Monitoring Elections in Africa: Investigating the Role of Regional Actors

MONITORING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS

ANNA KAPAMBWE MWABA

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2018

To my parents

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, and foremost, I would like to thank my Chair, Bryon Moraski, for his unwavering support throughout this process. I appreciate his reading through countless pages, providing careful comments, and asking critical questions that challenged me and contributed to my development as a scholar. I will always be grateful for his mentorship and strict adherence to grammatical norms. I would also like to thank my committee members: Arfi Badredine, Daniel

A. Smith, Leonardo Villalón, and Abraham Goldman for taking the time to read my research and strengthen this work.

I am also indebted to the Department of Political Science for providing me with a place to work and access to resources that have aided in the completion of this project. I am especially grateful to the Center of African Studies for being a home away from home and a place where I have grown as both a person and as a scholar. I would like to thank the Department of Political

Science, the Center of African Studies, and the University of Florida Graduate School for providing the resources that made this project a reality. I would like to thank Sue Lawless-

Yanchisin for her constant positivity and for helping me navigate the formalities associated with graduate life on countless occasions.

I would also like to thank my fellow Africanists: Mamadou Bodian, Chesney McComber,

Daniel Eizenga, Lina Benabdallah, Oumar Ba, and Ibrahim Yahaya Ibrahim, for all the support, advice, and shared experiences over the years. I would like to say a special thank you to Emily

Pukuma, my dear friend and colleague, who has been a constant source of encouragement throughout this graduate journey and without whom this process would not have been the same.

I am thankful to all the research participants I met while in the field. Thank you for taking the time to talk to me about your experiences and help me uncover the intricacies of election

observation in Africa. While I am unable to share your names, you know who you are and please know how grateful I am for your assistance with this project.

I am grateful to my parents for all their support, love, and patience over the last few years. My parents, Andrew and Catherine, have served as examples of resilience and have always been there to support me when I needed them the most. I appreciate them for sending me to school at three and making me fall in love with reading and encouraging me to ask questions from a young age. I am thankful for my siblings, Kasonde and Bwalya, who have been sources of encouragement at times when I was unsure of what the future entailed. I would like to also thank my sister and best friend, Nancy, who was there for all the ups and downs of the writing process and for constantly reminding me of how far I have come. I want to express a heartfelt thank you to my second parents, Charles and Judith, for all your support over the years and for always pushing me to be better.

Last, and definitely not least, I would like to thank my husband, Adrian, for his love and patience throughout this process. Even with the distance, he remained a constant source of positivity and always there for me without my ever having to ask. He was always a reminder that there was life outside the dissertation. Words cannot express how grateful I am for him.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 4

LIST OF TABLES ...... 10

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 11

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...... 12

ABSTRACT ...... 14

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 15

Introduction ...... 15 Election Observation as a Global Norm: Monitoring the Developing World ...... 19 Political Dimensions of International Election Monitoring...... 26

2 CHARTING ELECTION MONITOR BEHAVIOR ...... 31

Introduction ...... 31 IO as Embodiments of the State ...... 45 IOs as Independent Actors ...... 49 Conclusion ...... 52

3 METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION OF INTERVENING VARIABLES ...... 54

Introduction ...... 54 Case Selection ...... 56 International Organization Case Selection ...... 56 Country Case Selection ...... 61 A Note on the Datasets Used ...... 65 Data Collection Process ...... 72 Conclusion ...... 77

4 THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ...... 78

Introduction ...... 78 The European Economic Community to the European Union ...... 78 The EU and its Institutions ...... 82 The EU as Promoter of Democracy ...... 88 The European Union and Election Observation ...... 95 Conclusion ...... 103

5 THE AFRICAN UNION, DEMOCRACY, AND ELECTION OBSERVATION ...... 105

Introduction ...... 105 Redefining the African Union ...... 106 Advancing the Democratic Agenda: Introducing Election-Monitoring as a Governance Tool ...... 122 The Challenges of Financing Election Observation ...... 140 The AU as an Election Observer ...... 145 Short-term observation missions (STO) ...... 151 Long-term observation missions (LTO) ...... 153 Expert/Technical Assessment Missions (TAM) ...... 156 Pre-and Post-Election Audits ...... 157 Conclusion ...... 158

6 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) ...... 160

Introduction ...... 160 From SADCC to SADC...... 160 SADC and the Move towards Democratic Governance ...... 165 SADC and Updating its Election Observation Procedures ...... 178 Partners in Monitoring? ...... 203 SADC Parliamentary Forum ...... 205 SADC Electoral Commissions Forum ...... 207 Conclusion ...... 212

7 THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS ...... 214

Introduction ...... 214 Moving Beyond a Colonial Legacy ...... 215 Understanding the Commonwealth ...... 222 The Commonwealth and Democracy Promotion ...... 227 The Commonwealth as an Observer ...... 234 Conclusion ...... 240

8 MALAWI’S 2004 ELECTION AND ITS OBSERVERS...... 242

Introduction ...... 242 Malawi, Elections, and Observation ...... 245 The European Union 2004 Election Observation Mission ...... 254 The African Union 2004 Election Observation Mission ...... 266 The Southern African Development Community 2004 Election Observation Mission ...... 274 The Commonwealth 2004 Election Observation Mission ...... 284 Conclusion ...... 294

9 OBSERVING THE 2009 ELECTION ...... 298

Introduction ...... 298 Contextualizing the 2009 Election ...... 299

The European Union 2009 Election Observation Mission ...... 301 The African Union 2009 Election Observation Mission ...... 308 Southern African Development Community 2009 Observer Mission ...... 321 The Commonwealth 2009 Observation Mission ...... 329 Conclusion ...... 333

10 OBSERVING THE 2014 TRIPARTITE ELECTION ...... 336

Introduction ...... 336 Preparing for the Inaugural Tripartite Election ...... 337 Who has the Right to Observe? ...... 339 The European Union 2014 Observer Mission ...... 340 The African Union 2014 Election Observation Mission ...... 346 The Southern African Development Community 2014 Election Observation Mission ...... 354 The 2014 Commonwealth Observer Mission ...... 363 Conclusion ...... 368

11 CONCLUSION...... 372

Introduction ...... 372 Election Observation as a Game of International Relations ...... 374 Political Implications and Limitations of Election Observation in Africa ...... 382 Conclusions and Future Projects ...... 391

APPENDIX

A LINKING AGENDAS, BIASES, AND BEHAVIOR ...... 395

B LIST OF VARIABLES ...... 396

Afrobarometer ...... 396 National Elections across Democracy (NELDA) ...... 396 Data on International Election Monitoring 1980-2004 (DIEM) ...... 396

C EU ELECTION OBSERVERS CODE OF CONDUCT ...... 398

D OVERVIEW OF THE EU’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS ...... 399

E OVERVIEW OF THE AU’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS ...... 400

F OVERVIEW OF SADC’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS...... 401

G OVERVIEW OF THE COMMONWEALTH’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS ...... 402

H SEOM OBSERVER PROFILE ...... 403

I SEOM ELECTORAL OBSERVATION AND REPORTING GUIDELINES ...... 404

J MEC DISTANCE CALCULATOR ...... 408

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 409

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 435

LIST OF TABLES

Table page

2-1 Categorizing the International Organizations ...... …… 53

3-1 Selecting International Organizations and Country Cases….………………………… 66

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

2-1 Charting Determinants of Behavior…………………………………………………..32

5-1 Moving Towards Improved Election Observation Guidelines……………………….140

6-1 The European Union, African Union, and Southern African Development Community’s Political Institutions.……………………………………………...... 173

6-2 Putting Democracy on the Agenda…………………………………………………...178

7-1 The European Union, African Union, Southern African Development Community, and the Commonwealth of Nations’ Political Institutions. ……………………...... 223

8-1 Determinants of EU Mission Bias in the 2004 Election……………………………...266

8-2 Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2004 Election...…………………………....273

8-3 Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2004 Election...………………………...284

8-4 Determinants of Commonwealth Mission Bias in the 2004 Election………………...294

8-5 Summary of IO Biases in 2004..……………………………………………………...295

9-1 Determinants of EU Mission Bias in the 2009 Election……………………………...307

9-2 Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2009 Election……………………………...320

9-3 Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2009 Election…………………………..329

9-4 Determinants of Commonwealth Mission Bias in the 2009 Election………….…..…333

9-5 Summary of IO Biases in 2009…………………………………………………….....334

10-1 Determinants of EU Mission Bias in the 2014 Election……………………………...345

10-2 Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2014 Election…………………………...…353

10-3 Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2014 Election…………………………..363

10-4 Determinants of Commonowealth Mission Bias in the 2014 Election……………….368

10-5 Summary of IO Biases in 2014…………………………………………………...... 368

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU African Union

AUC African Union Commission

AU EOM African Union Election Observation Mission

CE Council of Europe

COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa

EAC East African Community

EAD United Nations Electoral Assistance Division

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Development in Africa

EU European Union

EUC European Union Commission

EU EOM European Union Election Observation Mission

GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH

GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Organization for Technical Cooperation)

IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems

IDEA International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance

MEC Malawi Electoral Commission

MNLA Mouvement national de libération de l’Azawad (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad)

OAS Organization of American States

OAU Organization of African Unity

ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

SADC Southern African Development Community

SEOM Southern African Development Community Election Observation Mission

SADC PF Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum

SEAC Southern African Development Community Electoral Advisory Committee

ECF-SADC Southern African Development Community Electoral Commissions Forum

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group

ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

MONITORING ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF REGIONAL ACTORS

Anna Kapambwe Mwaba

May 2018

Chair: Bryon Moraski Major: Political Science

This dissertation explores the dynamic nature of election observation in democratizing states. It examines the relationship between the political incentives of international organizations and the actions of their election observer missions. Specifically, it focuses on the politics that surround the election observation missions deployed by the African Union and the Southern

African Development Community and compares them to their Western counterparts, the

European Union and the Commonwealth of Nations. By comparing and contrasting the political agendas and biases of these organizations, this work establishes that all organizations have political incentives when it comes to election observation. While these biases may vary depending on the organization, whether they are independent actors or extensions of powerful states, they provide an understanding of the complexities involved in election observation and offer insights into international organization behavior. This work finds that African international organizations are taking a more prominent place in the political affairs of their member states and influencing the nature of election observation. As election observation continues to be a growing industry that increasingly includes regional actors, this dissertation examines the implications of this shifting political environment. The findings of this work emphasize the importance of paying closer attention to regional actors in election observation.

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Election monitoring continues to be a growing enterprise in developing democracies around the world. Though election monitoring was established by organizations like the United

Nations in an effort to encourage democracy in formerly authoritarian states, the last two decades have seen a rise in the number of African, Asian, and Latin American international organizations

(IOs) taking a more visible role in this activity. This rise in “non-traditional” democracy actors leads to questions regarding their intentions, as these are organizations often labeled as self- interested and biased towards their member states. Namely, these organizations do not command the same respect as the European Union, Carter Center, International Foundation of Electoral

Studies, and until more recently, the United Nations. Yet, they still engage in electoral support initiatives in their regions. Therefore, this work is interested in why they get involved, why they perceive themselves to be the most important advocates of democracy promotion in their respective regions, and how their agendas manifest themselves into realities on the ground when it comes to election monitoring.

Election monitoring has proven to be a popular form of intervention for international organizations working towards increasing the quality of elections to ensure that they meet the international standards and principles (Norris, Elkit, and Reynolds 2014, 35). However, if their agenda does not align with their legal mandates, the organizations may engage in behavior that indicates interests other than advancing the quality of elections. Therefore, it is important to understand the impetus for their actions, especially in regard to mission deployment and other crucial decisions on the ground. Given that most literature focuses on the impact of organizations rather than their intentions, this work offers a more holistic approach to the study of election

observation. Specifically, a large part of the literature is concerned with assessing the impact of election observation on fraud, electoral quality, and such. Little attention is paid to the actual considerations made by organizations as they purposefully engage in certain behaviors.

Consequently, this work explores the under-investigated role that African organizations play in election monitoring by underlining the manner in which their agendas support, or undermine, their stated goal to support elections and enhance the quality of democratic processes on the continent. I make the argument that all international organizations have agendas that impact their behavior in the political affairs of the states in which they are involved. Specifically,

I argue that their behavior during election monitoring is directly linked to their biases during a particular election given their position in the international community and their respective relationship with country under observation. It explores and compares the role that IOs have played in Malawi over the last three election cycles to show that politics, no matter how impartial an organization claims to be, has real effects on the realities on the ground during an election. For this analysis, I target two African organizations, the African Union (AU) and the

Southern African Development Community (SADC), and two Western organizations, the

European Union (EU) and the Commonwealth. While this work focuses solely on the Southern

African region, it has implications for the development of election monitoring on the continent as a whole. Considering the universality of political biases, these are patterns that one should observe in other African countries and even other regions across the globe. Therefore, this work aims to highlight how these political mindsets can influence decisions made by observer missions during the election monitoring process. Thus, it asks what are the determinants of IO behavior when it comes to election monitoring and how do their respective identities determine their actions.

