, • I ' tDO l'IOT Dft.c;n-1'Mil .... ll• -fl.....-..-4 !f, )f. I . • A. ROUTINGS~ omct :~:::;;;::: TIONS :::---~<:::;] -•• a.• L ...·-- 1-+-+-+---­ V. • D--- _,___ COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION INTEROmCE MEMO FROM: Lieut. Colonel George c. McDonald DATE!lecember 15, 1941 To: Col onel William J. Donovan SUBJECT:Azores Air Patrol and Inter-i sl and Service. The attached study by Ur. Oliver J. Lissitzyn, dated December 101 on the subject of a proposed Azores air patrol and inter-island servi ce, has been read with considerable interest by both Captain Vleir of the ~ar1ne Corps Aviation and Lieutenant Col onel McDonal d of the Ariey Air Forces. It is our opinion tha t: (a) If such a plan had been attempted and put into effect about one year ago, it would today be valuable for observation and intelligence purposes. Bovrever, with this country now being i n a sta te of war wi th Cermal"(Y a nd Ital,y i t is not be li~ved pr acticable that such a scheme be placed in operation. (b) Another disadvantage at the pr esent is conflict ?:ith United St ates 'llar Depart­ ment, Navy Department end British war emergency plans of oper ation in t his area. I n viev.• of t he above it is recommended that favorabl e action not be taken on the s ub ject study. (l1 - ~~~ . ~orge C. McDonald Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps, u.s.A-. FbEcLA$ SIFIED b\l" t:J<J vG$7 NOV 15 1974 ( - __ COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION · ~I INTEROmCE MEMO '"'- --- / DATE December 10, l94i To: Colonel Donovan SuBJ£CT:Azores.. Air Patrol - The question tells i nto two parts: (l) The narrower problem or e.n inter-island service in the Azores; (2) the broader problem of a service connecting various groups ot islands and points on the mainland ot Africa and Europe . I. The advantages ot having an inter- island air service in the Azores as proposed ~~uld be considereble . l. At present, only Pan-American Airways provides a means of aerial observation in and near the i slands, but it bas frequently omitted stops et tho Azorss, eepeci olly i n winter, owins t o heavy sees at Horta. An inter-island service woul d facilitate (a ) r econnaieeanee tor submarines a11d surface vessels at and orr the Azores; (bl aerial photography or possible enemy installa­ tions, and other objects. Tbo value or the service as a means or observation woule depend on three f actors : (a) The routes tlown. The service should be extended as early as possi ble to outlying islaods, from Corvo in the Northv1est t o Senta Maria and Formigas in tho Southeast. (b) Ft-equency or schedules. (cl Opportunities ror observation and photography un- ilr.pad ed by official l'agulations, the PortU£uese flying per sonnel, etc. 2. An inter-island service would provide a ceane or rapid con.:;.un i cation between the islands. Daily. contacts could be maintained by the proposed service between tbe islands , and cooto.unicetione bet.:een United States asents .:ould be facilitated. It mi{;llt aesil>t in =ugglint; cor.m.un i- cations and materials. f bJ!lCLASSIFIED ~ uav \15 1974 - 2 - J . American technicians would form a nucleus of a "Fitth Column" for purposes of observation and counteracting enemy activity, and for any necessary action in an emergency. With proper preparation and instructions as to behavior they should also be able to establish friendly contacts with the local inhabitants and make the United States more popular. 4, It would provide an advance organization for use by American forces , with some technical personnel familiar with local conditions. 5 , It would further the construction of land and sea landing bases, on all the isl ands served, for possibl e use by American forces. For all of the above purposes, it would be desirable to have as many islands served as possibl e . The possible drawbacks of t he proposed services would be as follows: (a) Use of the organization by enemy agents, either through infiltration into its personnel (including the management) or as pa s sengers. It is important to have some means of surveillance and control over the personnel (includ­ ing the management). The use of the service by enemy agents for inter- island communication probably could not be entirely prevented. (b) Use of the landing facilities, ground equipment and fuel stores by the enemy in case of enemy attack or occupation. Landing areas would have to be guarded constantly and effectively against sudden enemy l andings; and thorough­ going plans for destruction of the fuel stores and as much ground equipment as possible should be worked out and made ready for execution on short notice, even, if necessary, with­ out t he cooperation, or in t t e race of opposition, of t he Portuguese author~ties and personnel. (c) If American influence and employment of the service should be too obvious, it may provide additional fuel for anti­ Amerioan propaganda on the islands and in Portugal. The pro­ vision of a postal subsidy by the Portuguese government should .a.._._.!I ..