friend to inclination” though they are reversed both Robertson and Stevens. As to in an inclination reversal. Radar images Because I specialised in engineering my why Robertson did not raise this as were not considered reliable for this bridge experience is limited to around a possibility before the Commission, purpose. Compounding general lack six months on Voyager’s bridge, of 20 Stevenson said that was because he had of help from steaming lights, carriers months onboard. However the even- formed a view and was “overwhelmed” when operating aircraft and about to, speed manoeuvre has been described by the event. Melbourne’s navigator display various red lights as mentioned as a plausible theory,(10) by retired Rear told me,(11) based on his earlier earlier, which can be brighter than Admiral AO, ex-Fleet experience that he thought the fishtail side lights – particularly with the latter (“Maritime”) Commander, himself a “clumsy”, though he did not rule it out. dimmed. Voyager would have been navigator, in the context that since key The then Fleet Commander, put his aware that it is notoriously difficult bridge personnel did not survive the view to the first Commission that a to discern a carrier’s course visually cause will never be certain. He had turn towards a carrier when forward at night. The Far East experience of this type of manoeuvre of her beam would be ‘unseamanlike’,(4, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 8 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries p105) implicitly rejecting the possibility that an experienced captain such as Voyager’s would have selected it, unlike Robertson; and supposing Voyager was aware she was forward of Melbourne’s beam. The more conventional and less hazardous manoeuvre, continuing her starboard turn to almost a circle before then crossing Melbourne’s wake, would have placed Voyager behind station,(6, p134) with aircraft arriving, depending on the extent she tightened the turn and sped up. Evidence was that she did not change engine revolutions.(6, p35) I note that following the principle of Occam’s Razor, the theory of a miscalculated fishtail is consistent H MAS Voyager ship’s with Voyager’s turn to starboard then so being away for more than a few But also as iterated from earlier company members in 1961 reversal of course. Also, there was moments would be incompatible with Voyager turned some 45° to starboard, some evidence(4,p8) that she may have the fishtail theory. That cannot be quite a delay before the turn was been close to dead ahead of Melbourne established, either way. reversed, suggesting it was her captain before the joint turn and therefore who ordered the starboard turn then about 200 yards to starboard of station Inadvertent Turn Theory changed his mind2. Even so the theory than figure 1 (drawn from a Melbourne does help explain a starboard turn reconstruction) depicts. This could Another explanation raised during first and accords with some evidence have led to a lesser perceived need to the first Commission(4, p23,24) was that of use of 10° of wheel (4, p22) rather than swing wide. Voyager’s final port turn was a result the more usual 15° for an individual All the same, though initiation of a of Captain Stevens countermanding manoeuvre; and also why some misjudged fishtail could be explained as a turn to starboard, ordered by the crucial attention might have been per light arcs and being out of station OOW to take up the new station, concentrated elsewhere. as above, the impression that she would ordering “port 10”, the OOW then Like the other theories it does pass clear astern of Melbourne would assuming that the port turn should not explain why the OOW lookout have to persist until she was very close. continue whereas her captain intended was ineffective. The OOW was seen Yet knowing that she was turning just to return to 020 while he checked looking at Melbourne with binoculars towards Melbourne, even behind whether immediate stationing action before ordering full ahead. Robertson the beam in the mind’s eye (or eyes), was required (discussed further below). later observed that if Voyager had left should have made her more alert than Hence the port turn, her captain by port wheel on in error, when the OOW a belief that she was on the port side his action assuming control until the discovered Melbourne on his port bow and turning away. As discussed below, OOW received an order otherwise. instead of astern he would have gone (“Other Accident Cause contributors”) Robertson did not favour this hard a starboard rather than pick up his there was evidence from the bridge theory,(4, p23) believing that Voyager binoculars and look at her.(4, p12) tactical operator (signalman) that her would have been alerted by the captain was at the chart table(4, p11) continuing heel. Stevenson(9) and O ther Accident Cause (6, p21) adjacent to the bridge. If there for any Chapman do not agree that 10° of Contributors time he would require frequent updates wheel would create heel that would be by the OOW of bearings of Melbourne. noticed necessarily. Stevenson initially At the first Royal Commission the (10). However it seems unlikely such shared Robertson’s port side theory but Voyager bridge signalman, one of two bearings were taken since they would later came to prefer this inadvertent (9) have disclosed the mounting hazard, wheel retention. 2 Stevenson agrees that this delay weakens the theory. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 9

bridge survivors (with a lookout), said change of cockpit practice left the evidence. It found, “beyond doubt that (4, p9) that he believed that Melbourne aircraft captain in charge but with it any suggestion that his faculties or failed to turn to 020. Supposing he being mandatory that he be questioned judgement were in any way impaired overheard a bridge remark based on a should he appear mistaken. The bridge by alcohol at the time of the collision port-side belief, this observation must officers were gaining/regaining their is positively excluded.”(7, p228) Even so he have been well before a collision was expertise in this type of manoeuvre was found to have concealed a long- imminent. Otherwise appearance of so may have lacked confidence. Many standing ulcer, warranting posthumous Melbourne’s starboard light should captains would not have welcomed censure by that Royal Commission have dispensed with any port side others appraising their actions, to on moral grounds. Nevertheless the notion as they converged. If well before say the least. Even though Voyager’s second Royal Commission found that, the collision this would have been navigator was also on the bridge, “none of his personal circumstances reason for close observation and thence alerting of her captain to a dangerous need be implicated in the accident.” avoiding action at sight of the starboard situation might have been delayed. He Later it was disclosed that he may have light. Were there no belief she was to might have needed time to assess the used amphetamines.(8, p269) Though port and she was confronted with lack situation once alerted. these were legal at the time, any such of room during a fishtail, this could give While Voyager did have twin use and his ulcer should have been her the impression that Melbourne had rudders, both ships had direct-geared reported by medical staff, which would not turned. steam turbines, much slower to react have led to him being posted ashore. Voyager’s captain apparently was and also less responsive astern than As to Melbourne altering course reviewing a signal at the chart table earlier steam reciprocating engines, or speed earlier, or warning Voyager, after receipt of the stationing signal. electric drive or internal combustion she was obliged to hold both course H MNZS Royalist (4, p11). Most likely, as speculated by engines with controllable pitch and speed until finding herself so close sporting 8 x 5.25- the first Commission,(4,p6) he was propellers. that action by Voyager alone would inch guns, inboard of the ill-fated Daring- investigating, or joining his navigator About any lingering public not have averted collision. Voyager’s class destroyer and signals supervisor in investigating, impression that Stevens might have twin rudders made her particularly HMAS Voyager, whether the stationing signal required been affected by alcohol, the second manoeuvrable so this would have been and the Royal Navy the immediate action Voyager had just Royal Commission investigated very late and at a point where action by Type 61 Salisbury- taken to change station; or whether this most thoroughly, including Melbourne would make no appreciable class HMS Chichester (Courtesy such action should await a further examination of post–mortem difference. The first Commission Vic Jeffery) signal. While it was confirmed later that immediate action was indeed required and that this was what Melbourne had intended, he may have wanted to have this checked. Such distraction if prolonged might well have had a effect under any of the theories. Stevenson has observed that Stevens had limited destroyer experience.(9) Chapman, a friend too, queried his self discipline.(6, p211) His fleet commander thought he handled his ship well but in company could be impetuous.(6, p305) However, there is no evidence that any such characteristics had a bearing on the accident. Another contributor might lie in the unquestioned authority which a captain exercised. This was paralleled at the time in aviation, leading to a disaster some years later. A consequent Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 10 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries found nevertheless that a warning from Melbourne might have alerted Voyager,(4, p22) based on finding that Voyager was on a steady course before the collision. The second disagreed that she was on a steady course, described Voyager’s action in continuing her turn to port as, “far from reasonably foreseeable, entirely incredible” to Melbourne. It overturned the first’s finding.

F inding of Cause and Lessons Learnt

Three plausible theories are belief in Voyager that she was to port of Melbourne, a misjudged fishtail and port helm being left on inadvertently. All have strengths and weaknesses. 10° as the more likely. Unfortunately the focus of the first Skyhawk launch from HMAS The time the Voyager captain was off For lack of decisive evidence about Commission was on testing of evidence Melbourne her bridge would help but is unknown time off bridge and port wheel applied and witnesses rather than seeking their (Courtesy RAN) and it is uncertain that only 10° of we will not know which of the three, co–operation in the search for cause. port wheel was applied. This was the supplemented by contributors, was Chapman has likened this to a trial recollection of an engine telegraph the initiating cause. Neither is it at all without a jury.(6, p265) Generally naval operator, the only wheelhouse survivor. clear why the lookout by the bridge inquiries by their structure seek full His testimony, differing from his earlier officers was ineffective, the final cause, voluntary disclosure from witnesses. statement, added ‘wheel amidships’ other than most likely inclination in the Furthermore that Commissioner’s after a ‘port 10’ order, followed by a dark remained an illusion even as the findings were limited in the way course to steer.(4, p22) This sequence two closed. This is about as far as any of lessons learnt and underlying would fit with steadying after an earlier inquiry could go with cause. improvements warranted. There was turn to starboard. Some evidence of However another objective of no critique of the appointment of sharp heel during the final turn(8, p75) accident investigation is to wrest, officers of the watch.(4, p28). He recounted from below decks and the operations salvage and distil what can be gained that though the Voyager OOW had room would point to more than 10°(9). from the wreckage of aircraft, ships and held a watch keeping certificate A pilot in an aircraft just arrived vehicles and lost and damaged lives, so for many years, he had worked in overhead observed, “Voyager’s wake that accidents and their aftermath are minesweepers almost continuously. had appeared as a hard turn and then offset by whatever gain might be had. As to whether this was sufficient his straightened....” What of the royal commission process comment was that, “The inexperienced Stevenson’s opinion is that a fishtail here? must gain experience”. Thus they “could or full turn normally entails more than gain in a work–up programme under 15° helm, though this does not rule Suitability of supervision”. He might have addressed out a fishtail with less helm if under Royal Commissions what experience, training and currency the illusion that this will take Voyager were sufficient to qualify OOW’s safely across Melbourne’s wake. 15° Some broad issues arise from use of formally to conduct manoeuvres would discount helm left on, due to royal commissions for this type of such as screening an aircraft carrier. heel. However reconstructions are investigation. They have extensive Nevertheless with the general based on 10° and recasting to a tighter powers and offer detachment though experience of the captain and directly turn would conflict with observations they need not be led and manned related experience of the navigating of earlier relative positions, supporting by lawyers as in these two cases. officer, both on the bridge, the Voyager Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 11

OOW’s training should not have been view it should have found that the also. Some Australian accounts of it central. Naval Board should have known that construed USN command partiality in The Commissioner recommended Stevens was unfit.(6, p309) its process and outcome, illustrating changes to safety arrangements and to A second broad issue is that a the advantages of separation from that procedures and, as to materiel state he royal commission can be ordered possibility. More about this follows. found, “the ships and equipment in a without public review of its findings While an RAN inquiry into the proper state of readiness.”(4, p 27) What and opinions. The outcomes of Voyager accident may have been more his Commission might have explored these Commissions were discussed informed as to cause than a royal if tasked with recommendations for in parliament but the subsequent commission and drawn more lessons preventing recurrence were: concentration on justice and the from it, its findings would have lacked • objective systems for qualifying politics of public reaction overlooked the appearance of impartiality in an and periodic requalifying of bridge the systematic gains which again atmosphere of public mistrust. As it watchkeeping officers for day and might have been drawn from more happened, had it been a naval inquiry night manoeuvres, including with analytic and objective review. The which was followed perforce by a ships darkened; parliamentary debate did not address separate investigation into the physical • a better means of assessing a expectations of the royal commission fitness for command of Captain ship’s inclination to supplement process and the adequacy of the Stevens, doubtless this would have had navigation lights; Commissioners’ reports. Many in the appearance of a “cover–up”. • whether navigation lights should the media were distracted by the The Combined Investigation had be dimmed when others in use superficial rather than comparing the more crucial evidence available to it are not; work of these royal commissions and but the Royal Commissions were not • greater encouragement of parliamentary review of them with subject to the same legal difficulties in reporting of mistakes and near desired outcome. Had the suitability compelling testimony. The first Royal misses (several unrelated incidents of royal commissions been aired Commission reported six months after were disclosed during hearings publicly, subsequent debate might have the Voyager accident. The Combined and Chapman describes many)(6); led to more discrimination in public USN/RAN Investigation took two • preference for quick–response expectations of them; and could still. months, was more focussed and used propulsion to increase A third is that Chapman describes a less resources. manoeuvrability generally; legal practice called “pre–arrangement”, Judicial General Courts of Inquiry • review of night manoeuvring (6, p332) effectively a deal between can now be set up by the Minister for instructions; opposing lawyers. If part of any inquiry Defence when required. • review of this night manoeuvre this would detract from its objectivity. with its close stationing – its As to the suitability of a naval A ctions by the Navy benefits, risks and alternatives; board of inquiry, there was the very • recording of ship voice commands; similar collision in the South Changes included a new Coordinator • course and speed data recording Sea between Melbourne and the USN of Naval Safety, review of manoeuvring in a resilient and recoverable destroyer Frank E. Evans some five instructions and correction of form (for accident and incident years later in which 74 died, all from safety deficiencies.(28) Others made reconstruction). (Chapman Evans. A Combined USN/RAN Board subsequently(2, p 109) included assessment recommended this too)(6, p210) of Investigation was convened, led by of safety drills, command team training • explicit handover of ship control; (“Senior Member”) a USN rear admiral in simulators ashore and structured • use of klaxons as an emergency whose command included Evans. The and monitored workups. A zone alert (voice broadcasts by combined structure was requested and ahead of Melbourne was established themselves lacked impact and agreed by Australia, the USN earlier into which escorts could not enter clarity in Voyager’s case); and, intending its own investigation with without specific approval and under • availability of requisite RAN observers.(12) 3 The senior RAN which Voyager “would not have been independent accident investigation representative was a rear admiral permitted to turn to port”. There expertise. is now monitoring and assistance 3 On 7th June the Naval Board convened a The second Commission did achieve a Board of Inquiry, listing the USN members from operations rooms on stationing principal purpose though in Chapman’s and the naval lawyers assisting, by name (17, courses and challenging of unclear p152) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 12 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries

See above - figure 3. manoeuvring signals is obligatory. Also and set course towards Melbourne with relying on her captain’s ‘seaman’s eye’.(14, The Evans Collision. F 115) the Naval Board altered procedures for her fine on his port bow, expecting The Evans captain did not always Evans thought the medical examination of captains her to draw across Evan’s bows to supervise such manoeuvres (14, F 44) but Melbourne’s course and instructions to medical officers; starboard. The JOOD was not yet had left instructions to be apprised was towards the and there was cultural change.(13) qualified as an Officer of the Deck of them, which the OOD did not do. south or she would turn there, until 14.2 (OOD) and he did not assess her aspect Hence he remained turned in. The (Reconstruction R elated Experience visually. OOD left manoeuvring to the JOOD by Commander Melbourne had turned on her and decoded Melbourne’s course AI Chapman, RAN from the Evans Collision 6 navigation lights at full brilliance as a signal. He erred by 100°; moreover (Rtd) printed in “In First, a brief description of the accident. precaution. After4 Evans unexpectedly misunderstanding the signal’s purpose the Wake” by Jo A little after 3 am on 3rd June, 1969 turned inwards towards her track and interpreting it to mean she was Stevenson, 1999. Reproduced with Evans was about 3600 yards on the Melbourne signalled her course. turning 100° to port. Thence to his the permission (14, F 98) 5 port bow of Melbourne when ordered Conditions were calm, clear mind Evans would be on her starboard of Captain JP to a position 1000 yards astern of her and moonlit: others had had no beam after Melbourne’s turn. He had Stevenson, RAN in preparation for them turning to a problem with picking her course when seen that Evans was on her port bow (Rtd)) course for flying. The ships engaged in darkened. The JOOD’s concentration when the JOOD was bringing Evans this SEATO ASW exercise had been was on taking bearings. Melbourne’s around to starboard initially.(14, F 107) He zigzagging, darkened. In ordering drift he found was to the left, which said to the JOOD, “watch her, she is an initial reversing turn the Evans’s puzzled him and he altered course coming left...”(15, p43). JOOD (Junior Officer of the Deck slowly to port to correct. The Evans As the Evans approach continued or assistant OOW) misunderstood drift from Melbourne was progressively Melbourne signalled a warning the base course and the collective finer on her port bow, Melbourne 6 USN practice, apparently not followed zigzag situation, placing Evans in his on this occasion, was for bridge decodings 4 Stevenson says that this was before. to be compared with that in the Combat mind on Melbourne’s starboard bow. 5 The Combined Board’s instructions Information Centre (CIC) (ie Operations Consequently he turned to starboard sought facts (‘F’) and opinions (‘O’) Room)(15, P31). Neither of the CIC officers only(17,p148,152). survived. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 13

she was on a collision course. This right” rudder, informing Melbourne. deck “moonlighting” was on gained the OOD’s attention, though So therefore neither vessel when during this approach also,(14, F 74) Melbourne’s lights apparently added applying wheel was aware of the though the Board found the latter to JOOD confusion (see below). The other’s turn. Despite Evans having of no consequence.(20) The JOOD OOD wrote7 that he and his assistant placed the two in extreme danger testified(15, p46) that during the “eyeballed”(16, p44) the approach from her starboard turn might have been Evans’s final turn, Melbourne, “had the starboard wing, probably at this at least partially successful (16, p100) had bright white lights on her flight stage. With Evans about 1200 yards Melbourne not found it necessary deck a masthead and range (ie away,(14, F 125) the two closing at more to make her own evading turn. Now steaming)light; well her navigation than 30 knots, Melbourne turned instead of Melbourne clearing her, her lights were on, but due to the hard to port, informing Evans and turn took her across Melbourne’s bows, number of lights, we still couldn’t sounding her siren.8 Her signal crossed, practically square. She went full astern, tell what aspect we were seeing”. near enough, with one from Evans, as did Melbourne, but their steam The OOD and JOOD went to the her OOD reacting to Melbourne’s turbines were ineffective and she was port wing as Evans turned and, “at earlier collision warning. He was not cut in two. Her bow sank, her stern was that time we saw we were looking confused by lighting,(14, O 16) was now salvaged. at the bow aspect of Melbourne”. aware that Melbourne “had not altered There were some points of common Her OOD had been aware of its course”(17, p65) and ordered “full ground with the Voyager collision: Melbourne’s port light in ordering

7 According to testimony presented to • Neither the Voyager nor Evans the full right rudder, though he the Combined Board of Investigation(17, bridges sought assistance from had thought Evans to be broad on p74) he had been qualified 10 days before (14, O 27) after standing four months of watches their CIC/Ops Room. Melbourne’s bow , not fine. onboard and 20 months sea service, though • In neither case were data or Melbourne’s lighting was criticised his formal qualification is in doubt.(16, ch 12) Evidence from him consists of written recordings available to reconstruct by the Board as, “warranting the statements shortly after the collision: he exact timings of orders, signals attention of all concerned”,(14, O 15) declined to give testimony at the Board or tracks. In particular signal implying there was a correctable hearings. Press reports from his ensuing court martial are sketchy, though they timings differed, even amongst design problem. If of long standing included his admission that he should have Melbourne’s crew,(17, p97) as they this might have been within the taken control earlier from the JOOD.(17, p14) He said he would have turned more had in the Voyager collision. The scope of the first Voyager Royal to port than the JOOD. While in his mind Combined Board ordered a signal Commission, though side lights Melbourne was yet to turn to port(15, p44) reports of his court martial convey that he log analysis to establish sequence in use with Voyager were those intended crossing her bows, presumably for and timings but found this had mounted on sponsons, with Evans fear that a turn to starboard would coincide (14, p2) with the expected Melbourne turn. He errors, a focus being on delays on her island. Left open is whether, disputed,(15, p41) mistakenly (14, F 23), in Melbourne’s signalling system had Melbourne issued no warning that there were instructions which required him to alert his Captain. The Board found (more below). The outcome was and not turned, Evans would that Evans Captain had discharged his that the Board concluded the helm have been deceived until too responsibilities satisfactorily though he had inherent accountability as Commanding orders in both ships were given at: late, as Voyager had been, albeit Officer.(14, O 104–106) As to RAN witness’ “approximately the same time.” (15, in different circumstances. The rights not to give testimony to the Board, p96) Statutory Rule No 90 of 6th June, 1969, . Also the Board noted that its USN was conscious of the general signed by the Governor–General(17, p149) reconstruction diagram was, “at problem with carrier lighting(15, authorised the Naval Board to convene p99) a Board to inquire into the collision. It best an approximation”. and confusion from bright permitted refusal to answer questions “if • As to Melbourne’s lighting, in lights.(15, p49) Incidentally, Evans liable to a penalty”, required that witnesses be warned of this and stipulated that its Voyager’s case her navigation had assumed rescue destroyer proceedings were inadmissible in a court- lighting was dimmed, she bore station successfully several martial. Stevenson was unrepresented at the Board hearings since he had not red lights for flying and utilised times that evening, manned by been named as ‘suspect’. He recalls(9) no red deck floodlights. With Evans, another watch. It is probable that warning though he says he would have given her navigation lights were on full, Melbourne was not darkened then. evidence anyway. An Australian lawyer(21, p71, 222,) sent to assist Australian witnesses though according to other ships (9) Evans was considered by her was not allowed to attend, having multiple her steaming lights mounted on destroyer squadron commander clients. US defence lawyers did not “sit in” either.(26) her island and dominated as probably the squadron’s 8 Evans did not do likewise for her her side lights. Some of her white most efficient ship(15, p8) and had starboard turn.(6, p363) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 14 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries

been recently on the gun line in Stevenson was court-martialled in 1964 was not required to go Vietnam. on return to Australia, as OTC, for astern sooner, quoted(4,p17) from • Melbourne had been criticised not giving Evans positive direction Halsbury’s Laws of about for not warning Voyager. After and, as Melbourne captain, for the International Regulations for the Evans accident the Board not going astern when collision Prevention of Collision at Sea: was of the opinion that Captain could not be avoided by Evans’s “...... the rule relating to the duty JP Stevenson, now posted as action alone. He was honourably of the stand on vessel is the most Melbourne ‘s captain, and who was acquitted but subsequently retired. difficult of all the Regulations also temporarily officer in tactical The Defence Minister in 2012 to understand and obey”; “It command, had responsibility for said that his treatment and court– must always be a matter of some the safe operation of all ships(14, martial were unfair(22) viewed from difficulty for the officer in charge F 107) and as such carried a share today. of a stand–on vessel to determine of responsibility for the accident. • International Regulations, to the when the time has arrived for him The “informatory” collision course extent they apply to manoeuvring to take action and some latitude signal, “was in the circumstances naval ships, required a vessel to must be allowed to him.....the rules not positive enough”. This begs starboard, which Melbourne was have to be construed so that men the question as to how as OTC until she turned, to hold her course may act reasonably [my italics] on he could have been aware, and and speed until the actions of the them.” Even so, had they been on accepted, that the Evans’s captain giving-way (‘stand-off’) vessel a collision course when Melbourne was not on the bridge, how he alone cannot prevent collision. turned, Evans’s manoeuvrability could have known the nature of TheEvans OOD asserted that (like Voyager‘s), evinced by her the Evans problem and how he had Melbourne not altered course final turn, suggested that the point could be confident his instruction there would have been no collision. where Melbourne was allowed would help. (Separately as OTC (17, p14) Melbourne’s OOW when and obliged under International he was criticised together with the asked whether there would have Regulations to take evading action screen commander for, “a less than been a collision without this turn would have been very late.11 vigilant watch” in not correcting responded candidly that, “..it would However, bearing in mind the: Evans when she, “displayed a have been close.”(16, p100) Stevenson(9) – awareness in Melbourne of the remarkably low standard of station observes that Evans was crossing Voyager collision, keeping” earlier: Evans had been Melbourne’s bows when he ordered – general warnings and directives twice out of her assigned sector. the hard port turn to avoid her given to escorts prior to and during (14, F 139, O 41))9 The Board also(14, O 108) stern. The Board found,(14, O 98) the exercise, plus the precaution of put its view that had Melbourne supported since by published positioning escorts astern before “backed his engines at the time he reconstructions,10 that had neither stationing them for flying, put his rudder over” this might ship altered course, Evans would – near collision with another US have “lessened the effects” of the have cleared Melbourne ahead: destroyer changing station three collision. This was inconsistent in other words when Melbourne nights before,12 with an earlier opinion(13, O 33) altered course they were not on a – specific signalled warning to that had Melbourne gone astern collision course. Expert witnesses(6, Evans; and, on receipt of the Evans’s full p412) at the Stevenson court – judgement in Melbourne that right rudder signal, shortly after martial said that if Melbourne high risk of collision remained; Melbourne turned, it would have, had not turned, Evans would the Combined Board and RAN later “made no difference whatever”. It have cleared her. Even so, the first 11 An expert opinion offered at Captain also took no account of the early Royal Commissioner’s Report, Stevenson’s court–martial was about 55 deceleration caused by going hard- in concluding that Melbourne seconds before.(21, p189) 12 She was using a zigzag plan with the a-port, or the effect on rudder 10 Fig 3 above illustrates this. Chapman(6, wrong time base and also, coincidentally, efficiency or turning rate. Captain p388) estimates clearance at 350 yards, turned to starboard then port, as did 1½ lengths of Melbourne. He adds that Voyager.(21, p24) Melbourne was darkened. 9 Stevenson says(9) he did not mind though there was a, “possibility she might Stevenson’s memory is that after this escorts being mildly out of sector since this get across...at a rapidly closing rate of 30 or incident, signalling by Melbourne of her would complicate the task of an attacking more knots, at 900 yards was no time to take course and displaying navigation lights submarine. chances on a possibility”. became routine. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 15

levelled no criticism of the need “was coming right by the time the expected another about the scope for for and timing of, Melbourne’s final signal man had told us” of her message improvement in OOD training and turn.13 As with the Voyager collision, advising this. In Melbourne, signals qualification. Instead it found,(14, O 43) the problem is compounded when were logged, relayed/transmitted “...Evans’ officer training program was one vessel is manoeuvrable, the by a signalman(14, F 135a&c): the Evans well organised, planned and executed”. other not; and further the latter is conning officer had quick access to Further, leaving aside her captain’s manoeuvring. If the other can do the microphone and loudspeaker. overall accountability, its opinion was nothing to avoid it, at that stage she Even so, with bridge officers manning, that he had discharged his specific can do nothing either. 14,15 recording, interpreting (29, p120, 310)and responsibilities adequately, including Further on signals, an opinion(14, O 40) taking any urgent action, there could be that to, “insure(sic) that a qualified of the Board was that conning officers other delays. The collision course signal and trained watch was posted.” (14, O 104) should have direct loudspeaker and had to be repeated(6, p395). The signal It was her captain who had qualified transmission access to the Primary log analysis above was followed by a the OOD. The station keeping failings Tactical radio circuit to reduce signal forensic examination of one Melbourne above of the JOOD/OOD (14, O41) add delays. An example of delay was the log.(15, p95) The Board Senior Member to questions. The might Melbourne OOW noticing Evans, apparently alleged some time later that have placed the USN under training (21, 18 13 Evans had to keep clear under both the Melbourne logs were, “fudged” and public pressure, influencing a the naval ATP1(A) and International p199), though the forensic results could possible compromise in the Board’s Regulations Rules (the relevant one then 16 being No 19)(14, O 28, 29), which the be explained. findings and the light sentences the ATP displaced. Melbourne’s duty under The Board’s listings17 of Evans’s JOOD and OOD received. In 1975 International Regs 21 (apparently applicable even though she might be without JOOD and OOD failings were the USN did release a training film, lights!) was to hold her course and speed. extensive, these and her captain being “I relieve you, Sir” as a consequence According to an Australian lawyer familiar with some behind the scenes aspects, the punished, two being court–martialled. of this accident; now accessible on Board Senior Member had to abandon, (23) Its opinions embraced command ‘YouTube’. At the same time I would “four other particulars of negligence on and control (including zigzag add that if it was just the OOD Stevenson’s part” on legal advice to the Board.(21, p229) instructions), tactical publications training which accounted for mistaken 14 The 1972 rules now allow the stand-on applicable, the status of the ships, Melbourne inclination this would beg vessel to act when the give–way vessel is, “not taking appropriate action”. Pertinent Melbourne’s lights and dissemination the question as to how several more here, under 1972 rules, preferably the of their characteristics, signal highly qualified and experienced stand on vessel should not alter to port. Chapman(6, fig 87) illustrates that a selection/procedures/addressees/ officers on Voyager’s bridge were starboard turn by Melbourne would have execution/coding etc., applicability deceived. Though this was during been ineffective had Evans not turned. Chapman(6, p432) notes that a starboard of international collision rules and work-up on a dark night it did not have turn may not work more generally. those of ATP1(A), and clarification of the zigzag complication. As to RAN 15 The Board Senior Member posed (6, p457) adversarial questions(21, chap 8) to ships’ turning circles. One would have training, Chapman speculated the Melbourne OOW about avoiding that the Melbourne OOW’s knowledge action which she might have taken. The 16 He remarked also to Commodore J of Collision Regulations (see footnote questioning suggested the Senior Member Matthew RAN (Rtd) later that he was did not understand the International “working to instructions” during the 15) might have been found wanting Regulations. Sherbo’s(15, p99) view is hearings.(9) had Stevenson not been on her bridge that he seemed aimed at invoking, against 17 The JOOD was not helped in his Melbourne, the ‘General Prudential Rule’(19, not understanding the base course and but concluded that most likely it was p108); to the effect that mariners may zigzag position.(15, p33,37) Melbourne’s the Senior Member’s manner which disregard the Regulations in special cases stationing signal was sent in the middle if needs be to avoid collision. However of a short zigzag leg and the zigzag unsettled him at the Board hearings. whether or not this Rule could imply that instructions may have been confused by I expect that simulator training and Melbourne acted too late, it also might be what reference to use, according to the a defence against any criticism she acted RAN Fleet Communications Officer. The other assessments currently would too early. But about the tenor of the Senior zigzag had been suspended by Melbourne fill any gap in bridge skills in most Member’s questions, Mrs Jo Stevenson, earlier signalling a flying course, the same the Australian-American wife of Captain course she later signalled she was on. The Stevenson who was attending the hearings, JOOD may not have been clear about 18 The entagonP press release on the wrote and complained(21 ,p124) to the the suspension.(29, p119) However his Board’s findings came after the Australian USN Chief of Naval Operations, whom she basic mistake was to confuse the previous release of news of Captain Stevenson’s had met. She received no direct reply. It formation course with the new base course. court–martial and after that news had transpires that the CNO, Admiral Moorer The OOD’s assertion that Melbourne would distracted the press in the US. The was chief mentor to the Board Senior turn to port reinforced the JOOD’s mindset. Department of Foreign Affairs had been Member, Rear Admiral King (his obituary, under the impression that the timing would Washington Post, 17th June, 2008). be coincident.(17,p48) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 16 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries navies; partly due to technological Despite shortcomings in the say the RAN had agreed, “that the development but also an evolutionary Investigation and concern as to procedures of the US Navy manual of perception of need. objectivity,(21)(see annex), and general the Judge Advocate General should The Combined Board’s findings distraction by blame apportionment apply”, (14, p1) which might have led to were approved by the Commander between the USN and RAN,20,21 its misunderstandings. An example was Seventh Fleet (23) (who noted, “the Report was competent in much of the RAN misconstruing the roles of its rights of RAN witnesses were protected its work and efficient. It was dated counsel.(21,p224) Though the subject was under procedures applicable in an 18th July, the completed report touched on in the Report, whether it Australian investigation”(which indeed having 362 findings of fact and 108 was addressed in a Naval Board review is so (29, e.g. p76)) and the Commander–in– opinions, comparing favourably is unknown. The Combined Board Chief, Pacific Fleet,(25) who described with the discursive style of the Royal could be seen as successful, as it was the Report as, “thorough and complete Commissions. Some of the apparent by the USN, when compared to what in all respects. This is particularly partiality might have stemmed from it might have been. It may be though significant in view of the delicate and procedural and legal differences. that scope for misunderstanding and complicated nature of the proceedings The Board Senior Member did partiality persist in international armed which were conducted in full view of forces investigations and less ad hoc Board member, says that Australian Board the world press.” He complimented its members were under no constraints of arrangements could be looked into if Senior Member on, “..an outstanding which he was aware.(26, see annex) As not yet in place. to Stevenson’s posting, the CNS of 1964 investigation.....”. It may be that there “relieved Robertson of his command” having was a review conducted by the RAN been, “overconfident and slow to react.”(6, p250)) Perhaps Stevenson was seen as T his Paper’s Outcome and opinions in the Report on such as having some ‘inherent accountability’ akin Melbourne’s lighting and signal delays to the Evans CO. However he completed More broadly, investigations such as his Melbourne posting, being advised after were taken up but this has not been not the Naval Board 25th July meeting(8, p335) those of Voyager and Evans should evident to date.(27) It is ironic that the that though he had been led to expect be holistic and seek out systematic it would be as Chief of Staff to the Fleet Report’s sole manifest RAN outcome improvements. Defence now has a Commander,(8, p 335) it would be another was a court-martial of an officer who, Sydney shore posting. The new Fleet judicial court of inquiry system but with his Fleet Commander, made every Commander had headed the investigation’s there might be lessons available still RAN contingent, a more likely prompter effort to see that the Voyager collision of the posting change. Stevenson’s new from these accidents which go beyond was not repeated.19 post at the time was filled by a more junior those of investigation structure into officer though the plan was to upgrade it to 19 The avalN Board had been told that Commodore, which eventuated. Apparently scope. Moreover they extend to it would provide Stevenson with the Stevenson did not learn of this intention review and implementation process: opportunity of having, “imputations against until later.(21, p214) It was seen widely as him judged professionally”(8, p334), having the appearance of a demotion. He assurance that recommendations denied Robertson. This memorandum was offered alternatives(8, p336) but had are adequate and that those which added that Stevenson, “had stated that been led(21, 205) informally to expect a he intended to rebut any criticism of his promotion course: not forthcoming. Even should be implemented, are. Leaving conduct if such were made in the report”. so the reason he gave to the Navy Minister aside review, the Australian Transport Naval Board minute 94/1969 of 25th for his retirement(21, p219) was because July(8, p335)forwarded the Report to the he could not serve with some seniors(21, Safety Bureau integrates its findings Fleet Commander, “for necessary action”. p214), including those who had signed with priorities for implementation and The Fleet Commander weighed this(21, the Combined Board’s report. Stevenson p231)and decided on the court–martial, endorses this account.(9a) an implementation control process. possibly to bring the opinions of the 20 At the Pearl Harbor washup after The 2012 investigation by the ATSB Combined Board to closure. He might have the 1973 RIMPAC exercise, attended by thought it would provide Stevenson the hundreds of officers including dozens of the engine explosion in a Qantas rebuttal opportunity, though Stevenson from the RAN, the Exercise Director, A380 provides an example. Defence did not welcome it.(21, p231) The rebuttal COMTHIRDFLT Rapp USN Stevenson had sought was of the Report, to referred to the Melbourne/Evans collision might benefit from checking what the which he had had no access(9a) (rebutted in his address along the lines, “.. I was in the ATSB might offer. I intend drawing later(21, ch15)). Frame thought he should at the time and was familiar with have been consulted.(8, p337) In the the Board of Inquiry into that collision. The its attention to this. It is possible that event, Stevenson’s lawyers contended at fault lay entirely with the Evans...” (31) further lessons can be gained still from proceedings that there was ‘no case to 21 Taking us back to those times, the these accidents of decades ago. answer’, leading to the ‘honourable acquittal’ Chinese on 6th June after outlining the outcome. Stevenson agreed reluctantly to accident noted, “The US naval authorities Worth highlighting are bridge this,(21, p188) it precluding opportunity then tried hard to blame their for training, tasking and qualification, now for a full airing of the Combined Board’s the disaster...but the Australian authorities findings and of any constraints it was under. would not swallow this”... “The row between hopefully well in hand. I quote from an Rear Admiral Davidson AO RAN (Rtd), the master and the satellite only revealed the Evans’s OOD statement post-collision, of who as a captain had been a Combined quandary US imperialism is put in”(24). Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 17

interest beyond the USN and past times: might have spoken for Voyager also: The ship had been manoeuvring With a great deal of personal quite beyond its normal tactics sadness it is my duty today to with the Kearsarge [a USN carrier] farewell a fine fighting ship. during the entire SEATO exercise Concurrently, it is with a great deal with the Commonwealth ships. of pride that I pay tribute to those They sharpened us up you might officers and men, who served her say. They like to do a lot of playing so well. Those who survived the around, type flanking movements tragic accident that so hurt Frank E and we have very seldom if ever, Evans have every right to be proud gone through zig–zag plans and of their effort and performance, things like this. I can’t say it was both before and after the accident. new. We had been going through Those who died in the collision Commodore David Ferry AM RAN (Rtd) that for 3 or 4 days, these zig–zag share in being part of a fine and was visiting Melbourne at the time of plans. But it did make everybody a dedicated crew, and their sacrifice her collision with Voyager. He was air little bit tight. But what made me is part of the price sometimes paid engineer of her helicopter squadron particularly tense was an 18 knot by those who go down to the sea zig–zag plan, was the closeness of in ships. when she collided with USS Frank E. the 3000 to 5000 yards screening Returning to Voyager (though with a Evans. He joined the Navy as a cadet– station. Mr Hopson (JOOD) and I similar eye to Evans), as with so many aged 13 in 1953. After – when I had the conn the first two accidents misfortune played a large general list training, he specialised hours it was just constant change. I part. Had she been a few seconds in aircraft engineering. Subsequent couldn’t do anything but watch the sooner, or Melbourne later, the two carrier. Mr Hopson was doing the ships would have missed, whichever postings were to air squadrons same when he took it.(30) sequence it was which led to the ashore and afloat, aircraft engineer As one RAN retired navigator has collision; and an accident so calamitous of Melbourne air group and specialist commented about the RAN, “...we for those who died or were injured staff positions, including as Director of expect too much from junior officers. and their families, and so momentous Naval Aircraft Engineering. In close quarters situations, especially for others affected, might have been at night, experienced personnel avoided. should be in charge. Even then some However on the other hand some of of the manoeuvres are unnecessarily the rescued might have been fortunate complicated.”(32) The USN did release its that the accident occurred in calm seas training film afterwards and may well and warm water within range of shore Annex (see (26)) have taken other measures. support. Search and rescue craft were Extract by David Ferry from written To the RAN there was a theme able to respond from HMAS Creswell recollections by Rear Admiral J spanning these twin accidents; at Jervis Bay and from Davidson, AO RAN (Rtd), January, inclination assessments at night the Naval Air Station, supplementing 2014, about his membership of the with and without lighting and how Melbourne’s early rescue efforts, other Combined Board of Investigation into to obviate ambiguity. To me this ships joining from further afield. Also, the Melbourne/Evans collision. was a priority, applicable to close had Voyager been a few seconds later (His recollections carry a caveat manoeuvring at least. Perhaps it is still, she might have penetrated Melbourne’s that this was from his memory of 45 in or out of radar silence. a deal more seriously. As it was, years ago, with no notes from then. He a bulkhead prevented serious water noted that he had read my draft F inal Observations ingress and there was no aviation paper and later the presentation of his gasoline stored in the damaged area. t recollections below) At the decommissioning ceremony • He was sitting in for Secretary for Evans, her Commanding Officer, to the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Commander McLemore, addressing Admiral Sir . survivors assembled on her stern hulk, • After the two Royal Commissions, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 18 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries

Smith, “was determined to avoid that because of the close reliance case when he refused to put a having non-naval lawyers doing on the USN in many areas we question so asked.” a re-run this time. Accordingly were to avoid findings that were • Two points seem to him to he rang the USN Chief of Naval solely critical of USN officers and be forgotten: (see my earlier Operations and agreed with him this resulted in unfair criticism of comments about criticism of the to set up a joint Naval Board of Captain Stevenson. Unless this OTC): Inquiry”. was to Admiral HD Stevenson - “...Evans crossed Melbourne’s • Rear Admiral HD Stevenson, only and not to me and Shands, bow from port and returned Captain Shands and he (a I don’t believe this was so.” (a to be hit on her port side, was captain) were nominated. He was measure of the respect the RAN completely new to us. The surprised being a Supply, (non had accorded the findings would Voyager collision occurred seaman) officer. Smith told him be the action it took on the Board’s in a very short space of time his nomination was because of his opinions. There is no evidence of with that ship turning from a Voyager first Royal Commission action other than the Stevenson roughly parallel course straight experience and, “he wanted me to court martial, though this may be under the carrier’s bow. This monitor whether anything might because it has been lost.) (ie Evans) clearly gave the come out which would cause later • They were accompanied by Melbourne a much longer time pressure for a Royal Commission Commander Glass, QC, RANR. from first noticing the ‘collision here” (he had been Secretary to “I am not sure what the comment course’ in which POSSIBLY to the Fleet Commander and had to in David Ferry’s article about do something”. liaise with Smyth QC, assisting an RAN lawyer being denied - “Captain Stevenson was in the Commission, “who ran a very presence refers to (see footnote 7. ‘tactical command’ of Evans as biased ‘shop’ apparently based on It referred to Anthony Vincent(21, shown by his order to take up his belief that all naval witnesses p71), Lieutenant RANR another RESDES position and his signal would lie to implicate Captain lawyer who accompanied them, warning of her course. He Stevens of Voyager as the sole one of whose tasks was to assist could theoretically have sent culprit – I remember well how all Australian Naval witnesses other ORDERS to her.” shocked Admiral Becher was or potential witnesses with legal • “It soon became apparent when he returned having been advice.(21, p222). The Glass task was to Shands and me that (HD) the first witness at his treatment to assist the Board, jointly with his Stevenson was .. (not forceful).. by Smyth....” (I add that he has USN counterpart). and hardly ever argued with told me that as a Supply and • The and lawyers met King. It was up to us (ie Shands Secretariat officer he had received to discuss procedure and the in effect) to put answers to King’s training in naval law and had other RAN Board members were arguments.” (both HD Stevenson been a Judge Advocate at a court– informed that: and Shands are now deceased. martial) - “All decisions should be HD Stevenson on emerging from • At the Board he places on record unanimous. (Sounds a meeting with the Board Senior that he was constrained by, “lack prescriptive but worked to our Member apparently told the RAN of sea command etc experience advantage sometimes as I shall Fleet Commander(21,p67) that the in expressing any views on such mention (see “King...below)). latter would not, “like what’s going matters”. Shands and he shared Harold Glass told us that this to happen” though this might have a room in the Bachelor Officers’ was basically sensible unless been a casual observation.) “The Quarters at and, “he was there was something terrible to well known difficulties placed by meticulous in discussing all the object to.” International Law on the ‘stand points with me after we finished - “All questions would be put on’ ship arose here and it is really a each day”. by Admiral King to avoid conundrum which devolved into, • “It has been suggested that multiple ‘fire’ and that other “he could or should or couldn’t the RAN officers of the Board members would pass questions and shouldn’t.” King of course had been given prior orders – they wanted to him (this was pushed for could/should and presumably by Admiral Smith – followed and I never saw a Stevenson and Shands could not Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 19