The hypotheses put forth are as follows:

H1. International organization behavior is determined by its political agendas and subsequent biases.

H2. The type of IO and its level of independence from the major, influential states matters significantly.

H3. European organizations are as likely to be biased as African organizations though their biases may not be as detrimental to democratic norms as other, less established actors in election observation.

To investigate these questions, this dissertation is organized as follows. The following section outlines the relevant literature to highlight where and how my work contributes to the existing discussion. The second chapter builds on these works and introduces the dissertation’s theoretical argument. The third chapter outlines the methodology employed for this research.

Chapters 4-7 serve as profiles of these organizations and assess the various characteristics that can influence their behavior in the field of democracy promotion and election observation, more specifically. Chapters 8-10 serve as case studies of Malawi over its last three electoral cycles

(2004, 2009, 2014) and how expectations have manifested into action. These chapters place the four organizations in direct comparison to examine how their interests impact their behavior and how this leads to similarities or divergences in behavior given the political situations they face.

Chapter 11 outlines the findings from this work and how it answers the question posed at the onset. In addition, it explores how future works can further examine how politics impact election observation as these organizations continue to establish themselves as key actors in political affairs on the continent. It also provides ways in which these African organizations can advance and improve their impact on continental affairs. Last, it calls attention to the dynamic nature of election observation and emphasizes the complexity of this process. All findings are based on interviews, archival research, and secondary sources collected between May 2011 and December

2015. I employ content analysis of newspaper articles, both print and online; observer reports

and election-related communiqué issued by the international organizations; and documents published by the organizations relating to election observation. In addition, I rely upon the information provided by interviews with officials from international and domestic organizations as well as citizens involved in the electoral process. This allowed me to link mission behaviors at a given time with expressed priorities and biases and interpret their various actions.

Prior to engaging in the relevant literature, I begin by defining the term “international organization.” There are quite a number of international organizations in Africa that tend to be in constant flux, not only in terms of their existence, but in their roles as well. As such, keeping track of their identities over time can be difficult, making it necessary to clearly define how I use the term in this project.

Traditionally, international institutions are considered as a set of rules that constrain and dictate behavior in some manner (Keohane 1989; Mearsheimer 1994-1995; Ostrom 1990).

However, this work seeks to differentiate between a set of rules, which includes signed treaties, and an actual physical organization or bureaucratic actors (Martin and Simmons 2002, 329). By definition, an international governmental organization is one that includes “three or more nation states as parties to the agreement” (UIA cited in Church and McCaffrey 2013, 27). Therefore, in this work an international organization is considered as an association of actors, typically states, that have membership criteria governing whether an actor will be admitted (Martin and Simmons

2002, 329). I refer to both continental organizations, like the African Union, and smaller, regional organizations, like the Southern African Development Community, as IOs because they are composed of multiple countries and adhere to similar international agreements. Additionally,

I distinguish between African, European, and mixed organizations. African organizations are those that consist solely of African countries (e.g., African Union) while European organizations

have all European membership (e.g., European Union). Conversely, mixed organizations consist of countries from various regions (e.g., Commonwealth). As will be discussed in Chapter 7, the

Commonwealth is categorized as a Western organization due to the manner in which it was established but faces unique challenges due to its heterogeneous composition. The

Commonwealth offers interesting insights into the complicated nature of election observation.

Election Observation as a Global Norm: Monitoring the Developing World

Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations (UN) emphasized the need for

“enhancing the effectiveness of periodic and genuine elections” and the “promotion of democratization” (United Nations 2014). This commitment was a reflection of the mandate put forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on

Civil and Political Rights of 1966. Consequently, the 1990s saw the promotion of democracy as an international “growth industry” (Barkan 1997; Bland, Green, and Moore 2013), with emphasis placed on election monitoring. Leading the movement, the UN General Assembly in

1988 adopted a series of key resolutions on “Efforts of Governments to Promote or Consolidate

New or Restored Democracies” and “Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections” (Bjornlund 2004, 21). At this point, more multinational organizations became involved in the democracy promotion agenda, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CE), the Organization of American

States (OAS), the European Union (EU), and African Union (AU), amongst others (Kelley 2012:

35). In addition, countries have created their own respective international monitoring agencies, namely the United States with its Carter Center, International Foundation for Electoral Systems

(IFES), and Stockholm-based intergovernmental organization, The International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) (Bjornlund 2004; Kelley 2012; Bland,

Green, and Moore 2013).

The rise of election monitoring in Africa, Southern Africa, more specifically, is of particular interest in this project. As noted, the rise of election monitoring was closely tied to the increased importance placed on the adoption of democratic norms. With the third wave of democratization that ushered many new prospective democracies1 into the international arena, there was pressure to ensure that these states adopted the ways of western liberal democracy, which led to the international recommitment and expansion of democracy support efforts.

Indicative of this surge in international involvement in elections is that the countries subject to election monitoring have significantly increased during this time period, with 80 elections in the world monitored in 2004, up from 30 in 1999 and five in 1978 (Kelley 2012, 4). In addition, approximately 22 countries have been monitored once, 25 twice, 27 three times, and 19 four times (ibid., 132). The recipients of this “democracy aid” are disproportionately developing nations.

Consequently, these developing countries have decided to take the monitoring process upon themselves with both international and domestic organizations in Africa, Asia, and Latin

America prioritizing election observation as a crucial aspect of their democracy support efforts.

These organizations began to establish regional norms and standards for elections based on two principles: “inform the assessment of individual elections held within the region in question, and strengthen commitment to and the development of democratic institutions and standards within the region itself” (IDEA 2005, 2). Southern Africa is one region that has led the “movement towards establishing regional electoral standards and evaluations” (ibid.). The SADC

Parliamentary Forum’s (SADC-PF) detailed principles for elections in the region in 2001

1 I use the term “democracy” with caution here because of the fact that many of these new democracies can be classified as “hybrid regimes” as they may fulfill some of the minimal requirements, such as the holding of elections, but still fail to adhere to all the requirements of a full democracy (works on this include Diamond 2002, Boogards 2008, Levitsky and Way 2010, and Schedler 2006, among others).

highlighted this expansion in election observation and led to the production of similar documents by the SADC Election Commissioners’ Forum (ECF-SADC) and the Electoral Institute for

Southern Africa (EISA) in 2003. With the observation of a significant number of elections, these organizations have garnered a “considerable volume of regional expertise and experience in evaluating elections” (ibid.). The African Union has also followed suit in its efforts to establish itself as a major actor in election observation on the continent. For example, it was recently established that the African Union monitored 423 elections between 1989 and 2013 (Aniekwe and Atuobi 2016). This is in addition to the separate missions held by smaller organizations like the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community

(EAC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). However, despite this upward trend, scholars have shown mixed findings on whether the effect of election monitoring is a positive one (Geisler 1993; Carothers 1997; Pitso 2004, 2011; Kelley 2012).

The most direct benefit of election observation is that it acts as a deterrent of fraudulent behavior as election observers serve as neutral witnesses to the electoral process. Their missions are meant to assess the legitimacy and fairness of the process and reduce the chances of election- related conflict (Pitso 2004, 244). In an analysis of the 2003 Armenian elections, Hyde (2007) finds that the presence of international observers in an election where fraud is expected decreases the average vote share of the fraud–sponsoring candidate(s). In other words, where international observers are in place, incumbents are no longer able to manipulate the ballot box as easily since leaders fear the repercussions of exposure by foreign observers (Geisler 1993; Carothers 1997;

Hyde 2011). Given this dynamic, a refusal to invite external observers is perceived as a rejection of the democratic process and an indirect admission on the part of the government of their intention to engage in fraudulent behavior (Hyde 2011). Having the endorsement of an

international organization matters for a country’s status in the world, as does being considered a

“democracy.” For example, Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth when it held its highly problematic elections in 2002 and Fiji was also suspended from the organization following its failure to hold elections in 2006 (Commonwealth 2002; Kendall 2009). Similar patterns were observed with Madagascar’s suspension from the African Union and the Southern

African Development Community in 2013 (Massey and Baker 2013). Other organizations also prioritize the quality of elections though differ in enforcement mechanisms and, as such, leaders have to be careful if they seek to undermine the electoral process (Merloe 2015, 83).

In addition, election monitors are credited with improving voter registries, implementing of reforms to bolster election processes, and training of domestic observer groups (Kelley 2013).

The presence of monitors is also said to encourage participation in the polling process (Sives

2010). Finally, observer missions are recognized for limiting the power of the incumbent and thereby presenting a real opportunity for the opposition to compete (Roussias and Ruiz-Rufino

2013).

Yet, despite the perceived benefits, there are some negative aspects to the election monitoring process. Incumbents who fail to invite outside observers are not only perceived as lacking a commitment to democracy but also risk losing international legitimacy and foreign aid.

Thus, when confronted by this “pseudo-democrat’s dilemma” (Hyde 2010), leaders may have no option but to invite outside observers. One solution such leaders use to resolve this conundrum is to invite local observers that have historically proven to be more lenient—that is, those comprising “the shadow market”2 (Kelley 2012, 45). In such situations, then, election monitoring may mislead external observers by sending a superficial signal of a commitment to free and fair elections. Therefore, the presence of multiple observers may undermine the benefits of observer

2 Kelley (2012) refers to the availability of lenient observer missions as the “shadow market” (45).

missions. In other words, the presence of certain observers may actually undermine the entire process if these observers are themselves not supportive of the democratization process

(Daxecker and Schneider 2013). Even credible observers may end up limited in their actions by domestic dynamics as they risk intimidation and threats of violence where their “impartiality and professionalism may be impugned by regime mouthpieces and rumor-mongers intent on confusing world and domestic opinion while distracting credible observers from their tasks”

(Merloe 2015, 88). In these instances, election monitors may be placed in the difficult position of fulfilling their mandate and maintaining their positions in a tense environment while not upsetting the political order.

A related issue is that even independent election observers may inadvertently assist autocrats in their pursuit of staying power. Specifically, there is a tendency for these missions to issue statements before elections have been fully analyzed. This leads to attention prematurely shifting away from the problematic countries, thus providing fraudulent incumbents with another opportunity to manipulate the election (Bjornlund 2004). This limited scope risks undermining the positive impact these missions may have. For example, how valid are assessments made by missions that focus primarily on the polling process, paying little heed to electoral campaigns and the broader context (Carothers 1997; van Cranenburgh 2000; Bjornlund 2004; Simpser and

Donno 2012)?

Geisler (1993) worries that as the presence of international observers increases, monitors risk being perceived as a threat to autonomous state development. The lack of autonomous state development implies that these observers reflect certain foreign policies and serve at the will of their respective governments (Geisler 1993, 614). An example of such is during the run-up to

Zambia’s 1991 election where the incumbent, President Kenneth Kaunda, accused the

international observers of being part of an “imperialist plot” that sought to oust the leaders of his

United National Independence Party (UNIP) (ibid.). Such a possibility is troubling since, as

Kelley (2010) posits, election observers have inherent biases and are thus never completely

“neutral” because they each approach election assessments from different positions. These biases can take different forms and include the glasshouse bias, the subtlety bias, the progress bias, the special relationship bias, and the stability bias. These biases serve as the basis for the argument on agenda-setting put forth in this dissertation and will be further detailed in Chapter 2.

In agreement with the position that election observers are not entirely neutral, Laakso

(2002) posits that there is a “‘political’ character to international election observation” and that the election observation process in Zimbabwe’s 2002 election was impacted “by the political agendas both of the domestic plays and of the governments and the organizations sending the observers” which has implications for the electoral process itself (459). Prior to the polls,

Western donors pushed the government to invite foreign election observers as means of supporting “the multi-party system in Zimbabwe so that the unpopular and corrupt government could be checked or changed peacefully” (ibid. 450).

The deployment of foreign missions was considered as the only viable option for donors considering their concerns over the freedom and fairness of the upcoming election and even though organizations like the European Union (EU) and Commonwealth expressed their concerns, and were certain the elections would be problematic, observation missions were still deployed. The neighboring countries in the region took a different stance with South African president, Thabo Mbeki, dismissing the concerns of these Western organizations and stating that

Zimbabwean elections could in fact be free and fair. In response, both the South African

Development Community (SADC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent observers

to monitor the elections. This tension, created by the opposing positions towards the Mugabe regime, “seemed to be central and might have wider significance as African groups are encouraged to participate in election observation in the region” (Laakso 2002: 459). This position echoes the arguments put forth in this work.

One sentiment uniting all of these concerns is that “foreign observers are not omnipotent, ubiquitous, or infallible” and that the “electoral game is played in many different arenas” (Carey

1999, 1). Indeed, given their scarce resources and time constraints, election monitors have to target certain regions within a country and neglect others. This is the central focus of this project.

It asks what the driver for these decisions are? While these observers are not able to be in all areas at once due to many practical reasons, they also may selectively choose where to be based on their respective agendas. So, what an IO deems important is what will drive its decisions.

