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_,___ COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
INTEROmCE MEMO
FROM: Lieut. Colonel George c. McDonald DATE!lecember 15, 1941 To: Col onel William J. Donovan SUBJECT:Azores Air Patrol and Inter-i sl and Service.
The attached study by Ur. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, dated December 101 on the subject of a proposed Azores air patrol and inter-island servi ce, has been read with considerable interest by both Captain Vleir of the ~ar1ne Corps Aviation and Lieutenant Col onel McDonal d of the Ariey Air Forces. It is our opinion tha t: (a) If such a plan had been attempted and put into effect about one year ago, it would today be valuable for observation and intelligence purposes. Bovrever, with this country now being i n a sta te of war wi th Cermal"(Y a nd Ital,y i t is not be li~ved pr acticable that such a scheme be placed in operation. (b) Another disadvantage at the pr esent is conflict ?:ith United St ates 'llar Depart ment, Navy Department end British war emergency plans of oper ation in t his area. I n viev.• of t he above it is recommended that favorabl e action not be taken on the s ub ject study.
(l1 - ~~~ . ~orge C. McDonald Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps, u.s.A-.
FbEcLA$ SIFIED b\l" t:J COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION · ~ INTEROmCE MEMO I '"'- --- / DATE December 10, l94i To: Colonel Donovan SuBJ£CT:Azores.. Air Patrol - The question tells i nto two parts: (l) problem e.n The narrower or inter-island service in the Azores; (2) the broader problem of a service connecting islands and various groups ot points on the mainland ot Africa and Europe . I. The advantages ot having an inter service in the - island air Azores as proposed ~~uld be considereble . l. At present, only Pan-American a means of Airways provides aerial observation in and near the i slands, but it bas frequently omitted stops et i tho Azorss, eepeci olly n winter, owins t o heavy sees at Horta. An service woul d facilitate inter-island (a ) r econnaieeanee tor submarines a11d surface vessels at and orr the Azores; (bl aerial photography or possible enemy installa tions, and other objects. Tbo value or the service as a means or observation woule depend on three f actors : (a) The routes tlown. The service should be extended as early as possi ble to outlying islaods Northv1est , from Corvo in the t o Senta Maria and Formigas in tho Southeast. (b) Ft-equency or schedules. Oppor (cl tunities ror observation and photography un- ilr.pad ed by official l'agulations, the PortU£uese flying per sonnel, etc. 2. An inter-island service rapi would provide a ceane or d con.:;.un i cation between the islands. Daily. contacts could be maintained by the proposed isl service between tbe ands , and cooto.unicetione bet.:een United States .:ould be facilitated. asents It mi{;llt aesil>t in =ugglint; cor.m.un i- cations and materials. f bJ!lCLASSIFIED ~ uav \15 1974 - 2 - J . American technicians would form a nucleus of a "Fitth Column" for purposes of observation and counteracting enemy activity, and for any necessary action in an emergency. With proper preparation and instructions as to behavior they should also be able to establish friendly contacts with the local inhabitants and make the United States more popular. 4, It would provide an advance organization for use by American forces , with some technical personnel familiar with local conditions. 5 , It would further the construction of land and sea landing bases, on all the isl ands served, for possibl e use by American forces. For all of the above purposes, it would be desirable to have as many islands served as possibl e . The possible drawbacks of t he proposed services would be as follows: (a) Use of the organization by enemy agents, either through infiltration into its personnel (including the management) or as pa s sengers. It is important to have some means of surveillance and control over the personnel (includ ing the management). The use of the service by enemy agents for inter- island communication probably could not be entirely prevented. (b) Use of the landing facilities, ground equipment and fuel stores by the enemy in case of enemy attack or occupation. Landing areas would have to be guarded constantly and effectively against sudden enemy l andings; and thorough going plans for destruction of the fuel stores and as much ground equipment as possible should be worked out and made ready for execution on short notice, even, if necessary, with out t he cooperation, or in t t e race of opposition, of t he Portuguese author~ties and personnel. (c) If American influence and employment of the service should be too obvious, it may provide additional fuel for anti Amerioan propaganda on the islands and in Portugal. The pro vision of a postal subsidy by the Portuguese government should .a.._._.!I ..