(18) Preliminary Statement, Report of definitely refute it – it was best left him (presumably the posting) as he Combined Board, addressed to Com 7th to a Court-Martial.” did I have no idea and join with all Fleet and Australian Commonwealth Naval Board., • “ King also came up with a list in applauding the Government’s (19) Farwell’s Rules of the Road, by Craig H of about 8 items of criticism of tardy apology. Allen, Nautical University Press, 2005 Captain Stevenson – I have no (20) Pentagon Press Office Release of Board exact memory but they were of Investigation Findings, 16th August, 1969, NAA barcode 3055831 p.42 things like, ‘a noisy bridge’ (ie too (21) Jo Stevenson, “In the Wake”, 1999 many contributing. (Voyager’s References: (22) ABC 7.30 Report, 6th December, 2012 might have been?)) and HD (1) Books “One Minute of Time”1965, Stevenson had accepted them to “Postscript to Voyager”, 1969 (23) Commander Seventh Fleet memorandum 013-185 dated 14th October, 1969 go into the report as criticisms”. (2) C. Oxenbould, “The Sydney Papers” Autumn 2004, p109, The Sydney Institute (24) Dept External Affairs cable, 6th June, “Shands was adamant and I 1969, NAA barcode 3055831 p.292 (3) R J Robertson, Report to Fleet backed him. We therefore stated Commander, 5th March, 1964 (25) Commander in Chief, US Pacific that we would not agree to a Fleet memorandum 13-01392 dated 21st (4) J. Spicer, Report of the Royal November, 1969 unanimous finding of them as Commissioner on Loss of HMAS Voyager. s.l: criticisms. In face of having to Commonwealth Government Printer, 1964 (26) J. Davidson/D Ferry correspondence 10-18 January, 2014 record a dissent on the Board (5) A. Riley letter to “Good Weekend”, October 11th, 2003 and A. Riley/D. Ferry (27) NAA archives search, contact with; Dr the two Admirals settled for correspondence) T Frame, Dr D Stevens (Sea Power Centre), Commander A Cooper, RAN (CN Research mentioning them as having been (6) A I Chapman,“The Melbourne collisions, Officer), January 2014 raised but ‘the Board did not HMAS Voyager and USS Evans, a treatise of analysis and opinion, Commonwealth (28) National Archives of Australia, Barcode proceed to question his judgement Government Printer, RAN MISCPUB 0081 495392 on them’.”(footnote 13 would seem (7) S. Burbury et al, Royal Commission on (29) Report of Combined Board to relate to this) the Statement of Lieutenant–Commander Proceedings, Vol 1 • “I must emphasise that Shands Cabban and Matters Incidental Thereto. s.l, 1968 (30) Report of Combined Board, exhibits was the mover and shaker and I 44–110 p15 (8) T. Frame, “Where Fate Calls, the HMAS was the backer”. Voyager Tragedy,” 1992 (31) Commander G Spence, RAN (Rtd)/D. Ferry, correspondence 25 January, 2014 • He adds a note about a recent (9) Discussions JP Stevenson/D. Ferry discussion he had with JP 9th January, 2014, joined for part by (32) Captain JO Morrice, RAN (Rtd)/D Commodore D Farthing DSC RAN (Rtd) Ferry, correspondence 24 January, 2014 Stevenson, which I have passed and Captain J Morrice, RAN (Rtd) on to him. About any impression (9a) Discussions JP Stevenson/D. Ferry 23rd he had given to Stevenson, “that it January, 2014 had been agreed that all decisions (10) Assistance and correspondence, K. should be unanimous (and) he Doolan/D. Ferry 2009 read into this that we had been (11) Discussions and correspondence, Captain J. Kelly DSC RAN (Rtd)/D. Ferry ordered to give in to the USN on December 2006 everything. NOT SO...... ”. (12) Sec Dept Navy minute 1288/1/93 • “I remember HD Stevenson’s first dated 9th June, 1969, National Archives of Australia barcode 3055831, p147 words to VAT Smith when we reported to him, “I’m afraid Steve (13) T. Frame, “The Sydney Papers” Autumn 2004, p101, The Sydney Institute will have to be Court Martialled”. (14) Report of Combined USN RAN Board I took no part in anything that of Investigation into the Collision between happened later. After another HMAS Melbourne and USS Frank E Evans, note about JP Stevenson and (15) P Sherbo, Capt USNR (Ret), “Unsinkable Sailors”, 2007 the IDC, he added , “...voicing a (15a) P Sherbo, Captain USNR (Ret), thought which we all had that Unsinkable Sailors, 3rd edition, 2011, he would be treated properly and appendix B given his chance for selection for (16) Jo Stevenson, “No Case to Answer”, 1971 promotion to Admiral for which (17) National Archives Australia, barcode the IDC (promotion course) was 3055831, Foreign (‘External’) Affairs File on collision inc. AAP/UPI coverage of Board a given. Why VAT Smith treated proceedings, 463 pages Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

Issue 151 21 Vernon Parker Oration 2013 With Commander David Hobbs, MBE, RN (Rtd)

Commander Hobbs is a well-known duration. He won the author and naval historian. He served essay prize awarded in the Royal Navy from 1964 until by the Navy League of 1997 and flew fixed wing and rotary Australia in 2008. aircraft though a long career as a Fleet Air Arm pilot. He has flown Gannet, David lectures and Hunter and aircraft as well broadcasts on naval as Wessex Commando Helicopters. His subjects worldwide Log Book contains 2,300 hours with and has been a regular 800 deck landings, 150 of which were presenter at King at night. His service afloat included Hall Naval History the aircraft carriers Victorious, Conferences over the Hermes, Albion, Bulwark, Centaur, Ark last decade including Royal (IV) and Ark Royal (V). the one just concluded last week. He has H MAS Sydney carrying ADF After retirement from the active list become well known to readers of what a big-deck warship can do and I believe that similar words will be used personnel and vehicles to Vietnam. as a commander in 1997 he became Headmark for his book reviews and to describe Canberra and Adelaide by Curator and Principal Historian of the his incisive articles. He deploys his (David Hobb’s their commanding officers when they Collection) Fleet Air Arm Museum at Royal Naval historical understanding of flying join the Fleet. The world is actually Air Station Yeovilton in Somerset until at sea in the twentieth century a more dangerous place today than it 2006 when he became a full time to illuminate the opportunities was 50 years ago and aviation, within a maritime strategy, will have a vital author and lecturer. technology make possible in aviation part to play in many operations that in this new maritime century. cannot, yet, be predicted. He writes for several journals and The Royal Navy first deployed a magazines and in 2005 won the three-dimensional task force almost Aerospace Journalist of the Year, t is a privilege to have been asked exactly one hundred years ago, in to give the 2013 Vernon Parker July 1913, when the cruiser Hermes Best Defence Submission. He has IOration and, as a member of the ANI was commissioned as a dedicated written 12 books on a pleasure to join so many of you this seaplane carrier during the autumn and co-authored nine more. A Century evening. mobilisation manoeuvres. We can of Carrier Aviation - The evolution Captain Mike Fell DSO DSC* RN, say three-dimensional because her of Ships and Shipborne Aircraft has a fighter pilot with a distinguished two aircraft were embarked to carry war record commanded HMAS out aerial reconnaissance for the ‘Red become a standard reference book on Sydney’s air group in 1951 during Fleet’ and provide a surface picture the history of flying at sea. H is most her operational tour in the Korean for its commander. Less sophisticated recent book was The British Pacific War. In 1966 he commanded HMS experiments with aircraft were carried Fleet. This is a definitive study of the Ark Royal IV in the Far East Fleet and out in the same year by the United Royal Navy’s operations in the Indian when asked by the media what his ship States, French, Italian and Japanese did, he replied that it had the ability to Navies. Hermes’ aircraft included a and Pacific oceans in 1944-45. H is steam vast distances quickly and then Caudron with both wheels and floats interest in the history of maritime perform any operational task assigned that could, and did, take-off from a aviation in Australia is of long to it. ‘Any operational task’ is an small flight deck over the forecastle in accurate and succinct description of ideal conditions and a Short ‘Folder’, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 22 Vernon Parker Oration 2013

the first naval aircraft in the world to be designed with folding wings for stowage in a ship’s hangar. It was also fitted with a wireless transmitter but its engine lacked sufficient power to lift the weight of a receiver. Wireless telegraphy was the technological break-through that allowed time-critical information to be passed from an airborne observer into a fleet ‘net’ but it still took some years to evolve the system. After 1913 naval aviation developed with the procurement of seaplane carriers Civilians being which were really floating hangars and created by Royal Warrant on 13 April drop written messages to them. evacuated in HMS workshops; their aircraft used the sea 1912 to take responsibility for all These were exactly the functions Warrior. (David as their runway but their operation British military flying. It comprised the RFC performed for the BEF in Hobb’s Collection) proved to be difficult in any but the Naval and Military Wings with a 1914 but it was neither trained nor most ideal sea conditions. These were central organisation responsible equipped to perform a useful function seldom found in the North Sea. The for the training of pilots and the over the sea. An Australian Flying RAN fleet unit had no embarked development and procurement of Corps, similar to the Military Wing aviation capability in 1913 but a aircraft and engines. All three Wings RFC was established at Point Cook in number of Australians serving in the were manned by personnel seconded 1914 and was organised as a Corps of RN made significant contributions from the RN and the Army. the Australian Imperial Force. to the early development of naval The integrated RFC had many The Naval Wing in 1912 had no aviation. Among them were points of merit; surprisingly so real operational capability; a means Lieutenant Longmore, one of the first considering that none of the men of operating aircraft routinely from four qualified RN pilots, and Captain who drew up its terms of reference ships did not exist. From 1913 when Dumaresq, a gunnery expert who had any real idea what aircraft could, seaplanes could be operated to locate was one of the first senior officers or could not, actually achieve. It was enemy warships, they were time- to appreciate the value of embarked intended that pilots and aircraft from sensitive targets that required an aircraft and to insist on his own ship either Wing would reinforce the other accurate assessment of their position having the best aircraft and equipment if necessary. The Military Wing was course and speed to be passed to the available. quite capable of deploying a handful command quickly, hence the need Pre-war strategists including of aircraft as part of an expeditionary for wireless telegraphy. Unlike their Clement Ader in and Victor force on land and operating them military contemporaries, naval pilots Loughead in the USA predicted from a suitable flat surface close to the could not use map references and ships with flight decks and aircraft divisional or brigade headquarters. had to develop a means of accurate support facilities which would form The airmen could search for enemy navigation over the featureless sea the core of future fleets. Both saw forces over a wide area by day in clear to give the enemy’s position relative aviation as the third dimension of weather and, once located, the enemy to the flagship or some other agreed naval warfare rather than an isolated was likely to be either static or moving navigational ‘fixed point’; even a small force fighting its own battles but sufficiently slowly for the pilot to fly navigational error would render their many British politicians believed that back to the general and his staff and information useless. aircraft heralded a new and different give positions, including accurate The politicians who created form of warfare that would be better map references, which would remain the RFC had assumed that the two conducted within the Empire by a tactically relevant for hours or even operational Wings would integrate to unified force to avoid rivalry between days. They could also locate the exact develop new aeronautical ideas; while separate Naval and Army air arms. positions of friendly forces that were laudable in theory, the concept failed Thus the Royal Flying Corps was out of contact with headquarters and because of the different environments Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 23

they had to operate in. Aviation trials Board that so were carried out in 1913/14 under many ideas had the direction of an Admiralty Air been gained from Department, formed in November the British that 1912 to deal with all questions and any discussion of organisation relating to aircraft in the subject must commission with the Navy. Aircraft consider their flew over coastal waters in differing methods. The sea states to see if it was possible to RNAS had designed detect submarines or mines below and developed an the surface and air weapons including effective airborne torpedoes, machine-guns, darts and , the even a two-pounder cannon were Sopwith T1 to carry tested. The focus on naval activities it and the practical drew the Naval Wing away from the aircraft carrier Military Wing of the RFC and the from which they Sopwith one-and-a- Royal Navy’s air component was could be launched. Realistic training and Belgium in support of naval half Strutter launch officially recognised as the Royal Naval for a carrier-borne air attack on the operations off the enemy-occupied from HMAS Australia. Air Service, RNAS, in July 1914. The German fleet in its harbours had coast and when the RFC called for (David Hobb’s Collection) RAN had no separate aviation element begun before the war ended. help in the autumn of 1916, the RNAS but a large number of Australians Aviation was not the decisive honoured the original Naval Wing joined the RNAS and served in it with weapon that some had predicted but commitment and deployed fighter distinction. its achievements were significant. The squadrons from Dunkirk to RFC Given the forceful nature of naval attempt to force the Dardanelles control. Some of these units earned Winston Churchill, the First Lord was undoubtedly encouraged by the fame and fought with considerable of the Admiralty, the new RNAS anticipated ability of aircraft to spot distinction over the German side of quickly absorbed a number of for ships’ guns and the contribution the lines whilst integrated with RFC unconventional and unforeseen tasks of shore-based RNAS aircraft and Brigades. Other RNAS Wings were but made rapid progress. Command airships to littoral convoy defence formed to strike at German industrial Lt Cdr V A T Smith DSC and control of naval aircraft shifted was remarkably effective although targets in the Ruhr with the aim of RAN as Operations from the Admiralty Air Department not widely understood outside the reducing the amount of steel available Officer on HMS to -in-chief and area RN. Throughout the war RNAS for the construction of U-boats and Tracker. (David flag officers in 1915, helping their aircraft operated ashore in France yet others in the Mediterranean, the Hobb’s Collection) integration into naval tactics. In 1917 the post of 5th Sea Lord was established to administer air matters and an Admiral Commanding Aircraft appointed to the Grand Fleet as the focus of naval air operations. Admiral Beatty created the Grand Fleet Aeronautical Committee, an informed and influential group of senior officers to force the pace of development of embarked aviation from 1917, leading directly to the commissioning of the world’s first aircraft carrier, HMS Argus, in September 1918. Captain GW Steel USN, an observer sent to study aviation in the Grand Fleet reported to his General Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 24 Vernon Parker Oration 2013

Middle East and African theatres of not be used like sailors for ship duties operation. such as damage control and fire- In 1917 air operations became fighting. a focus of political attention with Attempts by the Admiralty arguments over the supply of material, to recover the RNAS led to a command and control. A Committee compromise agreed after a series was set up under the nominal of discussions between Admiral authority of Prime Minister Lloyd Keyes and Air Marshall Trenchard George to study the organisation of in 1924 and subsequently known as Imperial air forces but its report was the Trenchard/Keyes Agreement. effectively the work of one man, the Whilst keeping the status quo of RAF South African General Smuts, who administrative control, all observers took evidence in closed session and and telegraphist air gunners were recommended the amalgamation to be provided and trained by the of the RNAS and RFC into a single Navy and 70% of all pilots were to be air force. The post-war structure of naval officers. There was a significant aviation in the British Empire was ‘but’ however in that the pilots not the result of wartime experience, would have to have a ‘flying rank’ RAAF Meteors of therefore, but of political wrangling in addition to their naval rank and their time with the Grand Fleet and 77 Squadron being for control of air operations. serve in whichever was appropriate to attempts were made to form an RAN ferried into the Named the , their current appointment although, Air Service when they fleet returned Zone in the new service came into being in practice, they always wore their but, instead, the RAAF was formed in HMS Unicorn. (David on 1 April 1918 and focused on naval uniform. The term Fleet Air 1921 charged, like its UK role model, Hobb’s Collection) the activities of its larger element, Arm was a positive outcome of the with providing seaplanes for operation the former RFC. By October 1918 Agreement, the previous title of ‘RAF from warships. The seaplane carrier Admiral Beatty was complaining that Detachments in HM Ships’ being Albatross was partly the result of the RAF was failing to provide for the considered rather long-winded. political pressure to provide domestic growing air requirements of his Grand In the USA similar arguments for ship-building work but also the Fleet. Between 1918 and 1939 the a unified air service were voiced and response to Admiralty advice that the Admiralty and the Air Ministry shared in 1925 President Coolidge set up a Australian Squadron must be self- control of the aircraft embarked President’s Air Committee to look into sufficient in aircraft to be viable. in the growing number of British the subject with Dwight D Morrow, By 1933 the Admiralty had a aircraft carriers with the former a prominent lawyer, as chairman. clear concept of what it wanted from retaining operational control at sea The Morrow Board, as it was known, naval aviation and the dynamic Rear but the latter having administrative rejected these arguments, retained the Admiral Henderson, a former carrier control ashore, including the training navy’s air arm and recommended that captain, was appointed Rear Admiral of pilots and the procurement of only pilots should be given command Aircraft Carriers. Among the many aircraft. The cost of this less-than- of aircraft carriers and naval air changes he forced through was the ideal organisation was borne by the stations ashore. This encouraged replacement, in 1933, of six-aircraft Admiralty. The British Government many senior officers, some in their flights by operational squadrons with insisted that the embryo RAF be late forties including ‘Bull’ Halsey, to twelve or more aircraft numbered in given five years to settle in after 1919 learn to fly and ensured that aviation the 800 series, the system that is still but by the end of that time the policy was given the prominence it deserved used in the RN and RAN today. that all pilots should be capable of all before the outbreak of war. The Board By 1937 dual-control was clearly roles with time at sea considered as established the aviation structure of unworkable and the Admiralty made a temporary detachment meant that the USN including carrier air wings, a further bid to regain full control of most of the carriers’ time at sea was shore-based aircraft and specialised its air element. Sir Thomas Inskip, spent training new pilots who would training that endures to this day. like Morrow an eminent lawyer, was be lost to naval aviation after a few Australia, Melbourne and Sydney had Minister for Defence Co-ordination months and air mechanics who could all embarked RNAS aircraft during and in a judgement subsequently Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 25

known as the Inskip Award he larger Commonwealth formations stated that naval aircraft and their with RAAF squadrons embedded crews were a great deal more than in Coastal, Bomber and Fighter passengers in a convenient vehicle; Commands of the RAF based in the that a pilot in the Fleet Air Arm would UK. The RAN operated with the RN no longer need to be an Air Force in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and officer and that the Admiralty should Middle East Stations, with the US enjoy a more decisive voice in settling forces in the South West Pacific area the type of machine suitable for naval later in the war and with the British use. Pacific Fleet, BPF, which joined the The Admiralty was given two years US Fifth and Third Fleets for the to take over full control of the aircraft assault on the Japanese homeland in which flew from ships including their 1945. The BPF was miss-named, and procurement and shore support and could more accurately be described did so two months before the deadline. as the Commonwealth Pacific Fleet However, Inskip ruled that the shore since it relied heavily on Australia, based maritime aircraft which formed and for its Coastal Command should remain a composition. part of the RAF as they had important In Australia, the RAN and RAAF secondary functions including provided the BPF with bases, airfields, force where and when needed and Flight Commander R A Little DSC RNAS. bombing and troop transport which ships and, latterly, replacement to regroup for diverse, different (David Hobb’s he considered, on the advice before pilots who volunteered to transfer objectives afterwards. Collection) him, to be incompatible with naval from the RAAF to the RANVR to As three-dimensional operations operations. The ruling applied not fly RN aircraft from carriers. Many came to dominate the activities of only to the RN and RAF but was subsequently joined the RAN Fleet navies, the RAN found itself out of adopted by the Services throughout Air Arm. The naval aircraft of 1945 step in 1945 in that, based on a force the Commonwealth which evolved improved dramatically over earlier of cruisers and it could from them. Thus the Morrow and types. Carrier-borne aircraft had no longer form a viable task force on H MAS Sydney in the Inskip judgements are responsible for been seen as purely naval assets in its own. Negotiations to borrow two Yellow Sea as part of the different structures of the US and 1939, intended to support the battle new light fleet carriers from the RN an Allied Task Force Commonwealth naval air arms to this fleet in operations far out at sea but by had begun in 1944 but were slowed refuelling from RFA day. 1945 the allied fast carrier task forces by Prime Minister Curtin’s suspicion Wave Premier with the USS Hannah and HMS Before the Second World War demonstrated a more comprehensive that the Admiralty was merely trying Aler. (David Hobb’s the RAF had concentrated on the capability, able to concentrate to solve its own manpower crisis by Collection) development of a strategic bombing force to emphasise its independence with the result that tactical aviation in support of naval and land warfare had atrophied. The RN Fleet Air Arm was small and despite the success of operations in and the Mediterranean in 1940, it was unable to expand until significant numbers of ‘hostilities only’ pilots and technical ratings reached the squadrons in 1941. It was a maritime conflict in which the allies used an expeditionary strategy to attack the enemy at their point of choice. Australian forces operated as integrated elements of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 26 Vernon Parker Oration 2013

obtaining Australian sailors to man ships that could not otherwise be brought into service. Agreement was finally reached in February 1945 when the BPF arrived in Sydney but by then it was too late for the ships to be transferred in time to see action and the plan was eventually shelved. After 1945 the UK Government could not afford to donate carriers to the RAN but offered to sell two to the RAN for the construction cost of one plus the cost of their initial outfits of stores in 1947. After a study led by the then VAT Smith DSC RAN, who had served with Fleet Air Arm F-35B taking off from as an observer during the war, the nations’ ability to deploy aircraft as only been in existence formally the USS Wasp. (David offer was accepted and HMS Terrible, part of a maritime strategy. Similar since 1948, had done extremely well, Hobb’s Collection) under construction in Devonport arguments were deployed later in albeit with a little help from the RN. Dockyard, was completed and handed the UK and succeeded in diverting Sydney flew her aircraft in support over to the RAN in 1948 as HMAS Phantom fighters ordered for the of the naval blockade of North Sydney, perpetuating a famous name. RN to operate from the carrier Eagle Korea, on combat air patrol over The second ship, Melbourne, was and a number of Buccaneer strike the fleet, tactical ground attack and completed at a slower pace so that aircraft to the RAF which was to reconnaissance missions in support she could incorporate new technical operate them from land bases as part of allied troops ashore and strategic advances including the steam catapult, of a scheme named the Tactical Air strikes against logistics, road and rail angled deck and mirror landing aid, Support of Maritime Operations or communications including bridges. emerging in 1955 as one of the first TASMO by politicians who wanted The latter were integrated into an air- three ships to have them built in the big-deck carriers to be scrapped targeting scheme co-ordinated by the during construction rather than retro- quickly. A more apt name would have US 5th Air Force. fitted later. The two carriers formed been Removal of Air Support from Sydney’s usefulness did not end an important element of Australian Maritime Operations since the aircraft with the Korean War although maritime capability for three decades sat uselessly on their UK airfields financial restrictions prevented and increased the nation’s standing, while Sea Harriers in Hermes and her being modernised to the same both with allies and potential Invincible fought in the South Atlantic standard as Melbourne. In 1961 the adversaries. War of 1982. Australian Chiefs of Staff agreed to Despite the ships’ obvious value, HMAS Sydney relieved HMS bring her out of reserve and refit her the RAAF spoke against their Glory off Korea in 1951, the first for service as a fast troop transport procurement at the time as being Australian carrier to go into action. as a short-term expedient to improve not in the best interests of defence On only her fifth day of operations, the ADF’s strategic mobility. She did but the Prime Minister accepted the Commander Fell led her air group not embark assault helicopters like new capability, based on the role to equal the record for the largest her RN and USN contemporaries in models in the UK and USA, as part number of aircraft sorties yet flown the LPH role but gave valuable service of a five-year defence plan. This by a light fleet carrier in a single day carrying out 25 ferry trips to Vietnam opposition is difficult to understand and her performance was judged by between 1965 and 1972 with men and in retrospect because it appears that her RN and USN contemporaries, equipment from every element of the men who considered themselves to with their extensive wartime carrier ADF. She was withdrawn from service be proponents of air power spent experience, as quite excellent. The for the last time at unexpectedly short time and effort in trying to limit the RAN’s Fleet Air Arm, which had notice in 1973; an example, perhaps, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 27

of politicians identifying a ship with a were the only means of providing conflicts. They could not be more single role without comprehending its tactical aviation. wrong and I could spend hours giving full capability. The RAF aircraft allocated for examples of aircraft carrier operations Melbourne remained in service TASMO duties stayed on their UK in a broad range of crises. Examples until 1982 with arguments about her airfields and played no part but, include the 1961 Suez Crisis when replacement that mirrored debates fortunately the RAF’s Harrier ground Bulwark acted not only as an LPH in the USA and UK. She never saw could be operated from but used its radar both to direct RAF action but for nearly three decades a carrier and several were deployed fighters from Bahrain and to provide her latent capabilities underpinned south with air-to-air refuelling to an air traffic control service for RAF Australia’s maritime capability. In embark in Hermes and support the transport aircraft as they arrived in her time she operated the first all- Sea Harriers in the ground attack role. the Northern Gulf. In the 1956 Suez weather fighters to go into service Thus a medium-sized carrier was not Crisis two thirds of the tactical fighters anywhere in the southern hemisphere, only able to take its own air group into were operated from land bases in sophisticated anti-submarine aircraft action but to take other aircraft to the and Cyprus and one third from and helicopters and, latterly, the very fight as well, just as RN carriers had British and French carriers. Analysis capable A-4 Skyhawk strike aircraft. previously taken RAF aircraft to the of the results show that two thirds Her ability to provide humanitarian action in Norway, Malta, the Far East of the strike sorties were actually relief was demonstrated in December and a number of ‘brush-fire’ actions flown from the carriers and only 1974 when she used her helicopters after 1945. The 1982 deployment one third from land bases because to support Darwin after it was hit by succeeded on a diplomatic level with the carriers could be positioned Cyclone ‘Tracy’. Her withdrawal in the highly publicised departure from ideally within reasonable distance 1982 left a serious gap in Australian Portsmouth; on a strategic level with of the designated targets. Balkan maritime capabilities and the the ability to deploy a balanced force operations during the 1990s revealed RAN’s Fleet Air Arm became an over 8,000 miles from the UK and on a similar imbalance with the British all-helicopter force with Seahawks a tactical level with the ability to fly Government insisting that a carrier and Sea Kings in the front line which many different types of aircraft from remained in range of British troops on were able to operate from most of the different services on different missions the ground since shore-based aircraft surface combatants and auxiliaries around the clock. Hermes spent 108 were often grounded by bad weather in the anti-submarine, surface search days continuously at sea, not bad for a and could not be relied upon. Since and what has come to be known as sea ship that was dismissed by politicians 1945 Commonwealth carriers have control roles. in 1966 as being too small for effective rescued helpless civilians from war In the UK, the deployment of HM use in an overseas intervention. zones; evacuated wounded nationals; Ships Hermes and Invincible in the Some years later, and on a smaller protected nations at short notice task force sent to the South Atlantic to scale, the deployment of Army Air that had asked for help, deployed liberate the Falkland Islands in 1982 Corps Apache gunship helicopters peace-keepers and their equipment, provides a very clear example of how to the British LPH Ocean for action and carried out a host of other tasks big-deck ships can respond quickly to over Libya in 2011 showed another that have continued to vindicate the Sea King helicopter being refuelled in unexpected emergencies. Hermes was example of how flexible such ships statement by Captain Fell with which flight. Courtesy of actually in refit when the crisis broke can be in placing the right amount I started this talk. Their very presence Seapower Centre - in late March but she was prepared of force in the right place and, more off Indonesia during Confrontation Australia for action, stored and sailed from importantly, sustaining it in action for Portsmouth as flagship of the task a long time if necessary. These big- force on 5 April, by which time she deck ships provided politicians with had embarked her own reinforced Sea an option they would not, otherwise, Harrier and Sea King squadrons and a have had and which, sadly, some of commando assault Sea King squadron them might not even have known plus a number of Royal Marines’ their nation possessed. commando units and their equipment. Some commentators think that Without the two carriers the mission aircraft carriers can only be used in a would not have been possible as they limited number of scenarios in major Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 28 Vernon Parker Oration 2013

and off Belize deterred aggressors and Conference, prevented conflict. the Chief of A historical appreciation of the Air Force, contribution of naval air power to the national strategy published by the Geoff Brown, Sea Power Centre-Australia in 2008 stated that the noted that such ships were not only RAAF was the weapons system that had supplied committed most of the air support for amphibious to supporting operations around the world since the full range 1939, but that the placement of of Navy carriers close to the centre of activities and operations improved the flexibility the Maritime with which command, control and Strategy. communications could be exercised Further, concurrently. Fighters that rely on RN Sea Harriers and by all arms and responses to tactical he observed that Australia is tankers to operate at extreme range RAF Harriers on HMS situations could be made swiftly surrounded by air as well as sea in this way cannot react quickly or Hermes’ flight deck in and effectively with the minimum of and that the RAN’s ability to secure flexibly to unexpected threats and only 1982. (David Hobb’s Collection) resources concentrated where they the nation’s approaches and sea have value while their weapons last. matters most. The Paper concluded lines of communication represent There is little point in maintaining by noting that the procurement of a fundamental contribution to the a fighter on station if it fires out its the two new ships of the Canberra defence of Australia. He informed weapons in the first few minutes after class will provide the ADF with an the audience that the air contribution arrival. unprecedented capability to project to the new amphibious capability Perhaps airfields on friendly military force from the sea. will comprise a number of roles territory or islands near the focus of They can, in my opinion, do even including the provision of intelligence, action can be negotiated or seized more than that as part of a maritime surveillance and reconnaissance but does Australia have the logistic strategy that makes use of the sea information; strike; air mobility and and engineering capacity to develop and the air above it to provide the the control of the air, complementing them at short notice into bases while broadest range of capabilities at the principal roles of sea power. the focus of strike fighter, tanker and the time and place of Australia’s In answer to questions the Chief of AEW & C activity is over the task choosing. The future is unknowable Navy, Vice Admiral , stated force at sea? Will the air warfare and it would, surely, be wise to that a lot of work needed to be done destroyers be able to defend the ensure that the LHDs can be used before unmanned air vehicles could bases as well as the task force? Can to their full potential in the national be procured for operations with the Australia, if necessary alone, supply interest. They are, of course, perfectly fleet and that it was not Government a temporary base in addition to capable of landing and sustaining a policy to include fixed-wing STOVL the seaborne task force itself with peace-keeping force but they may fighters in the potential air groups to sufficient fuel, weapons, maintenance be required to go further into harm’s be embarked in the new LHDs. The facilities spare aircrew and their needs way to land military forces against Chief of Air Force’s enthusiasm for for command, control and briefing sophisticated opposition and it is not the maritime strategy is heartening in a timely manner? Can such a beyond the realm of possibility that but the ability of land-based fighters base be realistically defended? If they may have to fight a hostile three- to sustain operations for any length these capabilities do exist, they are dimensional enemy for control of seas of time beyond the Australian littoral impressive but if they do not, dare that are vital to Australian interests must, surely, be open to question. I point out that once Canberra and with, or without allies. Should this Their radius of action can be extended Adelaide are in service, they will be at happen, limitations placed on the full by in-flight refuelling but prolonged the focal point of the action, just like potential of these ships might not have operations would lock up much Hermes in 1982. They will bring flight been such a clever idea. of the tanker force and prevent it decks, bulk fuel, accommodation, At the 2012 Australian Sea power from carrying out its transport role workshops, magazines, technical Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 29

sailors and command, control and good and bad ideas; the many uses the capital ships of the twenty-first logistic support for a broad range of to which big-deck ships can be put century. Remember the words of tactical aircraft. In short, they are within a maritime strategy are among Captain Mike Fell with which I started a mobile and effective air base with the very good ones. Multi-purpose and imagine all the ways Canberra command and control facilities that ‘flat-tops’ like the LHDs equip many of and Adelaide can achieve their can move over vast distances quickly the world’s navies, arguably becoming aim. t and then perform any operational task assigned to them. Strike fighters have important roles to play in expeditionary operations, integrated alongside embarked helicopters and long-range, high- endurance aircraft based ashore. The US Marine Corps must be considered the primary role model and it does not believe that shore-based fighters can support the full spectrum of maritime operations. The ADF will have to work with the Corps closely and the STOVL F-35B Lightning II was designed for the USMC to operate alongside helicopters in ships similar to the new Canberra and cross-deck STOVL operations must, surely, be considered important. The F-35B is not without major problems but it is being produced for the USMC, RN and RAF. Before Australia orders production Lightnings, the significant increase in integrated performance the STOVL version would give an Australian task force ought to be considered. Without such a discussion Project Air 6000 is unlikely to deliver the maximum potential for Australia’s maritime SMARTER AND SAFER strategy and one has to question the judgement of those who dismiss UNDERWATER SOLUTIONS embarked capability too readily. More immediately, the F/A-18F already operated by the RAAF was ...Since the beginning designed for carrier operation with the US Navy; could detachments be embarked in USN carriers to augment the tactical fighter force and illustrate For more information, please contact: [email protected] allied resolve when necessary. There www.thalesgroup.com.au have been precedents with UK, French Photograph © Australian Department of Defence and Argentinean fighters operating from US carriers for short periods. The past is full of examples of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 30 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy Lowy Institute Analysis By James Brown and Rory Medcalf

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Australia’s new government must make tough decisions in defence policy. Australia’s broad national interests and the challenging strategic environment in Indo-Pacific Asia make it essential to modernise the . The nation’s defence capabilities remain underfunded and its strategic edge in the region is eroding. The gap between the nation’s interests and capabilities is widening, and it is getting harder to meet the demands of the US alliance. Australia’s new government needs to restore focus and funding to defence. The government will need a first- principles review to identify the military strategy and force structure required to protect and advance the nation’s interests. It will need to increase funding or be prepared to make drastic cuts to defence capability, with full awareness of the risks. It must also think deeply about the role of the US alliance in Australia’s security, and take the initiative in shaping that alliance in Australia’s interests.

t’s unlikely that many Australians the rise of China spared a thought for defence issues is changing Iat the polls on 7 September 2013. Just relations over five per cent of voters rate defence between as an important political issue.1 The major powers, 2013 election saw little pressure on resulting either party to present detailed or in greater even coherent defence policies.2 Yet competition Australia’s new Coalition government and mistrust under Prime Minister and raising the will need to make tough decisions likelihood of that will have long-term effects on the confrontation, nation’s security, power and influence coercion, and in the world. Failure to do so will be a perhaps even consequential choice in itself. The new war. Australia’s government will need to take major military edge government spending. As a proportion R eplacement steps to address the serious funding in its neighbourhood is slipping of overall national wealth, measured submarines? A Collins-class and structural problems in Australia’s as military technologies change by gross domestic product, it is (at submarines Weapons defence policy. and countries with faster-growing 1.6%) close to its lowest level since the Compartment (RAN 3 Just as Australia faces large economies spend more on their armed 1930s. photo) economic challenges, so too are long- forces. Australia’s alliance with the Both major political parties have held assumptions about the nation’s is being reshaped in agreed that Australia’s future military security in flux. In Indo-Pacific Asia, ways that will place new burdens on capabilities will include many elements Australia. And even after a decade of Force 2030, a modernised defence 1 Defence and national security not on voter’s radar. Roy Morgan of foreign deployments, Australia’s force to be constructed over the next Research, 26 April 2013: http://www. military will need to be ready for a two decades, outlined in the Rudd roymorganonlinestore.com/News/ wide range of new contingencies. government’s 2009 Defence White Defence-and-national-security-not-on- voters%E2%80%99-radar.aspx. Any further decline, or even Paper and largely endorsed in the 2 Though security issues like East Timor, continued stagnation, in Australian the 9/11 attacks, the War and the 3 David Watt and Alan Payne, Trends use of the navy to stop asylum seekers defence spending would imperil its in defence expenditure since 1901, have played into some previous election ability to respond to these challenges. Parliamentary Library budget review: campaigns, in the 2013 election defence http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ was not a prominent issue, to the point that Australia’s defence budget has Parliamentary_Departments/ the did not release a been shrinking as a proportion of Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/ formal election policy document. BudgetReview201314/DefenceExpenditure. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 31

Gillard government’s 2013 version. Yet real doubts remain that this aspirational force will ever be realised. At a time when security experts show a rare degree of unanimity on the alarming state of defence policy, it is not clear that political leaders are assigning it a high enough priority. This is most evident when looking at the state of Australia’s defence budget. The new government will need either to set out a credible plan to boost defence spending or begin serious cuts to capabilities and personnel. This Lowy Institute Analysis details some of the key defence international order, stability among security tensions remain unresolved, Will the Alliance be enough? USS policy decisions that Australia’s new powerful nations in Asia and the including over maritime sovereignty. Nimitz’s Maritza government must make, notably strategic imperatives and choices of Nationalism, resource pressures, Chavez explains in three areas: what it wants the its powerful ally the United States. For military modernisation and strategic operations to ABET Australian Defence Force (ADF) to all these reasons, Australia’s interests mistrust are reinforcing each other Sam Whitfield from be capable of doing; how it is going to extend well beyond the immediate in dangerous ways. The probability HMAS Toowoomba pay for a force that can deliver such physical security of its citizens and of armed conflict involving major during an exchange programme. (USN options; and what the future of the US the protection of its territory. An powers in Asia remains small, but has photo) alliance means for both of these issues. Australian government could choose become more thinkable than it was This is not intended to be an exhaustive to define its national security interests five years ago. For all of the upsides of study. Forthcoming Lowy Institute narrowly in order to justify reduced economic growth, disruptive societal research will consider more detailed defence spending. But that would make and technological change is making reform, force posture and strategic Australia a very different country, one the behaviour of major countries in the options for Australia’s defence. What no longer capable of contributing to region less predictable. This period of this Analysis will underline is the clear international coalitions or otherwise heightened risk and uncertainty will disconnect between, on the one hand, influencing its strategic environment. continue for many years, and could the increasingly complex strategic That strategic environment is also worsen. environment Australia faces, and its becoming more challenging. Australian In all of this, the probability of an broad strategic interests, and, on the interests now extend through much of adversary attacking Australian interests other hand, the low priority both sides the Indo-Pacific, and that broad region or territory remains low. But it is of politics accord to defence policy and is entering a phase of geopolitical not zero. If strategic circumstances funding. uncertainty and change.4 The rise of changed further, it is conceivable China, and to a lesser extent India, is that another country might attempt Broad national interests unsettling the Asian strategic order. to constrain Australia’s choices or Australia has broad national interests. Economic and political dysfunction threaten its interests through force. It has one of the world’s largest zones is worsening across a range of Conflict between major powers in our of maritime jurisdiction. The country countries, and multiple interstate region, even one that did not directly is located far from most of its friends involve Australia, would have profound 4 Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific: what’s and allies and is not a member of in a name? In Reports from a turbulent implications for Australian interests. any closely aligned regional bloc. Its decade, edited by Michael Fullilove and Plausible scenarios include armed Anthony Bubalo. Melbourne, Penguin prosperity and security depend highly confrontation between China and Australia, 2013, pp154-157. On the extent on seaborne commodity exports, of geopolitical change, see for instance: Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam secure sea lines of communication, Global trends 2030: alternative worlds. over maritime disputes, with the United States National Intelligence Council, global flows of trade, finance, December 2012: http://www.dni.gov/ prospect of the United States being information and people, a rules-based index.php/about/organization/national- drawn into one or more of these intelligence-council-global-trends. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 32 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy Lowy Institute Analysis conflicts. A security crisis or even sophisticated reconnaissance systems. expected conflict conflict on the Korean Peninsula Technology is shifting the balance. warning times. remains an ever-present prospect. Disruptive military innovation has The army, for Australia also faces an enduring seen the development of offensive one, has already range of security challenges in its capabilities that are relatively cheap signalled that nearer neighbourhood. Various South to acquire and deploy. Maintaining without further Pacific island states along with East a regional defence edge is now more augmentation it Timor will remain prone to severe difficult for Australia and the ADF will will not be able H ow many are governance problems, resource and need to raise its levels of capability, or to concurrently 7 needed? F-35 JSF population pressures, natural disasters, face a relative decline. sustain separate brigade and battle STOVL with lift-fan and the effects of climate change. Australia’s military capability is group sized deployments, as open (Defence Piracy, illegal fishing and the smuggling also eroding in absolute terms. After a mandated by government.10 The Industries) of people, weapons and drugs will also decade of foreign deployments, much inefficient defence estate, paucity need to be tackled. And the threat of of the ADF’s equipment is worn and of naval engineering capability, and terrorism has not gone away; it will requires replacing.8 The impact of the underdeveloped national defence pose a persistent threat to Australians. 10.5 per cent budget cut levied by the infrastructure are also jeopardising Gillard government in 2012 is only current capability and future force Living on the defence edge now being understood. Maintenance, modernisation plans. For decades, Australian defence policy logistics, and training are underfunded. has assumed that the country had a Some capabilities, such as tanks, have Defibrillating Force 2030 strategic edge over other militaries been effectively mothballed. Whilst In recent years both sides of politics in the region by virtue of its access the ADF looks largely the same, its have shared essentially the same vision to advanced defence technology and preparedness has been affected with for a future modernised ADF – Force the 13th largest defence budget in fewer platforms and capabilities 2030. Unveiled in the 2009 Defence the world. This is clearly starting to at a level of readiness necessary to White Paper, and largely reaffirmed in change. The 2013 Defence White provide options for government. This the 2013 Defence White Paper, Force Paper concluded that ‘over the next is particularly risky for a small and 2030 has been envisioned as ‘a stronger, three decades, Australia’s relative already finely calibrated force. In 2012, more agile and harder-hitting defence strategic weight will be challenged the then defence secretary issued a force’ with the ‘necessary combat as the major Asian states continue to stark warning: ‘as things stand I don’t weight and reach to be able to operate grow their economies and modernise think we are structured or postured with decisive effect against credible their military forces.’5 Analysis by appropriately to meet our likely adversaries.’11 This force structure the Australian Treasury concludes: strategic circumstances in the future.’9 was largely seen to reflect concern ‘If both we and other countries were The ADF may have already about the power of a rising China, to maintain military spending as a reached a point where short term 10 Land Warfare Development Centre, constant share of GDP, other countries’ savings measures have caused some The Army Objective Force 2030 Primer. higher growth rates would lead their military capabilities to decline Puckapunyal, Commonwealth of Australia, 2011 states ‘In order to meet military capability to grow more below their regeneration point for the requirements of strategic guidance rapidly than our own.’6 7 Department of Defence, Defence White – to deploy and sustain a brigade sized Paper 2013. Canberra, Commonwealth of force engaged in combat operations Although Australia still has a Australia, May 2013, p 14 for a prolonged period of time while more professional military than its 8 For example, the army’s fleet of light simultaneously deploying a battle group armoured vehicles has seriously deteriorated sized force – the AOF 2030 will need neighbours, some countries in the after a decade of constant use in Iraq to restructure and augment the current region are acquiring advanced fighters and Afghanistan, see LTGEN Morrison force. In the absence of augmentation, comments on ASLAV fleet in Parliament the AOF 2030 will be unable to sustain and submarines, and developing of Australia, Hansard transcripts, Senate the concurrency as detailed in strategic 5 Department of Defence, Defence White budget estimates, 13 February 2013, p 62: guidance’, p 42. Available at: http://www. Paper 2013. Canberra, Commonwealth of http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_ army.gov.au/Our-future/~/media/Files/ Australia, May 2013, p 15. Business/Senate_Estimates/fadtctte/ Our%20future/Publications/Army%20 6 Christine Duke and Cameron McKean, estimates/add1213/index AOF%202030.ashx Alternative methodologies for projecting 9 Duncan Lewis, Talking dollars and 11 Department of Defence, Defending defence spending. Economic Roundup, strategy: the challenging link to defence Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force (2) 2008: http://archive.treasury.gov. planning. Speech to Australian Strategic 2030, Defence White Paper 2009. Canberra, au/documents/1396/HTML/docshell. Policy Institute Annual Dinner, 23 August Commonwealth of Australia, May 2009, p asp?URL=01_Defence_spending.htm. 2012. 63. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 33