The advantages and disadvantages of election observation have been echoed by various parties, especially those based in the continents most subjected to international monitoring, namely, Africa, Asia, and Latin America. But, while not all political actors embrace the practice,

“[election monitoring] is now widely recognized as central to the task of holding genuine elections in the developing world” (Merloe 2015, 80). This is evidenced by the range of actors engaged in the process which include “regional and other intergovernmental organizations, associations of parliamentarians, international nongovernmental organizations, regional networks of citizen election-observation organizations, scholarly groups, delegations from political parties that have affinity with one or more of the parties that are competing, and diplomats accredited to the country holding the elections” (ibid.). In addition, it is now commonplace for foreign governments to also send their own respective observation teams to elections (ibid.).

As highlighted in the literature, in such a complex environment with many different political players, election monitoring cannot operate separately from politics. Rather, it is a consequence of these interlinked political processes, which include a multitude of actors. Thus, while scholars have examined whether labeling an election as “free and fair” affects democratic development, and the specific factors that make organizations more or less likely to deem an election acceptable, previous work has not outlined the implications of specific political agendas on the actual operation of observation missions. This dissertation, then, fills this gap.

Political Dimensions of International Election Monitoring

As established earlier, international organizations do not operate in a vacuum and the literature outlines the implications for organizations and their resulting behavior. Moving into a discussion on the role of politics in election monitoring requires a consideration of the literature on IOs and how their interests do not always align with the official rhetoric impacting their ability to undertake their tasks. Rational arguments cite that given the nature of their establishment, IOs constraints are a result of their creators and their divergent interests. These divergent interests can stem from internal factors which include resource dependency, the type of leaders, and the structure of administration leading a lack of effectiveness on the IO’s part

(Weiss 1982). Furthermore, Weaver (2008) argues that there exist intentional gaps between an

IOs talk and action giving rise to hypocrisy as demands made of them clash with the roles for which they were created (4). However, Barnett and Finnemore (1999) make the case that it is not dependence on member states that undermines IO ability to perform but rather their independence. The ability to act independently of the states that created them can result in self- destructive behavior, which they refer to as pathologies. These arguments aid in framing our understanding of IO behavior when it comes to international election observation.

As noted above, the literature on election monitoring largely focuses on the role that

Western organizations play in general. African organizations are rarely considered and, when they are, the treatment is marginal. Yet, regional organizations are playing increasing roles in the electoral assistance process in Africa and the number of such organizations has proliferated

(Cordenillo and Ellis 2012).

With this influx of observers from the non-Western world, the dynamic of election observation has been shifting. In the African case, there has been an escalation in calls for

African countries to take over the process in the region where Africa should be responsible for its own issues. Former Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, was quoted in 2013 as saying he believes “election observation in Africa has matured to a point and still continues to mature to an extent that it should be strictly and wholly an African affair” (AllAfrica 2013). As indicated by former President Obasanjo’s statement, there remains the sentiment on the part of African leaders and citizens that Africa must regain control of its own political and financial affairs. On the other hand, these organizations benefit from the technical and financial support of the

Western observers, which leads to complications. These conflicts of interest and political agendas manifest themselves on the ground and are apparent in the behavior of these organizations. These issues also arise from the fact that international organizations have their own strengths and tackle issues that arise in their member states versus those outside their boundaries in different ways.

According to Pevehouse (2002; 2005), regional organizations are very important for the domestic politics of member states and constitute the majority of international organizations in today’s international system. Regional institutions have the ability to accelerate improvements at the national level, through knowledge sharing among countries facing similar challenges (UNDP

Evaluations Office 2013, 48), and thus create a sense of accountability amongst members. In addition, these IOs provide a forum for airing complaints against member states and minimize state action that is viewed as a violation of member state sovereignty (Pevehouse 2005, 18). IO membership influences state democratization processes in several ways. First, regional institutions can pressure member states to democratize or redemocratize after reversions to authoritarian rule. Second, members can serve to reassure domestic elites that their interests will be protected in a democracy through the locking in of policies they value. Third, domestic elites can use IOs to socialize other societal groups not to intervene in the democratic process by changing their attitudes towards democracy. Lastly, conferring legitimacy on young democratic regimes helps make the consolidation of democracy more likely. However, the likelihood of consolidation is dependent on the democratic nature of the IO, that is, the total membership of democracies in IOs increases the probability of a successful democratic transition. So, regional organizations are able to assist in the consolidation of democracy “by encouraging domestic liberalization, providing protection to important elite groups, socializing key elite groups, and helping legitimize transitional regimes so they may complete the transition” (Pevehouse 2005,

15). On the other hand, they support democratic consolidation by helping nascent democracies credibly commit to certain policies, conferring international validation on new regimes, helping to deter anti-regime forces from moving against the young regime, and providing resources to assist leaders in gaining the acquiescence of key elite groups (Pevehouse 2005, 15). This argument emphasizes the importance of the rapport between member states. The relationships within these organizations, created by their interactions over the years, influence the political agendas that they set when addressing important exercises like election observation.

My dissertation engages this literature by arguing that regional election observers have mechanisms that may influence local political norms. Carothers and Youngs (2011) highlight the critical role that regional powers can play in encouraging democracy in their respective regions.

They argue that Brazil, India, South Africa, Indonesia, and Turkey “serve as powerful examples of the universal appeal of democracy and possess unique experiences with democratization”

(ibid., 1), sending positive signals to other actors in their regions. Thus, when it comes to issues of democracy promotion, regional powers, who are often the drivers of these regional organizations, are crucial partners in determining the role, impact, and nature of these missions.

Given the decrease in both economic and political aid provided by “traditional” donors (Hai-Ang

Dang et al. 2010; OECD 2012), the role of these “non-traditional” actors is significant as they continue to increase their participation in member state affairs. In addition, as the IOs adopt various election observations protocols over time, their identities shift, resulting in changing biases that may not always adhere to those outlined in the literature. For example, the AU in

2004 is significantly different from that in 2014, which, as will be discussed in later chapters, impacts the political dynamic surrounding election observation in Southern Africa.

The next chapter outlines the manner in which these organizations are expected to behave during their election observation missions given the nature and subsequent agendas of their organizations. On the surface, the expectations are that African organizations would have different aims than their Western counterparts as the nature of their relationship with countries holding the elections offers alternate avenues through which to navigate the election observation landscape. However, even within these Western organizations, agendas may not be the same, since the European Union, for example, is made up solely of European nations while the

Commonwealth consists of former British colonies, which include African countries. As a result,

the reality is more complicated than one would assume, and I examine whether these agendas and subsequent biases are key drivers in the decisions made. As it has been established, election monitoring is a political enterprise and this work examines the implications of politics on the ground.

CHAPTER 2 CHARTING ELECTION MONITOR BEHAVIOR

Introduction

The current literature outlines several circumstances in which international organizations are expected to behave in a certain manner and discusses the internal dynamics that may impact

IO performance. However, beyond establishing that their labeling of an election as “free and fair” does not have a direct effect on democratic development in a lot of “non-established” democracies and that certain factors make organizations more or less likely to deem an election acceptable, these works do not outline the actual implications of specific political agendas. The argument put forth in this project is that the role of international organizations goes beyond mere endorsements of elections. Namely, this work argues that IO election mission behaviors are expressions of their respective interests and biases during a particular electoral cycle. There are implications to these decisions for the electoral monitoring process and the redefinition of IO roles on the African continent. Subsequently, this work needs to address a number of questions.

First, how do these international organizations view their role as election observers? How do their perceptions of their role, political agendas, and subsequent biases influence the manner in which international organizations operate, and what are state responses to these international organizations? What is the political reality at the international level, and in these states, that dictates the manner in which observation missions undertake election monitoring? Answering these questions is key to examining the underlying reasons for IO behavior.

This chapter outlines the expected behavior of election monitoring missions given the political environments in which they operate. This dissertation puts forth several key actors: the international organizations (both as a separate entity and a tool for powerful nations), national governments, domestic political actors, and citizens. Their complex interactions determine the

nature of election monitoring missions, and this dissertation seeks to assess these dynamics. In doing so, it creates a fuller image of the realities that regional organizations face when undertaking these often-challenging missions, especially in countries where democracy is not always the priority of the nation under observation. The figure below illustrates the relationship between the various factors in this work and the different aspects that influence IO behavior as they deploy election missions.

Priorities, Election International National Domestic Organizations; Agendas, and Observation Organizations Governments Political Actors; Citizens Biases Mission Behavior

Figure 2-1. Establishing Determinants of Behavior

International organizations have certain interests when undertaking observation missions.

As previously noted, these interests directly impact the level and nature of involvement during an electoral cycle. An essential determinant of their interests is how they view their role during elections and as observer missions. It is important to establish whether they see their role as an organization simply meant to comment on the freedom and fairness of an election or to move beyond this and advocate for change in the domestic political system. Originally, election missions were tasked with observing an election and commenting on whether it adhered to requirements for a free and fair election. Expressly, “the core objective of election observation is to provide a trusted and independent assessment of the quality of electoral processes—thus shaping perceptions of key actors and providing a potential road map for reform for both national actors and the broader community of democracy promotion actors” (Davis-Roberts and Carroll

2014, 20). However, over the years of monitoring, this identity is shifting, with some organizations viewing their role as more than that of “passive observer.” Regional organizations,

for example, seek to ensure that their member states attain their nationally set goals (Interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). Additionally, observers can serve eight identifiable functions: confidence building (or international solidarity), deterrence (or conflict prevention),

[local] dispute resolution, observation, reporting, verification, advice, and insurance certificate

(Anglin 1998, 486-9).

Governments are also increasingly viewing the role of organizations as central to how they are perceived by the international and domestic community in adhering to established norms. As a result, election observation has also emerged as an “informal enforcement mechanism” when it comes to ensuring political rights in accordance with international human rights regimes (Tostensen 2004, 330). For example, in extraordinary situations, observer missions are able to certify or nullify results. However, these situations are often limited to areas that are holding elections following a crisis (UN Peacekeeping 2015). In rare cases, we see vocal criticism on the part of the missions and efforts to positively impact the political situation. A recent example of this was the highly disputed and violent election in Burundi on July 21, 2015, where, amid calls for dialogue and postponement of the polls, international actors denounced the process as being unfree and unfair. Consequently, the African Union and the European Union were among the organizations that chose not to deploy election monitors and heavily criticized the election after it was announced that Pierre Nkurunziza had won a third term with 70% of the vote (AU PSC 2015; Buchanan 2015; Manirabarusha 2015). In this situation, the monitors chose to distance themselves from the election and challenge it. If mere endorsements were the goal, this would not have occurred.

In addition, missions do not always have to be comprehensive. On occasion, there are missions sent to focus on one specific problem area, such as gender, or other forms of

discrimination (UN Women 2015). In certain African countries, there has even been the introduction of Women’s Situation Rooms, where the focus is placed on ensuring that women’s rights are protected during an electoral process (Godia 2015; UN Women 2015). For the directed missions, their mandates may differ from that of the larger electoral process-centered missions.

Moving from this, the political interests of organizations then shape the manner in which the actual missions are undertaken. The next section presents the expected relationships put forth in this project.1

This dissertation begins with the assumption that IO’s already exist within a political sphere, or status quo, which following the convention of formal theory I refer to as “nature.” The use of the term “nature” in this dissertation refers to the reality in which these organizations operate. This work does not make any assumptions as to how these IOs were established but instead, is interested in their daily interactions as international organizations both within the IO and among each other. Therefore, “nature” refers to the status quo, or ceteris paribus, the environment in which they exist at a given time where “aspects of the real world that could have an effect on the outcome during analysis,” like the reason(s) why they were created, are held equal (Morton 1999, 38). It is important to understand that the organizations all operate in the same political space and are exposed to similar challenges.

These IOs tend to come in two forms, that of organizations that serve as extensions of the state and those that entirely separate themselves from the intricacies of state affairs. I present these two types of IOs as ideal types to allow for comparison and investigate, where applicable, the organizations that fall in between the two. Once the type of IO is established, taking into account the international relations literature on IOs, certain agenda priorities are expected.

1 A figure depicting the relationships discussed below can be found in Appendix A.

Consequently, their behavior is determined by political biases that result from their respective agendas.2 This dissertation does not ignore the fact that international election observation is undertaken by actors other than IOs, such as regional networks of citizen election-observation organizations, scholarly groups, delegations from political parties that may have ties to the parties competing, and diplomatic missions in the country where the elections are being held

(Merloe 2015, 80). Rather, it considers these other actors as crucial in IO agenda-setting and these will be further discussed, where necessary, in the case study section.

IO agendas are established by the respective IO’s stated goals and interests. Specifically, these agendas are informed by their political and legal existence as outlined in their constitutions, charters, and treaties. It is important to note the differentiation between election assistance and observation here because this influences the priorities set by organizations, as it is not always apparent which is which, thus it can be hard to establish the impartiality of international organizations if they are very involved in election management (Tostensen 2004, 337). This confusion between the terms, election assistance and election observation, stems from the manner in which the United Nations (UN) involvement in state electoral affairs began, as international election observation missions were “sometimes blurred with the electoral assistance activities of wider [UN] peacekeeping missions” (Tuccinardi, Balme, and McCormack 2012,

57). These UN-led interventions were considered to be major electoral missions, which required a mandate from the General Assembly or Security Council and were considered exceptional activities. The missions were also part of peacekeeping missions that tackled multiple issues, including elections. These major electoral missions oversaw the organization and conduct of elections, the supervision and control of elections and the verification of the electoral process.