__ --1-- ~"L...- ---... ~ ...... - - ...... H ...... +.(,....,,., i n 'D ""-+.,, ,..., , A ~~ ,.. i., a,...01"1+.o~ - 3 - Weighing all of the foregoing considerations, and subject to the taki ng of all possible precautions as to security, it i s believed that it i s advisable to establish the service at the earliest possible moment, extending it to as many islands as possible. The cost of the project would appear to be relatively insignificant. II. Establishment of an air service to Madeira, Cape Verde Islands , Portuguese Guinea, Canary Islands, Bathurst and Lisbon, under the aegis of an Azores company as proposed, would have considerable advantages. l . Such a service would provide a means ot reconnais sance over the area Lisbon- Azores- Cape Verde Islands- Bathurst Bolana, through which important shipping lanes pass. 2. It would provide a means of observation and a nucleus of organization at each of the i sland groups served, with advantages similar to those outlined above, with refer ence to the Azores . The following particulars may be noted . (a) Madeira at present is not served by any air line. Development of landing facilities, radio communica tions and a nucleus of American technicians would facilitate eventual conversion of these islands into a base of opera tions, if necessary. .. (b) Cape Verde Islands are served by the Italian line LAT! , which has a landing field and a base at Sal Island. The extension of the proposed company' s servi'ces to these islands (with possible development of an inter- island service similar to that proposed for the Azores) would, therefore, be of special illiportance from the point or view of observation and counteracting Axis activity. (c) In Portuguese Guinea, where Pan Ame rican Airways already has a nucleus of organization at Bolama, the proposed service would provide an additional means of reconnaissance and communication. (d) The Spanish- owned Canary Islands have been con nected, according to the latest available information, with the Spanish colony Rio de Oro and with Spain by services nT'loT'at-.an h1r +n'"' ~no""'.(",,._ ,,. _ __ _ ""' " .. "T ~--" .- " ···"" "' - ~ - "' - - __ , _.__' - - 4 - and Tenerife (Los Rodeos Airport) . The Iber ia Company is controlled by the Spanish gover nment, but German LutthaUBa and Italian Ala Littoria eaoh hold, accor ding to reliable reports, 12 . 25% of the stock, and there is close technical collaboration between t he three oompani es. The value ot having the proposed Azores oompany operate to the Canaries is thus evident, especially trom the point of view of obser vation. It ls by no means certain, however, that the required permission ot the Spanish authorities would be obtained. In the recent past, the Franco government has been reluotant, as a general rule, to admit foreign air lines to Spanish territory, and this attitude would probably be even stronger in case of the Canaries. It is kno~n , however, that the Portuguese government has been dissatisfied with this attitude. Iberia operates a service between Madr id and Lisbon on one year authorization from the Portuguese government, subject to cancellation, and the Portuguese government, if desirous to have a Portuguese-flag service to the Canaries, would possibly be in a positi on to exercise some pressure here . J. The whole new system, as proposed, if linked with Bathurst and Lisbon, would provide additional means of com munication with United States agents at all the points to be served. 4. The service would provide additional means of com munication in friendly hands between West Africa (Bathur st) and Europe (Li~bon) . 