HMAS Melbourne/Voyagercollision
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ISSUE 151 MARCH 2014 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/ USS Frank E Evans collision) Vernon Parker Oration 2013 Fixing Australia’s incredible defence policy – Lowy Institute Analysis Reflections on four decades in the profession of Naval Engineering – and Jacky Fisher got it right! The Australian Navy Fleet Review and Future Intentions The Second World War and the Impact of Modern Amphibious Warfare Moral Autonomy in Australian Legislation and Military Doctrine JOURNAL OF THE Sponsorship_Ad_Outlines.indd 1 30/11/2013 10:43:20 PM Issue 151 3 Letter to the Editor Contents Dear Editor, and, I think, General Wainright (correct HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: I was delighted to see my old ship spelling?) are standing by. Cause Theories and Inquiries (with Queenborough in the Visions from the But the real treasure in Jan’s material is aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Vault section of the December Headmark an English translation from the Admiral’s Frank E Evans collision) 4 having been the navigator during her epic memoirs, relating to his meeting with and perilous trip to Europe in 1955. General Douglas MacArthur prior to the Vernon Parker Oration 2013 21 I must take you to task about the Signing Ceremony. I quote in full: statement that she completed a global General Douglas MacArthur received circumnavigation as her trips over and me in his room. As in my previous Fixing Australia’s incredible defence back were both via the Suez Canal. meetings with him, he was lively, sharp, policy - Lowy Institute Analysis 30 In fact, on the return trip and at the trim- looking in his single field- khaki, request of the Scottish canal pilot, we courteous, obliging and understanding. World Naval Developments 40 transited the Great Bitter Lake at 28 What must have gone through his mind knots. I seemed to be the only one on the stepping on enemy soil? As in Manila, I Reflections on four decades in the bridge who had reservations about this congratulated him but somewhat more profession of Naval Engineering - and procedure. effusively because this was ‘the end’. Jacky Fisher got it right! 44 With respect to the kangaroo, it “You are the representative for [they] were modeled on the kangaroo ‘Netherlands’?” Obituary – Eternal Patrol – on the reverse of the Australian penny “I am sorry Sir, I am the Representative Commodore Bryan Cleary, RAN (Rtd) 50 and were manufactured onboard by the for the Kingdom of the Netherlands.” shipwright. “ I understand. But my instructions The Australian Navy Fleet Review Yours, from Washington told me that you are a and Future Intentions 51 John Smith, Senior Researcher Representative for Netherlands.” Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc “ The instructions of the Netherlands The Second World War and the Impact Government told me that I had to sign of Modern Amphibious Warfare 53 Dear Editor, the Surrender as Representative for ‘the I read with fascination the article in the Kingdom of the Netherlands’.” Moral Autonomy in Australian December issue, on the late Admiral “ After some moments of silence: ‘I see Legislation and Military Doctrine 55 F ront page : A Toll Conrad (Emile) Helfrich. the difference. But everything is ready. I’ll search and rescue During the 1960s and 1970s, I worked see what I can do’ “. Confuse or Conceal - The Art of paramedic is lowered very closely for some years with his son “ On the Instrument of Surrender, Camouflage in His Majesty’s Australian on to the aft deck of Jan (John) at the Australian HQ in Sydney I have signed as ‘ Kingdom of the Ships during World War II 68 HMAS Diamantina of the famous Royal Interocean Lines. Jan Netherlands representative’.” during winching training off the coast subsequently joined another company, Jan’s book expresses some obviously Sea Chaplains: Serving Their Country of Solomon Islands however we remained in close touch and interesting views involving his father’s With Pride 74 in 2006, some four years before he passed association with the very controversial on Operation Render Safe 13. Photo by away, he kindly gifted me a copy of a loss of HMAS Perth and USS Houston. On Sandy Woodward 80 limited edition of the Familieboek Helfrich. If it would assist further ensuring the Sergeant Hamish Paterson Whilst mainly in Dutch, there is a good accuracy of history, I’d be pleased to Unmanned Maritime Surveillance English summary. Moreover, Jan sent me, loan all the material from Jan, to you or 1st Joint Public and Weapons Systems 86 among other writings etc., a most splendid colleagues. Affairs Unit photo of his father signing the Japanese A tale untold until now? Book Reviews 93 Surrender Document onboard Missouri Kind regards, in 1945. General Douglas MacArthur Warwick Abadee, Sydney. Israeli Sub 