and anticipated the acquisition of makes it more costly in the end. The military force structure, deferral about 100 advanced ‘fifth-generation’ acquisition cost of modern defence and underfunding is making it look strike aircraft, 12 submarines, and a equipment grows at approximately more like a mirage. Neither side of large number of surface ships armed 4 per cent.15 Even if Australia were politics has fundamentally revisited with land-attack cruise missiles. This to increase defence funding in line either the rationale for Force 2030’s vision of the ADF has been repeatedly with long-term GDP growth rates force structure or its feasibility resuscitated over the past four years, by (calculated at 2.7 per cent a year), for should increased defence funding not both sides of politics as well as by much each year that the construction of Force eventuate. of the security establishment. 2030 continues to be deferred the scale Force 2030 has been estimated to of underfunding will be magnified.16 Three steps to tackling tough cost up to $275 billion to build over In the 2013 election, the main defence choices the next two decades - requiring defence ‘promise’ made by both sides This pattern of delay and denial is not more than $146 billion in additional was to increase defence funding a sustainable basis for the nation’s funding beyond anticipated annual from 1.6 per cent to 2 per cent of defence policy. Australia must face up defence budgets.12 Yet in the four years GDP, presumably to fund the core to some tough defence choices. As our since Force 2030 was announced, capabilities of Force 2030. The allies and partners are already learning, only $18 billion of funding has Coalition promised to ‘cauterise when it comes to defence you cannot been committed to new defence the hemorrhage’ caused by Labor’s have it all. New Zealand has accepted capabilities. This is partly because the 2011-12 cuts, and then ‘return to the a smaller, value-for-money military Defence Department has lacked the aspiration of 2 per cent of GDP and structured around a joint amphibious institutional capacity to process such a 3 per cent real growth in the Defence task force. The bow wave of spending. But, critically, Budget.’17 Then opposition leader and France have reduced their it is also because under short-term Tony Abbott subsequently promised expeditionary forces and even begun political pressures the Rudd and that ‘defence spending will be 2 per sharing some capabilities. Canada Gillard governments began deferring cent of GDP’ within a decade.18 The is reconsidering large purchases like much of their own plans to modernise then prime minister, Kevin Rudd, the Joint Strike Fighter and trying to the nation’s military, delaying or committed Labor to ‘sustained defence redefine its area of strategic interest. cutting more than $20 billion in expenditure at 2 per cent of GDP’, but The US Quadrennial Defense Review defence investment.13 Most security without giving a timeframe.19 next year is expected to be ‘radical and experts believe that Force 2030 is now ThoughForce 2030 has remained reformist’,20 and a just-completed US unachievable – one estimates that in the vision for Australia’s future Strategic Choices and Management the next decade alone an additional $33 Review lays out an austere choice for billion beyond current defence budget 15 Christine Duke and Cameron McKean, defence planners – reduce military Alternative methodologies for projecting projections will be required to meet defence spending. Economic Roundup, readiness or investment in new the capability aspirations of the 2013 (2) 2008: http://archive.treasury.gov. capabilities.21 au/documents/1396/HTML/docshell. 14 Defence White Paper. asp?URL=01_Defence_spending.htm. Yet in Australia few of these types Part of the challenge is that each 16 The reasury,T Intergenerational report of tough defence choices have been 2010. Canberra, Commonwealth of year the latest defence equipment Australia, 2010, p 4: http://archive.treasury. discussed, much less made. Few becomes more complex and more gov.au/igr/igr2010/report/pdf/IGR_2010. Australian politicians show a sustained pdf. expensive, so deferring modernisation 17 Senator , Speech to interest in defence. There is presently to save money in the short-term the Lowy Institute for International no distinct school of defence thinking Policy. Sydney, 29 April 2013: http://www. 12 Department of Defence, Answers lowyinstitute.org/publications/coalition- on either side of politics, unlike to questions on notice, Senate budget defence-policy-speech-lowy-institute. estimates, 3 - 4 June 2009, p 28: http://www. 18 Tony Abbott, Campaign launch speech. 20 Squeezing the Pentagon: the wrong aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Senate_ 25 August 2013: http://www.smh.com. way to cut America’s military budget. Estimates/fadtctte/estimates/bud0910/def/ au/federal-politics/federal-election-2013/ The Economist, 6 July 2013: http:// index tony-abbotts-campaign-launch- www.economist.com/news/united- 13 Mark Thomson, Defence funding in speech-full-transcript-20130825-2sjhc. states/21580460-wrong-way-cut-americas- 2013: means, ends and make believe. html#ixzz2d4Lxa9nd. military-budget-squeezing-pentagon. Security Challenges 9 (2) 2013, pp 51-58. 19 Kevin Rudd, Transcript of Prime Minister 21 Chuck Hagel, Statement on Strategic 14 Mark Thomson, The cost of defence: ASPI Kevin Rudd, question and answer session. Choices and Management Review. US defence budget brief 2013-2014. Canberra, Lowy Institute for International Policy, Department of Defense, 31 July 2013: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May Sydney, Australia, 27 August 2013: http:// http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech. 2013. www.kevinrudd.org.au/latest4_270813. aspx?speechid=1798 Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 34 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy Lowy Institute Analysis previously when Labor was associated landscape amounts to a needless within a hollowed defence force will be with the ‘defence of Australia’ accumulation of risk. This is not only more apparent. Tactical fixes will no doctrine while the Coalition placed about hedging against the strategic risk longer suffice. greater emphasis on expeditionary of a breakdown in the peace. It is also Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s views operations. Over the past six years of about hedging against the political risk on defence policy are almost entirely Labor government, only Kevin Rudd of being caught without options when unknown to the public, and appear showed an active interest in shaping national interests are at stake. largely unformed at this stage. Defence military strategy. Despite the release Historically most Australian Minister David Johnston possesses of a National Security Strategy and a political leaders have only engaged on deep knowledge of technical and Defence White Paper in 2013, neither strategic military issues in reaction personnel issues, but is only beginning former defence minister Stephen to a crisis or strategic shock. This to articulate views on strategic-level Smith nor prime minister Julia Gillard neglect has often proved risky. The military issues, such as what the offered much by way of their views on 1999 East Timor experience of ADF and major assets like its new the strategic purpose of the nation’s being caught with a defence force amphibious assault ships should be military. In the last parliament, the few unprepared to deploy still resonates used for and why.24 occasions when defence was discussed deeply. Then, prime minister John So what then should the new were dominated by relatively trivial Howard and defence chiefs were able government focus on when it comes to issues such as travel leave for soldiers, to use tactical fixes to ‘adapt rapidly defence policy? Our recommendations ministerial movements on the air and get it “right on the night”’ in what are threefold. First, before deciding force VIP fleet, the carbon footprint the current Chief of Army has called on how much to spend on defence of the ADF, and the future of part- ‘a triumph of improvisation rather the new government should decide time military bands.22 Even debate on than professional mastery.’23 But in what it wants the ADF to be able to military involvement in Afghanistan the years since, warfare has become do in the decades ahead. This will was overly focused on platitudes and more technologically complex, help determine whether a substantial tactics. There has been a bipartisan and more reliant on interoperable change of direction of force structure lack of political focus on the priority systems and weapons that take years from Force 2030 is in order. Second, decisions needed to build and maintain to develop and master. During the the new government should commit an effective military force. Howard era Australia had a high the additional funds necessary to chart There also seems a reluctance degree of flexibility about when and a credible path towards Force 2030, or to face up to the gathering weight what niche military contributions it alternatively make the tough decisions of risks and expectations in the could contribute to allied campaigns. to reduce the ADF’s force structure and changing strategic picture, and the Strategy was set in Washington, capabilities to match what it is willing challenges of crafting a defence and not Canberra. In an Asian century to spend. Third, some deep thinking strategic policy to match. Policy and with the US rebalance to Asia, on the future direction of the US statements, public speeches, and Australia’s future possible military alliance is required, including to shape published official assessments are deployments alongside the United America’s rebalance to Asia in ways optimistic or euphemistic about the States are more likely to be in its region that suit Australia’s interests. region’s future, exuding confidence and therefore will be more strategic. that the United States and China will Australia’s military deployments with What should Australia’s manage their differences and that the United States will also be less military be able to do? there will be warning time for major discretionary than those of the last Senior military leaders and defence strategic change. Continued neglect decade, in which Australia had great civilians have privately made clear of military strategy at a time of great flexibility in choosing what forces to that more detailed military strategic change, uncertainty, and complexity contribute and when. Under such guidance is needed from politicians. in the regional and global geopolitical circumstances, capability shortfalls In the end, only political leaders can choose what military options will be 22 Philip Ruddock, Support for army reserve 23 Lieutenant General David Morrison, bands. Motion in the Australian Parliament, Seapower Conference 2012. Address to 18 June 2012: http://www.philipruddock. the Seapower 24 David Wroe, War footing: Minister eyes com/BerowraElectorate/Speeches/tabid/78/ Conference, Sydney, Australia, 31 January next hotspot. Sydney Morning Herald, 21 articleType/ArticleView/articleId/1647/ 2012: http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/ September 2013: http://www.smh.com.au/ Motion-Support-for-Army-Reserve-Bands- Speeches-and-transcripts/Seapower- national/war-footing-minister-eyes-next- 18-Jun-12.aspx. Conference-2012. hotspot-20130920-2u5dm.html. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 35

required to pursue national policy seem radical and imaginative options be particular pressure on the United goals. Rather than just discuss what for the ADF, such as a step-change States to assist its allies, Japan or major weapons systems the ADF investment in unmanned systems, the Philippines, should this occur. should acquire, a more detailed must be considered. The new white Many conceivable crisis scenarios in discussion is needed at the political paper should incorporate thorough Asia involve coercion being brought level of what contingencies those independent analysis, in a similar to bear on a US partner or ally, capabilities may actually be needed for. fashion to the US Quadrennial Defense leading to one of three outcomes: There are some reasons why Review, and conclusions should be the coercion is not resisted, in which politicians may be reticent to discuss publically justified against other case a troubling precedent is set in military contingencies: to protect alternatives. At the end of the defence the regional order; the United States diplomatic relations; to preserve white paper process, the political supports its partner or ally, leading secrecy for national security; or leadership should be able to clearly to an armed confrontation or face- because military professionals are articulate what military options it off that is managed without war; or better qualified than they are to expects the ADF to provide, and in there is escalation to war. All such formulate strategy. However, none of what range of contingencies. Here are outcomes would have implications these stands up to scrutiny. There are some credible scenarios where the for Australian interests, and in the ways of publicly formulating policy on government will need to consider its second or third possibilities the United the hypothetical use of force without military options. States would almost certainly seek causing undue diplomatic harm. Like most militaries the ADF Australian support, such as through Though secrecy about capabilities is needs to be able to respond to a the provision of a naval taskforce understandable, secrecy about strategy range of contingencies, from major including submarines and major must have limits in a democracy. And state-on-state conflict at one end of surface combatants. military professionals can only make the spectrum, to limited policing or Not all the high-intensity conflict effective contingency plans to the humanitarian missions at the other scenarios in Asia would directly extent they have a clear sense of what end. Short of a highly unlikely direct involve China as an adversary. A crisis the nation and its leaders might want attack on Australian territory, the in North Korea could generate US them to achieve. ADF’s most demanding missions are expectations of an Australian military The Abbott government has most likely to be those in support of contribution, and not only because promised a new defence white paper. its key ally, the United States. Given Australia is party to the UN Command This would provide an opportunity our history of fighting alongside in place since the 1950-53 war. There to take stock of Australia’s national one another, the convergence of our would also be specific roles for interests and the changing strategic interests in upholding a stable and Australian combat troops (particularly environment, and on that basis rules-based regional and global order, Special Forces) to help US and South formulate a new military strategic and the obligations of our alliance Korean forces secure North Korea and vision for what the ADF should be able treaty, it is difficult to imagine an its nuclear weapons in the event of a to do. This ought to include a cool- Australian government refusing to regime collapse. headed and unprejudiced appraisal of provide military support of some kind Below the level of major regional the 2009 and 2013 white papers and in response to an American request conflict, there is a high probability the classified work that supported their under a range of plausible scenarios of of Australia being called on to judgments. confrontation or conflict in our region. lead humanitarian or stabilisation A truly first-principles review is Though the chance of war between activities. Most such missions would needed rather than a process that the United States and China will be small. One exception would be the modestly adjusts inherited capability continue to be small, it would have an remote possibility of being asked to choices and endorses pre-decided extremely high impact on Australian restore order in Papua New Guinea constraints. The basic structure of interests even if Australia were not – something beyond the current the ADF has remained essentially directly involved. Recent maritime capabilities of the ADF. The need for unchanged since the Menzies era tensions between China and other the ADF to undertake humanitarian, and should be critically assessed Asian countries, notably Japan, the disaster relief and evacuation missions alongside the ongoing appropriateness Philippines and Vietnam, have the further from Australia’s region is also of Force 2030. What might now potential to escalate. There would expanding as Australian nationals Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 36 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy Lowy Institute Analysis and corporate interests increase their the past five years.25 Across most figures and calculations below are presence across the world. Allies, portfolios, government spending necessarily crude and should be taken partners and the Australian public will increases over the past decade have as indicative of the scale of savings expect the ADF to continue playing a outstripped GDP growth, but in only. We are also not recommending role in the fight against terrorism, even defence the opposite has been true.26 that these cuts should be made, but after the deployment to Afghanistan This trend is set to continue in the list them to highlight the strategic and ends. Australia might also be called next decade – rising health costs political risks that would accompany on to provide forces to distant US-led alone are forecast to account for an reduced funding of Australia’s defence stabilisation operations, including in additional 2 per cent of GDP by 2023.27 capability: the Middle East or Africa. Increasing funding for defence will • Freeze the salaries of civilian and conflict with the Abbott government’s military staff for one year: This Restore defence funding or stated intention of restoring the federal could save more than $2.5 billion make drastic cuts budget to surplus, and other expensive over the next decade, but it The government must set out a new schemes such as paid parental would undoubtedly be politically credible and detailed long-term leave. The Defence Minister will find it sensitive to freeze the salaries defence budget plan that commits difficult to secure increased funding. of serving military personnel, the additional funds necessary to If the government is not really some of whom may have only fund Force 2030 or its revised force willing to increase defence funding, recently returned from duty in structure. There are several problems or cannot begin doing so soon, Afghanistan.28 with the government’s current defence- then it must start contemplating • Cut back on the ‘hardened army’: spending aspiration of 2 per cent of deliberate capability cuts in order to The Army’s planned fleet of new GDP, beyond the fact that it may be avoid the ADF becoming a hollow armoured vehicles is estimated deferred until the end of the decade. and, in the worst sense of the word, to cost in the range of $10-16 For a start, it may not be enough incredible force. As the United States billion.29 A 25 per cent reduction to restore the funding trajectory for has learned through sequestration, to the future armoured vehicle Force 2030. It does not account for the capability cuts that seem unthinkable purchase could save $3 billion impact of the past four years’ delay in can fast become a reality. It is better over the life of the project, but funding defence acquisitions. Second, to minimise the damage by thinking would mean fewer armoured just because 2 per cent of GDP has ahead and identifying worst-case cuts vehicles for deployed troops, historically been European NATO’s according to a strategic and political exposing them to greater risk.30 aspirational spending target, this does logic than to have them occur in an • Reduce fighter aircraft and not mean that Australia’s alliance ‘dues’ abrupt and arbitrary way when the gap flying hours: Australia plans to should be the same. Australia’s strategic between budget and ambition becomes purchase at least 72 Joint Strike circumstances are entirely different impossible to paper over. Fighters (JSF) to complement from those of European NATO If funding for defence remains less 24 Super Hornets and 12 countries. Australia lacks the strategic than 2 per cent of GDP, significant ‘Growler’ electronic warfare depth provided by proximate allies cuts will need to be made to ADF aircraft. Australia could reduce with advanced militaries. Moreover, capability. The following examples the readiness of existing fighter the findings of a new defence white illustrate the scale of the cuts that squadrons and purchase one paper process or increasing demands would be necessary. The cost 28 Author estimates based on a low inflation for alliance burden-sharing may mean environment and modelled over the ensuing 25 Defence economic trends in the decade with no subsequent wages catch that the cost of a credible ADF would Asia-Pacific 2013. Defence Intelligence up. It should be noted that there would be be higher than 2 per cent of GDP. Organisation, May 2013, p 57: http:// procedural difficulties in implementing this defence.gov.au/dio/documents/DET_13.pdf. freeze given military remuneration is set by Even assuming that an increase to 26 John Daley, Budget pressures on an independent tribunal and defence civilian 2 per cent of GDP provides sufficient Australian governments. Grattan Institute, salaries are linked to other government April 2013, p 15: http://grattan.edu.au/ departments. funding to fix defence, finding this static/files/assets/ff6f7fe2/187_budget_ 29 Department of Defence, Defence money will be challenging for the pressures_report.pdf. Grattan includes Capability Plan: public version. Canberra, Abbott government. Defence’s share spending on the Australian Federal Police Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p 203. and intelligence agencies as well as defence 30 Author estimates based on total project of government outlays has shrunk operational supplementation in the category cost of $13 billion and nominal savings from from 5.8 per cent to 4.9 per cent over of defence spending. 25 per cent reduction in planned vehicle 27 Ibid. p 71. numbers for Land 400. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 37

fewer JSF squadron, bringing in the vicinity of $9 billion.34 Australia might have to choose just the JSF purchase down to just This would mean giving up the one of these areas in which to operate. 48 planes. This would be out of strategic weight that a larger Australia might want to ease off on step with regional trends (China submarine force would provide, its defence diplomacy so as to reduce for example is increasing fighter and shouldering less of the the expectations of what we can do readiness and numbers), but may alliance burden of submarine for friends and partners such as Japan. save between $3 and $4 billion.31 and anti-submarine operations. Canberra would need to decline most • Shrink the Defence Materiel Any of these crude cost saving options future requests to join peacekeeping Organisation (DMO): DMO would be politically difficult, and or stabilisation operations beyond has 7440 staff, three times more could seriously add risk to Australian the near neighbourhood. Above all, than the Department of Foreign interests – and even lives – in future Australia would need to reset the Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and security contingencies. There would be expectations of its ally, the United larger than both the Australian material consequences for Australia’s States. Federal Police and Customs.32 ability to carry its alliance burden Time to think hard about the US Reducing DMO personnel by and thus influence alliance strategy. alliance – and take the initiative 13 per cent may save $1 billion But these options at least illustrate Even if it wants to be ambitious over the next decade, with a the scale of the challenge facing a in its defence policy and strategic corresponding impact on the government unable to fund existing goals, the new government will need organisation’s procurement defence modernisation plans, let alone to think deeply about the US alliance. and sustainment functions. recurrent defence spending at 2 per The US alliance remains critically Fundamentally cutting back the cent of GDP. The government would important to Australia’s security, role and structure of DMO so need to implement all of these policy given that Australia cannot protect that personnel numbers could measures, including the enormous and advance its expansive interests be halved would save around $4 decision to halve DMO personnel single-handedly. Yet a defence policy billion over the same period.33 numbers, in order to make up only a that relies single-mindedly on what • Buy fewer submarines: portion of the long-term shortfall in the alliance can do for Australia is Australia has committed to defence funding, which may be as high unsustainable. A strengthened alliance modernising and doubling its as $33 billion in the next decade alone. and good regional defence relations submarine fleet at a cost that If the government were to make are complements, not substitutes, is currently unknown, but has these sorts of cost savings in defence, it for ensuring that Australia possesses been estimated at $36 billion. would need to re-evaluate the mission strategic weight of its own. The government could decide set of the ADF. For instance, instead of If Australia appears less than to build fewer submarines, being prepared to lead any stabilisation serious about its own security, or for example eight, potentially of South West Pacific states, the ADF about shouldering a portion of the yielding long-term savings might only be able to contribute security burden in a changing Asia, it elements to such tasks. Rather than will be difficult to maintain credibility 31 Author estimates based on purchasing 24 maintaining maritime surveillance in the eyes of the United States, fewer JSF and immediately reducing flying hours for existing fighter squadrons on a in the Eastern Indian Ocean, South itself struggling to follow through rotating basis. Pacific, and the , on its declared ‘rebalance’ to Asia. 32 DMO personnel figures from Department of Defence, Defence 34 Author estimate of nominal savings Conversely, the differences within Annual Report: 2011-2012. Canberra, assuming that costs for the final four Washington over the future of its Asia Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, submarines are below an estimated average p 285. DFAT personnel figure (2480) $3 billion per-unit cost for 12 boats. The strategy – what it is for, how it will from Department of Foreign Affairs and cost of the eight to twelfth boat in the future be resourced, what is the right mix Trade, Annual Report 2011-12. Canberra, submarine project cannot at this stage be Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, accurately projected. It is possible it could of military, economic and diplomatic p205. AFP figure (6543) from Australian be as low as 60-80 per cent of the cost of the levers – offers an opportunity for a Federal Police, Annual Report 2011-12. first hull, but each hull would not necessarily smart ally to play a disproportionate Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia, be cheaper than the one before, depending 2012, p 173. Customs figure (5222) from on decisions to incorporate new technology role in shaping the rebalance. Australia Customs and Border Protection in subsequent building blocks. See Sean There is no doubt that the alliance Service, Annual Report 2011-12. Canberra, Costello and Andrew Davies, How to buy a Commonwealth of Australia, 2012, p 19. submarine: defining and building Australia’s brings great benefits to Australia, 33 Author estimates based on current DMO future fleet. Canberra, Australian Strategic including high-level access to strategic civilian and military personnel costs. Policy Institute, October 2009, p 21. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 38 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy Lowy Institute Analysis deliberations, exceptional intelligence been floated, including enhanced US for US global military campaigns. That sharing, access to advanced military naval access to Australian ports as does not mean this is the only or the technology and a set of explicit well as intelligence, surveillance, and wisest way for Australia to approach and implicit security guarantees. reconnaissance cooperation from its alliance commitments in its own These have long reduced the Australia’s Indian Ocean territories. region. incentive to build what would be an It might be tempting for a cash- There is much Australia can enormously costly military deterrent strapped Australian government to contribute to the US alliance beyond commensurate with the size of our volunteer further strategic real-estate serving as a location for American territory or the security challenges of as its main contribution to the alliance. military assets and providing moral our region. But a greater US forward presence in or political support for US military But transformative strategic change Australia is predicated, more than any operations. Australian contributions in Asia will reshape the alliance, time in the past 50 years, on a credible can and should include leadership on whether we like it or not. So in tandem ADF, able to protect and fund defence security contingencies in the South with reinvigorating Australia’s own facilities on its sovereign territory. Pacific; major responsibility for shared defence strategy, and increasing It is not clear who would pay for the situational awareness in the eastern funding, the new government needs to infrastructure US and Australian Indian Ocean and the core Indo- take the initiative to shape the alliance. forces would need as a result of the Pacific zone of maritime Southeast It is better to ensure the alliance is rebalance to Asia, such as improved Asia; undertaking tailored engagement adaptable and politically robust now, airfields in northern Australia or on with countries that the US military is when it is not under strain, than to test the Cocos Islands. In the aftermath of legislatively prohibited from engaging its resilience in the thick of some future sequestration, it is hard to imagine the deeply with (including China); and crisis.35 US Congress releasing major funds to providing military intelligence, Some changing dynamics in the make up for an ally’s unwillingness to planning, and wise strategic counsel alliance need to be closely examined provide infrastructure for the enhanced in the event of regional crises. But and understood by the Abbott US military presence that same ally Australia’s effectiveness in all of these government. One is deepening wants. roles requires credible and properly military integration, which the past An expanded US military footprint funded military capabilities of our own, few Australian governments have in Australia would also bring its own underpinned by clear thinking on our pushed a long way without much prior strategic complexities requiring close own strategic and diplomatic goals. parliamentary or public discussion. political attention. This includes the Serving Australian officers and possibility of US units staging future Facing up to the challenge civilians have recently been appointed military action from Australia, as Ultimately, the defence decisions to senior positions within US Pacific well as managing the sensitivities the new government will need to Command and US Central Command. of Australia’s neighbours. On all of make must connect with a vision of A US Marine Air Ground Task Force these fronts, policy should be driven Australia’s future national interests. is establishing a forward presence in by political leadership, rather than The country’s political leaders will Darwin. US combat aircraft may well emerging from habitual discussions need to level with the public about soon stage from Australia’s northern between officials or through the the strategic challenges and choices airfields, and a US space-tracking radar momentum of existing military ahead, from the defence budget, to is due to be positioned in Western connections and enthusiastic staff the alliance, to the strategic realities Australia. Other initiatives have planning. of the Asian Century. Political leaders

35 The Lowy Institute’s opinion polling Another dynamic relates to will need to engage more deeply and indicates that an overwhelming majority demands on Australia as a force proactively with military strategy of Australians (82 per cent) consider the alliance to be important to Australia’s contributor as the United States to determine what military options security, and 61 per cent support the rebalances its military and diplomatic Australia needs in the decades ahead. basing of US forces in Australia. However, posture in Asia, and looks to The context of Australian defence according to the poll only 38 per cent of Australians would want to see their country recalibrate military burden-sharing policy has changed. The tactical supporting US-led military action in Asia. with its allies. Australia has grown alliance contributions, guaranteed Alex Oliver, The Lowy Institute poll 2013. Sydney, Lowy Institute for International used to providing niche military defence funding increases and reactive Policy, June 2013: http://lowyinstitute.org/ capabilities and broad political support big-ticket capability purchases of the publications/lowy-institute-poll-2013. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 39

Howard era are no more. Gone, too, are the contradictions of the Rudd- Gillard era, a combination of brief strategic flourishes with prolonged political inattention , and budget cuts and deferrals. The new government has a responsibility to set a new course. If Australia is to have strategic weight in a more challenging region, it must start facing up to risks and make difficult choices on defence policy now. t

James Brown, a former officer in R ory Medcalf is Director of the the , is the Military International Security Program at Fellow at the Lowy Institute focusing the Lowy Institute and a Nonresident on military issues and defence policy. Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy at the He previously coordinated the Lowy Brookings Institution in Washington Institute MacArthur Foundation DC. His professional background spans Asia Security Project, which explored diplomacy, journalism and intelligence security cooperation in Asia. James analysis. In parallel with his analytical also coordinates a project investigating work, Mr Medcalf has been active the use of private military security in the development of Australia’s companies in disaster and conflict relations with India. He is Associate zones. He is a visiting research fellow Director of the Australia-India Institute at the Australian Army’s Land Warfare and the head of its Sydney Node at Studies Centre. the University of New South Wales. He is also co-chair of the Australia-India Roundtable, the leading informal dialogue between the two countries.

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 40 World Naval Developments b y DR Norman Friedman

he intelligence disaster wrought Snowden might have been ignorance approach: cash. Every so often we by Edward Snowden carries of the relative values of the documents read of a massive loss of personal data Timportant lessons about the character he was stealing. due to the corruption of a low-level of the digital world we now inhabit. It is, moreover, nearly impossible employee. Should we believe that Intelligence agencies, and indeed to enforce restrictions such as ‘need the same thing does not happen to anyone who relies on information to know’ in an Internet-style data corporate or military data? security, is far more vulnerable than base such as we currently use. We do not know enough about in the past. At one time a spy was Moreover, any such restrictions go Snowden to say when or why he lucky to bring home a film cartridge against the need to ‘connect the dots’ decided that it was his mission to from a Minox camera, with copies so as to detect and thwart terrorist collect secret information which (which might not be terribly good) of operations. Who can be sure of could later be used against the U.S. a few pages of some secret document. exactly what information is relevant? government. It does seem that he Obtaining those few copies might That is particularly the case when the began working this way as a contractor take as much as 15 or 20 minutes, distinction between foreign and home- for the CIA, before moving over to during which he was vulnerable to grown terrorists seems to dissolve. contract work for NSA. The CIA went detection. A spy with legitimate access How do you classify those who carried so far as to warn NSA that he was to a classified library might manage out the Marathon atrocity? showing undue curiosity - electronic to obtain information from 10 or 20 What is the appropriate relationship libraries do register who asks for what documents in a day, assuming he knew between law enforcement, which seeks and when. As a system administrator, what he wanted. Jonathan Pollard to identify and penalize those who have Snowden should not have been apparently obtained a few hundred already committed crimes, and defense using the data on his networks; his sensitive documents, which he carried against terrorist threats? Without job was to ensure that the networks to his masters to be copied. He was knowing a great deal more about how functioned properly. Snowden may limited to what he could carry in a well we have done, we cannot say how have been affected by the various briefcase. In each case, the damage worthwhile defense has been. Wikileaks scandals and by the US was significant, because even one Enormous effort has been expended reaction to them, or he may have sensitive document might well contain to find better ways of protecting made his decisions well before they crucial information. sensitive information against those broke, perhaps in connection with Snowden’s theft was on an attempting to penetrate our networks. the Wikileaks project or with the altogether vaster scale. Because he Every time you use a password, you ‘Anonymous’ hacking group. No one was a system administrator, he could make use of such security mechanisms. knows, apart from Snowden himself. override the settings on computers Snowden is a key example of a very It does seem obvious that Snowden which prevented them from dumping different problem: a human threat, benefited from a series of devastating data into thumb drives. He was or perhaps the threat of human human failures. The first was that he acquiring data at the rate of millions engineering (did he reach his ideology was granted a very high clearance in of bytes per second. That might on his own, or was he helped?). We the first place. That may have been be thousands of pages per second, have been seeing such examples for tied to the mobilization of homeland- depending on how documents were years, and often ignoring them. A security operations in the wake of 9-11. stored. Current thumb drives are rated major technology company found out Suddenly large numbers of computer in the tens of gigabytes of data. A accidentally that someone had been experts were needed, to create and gigabyte is roughly a thousand million rummaging its files. It seems likely that to maintain systems for sharing and bytes, which is on the order of half the break in its security came when analyzing intelligence data. It was a million pages. Snowden’s system some of its senior executives visited also suddenly necessary to extend administrator status almost certainly China, leaving their laptops in their the military clearance system into made it possible for him to override hotel rooms. Maybe the convenience law enforcement. This requirement any firewalls within the systems he of on-the-go connectivity was a bit too seems to have collided with a decision operated. The only real limit on convenient. There is also the classic made during the late 1990s to largely Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 41

or completely privatize the clearance analysts system. By that time massive human wondered what losses due to the end of the would happen had badly damaged the government if the Japanese system which had been developed woke up and to handle the mass of contractors changed their involved in classified work. The other codes (as they problem, in Snowden’s case, is that did in 1941). NSA seems to have failed to convince They decided him that what it was doing was for the to rely entirely public good, rather than for some evil on traffic purpose. analysis to The pool of potential computer follow the 1930 system analysts is not large, and most maneuvers. To of them are probably snapped up by their surprise, private industry at high salaries. NSA the technique and other government entities badly worked needed whoever was available. How perfectly. Among other things, because the Internet (like terrorism) many administrators would happily it revealed the unhappy fact that is borderless; it is non-local. You drop a talented computer analyst Japanese observations of earlier US experience that every time you go because he seemed to be acting oddly? maneuvers had revealed US Pacific instantly onto a foreign web-site: How easy would it have been to obtain strategy to them. The Japanese had for example, there is literally no a replacement? To wait while the developed effective countermeasures. difference between going on the US replacement navigated the clearance One consequence was that the CNO version of amazon.com and going process? had to tell President Hoover in on the Japanese one (assuming you The public cry to ‘connect the 1931 that the US Navy could not do know what you want in Japanese). In dots’ so that information already in much about the Japanese attack on better times this made the Internet a our hands could be used to prevent Manchuria that year. Another was a wonderful way of learning about the atrocities translates to ‘use all the data dramatic change in US naval strategy, rest of the world. In worse times it we can have in an effective way,’ which from the ‘through ticket to Manila’ to makes the Internet a terrific form of in turn requires that data be shared at the step by step strategy executed very communication across all boundaries. every level. That means reducing it to successfully during World War II. Thus far the only barriers have been digital form and creating data bases Put this way, it is unsurprising that those set up by foreign governments, which can be exploited. In theory, a NSA has been collecting phone and like the Chinese, who fear free terrorist operation on American soil E-mail records, in terms not of what communication. The international produces an identifiable signature. was said but of who called whom character of the Internet makes it If that signature can be detected, it and for how long. Once a potential very difficult, and perhaps impossible, may be possible to trace back to those threat was identified, the agency had to split domestic from foreign involved and neutralize them. the authority to concentrate on the communication in any meaningful That is largely the modern form of individuals involved. We don’t know way. Since the same cables may often a classic signals intelligence technique, whether it worked, but we can see it carry voice traffic, it is not so clear how traffic analysis, which NSA has as something more than government any communications can be split undoubtedly used for decades. Even if greed to ruin our privacy. If we have Snowden also revealed the the enemy’s codes cannot be broken, some idea of how well it works, we shocking (shocking!) reality that careful analysis of who talks to whom can decide whether the loss of privacy NSA has been listening to the (and when) yields enormous dividends. is justified. Snowden did not care to communications of foreign leaders, For example, in the interwar period reveal anything about how well (or including our allies. After all, such the US Navy had key Japanese codes, poorly) the program worked. Perhaps interception (to protect us from and used them to follow the major it worked too well for his taste. surprises) is its great responsibility. Japanese fleet exercises. Its signals NSA operations were international NSA is also responsible for protecting Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 42 World Naval Developments

us from foreign eavesdropping, opposition know what it needs to from the United States, and also to but Snowden apparently did not know to evade detection. Cries from create their own censored Internets; consider it worthwhile to reveal what leading Internet companies to kill China, for example, is already doing anyone has done to us. It is just a bit NSA’s programs are really cries to let that. The freedom of the Internet, rich to read of Chinese outrage at their clients know they are safe from about which Snowden claims to be American eavesdropping in the light surveillance of any kind. To most passionate, will evaporate. t of extensive Chinese penetration of citizens, such safety is a reasonable sensitive US computer systems – expectation of privacy. To a terrorist, which was doubtless revealed partly safety means safety from detection. by NSA’s penetration of Chinese What happens now? First, to communications. Allied leaders’ the extent that Snowden revealed outrage that we were listening is details of NSA operations, many of presumably for public consumption: those techniques are no longer going their own intelligence services would to be effective. NSA will develop be remiss if they were not trying to alternatives, but that will take time. eavesdrop on us. Perhaps there is a We can expect our enemies to universe in which different countries take advantage of that window of do not have their own interests, and opportunity. They have already shown hence attract intelligence notice, but it considerable awareness of the danger is not the one we currently live in. NSA and similar agencies represent. Norman Friedman’s latest book is The The damage Snowden has done NSA’s exploitation of the Internet will Naval Institute Guide to World Naval is the classic damage of a signals cause hostile foreign governments to intelligence disaster: he has let the work harder to wrest Internet control Weapon Systems

T he ship’s company of HMAS Melbourne gathered on the flight deck for Christmas lunch in the MiddleE ast Area of Operations. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

44 Reflections on four decades in the profession of Naval Engineering - and Jacky Fisher got it right! By Rear Admiral David Holthouse, AO, RAN (Rtd)

Instead of an obituary for RADM Fro m the Pilbara to Jervis Bay David Holthouse, who died earlier The title of this presentation might this year, the Naval Historical Society give the impression of something reprinted in a recent edition an article about Jacky Fisher’s secret life as an he wrote some years ago which is an engineer. But no, my plan is simply excellent memoir of his naval career. to reflect on my own more than four decades service in the business which The editor of the Naval Historical saw an interesting range of propulsion Review, Walter Burroughs, has very systems. From fire tube boilers and steam reciprocating engines, wet steam kindly agreed to it being reprinted in and superheated steam turbines with Headmark. We acknowledge further steam pressures ranging from 300 psi the co-operation of the Admiral’s son to 1200 psi. Then came medium and Captain Guy Holthouse RAN, and his high speed diesels; gas turbines and of sister Victoria Holthouse. course combinations of most of them: COSAG, CODAG, CODLAG and more. avid Holthouse entered the As a youngster hailing from Australian Naval College in farming stock in the then very remote D1950, just a few days after his 14th Pilbara, life at the naval college was birthday. He had an outstanding career at first strange, but I soon settled as a Marine Engineer, culminating into the routine. Like most of my DAVID HOLTHOUSE is his appointment as Chief of Naval contemporaries, I joined with good group of ship’s officers returning on (Courtesy Guy Engineering. His management eyesight, suitable for any branch. We board, one of whom was a lieutenant Holthouse) skills were further acknowledged didn’t have to decide which branch until (E) resplendent in by appointments as Chief of Naval well into our fourth and final year. In what must have been Personnel and Naval my third year, I developed myopia in my his best No 5 uniform. Support Command. He was appointed right eye. I didn’t need glasses then and Shiny new stripes, rich an Officer in the Order of Australia in scarcely need them now but the Navy purple velvet between 1991. He retired from the Navy in 1993, was inflexible. I could be an Engineer or them and best of all, taking on a number of senior business Supply Officer and I didn’t know much pilot’s wings on his roles before he and his wife Isobel about either. I am not even sure that left sleeve. Perhaps I became farmers, settling on a property I had firmly decided on the Executive could be like that and outside Braidwood. David died in May Branch but the sense of exclusion was the die was cast. I did 2013, with Isobel having predeceased real, and I was old enough to know learn to fly, when in him by two months. In September what ‘non-executive’ meant. I said command at HMAS 2009, David gave a presentation to the ‘no’ and my father wrote to the Navy Nirimba, but only with A young David Naval Historical Society, in which he seeking my withdrawal. After careful a private licence. It was on that visit to Holthouse. (Courtesy reflected upon his four decades of naval consideration it was agreed that I would Australia that I asked what seemed to Guy Holthouse) engineering. As those who knew him be an Engineer but I must admit to me to be the all-important question will recall, David was never short of a being a reluctant starter. about engineering. In 1952, all Chief few words; accordingly his presentation Not long before this, the flagship Stokers had seen service in WW II, and has been edited to fit a magazine format HMAS Australia visited Westernport as we descended deeper into the bowels and has been approved by his family. and as was customary, my year (Cook) of a boiler room with one such Chief, I went out by boat to tour the ship. asked what it was like down there, when Gathered in the stern sheets was a the ship was under fire: ‘Safest place Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 45

to be son, with all that water out there to protect you’. This Chief Stoker was happy to expand on his philosophical theme to a group of 15 year olds: ‘It’s all about what you’re used to’ and went on to tell us about an experience he’d had in the Mediterranean. His ship, one of the , had taken some soldiers on board when she came under air attack. Those on deck hit the deck and he found himself lying beside a big Scots sergeant who was terrified: ‘You see, he couldn’t shoot back and he couldn’t dig a hole. Put us ashore and he’d be in his element; brave as a lion and I’d be jelly’. O verseas:Dartmouth and Manadon

Customary in these times, most college graduates went to Dartmouth H MAS Hobart to complete their training and then and the opportunity was taken to tubes, sealing and replacing the doors. leads Stuart,Swan for experience in Royal Naval ships. resupply the British garrison in Egypt. In those days the RN employed Chinese and others in The competitive environment must This necessitated pulling out of the Stokers, perhaps in the same way that the 1986 Review have suited me as I came away with southbound convoy in the Great Bitter we used to take on Chinese laundrymen (Courtesy RAN) the unusual distinction for an engineer Lake and missing a turn whilst stores when operating on the Far East of being awarded the Queen’s Sword. were unloaded into lighters. As we Strategic Reserve. No prize for guessing After which it was off to sea in the manoeuvred to join the next suitable who got the job: the Chinese Stokers training ship HMS Triumph, followed convoy, we hit the sandy bottom and and the midshipmen (E) of course, by professional courses at the Royal stuck fast. three of whom were Australians. Navy Engineering College HMS A high tide, de-ballasting and Engineering Career Thunderer(RNEC Manadon). I was discharging precious water over the side Structures here when purple stripes vanished got us off, and tugs towed us to deeper from RN wardrobes overnight but water. We couldn’t get underway, Since the days of sail, the Navy’s officer Commonwealth officers continued to however: the main circulators had structure has been unproductively have the designator (E) attached to their sucked up sand and shellfish and skewed in favour of the Deck, Executive rank and purple stripes attached to their choked the main condensers. Turbo or Seaman Branch. A critical outcome, sleeves, for another year in the case generators and fire pumps had similar it has been argued, was that the Royal of Australians. I’d become used to the problems. Anything that relied on sea Navy was slow to adopt technological distinction by then and perversely kept water for cooling was in trouble. Not advance and ill-prepared, therefore, engineers’ purple on a working uniform that this particular seawater was cool. for the two great wars. Jacky Fisher’s for years to come. The main condenser doors had to come far-sighted plan to effect much needed I learnt a lot about main condensers off, a big task at any time but in this change, embracing integration and as a Midshipman (E) in HMS Glory, in case really testing. Hot machinery and casting out separation, struck the 1954. We were resupplying the British hot spaces in a hot climate. The work rocks of entrenchment and prejudice. forces in Malaya during the Emergency involved shoveling what seemed like the The ‘Great Betrayal’ of the early 1920s with people, stores, guns, aircraft, and, whole of the bottom of the Great Bitter saw the end of the Fisher-Selbourne on the way back via Malta, Lord Louis Lake out of the condensers and carting Scheme, and it was not until the Mountbatten’s polo ponies stabled in it by bucket up to 3 Deck and over the Admiralty Board’s adoption in large ‘A’ hangar. The passage was via Suez side, flushing out, jetting condenser part of the Mansergh Committee’s Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 46 Reflections on four decades in the profession of Naval Engineering - and Jacky Fisher got it right! recommendations, that anything My years on the resembling Fisher’s new democracy re- plates in steam emerged, in Admiralty Fleet Order No 1 of 1956 (AFO 1/56). Except for a brief posting to a Subsequent arm wrestling distorted conventionally powered submarine, Admiral Mansergh’s General List and HMS Anchorite, my entire seagoing the Post List disappeared altogether, career, spanning some 14 ships, was arguably to the grave disadvantage spent in steam. Flexible, reliable and of non-seamen. Meanwhile the nimble schoolrooms, for the navy’s evolving nature of the Fleet and the very best craftsmen. Think back to consequential absence of engineering the redundancies available to the hierarchies at sea have reintroduced engineer of a fully ‘unitised’ destroyer. Yarra, handing over to Frank Woods, H MAS the need for fundamental change in the Imagine what they were in a four and the Lieutenant Commanders Queenborough officer structure. Fisher’s principles are unit ship. I served in one, HMS Eagle, were progressively replaced with (Courtesy RAN) still valid, but for Australia’s new navy it as a midshipman and vividly recall . Under both regimes she is time to look elsewhere for how best when some disaffected sailor used the was a wonderfully happy ship. Not all to give effect to them. firemain to flood ‘Y’ boiler room to the beer and skittles though. So how do we think AFO 1/56 level of the main stops whilst at anchor At about 0400 whilst flashing worked out? No doubt there are those off the south coast of England. She still up from cold after 24 hours or so at who would argue that promotions got underway and steamed home and , a fire took hold in the General List are competitive continuing flying operations en route. under the after boiler. By the time I and that, by and large, these figures ‘Make a bastard!’ was a wonderful had been called, we had a threatening represent the competitiveness of expression I learnt from one catastrophe and no successful means candidates. So what happened to the Jackie Markham. Jack, a Senior of dealing with it. Cumbersome engineers? Did their four year degrees Commissioned Engineer at the time Fearnought suits, Foam-making Branch fry their brains or their personalities? (he retired an Engineer Commander) Pipes, discarded fire hoses starting Or did career paths to Commander, was my Sea Daddy during my first to block the airlock access, boundary largely confined to in-branch postings appointment to HMAS Melbourne, cooling flooding seawater over the rather than General List postings, under training for my EO’s main deck and frantic efforts to raise ‘smoke stack’ them for future Watchkeeping Certificate. He taught steam forward hampered by the employment? Or did the engineers me many things for which I am still radiated heat from the blistering and themselves write their own epitaphs, grateful, including the essentiality of buckling bulkhead between the two by seeking only in-branch postings as pipe tracing; but perhaps the most boiler rooms. I can remember lying on junior and middle-ranking officers? valuable was his absolute conviction the plates in the after boiler room with Certainly Engineers are not blameless that if the bit you wanted wasn’t in my Damage Control POM(E) trying to in this. Admiral Mason acknowledged engineer’s spare gear then you simply direct the trickle from the latest FBP that the Engineering Branch was no made one. I did my best to keep Jack’s to come through the airlock at the dull less to blame with its tendency to maxim alive in naval engineering circles red glow under the boiler. I had decided ‘class consciousness’ and declared self- thereafter but I fear that the demise that we either got it out this time or sufficiency. In his own career, he said, of steam, as much as the demise of we would stay down there with it. We there were some incidents of which he Nirimba, sent it off to the antique shop. might have had to anyway as the air at was ashamed. I should stand with him I was Chief in HMAS Queenborough the top of the boiler room had become I guess: there have been times when I in 1962 - 1963, Captain ‘Chick’ Murray intolerably hot and the hand rails too felt that the best way to survive was to in command and LCDR Frank Woods hot to hold. Miraculously the red glow adopt the Merchant Navy model and as First Lieutenant. Chick was ‘Fox 1’ faded out. run my department in as self-contained and his other Heads of Department With no Ordnance Engineer a way as possible, which may well have and some specialists like the Gunnery (OE) on board, the EO found himself made my own captain’s life difficult. Officer, were senior LCDRs. In due responsible for the mechanical side course Chick took his thick black of the main armament, the LO for funnel band to new ship HMAS electrics and of course the GO for Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 47

using it. How well I remember the HMAS Hobart was next, Vietnam succession of pipes: ‘Gunnery Officer, and the fog of war. Battle damage and Bridge! – pause – Electrical Officer, its control and repair provided useful Bridge! – pause – Engineer Officer, lessons but I came away with three Bridge!’ when we failed to hit the target, more lasting memories. First, whilst or simply failed to fire. Of course on the the Americans did not run these ships’ one occasion when we shot down the engineering plants as well as we did, drogue, HMS and the rest of the they had certainly designed them to line having failed to do so, all we got be better than anything I’d served in was ‘Well done Guns!’ but we were all before. The very simple example I like to very pleased. In one time, the give is the steam turbine thrust bearing. Chief OA and I agreed it was time to Renewing the thrust pads in a British overhaul the recuperators on the twin 4 design required skill and patience, each inch mount and we had the left gun out pad being blued and scraped and tried by the end of the day. The gun barrels individually until at last all of them were used to suspend the movie screen bore an equal load. In the DDGs the for evening viewing by the Dutywatch, pads were linked in two semi-circular men under punishment and those articulated collars, and replacements who couldn’t raise sufficient breeze for were simply removed from their another run ashore. The screen was too packaging and dropped into place, self- T hree GLORY low it seemed, and some enterprising adjusting to bear an even load. In HMAS Hobart, during her Midshipmen sailor decided to elevate the mounting. Second, the steam generators second deployment to Vietnam, the (Tom Lewis Collection) Gravity took charge, and at colours and switchboards were in the main crosshead on the port main engine next morning the captain was less machinery spaces and our electrical Ahead Throttle operating gear seized than impressed to find one and a half Special Sea Dutymen mustered there. solid during operations. Down to guns pointing pretty much vertically Indeed, there was a group of dedicated one engine and no spares for such a skywards. That day there was only one machinery space electrical ratings who large, and you might think robust, bit pipe: ‘Engineer Officer, Captain’s Cabin!’ became, for all practical purposes, part of kit. We had detailed drawings and, I had three postings to Melbourne, of the engineering department. surprisingly a billet of what looked like the last one as Senior Engineer, under Third, in working up for Vietnam we suitable material (nickel steel) in the Commander Tom Fisher. I’d at first trained for what we had always done: Bolt Stave store. Importantly, we had been disappointed about going back to the EO ran the training and was the suitable people to work it: Engine Room the flagship when my contemporaries Damage Control officer but the XO was Artificers, ERAs. This was not kids’ were having a nice time in destroyers, in overall charge as NBCDO. When stuff, a 2-start left hand buttress thread but eventually an important lesson we were hit, precisely the time when on a spindle which my mind’s eye tells emerged. Big ships have hierarchies continuity is king, my damage control me was about 2 inches in diameter, of engineers and legions of very reports went to the Ops Room (CIC), with the female threaded crosshead senior and experienced sailors whose to be sliced and diced for the Ship’s traveler to match. In a simple lathe in a knowledge rubs off. The ship was Company. The Ops Room, however, destroyer’s workshop at sea. Half a day broken up into departments, with a was busy coping with lost sensors and later up it went and I proudly marched junior officer in charge of each, and the uncertain tactical picture, and the my bemused ERA to the bridge to they move around. Officers keep watch. Ship’s Company remained in the dark. announce that the Port engine was back This was a wonderful environment in Eventually the Captain asked me to in business. Sadly though, I’d let him which to become competent and the provide summaries directly over the down. In the excitement of finding the opportunities that such ships provided Main Broadcast, which made complete steel billet I forgot Engineering 101. for satisfying progression in the seagoing sense. I understand that this lesson We used the same material for both the environment went a long way towards was learnt and that now the MEO/ spindle and the traveler and of course meeting the need that young engineer Damage Control Officer has overall when the crosshead was hot enough officers felt, or anyway this young officer responsibility, with the XO and SO they seized. Bronze or even brass would felt, to be ‘all of a company’. providing advice on a roving basis. have done the job. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 48 Reflections on four decades in the profession of Naval Engineering - and Jacky Fisher got it right!