2 Various agendas can result in similar biases and this reality, and resulting complications, is addressed in the project.

The organization and conduct of elections are where the UN takes on the role meant for national electoral authorities, such as the electoral commission. This mission has a mandate that “requires the establishment of a system of laws, procedures, and administrative measures necessary for the holding of free and fair elections, as well as the actual administration of the electoral process”

(UNDP 2000, 8). An example of such a mission is the United Nations Transitional Authority in

Cambodia (UNTAC) that lasted from February 1992 to September 1993. This mission was

“established to ensure implementation of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political

Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on October 23, 1991. The mandate included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military agreements, civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian infrastructure” (United Nations 2003a).

The second type of mission, supervision and control of elections, is an equally rare form of electoral assistance and “has been undertaken largely in the context of decolonization. In this case, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General must certify the results of the elections and all stages of the process” (UNDP 2000, 8). An example of such a mission is Namibia in

1989. This mission, initiated by the United Nations Transition Group (UNTAG) and held from

April 1989 to March 1990, was tasked with assisting the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General in ensuring “the early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations, and to carry out a number of other duties” (United

Nations 2001).

The third, verification of electoral process, holds the host government accountable for the organization and conduct of the elections. The UN is tasked with observing and verifying the legitimacy of the electoral process and whether the national electoral authorities are in

compliance with electoral regulations. During this mission, “international observers are deployed throughout the country to follow closely all aspects of the electoral process and provide the basis for the final statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the conduct of the elections” (UNDP 2000, 8). The UN’s observer mission to El Salvador, ONUSAL which lasted from July 1991 to April 1995, serves as an example of such a case. This mission was created to ensure that all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and Frente

Farabundo Marti para la Liberación Nacional were implemented (United Nations 2003b).

In addition to these special missions, the UN also engaged in what it referred to as

“standard electoral assistance” where missions are undertaken with a smaller scale of technical assistance and do not require a specific mandate from the General Assembly or the Security

Council. Examples of these standard types of assistance are: following the electoral process and reporting to the Secretary General; coordinating and supporting international observers affiliated with other organizations; and providing technical assistance and support for national election monitors. In these special cases, small UN observer teams, usually composed of UN political affairs officers, are sent to a country to follow the final phase of an electoral process and issue an internal report to the Secretary-General on its conduct (UNDP 2000, 9). This was the case for

Yemen in 1997 when it held its parliamentary elections (NDI 1997).

Coordination and support to international observers affiliated with other organizations usually occurs when multiple governments and organizations have been invited to observe a member state’s elections. The EAD and UNDP establish a small secretariat to “help coordinate and provide logistical support to international election observers. Throughout the operation, the

UN maintains a clear public position of neutrality” (UNDP 2000, 9). An example of this is the

UN mission to the Malawi’s referendum and subsequent founding elections in 1993 and 1994,

respectively. Considering that this was Malawi’s first democratic experience, the mission’s role was to support the country during this electoral process.

Third, the provision of technical assistance “is the most frequently requested type of electoral assistance and covers a broad range of short and long-term assistance to national election authorities responsible for administering elections in their countries” (UNDP 2000, 9).

Last, the support for national election monitors provides technical assistance to non-partisan members of civil society to monitor elections (ibid.). As a result, international involvement in electoral affairs addressed multiple areas that fell under the umbrella of electoral assistance.

Following the UN example, these standard forms of electoral assistance are similar to what IOs do now in terms of support during elections. It is this conflation that renders an understanding of political incentives in the agenda-setting process even more important.

Biases are influenced by state agendas and take into account the “personalities” of the member states and the political space within which these organizations operate. These

“personalities” are dependent upon the composition and interests of the IOs. As a result, these biases can take various forms: the glasshouse bias (GB), the subtlety bias (SuB), the progress bias (PB), the special relationship bias (SRB), and the stability bias (StB) (Kelley 2012). These are discussed in turn.

First, the glasshouse bias refers to organizations that include undemocratic members that are often unwilling to criticize elections, since these states are in no position to “throw stones.”

In this case, certain states are unwilling to let elections in neighboring countries be heavily criticized, as it risks bringing attention to their own problematic regimes. An example is the case of Russia following the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Russia pushed to have the independence of the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) observer

missions limited due to their unwillingness to have their own elections criticized (Kelley 2012,

65).

Second, the subtlety bias suggests that observers are more likely to overlook subtle forms of fraud. This bias occurs when observers draw attention to overt forms of fraud during the pre- election and election period and in the legal frameworks, while ignoring subtler forms. In this situation, not much attention is paid to minor electoral transgressions. An example of such is

Zimbabwe in 2000 where the Joint International Observation Group (JIOG), focusing on polling and counting days, lauded the peaceful nature of election day, without discussing the pre- and post-election day manipulation on the part of the incumbent (Kelley 2012, 66).

Third, progress bias is when monitors refuse to criticize elections due to a fear of interrupting the democratization process. This bias stems from the organization’s mandate to support democracy, so their observer missions tend to be more lenient with first elections or with countries that are showing signs of improvement in terms of democratic progress (Kelley 2012,

71). This bias often occurs when monitoring a founding election or sensitive elections held after a civil war. For example, the case of Sierra Leone in 2002 where, despite the challenges faced during the first election held after the end of the civil war, the election was considered to have been largely successful by the international community. Specifically, “the Sierra Leone presidential and parliamentary elections of May 2002 represent[ed] a tremendous step forward for Sierra Leone” (The Carter Center 2002, 6) and “marked a first step to return to democracy in

Sierra Leone” (EUEOM 2002, 2). It was clear that the international election observers saw their role as one of encouraging the steps being made towards democracy.

Fourth, the special relationship bias refers to cases where international organizations have personal interests at stake. In the cases where organizations have strong ties to the state holding

the election, they tend to be more lenient in their verdicts. An example is the SADC and the former OAU in the 2000 Zimbabwean election, where political ties made them unwilling to issue harsh criticism (Kelly 2012, 69). In this example, the special relationship bias can be traced back to the legacy between South Africa, a key political player in the region. Former president Thabo

Mbeki’s policy approach has been attributed to his reverence of President Robert Mugabe.

Despite being president of one Africa’s most “democratic” and progressive states, at the time,

Mbeki was in support of the Zimbabwean leader. In addition to his reverence for the leader, he was also partial to Mugabe’s authoritarian tendencies. It was noted that Mbeki shared the view that the West sought to oppress mankind and the Zimbabwean appeal to revolution and independence from the West led to his lack of action. Additionally, there was a level of gratitude owed to Mugabe due to the role he played in fighting apartheid South Africa (Tupy 2008). All these factors played into the behavior and decisions made on the part of observer missions.

Last is the stability bias. This bias refers to situations where organizations take into account the effect that their pronouncement will have on the country’s stability and whether their verdict on the election will lead to violence. In the cases where they fear violence, the election observers tend to be more lenient in their verdicts (Kelley 2013, 72). An example of such a case is the political turmoil that surrounded the 2013 elections in Mali. In Mali’s case, we saw a country on the verge of division where disagreement with the outcome would risk inciting the tensions that existed following the challenging of the regime by the Islamist, predominantly

Tuareg, rebel group, National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), in the North.

Western powers, with France at the forefront, pushed for the election as the sole solution to addressing the existing tensions following the coup in 2012 despite there being concerns about

the timing and the country’s level of preparedness (Keenan 2013; Dechamps-Laporte 2013; RFI

2013). Under any other circumstance, this election would have been deemed insufficient.

Taking these various biases into account, this work highlights the importance of understanding the manner in which IO agendas overlap and how these resulting biases may influence election observer mission behavior. It emphasizes the importance of politics in international affairs especially in countries where democratic norms are not fully established. By exploring the link between incentive and outcome, this section outlines how the various attitudes held by international organizations, domestic political actors, and citizens’ influence where missions are deployed. In doing so, it emphasizes the importance of paying attention to political factors when establishing the role and limitations of election observation.

International organizations do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, there are political arenas in which they operate. These complex political arenas are created by previous elections, the country’s current democratic development, and its international position, among others. This work argues that the type of IO, whether African or Western, their respective goals, size, and such, influences the manner in which they operate in their given environment. This environment thus informs their biases. However, there is the possibility of reverse causality in that these same biases may be created due to the factors outlined above, where rather than be the causes of behavior these biases are the cause of these attributes. While reverse causality is a possibility, this work will show that it is not likely considering the aim of these organizations. As overarching bodies, their initial establishments were to address the economic, social, and political challenges facing their member states. Consequently, their charters and mandates were created to do just that. Therefore, as this project acknowledges the possibility, it is confident in

the causal directions of the relationships explored. Any changes in behavior are a result of interactions over a period of time and thus the argument put forth is not affected.

As noted above, the literature puts forth five “major” biases and the aim of this theoretical chapter is to link IO agendas to their biases and these biases to their behaviors, this includes not just major aspects like observer reports (Kelley 2012) but also other key factors like time of deployment, length of deployment, changing number of observers per mission, deployment schedule, amongst others. These factors serve as indicators of IO behavior.

In order to understand the theoretical relationships, these IOs, as stated earlier, are divided into two categories, that of organizations that are indistinct from the state, where their independence is limited and they serve as tools of the member nations, and independent organizations that are allowed the full autonomy to fulfill their established mandates. The importance of these ideal types is that they help reduce the inevitable ambiguity associated with the study of international and domestic politics. While admitting this ambiguity due to the fluidity of organizational identities, ideal types offer a means of properly understanding incentives for behavior. An example of this ambiguity is that organization agendas do not remain static over time; rather, agendas may change within the organization as it evolves over time. A close analysis of the documents issued by these organizations allows for an investigation of how behaviors and attitudes have changed over time. The African Union, which was originally founded as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 as a defender of African sovereignty in response to the struggle for independence from colonial powers across the continent, is an example of such a case. The OAU’s aims were “to promote the unity and solidarity of African States; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and

independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation” (AU 2002, np). While these may have been appropriate for the time at which it was founded, the shifting global environment called for change in priorities. As a result, the AU embodies different principles today. It now prioritizes peaceful conflict resolution; democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance; and the promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic development (African Union Charter 2001). Consequently, its actions and interests should be expected to reflect these new aims. The AU, then, illustrates not just that IO’s have agendas, which in turn determine their respective biases and influence their behavioral outcomes, but also that these agendas can change over time.

In order to identify how these biases manifest themselves during the electoral monitoring process, they are disaggregated into multiple classifications, where one can expect certain biases to be associated with particular behaviors. The first step to assessing the determinants of mission behavior, as a consequence of these various biases, is to establish the nature of the international organization. As noted above, international organizations can be separated into two major categories, tools for powerful states (Keohane 1982; Strange 1988; Krasner 2000) and independent agents (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; 2004).

The first category makes the argument that IOs cannot be viewed as separate from the nations that created them, namely from the interests of the key political and financial players

(Keohane 1982). For these state-dependent organizations, the notion of sovereignty is consistently violated by laws and treaties that tend to grant power to the more powerful states, effectively limiting the voice of the smaller nations (Krasner 2000). This school of thought echoes that of the “power-based” or realist camp. Realists make the argument that international organizations were created by, and thus operate at the will of, member states (Hansclever,

Mayer, and Rittberger 2004). Keohane (1988), in his differentiation between rationalistic and reflective, refers to this category as the rationalistic camp. Rationalistic institutions are created as a means of reducing uncertainty and altering transaction costs. As a result, these institutions persist only as long as their members deem them necessary. These institutions are not “politically neutral: they can be expected to confer advantages on those to whom their rules grant access and a share in political authority” (Keohane 1988, 387). Given their lack of political neutrality, these organizations determine their agendas based on the goals of the member states.

The second category consists of organizations that act as standalone entities empowered to make decisions. Specifically, once established, these organizations are given the license to perform as they see fit. While these organizations are formed by states, the assumption is that their Secretariats, which are run by individuals voted into the position of Chairperson, are not micro-managed by states (Barnett and Finnemore 2003). This category is what Keohane (1988) loosely refers to as reflective in that they challenge the lack of contextual understanding on the part of rationalists regarding member state interactions. Basically, these organizations adapt to the circumstances as dictated by their mandates rather than individual state preferences. This distinction between the categories of IOs is important in establishing the priorities of international organizations when formulating agendas and their behavior following any political agreements made.3

When these international organizations are placed into these two categories, member state tools and independent bodies, it emphasizes their respective interests by indicating what biases

3 A more recent paper by Randall Stone (2008) challenges both positions. According to him, these positions are inherently contradictory and he thus suggests another way of approaching IO behavior determinants, which he refers to as informal governance. With this theory “international organizations operated according to two parallel sets of rules: formal rules, which embody consensual procedures, and informal rules, which allow exceptional access for powerful countries” which he tests using the IMF as a case study (590). This argument does not negatively impact my work. Rather, it further highlights the ambiguous nature of these IOs.

may result from their positioning vis-à-vis their member states.4 Thus, states that are more inclined to protecting their own interests are more likely to micromanage the affairs of the organization, which places it in the category of organizations not completely disentangled from its member countries. On the other hand, there are organizations that make the concerted effort to distance their Commissions from the Executive thus protecting their independence. These are organizations that adhere to the norms and practices in line with their given mandate.