5, ·The broader implications of the proposed services are of farreaching importance. It ls known t hat Portugal desires to establish an "imperial air route" conneotlng the mother land with its African colonies ; and a Portuguese Brazlllan service i s also being advocated. It is also kno~n t hat the qermans are attempting to take advantage of these Portuguese desires in order to acquire influence in Portuguese air transport. One of the Portuguese projects involves an overland route from Tangiers to Douala (French Cameroons) and fUrther South to Angola. The companies being considered for this route are variously reported as Aer o Portuguesa Ltda., which already operates the Ll sbon-Tangiers line and which has been closely linked to Air France; and Compan.hia Colonial de Navega~4o, a shipping company . Establishment ot a system of air lines by an Azores 1"1- ----·- .-JI>~ ""t..- •·•--_. ----• -~ A A-A---~ - \..• ---••,.._ A- .,.,__ - 5 - be the first step to the development ot a Portugal- Brazil service. The control ot these services by a company such as the one proposed, with headquarters in the Azores (and thus relatively sate in case of.an Axis occupation ot Portugal) and under American influence, would be clearly ot great advantage po the United States. It, at any future time, the Portuguese government should decide to place all Portuguese air transport under the control ot a single national company, the Azores company, as an already function ing enterprise, might be in a good position to participate in the organization ot such a nati onal company . In case of occupation of Portugal by the Axis, the only remaining means of air communication between Great Britain and Atrica would be by a service trom Foynes via the Azores or Madeira. West Atrica has become the object ot air transport activities of a large number of powers. (a) The British are operating Lisbonr-Bathurst- Lagos service with Boeing 314' s purchased in the United States. This service is the only direct means ot rapid communication (aside from radio and cable) between Great Britain and West Africa. A service is likewise operated from Lagos to Khartoum. American planes are ferried over West Africa to · Khartoum and the Middle East. r The importance ot West Africa in the scheme of British Imperial air communications is tremendous . Befor e the out break of the war in 1939 , an "Imperial Reserve Air Route" had already been surveyed . This route, as planned, passed through Lisbon, :Madeira, Bathurst and Le.gos in West Atrica,•"" extended through Central Africa to the Indian Ocean and Australia. The present British Lisbon- Bathurst- Lagos Khartoum services thus represent a partial execution ot the Reserve Route Scheme . (b) Air lines controlled by the French (Vichy) gover n ment have been re-established in French West Atrioa, and have been developed into a thick network. Air France has projects for re- establishment of its line to South America, although so far these projects have been toiled by the refusal of "R-rA7.i1 +.n O''rAni" +ho ""A"'' -4a.C+ A nT•uE> ,..n+.C- ,.,. _., _,,.._..,.. " '~~- ' ... ~- - - 6 - (operated by the company Chargeurs Reunis) to resume landings at Monrovia, but the Aeromaritime service, running along the coast of Guinea from Dakar to Cotonou, is reported to have been otherwise reestablished. All of these French activities are developing with the permissi on of the German Armistice Commission. The South American branches of Air France are on the United States black list as having Axis connections. (c) A Free French air line has been established between Brazzaville and Syria. (d) The Italian LATI line i s operating a service to Brazil via Seville (or Lisbon) , Villa Cisneros (Spanish Rio de Oro) and Sal Island. It serves as an i:uportant means of Axis communication with South America. (e) German Luftha• sa operated prior to September, 1939 , a line to Brazil via Bathurst . Early in 1939 it approachea the Portuguese government for permission to land at Portuguese colonies on a projected service to Angola or South Africa. Germany is at present interested in acquiring influence in Portuguese " imperial" air services. (f) The Spanish Iberia, in addition to running a line from Madrid to Rio de Oro and the Canaries, operates a service between Fernando Poo and Rio Muni (Spanish Guinea). Spain is re1iorted to desire to establish an air service from these Spanish colonies to the Canaries, thua completing a Madrid Guinea trunk line . It has attempted ~o purchase American planes for this service. Spain is also interested in a Spanish line t o South America. Iberia, as already stated, is connected wit~ the German and Italian companies. The interest of the various powers in West African air transport is in part explained by the strategic