Nuclear Propulsion Staff Appointments and with a full cargo was nightmarish. The only way to sleep easy as Director General Fleet was to transfer fuel around until all tank levels were lower I was one of three RAN officers Maintenance than the sea outside. (Castles, Holthouse and Rourke) Supporting the RNZN off Mururoa was not the highlight dispatched over a period in the late I was fortunate to be posted to the of my life at sea but keeping the engine turning for a month 1950s and early 1960s to study Nuclear Royal Naval Staff College Greenwich straight was satisfying, though not much compensation for Reactor Engineering in the UK. Both next, and I had a fantastic year at that missing out on RIMPAC and a visit to Japan. And to be fair, Castles and Rourke studied with the RN wonderful place. We mourn the loss of we’d had a fascinating deployment with HMAS Perth, to the for some hands-on design experience places like ‘Tresco’ but think how the Seychelles, Mombasa and the year before. Then at Y-ARD, but Admiral Rickover, USN, RN must mourn the loss of the Painted there was the Boxing Day departure for Darwin to help out got wind of this arrangement between Hall. Here I received the Director’s with the aftermath of , including sitting on the the RN and RAN before my nuclear Prize for the best Service Paper on Board of Inquiry into the Patrol Boat losses. The SAILSTRUC training began, in 1964, and the RN Defence Policy, which I particularly model had been approved by now and I had both MTP and reluctantly cut us off. enjoyed. Shortly before departure by MTH sailors in the Department. But where were the MTLs? Instead I went to UKAEA at sea for London, the Engineering poster, I don’t remember exactly when High Power was eventually Harwell, Dounreagh, and the Commander Bert Stapleford. rang to transferred to the MEO but it was not in my time at sea. Birmingham CAT before heading off say that there was a vacancy on the Joint Leaving the ship was a wrench but the two best for 18 months or so of sheer delight Services Staff Course and since I was engineering jobs at Fleet Headquarters, FMEO and CSO(T), at Y-ARD. Plenty to do but Rickover’s now a Commander it had been offered helped me get over it. From a professional naval engineering long arm had reached the Clyde too, to me. There was a catch of course; the view point, the near continuum from CMDR (E) at sea and I was excluded from the nuclear JSSC was a 6 month course only and through FMEO, CSO(T), Nirimba (RANATE) and DNOP submarine design office and sent therefore not ‘married accompanied’. I to DGFM was magical. Managing people, their conditions instead, to work on the next generation turned it down and Bert was horrified: of service and their careers is a very satisfying thing to do. I of steam frigate propulsion systems, the ‘This is a real privilege’ he said and dragged my poor family out to Quakers Hill, forcing them to never-to-be built Y136. ‘Engineers seldom get an opportunity commute by train back to Sydney for school and work, but for The unwillingness of successive like this’. me at least it was a very satisfying experience. SAILSTRUC governments in Australia to encourage After an interesting stint as DFM Phase 2 training started whilst I was there and seemed to be and participate in the nuclear energy at Navy Office including a short well accepted. Three or four females were in the intake and in debate has had a lot to do with blind- secondment to Prime Minister and those early days of integration we over-killed on segregation siding the general public on this Cabinet and as equerry to the visiting and security. We fitted out a very comfortable annex for them important issue; and as we have seen King of Nepal, I found myself practicing in the hospital, well away from the 800 or so young men and from the plan for the Collins Class what I preached. I had expected to go boys on the base with whom they trained by day. So why were submarine replacement, this attitude back to Melbourne as Chief but she they so unhappy? is not going to change any time soon, went to someone else and for the first I was DGFM in 1984 when a Naval Reserve Cadet died or anyway, not soon enough. Much to time I initiated a call to the Poster. on board HMAS Tobruk, and it was my task to establish my chagrin, the influential submarine ‘You don’t have to go back to sea’ said what went wrong. It was a sad business but very satisfying to lobby, made up largely of former Bert. I’d been promoted in Hobart so untangle the chain of causation. I don’t want to get into the RAN submariners, who in my view it counted as my Commander’s job: detail here but there were a couple of important lessons to should know better, has been content ‘Well there’s Supply but you wouldn’t be learnt. Seeking to mitigate effect, rather than to establish to go along with this, for what I can want that would you?’ Supply was a cause, is a potentially dangerous course to pursue and, losing only assume to have been tactical very satisfying experience and in taking sight of underlying design principles can end in disaster. reasons. But Rickover played his part charge on the RAS deck I got closer Being a naval engineer is not solely about ‘how?’ The Navy too, by restricting allied access, other than I had ever been to a General List has well trained operators and technicians who should than for the RN, to even the most job at sea. She had many tricks and know all about ‘how’. It is ‘why?’ that justifies the continued basic information and creating the treasures which had fallen into disuse employment of the professional engineer. Having said that impression of a black art. and it was enormous fun, for all of though, it has always been my contention that professional my team I hope, to restore them to engineers should apply themselves to ‘how’ sufficiently well, operation. She had a riveted hull and, at least, to be credible to the operators and technicians whom after converting her cargo capacity from they lead. Part of it is taking the can for other people’s honest FFO to Dieso, time spent in harbour mistakes. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 49

After DGFM came a posting to and useful mechanics, but received no officers could qualify in more than one specialisation, say North America as Naval Attaché in recognition for it when they returned PWO and Marine Engineering. So much time under formal Washington and Naval Adviser in to ‘Civvy Street’. Within the marine training; it was never going to work and I am cynical enough Ottawa, providing first hand exposure engineering community too, they to think it was never intended to. to how the USN and RCN employed were second class citizens. Nirimba The full integration of women into the RAN, as opposed engineers. The Americans didn’t know graduates had to learn operating to the WRANS, kept coming my way: at Nirimba, as DNOP what to make of me. Ever courteous, skills before they could be employed which was my next posting, and later as ACPERS(N). It was they afforded me flags and car pennants usefully as Artificers and they often something the Navy really wanted to do and do well but it when I visited USN establishments. became disillusioned by this. Too much became political and Navy was pressed to move faster than Sometimes it was the Line Officer’s training too soon could be a negative we would have wished, particularly in getting women to sea white star on a blue background and in retention terms. Rank and Skill and into command positions. There were some stumbles but at other times it was the Specialist pyramids matched each other, close by and large I think it went well and today we think nothing Officer’s blue star on a white enough; and finally, the ‘Mechanician’ about it with female marine engineers now reaching senior background. The RCN was still much provided a good model. These are still ranks. the same as us, despite Canada’s largely valid principles but things have gone I had hardly settled into the Assistant Chief of Logistics unsuccessful early experiment with a off the rails a bit since SAILSTRUC was (Navy) – ACLOG(N) chair when further change loomed, unified Defence Force. introduced, perhaps mainly because of this time to merge Logistics and Materiel into a single the contracting out of training and the Division embracing in-service, logistics policy, design, Ne w Initiatives in Technical Sailor Training complexities of civilian recognition. production services and acquisition. I had a real concern for the continuing support of what became known as the Fleet- Rise o to the t p - Chief of Some healthy initiatives were Naval Engineering and other in-Being, particularly as the spotlight was being turned more undertaken in the training of technical appointments and more on the acquisition process. sailors. In 1969 I co-authored the Who was to be Navy’s Design Approval Authority once review of naval technical training which When I took over as CNE an important the Design Authority function had been contracted out, and led to the introduction of SAILSTRUC, task was merging the Technical Services ACLOG(N) had gone? Surely not the same authority that the sailor structure which replaced Division with the Supply Division and was charged with acquiring the new kit? And who were to be RATSTRUC. One recommendation assuming the role of Assistant Chief heads of corps for the Engineers and Supply officers? How was that technical sailors’ right arm of Naval Staff (Logistics). This was a would the Engineers react to a career path truncated at the category titles include the word sensible move, involving the transfer one-star level? ‘Technician’ as in, for example, Petty of most in-service support functions Officer Marine Propulsion Technician to the Naval Support Commander O nwards and Upwards (POMTP). ‘Technician’ is a noun and in Sydney whilst retaining a credible it accurately describes the role and Design and Production capability in What I have been advocating is an evolution in the training, capabilities of the sailors concerned. Canberra, along with the Policy role. employment and progression of the Navy’s officer corps, MTP was accepted by the Board but My final posting was to be as Flag not a revolution. If we do it, Drake’s ‘All of a company’ will on the advice of the Second Naval Officer Naval Support Command and merge and have real meaning in the technology based service Member of the day, ‘Technician’ was far the new arrangement looked as sensible which we all wish to see sharpen its sword for the defence of too grand and ‘Technical’, an adjective, from that end as it had from Canberra. our nation. And I am not downhearted. A New Generation was substituted. ‘What is a Marine An opportunity arose in 1990, whilst Navy has already tackled some of the inequities in the Technical?’ one asked without response. I was Assistant Chief of Personnel present structure and I am aware that a strategic review of The study that led to SAILSTRUC (Navy) – ACPERS(N) to strike a blow naval engineering is underway. It has been a wonderful four provided the opportunity to right for the General List. The Chief of Naval decades – onwards and upwards! t some of the wrongs that pervaded Staff agreed to examine officers’ career the engineering sailors’ career paths paths with a view to broadening the and, at the same time to do something employment of non-seamen. The study about shifting high power electrics to was called ROCS, RAN Officers Career the MEO. Artificers were not seen as Structure. I am unsure what became real POs and Chiefs by the rest of the of ROCS but the part that should have ship’s company, sometimes justifiably. interested me, didn’t. It proposed a Stokers became skilled plant operators form of dual career streaming wherein Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 50 Obituary – Eternal Patrol – Commodore Bryan Cleary, RAN (Rtd) Bya Capt in Chris Churcher CSM, RAN

egrettably I advise of the passing HMAS Melbourne for the Admiral’s to FOCEAA from where he retired, of Commodore Bryan Cleary, Staff as the Fleet TAS. In Jan 1958 subsequently to become a barrister RRAN (Rtd), who died of a heart attack he was sent to the Training and in Sydney. on Sat 7 Dec 2013. Staff Requirements Division of Commodore Cleary’s association Commodore Cleary joined the Navy Office for 12 months before with the Navy, Rushcutter and Navy as a recruit in 1942 through attending JSSC in the UK during K9 continued after he left the HMAS Cerberus, but was quickly 1959. Promoted to Commander permanent Navy. As part of the identified as an officer candidate and while on Course he returned to Naval Association he was involved by Nov 1942 was a Midshipman in Australia to assume command of with the RANEL (later RANRL) the RANVR. HMAS Quickmatch at the end of Association links to Rushcutter and After doing specialist training at 1959. In Oct 1961 he posted to was active in ensuring the name of HMAS Rushcutter (beginning his HMS Terror (Singapore) and on HMAS Rushcutter is not forgotten, long association with Rushcutter), return to Australia was made the being closely involved with the he was posted to HMAS K9 (a Deputy Director of Intelligence in plaques that were unveiled at the site former Dutch submarine, tendered Navy Office in May 1964. in Mar 2009. Similarly he kept an to Rushcutter) as an acting Sub After two years in Navy Office interest in the K9, which after being Lieutenant in Aug 1943. His Bryan joined HMAS Watson as transferred back to the RNLN, near association with submarines OIC TAS School in Apr the end of WWII, ran ashore after continued for the rest of the war 1966, before briefly serving in breaking its tow line off the NSW serving with the Royal Navy’s 3rd, HMAS Rushcutter (yet again) in coast and grounded at Fiona Beach 7th and 8th Submarine Flotillas. Hhe mid-1968. Temporarily promoted (Seal Rocks). t also served in HMS Elfin (a TRV) and to Captain he posted to the Top HMS Maidstone a Submarine Depot End in Nov 1968 and took over as ship. NOICNA (later NOCNA); he was Bryan transferred to the RAN in confirmed in rank in Jun 1969. In mid-1945. Post-war he was promoted May 1970 he returned south and to Lieutenant in Jun 1946 and briefly became the Director Naval Reserves commanded HMAS Air View before and Naval Dockyard posting to HMAS Manoora the same Police Branch. This job year. He subsequently served in HMA lasted until Sep 1972 when Ships Rushcutter (again), Quickmatch he assumed command of and Tobruk, before posting to the HMAS Penguin and 18 UK in 1951 to undergo specialist months later moved on training as a TAS officer. Once to assume command qualified he served on exchange in of HMAS Nirimba in HMS Porchester Castle during 1953. March 1974. Returning On returning to Australia to sea he posted in in Jun 1954 he posted to the command of HMAS Naval Ordnance Branch in Navy Supply in Dec 1975. Office. In Feb 1956 he posted Promoted to to HMAS Tobruk as the TAS Commodore in Mar 1977 remaining there until posting to he was made Chief of Staff

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 51 The Australian Navy Fleet Review and Future Intentions By Geoffrey Till

he Australian Fleet Review held opposition. On the 7th October, the spending their taxes on, and of eliciting in October 2013 was certainly Sydney Morning Herald ran its letter their support for further such efforts. As Ta spectacular example of the type. It page under the heading ‘Navy spectacle one commentator described the Sydney commemorated the arrival, exactly glorifies war and wastes our money’ event they were a means of binding the one hundred years earlier, of the although, to be fair, most of its letters navy and the community together. They so-called British-built (but in large did not support that view. were, and are, also designed to convey measure Australian paid-for) ‘Fleet Fleet reviews have a long history. strategic messages to the outside world, unit’ which more or less started the Once, these were occasional, formal most often as a display of military might Royal Australian Navy. It involved occasions in which the Sovereign (and technological prowess) intended to 19 Australian ships and another 18 inspected the fleet in order to assess its impress and to encourage respect from from other countries. There was an current capability for future operations. other powers. inspecting sail-past for the Governor- As ways of confirming fleet readiness, Starting perhaps in the Indo-Pacific General (plus Prince Harry); fireworks, they were a form of quality control. with the ’s ‘Bridges of several days of ship-visits, much The last time there was such a purely Friendship’ fleet review off in conviviality, a dramatic son et lumiere functional review was arguably in 2001, such naval gatherings have also show in Sydney harbour, a grand May 1944, a secret one, held just sought to illustrate the benign aspects march-past of the participating naval before the Allies invaded Normandy. of naval power by providing a practical contingents, a big naval arms fair and But fleet reviews soon took on other display of international togetherness. several international conferences. characteristics and justifications too. ‘Look,’ they seem to say, ‘at how Over one and a half million people are Whether put on to commemorate a cooperative we are, and how much we said to have participated in the event significant event or just for the sake of contribute together to humanitarian or watched it first hand. There was it, they became a means of showing operations, to keeping shipping safe huge excitement – and of course some the public what the Government was and to preserving your peace and

H MAS Sydney leads HMA Ships Darwin, Perth, Parramatta, Bundaberg, Gascoyne, Diamantina and Huon into Sydney Harbour for the International Fleet Review 2013. (By LSIS James Whittle, Navy Imagery Unit - East) Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 52 The Australian Navy Fleet Review and Future Intentions prosperity.’ A few weeks later indeed stands in the huge naval arms fair. Many defence spending it has remained vague some of the navies (and indeed some of them were especially interested in about by how much and when. Others of the ships) involved in the Review HMS Daring, a modernistic cruiser wonder at the capacity of the country’s were proving the point in humanitarian masquerading as a destroyer, (now in defence industrial base to deliver the activities in the typhoon-hit Philippines. Singapore) clearly a different generation capabilities needed, or of its military Whatever their motivation and to everything else in the review, and system to grow the necessary skill sets – impact, Fleet Reviews as very public according to Britain’s current First Sea despite all the external help the country and discrete events are important and Lord symbolizing its ‘naval renaissance.’ is getting. Still others wonder about the attract a lot of interest both for what Shedding light on Australian impact of future governmental changes, they tell us about the international Intentions shifts in key personnel and, most environment and about the country But of course, the main issue is what obviously of unpredictable international that hosts and organizes them. it will tell us about Australia. No-one events. Only time will tell, but for Aficionados of such issues can spot could have missed the pride of the now, to judge by this review at least, who’s in and who’s out, can compare Australian navy in its past and its Australia’s naval aspirations and current technologies and capabilities between determination and confidence in its intentions are clear! the participating navies, can speculate future. It has a very ambitious building Australia’s two recent Defence about the priorities of the organizer and program that includes two large White Papers have signalled a strategic deduce the domestic and international amphibious assault ships, ‘the most shift towards a forwards oriented reaction. capable ships ever operated by the defence posture within Asia, and a What the Review Told Us navy,’ advanced air warfare destroyers, further move away from its previous So what did it tell us about the a frigate and patrol boat replacement focus on a ‘near abroad’ comprising the international context? Some clues program and of course the much- waters to its immediate north and to emerged from who was there and who discussed 12 strong submarine project. the troubled island states of the South wasn’t. People noticed that the Russian Very significantly, on top of all this, at Pacific. How much this forward policy contingent pulled out at the last minute, one of the connected conferences, Lt turns into a strategic reality will depend perhaps because of their current General David Morrison, Chief of Army in large measure on how much and focus on Syria-related deployments; (a position not normally associated how soon the country’s current naval they noted that the Chinese ship’s with ‘dark blue’ thinking) went out of program is achieved. t company were not allowed ashore; they his way to endorse Australia’s adoption sympathized with the Canadians whose of a thoroughly ‘maritime’ strategy in two ships collided with each other on the wake of its Iraq and Afghanistan the way and had to withdraw. They experience. He spoke of the Army’s got the significance of the presence determination to work closely with the of the ’s replenishment Navy’s current and projected power oiler Cantabria currently part of the projection fleet in order to build up Australian fleet ( has a central a substantial amphibious element, part in Australia’s fleet construction perhaps illustrating something of a shift program). They will have noted the away from its traditional ‘continental’ perhaps surprising presence of the and counter-insurgency mode of Nigerian frigate NNS Thunderseeing thinking. If all this comes to fruition, it as perhaps an indication of a navy on it would contribute significantly to an an upwards trajectory in response to a Australian strategic policy of forward Geoffrey Till is Visiting Professor in deteriorating security situation in the engagement in , the Maritime Studies and is attached to the Gulf of Guinea. Naval technologists Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Maritime Security program at the RSIS. and capability ‘spotters’ (and let’s be But it is a big ‘if.’ Some wonder clear there were a lot of professionals whether the money needed to This article is based on a Commentary doing this in the various participating support such aspirations will actually produced by the Rajaratnam School ships’ companies!) looked at and be forthcoming, pointing out that of International Studies, Singapore in compared platforms and systems in while the new Abbott government November 2013. the assembled fleet and reviewed the has promised an uplift in Australian Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 53 The Second World War and the Impact of Modern Amphibious Warfare By Mike Fogarty

he successful application of amphibious warfare was a key Tdeterminant in the Allied victory of World War II. Japan had an early edge in doctrine, strategy and tactics but the Allies reclaimed the necessary initiatives from late 1942 and sustained the momentum to defeat Japan in 1945. Assault from the sea proved that naval forces, augmented by air power and land armies, could overcome island defences. One modern doctrinal view on an amphibious operation defines it as such: “A military operation launched from the sea by a naval and landing force embarked in ships or craft, with yet they had to confront defended and air reconnaissance, coupled with A mphibious assault the principal purpose of projecting the positions to seize their objectives. underwater diving teams and raiding vehicles transporting U.S. Marines and landing force ashore tactically into an The first US amphibious landing parties, also shaped the battles. The soldiers from the environment ranging from permissive in WWII was made at Guadalcanal in misplaced assumptions on the tidal Malaysian Army 9th to hostile.” 1 mid-1942. In 1960, Admiral Turner RK conditions at Tarawa were telling. Many Royal Malay Regiment Several differing approaches were Turner reiterated a key doctrine. “As Marines died for want of an extra foot pass the amphibious adopted. The Japanese preferred night soon as the action ashore changes from of water when their craft could not dock landing ship USS actions. Both sides accepted that they amphibious warfare, the Army relieves surmount a reef in a misjudged tide. 6 Harpers Ferry (USN photo) could not always risk their carriers to the Marines.”4 However, the Marines McKiernan noted that their LCVP craft protect a landing force. Both opponents continued to fight major battles drew four feet of water. An expected were adaptive in acknowledging inland, advanced far from a secured neap tide of five feet did not eventuate. vulnerabilities. Feints in attack fronts beachhead. The Japanese allotted her At the coral fringe, many landing also distracted their enemy. The Army for its amphibious role yet also boats were stranded as only four feet absence (or delay) in applying air complemented the force with specialist of water covered the reefs. From that strikes, or ship to shore bombardment, naval units. The Americans relied on planning error, the technology adapted could stall the momentum. At Borneo an organic amphibious force which to the threat of littoral obstacles. 7 in mid-1945, Mallett evidenced that also accommodated the Army as their Many islands were veritable anvils as “the Australians were relying on the resources became available. Joint they crushed opposing sides, when Japanese adhering to their doctrine of (combined) warfare thus emerged. the ability to manoeuvre was equally not opposing landings .” Tarawa in 1943 educated constrained. Tim Bean criticises the 2 Gatchel contradicts that optimistic both protagonists. Those lessons campaign on Okinawa (which) “was assumption. “Japanese army doctrine included: naval gunfire support, air conducted in an unimaginative attrition still directed commanders to annihilate bombardment, logistics, intelligence, Gilberts had positive benefits. See p. 729. Tarawa was another stepping stone an amphibious attacker at the beach.” communications, harmonious inter- 6 Patrick L. McKiernan, Tarawa: The Tide 3 Commanders preferred weak salients service relationships, adequate shipping that Failed, in Bartlett, Assault from the 5 Sea, p. 210-218. McKiernan surmised that 1 Ministry of Defence, British Maritime and local knowledge. Submarine hydrographic intelligence was sufficiently Doctrine, BR 1806 (3rd edition), HMSO, 1996. p. 109. accurate. The high US casualty figures London, 2008, p. 238. This definition is 4 George Carroll Dyer, The Amphibians indicated the contrary. See p. 216. synonymous with present USMC doctrine. Came to Conquer, The Story of Admiral 7 Bernard Ireland, The Illustrated Guide 2 Ross Mallett, p. 127. This article notes Richmond Kelly Turner, USN, Department to Amphibious Warfare Vessels, Hermes the procurement and acquisition of craft for of the Navy, USGPO, Washington, 1971, House, Leicestershire, 2011. The author Australia. volume II, p. 225. describes the craft involved, including: 3 Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge: 5 Dyer above, passim. In this two volume LCM (Landing Craft, Mechanized), LCVP Defending against the Modern Amphibious edition, the author reiterates these inter- (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) and LVT Assault, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, related themes. While costly, seizing the (Landing Vehicle, Tracked). Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 54 The Second World War and the Impact of Modern Amphibious Warfare mode which played into the hands of armoury created and served specialist were taken out of the fight for lack of provisioning. This was the defenders.” 8 The Japanese were functions. The USMC, as shock sea manoeuvre warfare sine qua non, often done with stealth and fatalistic. In their desperation, they gave soldiers, discharged discrete roles. surprise, with increasing dominance. Joseph Alexander cited the Allies few options. The Americans Von Lehmann noted that “among the British military historian, JFC Fuller, who acclaimed the prevailed amid their own sanguinity. the most important preconditions of development of American amphibious power projection as Drea stressed that (the) “allied ability large amphibious operations were air “the most far-reaching tactical innovation of the war.” 16 to read Japanese army radio messages and sea superiority.”12 Their inverse Japan had over-extended its ambitions. By 1945, her definitely shortened the ground war in proportionality invited defeat. Frontal ability to tactically prosecute all phases of warfare was being the Pacific.”9 The author observed that assaults on defended beaches demand countered by the allies. She was unable to thwart a plethora of the supreme commander MacArthur the maximum exercise of force. amphibious invasions against her possessions or to the fringes often chose to ignore or downplay Louis Morton has summarised the of her homeland. Japan succumbed to an enemy which re- key intelligence intercepts. Drea has strategic and historical significance mastered amphibious warfare. t conflated ULTRA. He did not cite the of amphibious warfare. “What USN success in breaking Japan’s JN 25 distinguished the Pacific from every Mike Fogarty is a retired naval code, Purple. other theatre of operations in World diplomat who has served The roles and relative operational War Two was amphibious warfare. in Singapore and Hanoi advantages of naval and land forces The Pacific was the one theatre and of naval and land-based air power where assault from the sea was both during his DFAT career invite perspective. Ashore, armies customary and normal.” 13 (1973-2001). A former are conditioned by topography. Forty years after Gallipoli, WWII SLSU officer, he served The sea is its own highway. Dyer showed that, when adequately from 1966-1972. He has qualified air power. “Naval air could resourced, seaborne landings could a BA (Social Sciences) not be substituted for land-based subdue littoral redoubts. Foster found air because, as Fleet Admiral Nimitz inspiration from Gallipoli in later from the Canberra CAE. later said (in the fall of 1943) the doctrine. He is now a part-time Navy lacked the carrier strength to “Yet Gallipoli saw much of interest postgraduate student at UNSW undertaking an M.Phil at ADFA. provide the necessary air power.” 10 in the development of amphibious The Allies needed air bases to shorten warfare techniques, which were to Bibliography the concentric operational arcs. The come to fruition only in the Second Joseph H. Alexander, Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997. amphibious fleets also required air World War. Specialised landing Tim Bean, “Iwo Jima and Okinawa” (chapter XXXI), in Tristan cover to both protect the invading force craft, dedicated bombardment Lovering (ed.), Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the sea, and undertake air strikes. All aircraft ships, air spotting for naval gunfire, Seafarer Books, Woodbridge, 2007. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA codebreaking and the war wanted alternative and emergency artificial harbours – all these and against Japan, 1942-1945, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, landing strips. 11 many other aspects of amphibious 1992. Amphibious forces enabled a warfare now taken for granted Simon Foster, Hit the Beach!, Amphibious Warfare from the Plains of Abraham to San Carlos Water, Arms and Armour, London, 1995. multiplier effect with a potential to were first experimented with at Theodore L. Gatchel, At the Water’s Edge: Defending against the 14 either attack or bypass islands and Gallipoli.” Modern Amphibious Assault, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1996. coasts alike. Those ‘storm landings’ Taafe noted: “the Japanese could not Bernard Ireland, The Illustrated Guide to Amphibious Warfare Vessels, Hermes House, Leicestershire, 2011. were mostly contested by an equally begin to match an American strategic Ross Mallett, “Together Again for the First Time: The Army, the determined enemy. Amphibian forces mobility that neutralised the effect of RAN and Amphibious Warfare 1942-1945, in D. Stevens and J. segued to form a subset of sea, land their possession of interior lines.” 15 By Reeve (eds.), Sea Power ashore and in the air, Halstead, Ultimo, 2007. and air power. This integrated combat leap-frogging remote Japanese bases, Patrick L. McKiernan, Tarawa: The Tide that Failed, in M.L. Bartlett the allies controlled the battle space. (ed.), Assault from the Sea: Essays on the history of amphibious 8 Bean, in Lovering, p. 408. warfare, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1983. 9 Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s ULTRA Tokyo’s communications and support Ministry of Defence, British Maritime Doctrine, BR 1806 (3rd codebreaking and the war against Japan, lines were cut and many Japanese edition), HMSO, London, 2008. 1942-1945, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1992, p. 232. 12 Hans G. Von Lehmann, p. 196. Stephen R. Taafe, MacArthur’s Jungle War. The 1944 New Guinea 10 Dyer, volume II, p. 728. 13 Hans G. Von Lehmann, p. 220. Campaign, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1998. 11 Tim Bean, “Iwo Jima and Okinawa” 14 Simon Foster, Hit the Beach!, Amphibious Hans G. Von Lehmann, “Japanese Landing Operations in World (chapter XXXI), in Lovering, p. 396. Bean Warfare from the Plains of Abraham to San War Two”, in M.L. Bartlett (ed.), Assault from the Sea. poses a specious argument. Fighters have Carlos Water, Arms and Armour, London, a shorter range and bombers needed their 1995, p. 205. own air cover for raids on Japan. 15 Stephen R. Taafe, p. 54. 16 Joseph H. Alexander, p. 6. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 55 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine By LCDR Richard Adams A bstract Australian legislation and military doctrine stipulate that soldiers “subjugate their will” to government, and fight in any war the government declares. Neither legislation nor doctrine enables the conscience of soldiers. Together, provisions of legislation and doctrine seem to take soldiers for granted. And, rather than strengthening the military instrument, the convention of legislation and doctrine seems to weaken the democratic foundations upon which the military may be shaped as a force for justice. Denied liberty of their conscience, soldiers are denied the foundational right of democratic citizenship and construed as utensils of moral autonomy in Australian virtue, which find profound expression Soldiers of the 55th Armored Infantry of the State. legislation and military doctrine. in the philosophy of Epictetus. Noted Battalion and tank This paper critiques the idea of The paper illuminates the obligation for his dictum, “bear and forebear,” of the 22nd Tank moral agency in Australian legislation of soldiers to resign rather than Epictetus articulates a philosophy Battalion, move and military doctrine. The paper is to participate in operations they which resonates with the profession of through smoke filled concerned with the obligation of the consider unjust. This obligation arms.1 He argues that: streetWernberg, State to safeguard the moral integrity is not considered by Australian There are two vices which are far . (Tom Lewis Collection) of individual soldiers, so soldiers legislation, or by Australian doctrine. more severe and more atrocious might serve with a fully formed moral Examining the moral responsibility than all the others, want of assurance to advance justice in the of soldiers and the obligations set out endurance and want of self- world. in legislation and doctrine, this paper control, when we do not endure Beyond its explicit focus on the will inform enquiry likely to follow or bear the wrongs which we convention of Australian thought, from the Kampala Review Conference have to bear, or do not abstain the paper raises questions of far- concerning the Rome Statute and from, or forebear, those matters reaching relevance. The provisos of the crime of aggression. Most and pleasures which we ought to Australian legislation and doctrine prominently, the paper contributes forebear.2 are an analogue of western thinking. to discussion about the expectations This position dovetails with Nancy Thus, this discussion challenges many democratic society may rightly impose Sherman, inaugural Distinguished assumptions concerning military upon citizens who chose to serve in Professor of Ethics at the United States duty and effectiveness. Discussion uniform. Naval Academy, Annapolis. Recalling will additionally provoke some This paper asserts that, in her tenure at the Naval Academy, reassessment of the expectations legislation and doctrine, allowance Professor Sherman observes that: democratic societies hold of their ought be made for soldiers to observe Most military men and women soldiers. the calls of their conscience. Such do not think of themselves in Note: “Soldiers” is gender- allowance should enable soldiers Epictetan terms. Yet, they do think neutral, referencing those who serve, to conscientiously refuse service in of themselves, or at least they have regardless of rank, in each of the operations to which they harbour idealized notions of military character, armed services. moral objection. as stoic in the vernacular sense of This paper addresses the issue The study recalls the Stoic ideas of the term. The traits that go with Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 56 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

that stoicism are familiar: control, flourishing. In address “to those discipline, endurance, a sense of ‘can- who fail to achieve their purposes,” do’ agency, and a stiff upper lip, as the Epictetus holds “…it is a contest for Brits would say.3 good and happiness itself. What Similarly, Michael Evans from the follows? Why here, even if we give in Australian Defence College argues for the time being, no one prevents us that: from struggling again….”9 Stoicism may seem redundant; Epictetus finds resonance in the yet to believe this is an illusion…. argument of Mark Osiel, who has Stoic philosophy has much to advanced virtue ethics as a position offer today’s Western military upon which the conduct of military professionals. Nowhere is this members might be critiqued. Noting truer than in the Stoic teaching virtue to be “a property of our that courage is endurance of the character, not our relation to others,”10 human spirit based on a resilience Osiel observes that: equivocal and interpreted in several Magna Carta and steadfastness in which The duties we owe to those we relevant ways,13 the concept is individuality is embedded within a have detained as terror suspects foundational to the democratic larger community of comradeship should best be understood. . . as ideal. Magna Carta offers celebrated that upholds a balance between an inference from the duties we expression holding, at Chapter 40, the principles of public duty and owe our fellow citizens to behave that “to no one will we sell, to no one private excellence.4 honorably, consistent with our deny or delay right or justice”. Thus, But, the nucleus of Epictetan identity as a people constitutively in a democratic society, legislation argument is that “no man is free who committed to the rule of law. 11 and doctrine should operate to secure is not master of himself”.5 Epictetus Osiel’s argument accords with the background conditions within thus reveals Stoicism to be far richer concepts resonant in professional which the military can function well, than clichéd ideas of “‘sucking it up,’ militaries around the world. Often as a just instrument and for justice. (and) being stoic.”6 The real value of tacit, the power and credence of the This is not to suggest that legislation Epictetan Stoicism lies in hard-nosed appeal to high-mindedness is made or doctrine can be perfectly just. ideas of integrity or independent explicit in United States Army and There is no chance of agreement on moral agency. In this way, Epictetus Marine Corps counterinsurgency what such instruments would be like. presents a philosophy, which resonates doctrine, which argues “lose moral Yet, manifest injustice -- such as the with military ideals whilst challenging legitimacy, lose the war”.12 asphyxiation of soldiers’ conscience doctrinal argument that soldiers are No soldier can act for justice yet -- can be redressed; and if it cannot be “required to subjugate their will” even commit to action he or she considers removed, at the very least such clear to the degree of fighting in a cause to evil. And, no just society can expect injustice can be minimised. which they have a moral objection.7 the soldiers who defend its ideals Considering ideas of social justice, Epictetus would understand to turn a blind eye. Volunteering the present paper is informed by the that soldiers might not control the military service, soldiers pledge -- or ideas of John Rawls who advanced government’s decision to go to war. at least they should pledge -- to act the notion of justice as fairness, and But, at the same time he would assert conscientiously to advance just causes whose basal concern was for the equal that soldiers control “how they are by just means. Soldiers therefore liberty of conscience: “one of the fixed subordinate”.8 Ultimately, soldiers face a challenge in Australian points in [a] considered judgment control their commitment to serve or legislation and doctrine, which is of justice”.14 Rawls recognized that to resign honourably. insufficiently attentive to soldiers’ a just society will take the moral Where doctrine stipulates (and moral concerns, failing in particular convictions of citizens seriously, and legislation presumes) submission, to consider the dilemma of soldiers enable individuals to examine and to Epictetus argues for unfaltering who are commanded to participate in act upon these deeply held beliefs. self-control. For Epictetus, vice is operations they consider unjust. In Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, found only in the failure of individual Though, as Adam Smith observes, Rawls described the equal liberty character, and virtue only in its the idea of “right” or “justice” is of conscience as a primary good Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 57

and constitutional essential.15 He A Dilemma of their conscience and conditioned to advanced a view of people as morally Soldiers may, in some situations, be obey without question, may commit responsible and equally free to faced with dilemma: should they crimes of obedience: acts “performed exercise moral judgment. The moral abide by command or personal in response to orders from authority independence of soldiers is suppressed moral conviction? Rhetoric suggests that [are] considered illegal or by Australian legislation and doctrine, soldiers should act with independent immoral by the larger community”.22 which advance an argument typical conscience and disregard morally Opposed to realism, the amongst modern western militaries. abhorrent orders to advance unjust present paper looks to the “logic Exploring the arguments of operations. Yet, the convention of of appropriateness” posited Australian legislation and doctrine, Australian legislation and doctrine by the constructivist school of which together operate to curtail the suggests otherwise. international relations. Investigating rights of soldiers, this paper accepts At odds with military ideals and ideas of security ethics, Mura that just institutions, which advance democratic principles, the Australian Sucharov explains that the logic of individual liberty and fairness, are convention demands the subjugation appropriateness “stresses the role essential to just societies, which in of soldiers.20 But even if this word of actors’ own identities, and the turn are critical to global justice. The were not used -- and it is used in rules and norms that permeate the paper’s importance derives from the doctrine -- the effect of the convention given system, in shaping decision fact Geoffrey Robertson observes, that would be the same. Obsessively realist, outcomes”.23 Tending to correspond “at the beginning of the twenty-first neither legislation nor doctrine is with a more ethically responsive century, the dominant motive in world sufficiently attentive to the obligations and informed military, the “logic affairs is the quest -- almost the thirst of jus in exercitu, the responsibility of appropriateness” connects to -- for justice. [This thirst is] replacing of the democracy to ensure “right in Stoic ideas of moral autonomy even the objective of regional security the army”. Appreciating the claims of and to Rawlsian ideas of individual as the trigger for international soldiers to justice, this idea underpins responsibility and social justice. A action”.16 the contract between the democratic compelling counter to realism, the The paper is focused on provisions state and the citizens who volunteer constructivist logic of appropriateness of the Australian Defence Act, and in her defence. But realist to the core, is echoed by Robert Bolt who, in his on argument advanced in military the Australian convention construes play A Man for all Seasons, has Sir doctrine “pitched at the philosophical soldiers as instruments and neglects Thomas More say: “when statesmen and high application level”.17 Doctrine, to secure background conditions forsake their own private conscience which is subordinate to legislation, which safeguard their individual for the sake of their public duties… “states the ADF’s philosophical rights and interests. In this way, they lead their country by a short military approach to the operating legislation and doctrine form the route to chaos”.24 environment”.18 Taken together, ideas basis for prodigious consequential set down in legislation and doctrine, wrong. Disregarding the inalienable Moral Autonomy are critically important as part of what rights of soldiers, the legislative- Walzer called the war convention: doctrinal convention undermines the For the Stoic, the decisive the “norms, customs, professional democratic foundations of the military characteristic of virtue was the codes, legal precepts, religious instrument. absolute resolve and autonomy and philosophical principles and The effect is to compromise the of the individual will.25 The Stoics reciprocal arrangements that shape military as an instrument of justice. -- like Kant some centuries later26 -- our judgments of military conduct”.19 Most evidently, this is because soldiers understood man to be a moral agent Though focused on the denied the liberty of their conscience and recognised that the “achievement “conventions” of Australian thought, and compelled to prosecute action in of good character call(ed) for the most this paper identifies and critiques a a cause to which there is conscientious arduous efforts”.27 thematic approach to military service, objection may, in the words of For the Stoic, only virtue had typical of many western powers, and Jonathan Shay, be morally “ruined”.21 intrinsic worth,28 and a virtuous life deserving academic scrutiny. To take such advantage of citizens is was directed deliberately toward malum in se. On the parallel plane of the perfection of an individual’s jus in bello, soldiers denied the liberty nature.29 This position accepted that Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 58 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

people were obliged to fulfil certain essential as well to socially derived duties,30 in which democratic society regard, Stoicism recognised the social which, Locke and political obligations Cynicism argued, rests upon rejected.31 But the Stoic did not the premise:”Men argue that the individual needed to being…by nature, subjugate himself or surrender moral all free, equal and choice in the way that Australian independent, no doctrine and legislation command. one can be put out These ideas are typical of Epictetus, of this estate, and whose philosophy of self-mastery subjected to the is amplified and complemented political power of by awareness of civic duties and another, without responsibilities. So, Epictetus does not his own consent.”38 profess a self-obsessed philosophy, Locke explained Bangladeshi soldiers but holds that we should acknowledge how individuals by the larger sum of advancement use a stretcher to 40 duties because: “I ought not to be are free and equal by nature. He shared by many. unload a shipment unfeeling like a statue, but should argued that people have inalienable In a just society, Rawls argued of bottled water maintain my relations both natural rights independent of the laws of any that individual moral freedom is delivered by Marines and acquired, as a religious man, as a particular social order. For Locke, paramount.41 This idea resonates of Marine Medium 32 Helicopter Squadron son, a brother, a father, a citizen.” political society entailed a contract by within modern democracy which, in (Courtesy of US Navy) Recognising public duties, which people devolved some of their the words of Robin Williams, is more Epictetan stoicism acknowledges the independence to the government, so than a system of government and “domain of the appropriate”33 to be as to assure their enjoyment of liberty might be understood as “a culturally more than a narrow philosophy of and property. But he was mindful that standardised way of thought and endurance without hope. But still, the this devolution was conditional, and evaluation, a tendency to think case-hardened influence of Socrates did not entail the impoverishment of rights [and] a deep aversion to and Diogenes the Cynic34 is tangible in of individuals, or the surrender of acceptance of obviously coercive powerful emblematic ideas of moral inalienable individual freedoms. restraint”.42 autonomy, integrity or self-control. These ideas are prominent in the Jus in Exercitu “In our power” claims Epictetus, “are work of John Rawls, who explained moral character and all its functions”.35 the obligation of social institutions These ideas are significant, because Famously, he writes that people to impose nothing more than the the character of western arms should must be responsible for themselves obligations to which people would reflect the character and aspiration “even in dreams, or drunkenness assent voluntarily. Illuminating of western ideals. Serving to protect (in) melancholy (or) madness”.36 justice as critical to human activity, the democratic liberties of individual Emphasising ideas of integrity Rawls argued, “laws and institutions conscience, justice, to restate Rawls, and self-discipline, the thinking no matter how efficient and well- should be the first virtue of the resonates with military ideals and the arranged must be reformed or military institution. This is regrettably philosophy that: abolished if they are unjust”.39 He not the case. The ethical man must above maintained that each person: Neither Australian legislation all remain the agent of his own Possesses an inviolability founded nor doctrine is sufficiently attentive fate. (As a soldier, such a man) on justice that even the welfare to fundamental democratic ideals must bring to bear his own of society as a whole cannot and dignities, the ideas of jus in reasoning powers, and he must override. For this reason justice exercitu, or “right in the army”. The shoulder ethical responsibility for denies that the loss of freedom for legislative and doctrinal convention is what he chooses to do in given some is made right by a greater unrealistically realist, and blind to the circumstances.37 good shared by others. [Justice] actuality that when people fight under These ideas of individual moral does not allow that the sacrifices duress they are denied the opportunity autonomy and responsibility are imposed on a few are outweighed to commit or to assume an obligation Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 59