Conceptualizing IOs in this manner is useful because it draws attention to the fact that IOs have varying levels of agency and are very much influenced by factors outside their legal, formal structures. Each organization seeks to establish itself in a certain manner and achieve specific goals which impacts how they align themselves and the issues that they choose to pursue.

Granting IOs this agency allows one to establish the determinants of their behavior even beyond election observation. The following section outlines the expected relations between ideal IO types, agenda, bias, and mission outcome.

IO as Embodiments of the State

Starting with the organizations that strongly align themselves with the countries that formed them, this section outlines several theoretical expectations. Each specific agenda item encourages particular biases when approaching election monitoring, which in turn results in certain outcomes. Generally, I expect these organizations to prioritize two key agendas: 1) self- preservation by ensuring the survival of the current regime in the country being monitored, and

2) the protection of national economic interests.

4 While there are concerns whenever one employs any form of categorization because it risks undermining the more elusive elements when understanding mission behavior, this framework is useful because provides a starting point from which to investigate IO behavior. Specifically, it captures the “personality” and how it exists in the political environment (nature).

Preservation of the incumbent government highlights the importance of existing political relationships. The dynamic among member states leads to the prioritization of the survival of the current regime following an election. This is especially important if the incumbent government in the monitored nation has established its place in the organization and expressed its want to stay in power as long as possible. As a result, the expectation is that the monitoring organizations are more likely to be subject to the glasshouse, special relationship, or subtlety biases. These three biases take into account the existing relationships at the national level that influence the nature of election monitoring missions. Ultimately, the aim is the protection of the regime in the country under observation so there is the banding together mentality and a desire to protect the members of the “club.” They would not want to point fingers at the others because in doing so they may risk it being done to them when their turn comes around. Moreover, the member states are more likely to uphold the interests of the more influential nations. If the nation plays a key role in the organization, it is in the organization’s best interest to protect it.

Additionally, these organizations are likely to endorse elections more often in a continued effort to protect future political interests and the stability in the country being monitored. Due to the existing political dynamics, such IOs prioritize the status quo. As a result, they are more likely to endorse the polls regardless of the nature of the election. These organizations will then shift their attention to issues that cannot be overlooked and ignore the smaller issues of fraud that occur. Shifting this attention allows for the incumbent government to attribute any faults in the electoral process to the difficulty of establishing democratic institutions in these emerging nations and results in the subtlety bias. Often such issues arise prior to the election, such as challenges during the registration period or the insufficient allocation of election material to polling stations, which can be attributed to a lack of capacity on the part of the electoral

commission, and not always a reflection of the government. Supporting the election of a fellow member state ensures that the existing political relationships are maintained. Political support from the international community is particularly important in these countries, and in endorsing an election the international organization is ensuring its place on the international arena as a strong partner at both the regional and international level.

For organizations that are more politically tied to member states, we see the larger, more financially capable nations sending their own bilateral missions rather than placing priority on the intergovernmental mission. For example, countries like Brazil, India, and South Africa are increasingly reliant on bilateral election monitoring as a means of democracy promotion in their respective regions (Cooper and Farooq 2014). These missions are more likely if the country has an embassy or form of diplomatic representation in the country being monitored because there is an established coordinator on the ground. While sending bilateral missions may appear counter- intuitive, as it directs both human and financial resources away from the international organizations, it ensures that the countries are able to focus attention on their interests. The ability to focus their attention on their own interests is possible because their missions are not bound by the mandate set by the international organization. This point is important because an organization like SADC depends on its respective member countries to donate to the election monitoring process. For example, during the 2014 election in Mozambique there was need for helicopters to shuttle observers from one part of the country to the other. The only country able to afford such a contribution was South Africa (Interview with SADC official, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015). However, if their agenda is to protect the incumbent government, there is no incentive for them to share these helicopters or they may use these as means to their

own end. In such a situation, the stronger nations are actively undermining the regional body and exerting their influence.

These more influential states also tend to control the finances of the IOs, as they often contribute the most to operating cost. The level of funding available is crucial to determining an organization’s ability to carry out its operations. In the case of election observation, without adequate resources, these missions are unable to carry out the necessary training workshops, stay for a significant period of time, or send more monitors, if necessary. With a larger observation team, the organization is able to ensure a wider reach. As a result of having an economic stake in these nations, they are in a better position to potentially dictate the nature of these missions.

One potential indicator of IO bias is where they send their observer missions within a country as this serves as a direct reflection of the areas that they prioritize. Thus, organizations that prioritize the protection of the regime undergoing monitoring are expected to send missions, for example, to electoral districts in areas that are more supportive of their involvement in their countries. The reason for this is that, regardless of the verdict, these districts are less likely to challenge the monitoring missions. In many cases, these may be the same areas that are supportive of the winning party because support of the election advances their interests. As a result, the likelihood of a negative reaction on the part of the population in this region is decreased. At the same time, the organizations are preserving the image of a commitment to democratic norms while the actual motivation is the preservation of political interests.

Second, for an organization that prioritizes the economic agenda of member states, or probably that of the more influential state(s), the likely biases are those of special relationship and stability. These biases would imply that the missions are most often sent to key economic areas, for example, if there is a region where an organization, or the state being observed, has

significant investments like dams, mines, or other crucial development programs. Certain electoral districts are not economic drivers and thus tensions do not tend to be as high as in surrounding districts. Therefore, because they may not be priorities of the monitored nation, they may not be for the organization deploying the mission. Kelley (2012) refers to this as strategic monitoring. For this reason, one would expect that the higher the level of involvement of the international organization in terms of supporting local programs and the existence of political and financial agreements, the more likely they are to be selective in mission deployment.

Economic concerns also include perceptions held by international donors. When examining economic incentives, it is necessary to establish the financial priorities of the member state, whether they are more focused on their regional relations or those with the donor community. For organizations with economic interests, the priority is to maintain an image of a stable state, and region, to ensure continuous external support. In Africa, where donor support accounts for approximately 20-40% of government budgets, this is a reality that must be taken into consideration (Lawson et al. 2005, 2). Additionally, they may not prioritize election observation in an effort to address other more “critical” issues. When this occurs, the attention attributed to crucial aspects of monitoring, like ensuring evenly distributed deployment or allocating sufficient funds to cover operating costs, are set aside for ensuring that they maintain a positive reputation in the eyes of the donor community.

Overall, for the organizations that serve as extensions of the state, the economic and political status quo must not be altered. The organizations exist, often de facto, to protect their member states and preserve the “club” that exists outside the demands of multiparty democracy.

IOs as Independent Actors

The second category of IOs includes the organizations that fulfill their mandate to serve as independent actors and separate entities from the states that created them. Organizations that

“act with their own authority” are able to “formulate and implement policies based on their norms, rules and expert knowledge” and thus “act above the level of intergovernmental cooperation” (Andrew 2007, 3). These organizations have different priorities than those IOs that serve as reflections of their states. Rather than prioritize economic and political relationships with member states, these organizations focus on 1) the promotion of a democratic agenda, and

2) establishing themselves as effective, neutral actors, which enhances the credibility of both the institution and the member nation’s regime. As a result, these organizations are more likely to be subject to stability, progress, or subtlety biases. Notably, there are overlaps in the biases of the

IOs that serve as embodiments of states and those that exist independently lending support to the argument that understanding the drivers of these biases is crucial to explaining IO behavior.

First, when the goal is to promote a democratic agenda the IOs are more likely to be subject to progress or subtlety biases. In seeking to fulfill their mandate for democracy promotion, these IOs give precedence to enhancing democracy in the region by ensuring that there are adequate programs being held prior to and after elections are held. Here we see an emphasis on sensitizing the population as to what their role as monitors is.

In addition, these organizations aspire to act as neutral actors and do not want to be seen as entangled in the messiness of state politics. As a result, they seek to limit their exposure to bias. However, intentional or not, all actors have a certain level of bias. For example, while they are more critical of issues during the electoral process, IOs may still endorse elections that have minor issues or fraud. These endorsements are highly dependent on their level of independence from member states, which may vary even in the most “independent” of organizations. Hence, the degree of independence from the political interest of member states is important. The observer missions must be able to maintain their political distance to ensure that they are as

effective as possible and avoid introducing bias. So, the more independent an organization, the less biased it would be in approaching the electoral process. In this case, their missions will be driven by the desire to ensure a free process rather than protecting their political interests. Thus, higher levels of independence decrease the chances of any of the biases occurring, as the link between IO agenda and the observer mission is weaker.

In this situation, the IOs make a concerted effort to be critical of an election in order to not jeopardize their status as a credible actor. However, there remains the risk that they purposely disregard instances where fraud is minimal and do not appear to undermine the voters’ ability to select who they wish to represent them. Calling attention to clear violations of the electoral process, and ignoring the subtler forms, still demonstrates the IOs unwillingness to tolerate blatant instances of fraud. So, unlike state-dictated IOs, these organizations will still be more likely to be critical of areas where there have been instances of fraud to avoid sparking negative reactions on the part of the opposition. The pronouncement of elections as acceptable has been shown to spark reactions by citizens in areas where they felt the international organizations were endorsing a fraudulent poll. Consequently, noting irregularities is in their best interest if they want to temper the reactions of the local population. This willingness to be forthright in their report highlights their commitment to assuring that all parties involved in the electoral process have been freely represented. Cases where there have been clear violations and no reaction from the international community has sparked violent reactions from the opposition

(Daxecker 2012, 515), as seen in the cases of Zimbabwe in 2008, Nigeria in 2011, and Lesotho in 2015. In addition, they are more likely to monitor areas with histories of unrest. They are aware that their presence lowers the chances of fraud and/or violence. Progress and subtlety biases imply a legacy of democracy promotion and development that the IO seeks to preserve

and fall in line with the IO prioritization of democracy and the demonstration of effectiveness.

Specifically, progress bias is a result of the IO seeking to establish itself as an organization able to carry out its mandate to support elections and the democratic process in member nations. In a similar vein, by only addressing minor electoral fraud, they further the image that the electoral process has improved in monitored states.

Second, if demonstrating effectiveness and the ability to fulfill goals is a crucial agenda item then these organizations will likely have progress or subtlety biases. These biases imply a legacy of democracy promotion, support the rule of law, and current political development that the IO seeks to preserve and improve. Progress bias is a result of the IO seeking to establish itself as an organization able to carry out its mandate to support elections and the democratic process in member nations. An inability to do so suggests that the organization has not adhered to the goals that it set for itself, namely to move the country to a “more democratic” state.

Considering the background of these organizations, this dissertation puts forth the following expectations for investigation:

Table 2-1. Categorizing the International Organizations IOs as Embodiments of the State IOs as Independent Actors 1. Prioritize political relationships 1. Aspire to be neutral actors 2. Refuse to implicate other members for 2. Tend to be more critical than IOs as embodiments of the fear of repercussion state 3. Tend to endorse elections more often 3. Make concerted efforts to adhere to a legacy of democracy due to the ties because member states promotion, support the rule of law, and political development 4. Larger states send bilateral missions

5. Finances are dictated by the more influential, economically powerful states 6. Send missions to areas are agreeable to their presence

Conclusion

This chapter introduced the two types of organizations that are of interest to this dissertation: IOs as embodiments of the state and IOs as independent actors. The first category

refers to organizations that operate at the will of influential member states, and the second is organizations that seek to uphold their mandates without the interference of state politics. These ideal types allow for a better understanding of each category and from there one is able to investigate the ambiguities that inevitably exist when dealing with international and domestic politics. For example, the last section outlined the behavioral expectations of the organizations that seek to remain independent. In these cases, the organization seeks to distance itself from the perception that organizations serve as protectors of members in the “club” and make the point that they are committed to their democratic mandate and fulfilling the function that their organization was created for. On the other hand, there are the IOs that stay bound by the politics of member states. Both types of organizations emphasize the important role that IOs play in international relations and regional politics. Chapters 4-7 discuss the IOs under investigation and how they fit within these ideal types. The following chapter articulates how the research for this project was undertaken and how the evidence collected will be used to investigate the relationships proposed above.

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION OF INTERVENING VARIABLES

Introduction

The previous chapter argued that international organizations can be placed into two categories: that of dependent IOs, serving as embodiments of member states, and independent

IOs, those that distance themselves from state pressures. While it emphasized the value of conceptualizing the IOs as ideal types, the chapter also noted the importance of recognizing that in reality the organizations are located on a continuum in between the two. Building on the arguments presented, this chapter outlines the methods used in this project and the variables that are used to understand the relationship between IO political agendas, and biases, and the nature of election monitoring missions.