location of West Africa in regard to communications. It lies on the following routes: (a) Europe-South America. (b) Europe-South Africa. (c) Europe-North America, (via Trinidad or Brazil) (d) Great Britain- .hiiddle East-Australia (the Reserve Route) (e) United States--iddle East . - 7 - West Africa flanks important North-South Atlantic ship lanes, on which Axis raiders have been active. The work of t hese raiders would be facilitated by Axis bases in West Africa ot the adjoining islands. Strategically, West Africa is of the greatest importance to the United States. Any attack from Europe against South America would, of' course, be greatly facilitated by enemy control of Wes t Africa; and would, conversely, be made difficult, if not impossible, by American control of West African defenses. West Af'rica, moreover, lies on the route of direct communication with British and Russian forces in the Middle East , Acquisition by the United States of bridgeheads in West Africa might be considered as a threat by the Axis powers. It woul d facilitate eventual military action against North Africa and Spain, and would cut off Axis communications with South America . From the economic point of view the immediate importance of Wes t Africa to the Axis or to the United States is apparently not very great. For the Axis, vegetable oils, manganese ore and fruit, would present some interest. The United States would probably be most interested in manganese. (It is under stood that a special study of the economic importance of Wes t Africa is being made by the research staff,) The long-ran~e economic importance of West Africa to an Axis Europe maye considerably greater. Of all the large tropical areas, \'lest Africa lies nearest to Western Europe. The French have always shown much interest in its economic development , and are understood to be pushing the construc tion of the Trans- Sahara railroad, The products that could conceivably be obtained in large quantities from West Africa with proper development would include rubber, cotton, sugar, coffee and cocoa, vegetable fats , rice and some livestock, as well as manganese. West Africa may also be a source of labor. It is evident that Germany is l ikely to use great efforts to acquire West Africa, and to prevent the French and Portuguese possessions from falling into American or British - 8 - hands. German interest in Portuguese colonial sir tra.osport undoubtedl.y stema 1n part rrom these motives. The granting by the Portuguese government or operating rights to LATI in Sal Island , and to Japan 1n T1mor , indicates the suscepti bility or Port ugal to Axis pr essure in this matter. In order t o forestall \ he Germans , it woul d be desirable for the United States t o exercise infl uence in Portuguese air transport. The possible disadvantages or American participation in Portuguese colonial air transport are simil ar to those already outlined in regard to the Azores. It may be added that the Portuguese government ~ould inevitably tend to exercise a large degree or government control over any il:lportant Portuguese air transport systen . It may even decide some day to take over completely t he organization or the system. There rore, the danger or the potential use or the organization by the enemy can never be completely el1lllinat ed . It i s beli eved that, in the balance, it would be advan tageous t o the United Stat es to participate in the organiza t ion or the pr oposed services, under the aegis or an Azores company ; and that action shoul d be taken to that errect es soon as possible, in order to forestall German penetration. The method or financing the Portuguese company through the Reconstruction Finance Cor~oration end Pan Al!>er ican Air ways, as proposed, appears to be unobjectionable. Care should be taken, however, to prevent, it possible, public disclosure or the financing through any hearings in the Civil Aer onautioe Board or in Congress. ·. ~E SECRtTARY OF' THE NAVY WA8MINOTON • !""'I., ... .. (SC)A8-2/EF58-l (0100) JllJIWU')' l , 1942. r·· --ti "OORA!IDUll FOil T!IB PRES IDFlit. The attached report on the Azores Ialanda (NOTember, 1941) ha.a been read and le herewith returned for your files in compliance with your memorandum of Dec ellber 17. Attaclcent bEcLASSIF lliD I REPORT ON THF AZOR.ES ISLANDS C OUTl:. N TS I. THr, !.l.ORES ( GEJIEJ!J.L) II. HORTA III. ~/T CaJlJlJUICATlotlS IV. AZOIU:.S AIR PATROL v. A IR W'it.Ll.ICUICE STllTOOh'T BY J. '' VI. MR. B. BENSAUDE Note on Sources: I and II o.ro baO•d en observations made durini; a rrctnt visit by a Brltioh Naval Sta!! Officer. III, IV and V ar c l> Mine volcanic hlaada, rhlnG abniptl.