voluntarily and thus, “their battles are the calls of their conscience. Such much as by explicit teaching”.52 This no longer theirs”.43 allowance ought to enable soldiers to means that ideas can be doctrinal Even in the non-ideal world, refuse service in operations to which without being written down. But, certain minimal ideas of justice can they harbour conscientious objection. when ideas are written down, there be acknowledged and advanced. In some circumstances, the reasonable is reciprocity between formally As a minimum, legislation and course of action may be that soldiers articulated argument, and unstated doctrine should enable soldiers to are enabled to resign honourably belief. Beyond the provisions of conscientiously refuse. As it is, soldiers when their conscience precludes their legislation, doctrine gives expression are expected to “subjugate (their) will committed service. to tacit cultural motifs whilst, at the to that of the Government”44 and fight Taken together, ideas set down in same time, informing these unspoken in operations against which they may legislation and doctrine, are critically shared ideas. Doctrine shapes -- and hold deep moral objections. Neither important as part of what Walzer is in turn shaped by -- a Kuhnian society, nor the military instrument, called the war convention. The phrase cultural gestalt53 within which is well-served by this logic which acknowledges how ideas become distinctive bodies of belief derive perpetuates, as Wilfred Owen would established and predictable within the from and epitomise characteristic have it, “that same old lie”45 for those collective order of military thought. and predictable patterns of action. who “die like cattle”.46 But beneath the amalgamated sense This means that doctrinal argument of a “convention,” the interconnection is metaphorically and meaningfully L egislation and Doctrine between legislation and military entwined within the fabric of doctrine is subtle and significant. cultural practice and belief. Doctrine “Australia’s Defence Act of 1903 was Where national or government reinforces routines and, as part of the the first national legislation to grant policy states, “what is to be done,” collective institutional order, exerts a total exemption from military service military doctrine articulates “how broad and significant practical effect. on the grounds of conscientious military operations should be directed, be1ief”.47 Under Section 61A (1A) of mounted, commanded, conducted, Just Cause, Just Acts the Australian legislation, persons sustained and delivered”.48 Military conscripted to the Australian Defence doctrine both establishes and reflects The Just War tradition provokes Force may be exempt from service philosophical principles by which critical questions concerning the on the basis of either a universal, or military forces guide their actions in justice of war. The justice of war is a specific, conscientious objection. support of national objectives. considered in the combination of But, according to section 61C (c) of But military doctrine is richer two parts: when it is right to go to the Defence Act, citizens who have than mere “officially sanctioned, war -- jus ad bellum -- and what volunteered to serve in the Defence formalised and written expression of may be considered a right act within Force and who come to acquire a institutionally accepted principles and the situation of war -- jus in bello. conscientious objection, are not guidance about what armed forces do Under the umbrella of jus ad bellum, able to exercise the entitlement of and how they do it”.49 Though doctrine questions are asked regarding the conscientious refusal either to service reflects legislative provisions to justice of the cause. The modern in general or to service in a specific which it is subordinate, in many ways jus ad bellum discourse continues operation. doctrine is a richer instrument, with to be richly informed by Thomas Australian Defence Force doctrine a cultural presence and influence the Aquinas (1225 – 1274 AD). In Summa maintains the argument of legislation legislative arrangements do not have. Theologica, Part II, II, at Question to which it is subordinate. Thus, Taught within a group as its 40, Aquinas advances the argument doctrine does not address the question “corporate beliefs, principles or that only a sovereign authority might of citizens who, having volunteered faith,”50 doctrine expresses ideas which identify a just cause and declare war for military service, develop moral are foundational to the military ethos legitimately. concerns about participation in and codes of conduct.51 Doctrine This is the basis upon which the conflict. is powerfully intrinsic to military present paper engages with just war This paper asserts that there ought culture. As a deep-rooted part of thinking. The present paper does to be both a legislative and a doctrinal the military psyche, doctrine is not debate the elements that make allowance for soldiers to abide by “imparted by corporate ambience as war just or not just, but calls into Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 60 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

question the idea that only a sovereign serve without moral agility, without or State might determine the justice a mind to justice or human dignity, of conflict. The present paper makes as morally mute instruments in any the claim that soldiers have relevant cause. and important ideas about just cause. The peril of this approach was Soldiers enlist in order to advance put in a nutshell by General George the cause of justice by just means. Marshall. Serving as Secretary of They deserve the chance to fight, State in 1948, Marshall argued before and perhaps to die, with the fully the General Assembly of the United formed moral assurance that their Nations that “[g]overnments which cause is just. If soldiers come to the systematically disregarded the rights moral conclusion that a cause is not of their own people were not likely to just, then legislation and doctrine respect the rights of other nations and should acknowledge their right of other people, and were likely to seek conscientious refusal. their objectives by coercion and force But the Australian convention H enry V Though mindful of positivist in the international field”.54 forgets the caution of Michael legitimacy, the convention of Australian soldiers are expected Williams, who reminds Bates: “Tis Australian legislation and doctrine to be concerned with “the ethical certain, every man that dies ill, the ill is largely indifferent to the justice or pursuit of missions”.55 But they are upon his own head, the King is not to rightness of military action. Neither expected to close their minds to jus ad answer for it”. The moral sensitivity of instrument is sufficiently attentive bellum thinking, which contextualises this Shakespearean soldier resonates to the obligation of the military to individual martial acts and informs in the modern democratic state, where advance and to harbour justice in the the moral commitment of soldiers citizens who bear arms accept the army or, more broadly, in the world. to serve at all. The upshot is that obligation to bear arms justly and for Recognising a singular unidealistic so long as Australian soldiers abide justice. premise: that military success is by positivist rules of engagement, Absorbed by legalist ideas of justice the triumph of the strong over the they shall be presumed to have done in war, the Australian convention weak, legislation and doctrine each enough. This position is difficult articulates only a partial moral build an instrumentalist reasoning, because it presumes that any fight is reasoning, failing to contemplate which misses the deep human the same and that soldiers will take life the justice of war. Australian soldiers significance of military service and and risk their own lives just because are presumed to be uninterested conflict. Unrealistically indifferent they are told to. in the justice of acts, which are to the sacrifice of human life and the The philosophical quandary is contextualised by the rightness of the abdication of human ideals, neither illustrated by Shakespeare [King Henry cause. Both the legislation and the legislation nor doctrine is satisfactorily V, Act iv, scene 1] when he has King doctrine deny the tragedy and reality alert to the issue of moral conviction. Henry V going secretly amongst his of contemporary military operations, In consequence, the legislative and soldiers on the eve of Agincourt. which have been impaired by political doctrinal argument minifies the King Henry V [in disguise]: deceit and dissembling. Expecting concept of military service and ‘Methinks I could not die anywhere soldiers to obey government direction dehumanises conflict more generally. so content as in the King’s company, without demurral, both instruments In legislation and doctrine, soldiers his cause being just and his quarrel establish conditions, which enable are construed impersonally as military honourable’. the military to be mired in political implements, their purpose to serve Michael Williams [a soldier]: ‘That’s cupidity and seduced away from ideas political strategy costumed in the more than we know’. of justice. Even worse, the doctrine language of national interest. John Bates [a soldier]: ‘Ay, or more enables soldiers to be taken for The realist argument of the than we should seek after; for we granted, and denied proper expression Australian legislative–doctrinal know enough if we know we are the of their conscience. convention does not appreciate that King’s subjects, if his cause be wrong, The line of reasoning followed soldiers fight as citizens committed to our obedience to the king wipes the by the legislative and doctrinal high ideals. Soldiers are presumed to crime of it out of us’. instruments would be enriched by the Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 61

fusion of logically distinct ad bellum into two parts. War is always profession of arms and the decisions and in bello perspectives. Understood judged twice; first with reference soldiers make, bridge the separation together, these separate yet connected to the reasons states have for between jus ad bellum and jus in bello perspectives frame what the fighting, secondly with reference thinking which is unduly conspicuous Australian-born British General, Sir to the means they adopt…. in the arguments of Australian John Winthrop Hackett, called the The two sorts of judgement legislation and doctrine. “unlimited liability” of the profession are logically independent. It is Operating in precarious and of arms.56 Pace Osiel, this is more than perfectly possible for just war ambiguous situations, soldiers do a soldier’s commitment to “risk death to be fought unjustly and for best when empowered to determine for his country,”57 and more than “the unjust war to be fought in strict and apply intricate standards of individual commitment to almost accordance with the rules. But, proportionality. Sometimes definable, unlimited service”.58 Hackett identifies this independence, though these standards are typically the unlimited moral liability, to which our views of particular wars indeterminate and understood as Australian legislation and doctrine often conform to its terms is matters of honour intrinsic to the is indifferent. Hackett understands nevertheless puzzling.61 profession. They are standards which soldiers must be principled, and But more than puzzling, the technical concern proportionality and rightness, resolve to advance just causes by just separation of jus ad bellum reasoning and they are linked unavoidably to means. He expects soldiers to be from jus in bello thinking is deceiving, the cause beyond the immediacy of unwaveringly responsible and argues: operating to emphasise the idea of the fight. Soldiers appreciate this; “What the bad man cannot be is a the State and to understate the moral they are not morally inert. Yet the good sailor, or soldier or airman”.59 responsibility of citizens who choose Australian convention denies soldiers Hackett expects soldiers to be to serve as soldiers. must make moral judgements framed high-minded and upstanding. His As a political entity, the State by the justice of the cause; ultimately reasoning coincides with the Crito affords an expedient excuse. The State declining to fight when holding [47b – 48b] where Socrates asserts the is a device that somehow justifies conscientious belief the cause is importance of a rational conscience, passive acceptance among soldiers unjust.65 arguing one ought to do what is who see no realistic prospect that Choosing to serve, volunteer morally right or “just” and seek to they might exert constructive moral soldiers freely embrace martial avoid that which is wrong, “unjust” or influence upon policies they enact. ideals and social obligations. But “shameful”. Walzer himself refers to reasons volunteers retain citizenship and the Both Socrates and Hackett would States have for fighting and the rights of citizens. Volunteers are not agree that soldiers are very far from means they adopt. His anonymous indentured in military servitude, their unvoiced machines without capacity phrasing obscures people and the lives are not nationalised. Soldiers for responsible decision. Soldiers are moral obligations of individuals and do not surrender the right to refuse not heedless sheep; they are citizens underlines the artificial separation of service in a cause they find unjust, and who choose to serve. Connected to states from soldiers, as he puts it: “the they retain the right to decline morally assumptions of personal excellence protagonists of war, and of combat, its insufferable orders. Soldiers volunteer and moral responsibility, military central experience”.62 [or at least they should volunteer] to service is saturated with stoic notions The moral reality of war must take advance the cause of justice, justly. of integrity: “more or less on the in the theoretical wholeness which There is a morally questionable side same plane as conscience, [which] informs soldiers’ moral decisions. to these ideas, as David Kennedy has presupposes moral autonomy”.60 Acknowledging this theoretical unity, addressed in his book The Dark Sides But these ideas are muffled by Rawls argued that justice of the cause of Virtue: Reassessing International conventional argument that soldiers affects the means with which war can Humanitarianism. Kennedy’s thesis be unmindful of the cause and merely be prosecuted.63 Similarly, Walzer is that the idea of just cause may be do as they are told. The logic of the argues that, in cases of supreme distorted to demonise the adversary Australian legislative–doctrinal emergency, utilitarian calculation can and his cause. Additionally, the convention coincides with the sustain the escalation of force, though humanist discourse confronts the argument of Walzer who argues: some principles are inviolable.64 Ideals pragmatic analysis, which has shaped The moral reality of war is divided of justice and gallantry, central to the the vocabulary of international Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 62 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

affairs since the end of the Second proportionality and necessity. Du Picq democracy and the western military War. These issues, however, are argues famously: tradition. The Australian convention rather beside the point of the present It often happens that those who chokes the moral agency of individual paper, which reasons, in the words discuss war, taking the weapon soldiers, and neglects the obligation of of Michael Walzer, that “democratic for their starting point, assume democratic government to protect the states suffer whenever conscience is unhesitatingly that the man called liberty of citizens’ conscience. coerced”.66 to serve it will always use it as The legislation and military Taking this point, the present paper contemplated and ordered by the doctrine of a democracy ought reasons that the espalier of Australian regulations. But such a being, to preserve the equal liberty of legislation and military doctrine throwing off his variable nature conscience. In debate concerning the would be enriched by consideration to become an impassive pawn, an Vietnam War, Dr. advanced of jus ad bellum issues. The present abstract unit in the combinations this logic in the Australian Parliament: paper contends that the rights of of battle, is a creature born of the There must be room in a free citizenship are not surrendered by musings of the library, and not a and civilized community for an the assumption of military obligation. real man.69 individual to decide for himself Citizens do not surrender the liberty Du Picq acknowledges that soldiers what’s right and wrong…. If of their conscience upon enlistment. are not impassive creatures of the conscience is to amount to This is not to suggest that soldiers military bureaucracy. Soldiers are anything, the individual whether should be utterly autonomous, soldiers, but also people who retain he happens to be wrong or right faux-mercenaries who decide for absolute responsibility for what according to my standards or themselves what they would prefer to they do. Military enlistment does those of the Government… do, and what not. Volunteer soldiers not confer an excuse, but rather an should have his right to exercise accept that the discipline of the State obligation to act deliberately for his conscience protected. If will -- and must -- be imposed. But justice. conscience is to mean anything, State authority can only go so far. Underlining this idea, McMahan it must be based upon the right The State’s obligation to maintain asks rhetorically: of the individual to say what he order does not mean the State has How can certain people’s believes is right and wrong…. 71 licence to do whatever it wants. As establishment of political relations In the Senate fifteen years later, Cesare Beccaria argued in his 1764 among themselves confer on Senator Tate argued similarly that: Essay on Crimes and Punishments, them a right to harm others, when As legislators we ought to the protection of public security does the harming or killing would be be reinforcing the individual justify some measure of imposition, impermissible in the absence of conscience - an activity which but “every act of authority of one man [those] relations? How could it be culturally marks us as a free over another for which there is not that merely acting collectively for society where the common good an absolute necessity, is tyrannical”.67 political goals, people can shed cannot be relentlessly pursued Thus the smallest encroachment the moral constraints that bind by means which destroy the beyond that which is strictly necessary them when they act merely as individual’s personality.72 is “abuse, not justice”.68 individuals….70 Similarly, in 1985, the Report of Australian legislation and doctrine the Standing Democracy and the takes for granted that democracy’s Committee on Constitutional Legislative public legitimacy increases the State’s and Legal Affairs held, regarding coercive influence. The argument conscientious objection, that: –Doctrinal Convention presumes jus ad bellum concerns are “Australia, as a democracy, even when The convention of Australian purely political, and that soldiers do engaged in armed conflict [should legislation and doctrine construes well enough if they obey orders and recognise] conscientious belief in the soldier as an utensil standing comply with jus in bello protocols. order to protect the integrity of the to the army as his weapon does to Emphasising the coercive power of the individual against the coercive power him. This position is unsafe, because State, the Australian legislation and of the State.”73 soldiers must make morally significant doctrine ignore the complex moral Following the 2010 Review decisions, applying complex criteria of narrative which informs western Conference of the Rome Statute, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 63

which was held in Kampala, these crucially important that the legislation Democracy and the ideas have an additional piquancy. enables, and the doctrine encourages, Duty to Obey The Kampala Review Conference has individual soldiers to exercise moral paved the way for the International sensitivity and responsiveness. Presuming individually responsible Criminal Court to exercise its But the Australian convention judgment, and the ultimate right of presently dormant jurisdiction vitiates soldiers’ conscientious conscientious refusal,77 Rawls did not over the crime of aggression. decision and right to fight with a hold that people should be wanton Acknowledged by Article 5 (d) of the fully formed moral assurance. The or heedless of civic obligations, Rome Statute, the crime of aggression Australian instruments thus impair but that people should be properly has been defined in Kampala as: the military as an instrument of mindful of moral responsibilities. The planning, preparation, justice. At the institutional level, He maintained that individuals are initiation or execution, by a senior commanders acculturated to “always accountable for their deeds,” person in a position effectively to obey government direction without and unable to divest themselves of exercise control over or to direct question, enable and conduct morally responsibility and transfer the burden the political or military action of dubious operations. Retired Australian of blame to others.78 In this way, Rawls a State, of an act of aggression Major General, John Cantwell, coincides with the ideas of Stoic self- which, by its character, gravity illustrates this point. sufficingness and Kantian duty. Rawls and scale, constitutes a manifest The commander of Australian acknowledged the importance of self- violation of the Charter of the forces in Afghanistan in 2010, respect and personal virtue, and the .74 General Cantwell was quoted in The importance of acting so as to avoid The Kampala provisions will be Age newspaper of April 17 2012. He moral shame.79 To refuse an unjust law translated into the domestic legislation said; “at the human level [operations would, for Rawls, be justified only in of States Party to the Rome Statute in Afghanistan] were not worth it”. order to advance the greater cause of -- including Australia. Conspicuously, Rejecting “the dirty ugly world of justice and to avoid moral shame; not the provisions underline the issue of international relationships, where for hedonistic or egotistical reasons. criminal liability. But at a deeper level, ‘it’s you scratch my back, I’ll scratch These notions, which informed the Review Conference acknowledges yours’… [where] lives become less Rawls’s ideal theory, also inform ideas of individual merit and moral important,” the General said it was our understanding of the obligation responsibility, highlighting that no wrong to forfeit the life of any soldier to obey. Conflating ideas of ethical soldier can act for justice yet commit for ill-conceived political purpose.75 rightness and legal compliance, the to action he or she considers evil. But this is exactly the realpolitik of Australian convention presumes Volunteering military service, the legislative–doctrinal convention, soldiers will do well enough if they do soldiers promise -- or at least they which holds that soldiers, insensible to as they are told. Harking to outworn should -- to act conscientiously to the cause, must subjugate themselves and ethically constricted ideas of advance just causes by just means. to Government bidding. military service, neither Australian They must resist the coercive power Equally insensible to moral legislation nor doctrine acknowledges of the State, which would turn them responsibility, and acculturated to the obligation of the State to safeguard into mere instruments, and remember obey without demurral, Defence the moral integrity of individual that military success is not Melian officials squander public treasure. soldiers. And, neither instrument triumph of the strong over the weak. Citing Australian National Audit addresses the foundational obligation Military accomplishment depends Office reports, and the Australian of soldiers to act conscientiously to upon moral legitimacy, and relies Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and advance the cause of justice in the upon soldiers whose idea of service is Trade References Committee, David world. This model must be reformed. informed by commitment to societies, Ellery explained, in the Canberra No longer may States presume to their protection and to their ideals. Times newspaper, how a “compulsory that soldiers ought trust their The soldier who achieves success will culture of consensus” has been superiors uncritically and obey them recall the Stoic ideal, and associate instrumental in the dissipated unthinkingly. Doctrinal argument ideas of duty and service with frittering of billions in mismanaged must respond to the proclivity of concepts of justice, civic obligation, Defence procurement projects.76 officials and politicians to use moral and individual excellence. Thus, it is language whilst avoiding the burden of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 64 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

moral responsibility. As Pogge writes, of the good [and] a capacity to against the provisions of Australian in modern politics: acquire conceptions of justice and legislation and doctrine that soldiers Moral language is all around fairness and a desire to act as these subjugate their will to Government. us--praising and condemning as conceptions require when they Denying soldiers access to their good or evil, right or wrong, just believe that institutions or social conscience, the Australian convention or unjust, virtuous or vicious. In practices are just….81 was seen to be unworkable and wrong. all too many cases, however, such Enlisting with their eyes open, citizens The example of Commodore Richard language is used only to advance expect to fulfil onerous and complex Menhinick RAN, cited in The Age personal or group interests. The duties. But they do not expect to serve newspaper of July 12, 2012, illustrates speaker expresses the narrowest an unjust cause. Presently, doctrine the unsafe nature of the Australian judgment that allows her to score restricts the frontier of soldiers’ moral position. her point while avoiding any thinking artificially and unduly. Much The newspaper describes how, further normative commitments as Mary Wollstonecraft lamented when commanding officer of HMAS that might encumber herself now the disadvantages borne by women, Warramunga in 2001, the then or in the future.80 denied access to education and Commander Menhinick defied Amplifying this point, the infamous condemned in consequence to a direction to abandon asylum seekers 2002 September dossier demonstrates deferential life, soldiers are infantilised at sea. Finding his orders neither the sort of deliberate deceit, which by doctrine, which ordains jus ad “sensible nor ethically prudent,” makes it difficult for soldiers to bellum concerns to be beyond their Commodore Menhinick declined to place unquestioning confidence in moral interest. Wollstonecraft writes: follow legal command. Refusing to be the political-military establishment. “Standing armies can never consist subjugated, the Commodore is quoted This report revealed that intelligence of resolute, robust men; they may be as understanding “the importance agencies are adept in the fabrication well-disciplined machines, but they of acting with integrity and in good of crooked evidence, whilst senior will seldom contain men under the conscience”.83 This principled officer authorities are not above calculated influence of strong passions, or with reveals the absurdity of legislative deception. very vigorous faculties.”82 and doctrinal provisions that assume Doctrinal argument must enable Wollstonecraft does not anticipate military service entails soldiers’ moral the responsibility of soldiers to ensure that soldiers will be much more quiescence, and demonstrates what that their important decisions can than obedient and dutiful. She Walzer calls the “long tradition” of be morally justified. Doctrine must does not expect ethical resolution officers who “protest commands of recognise that when public officials or integrity sufficiently robust to their civilian superiors that would habitually demonstrate moral conscientiously refuse service in an require them to violate the rules insolvency, the burden upon soldiers unjust cause. Legislation and doctrine of war and turn them into mere to be morally responsible is increased. must expect more of soldiers. The instruments”.84 Acting deliberately as Doctrine must reflect the moral legislative-doctrinal convention must an agent of justice, the Commodore obligations that accompany military acknowledge that no soldier can act demonstrated the critical importance service in the modern age. as a force for justice, and commit to of conscience to the profession of action, which he or she considers arms, and the impossibility of the In Practice evil. Soldiers, who have enlisted to inelastic provisions within Australian advance justice by just means have a legislation and doctrine. Doctrinal argument should enable moral duty to decline service in causes Australian legislation and doctrine soldiers to conscientiously refuse they consider villainous. Thus the presumes that no-one can cavil, no service in morally dubious causes. Australian convention ought recognise matter how iniquitous the pretext for Citizens who volunteer military that when a soldier comes to the action. Reinforcing the coercive power service are likely to respect this conclusion that a course of action is of military institutions, the legislative- autonomy, and unlikely to shirk duties. unjust, that it is wrong to participate. doctrinal convention is oblivious to In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues in In some circumstances an additional the fact that atrocities soldiers commit support of this point, that: conclusion may be that resignation is are their own. Citizens have a reasonable moral the honourable course. Crafted to uphold jus in exercitu psychology…[and a]… conception In conclusion, this paper argued obligations, the convention should Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 65

James Stockdale, “Courage Under abandon the fable of unquestioning repressed soldiers unable to discern an Fire: Testing Epictetus’s Doctrines in a obedience. Debunked by the alternative. Laboratory of Human Behavior,” in Hoover Essays 6, (Stanford University: Hoover Nuremburg tribunal, this myth The war convention must Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, was made infamous by Himmler at recognise the moral justification 1993), 3, 6. Posen on 4 October 1943. On this for disobedience afforded by the 2 Epictetus, “Fragments,” in The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, occasion, in a speech to Nazi police conscience. Legislative and doctrinal Fragments, and The Encheiridion, (two fuehrers, Himmler argued that instruments must acknowledge that volumes) tr. W. A. Oldfather, (Cambridge MA, London and England: Harvard obedience to orders -- no matter how the duty to obey is not absolute, and University Press, 1998), 10.5 – 6. ghastly -- was a mark of honour.85 that the moral obligation to disobey 3 Nancy Sherman, Stoic Warriors: The The Nuremburg testimony of SS may be prompted by more than Ancient Philosophy Behind the Military Gruppenfuehrer Otto Ohlendorf manifest illegality. t Mind, (Oxford and New York: , 2005), 1. illustrates how this impossible dogma 4 Michael Evans, (2010) “Stoic Philosophy was accepted. Formerly leader of and the Profession of Arms,” Quadrant, the Einsatzkommandos, Ohlendorf (January-February, 2010), 55. admitted calmly to the murder of 5 Epictetus, “Fragments,” 35. 90,000 Jews. Despite confessing to 6 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, ix. pangs of scruple, he said, “it was L CDR Richard Adams PhD RAN is 7 Australian Defence Doctrine inconceivable that a subordinate Publication 00.6, Leadership in the posted presently to the Centre for Australian Defence Force, (Australian leader should not carry out orders Defence Leadership and Ethics at Defence Headquarters: Canberra, 22 given by the leaders of the State”.86 March, 2007), paragraph 2.7. We need to think differently so the Australian Defence College. He 8 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, 8. My emphasis. as we might apply military power attended Yale University as a Fulbright 9 Epictetus, “Discourses,” in The more wisely. Legislation and military scholar. His interests are in stoicism, Discourses as Reported by Arrian, doctrine need to acknowledge that Fragments, and The Encheiridion, (two volition and moral responsibility, volumes) (tr) W. A. Oldfather, (Cambridge soldiers who believe orders to be ideas of institutional responsibility, MA, London and England: Harvard immoral, not merely illegal, have a University Press, 1998), 3.25.4. global justice, motorcycles and duty to refuse. Alastair McIntosh 10 Dale Stephens, “The Age of writes: rowing. Lawfare, International Law and the Changing Character Of War,” U.S. Naval For the first time in history War College International Law Studies we have at our fingertips utter Series, ed. Raul “Pete” Pedrozo & Daria P. Wollschlaeger (Newport, Rhode Island: destructive power, but matched United States Naval War College, 2011), to it, all the possibilities for 348 greater understanding opened up 11 Cited in Stephens, The Age of Lawfare, 348 by globalised communications. Acknowledgements 12 The nitedU States Army and Marine Now is the time to press the reset This paper was published originally in Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual: button at many levels of depth.87 Ethics and Global Politics, Vol. 6, No. 3, US Field Manual 3-24 also published as 2013, pp. 135-154. This is not the time to be comfortably Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, (Chicago and London: University of The valuable insights and constructive complacent, to assume familiar Chicago Press, 2007) paragraph 7.44. The comments afforded by the anonymous example of the French counterinsurgency ideas will serve into the future. A reviewers for that journal are in Algeria is provided as an example. In acknowledged most gratefully. new position must be endorsed, and this campaign, the French condoned the with it, a new way of understanding The author would also like to acknowledge use of torture against insurgents. This was the Global Justice Program at Yale seen to undermine the moral legitimacy military service, military ideals University, particularly Prof. Thomas of the French campaign, and to empower and military functions. No longer Pogge and Matt Lindauer. The author is the insurgent campaign, which became deeply indebted to the assistance offered associated with ideas of just cause and seen must the legislation or the doctrine by the Australian-American Fulbright as a defensive action against oppression. Commission. perpetuate notions of subjugation, 13 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral which dehumanise soldiers and Notes Sentiments, ed. David Daiches Raphael and Alec Lawrence Macfie, (Clarendon Press: degrade the democratic foundations (Endnotes) Oxford, 1976), 269. of the military instrument. These ideas 1 James Stockdale, Thoughts of a 14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice place the world in peril of crimes of Philosophical Fighter Pilot, (Stanford (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of University, California: Hoover Institution Harvard University Press, 1999), 181. obedience, committed by morally Press, 1995), 21. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 66 Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine

15 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A C. Gill, “The School in the Roman Imperial “The 1970 Harmon Memorial Lecture: Restatement (Cambridge MA and London: Period,” in The Stoics, ed. B. Inwood, (New The Military in the Service of the State.” The Belknap Press of Harvard University York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), in The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Press 2001), 28, 58. 47. Military History: A Collection of the First Thirty Harmon Lectures Given at the 35 Sherman, Stoic Warriors, 27. 16 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against United States Air Force Academy ed. H. R. Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice 36 Epictetus, “Discourses,” 3.2.5, 3.2.12. Borowski, (Washington D. C: Office of Air (England: Penguin, 2006), xxxiii. Force History, 1988), 523. 37 Richard A. Gabriel, To Serve With 17 Australian Defence Doctrine Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and 60 Peter Olsthoorn, “Honor as a Motive Publication-D. Foundations of Australian the Way of the Soldier, (Connecticut and for Making Sacrifices,” Journal of Military Military Doctrine (Canberra: Australian London: Greenwood Press, 1982): 27. Ethics 4:3 (2005), 184. Defence Headquarters, July 2012), iii. 38 John Locke, Two Treatises of 61 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 21. 18 ADDP-D, Foundations, iii. Government ed. M. Goldie, (London: 62 Ibid., 22. 19 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: Everyman, J. M. Dent, 1995): 163. A Moral Argument (New York: Basic 63 Rawls A Theory of Justice, 332. 39 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 3. Books, 2000), 44. 64 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 229, 253, 40 Ibid., 3. 20 ADDP 00.6. Leadership, paragraph 2.7. 268. 41 Ibid., 181 -183. 21 Jonathan Shay, Achilles in Vietnam: 65 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 333, 334, 335. Combat Trauma and the Undoing of 42 Robin M. Williams, American Society: Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia Character (New York, Toronto, London A Sociological Interpretation (New York: (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 100. and Sydney: Scribner, 2003), 197. Alfred K. Knopf, 1960), 446. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Canada: 22 Herbert C. Kelman, H. C and V. Lee 43 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 29 Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience (New Broadview Press, 2006), 109. 44 ADDP 00.6, Leadership, paragraph 2.7 Haven and London: Yale University Press, 66 Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays 1989), 46. 45 From Dulce est Decorum Est. on Disobedience, War and Citizenship (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard 23 Mura Sucharov, “Security Ethics and the 46 From Anthem for Doomed Youth. Modern Military: The Case of the Israel University Press, 1970), 141. Defense Forces,” Armed Forces & Society 47 Hugh Smith, “Conscience, Law 67 Cesare, Marchese di. Beccaria, An 31: 169 (2005), 171. and the State: Australia’s Approach to Essay on Crimes and Punishments: Conscientious Objection Since 1901,” with a commentary by M. de Voltaire. 24 Robert Bolt, A Man For All Seasons, Australian Journal of Politics and History, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 22. (Philadelphia: William Young, no. 2 Second 35:1 (1989), 13. Street, the corner of Chestnut Street, 1793), 25 A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, 48 ADDP-D, Foundations, paragraphs 3.6, 19. (1995) “The Hellenistic Philosophers,” 3.8. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 68 Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments, 20. 1995), 385. 49 ADDP-D, Foundations, paragraph 3.2. 69 Col. Ardant Du Picq, Battle Studies: Adolf Friedrich Bonhoffer, tr. W. O. 50 Wayne P. Hughes, “The Power in Ancient and Modern. tr. J. N. Greely, and R. Stephens, The Ethics of the Stoic Epictetus, Doctrine,” United States Naval War College C. Cotton, (Milton Keynes: Bibliobazaar, trans. Stephens, W. O. (New York: Peter Review 48: 3 (1995), 14. 2006), 53. Lang, 2000), 19. 51 Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed Debate 70 Jeff McMahan, “Collectivist Defenses of 26 Michael Gass, “Kant’s Causal on Military Culture,” Orbis 43:1 (1999), 16. the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Journal Conception of Autonomy,” History of of Military Ethics 6: 1 (2007), 53. 52 Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game Philosophy Quarterly, 11:1 (1994), 53. (London: John Murray, 1997), 580. 71 Dr. Jim F. Cairns, Member for Yarra, 27 A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, (New House of Representatives Official Hansard 53 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1974), 182. No. 22, Tuesday, 28 May 1968, 1618. Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University 28 I. G. Kidd, (1955) “The Relation of Stoic of Chicago Press, 1970), 114, 150, 151. 72 Senator Michael Tate, Senate Hansard, Intermediates to the Summum Bonum, Tuesday, 31 May 1983, 1027. 54 Cited in Eric Stein, (1994) “International with Reference to Change in the Stoa,” Law in Internal Law: Toward 73 Report by the Senate Standing The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 5:3 Internationalization of Central-European Committee on Constitutional and Legal (1955), 181. Constitutions?” The American Journal of Affairs.Conscientious Objection to 29 A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and International Law 88: 3 (1994), 427. Conscripted Military Service. (Canberra: Socratic Guide to Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Australian Government Publishing Service, 55 ADDP 00.6, Leadership, paragraph 1.8. Press, 2004), 146. 1985), x, 30. 56 Lt. Gen. Sir. John W. Hackett, The 30 Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 183, 184. 74 Annex I, Article 8 bis, Amendments Profession of Arms: The 1962 Lees to the Rome Statute of the International 31 Malcolm Schofield, “Epictetus on Knowles Lectures Given at Trinity College Criminal Court on the crime of aggression: Cynicism,” in The Philosophy of Epictetus Cambridge (London: Times Publishing, RC/Res.6. ed. T. Scaltsas, and Andrew S. Mason, 1962), 63. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 75 Michelle Grattan, “Most Troops Home 57 Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, 83. by Next Year’s End,” The Age newspaper Military Discipline and the Law of War, (April 17 2012), Melbourne edition. p. 4. 32 Epictetus, “Discourses,” 3.2.4. (Transaction: New Brunswick and London, 2002), 65. 76 David Ellery, “Call to Avoid More 33 A. A. Long, Epictetus: A Stoic and Defence Bungles,” The Canberra Times Socratic Guide to Life, 115. 58 Nicholas Keijzer, Military Obedience, newspaper, (September 17, 2012), (Sijthoff & Noordhoff: Alpena an den Rijn: Canberra edition p. 2. Ellery identifies the 34 Ibid., 98. The Netherlands, 1978), 32. Super Seasprite helicopter project, landing craft for defunct LPAs, the Wedgetail early A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 234. 59 General Sir. John W. Hackett Hackett, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 67

warning radar and air control system, the Terrorists – Reflections on Harming 84 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 45. Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter, the Innocent,” The Journal of Political 85 Gerald Reitlinger, The S. S: Alibi of a the Adelaide class FFG upgrade, the KC30 Philosophy 16: 1 (2008), 11. Nation 1922 – 1945 (Melbourne, London Multi-role tanker aircraft procurement, the and Toronto: Heinemann, 1956), 278. multi-role helicopter [MRH] project, the 81 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 86. lightweight torpedo project, the air warfare 86 Michael Berenbaum, Witness to the destroyer project, the APC upgrade and 82 Mary Wollstonecraft, A Vindication Holocaust, (New York: HarperCollins, the Collins class submarine sustainment of the Rights of Woman and the Wrongs of 1997), 135. project. Woman, or Maria. ed. Mellor, A, Chao, 87 Alastair McIntosh, “A Nonviolent N. (New York, Boston and San Francisco: 77 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 336. Challenge to Conflict,” in Ethics Law and Pearson Longman, 2007), 41. Military Operations ed. David Whetham, 78 Ibid., 341. 83 Daniel Flitton, “Captain Defied Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 49. 79 Ibid., 390. on Boat,” The Age newspaper (July 12, 2012), Melbourne edition, p. 1. 80 Thomas Pogge, “Making War on

A ustralia’s second and finalL anding Helicopter Dock Ship (LHD) has entered Australian waters on its way to Melbourne. The second LHD (to be known as HMAS Adelaide once commissioned) is being transported from Spain to Australia by heavy lift ship Blue Marlin. Blue Marlin has travelled 10,000 nautical miles and the trip has taken eight weeks to complete. The LHDs are the largest ships ever built for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and will provide the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with one of the most capable and sophisticated amphibious deployment systems in the world. The Canberra Class LHDs are bigger than Australia’s last aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. They are more than 230 metres long, 27.5 metres high and will weigh around 27,500 tonnes once completed. The LHD hull will be unloaded and moved by tug to the Williamstown dockyard for consolidation of the superstructure and other critical fit out work. The vessel is expected to be introduced into RAN service in 2015. (Courtesy RAN)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 68 Confuse or Conceal - The Art of Camouflage in His Majesty’s Australian Ships during World War II By Lieutenant John Nash

amouflage is a surprisingly new term, only entering the CEnglish language in the last 100 years.1 Especially on ships, camouflage is a little explored topic of historical inquiry with a relative dearth of secondary literature. Yet serious resources were devoted to research on the subject during World War II across all services and the process of painting an entire warship in a complex colour scheme is not something done on a whim. A great deal of historical research has been carried out on other technologies of war, from weapons systems and armaments to radar and sonar, and it is perhaps due to its seemingly inconsequential and dull nature that camouflage has not been explored contains one chapter on Camouflage, writing salutations), but these H MAS Sydney on much in the historiography. Few civil defence and mapping. Its 19 omissions in the historiography do return from the Mediterranean works have been written on wartime pages devote a mere three paragraphs, help illustrate that pre-war thinking, during WWII, camouflage and they make little half a page, to camouflage of Royal experimentation and experience saw depicted in 2 reference to warship camouflage, and it Australian Navy ships during the war. the Navy more willing to listen with camouflage scheme. is very much worth exploring why this This brief treatment of the subject sets respect to camouflage research than (Courtesy RAN) might be the case. the scene for camouflage’s obscurity the other services when war broke out. I will firstly explore the organisation in history, with the next book on the In her book, Elias reinforces the of camouflage research in Australia subject coming over 50 years later. view that Professor Dakin seems to during the Second World War for Ann Elias’ book on camouflage in have made much of the clash between ships, including the challenges Australia during the war makes a camouflage and the military, especially faced and the differences between relatively thorough exploration of the army, and the view that camouflage camouflage as applied to ships of the the topic, and a general theme which went against the masculinity of war Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and as emerges is the tension between the through deception and hiding.5 Whilst applied to the Army and the Royal camouflage organisation and the Army this may have held some truth for Australian Air Force (RAAF). Through and RAAF, with very little mention the army and RAAF, the navies of this examination, it will explore what of the Navy.3 Examples given in her the world were far more accepting part camouflage and the associated book are exclusively concerned with of outlandish paint schemes if this research played as part of the war the Army and the RAAF. Reading could give them some sort of fighting effort, examining such issues as the through Dakin’s correspondence shows edge. For instance, Captain Louis use of model ships in research and the cordiality with naval officers that is not Mountbatten as commander of the elaborate testing done for the Fairmile present in Army correspondence, with Royal Navy’s 5th Destroyer Flotilla class of Motor Launches. Finally,the Dakin frequently addressing Admirals made unofficial experiments painting effectiveness of ship’s camouflage will as ‘My dear Admiral’, in contrast to his ships in a pinkish-grey colour. examined, through observations during the stiff and formal addresses to Army The colour, which became known as testing and trials. Generals.4 Mountbatten Pink, was thought to DP Mellor’s volume of Official Not to make too much of an make ships less visible during sunrise History of the Second World War argument ex silentio (or from letter and sunset, the most likely time of Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 69

attack by U-Boats.6 It was discontinued would get official through lack of effectiveness but its recognition and an use does highlight a creativity and official camouflage willingness to try different colour organisation schemes, with seemingly little regard established.11 One for any considerations of ‘masculinity’. of the first major Interest in naval camouflage projects was the before World War II meant that it production of faced fewer challenges than the other Professor Dakin’s The services, and far less is made of tension Art of Camouflage, between camoufleursand the RAN published in 1941 than the other two services. The and in a second H MAS Perth ‘Sydney Admiral commanding the Australian edition as a Secret (official use only) organisation in Australia arose during Harbour Bridge’ scheme, late 1940. Squadron in Sydney submitted a report document the year after.12 In this book the War, and it remained important (Courtesy RAN) for consideration to the Naval board there are several pages on marine and to the war effort throughout with concerning painting ships in wartime ship camouflage (pp. 52-5), one of the research conducted constantly, and based on a 1932 trial conducted in first attempts at centrally collecting then published and disseminated until the Mediterranean, with orders that and disseminating ship camouflage the end of the war. ships be painted in accordance with knowledge. Camouflage is a discipline that the testing at the outbreak of a war.7 Before this point much of ship brings together both science and art; a A later 1935 memo then outlined the camouflage painting was done on fact alluded to in the first paragraph of amount of paint to be carried by RAN an ad-hoc basis, without scientific Dakin’s The Art of Camouflage.17 The destroyers, with special consideration experimentation and devised by research required scientific knowledge for the larger HMAS Stuart, which officers and crew aboard the ships and experimentation, and artistic flair amounted to each ship carrying a themselves.13 A classic example is the in execution. This can be seen through combined total of 5 CWT of light and camouflage paint scheme applied to the assignment of Professor Dakin dark grey paint (8 CWT for Stuart) HMAS Perth in the Mediterranean in as the Technical Director, and the – issued in 1935 to be carried at all 1940. The ship’s company was asked to choices made for the Deputy Directors times in the event of war breaking devise a paint scheme, and the winner of Camouflage in each state, amongst out.8 This was aided by the increase was Ordinary Seaman Ross Birbeck, a whom were included architects, in paint production in Australia former hairdresser, whose distinctive town planners and artists, including during the 1930s as the chemical design resembled the arches of the two directors of art galleries.18 Dakin industry expanded.9 Early in the war Sydney Harbour Bridge.14 Soon after was scathing of those who could not a Camouflage Paint Committee was all warships and naval staffs were see the importance of science as it set up and meetings arranged with the issued with a set of regularly revised applied to warfare through camouflage Paint Manufacturers Association to policy orders known as Confidential research, a post-script in one of his discuss paint testing systems.10 Admiralty Fleet Orders (C.A.F.O.), with letters saying: ‘One of the examples Interest in military camouflage C.A.F.O. 1112/42 issued 11 June 1942 quoted above provides an indication post- increased further in being the second but definitive set of of how completely the position of the years just before the outbreak of orders for camouflaging of all ships.15 Science (which Germany and Japan are the next World War, with a group of 30 These camouflage orders culminated using to the utmost) is still completely men of the arts and sciences as well as in a full book, The Camouflage of Ships misunderstood in Australia.’19 military personnel forming the Sydney at Sea. The perceived importance This letter gives a glimpse of Camouflage Group. The leaders of this of camouflage on ships is summed one of the problems Dakin and the group were the artist Frank Hinder and up by the front cover: ‘It is vitally camouflage organisation encountered Professor of Zoology William Dakin, important to the fighting efficiency in that the services, mostly the who would later become the Technical of the Fleet and your Ship that every Army, did not view camouflage in Director of Camouflage during the facility be given to ratings concerned the light of science. US General war. It would take many years, until to study this book’.16 From ad-hoc Douglas McArthur, Supreme Allied April 1941 in fact, before the group and small beginnings the camouflage Commander in the Pacific, directed Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 70 Confuse or Conceal - The Art of Camouflage in His Majesty’s Australian Ships during World War II all naval, air and land forces to regard oil tanks at Chowder Bay and Garden camouflage as an instrument of war, Island in early 1941, the first large-scale and directly referred to Dakin’s Defence camouflage project undertaken in Central Camouflage Committee Australia.26 Though not concerned with (DCCC) as a key source of technical ship’s camouflage, it is illustrative of the camouflage advice and direction.20 RAN hierarchy being concerned with Mellor points to wartime camouflage camouflage as useful during the war, efforts as an example of the difficulty and once again places RAN thinking of coordinating scientific efforts with ahead of the other services in this military and civil defence.21 respect. patterns had been (relatively) Model ships used Though the experiments and The camouflage organisation stood standardised during the war, orders during camouflage research behind the basis of the camouflage painting were up in Australia was concerned with were still in place which ensured ships Hotel Canberra. basic, they nevertheless demonstrated camouflage of all military assets and could change their schemes ‘to meet (Courtesy John Nash) forward thinking on behalf of the each type of unit required special changing conditions or special tactical Admiralty. The director of Naval consideration, perhaps none more so situations’, clear recognition that ships Stores was asking after details of than ships, which posed (and still pose) operated in a unique and ever-changing paint availability in a letter dated 4 unique challenges. Firstly, ships are environment.27 Camouflage research September 1939 – mere days after the large and require a large investment papers and Admiralty orders, such as outbreak of war in Europe.22 Before the in material and men to paint; a light C.A.F.O. 1112/42, all made distinctions official camouflage group was stood cruiser such as HMAS Perth had an between the different operating up, Professor Dakin was conducting his overall length of 169 metres requiring environments and which paint schemes own experiments on ship camouflage painting on two sides, plus the upper were most effective. Camouflaging of in 1940 and 1941, using his yacht decks and superstructure. In order to ships was a dynamic activity, changing and the training ship HMAS Kybra. paint it, the ship must be at a port or at as new data provided better solutions These experiments particularly anchor in very calm seas, and obviously and as ships ranged far and wide across interested Rear Admiral Sir John in friendly waters. A large section of different oceans and seas. Crace, Commander of the Australian the ship’s company was needed to paint Illustrative of the effort expended Squadron.23 In contrast to the Army, the ship. Time spent painting was time towards camouflage of RAN ships Admiral Crace actively sought the not used in training, maintenance or during World War II is the use of advice and aid of the camouflage rest and it was hot, dirty work and scale models of ships for research and directorate, asking Dakin to prepare was often found to be distasteful and experimentation. A key to determining a camouflage schemes for HMAS pointless to many of the sailors who the effectiveness of camouflage was Adelaide and Australia, which he did in had to do the job. comparison, testing one scheme or May 1942.24 Of particular importance The decision to apply new paint a particular colour against another. was Dakin’s realisation that naval schemes, and especially complex This required two ships of similar camouflage of World War I did not patterned schemes, was not one taken design/shape/size; being difficult to take into account the need for ships to lightly. A ship’s camouflage scheme, arrange during wartime when ships be camouflaged against not just surface much like that of a RAAF aeroplane or were needed for combat duties, threats, but from aerial observation Army tank for instance, was dependent maintenance or training, Britain and as well.25 Though naval camouflage on the operating environment. Planes soon after, Australia, turned to the started out as rudimentary and was and vehicles required different schemes use of models.28 Tanks, aircraft and applied in a very ad-hoc manner, the for desert or jungle, and ships needed buildings could, of course, be tested camouflage research that informed different colours for different maritime in the field with relative ease, being naval uses was ahead of that for the environments. However, whereas far more readily available, whereas other two services, and there seemed RAAF and Army units were usually warships were much less disposable for to be less tension between the official painted before being deployed, ships such tasking. The use of models helps camouflage organisation and the were tasked and re-tasked constantly demonstrate the kinds of workarounds RAN. Rear Admiral Muirhead-Gould – a ship’s great mobility being one of used in experimentation, as well as the was able to secure funding for the its inherently useful characteristics as a time and effort expended on research camouflaging of naval magazines and weapon of war. Even when camouflage specifically for ships. Whilst not as Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 71