This work is interested in empirical manifestations of IO bias. Accordingly, the analysis will focus on a core aspect of observation missions and one that is universal across the IOs under investigation—mission deployment. Mission deployment refers to the areas to which monitors are deployed during a particular election cycle. While monitors tend to be sent to areas based on a formula - ease of access, distance from major cities, reliable accommodation, etc. (Interview with MEC official, Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015) - there are other less concrete factors that play into their decisions. While observation missions are deployed under the banner of democracy promotion, the decisions are directly tied to the funding for political activities. At the same time, the allocation of these funds is highly dependent on what the organization prioritizes.

As a result, these decisions made by IOs are determinant on factors at the organizational level.

To evaluate the expectations outlined in Chapter 2, this work uses a multi-method research design. I employ archival research, elite interviews, and reviews of secondary literature.

In addition to the data collected on mission deployments, I rely on several datasets that provide

useful information regarding political environment, citizen perceptions, electoral quality, and election observation missions: the Afrobarometer, the Elections and Democracy in Africa 1989-

2003 dataset, the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset, and the

Data on International Election Monitoring 1980-2004 (DIEM). I use these datasets mainly to establish existing political trends and in the selection of my country case.1

This project also employs elite interviews to assess the perception of these organizations by those who work for, and with them, namely, heads of missions, former mission participants, domestic electoral management bodies, political parties, and the voting population. Election monitoring in Africa still remains a game for the elite, and as a result, missions tend to be made up of former presidents, ministers, and members of other electoral commissions; thus, it is important to get the perspective of those who play by, and at times set, the rules of election observation.

The elites interviewed are privy to information that citizens are not, which allows them to make decisions that significantly impact the process. They are also the main continental political players so their actions and behavior serve as a reflection of the political realities surrounding a given election. The voting population, though not as privy to the details surrounding the monitoring process, are the ones who experience these elections and are able to voice their opinions on election monitoring and whether they find it to be a contribution to the electoral process. It is for this reason that Afrobarometer data are useful, because they provide attitudinal data as a supplement to voter (citizen) interviews. The specifics of the interviewees are included in the section on data collection. In using these data, I engage in content analysis, interpretive methodology, and use of descriptive statistics. The reason for this is that the nature of election observation is complex and requires in-depth analysis of the different factors at hand. Using

1 A fuller description on why these particular datasets can be found later in this chapter.

these diverse pieces of evidence allows for the investigation of the different aspects of the processes undertaken by the organizations.

The case selection process was two-step, with the selection of the organizations of interest, followed by the country in which the processes were to be tested. The unit of analysis in this project is the African and Western international organizations that have election monitoring arms. Specifically, I have chosen to focus on international organizations that have monitored elections at national and regional levels.

Case Selection

International Organization Case Selection

This project examines four organizations involved in election monitoring in Southern

Africa, two African and two Western; the African Union (AU), the Southern African

Development Community (SADC), the European Union (EU), and the Commonwealth of

Nations (Commonwealth). Considering the vast universe of international organizations that operate in Africa,2 it would be impractical to assess the political determinants of all their involvement in electoral affairs. One main reason for this impracticality is that not all IOs are large enough or have the mandate to engage in political affairs. Therefore, further investigation into their political behavior would yield results that would not be of interest to this project.

2 The international organizations that operate, some at both a global level and within Africa, and others solely in Africa, are the Commonwealth of Nations (or Commonwealth Secretariat); the African Union (AU); African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Monetary and Economic Community of Central Africa (CEMAC); Southern African Development Community (SADC); the Southern African Customs Union (SACU); the East African Community (EAC); the Indian Ocean Commission; African Development Bank Group (AfDB); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); European Union (EU); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations; International Development Association (IDA); International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); International Joint Commission, International Court of Justice (ICJ); International Monetary Fund (IMF); the League of Arab States; United Nations (UN); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA); World Bank (WB); World Food Programme (WFP); World Health Organization (WHO); and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Coalition for the International Criminal Court 2016, United States Institute of Peace 2016). However, do note that while this list is not exhaustive it highlights the level of international involvement in Africa and the importance of narrowing them down by mandate to avoid theoretical confusion.

By definition, an international governmental organization is one that includes “three or more nation states as parties to the agreement” (UIA cited in Church and McCaffrey 2013, 27).

The larger the organization, the more financial resources available for democracy-related activities, because with more member states they have access to more countries and their financial resources, and ideally more supporters of the election monitoring process and other democracy promotion efforts. For this reason, a subset of organizations was selected for their representation of member state and regions, and for their history of involvement on the continent.

These organizations will be discussed in turn in the subsequent chapters and were chosen because each possesses the following characteristics: existence of an operational secretariat; a history of election monitoring in the region; observation of multiple elections over a significant period of time; explicit mandate to uphold democratic values in member states; establishment of election monitoring unit; active involvement in regional affairs; and awareness of member state political issues. These criteria are theoretically grounded in the preceding chapter while narrowing the number of organizations down to those that exist not only in the legal sense but also in practice.

First, and most importantly, these international organizations must have a secretariat and not exist as a mere association of countries. A secretariat enables the organization to “carry on continuous, administrative research and information functions” (Bennett 1977, 3). Further, the secretariat must be operational and fully mandated by the organization to carry out its duties as described. Having a functioning core renders it easier to examine and assess the organization as an actor (Zacklin 2010). The proliferation of international organizations in the last twenty years is noticeable; however, not all these organizations have a mandate for democracy promotion or a headquarters where decisions are made. The lack of mandate or headquarters is problematic

because it can lead to a lack of accountability on the part of the organization and, for the purposes of this project, it leaves nothing to assess.

Second, the organization must have a history of election monitoring in Africa. A familiarity with the electoral processes in the region allows for an understanding of the political nuances that exist and provides a more discerning eye when monitoring elections. This knowledge of domestic and regional affairs results in organizations which are aware of the peculiarities of elections in non-consolidated democracies. An awareness of these peculiarities gives the organization a better place from which to observe and make decisions. For example, an election can be viewed as fraudulent because the turnout was particularly low; however, if one is familiar with the politics of the country, they would know whether low turnout was an issue for the last election as well. The opposite could be the case as well. A longer history in election monitoring also provides the organization with a presence, so the country knows who they are and respects, or possibly challenges, its position, which provides missions with a political rapport that can influence behavior during the election.

Third, these organizations must have monitored multiple elections, because with the more elections observed over a period of time the organization has the opportunity for higher levels of professionalization due to increased familiarity with the practice of international monitoring.

Additionally, a longer period of time enhances this professionalization due to the experience of multiple countries over a time to allow for exposure to the progression of the democratic consolidation process in these countries. Without this experience, it is harder to objectively assess a mission, which makes it more difficult to discern whether IO behavior is based on the

IO’s agenda or lack of familiarity with the monitoring process.

Fourth, given that this dissertation is ultimately interested in the determinants of democratic development in Southern Africa, it is important that these organizations must all be explicitly mandated to uphold democratic norms and encourage their development in their member countries. This mandate to uphold democratic values must be clearly stated in their respective constitutive acts or charters. An explicit statement is central because there are many organizations that exist to support the economic development of countries and do not pay as much attention to the type of government that exists. As a result, these organizations prioritize regime type, and at times issue sanctions when democratic norms are violated. An example is the

EU and its insistence that all member states adhere to the rules of democracy, a firm requirement when applying for membership with the organization. Often financial incentives are given to ensure that states adopt these policies (Kelley 2009). Another example is that of SADC’s suspension of Madagascar, following the AU’s earlier decision to do so, in response to the unconstitutional change of power in 2009. However, unlike the AU, SADC took it one step further by threatening the imposition of sanctions against the country. Though these sanctions were never imposed, the threat sent a message that the de facto coup by Andry Rajoelina, in an effort to oust the sitting President Marc Ravalomanana, was not to be tolerated by member states.

SADC then took the lead in initiating mediation talks between both parties (Massey and Baker

2013). Financial organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank

(WB), though advocates of “good governance,” are not considered as part of this classification.

Their exclusion is due to their prioritization of the economic rather than political dimensions of governance (Santiso 2001). Therefore, since all the organizations have a democratic mandate, it is easier to observe at what point, and by how much, they deviate from their mandates and the guidelines set by international commitments on how election monitoring should be undertaken.

Fifth, these IOs, in line with their mandates, must have election monitoring arms. With units dedicated to democracy promotion and support, there is a centralization of staff and information on election monitoring efforts in the region. The election monitoring arm also serves as a physical representation of the organization’s engagement in this activity. With a dedicated unit, one is better able to track IO and mission behavior when it comes to elections and election monitoring. Election monitoring arms were introduced in order to establish election observation as a priority for organizations dedicated to the support of democracy in the region. As a result, the reasons for the establishment, the various challenges they face, and their actions can be compared to one another. It would be unfair to compare an organization that does not have a budget for election observation to one like the EU, which has been involved in monitoring for decades. Thus, while the organizations under investigation do have varying endowments, each has the basic infrastructure necessary for election observation in place. How well these structures operate, and what they do once on the ground, is what is being investigated in this project.

Last, these organizations must be actively involved in regional affairs. If organizations are active, such activity supposes their awareness of the issues at hand. In essence, these organizations are involved in, and aware of, regional, specifically political, affairs. This does not mean that the organizations are partial to any member countries, but rather that they operate in a manner in which they are aware of what is happening within the countries, and are able to address issues as they arise.

International organizations are the focus of this dissertation, and as bodies that operate beyond state borders they have the capacity for significant impact. This section has operationalized the term “international organization” for the purposes of this dissertation, identifying the main factors guiding the IOs’ selection. However, the effects of the IOs’

decisions are felt by the member states, and these effects need to be explored. To examine the effect of international organizations, the following section introduces a country case: one that has been exposed to election observation by the four organizations listed above and can serve as a way to observe their behavioral patterns on the ground.

Country Case Selection

In order to examine how international organizations make decisions regarding mission deployment and how the political relationships play out in reality, this project investigates IO behavior in a single country over time. Assessing these dynamics aids in establishing the existing relationships and in determining whether the evidence supports the hypothesis put forth.

Therefore, the inclusion of a country case brings the work from the abstract to the concrete. To reach these goals, the analysis must examine a country that meets the following minimum criteria: 1) the country must have held at least two or more multiparty elections; 2) these elections must have been monitored by at least two of the major regional and western organizations; 3) the country should fulfill the definition of a competitive authoritarian regime; and 4) it has to have undergone multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer survey.

First, the country must have held two or more multiparty elections. According to

Lindberg (2006), the more elections held by a country the further consolidated the democratic process as repeated elections increase the likelihood that a democratic regime will survive. From this perspective, the more a country has experience with the electoral process, the more familiar it will be with what it means to uphold democratic norms while conducting elections. Applying this criterion also means that the country under investigation is not burdened by the organizational challenges and IO behavior will not be influenced by the biases commonly associated with founding elections. At the start of multiparty elections in Africa, 30 of the 54 founding elections were considered to be “free and fair” only to be followed by elections that

were declining in quality (Bratton 1998, 53). This decline in electoral quality suggests a bias in the evaluation of the first election. Additionally, international observers tend to be more lenient in their assessments due to these founding elections being a country’s first democratic experience

(Kelley 2012). Because of the history of multiple elections, the period of observation is longer and the monitors are able to critically assess an election rather than attribute every error to the country’s unfamiliarity with the electoral process.

Second, these elections must have been observed by two, or more, of the organizations mentioned in the previous section (i.e., the African Union, the Southern African Development

Community, the European Union, and the Commonwealth Secretariat). These organizations are more established in the field of election observation and allow for a fuller investigation of the process. Monitoring by credible organizations ensures that the electoral process was observed by professional election monitoring bodies rather than untrained organizations with limited capacities. For example, with the increasing number of international observers during elections a

“crowding” effect occurs, and while having multiple missions present during an election may lead to further coordination and the relieving of possible deadlock, it also runs the risk of inter- organizational politics. With so many missions, there may be instances of competition for resources and political leverage, which can lead to these actors undermining the entire process

(Kelley 2009, 61-62). However, these multiple missions allow for variation in reports and behaviors necessary for comparison. This variation allows for observation of IO behavioral patterns and the chance to determine whether their respective agendas and biases influence their decisions.

Third, the country must fulfill the criterion of a competitive authoritarian regime. In such a regime, countries hold regular elections. While the regimes meet minimal democratic

requirements, they are not considered to be full democracies. In fact, “competition is real but not fair” (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). In these countries, we often observe incumbent governments skewing the electoral playing field in their favor while still adhering, at least superficially, to the demands of electoral democracy. Specifically, these regimes are differentiated from democracy in that “incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy, namely (1) free elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, and (3) a reasonably level playing field” (ibid., 7). As a result, we can expect variation in quality of elections, level of international involvement, and declarations made on the part of observer missions over the years rather than elections always being considered free and fair. Levitsky and Way (2010) provide a list of 14 countries that fell, or still fall, into the category of competitive authoritarianism: Benin,

Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal,

Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (237). Of these countries, Benin, Ghana, and Mali underwent transitions to democracy (ibid.).3

An additional, though not necessary criterion is that the country must have undergone at least three rounds of Afrobarometer surveys. These surveys provide valuable data on attitudes towards democracy and political, and economic, developments by region. Recent cycles specifically ask questions concerning the perception of involvement by international actors, namely, regional ones and the incorporation of these data lend to a richer understanding of dynamics surrounding IO involvement and participation in the electoral process. Therefore, countries that have been surveyed offer further avenues for investigation.