¥ r,,_ the aea floor 110re t h&ll ail•• bolowl 2i 10&rln/! 1teopl7 aa they i ..vo the ••••• ( t on Pico Iahnd ; beachu o ?, 61J t oot uu•, carpet ed with -11 etc:nu, hill• coated with ..,muon !llropean, the r ow tall trou 1.llported 1n th• 191.h c.,tur)'; farthoet frca l&nd of all Atl antic hlands •••tern.moo (850 llil u froa t San lliguel to Cape de Roe• 1n Port114al) 1 •JlOll&l•d Ha for a l over tho oncth of 400 allu, apllt into three &J'O'IP• - to aat, no.rea and Corvo; the north in th• C9't.er, r.,u, Pi co, ~ Jorge, T•rc•ira, Santa Crua de Gracioea (.-oot f&llOU• for it• 1ctn•r1l; San to the southweet, lliguel (laraut 116,286 popW.aUcn) and Santa Ilaria; tho iolanda, area of all 922 aquaro &ilea, popul&Uon 2)2, 012 illandera ot origin with adllixl.ure Port114UeH or llooriah and l"leai•h blood; tmporate cl!Mte, ranging tree 48 Fahrenheit 1n Janu•rr to record 82 in July (record low 45, high 86), pe.rwJ.tting abwulant product.ion or oranges, banana.a, luone, apricots, pineapples, pomeg:raoat.e.s and gra.pet tor the strong local wine; no don geroua animAle but ''"'" 2. G&'l!l'.A!. §WAT!m:S On t h o llhole, the bland• are pro-BriU•h and anti-Oonnan, have important but Goman• interes t• in SAN llIGUEL and FAYAL and in have been particul.-.r thr1 the principal market for SAll llIGU!L pineapple•. The M.oru populAtion have voey grMt na. ti A large D\ll:lber or Az.or·e.ans work tor .vear.s in America t.o bui , a.nd o•ni enough ld a hcno t.o retire t.o in t.heir 011n iellLl\d. There three Urge &ro at. leaet A~orun colonies in. U. S. A. For these rea.son1 there 1• some l1nk betwoen the As.ores people and Aoerlca . J. moo: ACXIYITIE:s a) Tho Port114U Ue havo prevmted """"¥ in!iHraUon i nto an,y by forbi dding occHO islandt, to all toreill)l•r.. 'fhi• hao prevent ed Gol'llM "tou.rists• etc. and t.he Coman coloniea are veey clo"lT bal-l and a.re b"t inefficiently 1Uperv1eed by the Port"&"•... b) Except tor occu ion& l special vioito to- the 1ol.3nds f or 1ccie pertiClllar purpooo, web u .to obtain water or to men, drop or pick Ill' et.c. , German S/V' s and raidor1 bavo not used the bland Portu.gueae • at all. · !lost or tho r eporto or ..,..., S/11° a in the A.. re• S/11 refer to a Brhish patrol which wu main~incd tor oevero.l months • a) Portug al r ...&1ns V•rY loyal to Britain, but they &r• roal.17 oI Genllln;r. frightened SALAZAR ia loyal to ua but conceal• hb plan• of hia Govem110ot with troa 010.t • coneiderable distrust., and 1o Vlf"/ retic.,t • (p.. IOn t • s cheracterietic). b) He haa honoot belle! end 1de&l1sa tor !IEU'l'!W.OY, and <h""&h inclines he towards our aide, he h•• real belief in hia a neutral, obl1gat1on1 ao and Britain hao &lwo.ya eocouraaed thil att itude. c) Brito.in haa told b1a t.~&t we cmnot 701. give b1a on tho aainland, gr~t aoaiatanco and that we do not wish Portui;&l to imolato her• oelt 1n rutil• rooistanco; should Spain resist Gor:u.rv, expect Port114al we would to aasist ccn;>letely, but not b7 berselfJ a •token - 2 - rtt1• t.&oce• tor m hour or t wo • 'OU.ld bl • uttid.ent. d) Britain however baa Mdo clear the ract that wo con - and will - protect tho hlanda and th• &opi:e. lie have d1oc11Hod tho1r de!onco rlt.11 Sa.laur and are en c our~e h14 to rolnrorco th• lllanda aa •trcngl1 ao ho can. o) Spoo~hea by Senator ~epper ond later by tho Preeident or t ho U. S. A, ter ri!'l.od tho PortllglJ••• and 11>1de them ve17 rt•enttuJ.1 thoy ~ accept help, bot their infurlatine type of •National Pride" mal<•• t.ht11 reee.nt int.orlcrence. S. DEFJ;?ICE OF ISLA.~ll!S a) At foroignor1 are oow forbidden access to tho ialandt ( oxce~t existi.ne r1:ddtnt.a and official•, and new o!ticiAls .tio have geriu.1.oe uuae !or their rltit) it has not been ;>os si ble ror AO to vitit all the blands ..,.elr, at rubed by the British Chiefs of Starr. ~ infont&t.ion on th• lillhol• ii good, however. b) S&l.aur hat Hnt hh principal ailltar1 confidant on a tour of lladeira a.nd the A:OAI • and • seeond eon!idant t.o t.h1 t.ap• Verdes. Tbeae offi cer• &ro t o in~;:>ect t.h• de!eace3, and to orga.n1a1 iaprovtaMtnts; before depart.1"" tor t. fu=i islands, they • ere 1n1tl"\lctod by S&l.&ur t.o cooper&t.e t\Ll.11 wit.b &e, and ~e discu~aed all points t.ogeth~r in April and K:11 1941.