__ --1-- ~"L...- ---... ~ ....... - - .......... .... H ....... +.(,....,,., i n 'D ""-+.,, ,..., , A ~~ ,.. i., a,...01"1+.o~ - 3 - Weighing all of the foregoing considerations, and subject to the taki ng of all possible precautions as to security, it i s believed that it i s advisable to establish the service at the earliest possible moment, extending it to as many islands as possible. The cost of the project would appear to be relatively insignificant. II. Establishment of an air service to Madeira, Cape Verde Islands , Portuguese Guinea, Canary Islands, Bathurst and Lisbon, under the aegis of an Azores company as proposed, would have considerable advantages. l . Such a service would provide a means ot reconnais­ sance over the area Lisbon- Azores- Cape Verde Islands- Bathurst­ Bolana, through which important shipping lanes pass. 2. It would provide a means of observation and a nucleus of organization at each of the i sland groups served, with advantages similar to those outlined above, with refer­ ence to the Azores . The following particulars may be noted . (a) Madeira at present is not served by any air line. Development of landing facilities, radio communica­ tions and a nucleus of American technicians would facilitate eventual conversion of these islands into a base of opera­ tions, if necessary. .. (b) Cape Verde Islands are served by the Italian line LAT! , which has a landing field and a base at Sal Island. The extension of the proposed company' s servi'ces to these islands (with possible development of an inter- island service similar to that proposed for the Azores) would, therefore, be of special illiportance from the point or view of observation and counteracting Axis activity. (c) In Portuguese Guinea, where Pan Ame rican Airways already has a nucleus of organization at Bolama, the proposed service would provide an additional means of reconnaissance and communication. (d) The Spanish- owned Canary Islands have been con­ nected, according to the latest available information, with the Spanish colony Rio de Oro and with Spain by services nT'loT'at-.an h1r +n'"' ~no""'.(",,._ ,,. _ __ _ ""' " .. "T ~--" .- " ···"" "' - ~ - "' - - __ , _.__' - - 4 - and Tenerife (Los Rodeos Airport) . The Iber ia Company is controlled by the Spanish gover nment, but German LutthaUBa and Italian Ala Littoria eaoh hold, accor ding to reliable reports, 12 . 25% of the stock, and there is close technical collaboration between t he three oompani es. The value ot having the proposed Azores oompany operate to the Canaries is thus evident, especially trom the point of view of obser­ vation. It ls by no means certain, however, that the required permission ot the Spanish authorities would be obtained. In the recent past, the Franco government has been reluotant, as a general rule, to admit foreign air lines to Spanish territory, and this attitude would probably be even stronger in case of the Canaries. It is kno~n , however, that the Portuguese government has been dissatisfied with this attitude. Iberia operates a service between Madr id and Lisbon on one­ year authorization from the Portuguese government, subject to cancellation, and the Portuguese government, if desirous to have a Portuguese-flag service to the Canaries, would possibly be in a positi on to exercise some pressure here . J. The whole new system, as proposed, if linked with Bathurst and Lisbon, would provide additional means of com­ munication with United States agents at all the points to be served. 4. The service would provide additional means of com­ munication in friendly hands between West Africa (Bathur st) and Europe (Li~bon) . 5, ·The broader implications of the proposed services are of farreaching importance. It ls known t hat Portugal desires to establish an "imperial air route" conneotlng the mother land with its African colonies ; and a Portuguese­ Brazlllan service i s also being advocated. It is also kno~n t hat the qermans are attempting to take advantage of these Portuguese desires in order to acquire influence in Portuguese air transport. One of the Portuguese projects involves an overland route from Tangiers to Douala (French Cameroons) and fUrther South to Angola. The companies being considered for this route are variously reported as Aer o Portuguesa Ltda., which already operates the Ll sbon-Tangiers line and which has been closely linked to Air France; and Compan.hia Colonial de Navega~4o, a shipping company . Establishment ot a system of air lines by an Azores 1"1- ----·- .-JI>~ ""t..- •·•--_. ----• -~ A A-A---~ - \..• ---••,.._ A- .,.,__ - 5 - be the first step to the development ot a Portugal- Brazil service.