3 For a more complete discussion on competitive authoritarianism and determinants of transition, please see Levitsky and Way 2010.

Following careful consideration of these criteria and the universe of countries available,4 the country that best fit the requirements was Malawi. First, Malawi held its fifth multiparty elections on May 20, 2014. Second, in addition to having had all its elections monitored, Malawi currently has a Polity Score of 6, which was the case for its 2004 and 2009 elections (Center for

Systemic Peace 2016). It has also been consistently ranked by Freedom House as “partly free” since 1999 (Freedom House 2017). Third, Malawi held a referendum in 1993, which allowed for its first multiparty elections in 1994 and led to a relatively open political environment, with parties rallying against the incumbent parties and space for political debate (Hyde and Marinov

2010). However, internal party crises and opposition challenges led to “frequent turnover and relatively contingent regime outcomes,” conditions that resulted in democratization in Benin and

Mali but not Malawi (Levitsky and Way 2010, 276). These challenges continue and support

Malawi’s characterization as a competitive authoritarian regime.

In addition, Malawi is one of the 12 African countries5 that have been subject to the

Afrobarometer survey in all five rounds, providing attitudinal information that is crucial for this project given that it is investigating attitudes and behaviors that happened prior to fieldwork. The attitudes of citizens and their perceptions of the involvement of international organizations are central because they help establish the nature of national politics at the time of observation. As noted earlier, the political environment is not limited to international organizations, and a better understanding of the various complicating factors is crucial to this project.

4 The universe of possible cases is as follows (dates of the recently held or planned elections in parentheses): Malawi (2014), Mozambique (2014), Burkina Faso (2015), Burundi (2015), Comoros (2016), Côte d’Ivoire (2015), Nigeria (2015), Tanzania/Zanzibar (2015), and Togo (2015) (EISA 2013). 5 The Afrobarometer has now surveyed a total of 34 countries (Round 5 – 2015). This number is up from 20 in Round 4 (2008), 18 in Round 3 (2005), 16 in Round 2 (2004), and 12 in Round 1 (1991-2001). In terms of data collection, I will be using only countries that currently fit the description because many of them have been included in at least one or two rounds.

Table 3-1. Selecting International Organizations and Country Case International Organizations Country Case 1. Have a Secretariat and not exist as a mere association of 1. Has held two or more multiparty countries elections 2. History of election monitoring in Africa 2. Elections have been observed by two or more of the IOs under investigation

3. Have monitored multiple elections 3. Competitive authoritarian regime

4. Explicitly mandated to uphold democratic norms and encourage their development in their member countries

5. Have election monitoring arms

6. Level of engagement in regional affairs

The following section briefly outlines the datasets used in this project. These datasets proved valuable in establishing the nature of politics at various time periods.

A Note on the Datasets Used

As previously noted, this project relies upon a variety of datasets to supplement the information collected during fieldwork. These datasets were particularly useful in establishing regional political trends and during the case selection process. This section briefly discusses the merits of these respective datasets for this project.6 These datasets do not all include all the years with which this work is concerned and, where this is the case, they have been expanded for the purposes of this project. While this dissertation is highly qualitative, these datasets provide information that offer insights into certain patterns of behavior during electoral processes that are useful in making my argument.

The Afrobarometer provides survey data for the past twenty years on attitudes towards democracy and citizen perceptions of African and Western organizations in multiple African

6 The variables of interest taken from these datasets, along with those collected during fieldwork for the purposes of this dissertation, are listed at the end of this chapter and in the Appendix B.

countries. In addition, the data are divided by region and district, which allows for the linking of survey data to observer mission deployment patterns and behavior (Afrobarometer 2015). In using the data, I am able to highlight the links between international organization behavior and attitudes and those of the surveyed citizens and how these influence the decisions made during the election monitoring process.

The Elections and Democracy in Africa 1989-2007 dataset provides data on all elections held in Africa until 2007 (Lindberg 2009). This dataset tracks the developments in civil liberties and shows the nature of democratic trends in Africa. It is useful in that it provides data on the dynamics between the incumbent and opposition, which aids in establishing the political environment that election monitoring missions have been, and are, exposed to.

The NELDA dataset further contributes to this project because it provides data on the

“competiveness” of elections and the various factors that make an election “competitive”

(Marinov and Hyde 2010). In addition, it establishes whether or not Western observer missions were present at a given election and provides insight into the type of relationships that exist between the country and these international actors during each election cycle.

Last, and of most relevance to this research, is the DIEM dataset that “codes the assessment and activities of international election monitoring organizations to national level legislative and presidential elections in 108 countries from 1980 to 2004” (Kelley 2015). This dataset provides information on observer missions ranging from mission size, long or short term, and length of stay in country, which is central to the questions posed in this dissertation.

Expanding this work to 2016 further highlights how election monitoring has evolved over the years.7

7 This dataset currently only has four data points for Malawi: Commonwealth Secretariat (1999, 2004); Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (2004); and European Union (2004).

While these are all national level datasets, they provide important information in gauging the political atmosphere of past elections and are useful in establishing regional election monitoring trends. In addition, they serve as complements to the findings made during fieldwork.

As mentioned above, this project uses and extends, where necessary, existing datasets.

The variables taken from these datasets and their contribution to this work are listed below. A codebook outlining each variable will be included in the Appendix.

The first set of variables are taken from the Afrobarometer Survey dataset: area

(district/county/province/region); identity; support for democracy; rating of previous system; rating of current system; extent of democracy, satisfaction with democracy; vote does not matter vs. vote matters; honest elections (need to control for distance from the past election); perception of previous elections; trust in the president; trust in the electoral commission, MEC preparedness; and how helpful the citizens perceive the African Union, Southern African

Development Community, United Nations, European Union, and international non-governmental organizations to be. These data are central to establishing citizen attitudes during the electoral process. Assessing the patterns between one’s region, identity, attitudes towards democracy and international organizations allows for the comparison between Malawi and other countries in the region covered by the Afrobarometer. The rationale behind the selection of these variables can be found below.

First, the area (district/county/province/region) is the part of country from which the citizens come and it is an important variable because it gives information into whether or not the constituency with which they identify themselves influences attitudes and perceptions towards election monitors. For example, if a mission from an organization that is partial to the member

country is sent to an area that is against the ruling party, they might fear hostility and limit their interactions.

The identity variable is useful in establishing political allegiances. In the case of Malawi, demographic data were collected to supplement this information as “identity” in this case is referring to their ethnic group affiliations. In a country like Malawi, where ethnic group relations dominate politics, this piece of information matters.

Support for democracy is included because the people can be influenced by their perception of the state of democracy in their country and let that impact how they view international organizations. For example, if support for democracy is low then support for anything associated with the organizations will be as well, especially when it comes to actors they view as “foreign” to their system. Relatedly, satisfaction with democracy is important for the organizations that are keen on proving their value in protecting democratic values. Missions are sent to areas that have little faith in the democratic process to show that their respective organizations would like to change the perception of democracy. However, the organizations that do not care how the citizens perceive democracy can continue to undermine this process in the areas of containing unsatisfied citizens because democracy does not matter to them.

Next, the “vote does/doesn’t matter” variable is of interest because one can safely assume that if the vote does not matter to the voter, neither does the overall electoral process. If monitors are not viewed as supportive or helpful to ensuring that the vote matters then their role is questioned throughout the entire process. If they do not carry any political capital to voters then why would they expand their resources to areas where there is no interest in the process? In addition, limited funds dictate that observer missions and will go to places where the vote is valued and will be attended.

Further, “honest elections” matter to all involved in the process, and if elections are not viewed as honest this challenges the democratic process and all future efforts as a result. It also directly impacts another variable, “perception of previous (and future) elections” (2004, 2009,

2014), which is included because the perception of previous elections is important to monitoring missions. Specifically, an organization can base its decision on whether to attend or how well the previous elections went, and on perceptions of upcoming elections in cases where the survey was undertaken soon before the elections were held. If the previous pronouncement on the quality of the election is at odds with that of the people’s sentiment it can be very telling of the political environment in which the organizations are operating. For example, perceptions of previous and future elections can provide insight into whether the people support IOs or view them as “rubber stampers.” Therefore, if the IO endorsed the previous elections, then they are more likely to continue monitoring areas where elections are viewed as free and fair rather than districts where the overwhelming majority does not agree.

“Trust in government” is crucial when analyzing the political determinants of election mission behavior. International organizations are invited by the government to monitor its elections so there is the risk that they can be viewed as being at the mercy of the states, and therefore, trust in the government matters. The inability to trust the state in the electoral process can translate to a lack of trust in the organizations that have been deployed to certify the process.

If areas are partial to the ruling party then an organization interested in maintaining the status quo is more likely to monitor these areas and call the election fair because these will be the first areas to be called into question. Consequently, party strongholds matter during elections.

“Trust in the EC” is also related to the distance that IOs put between themselves and the government. Thus, the neutrality of the MEC matters because they are the ones in charge of the

electoral process as they decide who gets accredited; they also control information, and exist not only to assist the IOs when they come but to serve as liaisons for parties, government, etc., and as a link between the people, the organizations, and the government. If the MEC is viewed badly so are the IOs who risk being viewed as simply providing a “yes vote” for all decisions made by the MEC. Therefore, trust in the MEC is directly related to trust in the government and international organizations when it comes to election observation. “Perception of the MEC” also factors into these considerations.

In addition, “MEC preparedness” also matters because IOs are unable to monitor areas where a system has not been installed; hence if the MEC is unable to properly set up polling booths or distribute ballots accordingly, then people get frustrated and tensions are high because they all fear the worst in terms of electoral quality. Organizations that operate independently will view unpreparedness as problematic while those that seek to protect their members will consider this as a “growing pain” for a young democracy. MEC preparedness also matters for how much trust the citizens have in the process because they have to be assured that the ones in charge of holding the elections do so in a manner that ensures that their votes are protected.

The last variables are “help received from the AU/SADC,” “help received from the

UN/EU,” and that received from donors. I must note that for international organizations the term

“help” can be rather ambiguous but due to the lack of data on attitudes and perceptions of IO involvement this variable will serve as a proxy for such.

The second and third sets of variables are focused on the actual elections, their quality, and whether they were monitored, and the general political environment surrounding them. Each of these variables contributes to the overall image created of the electoral process and the actors.

The second set of variables are taken from the National Elections across Democracy and

Autocracy (NELDA) dataset: date of the elections; whether regular elections were suspended before the election in question; were these the first multiparty elections; whether opposition was allowed; were there significant concerns as to the freedom and fairness of the election; were international monitors present and, if so, were monitors present?8 Were some monitors denied the opportunity to be present by the government holding elections? Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed that it would be fraudulent? And, is the country said to have a substantial, economic, military, or political relationship with a Western country or

Western IGO and if so, which one? These variables provide information on the missions present and the nature of the election. With this information, one has a better idea of what the electoral process was like. The NELDA dataset is useful for this project because it outlines the details of each individual election as it pertains to the nature of the proceedings, especially the circumstances leading up to the election and the type of international involvement.

The third set of variables is taken from the Data on International Election Monitoring

1980-2004 (DIEM): pre-election, post-election, and final documents (and paged numbers for each document) coded; number of persons in the observer delegation; number of days that the delegation is in the country; joint observation mission; monitoring organization code; total number of observers present on election day; domestic observers; number of domestic observers; number of pre-election assessment visits; number of press statements issued before the election; training of domestic monitors; legal advice provided regarding election administration; voter education; observed campaign rallies; logistical support; and observation of voting and counting.

These variables provide information on election monitoring for each election and further details on their findings and assessments. These variables are helpful because they provide insight into

8 Considering the subject of this dissertation, I added variables that specifically ask if African organizations were present and the names of the African and Western organizations present.

the nature of election observation, from both the international and domestic perspective. In addition, this dataset accounts for the nature of the involvement of both international and domestic observers.

In addition to the variables taken from these three datasets, I have included the time of mission deployment, number of electoral districts visited, and the number of polling centers visited (where this information is available) along with the variables of interest outlined at the start of this section. The time of deployment was included because it matters at which point in the electoral cycle the missions were deployed. This is important when coupled with the length of deployment because a mission that was deployed early and stayed longer has a different perspective than a mission deployed later in the cycle for a similar, if not shorter, period. The number of electoral districts and polling centers visited highlights the organizations’ reach and presence during the elections. These variables contribute to an understanding of the political dynamics during a given election and the specifics of each election observation mission. As noted earlier, these variables are used to link IO mission behavior to the various factors they faced in a particular period. The following section outlines how the evidence for this work was collected.

Data Collection Process

Data for this project were mainly collected in two ways: through the use of national and institutional archives and interviews with political elite, with supplemental data provided by secondary literature. As discussed in the above section, a number of variables were collected from a variety of existing datasets.