prohibitive in time and money as using model ships, there was still ships, models still required dedicated a requirement to test out facilities and resources to create and camouflage painting on use. The large testing facility in Britain actual warships at sea, using at Leamington was described as ‘costly’, observations from the shore, and some of the model set-ups used other ships and aircraft. Further, in Australia were elaborate to say the scientific testing was conducted least.29 Another factor was that these into environmental conditions, facilities could be hidden from enemy especially sun ratio readings. observation – Australian testing was These readings were taken done in a pond behind the Hotel throughout 1943 from stations in Canberra, far from preying eyes.30 Sydney, Darwin and Townsville, himself is indicative of the importance F airmile craft ML Far from being a small part of sometimes up to five times a day, every of such testing to camouflage research. 814, one of the 33 vessels used in research, experiments using model day. Measurement of sun ratio helped A good example of the effort put testing. (Courtesy ships provided much of the data determine the most effective tone into the camouflaging of RAN ships RAN) used for camouflage research. Worth of paint relative to the predominant during the Second World War is the quoting at length is a comment from lighting conditions of a particular construction and camouflaging of the an Admiralty book on the conclusions area. This information was seen as Fairmile class of patrol boats. A British reached on sea-going camouflage: important enough that the information design built in Australia 1942-43, the Their validity has been checked by collected by the UK and Australia was Fairmiles were a small patrol boat laboratory experiments on model given Prime Ministerial clearance to be (or more correctly, a motor launch). scale under lighting conditions shared with the .34 Discussions of the camouflage scheme controlled so as to correspond In accordance with standing orders appropriate to the Fairmiles were accurately with natural conditions (namely C.A.F.O. 1112/42), reports conducted before the launch of the at sea... The results of observations on observations of camouflaged ships first vessel, with the Assistant Director at sea and in the laboratory have made from surface stations and from of Engineering (Naval) requesting the corresponded so closely with each aircraft were required to be forwarded final paint job of the vessels before other, that any major revision of in a very specific format. Early launch be a camouflage scheme, having the statement of the principles of observations of camouflaged ships ruled out the practicality of fitting camouflage for concealment at sea were conducted by Dakin from the structural camouflage to the vessels.36 is unlikely to be necessary.31 air off the coast of Sydney. One of the To return to a previous observation Correspondence between Professor first was of the cruiser HMAS Perth, (see page 7), the use of models on water Dakin and the director of Scientific with a brief observation of the other in testing was critical in developing the Research at the Admiralty in cruiser HMAS Canberra in November proposed paint scheme to be used.37 Britain makes constant reference to of 1941. Coming back to the issue of However, it was decided that the first HMAS Melbourne (I) principles derived from model scale the rarity of having two ship to observe, two vessels, M.L. 813 and 814, would in dazzle pattern camouflage during experiments. This includes attempts HMAS Perth was painted in two be launched and then used in testing to the First World War to confuse submarines attempting to different camouflage judge the inclination of ships through schemes on the port a periscope, first tested in the lab and starboard sides, on models and then backed up by maximising the observation from submarines at sea.32 opportunity to test out The use of model ships show to what different camouflage lengths researchers would go in order principles.35 Despite to test out camouflage principles for the use of model ships, and far from being trivial side ships, there was still experiments, their use formed the no substitute for basis of much camouflage knowledge observations of real applied to ships at sea during the war. ships at sea, and the Despite the effective use of involvement of Dakin Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 72 Confuse or Conceal - The Art of Camouflage in His Majesty’s Australian Ships during World War II evaluate the best camouflage pattern War I, and though to be used. This experimenting was its effectiveness requested to be expedited so that the was questioned, most effective pattern could be applied it continued to later vessels. The testing was done to be used on one month later, with three vessels used merchant vessels and Professor Dakin himself taking as it increased the observations. Interestingly, as the the confidence policy regarding Fairmiles was one of and morale of trying to conceal rather than confuse, it the crews.40 It is was decided that a camouflage pattern worth noting that was not appropriate, and a single recent research colour scheme was chosen.38 This did into the topic has not, however, mark the final testing of found that dazzle camouflage for Fairmiles. patterns do, in Testing was carried out using fact, affect speed U SS Freedom, camouflage netting throughout the first perception, and that the principles that there was a clear objective in mind; painted early 2013 three months of 1944, a year after the on which the painting was done were camouflage could help conceal or in ‘Measure 32’ initial Farimile trials. Dakin’s report sound.41 A report from mid-1941 relays confuse, but it could not do both at the camouflage pattern found the use of nets impractical and of how a RAAF officer, very experienced same time to any great degree. (Courtesy US Navy) minimal value, and the Navy concurred in coastal surveillance from the air, was The camouflaging of Royal with this assessment, discontinuing this warned that his flight would overfly Australian Navy ships during World policy.39 It is also worth noting that in HMAS Australia, and when he did so War II is a little explored yet rich topic his report Dakin points to similarities he was still unable to recognise her. of historical inquiry. Explorations of in camouflage principles between Even knowing that the vessel spotted camouflage in the defence industry awnings used for ships and Army tents should be Australia he closed the ship and war histories are brief and often used on land, a good demonstration in order to get a close observation overlook naval camouflage. From of the broad range of camouflage and confirm her identity, reporting rudimentary beginnings in World War testing undertaken by the Camouflage back that the camouflage made I interest, though slight, remained Research organisation. AUSTRALIA appear to be a small two- in the interwar period with testing The case of the Fairmile Motor funnelled cruiser rather than a heavy conducted during the 1930s and plans Launches demonstrates the effort three-funnelled one.42 However, a put in place for camouflaging of ships that was put into the camouflaging of report from eleven months later notes in the event of war. The outbreak of RAN ships during World War II. From that the camouflage pattern Australia war saw ad-hoc measures put in place, their inception tests were undertaken sported seemed to assist an observer in and key people like Admiral Crace to determine the best camouflage estimating inclination, a demonstration and Professor Dakin took an early paint scheme so that they might be that camouflage could not do all things interest in testing camouflage on ships, painted before even being launched all at once; it needed to be tailored for a putting the research ahead of that and testing was conducted throughout specific role.43 regarding the Army and Air Force. The the war to ensure that the best possible The United States Navy Littoral fact that less friction existed between information was available in order that Combat Ship USS Freedom was the RAN and the official camouflage they were painted in the most effective recently painted in a World War II organisation aided in the effectiveness way. camouflage scheme, demonstrating of implementing naval camouflage. The One of the biggest questions which not only continued interest in decision to paint ships in camouflage hangs over the issue of camouflage camouflage, but interest in Second was not taken lightly, requiring much of ships during the World War II is World War camouflage.44 These cases of a ship’s company, both in time and the matter of effectiveness. There are help demonstrate that the principles resources, and the ever-changing mixed reports as to the effectiveness behind camouflaging of ships were conditions of the sea meant that of camouflage patterns. Dazzle style of sound, and that camouflage patterns schemes were constantly changing as camouflage was popular during World on ships could be effective, provided ships changed operating environments. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 73

(Endnotes) NAA MP1049/5/0 2026/2/250. The use of scale models of ships 1 Rankin, Nicholas. A Genius for 23 ADM 212/130. A 3045. Camouflage demonstrates the effort that was put Deception: How Cunning Helped the British Colours in H.M. Australian Ships (Prof Win Two World Wars. Oxford: Oxford Dakin) 1943. into camouflage research and the level University, 2009. pp. 24-7. 24 Letter dated 8 May 1942 from Dakin to of detail that was implemented during 2 Mellor, D.P. Australia in the War of Commanding Officer HMAS ADELAIDE. experimentation. 1939–1945. Series 4 – Civil - Volume V – NAA MP1049/5 2026/2/873. The Role of Science and Industry. Canberra: 25 Dakin, The Art of Camouflage: 54. The camouflage testing that , 1958: 544. 26 Mellor, D.P. Australia in the War of was conducted on Fairmile Motor 3 Elias, A. Camouflage Australia. Art, 1939–1945: 538. Launches is a very illustrative example Nature, Science and War. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2011. 27 Pacific Fleet Confidential Order of what was required for camouflage dated 1 January 1945. NAA MP1049/5/0 4 For instance see: letter dated 8 May 1942 2026/2/873. projects, from testing on scale models, from Dakin to Rear Admiral Crace and 28 Dakin, W.J. Notes on Camouflage to actual ship tests at sea and continued letter dated 30 March 1944 to Rear Admiral G.C. Muirhead-Gould, NAA MP1049/5 Colours on H.M.A. Ships. NAA MP1049/5/0 evaluation throughout the war to 2026/2/873. Compare with letter dated 22 2026/2/873. 29 Dakin in his notes above (ibid.). For constantly keep the data relevant. June 1942 to General Sturdee. 5 Elias, A. Camouflage Australia: 95; Elias, example model ships used during testing for Finally observations, scientific A. ‘Campaigners for Camouflage: Abbott H. jungle camouflage. NAA C1905 T1, 10[57]. inquiry and present day interest in Thayer and William J. Dakin’, Leonardo 42, 30 For example see photograph AWM no. 1 (2009): 40. PR88/133.003. ship’s camouflage show that it was 6 Hartcup, Guy. Camouflage: a history of 31 The Camouflage of Ships at Sea. C.B. effective, perhaps not to the degree concealment and deception in war. Devon: 3098R: 9. hoped for, but nevertheless providing David & Charles, 1979: 120. 32 Secret letter dated 22 May 1943. Camouflage naval projects – Bulletin aid to His Majesty’s Australian Ships 7 Painting of Surface Ships in Time of War. NAA MP1049/5/0 2026/2/378. on Naval Camouflage, London. NAA in time of war. From this it can be seen 8 1 CWT being a hundredweight, or about 1942/25/1555. that the Art of Camouflage during 100 pounds worth. 33 Camouflage naval projects – Bulletin on Naval Camouflage, London. NAA World War II is a little known but 9 Ross, A.T. Armed and Ready. The Industrial Development and Defence of 1942/25/1555. important contribution to the war Australia 1900-1945. Sydney: Turton & 34 Letter sent 19 May 1943. ibid. effort in Australia. t Armstrong, 1995: 190-1. 35 Home Security. Report on camouflage 10 Mellor, D.P. Australia in the War of of HMAS “Perth” (with some general 1939–1945. Series 4 – Civil - Volume V – observations on HMAS “Canberra”) 25 The Role of Science and Industry. 537. November 1941. NAA A5954/69. Item 11 NAA A472/W3253. Establishment of 673673. Camouflage Organisation; Mellor, D.P. 36 Letter dated 7 September 1942. NAA Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 4 MP1049/5/0, 2026/2/543. – Civil - Volume V – The Role of Science and 37 Letter dated 15 September 1942. ibid. Industry: 531-33. 38 Letter dated 7 April 1943. ibid. 12 Dakin, W.J. The Art of Camouflage. 39 Dakin’s letter and enclosed report dated 13 ADM 212/130. A 3045. Camouflage 21 April 1944; Navy letters in concurrence Colours in H.M. Australian Ships (Prof dated 26 and 30 May 1944. NAA Dakin) 1943. MP1049/5/0, 2026/2/873. 14 Carlton, M. Cruiser. The Life and Loss 40 The Camouflage of Ships at Sea. C.B. of HMAS PERTH and her crew. Sydney: 3098R: 8. William Heinemann,: 2010: 162. 41 Scott-Samuel NE, Baddeley R, Palmer 15 C.A.F.O. 679/42 being the first to deal CE, Cuthill IC (2011), ‘Dazzle Camouflage with camouflage but restricted to a select Affects Speed Perception.’ PLoS ONE 6(6): few ships in Atlantic conditions. e20233. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020233. 16 The Camouflage of Ships at Sea. C.B. 42 Letter dated 31 May 1941. NAA 3098R, published by the Admiralty, October MP1049/5/0, 2026/2/405. Lieutenant John Nash, RANR is a full- 1945. 43 Letter dated 26 April 1942. NAA time Naval Reserve officer working 17 Dakin, W.J. The Art of Camouflage. MP1049/5/0, 2026/2/456. Published for the Department of Defence, 44 United States Naval Institute article, Commonwealth of Australia by Australian at the Sea Power Centre-Australia. 1 March 2013. “LCS CO: Freedom is ‘A Medical Publishing Company Limited, Mean Looking Ship”. 1939–1945: 535. Classical Studies (Honours) at the ANU. 19 Letter to the Minister for Home Security dated 21 September 1942. NAA A453 His research interests include ancient 1942/21/2632. naval warfare and strategy, and naval 20 Elias, A. Camouflage Australia: 93. 21 Mellor, D.P. Australia in the War of history throughout the ages. 1939–1945: 544. 22 Painting of Surface Ships in Time of War. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 74 Sea Chaplains: Serving Their Country With Pride By Rev Dr Melissa Baker RAN

…the drenching spray as the provided last rites before men went ensuring that ship thudded into each on- into battle. Chaplains carried out the an evangelical coming wave and then rose role of Almoner, which comes from Christian would upon it, the loneliness amid the dull green or grey-black ex- the Greek ‘eleimosyne’ meaning pity, be Chaplain panse of the ocean all around, compassion, kindness and almsgiving. as part of the occasional appearance The Bible recorded the earliest the military of the long black shape of a sea chaplain in 60AD, when Paul the establishment shadowing German bomber, Apostle led a communion service on of the Colony the care that had to be exer- board an Egyptian ship headed for of New South cised on the wet and rolling . It was during the midst of a 14 Wales. Thus deck, especially by the torpedo day storm that Paul broke bread and the first tubes, where the guard rail did encouraged the 276 sailors onboard. appointed sea not exist, the smell of oil which As Christianity spread across the chaplain was in proximity to the galley was Mediterranean, the governments and a Church augmented by that of cooking, rulers of the day provided sea chaplains of England the nausea which, until sea- to care for sailors and soldiers afloat by minister, the R ev Richard legs had been gained, caused using the Word of God as their swords. Reverend Richard Johnson (1753- Johnson every opportunity of remain- The rank of Chaplain is one of 1827). Johnson received a military style ing in the open to be grate- the oldest ranks in the Fleet, along commission on 24 October 1786 and fully accepted, and the abiding with Boatswains and Gunners, dating arrived as part of the First Fleet as an necessity of having to perform back as far as 1298. The first named official along with crew members and assigned duty. paid sea chaplain recorded in Royal marines and their families and convicts Chaplain Gordon Taylor HMS Navy history was Robert of Sandwich on 26 Jan 1788. From his letters it Arrow, April 1941 appointed during the reign of Henry seems loneliness and frustration as a VIII on 6 pence a day, twice the pay of a chaplain was a common theme. ver centuries, Australians have sailor and half that of a Captain. It was The first chaplain to the Colony Oserved in the military through not until the reign of Charles I in 1626 of NSW discovered much about wars, terrorist threats, peacekeeping that a formal naval chaplaincy began himself in his ministry and other activities and natural disasters with when, by Royal Decree, no king’s ship roles in education and social issues chaplains standing alongside military was to go to sea without a preacher including the welfare of aboriginal personnel. The role of the navy onboard. At this stage, Chaplains were people, through dangerous and hard chaplain, also known in ages past as the classed as Warrant Officers. Over this conditions throughout his 12 years sea chaplain, has not changed much next century the number of chaplains in the colony. Rev Johnson was a throughout history. Chaplains have increased and by 1793, there were young man of 35 years of age, and had provided pastoral care for the spiritual, 58 chaplains serving in the Royal completed three years of Bible College physical and emotional health of their Navy with their pay and status largely at Cambridge and three years as a constituents, sometimes through remained unchanged. Church of England minister before difficult circumstances as described taking on this role in new territory. above by the Chaplain in HMS Arrow The Reverend Richard Johnson A farming background certainly put during World War II. – Chaplain to the First Fleet him in good stead with the harsh The etymology of the word chaplain In keeping with the tradition of land and food shortages: by sewing comes from Medieval Latin ‘capellanus’. providing chaplaincy services to pips he obtained in Brazil he began Priests travelled with armies and would military units, John Newton (Church of the colony’s first citrus orchard. carry relics of the saints, including England minister), William Wilberforce Interestingly he named his first child the soldier’s cape known as Cappa St (politician and advocate for abolition from an aboriginal name, Milbah, Martin, as they performed mass, heard of slavery) and William Pitt (Prime which illustrated the love he had for confessions, assigned penances and Minister) were instrumental in anyone he met. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 75

In his first few years since leaving phrases whichever and anon meet would attend on Sundays as their social England by 30 Oct 1792, Rev Johnson his ear are, for some considerable gathering. This tradition carried itself had already performed more burials period, as unintelligible to him … on board naval ships where it was (854) than marriages (220) and while he enters the service when compulsory for the ship’s company baptisms (226) combined. He struggled it is all but too late to alter his to attend church up until 1946 in the to encourage others to take up the habits so as to accommodate them Royal Navy and the chaplain read Gospel which he fervently lived by to his new mode of life, without prayers as part of the daily divisions. and eventually opened Australia’s in some measure compromising Today, chaplains at sea would be lucky first church on 25 Aug 1793. The his character as a Minister of the to get ten sailors to attend church. church was subsequently burnt Gospel. down, although is remembered by How the chaplain carries out his/ Chaplaincy in the RAN a monument on the site at Richard her duties is dependent on cultural Prior to 1901, chaplains were attached Johnson Square on the corner of Bligh social structures that are important to to naval and army units of the colonial and Hunter Streets, Sydney. society at the time. Social structures forces, such as the Naval Artillery Reverend Samuel Marsden (1764– are essentially where we draw our Volunteers of the NSW Naval Forces. 1838, Anglican Minister) arrived 10 behaviour, knowledge and experiences, Rev Isaac Armitage served for six March 1794 as an assistant chaplain which includes aesthetics, ancestry, years in this role and then was one to Johnson. Seven years later in 1801, heritage, language, patterns, religion of the few who carried on in active Johnson was in poor health, and sold and traditions. One then tends service into China during the Boxer his land at Ryde to return to England. to socialise within groups within Rebellion when he accompanied the Reverend Marsden settled and the culture that has shaped our Naval Contingent. Soon after the established a church in Parramatta, characteristics, such as age, gender, inauguration of the RAN in 1911 becoming a wealthy land owner, and ideology, neighbourhood, religion, initiatives were undertaken to form rivalling John Macarthur in developing social class or work. This perhaps chaplaincy drawing upon centuries the wool industry. He was also a explains why sailors tended to socialise of Royal Naval experiences. The task magistrate whom the Irish Catholics together as no one can ever quite was not made easy with much scrutiny called the ‘Flogging Parson’ due to understood what they go through from the various churches with his excessive sentences of corporal other than another sailor. significant internal divisions between punishment. In 1814, he made the first Until recently, churches used to denominations. of many visits to the then lawless Bay of be a central connection place in the In Melbourne on 26 Feb Islands and claimed to have conducted town where majority of people the first Christian service in New Zealand.

Gradual Changing Role of Chaplaincy at Sea The role of chaplaincy at sea remained largely unchanged for many years as a Church of England sea chaplain from 1840 described his sea time similar to chaplains today serving their on board an operational warship: A sea life is at best a life of privation; and a Naval Chaplain must naturally have his share of it. He is alone, as it were, in the midst of a busy world; he has no one of his own profession, as all around him have, with whom to converse; even the technical Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 76 Sea Chaplains: Serving Their Country With Pride

1912, Church of England Archbishop England priest (4 Feb 1913) who Clarke met with the Naval Board served firstly in Australia and to formulate a chaplaincy proposal later became a Senior Naval for the Royal Australian Navy. This Instructor; the Rev William resulted in an agreement being reached Hall, a Church of England that each ship and establishment chaplain on loan from the should have one chaplain and the Royal Navy and Naval system was to be ecumenical with the Instructor (4 Nov 1912) who appointment of Protestant Chaplains served at the Naval College of ‘men who had no extreme views’. then at Geelong. By the Other agreed terms included the end of 1913, there were six appointment of five chaplains (three full-time chaplains and Church of England and two Protestant 63 reservists, the latter denominations) appointed for two attended land camps at years with a six month probation their own cost, in most period, paid 15 shillings a day with ports around Australia. only half the ration allowance of other In keeping with officers. A committee was established their Royal Naval representing the three largest counterparts the new denominations (Church of England, RAN chaplains wore no Presbyterian and Methodist) to make badges of rank. The RN appointments of chaplains. dress code of chaplains The Roman Catholic Archbishop introduced in 1891 Carr of Melbourne was disappointed was more in keeping with this decision and wrote to the with the dress worn at an English were a major part of the chaplain’s Extract Minister of Defence to ensure Catholic Victorian rectory and unsuitable duties as was the celebration of Holy from 1913 Navy List participation on the same footing to naval service especially afloat in Communion. If no chaplain was as other denominations. A formal varying climates. Over time this was present on board, then the Captain, agreement on the appointment of unofficially modified by the wearing often twice daily, read prayers. Other chaplains with the Anglican and of plain naval jackets with a clerical activities sea chaplains included: taking Protestant churches, and a separate collar being the only distinguishing charge of the ship’s sporting clubs; agreement with the Catholic Church, feature. Early chaplains are often running the seamen’s library; visiting were approved on 17 June 1912. shown sporting mortar boards but the ship’s sick bay and cells; visiting the The first twohaplains c to serve in this may have more to do with their parent’s homes in appropriate ports; the Royal Australian Navy were the often ancillary scholastic tasks. While answering letters from anxious parents Rev Garnet Eric Shaw (Church of naval instructors wore uniform and wives; organising ship visits; and England) and the Rev Alexander from 1916 (which then included listening to the sailors’ and families’ Tulloh (Presbyterian) both of whom the Reverend Riley) it was not until problems. From the beginning, RAN were commissioned on 8 Aug 1912. 1929 that agreement was reached on chaplains considered a major part of Chaplain Tulloh was the first to serve uniform to be worn by naval chaplains. their role was the promotion of moral at sea in HMAS Melbourne in 1913, Interestingly chaplains wear a slightly values, especially in dealing with the part of a new ship, a new navy and a different peaked cap and cap badge to detrimental effects of the behaviour new nation. The first Roman Catholic other naval officers, said to have been of naval personnel after excessive fleet chaplain, the Rev Patrick Joseph designed by Winston Churchill when consumption of alcohol, marital stress Gibbons, was appointed shortly after he was First Lord of the Admiralty. caused by lengthy separation and grief with a seniority of 16 Aug 1912; he Their proud motto is “For God and counselling. also served in HMAS Australia. They Country”. By the early part of the 19th were later joined by the Rev Vivian Chaplain Tulloh and other RAN century the pay of naval chaplains and Agincourt Little (17 Dec 1912); the chaplains maintained the centuries- schoolmasters had not increased and Rev Frederick Riley, a Church of old practice: preaching and praying it was becoming increasing difficult to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 77

attract and retain suitable applicants. The work is hampered, too, by an As a result in 1812 the so called inadequate stationery allowance. In ‘Chaplain’s Charter’ was introduced a ship that carries a large number whereby HM Ships carrying greater of Boys, as this ship does, I beg than 20 guns were entitled to carry to suggest that the Stationery a chaplain. There were significant allowance be increased. I have increased salaries of £150, plus an supplied necessary items from my allowance for a servant, provision of own pocket because they were not a cabin and messing with the officers. within the scope of the allowance. An added bonus of £20 was paid Thompson had transferred to the to chaplains willing to accept the RAN from the Army. He was a tall, additional duties of schoolmaster. thin man, who conducted services While this was quite a handsome in a large clerical outfit which package many senior clergy took complemented the university exception to a seemingly lower status graduate’s gown. Perhaps this is of school duties. Every chaplain that how the Cassock, which Protestant served greater than eight years of actual and Anglican RAN chaplains sea service, and not absent more than receive today, was established. six weeks, with recorded good conduct When Thompson joined the and moral behaviour by respective RAN there were fewer than 15 Captains, was entitled to half-pay or university graduates in its ranks. pension, which was five shillings per Naval chaplains were usually the day. best educated and continued to undertake the traditional functions interests and chaplains need C HAP Tulloh’s Chaplains as Schoolmasters of Naval Instructors long after they to make the best with what they have. progress report 1938 Schoolmasters, who later became ceased to hold both titles formally. Chaplain Pendleton-Stewart known as naval instructors, and Chaplain Tulloh’s report from who joined in May 1913, carried on chaplains coexisted for many years. The HMAS Canberra bears similarities with integrity through difficult work attached extract from a 1913 Navy List to the chaplains’ experiences of conditions on board HMAS Encounter shows Chaplains and Naval Instructors today. First, it was a two year posting without adequate space to care for and listed together and it was not unusual as majority of our postings are support men and conduct instructional for the former to be employed as naval now. Second, the progress report is classes. In his annual reported dated 18 instructors and where no instructor recognisable in today’s Naval Officer February 1914 he writes: was borne the chaplain was obliged Performance Appraisal Report There is no quiet place set apart to fulfil these duties. As previously (NOPAR). Third, as described by the within the ship where the men mentioned Chaplains Hall and Riley Captain, a chaplain’s personality and can meet for classes conducted had done so. It can also be seen that interests in performing the role of a sea for their moral and mental Hall was listed separately to the other chaplain is not much different some improvement. Under present chaplains. 75 years on. One notable difference conditions it is not possible for Even as late as 1918 the annual however is Tulloh had been in the the Chaplain to conduct voluntary report of school instruction in the service for 26 years and was still religious services or classes with aged cruiser HMAS Encounter which actively undertaking a full sea posting. any degree of satisfaction. I in that year became a training ship Working on a warship takes a toll submit that more effective work (firstly without a naval instructor) on every sailor including the chaplain. could be done by the Chaplains was submitted by Chaplain Vivian Whether it was a century ago or in the Royal Australian Navy if Thompson and subsequently today, the chaplain is alone in their they were granted a measure of forwarded by the Captain without role and it is also difficult to find quiet independence in carrying out their comment to the Naval Secretary. space to do counselling, worship on efforts for the benefit of the men. Within this correspondence Thompson Sunday or deliver workshops. Space is This is not too different to today from says: at a premium with many competing my experiences onboard warship Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 78 Sea Chaplains: Serving Their Country With Pride

HMAS Melbourne in 2013. It is A world away in the bleak and prison-of-war serving on the notorious certainly a balance game in finding cold waters of the North Sea, HMAS Burma Railway where he the appropriate spaces as a chaplain Australia had been sent, unfortunately was affectionately known as the on board a ship. You have to be a very to be involved in a collision and “Navy Padre”. Here he demonstrated good reader of people and decide unable to see action at Jutland. Her true courage and commitment in advantageously what is the best chaplain Patrick Gibbons was loaned helping maintain morale and survival direction forward on many things to the battlecruiser HMS Indomitable, in deplorable conditions with under including where and when one sits, becoming one of a handful of members nourished men driven to hard reflects, works, stops. of the RAN to participate in this great labour and, suffering from disease, naval battle in May 1916. died in large numbers. Being a good Chaplains on active service World War II was particularly communicator Mathieson sought out Like their colleagues, sea chaplains severe on ships and men and, chaplains sympathetic guards and gained extra have also entered battles, been killed too, paid the ultimate sacrifice. food to help the sick. He ministered in action during wartime and achieved Chaplain George Stubbs RAN died on to the many that fell ill and buried courageous acts. The New Zealand 19 Nov 1941 on board HMAS Sydney those who died with dignity. He Maori War called for an increased with the entire ship’s company of 645 maintained a diary and as a survivor naval presence which included the men when the ship sank after a fatal when he later returned to Australia he 21 gun screw ship HMS Orpheus. In engagement with the German raider wrote wonderful comforting letters of February 1863 making for Auckland Kormoran off Shark Bay in the Indian compassion to the next of kin of those she struck the bar at the entrance to Ocean. that he had buried giving details of Manakau Harbour on the west coast of In March 1942 HMAS Perth was where they lay. Much debilitated by his the North Island where she broke up. sunk in the Battle of Sundra Strait and experiences Keith Mathieson was an Of the ship’s company of 256 only 69 with the 353 men lost was Chaplain unsung hero of a cruel war. were saved. Among the dead was her Ronald Bevington. A few months later RAN chaplains have continued chaplain Charles Haslewood, the first in August 1942 HMAS Canberra was to support their comrades in all naval chaplain to die on active service sunk in the Battle of Savo Island. Her wars and conflicts from both World in Australian waters. chaplain Lawrence Nash who had only Wars, through Korea and Viet Nam, Shortly after the declaration of been in the cruiser for three months Confrontation and Peacekeeping roles WWI coded German signal traffic survived on being rescued by a USN in which the RAN has participated. in the Pacific region was being destroyer. intercepted. This was passed to Dr Another chaplain to lose his life in Chaplaincy in today’s Navy Frederick Wheatley, a Senior Naval Australian waters was Ernest Laverick, Navy chaplains are expected to have Instructor for decoding. The task an Army Chaplain, who was serving completed three to four years of Bible proving difficult the services of a naval in the hospital ship Centaur when College training with their church chaplain the Rev Frederick Riley were she was torpedoed and sunk off the denomination, be an ordained minister, called upon who helped decipher these Queensland coast on 14 May 1943. completed at least two years of pastoral important messages leading the Allies One of the ironies of war occurred experience, be deemed suitable by the to predict the intentions of the German to Chaplain Keith Mathieson who appropriate denominational Principal Pacific Fleet. Unfortunately for the was a passenger in HMAS Perth on Chaplain and be endorsed by the church Riley became a full-time Naval his way to join HMAS Hobart. HMAS Religious Advisory Committee to the Instructor. Perth refuelled at Batavia () on Services. It is through this extended CHAP Tulloh, serving in HMAS 23 February and when Hobart arrived process and the Officer Selection Board Melbourne at the time of the Sydney/ a short time later a boat was lowered that the Royal Australian Navy can Emden engagement of 9 November to take Mathieson and his gear to his assess whether the chaplain will uphold 1914, was also employed as the new ship. Half way across the boat was the Navy values and be responsible ship’s Intelligence Officer. The non- recalled as both ships made for sea leaders before attending the New Entry combatant roles of the clergy and the owing to an imminent Japanese air raid. Officer Course at HMAS Creswell. tasks assigned to both Tulloh and Riley, Mathieson now once more in Perth Essentially, sea chaplains are bridge because of their foreign language skills, survived her sinking but was captured builders and through being available may have compromised their status. by the Japanese and interned as a they become a minister of presence Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 79

and peacemaker in a troubled world. service on a Sunday at sea continue to Recently, whilst at sea, I reflected upon practice the old traditions of church my role as a sea chaplain: ‘What is it to that have been part of the navy since its be a chaplain at sea?’ It is a hard gig for inception, with the majority of sailors chaplain standing alone in a fortress having NRel (no religion) on their ID of war trying to bring peace to young tags. sailors who at this time are focused In a rapidly changing world on a role that is sometimes beyond of increased personal freedom of them. The young learn their weapons multiculturalism in a largely secularised of war in peaceful times through aids society, the conservative nature of the and games, and wonder if it actually armed services and the church has to came to the crunch would they change in order to remain relevant. succeed? Everyone is doing something Chaplains remain an important Chaplain Mel Baker, RAN, first joined that trains towards one goal. Here part of the Armed Services, even the chaplain stands, but separated, though the culture of the church has the navy in July 2011 following seven providing whatever morale support to changed significantly. Governments years in NSW Police Force as Lead those on board so they can best attain and hierarchy have seen the impact Chaplain in Post Trauma Support. She their goals. But then there are special chaplains have made over time and has accomplished working with New moments, in being in the right place at they are just as integral to the system Zealand Police, and the Police Service the right time, being there for someone as other categories. In more recent when their world caves in. Giving times, women have been encouraged of Northern Ireland, as well as a visit to advice or a suggestion to someone who to join the ministry and we now have the London Met and Police is unsure which route to take – that’s a chaplain from outside the Christian as part of her Doctor of Education in precious. faith. police chaplaincy and police trauma. Not only do cultural social The sea chaplains’ role is a lonely In the RAN, Chaplain Baker has worked structures and learned behaviour sometimes isolating task nevertheless dictate the way roles change over with great rewards. Whether serving in submarines, including a month in years, even in the various generations as a chaplain in the early RAN times, HMAS Farncomb, in HMAS Melbourne we see differences. For instance through World Wars or in today’s and as part of the International Fleet from my doctoral studies, the Baby new generation, chaplains have fought Review team. Boomers, who are the majority of through hardships and difficulties, today’s navy chaplains, believe that shared similar lonely experiences and the way they look (ie their dress code) difficult times sometimes at cost to is more important than behaviour, their own lives. Today however we are whereas Generation X rates image better resourced and prepared for the to be the lowest denominator and tasks ahead. The chaplain stands as a the way someone behaves is far more secure and dependable friend willing important (ie morality). The majority of to serve, care and support those in sailors today, Generation Y, will think need. As we learn from our history the differently again. standards to which chaplains operate This in turn and the way society should never fall below the exacting now connects with others, outside standards set by our predecessors all of the village church, has meant that those many years ago. t ministers albeit chaplains need to think differently. New models such as emerging church and organic church are being constructed in some societies as a new phase in the community moving away from the traditional, and yet most chaplains in their seagoing Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 80 On Sandy Woodward By JeremyLarken

( Ed: I don’t think we’ve ever published a sentence without some irony or two obituiaries of the same naval ‘double entendre’, be it illuminating, officer before, but this was such a great mischievous or just funny. At that stage portrait of a fighting admiral that it of his progression one needed to be was felt we should make an exception.) robust not to be intimidated. Brusque and caustic he could be, but always met Lieutenant Commander Sandy an excellent teacher, and beneath the Woodward in 1965 on joining banter kindly and caring. IValiant , the first all-British nuclear- Sandy’s brisk mode of address to powered attack submarine (SSN) all and sundry did not always reassure. building at Vickers at Barrow-in- Always precise and to the point, Furness, as Navigating Officer. Sandy beyond the wardroom this could take was XO, known as a supremely able on enigmatic and indeed alarming submariner, for instance a founder dimensions. Later, as CO of Warspite, member of the still-new Porpoise he was known as ‘Dr Spock’ – a Class operators – indeed had been nickname he reputedly quietly enjoyed. (I recollect) XO of Porpoise herself. Nearing the final stage of build and with Following Perisher, he had driven HMS the ship’s company complete, Valiant Promoted early to Commander, Sandy was appointed as Tireless, and recently for a short period suffered a six-month delay due to a the CO (or ‘Teacher’) of the Submarine Commanding Officers (due to delays in completing Valiant) need to rebuild the emergency cooling Qualifying Course (COQC) – a highly prestigious elevation. Grampus. system. This created awkward re- He and I both left Valiant in Singapore in 1967 to fly home in X branch officers appointed to the programming of the operations (‘front- the then long-range RAF trooper, the four-engined Britannia early SSNs took full General Service end’) element of the Ship’s Company – deadly slow, imposing a stupefying 24-hour experience via a Warfare Course – in Sandy’s case the who were not involved in this work. couple of refuelling stops, enlivened happily by Sandy’s many Long TAS (Torpedo Anti-Submarine) With X Branch colleagues, I attended dry interventions. Course; this because it was anticipated whilst Sandy broke this news. He was Since 1917 the Perisher had been the means by which that SSNs would operate closely and severe and abrupt, and his address was submarine COs ‘got their colours’. The Teacher was an directly with in the ASW received with some dismay. Amongst outstanding CO in Commander’s rank. Until Sandy’s coming, (Anti-Submarine) role, although things all his gifts, sensitive communicating however, it was treated as an intuitive art rather than a worked out differently in the event. ‘downward’ was not one – and I learnt science, in addition to being by tradition a major alcoholic An awesomely professional role richly from Sandy on this account also. marathon. Sandy related how impressed he was that Sam Fry, model, true to submarine standards We all spent a fortnight or so sea- his predecessor, could judge a minute to the second without Sandy expected me and colleagues to riding Dreadnought – the one-off consulting a stop-watch – but just wondered whether he had a know their ship intimately system-by- USN Skipjack class with a Brit front source over Sandy’s shoulder whilst demonstrating this! system and valve-by-valve - a mountain end. It tends to be assumed that here Sandy set about revolutionising the whole business, to climb in this unique (at that time) was initiated an intimate professional establishing principles that I believe remain in place today, submarine in terms of both size and relationship between Sandy and John 45 years later. The course had continued until his coming complexity. I failed my first ‘viva’ with Fieldhouse, then driving Dreadnought to revolve entirely around the ‘Periscope’ element. This was Sandy, passing on ‘re-scrub’. and the doyen of the emerging group based upon WWII tactics in attacking an escorted high-value Sandy was formidable socially as of very able SSN COs. They were unit (HVU), justified by the associated facility to embed well as professionally. Contrary to his however never especially close as safe submarine tactical handling in hazardous multi-ship later austere public image, however, he colleagues – indeed they had marked conditions, timed to a precision of seconds. This Sandy was always entertaining. He belonged differences throughout their immensely preserved, whilst rationalising it with a mathematical logic to an exceedingly bright genre of Naval distinguished careers, not least many which it had previously lacked, and helping students with Officers blessed with penetrating wit, years later serving together at the associated mental aids – which needed by their nature to perceptive of the bizarre and pitiless pinnacle of the UK Ministry of Defence be personalised to individual brain functionality. He added of poseurs. He could scarcely organise (MoD). a completely new Operational Exercise (OPEX) segment to Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 81

the course which, following successful 0500, we embarked in a motor fishing We desperately sought to be invisible to the frigates and completion of the Periscope phase, took vessel at the pier which took us out to destroyers that (from Week Two of this four-week inquisition) students through realistic operational Finwhale at her buoy. Here our Duty tormented us around the high-value unit (HVU) target, exercises in the outer Clyde areas and Captain would get the submarine under whilst Sandy ensured they knew precisely where we were and the north-west approaches to the Irish way under Frank Low’s fatherly eye directed their hazarding manoeuvres to his prescription. After Sea – tricky waters. whilst the rest of us settled for breakfast each attack Sandy debriefed us, sharp and uncompromising, I was privileged to be selected for in the Wardroom (from which the whilst the next attacking run was prepared. At last light, Sandy’s final Perisher in 1969. True to its luckless ship’s officers were evicted, exhausted one-and-all, we surfaced and Finwhale made her reputation, the course is a life-changing following an even earlier breakfast), way back to Rothesay. A bottle of whiskey was placed on experience, whether one passes or fails. thinking ourselves into the coming the Wardroom table, Sandy took his place at the head, and Our team of six (three RN, three RAN) dramas of the day, poring over our set about dissecting for us the follies of the day, laced with initiated our attacking instruction in notes whilst digesting fried eggs and contextual perspectives and instruction for tackling the ever- the Dolphin (Gosport) ‘Attack Teacher’ bad coffee. After some hour and a half increasing complexities with which we were to be confronted simulator. After some weeks of this, we would reach the diving position and on the morrow. we believed we were expert against submerge. Working in pairs through I retain the most vivid recollection of these sessions. From any number of ships. All such illusions the day (my ‘oppo’ was my dear friend my scruffy but treasured detailed notes, I could today recall dissolved during our first day in (and later eminent) Ian MacDougall, almost where everyone was seated and what was said by Finwhale in the Clyde exercise areas east we would work through a succession of whom, above all by Sandy. We would return to the hotel via of Arran confronted by a single target attacks on the forward ‘Attack’ periscope MFV, again in total darkness. There in the very Scottish bar, – real submarine, real planesmen, real whilst Sandy controlled matters from I would add a Carling Black Label to the whiskey or three bad visibility, real sea washing over the the after ‘Search’ periscope – goading resident in my tummy, go to bed, sleep like a baby, and arise periscope. us with his inimitable stream of crisp again at 0500 with brain ‘as clear as a bell.’ It was January. We were billeted in and generally provocative ‘Sandy’ Our course lost then one (RN) of the six after the periscope a ghastly hotel in Rothesay. Arising at observations. phase; an RAN member fell a fortnight or so later following