107 Issue Number 151 Printed in SPONSORS: Queensland Australia Style Notes for Headmark 109 DMS MARITIME – LOCKHEED MARTIN – AUSTAL – SAAB SYSTEMS ISSN 1833-6531 QINETIQ – AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE CREDIT UNION – RAYTHEON AUSTRALIA ANI Membership Application Form 111 Design & DTP by THYSSENKRUPP MARINE SYSTEMS AUSTRALIA – THALES NAVAL GROUP Diane Bricknell [email protected] Journal of the Australian Naval Institute 4 HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E Evans collision) BY COMMODORE DAVID FERRY ith discussion likely at commemoration of this Waccident I review theories as to its cause – including one I advanced in this journal in 2004 – and incorporate opinions I have encountered since. The review extends earlier assessment of the investigations and adds related experience from the Melbourne/Evans collision. T he Accident On 10 February, 1964, the destroyer HMAS Voyager collided with the F rank E Evans aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne off Subsequently there were two data record of her track, speed, helm or pictured post- Jervis Bay, New South Wales. The two inquiries by Royal Commissions, the engine orders. collision were positioning themselves for night first into the accident and the second R oyal Commissions and the (Courtesy USN) landing practice by aircraft based into allegations that Voyager’s captain, Port Side Theory ashore. Melbourne was in tactical Captain DH Stevens, RAN, was command. The night was almost physically unfit for command. There The first Royal Commission found windless, clear and moonless, with a have been numerous cases of claims that Voyager was responsible for the slight swell. With Voyager leading, fine since by survivors from Voyager and collision, though Melbourne should on Melbourne’s port bow (at position 1 also crew of Melbourne. The cause of have given her warning. Its findings in figure 1), Melbourne ordered a turn the collision remains undetermined as to how the accident occurred were together of 40° to port and into wind since none of those on Voyager’s bridge unpersuasive. for flying. About halfway through this familiar with stationing manoeuvres The second Royal Commission turn, with Voyager now ahead (position survived and there was no voice or found grounds to re-examine the F igure 1. 2), Melbourne signalled a flying course of 020, the effect of which was an order Collision for Voyager to take up station to port N and astern of her, for rescue of aircrew from any aircraft which might ditch. Turning Circles 3. 0 Voyager swung to starboard as depicted Voyager, 1000 yds (10 deg rudder) 020 200 850 yrds (15 deg rudder) before reversing in a long turn to port, 2. Turns to starboard 400 Melbourne, 2800 yds to manoeuvre to new station 600 accidentally crossing Melbourne’s 1. Turns to 020 800 bows. Despite going full ahead and Speed Averages 060 1000 Yards Voyager, 19 knots VOYAGER 1200 attempting to turn away at the last Melbourne, 21 knots 1400 2. Orders Voyager to new moment – and Melbourne going full station port quarter 1600 1800 astern – Voyager was cut in two. Her 1. Turns towards 020 060 2000 bow section sank quickly, the stern MELBOURNE some hours later. Eighty two died, all onboard Voyager. Melbourne’s bow was Fig. 1. The Collision stove in though she remained afloat. Journal of the Australian Naval Institute Issue 151 5 accident cause, determining that warned of this innovation. to port.(6, p129, 314) He canvassed the Melbourne carried no blame and Melbourne’s navigator and her psychological aspects which might that Voyager may have believed she air operations commander had have led to mistaken perception was still to port of Melbourne, when circled the carrier by boat in Jervis of Melbourne’s inclination1, which manoeuvring to her new station, Bay beforehand to check the new he believed(6,p48)central to likely this explaining her turn to port. lights did not shine or reflect collision cause possibilities. This view was shared by the Naval outboard. Even so it is possible Even so there are counters to the above: Board which believed that Voyager that the direction of the lights • The pilot’s observation could have was disorientated. Both thought the was altered after this check, to been at longer range than Voyager carrier’s lighting might have played optimise them for flying. Besides, had been, at least as she had been a part, a view shared by retired Vice ship roll and manoeuvring heel at when closing with Melbourne Admiral Harold Hickling, RN.(1) .More sea might have yielded a different during her final port turn. As to recently retired RAN Rear Admiral impression, as might height swell, being slight on the night Chris Oxenbould AO, a navigator, above the sea of Voyager’s bridge of the collision would reduce its ascribed to this, while noting that, “we and her distance. During a later potential to play a part.