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 82 On Sandy Woodward

the OPEX under Sandy’s successor Dick significant operational enterprise. Faslane. Husk. Sandy had meanwhile departed Many years later, having both left the SST was to prepare for Warspite, next off the RN and working together on Command essentially a Vickers line after Valiant. Later I was & Control and Leadership for the major- specialist squadron privileged with access to the Teacher’s hazard industry, Sandy spoke of some staff, populated notebook This provided my first and of the issues he had had to handle in skill-by-skill with most intimate insight of Sandy’s custom Warspite. Under the command of his personnel fresh from sea and well respected. Whether of detailed daily note-taking – plainly a predecessor, Warspite had endured or not Sam was the ideal first Captain (SM), he was supported major element of his highly organised a traumatic experience in northern as Commander (SM) by a supremely able contemporary of intellectual progression through issues, waters. This had shaken severely mine: Hugo White. By the time I was appointed to relieve as indeed he later described it to me her ship’s company, some of whom Hugo, Sandy was himself in the final year of his time as – and which I know he used, as ever, left submarines in consequence and Captain (SM). He and Hugo had it all running ‘like a sewing during the Falklands Campaign. It was several more were – in terms of nerve machine’, and Sandy was definitely standing back. So the enlightening to read his notes on my – never quite the same again. Sandy organisation was essentially mine to run whilst Sandy handled own Perisher – at least we got good encountered a profound air of anxiety the strategy and, I suspect, was thinking ahead as his intellect, marks for the quality of our pre-course at any vigorous submerged manoeuvre professional expertise and obvious potential for greater things preparations! – operationally unacceptable. With his portended. I was given command of Osiris, XO James Laybourne, also newly joined, It was certainly a year during which I’ve rarely worked happily in parallel with Ian MacDougall he arranged routinely (at first with due harder. We were trainers, judge and jury, as is the RN custom. in Otter. In the Faslane Operations warning) lots of bow-down, bow-up Lt Cdr Ken Armitage, then a staff member, wrote in The Room, one day ‘there was Sandy’, having and corkscrew manoeuvres to restore Financial Times on 17 August 2013 that Sandy “was positive, just taken command of Warspite, sitting confidence. disciplined and determined to meet his stated objectives”, on a table swinging his legs. “Not at The years passed. I recall that Sandy setting standards and “always supportive and encouraging”. I sea then?” he quipped cheerfully. I was had been promoted at essentially do not recall Sandy ever questioning any of my decisions in delighted some weeks later to read in the first opportunity to Captain and terms of whether or not a submarine was first safe and then the Operations Room ‘Line Book’ (= a appointed as Assistant Director Warfare ready operationally for full accreditation. He did however take record of entertaining daily happenings) in the Directorate of Naval Plans. Here a direct hand in high-end operational training and the new the observation “Brand new CO to CO he cut his teeth as a ferocious advocate computer-driven command systems being fitted in SSNs, of some experience “Not at sea then?”. of the ‘Naval Case’ in the Ministry of working directly with my Operations deputy Mike Boyce Shortly after this (Spring 1971) Defence (MoD), and scourge of the RAF who later became a most able First Sea Lord and then Chief the USSR mounted one of its most and the Air Staff’s excessive inclination of Defence Staff leading up to and during the second Gulf extensive major exercises – code-named for deceitful MoD claims and politics War – pressing the Prime Minister on a range of issues, and OCEAN SAFARI – issuing in strength – a formidable skill that he continued being somewhat ‘short toured’ for his steadfast rationale and from the Barents to well south-west in to contribute from without as well as integrity. Sandy and I had many reflective discussions on the Norwegian Sea as far as the Faeroes. within the RN for the rest of his life. training methodology which, working together later in the Warspite and Osiris were the two UK From there Sandy was appointed civil world during the 1990s, we both would have regarded as submarines deployed to survey this Captain Submarine Sea Training somewhat elementary – although Sandy invested the more event. With her unlimited submerged (CSST), a post in which he again penetrating thought to the matter. I delivered a hard greeting endurance and sustained high speed, succeeded Sam Fry. Sam had set up strapline to work-up COs: “I won’t wish you luck, as luck is Warspite achieved some spectacular this new consolidated approach to not a commodity in which we deal!” I recall Sandy suggesting intelligence which greatly exceeded submarine sea training following that helping further our charges to succeed stage-by-stage Osiris’s modest but nevertheless exciting the sinking of an elderly submarine would reinforce self-confidence, and enhance accordingly and satisfying contribution. We were alongside at Dolphin (Fort Blockhouse) the outcome in terms of ‘return on time and effort invested’. congratulated jointly for our efforts by and the consequent Cook Report He was surely right. That said, I believe we did much more of the Flag Officer Submarines, the great which identified the pressures that the this than we permitted ourselves to recognise – and I reflect WWII CO and now Rear Admiral Ian nuclear SSN/SSBN programme had anew on his huge gifts to me and many others then as when McGeoch. I do not recall discussing imposed and the inadequacy of the Teacher. the saga directly with Sandy, but it existing individual squadron training At the same time Sandy was working on a strategic tool, was certainly an added happiness to arrangements, with just a loose lead a matrix from which could be identified what he termed an have been his ‘partner in crime’ in a from the Third Submarine Squadron at ‘Isolable Option’ whereby a protagonist could overwhelm Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 83

an opponent by a single strategy – the shortly and unkindly to underline. deployed with him. He was also some 1300 miles towards the German attempt to break the link On promotion to Rear Admiral scene of action. between the USA and the UK during Sandy was appointed Flag Officer In support of this view, Conrad Jenkin wrote in The Times WWII, had they devoted sufficient First Flotilla (FOF1), succeeding 8 August 2013: U-Boat resources 1941-43, being a Conrad Jenkin. To complete the higher I have always felt that submariners, in having to pass credible example. He submitted this command picture, Admiral Sir John through the exceedingly fine sieve of the submarine for academic scrutiny, leading to advice Fieldhouse was Commander-in-Chief Commanding Officers Qualifying Course followed by that it needed more work. These Fleet Task Force Commander for then having to sharpen their operational skills in all sorts many years later, having with a helping Operation CORPORATE), Admiral of underwater skulduggery ‘up north’, end up with a sort hand myself delved into strategic risk Sir Henry Leach First Sea Lord, and of steely mental toughness that few if any of us surface management at an advanced level, I Admiral of the Fleet Sir Terence Lewin ship officers ever achieved; and Sandy Woodward had know this was correct – but it offers an Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). that toughness in abundance. When the Task Force sailed excellent example of Sandy’s inquiring At the onset of the Falklands I knew all the other Rear and Vice Admirals in the Fleet mind and intuitive grasp of mathematics emergency Sandy was conducting and when Admiral Fieldhouse put an end to any talk of and Operations Analysis, extending a Spring Train (training exercise in replacing Woodward by some more senior officer, I am from such formal training in maths the Mediterranean), flying his flag in confident he made the right decision. As Sandy took over that BRNC Dartmouth had provided Glamorgan. As part of his preparations that job from me, I was convinced from the word ‘go’ that decades before. We continued to discuss for his FOF1 appointment, later he he would do it far better than I ever would have, as events this issue from time to time, our last told me that he had been working at proved. exchange on the matter being autumn the USN Naval War College, Newport, Sandy’s force of destroyers, frigates and support ships (Royal 2012. Rhode Island on advanced Aircraft Fleet Auxiliaries (RFAs) – tankers, stores and ammunition From CSST Sandy was appointed Carrier tactics directly relevant to ships) departed the areas for Ascension Island just as the second CO of the Type 42 what was to come. It was plain that any south of the equator. From the UK sailed the aircraft carriers guided–missile destroyer Sheffield. I campaign to repossess the Falkland Hermes (Captain Lin Middleton – and to which Sandy duly had been appointed CO of Valiant, and Islands would have a major amphibious transferred his flag) and Invincible (Captain Jeremy Black), we attended the same COs Designate element as well as such air cover as we the latter nursing some major engineering defects which Tactical Course at Dryad, of which could contrive. were resolved at sea. My own part of the story was as Captain the lively Conrad Jenkin was Director. I am not party to the full of Fearless, the amphibious command ship from which the I’m not sure how much Sandy enjoyed considerations whereby Sandy was detailed landings were planned and duly executed – host Sheffield. Like me with Valiant, he appointed Commander of the Aircraft to the Maritime Amphibious Commander (Commodore had his share of mechanical problems, Carrier Task Group. FOF3 was the , and COMAW) and the Landing Force including to one of his two propeller flotilla commander assigned both the Commander ( Julian Thompson, and Commander 3 shafts. In exchanging views on some Aircraft Carriers and the Amphibious Commando Brigade) and their substantial staffs. The carrier topic, perhaps the Isolable Option, Ships. Rear (soon Vice) Admiral Derek and amphibious groups and their commanders were to he signed himself of as “Yours, from Refell, a fine and able officer and a rendezvous at Ascension Island at a fateful juncture mid-April. another Single-Shafter”. He was certainly previous Commodore Amphibious The command structure under Admiral Fieldhouse was fond of her, and I know suffered a Warfare (COMAW), had recently complex and changed several times. Sandy, Michael Clapp corresponding extra pang when she was succeeded Vice Admiral Sir John Cox and Julian Thomson were for periods co-equal Task Group mortally wounded. in this post. He was, I understand, Commanders, whilst Sandy had degrees of primus inter From there Sandy moved to the key seen not yet to be fully ‘worked up’ in pares status which varied and were by no means always clear MoD post of Director of Naval Plans, his new appointment; and there may to those concerned. Notwithstanding Admiral Fieldhouse’s where once again I served under him have been thought as to whether to superb personal leadership of the campaign from his shore briefly. Nearing the height of his powers, recall John Cox. Many assumed that a headquarters at Northwood, Middlesex, the consequent for this final two years as a Captain he ‘submarine mafia’ factor influenced John misunderstandings were serious. was immersed in major battles whereby Fieldhouse’s decision, but I am confident Baroness Margaret Thatcher in 1992 wrote of Sandy: the Conservative Government’s that this was not the case. Sandy was a “There were those who considered him the cleverest man in Secretary of State for Defence, John highly-regarded tactician. He was at sea the Navy. ……. He was precisely the right man to fight the Nott, was bent on Defence economies, and certainly ‘worked up’, both in terms world’s first computer war.” of which the RN was to bear more than of his personal operational readiness, Certainly his agile brain generated bright ideas at an a fair or sensible share – as events were and that of his staff and the ships already alarming rate. At inception these were generally not ordered, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 84 On Sandy Woodward

and his hapless staff could readily be run command centres, with imperfect ragged without stern prioritising by a communications in stressful, threatened firm deputy – which it had previously and entrepreneurial circumstances, is been my privilege to be in a number therefore a useful guide to their likely of posts. Michael Clapp knew Sandy behaviour. As a redeeming factor in the Woodward only slightly and Julian Falklands Campaign, this was in some Thompson not at all. senses a creative tension, and it did not A meeting of these seagoing prevent our ultimate success. principals would almost certainly occur There are vivid accounts of life with near Ascension Island where the small Sandy in Hermes through the campaign. Carrier Group had assembled before His most delicate task was to provide us. Sure enough, as soon as Fearless all the air cover he could to the inshore was within range, a helicopter bearing operations whilst keeping risks to the Admiral approached. The pressures the carrier group at acceptable level, from the Commander-in-Chief’s preventing above all serious damage to headquarters at Northwood were Hermes or Invincible. Not well known is already acute and there was a residual that submariner Sandy and the Captain air of stress aggravated already by the of Hermes and Sandy’s de-factor ambiguities in the command structure. Chief of Staff, Lin Middleton – older Some days before, I had decided to than submariner Sandy, and a fast-jet attempt to prepare my leaders for the pilot of some renown – had radically type of intercourse such a meeting was different views on the matter. Elements full attention. “Tell me” he said “what are the symptoms?” liable to bring. I was anxious above all of the debate still rumble, but I have no – suppressing a yawn with difficulty. “That’s one!” said the that they should recognise the inevitable doubt that Sandy was correct and to a Doctor. barrage of Woodward ideas, some mathematical nicety Only after the surrender did Sandy manage to get ashore. projected simply as a cheerful agenda Jeff Tall, later Curator of the UK He landed onboard Fearless, and with others I joined him for for lateral-thinking debate. Submarine Museum, was in Hermes. a helicopter-borne survey of some of the battlefield sites. I Everything turned out as predicted, Contributing to the BBC obituary remember particularly the devastating scene at Pebble Island, but my attempts to fix the chemistry ‘Last Word’ programme on Sandy, he the airstrip strewn with Pucara aircraft wrecked in the daring proved in vain. My two champions provides a lively evocation of the titanic SAS raid. He was not in talkative mood, very sombre – and were defensive, and dismayed and debates. The programme included possibly still cross with me. Whilst he was still FOF1 however, offended by Sandy Woodward’s extracts from a previous interview by I did call on him one evening in his assigned Terrace house breezy and provocatively creative Sandy himself on the need not visibly to in Portsmouth Dockyard. It was a gentle reflective occasion, demeanour. This set a pattern of be affected by bad news. My company and I sensed that any residual personal antipathy was easing. mistrust, almost adversarial, between uses today a quote from the great Perhaps two years later I called on him in his MoD office when the offshore Carrier Group and the General Bill Slim: “When things are bad, 3* Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments). He was inshore Amphibious Group – the two there will come a sudden pause when relaxed, and a touch mischievous on ‘Head Office’ matters. principal headquarters groups afloat. [people] will just stop and look at you. In 1991 both of us had recently retired from the RN. In They rubbed along together. But it No-one will speak; they just look at you the wake of Lord Cullen’s report on the Piper Alpha disaster, was a sadly raw relationship, fraught and ask for leadership. You will never I had attracted the attention of senior managers in the UK with misunderstanding and perceived have felt so lonely in your life.” North Sea hydrocarbon exploration and extraction industry. offence. Sandy knew all about that, and drew They encouraged me to form a company to help them with I did go on trying to moderate these such reflections into the talks he gave improved emergency command and control. My analysis was stresses and strains, with little success. I on Stress to our company clients later that training which synthesised the leadership elements of would only add that a bunker syndrome (see below). He recalled the Hermes the Perisher (distilled, of course, to separate this core element between command centres under Medical Officer insisting upon seeing from the substantive submarine-specific matters) would be a pressure is the rule rather than the him to express his concerns about powerful medium. Who better to consult than Sandy? To my exception. Command centres quickly stress around the ship and Sandy’s delight he responded enthusiastically, additionally agreeing to adopt personalities. The analogy of team. Sandy, much preoccupied with be a Non-Executive Director of the company. personal relationships to those between major issues, had trouble giving his Together we put together an eight-day course, later Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 85

distilled to five. The target clients were An event undertaken with Sandy Defence Select Committee. The future aircraft carriers and Offshore Installation Managers (OIMs) was always exciting, especially as one their air-group composition were a central concern. His focus of Oil and Gas platforms. The principle never knew quite what was to happen was not limited to the RN. A fortnight after he died I received was to assemble four or five active or next. The strategy was secure, but this from Captain Timothy Brown, RAN: trainee OIMs in a small vessel. This it was pointless to try to tie Sandy I got to know Sandy over the last six or seven years and was not to impose maritime skills but to a detailed game plan beyond a we wrote and emailed each other quite frequently. I to confine them together 24/7 in a framework. Whereas his own module initially wrote to him as I felt I owed him the courtesy of manner that could not be achieved in a on Stress was carefully choreographed, letting him know how influential his book, One Hundred conference hotel suite. The curriculum a generic course module was for him Days, was in providing an insight into his career as a demanded the hands-on management quite another matter. By nature an submariner, rather than a story about the Falklands of complex practical time-driven interventionalist, he would interject Conflict per se. From that point on we exchanged many problems, moving actual assets around remarks into a colleague’s sessions stories about submarines and he let me know a lot about and including the associated logistics. whenever he felt inclined. Profoundly his favourite exploits (perhaps too much!). He taught me Each trainee was to be in charge for a contrary to current ‘correct’ protocols much about the strategy of submarines, for which he had period long enough to ensure he or she of facilitation, this did need some insights and knowledge that was second-to-none. got tired and would experience elements management if client audiences were In 2010, I was the Director of our Future Submarine Program of operational and personal stress. The not to be disconcerted. Working and I spent the day with him and Prim down in Bosham area we selected was the Firth of Clyde; with him was invariably fun, a good where he was keen to share with me his experiences of the we knew it well, it lent itself to a fine and knock-about insightful show. I relished Astute program as it was ramping up. He hoped he could flexible business scenario, and it offered these fire-cracker episodes, as did our provide some valuable insights for the RAN and see us the great advantage of a large reasonably more interesting clients. Sandy helped succeed in our endeavours. It was great fun! sheltered area – seasickness not being a enormously in articulating the purpose I shall miss our regular emails, but feel privileged that he useful feature. and direction of the new company. Our took the time to engage me. I remained amazed at his sharp Sandy developed a module on Stress. clientele expanded, including into the intellect and memory. It was more than just stress; it was nuclear industry, where Sandy had every At the 70th anniversary of the essentially his treatise on leadership, element of credibility. remembrance and celebrations at Liverpool last June, the CO drawing deeply on his Falklands high- His active time with us drew to of HMCS Iroquois told me that he presented a copy of Sandy’s command experience, very personal, a close as health concerns began book One Hundred Days on his Falklands experiences to drilling down to the foundations of to impinge. He continued to sail each quaifying OOW as the best treatise of which he knew of much of the self-examination laid out competitively in his yacht Cry Havoc, leadership under stress. in “One Hundred Days”. Profound, including Cowes week. From his modest Within a day or so of his death Admiral Ian MacDougall arresting, humorously self-deprecating, and enchanting home facing the water e-mailed me: this was Sandy at his absolute best. It at Bosham, Chichester he then turned “Thus passeth a great man” was a privilege to have such illustrious to local radio-controlled model-yacht stuff presented under our banner. A racing – and radio-controlled aircraft. Shell executive, e-mailing to me on Undaunted by contraints, amongst his Jeremy Larken joined RN in 1957, qualifying in both reading of Sandy’s passing, wrote: fresh enthusiasms was the construction Although it is over twenty years of Nelsonic era ship models to museum submarines and surface warfare. NO of Valiant on build, duly now since we worked together I standards – work fascinating to watch commanding Osiris, Glamorgan, Valiant, Third SM Squadron, still remember many of his choice with his now-arthritic hands. During Fearless (Falklands Campaign) and UK/NLPhibGru, with phrases (‘who shall follow the the final weeks of his fatal illness, he set intermediate MoD posts. Retired as ACDS (Overseas) 1990, trumpet if it maketh a wavering about establishing from scratch a model starting company in crisis & emergency management and sound’ and ‘situate the appreciation’) railway, of ingenuity and complexity but in particular I remember the growing to the last moment. For Sandy, associated leadership. air of calm authority with which he ever the fresh endeavour! spoke of his time in command. I To the last Sandy was an influential have thought back to him during the contributions to the future of the RN, (thankfully few) serious situations advising at high levels confidentially, with which I have had to deal both and leading two major submissions to on and offshore in the period since. the Westminster House of Commons Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 86 Unmanned Maritime Surveillance and Weapons Systems By Gary Martinic

he rapid evolution of military oil/gas pipelines and robotic technology evident today international telephone Thas seen the emergence and growing cables, investigating the acceptance of unmanned vehicles impact of subsurface oil (UVs) across all three operating plumes (spills), UUV environments, air, land and sea. This deep dive missions to has been due to the fact that UVs have investigate deep ocean consistently demonstrated their worth photographic surveys, across a wide spectrum of current and lastly in maintaining military operations and campaigns.1 undersea facilities where Developed primarily because of oceanographic research is their strong intelligence, surveillance carried out. Today ‘state- maritime vessels and they are also F igure 1. and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, of-the-art’ USVs and UUVs are fast more flexible than commercial-ship Spartan Scout USV lower unit costs and reduced risk to becoming more prevalent, and they contributions, as can be observed via the operator, the development of UVs are being incorporated into the navies the use of ‘Wave Gliders’, which harness has continued at an unprecedented by an increasing number of nations wave energy as their primary means of pace. Not only can they be used for due to their utility and effectiveness. propulsion.2 ISR missions, but they can also be used This article describes the advances, With regard to the classification to provide the delivery of effective capabilities and military advantages of of naval UWS, USVs are unmanned firepower as unmanned weapons USVs and UUVs. naval vehicles which operate above systems (UWS), and they have grown the surface of the water. Under this smaller, faster and more sophisticated Historical Background and category fall the unmanned patrol with each passing year. Classification ofN aval UWS boats, whereas UUVs are unmanned Although the most pronounced use naval vehicles which operate below of UWS in today’s theatres of conflict The naval use of UVs has a long history the surface of the water. Examples have used unmanned aerial vehicles and refers to any vehicle that operates of this class include various types of (UAVs), both unmanned surface vessels in the marine environment without submersible vessels. Both of these naval (USVs) and unmanned underwater a crew. Indeed naval UVs, such as UVs can be operated either completely vessels (UUVs), are fast catching up torpedoes, underwater mines and autonomously, or alternatively via to their ‘aerial’ counterparts due to target drones, have been in use and remote-control from a considerable advances in computing and robotics, have been tested since WWII, while distance away. navigation, communication, power ballistic missiles and cruise missiles supply, and propulsion systems. UWS have been employed since the days of Unmanned Surface Vessels are gradually though consistently the Cold War and continue to be in (USVs) replacing humans in many combat use today. The demonstrated success missions as they take their place as of UVs, particularly naval UWS in This group includes the autonomous frontline naval weapons systems. Their conflict zones, have highlighted their and semi-autonomous, highly- mission applications are increasing to combat effectiveness across a spectrum manoeuvrable, and quick unmanned include maritime and port security, of naval applications. This in turn has patrol boats. There are varied types of anti-terror/force protection, ISR, naval had the effect of encouraging further USVs available ‘off-the shelf’, however warfare and identification and defusing development and expansion of their for the purposes of this discussion, only of underwater mines. use in future naval operations. Indeed a few of the better known models will Aside from military uses, maritime maritime UVs are valuable for both be discussed here. UVs have also been widely used in a military and non-military missions as Aside from their enhanced ISR variety of civilian offshore applications outlined in the introduction above, and interception roles, one of the including exploration of the Antarctic but they are also significantly cheaper greatest advantages of USVs are their Ice Shelf, inspection of underwater compared to the construction of capabilities as low-cost ‘force-levelers’ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 87

against asymmetric threats, making them excellent naval assets for ship force protection.4 In essence, this allows them to be used as the first naval line of defence by employing them to inspect certain vessels of interest by naval operators far removed from potential danger zones. Furthermore, they can be reconfigured to various mission requirements thereby further increasing their utility. Initially developed in the United vessel’s low-profile upper structure countermeasures, ISR with sonar/radar F igure 2. States as far back as 2001, though first which is sealed and aerodynamic, as well as UAV launch and control. The Protector USV tested in 2003, the ‘Spartan Scout’ and which also gives the vessel better Unmanned Underwater Vessels (Figure 1) is an unmanned surface stability and endurance (up to eight (UUVs). This group includes the inflatable watercraft consisting of a hrs of operation at a time).6 Various autonomous and semi-autonomous rigid hull, that is capable of working mission requirements can be met due operated (controlled and powered autonomously and remotely.3 to the Protector’s modular platform from the surface by an operator via an Originally designed for surface design which allows it to be easily umbilical or using remote-control), surveillance and force protection reconfigured, and it’s high speeds stealthy and long-endurance UUVs. missions in its 7m, 2 ton and 1,360 kg (92.6 km/h) are achieved via its single There are a varied number of types version, subsequent versions of the diesel engine which drives its water of UUVs which are available ‘off-the Spartan have produced an 11m USV jets.7 Furthermore, this USV is fitted shelf’, however for the purposes of capable of carrying a payload of around with a Mini Typhoon Weapon Station, this discussion only a few of the better 2,267 kg.4 a TOPLITE electro-optic surveillance known prototypes will be discussed Both initial and subsequent versions and targeting system (allowing day/ here. of this USV came armed with .50 night targeting capability via forward A system of classification of UUVs calibre mission guns as well as electro- looking infrared), charge-coupled based on weight and diameter is in optical sensors, infrared surveillance devices, laser rangefinders as well as a use by the U.S. Navy.10,11 This system and surface search radar.2 It can also be public address system.5 Since 2012, the classifies UUVs by the following modified for mine detection or anti- Israeli Navy has been operating a larger definitions;‘man-portable’ UUVs submarine warfare, and when equipped 11m version of the Protector, which has which weigh less than 45.2 kg, have with Hellfire or Javelin missiles, it has a greater range and a wider range of less than 0.007 cubic m of payload and the potential to attack other surface weaponry.8 are between 7.6-23cm in diameter. vessels and can even effect precision Another more ‘basic’ USV is the Lightweight UUVs weigh up to 226 kg, strikes ashore.3 UAPS20 Unmanned Autopilot System can carry 0.03-0.08 cubic m of payload Another effective remote- (Figure 3) which is manufactured by and are up to 32.4 cm in diameter. Figure 3. controlled and semi-autonomous the SIEL company of Italy.9 This USV Heavyweight UUVs weigh less than UAPS20 USV USV is the ‘Protector’ (Figure 2) has been purposely designed as a ‘low- which is manufactured by the Israeli cost’ USV which can operate in fully Rafael Defence Systems company.5 autonomous or remote-controlled Specifically developed to counter modes, usually via the use of a operator terrorist attacks on Israeli maritime control station. It is designed as 7.5m assets, the Protector has the unique rigid-hulled inflatable boat with a distinction of being the first USV to 150Hp 4 stroke outboard engine with be employed in operational combat a speed of approx. 74 km/h. Despite service. With a V-shaped, highly its basic design, this USV can carry manoeuvrable 9m inflatable rigid-hull, up to 2100kg of payload for various the Protector is both fast and stealthy. missions which range from harbour/ Its stealth capabilities are due to the port protection, mine hunting/ Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 88 Unmanned Maritime Surveillance and Weapons Systems

1,360 kg, can carry 0.11 cubic m of ‘black boxes’ from payload and are 0.553 m diameter the wreckage of Air (same as USN torpedoes); lastly, Large France flight AF447.17 UUVs can weigh up to nine ton, carry These later examples 0.42-0.85 cubic m of payload (plus confirm the capabilities external stores) and are up to 0.91m in of UUV platforms diameter. for hydrographic While the very first UUV to be reconnaissance, seafloor developed can be traced back to the mapping, and shallow pioneers of this field, such as Stan water mine counter Murphy and Bob Francois of the measures, which also University of Washington as far back as eliminate the need for 1957, todays UUVs are more versatile larger vessels and costly F igure 4. and significantly more sophisticated.12 special-handling equipment. forwards and four internal vector REMUS-600 UUV This early model UUV was used to Purpose-built and designed by the thrusters for manoeuvring, arranged study diffusion, acoustic transmission Gaymarine Electronics company of front and back, as two sets, one and submarine wakes and was known Italy as a reconnaissance and mine vertical and one horizontal. Computer as the ‘SPURV’, being short for ‘Special counter measures UUV, the Pluto processing power is supplied via a Purpose Underwater Research Plus (Fig.5) can be operated by a fibre- very small (100x72mm footprint) Vehicle’.12 optic cable or a wireless link, making PICO-itx, containing a motherboard Today, more recent examples of it suitable for hull inspections and for with a 1GHz processor which can UUVs include the ‘Remus’, the ‘Pluto- counter-terrorism operations.18 This provide up to 1GB of RAM and which Plus’ and the ‘BlackGhost’ models. UUV weighs approx. 315 kg, has a controls accelerometers, gyros and The Remus, manufactured by the US payload weight (in air) of 100kg) and pressure sensors, while a second 16-bit Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, can dive to a depth of 300m+.19 It is a microcontroller controls the motors, was designed as a low-cost UUV, which battery-operated underwater vehicle autopilots and the ability to perform is operated via a laptop computer and with an operational endurance ranging low-level control loops.21 therefore is completely autonomous.13 from 2-6 hrs. Sensors include three With several aluminium-bodied, separate sonars and TV camera, and What are the advantages of torpedo-shaped vessels within this its propulsion is supplied via two naval UWS for the ADF? class of UUV, the smallest in diameter horizontal and one lateral thrusters is the Remus 600 (Fig.4) measuring giving it a speed of around 11 km/h.19 As a nation at the forefront of UWS 32.4cm. Regardless of its small size, the Originally built by an engineering R&D, the US clearly sees a ‘big future’ Remus 600 can operate to a maximum team at Cambridge University in in the considerable warfighting benefits depth of 600m13 and due to its 5.2 2008, the torpedo-shaped ‘Blackghost’ of these unmanned platforms, and kilowatt-hour rechargeable lithium ion UUV was designed to autonomously as such the US continues to invest battery, it can operate for up to 70 hrs undertake underwater assault courses heavily in their development and and at speeds of 9.3 km/h.15 and to be able to be deployed through enhancement. In fact, as far back as The next model in order of size is an ice bore hole for scientific research 2002, the Chief of Naval Operations of Figure 5. the Remus 100 UUV which measures missions.20 Since then this UUV has the US Navy requested that the Naval Pluto Plus UUV 1.60m x 0.19m x0.19m and can undergone many improvements operate to a max. depth of 100m. including improved software The largest model is the Remus 6000 architecture, a new battery module and which measures 3.84m in diameter. enhanced thrusters. This lightweight Many Remus UUVs were employed UUV weighs 7kg and is 1200mm long, during the 2003 campaign ‘Operation yet cameras, a battery and a 1GHz Iraqi Freedom’ to detect underwater computer are stored within its small mines, which proved very successful,16 (100mm diameter) hull.21 Propulsion they were also successfully employed is achieved via a 100W main motor. in searching for and recovering the It has a rear propeller to drive it Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 89

Studies Board establish a committee to are traditionally the main ‘protection’ easily reconfigured review the status of, experience with, in this regard, by virtue of the fact that for a wide variety of technology challenges related to, and they are trained to locate, identify and critical missions, all plans for development and concepts defuse mines, UUVs, equipped with the while protecting for UVs to be used in support of naval both sensors and cameras, have made both the operator(s) operations. Such was, and increasingly this important job exceedingly easier and capital assets has been, the level of interest and and quicker. from potential risk of enthusiasm across all service branches UUVs such as ‘Knifefish’ (a variation harm. According to for these platforms, which the U.S. of the Remus class) can scan both deep the Rafael Defence (and many other nations) see as seas and comb shallow harbours for Systems company, the F igure 6. holding great promise for increasing up to 16 hrs at a time, un-piloted, and ‘Protector’ can be fitted to work with BlackGhost UUV roles in future military operations, with its stronger low-frequency sound UAVs, hence USVs could be considered encompassing air, land, sea, and signals, it can discern a mine from a as ‘mini’ integrated naval combat potentially, space.22 refrigerator littering the ocean floor.24 systems.26 With respect to the advantages that These new technologies are not only Israel, Singapore and a few these naval UWS can provide for the proving their worth in the area of mine countries in South America, currently ADF, it is the powerful combination ISR and identification, but also in the operate the Protector USV for both of the protection of the operator areas of port surveillance/security and naval operations and to protect their from direct enemy action, strong civilian offshore research applications. undersea natural resources. Of these, ISR capabilities as well as the ability Though UUVs today are more it is believed that only Israel has so to provide the delivery of effective advanced than in the past, problems far put their USVs to work in actual firepower, along with characteristics still remain, for example, underwater conflict zones, thus acquiring valuable such as high manoeuvrability, flexibility communication difficulties exist ‘unmanned’ combat experience. Being and speed (USVs), and stealth between UUVs and satellite and GPS a country that is surrounded by many and endurance (UUVs), which are systems, due to the nature of the hostile neighbours, and as such being undoubtedly the main advantages of current-shifting, water-distorting and involved in many continuous conflicts these naval UV platforms. ‘obstacle-rich’ maritime environment. over a long time, Israel has obtained Underwater mines are considered Other issues include operational valuable operational experience the most serious threat to many endurance and the need for stronger with the use of many unmanned critical waterways of the world. power sources (without need for systems. This has allowed their Although not considered sophisticated constant re-charging) thereby defence personnel the opportunity to weaponry, they are effective and can potentially increasing operability from continually and innovatively develop, destroy key underwater infrastructure ‘days to months’. Lastly, the need for produce and perfect such systems assets including important oil more UUVs to be armed and to have for their own countries protection and gas pipelines, international ‘dual application’ exists, so they can as well as providing valuable export telecommunications cabling and destroy enemy targets when required, opportunities.26 surface and subsurface ships. The US not just spy on them. The US Navy is In summary, as an island Navy estimates that some 250,000 currently investigating all of these key continent, our international trade maritime mines are stocked by 50 future requirements and has stated is overwhelmingly maritime, and as various countries that could be rapidly that it expects to have them solved by such the protection of our ability to deployed in any part of the world’s 2017.25 trade is the very thing that underpins oceans at any time.23 Armed USVs are essentially ‘lethal, our national prosperity.28 As well as With such an insidious arsenal unmanned patrol boats’. With regards Australia’s sovereign land and her lurking in many waterways, many to patrolling the littoral environment, island territories, the RAN is also navies are constantly employing naval USVs are perfectly suited for this role. responsible for securing the protection divers and dedicated ships to clear They have ideal characteristics in this of critical offshore infrastructure, these dangerous mines and other task as they are quick, agile, highly which in the future may extend up to obstructive debris from key seaways, so manoeuvrable, have a long range and 648 km from Australia’s shores.28 To do that ships can travel safely and dock at are also considered ‘stealthy’. They this many miles from home, the RAN key ports unhindered. Although divers are additionally versatile and can be has a fleet based around two main Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 90 Unmanned Maritime Surveillance and Weapons Systems types of surface combatant vessels military capabilities. However, as which include the Adelaide class with other UVs, and due to associated guided missile frigates and the Anzac ethical and legal questions surrounding class frigates, as well as a small fleet of their use, it seems very likely that USV/ diesel-powered submarines.29 These UUV operators will need to be trained fleets are capable of patrolling offshore and skilled in strategic thinking and open ocean regions around Australia, planning because their duties will be but they are not ideal for patrolling to plan autonomous missions which Australia’s littoral environment. It may not necessarily mean that they are stands to reason that both USVs controlling the USV or UUV in real and UUVs are well-placed for ‘dual time.32 As changes in technology have F lying Officer Gary Martinic in his application’ patrolling missions of always affected the characteristics of civilian role as Laboratory Manager 32 Australia’s littoral environment, both the men behind the machines, it may manages the Centre for Transplant above and below the water’s surface. be necessary in the future to survey the Apart from their low-cost ship characteristics of the new naval officer and Renal Research and the Centre for force protection and ISR capabilities, who will operate these ‘non-traditional’ Infectious Diseases & Microbiology, at the other important feature of these naval platforms, which are often heavily the Westmead Millennium Institute for naval UWS is their ability to decipher armed. This is because they will require Medical Research (Westmead Hospital). the tactical picture surrounding them, a broader range of skills to do the Gary is a Training Officer-Operations known as ‘Situational Awareness’, job effectively including one, critical- which USVs and UUVs can provide thinking and rapid decision making and an Instructor with the Australian above and below the water, as well skills which are semi-independent of Air Force Cadets, based at 303 Squadron as, in the near future, in the air higher chain-of-command structures, AAFC, Camden Defence Establishment, (via use of USV/UAV integrated and two, and in-depth knowledge of NSW. With a lifelong interest in military 30 communication links). USVs and the workings of and the maintenance aviation and military history, and UUVs can also complement the and repair of these advanced RAN’s ability by assisting in its core technologies under their control, both serving for a number of years in the mission requirements, particularly being due to the rapid nature of UWS ATC, he now dedicates a significant by safeguarding the state’s shores and battlefield conditions. t portion of his time to the supervision, by providing littoral ISR capabilities. training and mentoring of AAFC Cadets. These technologies also have a lot He has a strong interest in unmanned to offer the nation in terms of low intensity patrolling operations such and future weapons systems of land, as illegal fishing, drug trafficking and sea and air. smuggling, potential offshore terrorist activities, and as has been more evident of late, illegal ‘people smuggling’. Because of the success of UVs in recent operations, this has led to recognition of their broader utility and to calls for more UWS, and coupled with their low production costs and low-level of risk to the human operator, the future naval battlespace is likely to be dominated by completely autonomous UWS, comprising USVs and UUVs. 31 Once questions regarding the human-robot interface are solved, the effectiveness of naval UWS will be significantly increased, as will their Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 91

References 18. See accessed 16 August 2013. 1. Autonomous Vehicles in Support Figure 1. Photo sourced from: http://www. of Naval Operations. Committee on 19. See accessed 16 August 2013. aspx?ID=3113 Operations, Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, National Academies 20. See accessed 26 defense-update.com/20120805_human_ August 2013. aspects_of_usv.html 2. See accessed 3 July 21. See accessed 16 August 2013. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ File:UAPS20A%26RHIB750-LR.jpg 3. See accessed 3 July 2013. of Naval Operations. Committee on Figure 4. Photo sourced from: http://www. Autonomous Vehicles in Support of Naval km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nokbg0240.nsf/ 4. See, for example, ‘Spartan deployed on Operations, Naval Studies Board, National AllWeb/EE2BE20B1D7DA21FC12574B000 Gettysburg’, pp.1-2. Newport Public Affairs, Research Council, National Academies 3840BF?OpenDocument US Naval Undersea Warfare Centre: See Press, Washington, 2005. pp. 1. accessed 3 July 2013. 23. G. Ratnam. ‘The U.S. Navy’s Underwater en.ruvsa.com.catalogue/pluto_plus/ Drones’. Politics & Policy, Bloomberg 5. See accessed 3 July 2013. businessweek.com/printer/articles/25192- wikimedia.org/wikipedia/comons/8/8b/ the-u-dot-navys-underwater-drones> Blackghost.jpg 6. See accessed 3 July 2013. 24. G. Ratnam. ‘The U.S. Navy’s Underwater Drones’, Politics & Policy, Bloomberg 7. See accessed 3 July 2013. businessweek.com/printer/articles/25192- 8. See, ‘Rafael develops 11m Protector’. the-u-dot-navys-underwater-drones> Defense Updates: see accessed 3 July 2013. Robots, In ‘Autonomous Military Robotics: 9. See Research, U.S. Department of the Navy, accessed 3 July 2013. California, 2008. pp.16. 10. See the-rafael-protector-will-work-with-uas/> accessed 3 July 2013. accessed 19 June 2013. 11. R. O’Rourke. Unmanned vehicles for U.S. 27. See Congress. Congressional Research Services accessed 7 May 2013. Report to Congress, The Navy Department 28. R. Griggs., V.ADM. “Australia’s maritime Library, Washington, 2006. pp.3 strategy”, ADF Journal, Issue No. 190 12. See accessed 16 August 2013. 29. See accessed 30 November remus> accessed 16 August 2013. 2012. 14. See be a datalink between planes and ships’.pp.2. accessed 16 August 2013. See 15. See accessed 16 August 2013. dangerroom/2013/03/darpa-tern- 16. R. Scott. ‘Clearing the way: UUVs evolve datalink/?goback=%2Egde_65111_ to meet front-line MCM requirements’. member_226813233 accessed 28 March IHS Jane’s: Defense & Security Intelligence & 2013. Analysis. 31. Autonomous Vehicles in Support See accessed 26 August Operations, Naval Studies Board, National 2013. Research Council, National Academies Press, Washington, 2005. pp. 1. 17. C.E.Rodriguez. ‘Robots find many of the missing bodies amid wreckage 32. Gilat. ‘The human aspect of unmanned of Air France Flight 447’. See accessed 19 story?id=13292850&page=2#.T_o_D_ November 2012. WPm_4> accessed 26 August 2013. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 92

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 93 Book Reviews

discussion of the number – five – themselves: legions disgraced in and types of helmets; their swords, failure – the 5th Alaudae; disappeared spears and armour. The detail is more in Britain – the Ninth Hispana; and than sufficient for the average reader anchored forever in one place – the well-schooled in military history. For 3rd Augusta, which spent all of its example Roman swords changed over hundreds of years in Africa. Various time, including on which side of the myths are examined and dealt with, body they were worn; their weight such as all of those legions raised by and length – all of these aspects are Julius Caesar used an emblem of a bull examined. The book does not get on their shields. There are details even down to the exhaustive finer detail of cavalry squadrons such as those demanded by some: for example the equipped with camels and elephants: outline of the Roman catapult weapons we learn that sadly the latter did not Legions of Rome is good, but not so detailed as to see make the crossing to Britain, which By Stephen Dando-Collins the finer workings of wheeled gears. would have lent a new facet to the St Martin’s Press, New York. Hard Along the way any reader new military history of that country. There cover; 607 pages to the concept of the Roman armies are 110 pages of these accounts. will surely take away perhaps an Then come the history of battles, Reviewed by Dr Tom Lewis inadvertent impression of how and this is even more encyclopaedic, formidable they actually were. The and to most readers these combat This book’s introduction puts its sheer physical demands made on the actions will be obscure. Nevertheless, central theme best when it argues: humans who constituted the forces they are well-written despite being “The long existence of the Roman is the first indication: the weight concise. Empire had everything to do with requirements for each soldier on the Some of the combat accounts may the legions. While the legions were march, for example, was considerable: be familiar to readers who are not strong, Rome was strong. Conversely, and loaded with this the marching well read on Roman battles however. the disintegration of the Late Empire legions would still cover 18-20 miles, Amongst them are the invasion in has everything to do with the or 29 to 32 kilometres in a day. Britain in 43AD; and the story of St disintegration of the legions as effective And when on the march at the end Paul and his encounters with various fighting forces.” (p. 11) of every afternoon the legionaries non-Roman persecutors. Another In this hefty hardback author constructed a camp, with earth and story describes in detail how the Stephen Dando-Collins, a well-known wood walls and sentries posted Romans ventured into and historian and novelist, sets out on throughout the night, and with every fought the “rebels” there, with much the enormous task of charting the man (and indeed camp follower) in detail on how the northerners’ chariots individual Roman legion histories for his place. The overwhelming sense is were defeated by targeting the horses hundreds of years, from the formation one of remorseless progress and an and (we presume as it is described in the fifth century BC of just four unstoppable force. It is no wonder elsewhere), attacking the wheeled groupings, to the eventual dissolution that the Empire arose and remained vehicles from behind. It was the of Rome when not even these highly for many hundreds of years given such Romans’ northernmost campaign, and capable military formations could save capabilities as this. a complete victory. Another lengthy the Empire. This aspect covered, from there account includes the story of the The work is divided into several the second part of the book takes us 14th Gemina legion’s encounter with parts. First we are given an overview through the history of the individual Boudicca, the British warrior queen. of the men and their equipment. legions. This is not so interesting Dando-Collins might want to This is all-embracing, from outlining unless you are familiar with all of the review some of the numbers he cites legionaries’ pay to their weapons, matter of this part of ancient history, without question from his sources. For including their food and their and therefore will be treated as a example, he suggests around 80, 000 organisation on the march and in reference work by many. Nevertheless soldiers and civilians killed in action camp. The examination is finely there are details given in the 2-4 in an AD60 battle between the forces detailed: for example there is a page extracts which are stories in of Queen Boudicca and the Romans Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 94 Book Reviews north of London, at a village now ever to rule the world. As well, the called Mancetter, on the border of book covers what looks to be all of the Warwickshire and Leicestershire. major characters’ roles in much of the The Britons were eventually politics of the times, which given they involved in a crush due to the range over hundreds of years, is no constraints of the chosen ground mean feat. hampering them; their indiscipline The 16 pages of colour illustrations and chariot tactics, and they lost badly in Legions of Rome are particularly to the legions, having nevertheless attractive, as is the inclusion of carried all before them including useful maps showing the movement burning a lot of London to the ground. of legions and sometimes of the The casualty figures sound most progress of battles. There are black dubious to me especially as only about and white pictures every few pages 400 Romans are given as killed. The throughout; often of statues depicting book also gives, quoting the source the subject matter of the pages, but Dio, that the Britons had “230, 000 also occasionally sketches, for example Anti-Access Warfare: fighting men.” This must be seriously of a legionary and his equipment. questioned: the population of Britain This is not to say the work is a “coffee- Countering A2/AD in 1000 AD was estimated at only two table” book; it is rather a serious Strategies million; it must have been much less work of scholarship. The writing tone By Sam J. Tangredi, in Boudicca’s time. But even given that is nevertheless pleasingly easy to number, to say that about half of all read, and the overall graphic design Naval Institute Press, males of fighting age must have been gives an attractive but solid feel to Annapolis MD, 2013 involved in the action begs disbelief: Legions of Rome as a whole. There is By Dr Gregory P. Gilbert how would they have known about the a comprehensive list of sources and need to be there; how would they have an excellent index. At 600 pages it’s a Anti-access/area denial, or A2/AD as travelled there; what would they have hefty work both in weight and what it it is often abbreviated, has become lived on, and where are the bodies of has achieved. one of the buzz phrases of recent the slain? Has Stephen Dando-Collins defence debates. The story goes that Beyond the many, many, battles succeeded in his self-imposed as the US and its close allies withdraw there is other information. One is immense challenge to tell the story from their Middle East commitments a three page description of Trajan’s of the Legions of Rome? By any their militaries have moved away Column, that 38 metre monument to reckoning it must be said he has, and from counter-insurgency operations the ancient empire which still stands, in fine form too. This is a great book, and pivoted to the Asia-Pacific region albeit battered by thieves over time, in and indispensable for anyone who where the primary challenge is Rome. The detail given here is enough wants to fully understand Imperial countering, if not breaking down, the for a neophyte to definitely count the Rome. anti-access/area denial strategies of Column on a list of sights to be seen nations such as China, North Korea when visiting Italy. The disappearance and Iran. The US air-sea battle concept of the Ninth Legion is revisited, with a is often seen as the operational and new theory as to their fate. tactical counter to A2/AD, although There is a great deal scattered few details of air-sea battle have been throughout the text about Roman made available to the public. As a customs, laws, superstitions and result Sam Tangredi’s book on Anti- general culture, and from this the Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD book is almost another story in itself. Strategies is very timely indeed. A reader taking in all of the chapters Tangredi goes much further than rather than using the work simply as the typical water-cooler chat that a reference will gain a great deal of has tended to accompany the trendy knowledge about the greatest empire A2/AD label. Anti-Access Warfare is Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 95

much more than a review of military of Fortress Europe 1944, the Pacific control in the maritime environment technology in such operations: it War strategy of Japan 1942-45, and (which includes the littoral) may or involves a fundamental rethink of the Argentine attempt to defend may not contain a sea denial element, anti-access concepts at the strategic the Falkland Islands 1982. Tangredi but a sea denial strategy without other level. Tangredi makes the point that goes on to analyse four modern maritime elements is rarely if ever a anti-access is ‘an ancient concept’ that anti-access strategies in detail, using success. uses ‘techniques of strategy that have his fundamental elements to help Anti-Access Warfare is an excellent been used throughout military history.’ develop the analysis and increase addition to the modern maritime In this Tangredi is profoundly correct, our understanding at the strategic strategy bookshelf. Like Mahan before A2/AD is really not new but is rather level. These include chapters on East him, Tangredi provides a rich tapestry a new name for an old approach to Asia (looking at China’s anti-access of historical material that is applied war. Anti-Access Warfare starts by strategy), Southwest Asia (looking at to support his original strategic examining an ancient and a modern Iran), Northeast Asia (North Korea), analysis. This work is directly relevant example – the Persian War of 480 BC and Central Eurasia (Russia and the to our current struggle to safeguard and the 1991 – to determine near abroad). Each of these modern the global maritime commons. This five fundamental elements that case studies identifies possible ways book provides clear thinking about characterise the anti-access approach. that anti-access strategies may future warfare options in the Asia- In summary they are: the perception be broken down, like breaches in Pacific region, while avoiding the of strategic superiority of the attacking conceptual great walls, not necessarily rather narrow perspectives found force, the primacy of geography, by warfare or military action but often in other, more technology focused, the predominance of the maritime through a combination of other means. works. Anti-Access Warfare is highly domain, the criticality of information In fact Tangredi concludes that high recommended. and intelligence, and the determinative technology weapons, such as the anti- impact of extrinsic events. ship ballistic missile (ASBM), do not These five elements form a revolutionise warfare by themselves. historical model of A2/AD at the Historically it is the collective use of strategic level which is then utilised by force by sea, air and on land (maritime Tangredi when he discusses historical forces) that are able to enact a superior case-studies and modern anti-access offensive strategy often coupled with strategies. Overall these five elements a flexible defence posture, to gain hold up to the extensive evaluation victory. by Tangedi and hence represent Some might cynically suggest that fundamental truths of anti-access A2/AD will lose favour in coming warfare − critics might suggest that years when it is replaced by the next this is not all that surprising as they defence fad acronym, but none-the- are motherhood statements. The less Tangredi is correct to highlight theoretical construct that underpins the past historical examples and this book is rather illuminating and enduring nature of anti-access warfare. a rare departure from the standard Modern maritime strategy supports group think. It is, however, presented this view when it describes sea denial in a manner that is both easy to read as a sub-component of sea control. and comprehend. Unfortunately some recent military Anti-Access Warfare also contains education has conflated the sea denial a wealth of information for the naval construct by limiting discussion of practitioner as well. The historical its use to the tactical and operational case-studies include three anti-access levels of conflict. In my opinion, victories – the Spanish Armada 1588, anti-access warfare and A2/AD are the Dardanelles 1915 and the Battle nothing more than new terms for what of Britain 1940, as well as three anti- should be understood as sea denial at access defeats – the Nazi defence the strategic level. The gaining of sea Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 96 Book Reviews

Attack contains the most detailed and Seventeen appendices covers such accurate analysis of the military events topics as what remains may be seen of the bombing written so far. today, the finding of the wreck of Lewis, a naval officer who served USS Peary in the harbour and precise in the Iraq War, and Ingman, an details of ships and aircraft lost. One expert on World War II aircraft, appendix deals with the myth of the have collaborated before. In 2010 death toll cover-up. The authors argue they published Zero Hour in Broome, that there was no cover-up and it is the untold story of the attacks on not possible that, as is often claimed, northwest Australia in 1942. In this the death toll from the raid is a great fine account the authors honed their deal higher than the official figure skills and in Carrier Attack they apply of 243. In fact they provide good the same forensic approach to their evidence that it is probably a little topic. Readers familiar with Zero Hour lower, at 235. will not be disappointed by their latest Much of what is new in Carrier effort. Attack is drawn from Japanese Carr ier Attack Darwin The early chapters of Carrier sources. It is pleasing to see this trend -1942 The Complete Attack provide background to the in Australian military history, for events of 19 February. They deal with if we do not consult the records of Guide to Australia’s topics like the strategic importance both sides in a battle we can hardly Own Pearl Harbour of Darwin, and its relationship to the expect to get the story right. A dozen nearby war in Timor and the Dutch Japanese sources are used, most by Dr Tom Lewis and Peter Ingman East Indies in early 1942. One of importantly the Japanese official Avonmore books, Adelaide 2013 the best of the background chapters history, known as the Senshi Sosho, is an explanation of how flying and combat logs (kodo chosho) of the There have been a number of accounts operations were conducted by the IJN carrier air groups. of the Imperial Japanese Navy raid on Imperial Japanese Navy. Lewis and Carrier Attack is the most detailed Darwin on 19 February 1942. Douglas Ingman explain the nuts and bolts of account of the first raid on Darwin Lockwood’s 1966 Australia’s Pearl launching 188 aircraft off four carriers yet written – this is also the opinion Harbour was one of the first. In 1980 to form one formation, as they did of Dr Hiroyuki Shindo of the National Tim Hall wrote Darwin 1942 and in on 19 February, and something the Institute of Defence Studies in Tokyo. 1988 Alan Powell produced a scholarly authors point out no-one else but the Shindo has spoken at several WWII account in The Shadow’s Edge, Japanese could do at the time. They go conferences in Australia and he Australia’s Northern War. In 2009 on to show how Japanese intelligence recently wrote to me about the book: Peter Grose wrote An Awkward Truth, about the target modified their plans “Lewis and Ingman’s book the bombing of Darwin. and their selection of aircraft types provided a very detailed account of Lewis and Ingman’s Carrier Attack and bombs for the Darwin raid. the unfolding of the Japanese carrier is the first to concentrate entirely on ThenCarrier Attack shifts to a air attack on Port Darwin on February the military aspects of the attack, and thematic format, keeping the events 19, 1942. I thought the authors also this is much to the advantage of the of 19 February 1942 in chronological did a very good job of explaining the book. The authors carefully define order as far as is reasonable, but significance of the Darwin attack the task and what is outside their departing from chronology when within the larger context of the Pacific scope – civilian administration and necessary. The Japanese fighters War in 1942. The use of maps and evacuation, for instance, is excluded. shooting down of the United Stated photographs was excellent, and the They concentrate on ‘an analysis Army Air Force’s P-40s, other Allied appendices, which included technical and an explanation of events from air operations, the bomber attack on information on the aircraft and a military point of view.’ They are the harbour and the airfields, the USN ships involved, and an interesting right to do so for there is much, both in the harbour, the follow up attack comparison of the Pearl Harbor and strategic and tactical, that has not by Japanese land based aircraft, each Darwin attacks, were very informative. been explained about the raid. Carrier receives a chapter to itself. The discussion of the many myths Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 97

on the Australian side regarding the before published description of sharing conferences and his travels Darwin attack were especially helpful intelligence analysis in DIO in the to associated locations. At this point for an overseas reader, since such 1980s and 1990s. Herzog had his of his memoir, Herzog is generally interesting details are rarely found in text cleared by the relevant security critical of certain aspects of DIO accounts of the operation written in authorities and his warts and all management and cites instances Japan.” commentary on DIO in the 1980s and of jealousy, substandard staff Dr Peter Williams lives in Canberra 1990s alone is well worth the modest management and poor productivity by and has written several books price of this book. some staff. on the Second World War in the The book title, combining the Herzog’s comments on DIO Australian greeting ‘G’day’ with the management and his experiences were Pacific. good old Southern form of address, probably paralleled in other Defence ‘Y’all’, sums up the extent of the and wider public service agencies at book. It is divided into three parts: the time. Some readers may disagree Hawesville (Herzog’s home town) and with some of his observations; the US Navy; Townsville, Queensland however, this is a memoir and are and Intelligence Service. Herzog the author’s personal experiences writes in a humorous whimsical as he saw them. Reforms within the fashion laced with ‘good old boy’ Australian Defence Organisation reminiscences straight out of a 1950s in the last 20 years have done television situation comedy with all much to eradicate many previously manner of appealing characters. The substandard practices. tone changes when he describes his Herzog’s early life in Hawseville, service as a Photographic Intelligence Hancock County, Kentucky in the man operating in stifling conditions 1950s appears idyllic. His stories on aircraft carriers in the South introduce characters who are straight China Sea during the Vietnam war. out of southern folklore. Some Herzog details the imagery analysis examples: Hancock County was ‘dry’ techniques of the day, not far removed therefore those seeking alcoholic Ga ’d yY’all; Whimsical from World War II photo interpreting beverages had to go across the Ohio wanderings and procedures. River to Cannelton, Indiana. Martin, Herzog’s description of photo one of the Hawseville characters, wonderings from reconnaissance analysis will satisfy would ride his horse to the ferry Kentucky to Australia any reader curious as to how this landing, take it on the ferry and tie science was accomplished in the it up outside the Cannelton tavern. R ob Roy Herzog, Xlibris Corporation 1960s. He tells in fine grain technical Later, highly inebriated, he would be www.xlibris.com.au detail the missions flown, imagery carefully placed on his horse by the Reviewed by Tim Coyle obtained and how it was processed bar staff and patrons, the horse would and analysed. His return to the world make its way to the ferry landing, the This is the autobiography of Rob Roy of imagery analysis at DIO in the late ferry crew would ensure the horse Herzog, the only person who went 1970s continues this theme, but with and Martin were safely ashore on the from Kentucky (the Deep South) the added spectrum of the role of Hawseville side and the horse would to Townsville (the Deep North) via . take Martin home. five US Navy aircraft carriers, then In recounting his time in DIO, Joining the US Navy ‘to see the onwards to the Australian Defence he emphasises the striving for world’, his recruit training and early Intelligence Organisation (DIO), professional excellence as he explains service also border on the slap stick. where he served as an imagery the methods and specialist knowledge Assignment to the scullery party at analyst and latterly as an all-source required to produce intelligence the huge Great Lakes Naval Training intelligence analyst. It is a unique assessments. He also highlights his Station often led to practical jokes memoir of life as an imagery specialist interaction with colleagues of the for relief from the unpleasant duty. in a war zone and provides a never ‘five eyes’ community at intelligence One such joke resulted in one of their Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 98 Book Reviews number using a trolley loaded with commences with a concise breakfast food scraps as a skate board, introduction to the Asia maritime cannon-balling through swing doors commons and its geography, providing over the loading dock and upending an essential tour of the region, the lot over a senior inspecting disputed territories, trade routes and officer’s staff car. choke points. Cole briefly summarises At the Norfolk naval air station, the maritime strategic thoughts of Herzog was posted as a sentry to Mahan, Corbett and Aube, before scrutinise aircrew identity cards as placing them within the current they passed through a checkpoint Asian context. He then follows with between the taxiway and the runway. a brief historical discussion of past The only problem was that the Asian maritime strategic approaches aircrew were in taxying piston-engine including both successes and failures. transports who, quite naturally, Having set the scene, the core of refused to stop for this rather Asian Maritime Strategies is Cole’s ridiculous security check. One pilot Asian Maritime outline of the national maritime flashed what Herzog thought was a strategies of the United States, Japan, dry cleaning docket. Strategies: Navigating North Asia, China, Southeast Asia, Herzog arrived in Australia Troubled Waters India and South Asia. These seven as a member of a US Navy photo chapters discuss the development of intelligence unit where he met his By Bernard D. Cole, maritime interests and naval forces future wife Daphne and decided to N aval Institute Press, Annapolis MD, 2013 on a nation by nation basis, looking at take his discharge. For several years he R eviewed by Dr Gregory P. Gilbert each nation’s stated strategic outlook did various jobs such as prospector’s as well as their related interests assistant, postman and a lengthy … the center of gravity of world affairs including areas for potential conflict. employment as an officer of the has left the Atlantic and moved to the For convenience Australia and New Australian Electoral Commission. A Pacific and Indian Oceans. Zealand have been included under the similar cast of characters coloured Henry Kissinger, 2010 chapter of Southeast Asia – perhaps Herzog’s life in Townsville as had in a construct placed upon the author Hawseville. Captain Bernard D. Cole, USN (Ret.), by his publishers but a revealing ‘G’day Y’all’ is a unique memoir of a who teaches at the US National War aspect of Cole’s interpretation of their most appealing ‘whimsical wandering’. College in Washington, DC, is perhaps national interests just the same. The It tells of the recent past in war and uniquely qualified to write a book on final chapter discusses conflict and peace. In 1959 the novelist Peter Asian Maritime Strategies for the 21st cooperation throughout the Indo- Devries wrote that ‘nostalgia ain’t century. His experience as a naval Pacific, producing one of the best what it used to be’. Try this one for a officer, strategist, lecturer, historian summaries of these currently available. pure form of nostalgia. and Asian specialist comes to the fore The conclusion is thought in this compilation of modern Indo- provoking although decidedly middle Pacific maritime affairs. of the road, with the sections on Cole’s previous offering The ‘Conflict Scenarios’ and ‘Cooperation Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in Scenarios’ of most value. In Cole’s the Twenty-First Century was highly opinion: “The current naval influential and Asian Maritime developments in the region evince Strategies is his latest instalment. It elements of a naval arms race but is destined to be the new standard lack the coherent maritime strategies reference for naval practitioners for that would make them dangerous to many years to come, and should be regional peace and security.” included in future naval professional While writing this review there reading programs. was much discussion about China’s Asian Maritime Strategies unilateral declaration of an ‘air defence Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 99

identification zone’ over the Diaoyu/ Pacific. Indeed some of the country Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. specific information may be somewhat The Australian Government’s rapid superficial to those experts, living criticism of this provocative act was in the region, who are engaged in seen by some in the Australian media developing their own nation’s maritime as a failure of our political leaders in strategy. If you are after detailed foreign affairs and dealing with China. national information you will have However it was clear that a lack of to go elsewhere as this book is more understanding about Asian maritime summary than detailed case-study. issues underpinned such media Although Cole attempts to provide reporting. In such situations Cole’s fair and unbiased analysis, Asian Asian Maritime Strategies should be a Maritime Strategies is fundamentally mandatory source. written from an American viewpoint. The book emphasises that the long The US Navy is always in the back of running East China Sea dispute is the author’s mind while he writes, and not simply a technical disagreement he carefully avoids criticising US and F irst Victory 1914 between China and Japan, rather it other national policies. As a member -HMAS Sydney’s Hunt results directly from China’s (and of the US Defense establishment many other nations’) interpretation Cole is unwilling (or unable) to pass for the German Raider of the United Nations Convention judgements upon US decisions or Emden on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) even offer ways forward through Indo- By Mike Carlton which claims national sovereignty Pacific controversies. For instance over its declared EEZ. For China it is a the US decision not to sign off on the William Heinemann: Australia 2013 sovereignty issue which applies to all of UNCLOS is raised but not debated. www.randomhouse.com.au/books/ its maritime boundaries − in the South And by the way Sydney is not the mike-carlton/first-victory- China Sea, in the vicinity of capital of Australia! Such minor and in the East China Sea. As these inaccuracies will upset a few subject Reviewed by Desmond Woods areas contain Asia’s major sea lines matter experts. of communication (SLOC) they are Overall Asian Maritime Strategies This timely book is about much more vital to the national survival of many is a well written, readable and than just the search for Emden, though Asian nations. These include those informative collection of the most her legendary cruise and the Battle nations that rely upon trade through up-to-date material on Indo-Pacific of the Cocos Islands are very well these seas (especially Japan and navies and maritime Asia. It is highly covered from both the German and the South Korea) as well as their trading recommended for ANI members, Australian viewpoint. But the book is partners (including Australia and the members of the armed services, as also about the urgent transition that United States). Conflict over such vital well as for those who have an interest had to be made from peace to war interests have potential to lead towards in politics, defence and international in the last half of 1914, for Australia, open warfare. It is important for one relations. It should also be mandatory the RAN and the RN. It also explains to recognise and understand the reading for members of the Australian the fate of the ships and men of the potential for conflict and cooperation media who wish to comment on German East Asia Squadron which was in maritime Asia in order to avoid maritime events in Asia and who rightly perceived in 1913 as being a real making actions that would tend to lack the necessary background. Asian threat to Australia’s maritime trade and escalate rather than deter conflicts. Maritime Strategies is an indispensable potentially her cities. There are a few points which resource on the US ‘pivot’ to the Indo- The reader is taken from the nation the specialist reader will need to Pacific region and the nitty-gritties of building entry of the RAN’s First Fleet watch out for. This book provides a the Asian century. Unit, led by the battle cruiser HMAS comprehensive overview of a vast Australia, in October 1913, through to subject area. As such it is not intended the events that culminated in Australia’s to be a detailed reference source on first victory when SMS Emden was every maritime force in the Indo- reported by Sydney as being ‘beached Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 100 Book Reviews and done for’ in November 1914. in battle that he acceded to the request Meanwhile von Spee despite trying The book identifies the first strategic by Emden’s captain to be permitted to to give the opposite impression was mistake of the war at sea as being one detach and engage in cruiser warfare, or inevitably heading for Cape Horn of very grave significance. This was ‘guerre de course’, in the Indian Ocean. intending to round it and re-coal at the interference by Winston Churchill, Had Jerram and Patey been permitted Port Stanley. Off Chile he met the very the then First Lord in the Admiralty, to bring the German fleet to battle, as valiant Rear Admiral Sir Christopher with the battle plan of Vice Admiral they intended, Emden’s career would Craddock, RN, at the Battle of Coronel. Sir Thomas Martyn Jerram, RN, the have been brief indeed and her name This was a predictable disaster. experienced Commander in Chief on and that of her captain unremarked in Craddock’s slow, underpowered, semi- the Royal Navy’s China Station. His naval history. obsolete pre-dreadnought reserve flagshipHMS Minotaur was more Much of the rest of the book is about fleet ships were destroyed one by one. than a match for either of the German the fatal consequences of that mistaken Silhouetted against the setting sun they armoured cruisers. When war was order to retreat and the free pass that made an easy mark for expert German declared, to Jerram’s near mutinous it gave to von Spee’s ships to operate at gunners who were effectively invisible fury, Churchill ordered him to retreat will. But the early chapters also explain in the darkness. This battle is covered with his ships to Hong Kong. Until the decision to put the elimination of in tragic detail. Craddock had feared receiving these orders he had been on the minor German colonial settlements, that the consequences of not fighting the point of implementing the Navy’s and an insignificant wireless telegraphy his much more powerful opponent pre-war plan to bring the German East station around Rabaul, ahead of the big would be the court martial and disgrace Asia Squadron to battle off its home strategic picture, which was to catch that had befallen Rear Admiral Earnest port of Tsingtao. The Germans could and destroy von Spee’s squadron. This Troubridge, RN, when he had failed to either come out to fight or be blockaded was a case of Australian politicians pursue the Goeben and the Breslau in – either way they would not affect the and their Lordships in the Admiralty the Mediterranean in the opening days outcome of the war or threaten British situating their appreciation rather than of the war. Craddock had repeatedly trade. appreciating the situation. Germans in asked the Admiralty for a modern Rear Admiral Sir George Patey, the bush seemed more important than fast armoured cruiser HMS Defence RN, commanding the Australian those somewhere on the high seas. A to reinforce him in the South Atlantic squadron, proposed to the Australian pre- war plan to seize German New before the inevitable battle with von Government that Australia escorted Guinea and Samoa took precedence Spee which he accurately foresaw would by a cruiser should join the RN’s China over the larger significance of be a defeat. Defence was delayed by Squadron and seek out he German destroying an enemy fleet in being. Admiralty bungling at Montevideo. ships. This sound joint strategy, which An account is given of the raising In Valparaiso, after their bloodless would have in all probability resulted in and sending of the Australian militia German victory, Von Spee refused an early victory, was not entertained far brigade, consisting of some young to drink a toast proposed by locals to less authorised. soldiers and more experienced sailors, the ‘damnation of the British Navy.’ Instead of this sound joint plan into a costly frontal assault against He knew his turn to taste defeat was the ill-judged retreat to Hong Kong determined German and native coming. ordered from the Admiralty made easy resistance. Why Patey in his flagship Once it was realised in Australia and the escape of Vice Admiral Maximilian did not provide a barrage from her London that von Spee was at and von Spee. His squadron consisted of 12 inch guns, or order fire from his beyond being a threat to trade Australia two modern and powerful armoured cruisers’ six inch main armament, onto could have been sent to the west coast cruisers, SMS Scharnhorst and SMS the nearby the German wireless station, of Chile and Cape Horn, the only route Gneisenau, four light cruisers and will forever be a mystery. It was well which the German ships could use if colliers. He sailed unmolested from within range and its location reasonably they were to return to Europe. It that Chinese waters heading south into the well known. The sound of large calibre had been done then the catastrophe blue water of the South Pacific where, shells landing nearby would have at Coronel would have been averted. in an age before radar, he would be provided a very good excuse for a swift Australia’s 12 inch guns would have far effectively a free agent. It was only after German surrender and avoided loss of outranged von Spee’s and would have von Spee was clear of pursuit and knew Australian and probably German and protected the RN’s inferior ships. But he was unlikely to need all his escorts the local native militia lives. of course that is hindsight. It was only Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 101

after the humiliating defeat, and the authors. ordered to destroy the British cable and loss of the first fleet action by the Royal The account of the ‘Swan of the wireless station’s ability to be a nodal Navy since the eighteenth century, that East’s’ last battle with her more point in the Empire’s communication the recently recalled Admiral ‘Jackie’ powerful nemesis, HMAS Sydney, is network. The nonchalance and friendly Fisher sent Australia’s two sister ships movingly and accurately retold with a cooperation with which they were to the Falklands to deal with von Spee’s wealth of detail that brings the battle greeted by the British was, we now armoured cruisers. This they swiftly to life. The powerful descriptions of know, due to the fact that these station did at the Battle of the Falkland Islands. the carnage reminds one that when operators knew where their second set The enemy ships that Jerram and brave men are being torn apart by high of wireless equipment was buried to Patey could have brought to battle, if explosive lyddite there are no winners replace the one that the Germans were permitted to do so, in the North Pacific and no cause for exultation among smashing. The British also pointed were finally sunk in the South Atlantic those who have witnessed it. Certainly out where a dummy undersea cable three months and thousands of British Captain John Glossop was not among came ashore. The Germans set about sailors’ lives later. those who felt triumphant after he had destroying it with axes, while the real Most of the book is devoted to seen at first hand what his shells had one remained undetected under the providing the best account in recent done to Emden’s sailors. He wrote: ‘I’ve sand. decades of how Emden and her seen my first naval engagement, and all When his captain sailed into battle intelligent and resourceful Captain, Karl I can say is thank God we did not start with Sydney, von Mucke soon realised Friedrich Max von Muller, von Spee’s the war.’ that Emden was overmatched, that protégé, roamed the Indian Ocean and The importance of destroying von Muller’s luck had run out. Any succeeded in trying up British merchant Emden was acknowledged in the survivors must be prisoners. He was shipping and trade in port for weeks British Press while there was general determined to avoid the same fate for on end in September and October of admiration for her captain and his men. himself and his more than 30 men and 1914. Even the sailing of the first convoy The Times of London wrote: “We are before Sydney returned for him he of AIF and NZIF troops to the Middle pleased that the cruiser Emden was took the leaky local trading schooner East was delayed by doubt about where finally destroyed but we acknowledge Ayesha and his sailors on a remarkable exactly Emden was. Commander Von Muller as a valiant and unlikely prolonged adventure. He Emden’s night attack on the and chivalrous adversary. We hope that sailed from the middle of the Indian Madras’ oil storage depot, the surprise his life was spared, for should he come Ocean to the Dutch East Indies and destruction of the Russian cruiser to London we would prepare for him a rendezvoused at sea with a German Zhemchug alongside in Penang and rousing welcome.” steamer bound for the Middle East. the one sided battle with the brave Glossop asked his prisoner, Karl von Finally he led his men in dhows up the French destroyer, which Muller, what he would have done had Red Sea, evading the RN’s patrols, and made a doomed attack on Emden, are he known of the presence of the troop then fought the local Bedouin to get to all well covered. The larger than life convoy so near to Emden. Muller made a Turkish railhead and thence back to characters that inhabited that German it clear that he would have done his Constantinople. This saga of escape, wardroom are vividly portrayed, as are duty, which would have been to shadow perhaps without parallel in modern the eclectic mix of interesting British the troopships by day and attack by naval history, makes a great finale to merchant seaman Muller took as his night with guns and torpedoes until he this gripping well written history. prisoners before sinking their ships. His was sunk or out of ammunition. That The author in his acknowledgements punctilious observance of the rules of certainly puts to rest speculation as to makes clear his debt to, among many war at sea made him into something of what the stakes were in this mid Indian others, and David an international hero and his hunting by Ocean encounter. Stevens of the Seapower Centre– a dozen ships became a game followed The final chapters of this Australia. His German research partner with fascination in newspapers around extraordinary story of risk taking cover was Henning Bess, a descendent of the world. The contrast between his the six months of voyaging of the one of Emden’s officers and a retired humane, courteous naval behaviour Emden’s shore party led by Emden’s German flag officer. This is a scholarly and that of the German army’s troops First Officer, Hellmuth von Mucke, book rich with the fruits of careful ravaging ‘brave little Belgium’ was noted from Direction Island back to Germany research and can be read and enjoyed at the time and has been since by many via Turkey. Emden’s landing party was by naval historians and general readers Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 102 Book Reviews of history with equal satisfaction. It is These add authentic eyewitness voices Africa, the Swahili coast of East Africa, the first book since the 1914-18 war explaining the events described in the Mozambique, and Angola; and looks histories to deal with all the events of book. how Portuguese established dominion the closing months of 1914 from an This new book by Mike Carlton is and how native peoples responded to Australian perspective. It is therefore a fine piece of naval research and also Portuguese imperialism. a real addition to the library of anyone a most enjoyable page turner. It is Drawing on an impressive array of interested in why Australia went to war thoroughly recommended. primary and secondary sources that are in 1914 and how events unfolded on the available in English, Professor Laband broad canvas of the Pacific, the Indian traces the empire’s origins to thoughts Ocean and the South Atlantic. of the reconquista, the recovery of The startling level of success enjoyed formerly Christian lands that had by the little Emden and her gallant ship’s been lost to Islam. Circumventing the company hint at what Maximilian von Moslem emirates of North Africa was Spee might have achieved with his the driving force behind the voyages of whole squadron if Australia had not discovery, while controlling the trade possessed a battlecruiser that deterred routes along the coasts of Africa, India, him from implementing Germany’s and the East Indies was a means of pre-war plans. He wrote to his wife that paying for the dream rather than an end until the arrival of HMAS Australia in itself. the German plan in the event of war The dream ended at the close of had been to attack Australia and the the sixteenth century with a disastrous British Empire through destruction of mission to Ethiopia and a cataclysmic Australian ships and cargos. He might defeat in . The latter have also added that he would have The bringers of war: decapitated the Portuguese aimed to disable Australia’s ports and and aristocracy and led to dockyards by bombardment. They were the Portuguese in becoming a Spanish dependency and to logical strategic targets. That was no Africa during the age the empire becoming a prey for Dutch idle threat. Von Spee bombarded the of gunpowder and sail and English freebooters. port of Papeete in French Tahiti as he from the fifteenth to the During the seventeenth century, passed – because he could. eighteenth century the forts around the Arabian Sea and As Mike Carlton makes clear in his trading posts along the Swahili coast foreword the modern counterfactual By John Laband were steadily lost to the Omanis, just as concept that the Great War was Pen and Sword, 2013, the Indies had been lost to the Dutch nothing to do with Australia could and English. The empire’s centre of Reviewed by Major John Johnston not be further from the truth. In 1914 gravity moved to Mozambique and Australia was faced the destruction of Portugal was the first European nation Angola. her trade and wealth and the possible to establish itself in Africa and the last In Mozambique, Portuguese settlers bombardment of her cities. These to leave the continent. People generally – the prazieros – established vast facts were not lost on the British and know of the voyages of discovery in the estates on the Zambezi vallley, while Australian naval officers and Australian late fifteenth century and are aware of Angola became the principal source politicians who fought hard for a decade the empire’s painfully slow demise in of slaves for the New World. In both to provide the RAN with some teeth the second half of the twentieth century, regions, native polities were destabilised and succeeded just in time to prevent but what happened between these and collapsed into warlord territories. disaster. events is a mystery for most people. Armies of slave soldiers and child This book is well illustrated with Professor Laband has set out to warriors fought each other as often as photographs, diagrams and charts. It unveil that mystery by describing how they fought the Portuguese, and bands contains a useful postscript to explain the empire was created, developed, of irregular warriors marauded through what became of the main protagonists and maintained in different parts of countrysides that had been depopulated and provides as appendices Africa. He examines each region of through the depredations of the slave contemporary reports and letters. the empire separately: Morocco, West trade. To safeguard their possessions, Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 103

the Portuguese found themselves not new but find parallels in the slave line 13 miles off the coast of Egypt and drawn into local conflicts and having armies and irregular bands of the Israel and Egypt were engaged in the to expend treasure and manpower for seventeenth century, while the language ‘Six Day War’. Thirty-four Liberty crew little return. of the reconquista is strikingly similar were killed and the incident led to a The success of the Portuguese to that of neo-conservatism and liberal plethora of investigations by the US in Africa is often seen as resting on interventionism today. and Israel and gave rise to conspiracy technologies that were revolutionising The title of Professor Laband’s theories as to why the ship was attacked warfare in Europe. Heavily armed book is taken from remarks of an Arab in broad daylight in calm and clear but manoeuvrable vessels capable chronicler, writing a generation or so conditions by an erstwhile ally. of sailing across oceans enabled the after the first voyages around the Cape. The Liberty Incident Revealed is Portuguese to penetrate the African That view would have been shared by indeed ‘the definitive account’ of the coasts, to reinforce garrisons and to all of the indigenous peoples with the attack and its aftermath. The author, subdue rebellious towns. Firearms, Portuguese and other Europeans came a US federal judge and former US whether cannon or muskets, overawed into contact. The note for us today is naval aviator, is uniquely qualified native populations and cowed them that history has warnings, not lessons, to interpret the Israel Defence Force into submission, while the sheer, for the present. (IDF) tactical command and control impregnable mass of bastioned (C2) arrangements on the lead up fortresses made thoughts of resistance to the attack, the attack itself and its impossible. aftermath. However, other powers – the Cristol spent 27 years investigating Moors, the Dutch, the English, and the incident, conducted over 400 the Omanis – could use the same interviews of US and Israeli individuals technologies just as effectively against and secured the release of classified the Portuguese, while African tactics National Security Agency (NSA) of deploying warriors in a dispersed reports to prove that the attack was line nullified the effect of concentrated a series of blunders by both the US musket fire. Ultimately, the survival of and the IDF. Details presented at the the Portuguese empire rested on the investigations remained classified internecine feuding of native polities for many years and it was this lack preventing their leaders uniting to resist of transparency which led to the the intruders effectively. conspiracy theories which Cristol Professor Laband’s anti-imperialist demolishes. approach may make for uncomfortable The book may be divided into reading, but his dissection of the The Liberty Incident two parts: the strategic and tactical Portuguese empire leads to conclusions Revealed - The background to the attack and the IDF that are no different those of other definitive account of C2 and tactical units’ actions in the analysts if early modern empires, such attack, and the aftermath enquiries as Nicholas Canny’s studies of English the 1967 Israeli attack and conspiracy theories. The book’s imperialism in Ireland. It would be on the US Navy spy ship value lies largely in the ‘lessons learnt’ unfortunate if that approach should from the attack which shows that By A Jay Cristol deter readers because Professor deficiencies in pre mission briefings, Laband’s work can also be read as a case Naval Institute Press inadequate training leading to incorrect study for intervention operations. Reviewed by Tim Coyle assessments and conclusions, poor joint Portuguese intrusions throughout C2 and the ‘fog of war’ are a recipe for Africa distabilised African societies On 8 June 1967 the USS Liberty, an military fratricide. The Liberty incident and cultures and ultimately destabilised electronic intelligence collection ship is an example of badly prepared Portugal itself. Parallels with more (AGI), was attacked by two flights of units on both sides entering a blind recent interventions are inescapable. Israel Air Force (IAF) fighter-bombers engagement with tragic results. The Secondly, features of modern Africa and five Israel Navy (IN) motor torpedo book is a worthy addition to military such as armies of child soldiers are boats (MTB). Liberty was on a patrol fratricide literature. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 104 Book Reviews

TheUSS Liberty, with a NSA to naval intelligence with the warning communications with the shore electronic intelligence collection team that because of Liberty’s merchant command. Added to this was the IN’s on board, was ordered to monitor ship characteristics (a converted relatively lower prestige profile within very high frequency and ultra high World War 2 ‘Victory’ class freighter) the IDF compared to the IAF and frequency communications on a the ship should not be confused the army. Cristol states that ‘if the IN patrol line approximately 13 miles of with the Egyptian naval supply ship had believed that it could reach and the Egyptian coast. The Arab-Israeli El-Quseir. Liberty was marked on overtake the target, it was inconceivable war began on 5 June with the IAF the naval plotting board as ‘neutral’. that it would have called for help from launching a maximum strike effort Approximately six hours later, and the air force’. against Egyptian air force bases. Liberty two hours before the attack, the duty Alternatively, the MTBs had was the only USN vessel so close to the officer removed the Liberty’s marker tentatively identified the target as an war zone. Tensions had been building as he decided that the information Egyptian destroyer at speed, therefore since mid-May when the Egyptian was too old and that no ship would a call for air support was appropriate. government claimed there was a remain in the one location for such Regardless, a call went forward and the concentration of Israeli troops on or an extended period. This action IAF air controller tasked Kursa flight, near the Syrian border and Egypt was removed Liberty from the IDF’s current comprising two Mirage IIIC fighter going to demonstrate its leadership of tactical intelligence plot which led to it bombers on combat air patrol over the Arab world and come to the aid of becoming a target. the Suez Canal, to proceed to El Arish its fellow Arab country, Syria. As Liberty was taking up its patrol and engage the target ‘if it is a warship’. On 27 May the US 6th Fleet was line at 1130 on 8 June explosions At 1357 Kursa flight strafed Liberty ordered to remain clear of a possible occurred at the town of El Arish, held with 30 mm cannon in three passes, conflict zone and not to operate aircraft by Israeli troops. These troops reported departing the scene at 1404, by which within 100 miles of the Egyptian coast. the explosions as shelling from the timer a second flight of two Super- TheLiberty did not come under 6th sea (in fact this was either retreating Mystere B2 fighter bombers, call sign Fleet command as it was subordinate to Egyptian troops detonating their Royal, was vectored to continue the the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) because ammunition dumps or IDF clearing attack. Royal dropped napalm bombs, of its mission. This skewed command operations). The troops alerted the IDF only one of which hit the ship, but structure resulted in a labyrinthine command which ordered a three-boat the Royal flight leader noted the bow communications chain which Cristol MTB division in the area to investigate. identification number and reported describes as: The MTBs took approximately 44 it as ‘CTR-5’ (actually ‘GTR-5’ – an JCS, on 8 June, began sending a minutes to close the location at 36 understandable error as the aircraft was number of orders directing Liberty knots and a radar contact was made flying at 600 knots) – Roman letters and to remain clear of the combat at 1341 at a range of 22 miles. Liberty not the Arabic script seen on Egyptian zone. Liberty was 120 nm from the was steaming westwards at five knots; warships. Sinai coast when the first ‘stand however, the young and inexperienced This report caused the IAF off’ message was sent. A total of operator assessed the contact’s speed controller to order disengagement at five stand off messages were sent at 30 knots. This generated the 1412. Consternation reigned in IDF from or through various command presumption that the unknown vessel headquarters as they realised that a US channels, but as a result of was a destroyer. ship might have been attacked. This mistakes, faulty protocols and other At this point of the narrative the was aggravated by a worse fear that the problems, the flurry of messages author begins a masterly technical ship might have been a Soviet AGI as that directed the Liberty to stand assessment of the tactical and there were known to be several in the off were not received by the ship equipment failures of the action. area. The Cyrillic hull lettering ‘CCB’ of prior to the attack. Answering the question: ‘how could Soviet AGIs might have been confused. An IAF patrol flight, with an IN such a mistake (a five knot contact As Royal flight departed, the MTB observer on board, sighted Liberty eight assessed as moving at 30 knots) be division approached the Liberty from hours prior to the attack. The observer made’, he explains the shortfalls in the the north-west. The ship was emitting identified it as a USN vessel and the radar ‘human-machine interface’, the vast clouds of black smoke; the ship’s correct identity as the USS Liberty was primitive target tracking procedures ensign had been shot away and a larger verified on debriefing. This was passed and the faulty MTB division’s flag had been hoisted on the port Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 105

halyard which was on the opposite side headquarters as to whether the ship was remainder covering the post attack to the MTBs. The MTBs signaled ‘A-A’ Soviet. It was only shortly afterwards investigations, survivors’ perceptions the international code for ‘what ship?’ when the MTBs came upon a liferaft and the conspiracy theories which by light with no response gained. At with a ‘US Navy’ inscription that they Cristol addresses. Appendix 2 compares that point Liberty opened fire with one finally realised that they had attacked a the IAF and NSA audio tapes and or both of its 50 calibre machine guns. US ship. Appendix 3 publishes the long classified The MTB commanders consulted The extraordinary level of detail NSA report which was released under their copies of the IDF’s ‘Identification of the attack provided in the book Cristol’s Freedom of Information of Arabian Navies’ publication and includes a description of the physical application. decided that the target was the old composition of the IDF command Some readers may find the official Egyptian transport El Quseir. At 1430 centre and its staff positions, the investigations, survivors’ perceptions the MTBs launched five torpedoes, communications between the and conspiracy theories narrative four of which missed, but one struck centre and the tactical units and the challenging to negotiate due to their the Liberty’s starboard side, wrecking equipment and operator deficiencies. length and complexities. Regardless, the NSA compartment and causing Detailed schematics aid the this is a masterful analysis of a critical most of the fatalities. As the MTBs understanding of conditions on the incident between friendly nations passed the Liberty they noticed a flag day. These diagrams include an analysis which serves today as a lesson of the hanging limp and partially obscured by of what the pilots saw on their runs at importance of the fusion of effective smoke but they did not make a positive the ship and gun camera photographs joint command, communications and identification of its nationality until showing why the pilots could not see tactical intelligence with trained and they passed the stern which bore the the ship’s ensign. experienced operational personnel. ship name. Even at this stage confusion The book’s first 100 pages are raged in the MTB division and at the IN devoted to the attack with the

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QinetiQ_Recruitment_Maritime_HeadmarkMagazine_FullPage_KC_170713-02.indd 1 17/07/13 4:14 PM Issue 151 107 Israeli Sub Photography by Michael Nitz

he Israeli Navy submarine INS Tanin has conducted in its deep Tdiving sea trials in the Skagerrak sea area off Norway. The submarine, still under the ownership of the shipyard Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems in Kiel, used the Danish port Hirtshals for replenishment purposes, rest and crew recreation. After having successfully finished the trials phase, Tanin transited together with its shipyard guard ship through the North Sea to Wilhelmshaven Naval Base, to use the vessel degaussing range. INS Tanin is expected to be handed over to the Israeli Navy in mid-2014.

Michael Nitz, naval correspondent, Kiel (Germany)

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 108 ANI On-line: A guide to the new website.

O ur new website is now on-line! In addition to the features available on the Changing your details previous site, the new site also features a library of past journals, a discussion When your account is created, only your member ID and password are stored in the system for privacy reasons. However, you may provide forum, a news section and member list. This short guide is designed to help other details that are visible to other ANI members. In order to change you take full advantage of the new features. your details, login and click the “Change Your Details” menu item (figure 5). Then select the “change” link (figure 6) next to either your personal details or password. Change the text appropriately and click the “save” button (figure 7). F igure 1 The personal information that you provide will be visible to other Obtaining an account members of the ANI but will be hidden from members of the general In order to access the new features of the site you must have a user public. You may provide as much or as little detail as you wish but account for the website. If you have a current subscription to the ANI, none of the fields are compulsory. However, you may not change your navigate to the website www.navalinstitute.com.au using your web member ID as it is the link between the on-line database and our off- browser (figure 1), click the “Members Login” menu item (figure 2), line records. then click the link to download an application form. Fill in the form, then fax or post it to the ANI Business Manager. Once your account has been created, you will receive an email that outlines your member

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Participating in the forum Figure 2 Figure 3 In order to post topics and replies in the discussion forum, first login Logging in to your account and click the “Forum” menu item (figure 8). Then select a forum that Once you have your account details, you are ready to login and access you would like to view by clicking its “View Topics” button (figure the new features of the site. In order to login, navigate to the website 9). Select a topic that you would like to read by clicking its “View this (figure 1) and click the “Members Login” item (figure 2). Enter your topic” link (figure 10). If you are not interested in any particular topic, member ID and password as they were provided to you, then click you may add your own by clicking the “Add New Topic” button (figure the “Login” button. The case of the member ID and password are 10). Similarly, once you are viewing a topic, you may post a reply by important: i.e. “CaSe” and “case” are considered entirely different words clicking “Add New Post”. Fill in the heading and body of your reply and by the authentication system. Each letter of the password will appear as click the “Submit” button to add your reply to the topic. If you change a single “*” to prevent others from seeing your password as you type. your mind while writing your reply, you may click the “Cancel” button If you have entered your details correctly, you will be presented with and your reply will not be added to the topic. the news page. The grey status bar at the top notifies you of the account you are using (figure 4). You are now able to access all of the new features of the site.

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Further questions If you have specific questions regarding website features or even a Figure 5 Figure 6 feature request, post a topic in the “Website Questions” forum and a site administrator will reply. Otherwise, happy browsing!

Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 109 Thinking of Making a Contribution? Style Notes for Headmark

In general, please present your work So: the end of the article, please supply full honours - Lieutenant with the minimum of formatting. Adkin, Mark. Goose Green. London: Commander Bill Crabbe, CSC, RAN - unless you would prefer Paragraphs: Leo Cooper, 1992. not to use them. Then please supply a paragraph on yourself, Don’t indent, and leave left justified. Adler, Bill (Ed.) Letters from Vietnam. to a maximum of 50 words, including any qualifications you Separate paragraphs by one line. Single New York: EP Dutton and Co., 1967. would like listed, and any interesting biographical aspects. spacing only. Use one space only after Articles use quotation marks around If possible please supply a colour or greyscale head and stops and colons. their title, which is not in italics. shoulders e-photo of yourself for use alongside the article Conventions: If citing web sites please use the title. Use numbers for 10 and above, words convention: Illustrations: below. Ship names use italics in title Australian Associated Press. “Army Do not embed graphs or figures in your text without sending a case; prefixes such as HMAS in capitals admits mistakes in SAS investigation”. separate file as well. If supplying photographs use a minimum and italics. Book and Journal titles use 17 February, 2004. Forwarding your article: Citations: So, web site name. Article title. Full Please send to the Editor on Endnotes rather than footnotes. Use date of accessing the site. Full URL. Editorial considerations: footnotes to explain any points you want Bylines: The Editor reserves the right to amend articles where the reader to notice immediately. Book Supply your everyday title for use at the necessary for the purposes of grammar correction, and to titles follow Author surname, first name, beginning of the title, so: Lieutenant delete tables or figures for space considerations. title if any. Title. Place of publication: Commander Bill Crabbe, or Jack publisher, year of that edition. Aubrey, or Reverend James Moodie. At

RADM Harris USN, CMDR US 4th Fleet, RADM Gilmore, HADS Washington, CMDR Frost CO NUSQN 725 pose in front of a MH-60R Seahawk Romeo maritime combat helicopter. The first two MH-60R Seahawk Romeo maritime combat helicopters were accepted by the Royal Australian Navy at an ‘In Service Date’ ceremony conducted by NUSQN 725 at Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Florida on 24 January 2014. Personnel from NUSQN 725 have been conducting training and testing in Florida since 2013 as part of an enhanced training package. The Seahawk Romeo will replace Navy’s current ‘Classic’ Sea Hawk and will be primarily used for Anti Submarine Warfare. Photograph: Stephan Immerz Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 110 Australian Naval Institute

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Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Mine Warfare Clearance Diving Officer Lieutenant Robert Kelly, breathing off the Mine Counter Measures Stealth set, conducts a decompression stop at nine metres with the external breathing system during his ascent from 81m.

Able Seaman Imagery Specialist Jesse Rhynard surfaces after taking underwater imagery during HMAS Huon's diving operations.