Information on the AU and SADC was collected at their respective headquarters, in

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Gaborone, Botswana, with country-specific data collection done in

Malawi. Relying upon this archival and interview data, my project seeks to disaggregate the

impetus behind the election monitoring process. Empirical data collected include mission deployment patterns; the development and professionalization of election monitoring missions and democracy support departments; interaction with other organizations and in what capacity; changing domestic attitudes; political environment with each election; strengths and challenges of mission deployment and electoral support; establishing how independent an IO is; level of fragmentation or cohesion at the organizational level; financing mechanisms for missions; priority allocated to election observation; perception by local actors and other smaller international bodies involved in monitoring the electoral process; information on the organization regarding its establishment, commitment to democratic norms, dialogue being had on political issues surrounding electoral periods; and the region’s political history.

The information on mission deployment patterns is to be compared with organization mandates and political environment in order to determine why the missions have been deployed to the areas that they have. As this dissertation is focused on what drives organizations and how their political leanings influence decisions made at a given time, the crux of this project is to outline if there is in fact a relationship between politics, deployment, and the manner in which reports are issued.

In a similar vein, the development and professionalization of election monitoring missions and democracy support departments determine the efficiency level at which the organization operates. Professionalization establishes expertise, which results in organizations behaving according to a mandate rather than being directed by the whims of whoever is in charge at a given time. A more professional organization in place allows for the proper development of election monitoring guidelines and for institutional memory to take hold to reduce dependence on the same officials with every election cycle.

Dialogue surrounding electoral periods is important because, even though there are multiple actors involved in monitoring and supporting elections, very few are actually qualified to do so, which leads to the risk of having subpar monitors at a given election. Thus, it is important to know what is being said by each organization and what their position and experience is at a given election (Kelley 2009). Knowing this information is especially crucial if these actors seek to work together to create a support network: “given the limited number of international electoral experts available, broader network collaboration needs to be established among organizations providing electoral assistance to exchange information on qualified electoral experts” (UNDP 2000, 3). Any interaction among the various international actors can have an impact on the nature of the election observation process.

The political environment with each election presents the opportunity to work through the dynamics at both the international and domestic level. Elections are a politically tense period, especially in countries where the democratic process is not fully consolidated. In these countries, uncertainty as to whether the electoral process will be fair is commonplace. As a result, international organizations pay attention to these issues and assess what their role is to be in the oncoming election making the political environment a potential indicator of IO behavior.

Information collected on the strengths and challenges of mission deployment and electoral support establishes the position of each respective IO in terms of its election monitoring efforts. It helps investigate the issues that the IO has faced in the past and the challenges that continue to impact the process. Support for the electoral process in member states provides insight into how the member states view international election monitoring efforts and whether the missions are getting the political support they require to be effective.

As stated earlier, as ideal types, international organizations fall into two categories: independent and dependent on their member states. However, in reality, their level of independence is not so clear, and it is important to know how their degree of dependence impacts their actions when it comes to making decisions regarding political affairs and issues relating to international monitoring.

An organization’s cohesion level is crucial to assessing its behavior because when an organization fails to work together, competition at the organizational level can lead to the prioritization of certain projects over others and lengthy debates over issues that do not result in viable solutions. This reality is especially pervasive in organizations with constituent member countries that are at odds with one another. For example, performance levels can be lower in election observation missions when there are power struggles among countries, particularly when the regional power takes positions that diverge from others in the group. When this occurs, the efforts at establishing programs directed at political development can suffer, thus placing the entire process at risk.

Financing mechanisms for missions is one of the most important factors for the support of international observation at the organizational level. Without adequate resources, a mission is at a disadvantage from the start. While election monitoring missions over the years have shown that resources are always scarce, there is a minimum level at which a mission must operate if it hopes to succeed. For example, one cannot allocate the same amount of funds for a country like

Botswana, with a population of 2.262 million and a population density of 3 people per sq. km, to

Malawi that boasts a population of 17.2 million with a population density of 183 (World Bank

2016). Consequently, it is essential that organizations appropriate the necessary funds. Since

fund allocation is often political, the nature and debates surrounding how missions are financed can provide insight into whether missions are prioritized.

The issue of prioritization leads into the next point on how much importance international organizations place on election observation. Considering the multitude of issues IOs face at any given time, there may be other factors that influence how much attention is given to a particular election during a given year. There may also be factors within that same country, such as peacekeeping, food shortages, or financial concerns, which shift the focus from election observation to supporting the nation during a time of crisis.

Another piece of information collected to be examined is the perception of the international organization by local actors and other smaller international bodies involved in monitoring the electoral process. These actors interact with and assess the role of international observers, and whether their presence benefits the democratization process in the country. Thus, the opinions of these organizations influence the process of election observation.

In the same vein, it is important to understand how an organization was established and its mandate, which indicates its commitment to democratic norms and outlines what its values are as an international body. This mandate is what informs its actions and helps make sense of how it views its role in the region. In addition, an organization’s composition plays a role in terms of who is monitoring whom. Particularly, does a certain organization only monitor its own members, or does it explicitly monitor countries outside its membership? The political relationships among these organizations matter and the impetus behind whom they choose to monitor, and why, is important.

Understanding the politics of the region and Malawi’s history is essential because it establishes the political environment with which this dissertation is concerned. This history helps

situate Malawi relative to other countries in the region and it frames the narrative surrounding elections and election observation. For example, what are Malawi’s interactions with its neighboring countries? Where does the country stand when it comes to tackling regional affairs?

Does it have a voice in the organization when it comes to elections? These are the types of questions that a clear understanding of regional politics can address, which is crucial to assessing the political dynamics surrounding election monitoring in Southern Africa.

Conclusion

The next four chapters focus on the international organizations of interest to this dissertation. Using the data collected, Chapters 4-7 investigate the African and Western organizations in an effort to create full profiles of their involvement in election monitoring and how changing political incentives have dictated their development in the Southern African region with implications on how we understand the effects of the political game in other parts of the continent. These profiles offer insight into the organizations and, along with the data collected, highlight the various moving parts in election observation. Showing how these organizations have evolved over the years and how this is reflected in citizen perceptions, election mission leadership and size, and on-going political situations, among a number of other factors, emphasizes the complexities that IOs have to address when involved in member state affairs.

Following these chapters, this project investigates how their differences in agenda and priorities impacted their behavior in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 Malawi elections.

CHAPTER 4 THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Introduction

This chapter takes a closer look at the European Union (EU), while Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

Chapter 7 investigates the Commonwealth of Nations (the Commonwealth). By organizing the chapters in this manner, this work places the institutions in direct comparison. The EU, in the literature, is considered as the standard for election observation, and their financial means place them at an advantage in comparison to their counterparts.

The following sections document the political development of the EU and how its prioritization of certain agenda items impacts its efforts within the European Union and with other international partners. In this situation, how the EU manages its relationship with African nations is especially crucial given the fact that, unlike the other three organizations examined in this dissertation, the EU does not contain any African member countries. Given this composition, one would expect it to have an agenda that differs from that of its counterparts, namely, that it is distanced from the issues that may bias an organization where member states are in closer proximity and share more political ties. Consequently, using its interests as a baseline allows for examination of how African organizations and mixed organizations tackle election observation in ways that diverge from this “norm.” Positioning the EU in this manner allows for discussion of the political implications of moving away from the EU’s established norms and protocols.

The European Economic Community to the European Union

The European Union was first established as an economic community. In 1951, France,

Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg signed a treaty establishing the

European Coal and Steel Community followed by the formation of the European Economic

Community (ECC) in 1957. While the European Coal and Steel Community was formed to facilitate peace between France and Germany, the ECC was formed to allow for the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people among European nations. Like most international organizations today, it was created with the aim of stabilizing the financial situation of its member states. Consequently, it sought to rebuild Europe and regain both economic and political stability.

Moving through the years, 1965 saw the decision to merge three European institutions:

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC), and the

European Atlantic Energy Community (EURATOM) without affecting their powers (Dehousse and Magnette 2012, 25). This was the first step towards creating a more integrated Europe. This step was then followed by further expansion of and substantive changes to the Union. In 1970, the European Council was endowed with its own financing structure along with additional funding granted to the European Parliament. Most importantly, the Paris Summit of 1972 led to the decision to ‘“relaunch’ the integration process by developing policies more in tune with citizens’ expectations… the decision served to justify the development of a serious of policies that went beyond economic integration” (Dehousse and Magnette 2012, 25-6).

Another considerable development in the EEC’s evolution to becoming the EU was the

1993 Maastricht treaty, which led to the formation of the European Central Bank. At this point, given the continuing economic expansion, there were calls for the creation of a political union

(Dehousse and Magnette 2012, 27). The establishment of a political union would result in the redefinition of the EU and its place in international affairs after 1993. This call was followed by the adoption of the treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000). The EU’s transition was an indicator of the EU’s approach to its internal politics, slow and measured. This calculated

approach was indicated by the time it took for member countries to accept the idea of the EU being a more political organization. Its transition required the assurance that it would be given the political space to do so: the Maastricht Treaty opened up this space by extending the Union’s scope to “two new political ‘pillars’ for foreign policy and internal security: areas that had until then been the jealously guarded prerogative of member states, under national parliamentary control” (Micossi 2008, 1). Particularly, it was difficult navigating the pressures of the larger nations like Germany and France. Both of these countries had stronger economies and more developed political structures which smaller countries were expected to emulate. The relationships between countries continued to shift as the organization continued to expand in both membership size and scope.

By 2004, the organization had increased to twenty-five member states, which despite being signatories to the EU agreement were still not comfortable with the notion of ceding their authority to a supranational organization. It is a dynamic that continues to change over time

(Dinan 2005, 2). This is also a dynamic that we observe between disproportionately endowed states in other international organizations. However, with more countries scheduled to join the organization, the apprehension on the part of certain countries requires attention as the “original”

EU countries continued to be the main economic and political powerhouses in Europe.

Therefore, the newer countries have to work towards attaining the standards set by these nations, which creates an inadvertent hierarchy within the organization. But, despite these reservations, the Constitutional Treaty, signed in October 2004, indicated a “desire to enhance the legitimacy and efficacy of the EU” especially considering the fact that ten new members were due to join

(Dinan 2005, 4). Due to this recommitment to a united institution, signaled by the signing of the

Treaty, the apprehension felt in earlier years was not as palpable. This rapprochement indicated a

step towards a more unified organization in its treatment of both domestic and international issues but these internal struggles can impact how an organization operates in the political arena.

Signed by all European countries, the Union’s charter committed to several objectives.1

Taking this full list into consideration, this dissertation is especially concerned with the EU’s position towards countries outside its regional sphere. These are countries that have been recipients of the EU’s commitment to encouraging certain values at an international level, namely in the form of economic and technical assistance. Given its relationship with actors outside the European region, the EU has expressly stated the nature of its relationship with international organizations, third countries, and union delegations (EU 2004, 155). It is one where the EU is to be represented by missions working in various countries and expected to maintain “appropriate” relations with other international organizations (ibid.). The EU places a lot of emphasis on managing the way in which it is perceived by the countries that it works with.

The importance of managing expectations and perceptions provides insight into the drivers of

EU behavior, namely, how the country under observation will understand their involvement.

This reality may influence how EU missions act when monitoring an election in African countries, leading back to the differences between an organization that monitors the elections of

1 The full list of objectives is 1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples; 2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, and an internal market where competition is free and undistorted; 3. The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social, and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced; 4. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter; 5. The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Constitution (EU 2004, 17-18).

member states and one that does not. While the relationship with foreign actors is determined by the Union’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, the President of the European Council can “ensure the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” (EU 2004,

26). It is this relationship and how it has developed over the years that is of interest to this project. How does the EU realize these functions? Each EU institution is tasked with undertaking different activities central to the operation of the European Union as a whole. The following section outlines the EU’s organizational structure. The EU has built in checks and balances where one institution, even if it tasked with a particular issue, is bound to the others.

These procedures allow it to operate in a relatively systematic manner and limit the opportunities for bias to be introduced.

The EU and its Institutions

The European Union is divided into several institutions. These institutions are the

European Council, the Council of the European Union (also referred to as “the Council”),2 the

European Commission, the European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the

Court of Auditors, and the European Central Bank (EU 2016). Each institution is advised by the

Economic and Social Committees (ESC), which serve to protect the economic and social interests of civil society. These committees include employers, workers, farmers, and liberal professions. Consequently, the ESC is called on to consult for the European Commission, the

European Parliament, and the Council of the European Union on issues ranging from social

2 The European Council is not to be confused with the Council of the European Union. While the former consists of the heads of state or government of all EU countries, the European Commission President, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy the latter is the key EU decision maker. Its role is to negotiate and adopt legislative action in consultation with the European Parliament (EU 2017a).

matters, public health, and the environment. While each of these institutions plays a crucial role in the activities of the organization, I focus only on those that directly impact the organization’s political influences and election monitoring as a result. Specifically, these are the European

Council, Council of the European Union, European Commission, and the European Parliament.

The European Council is an assembly of the heads of government, and though it does not establish legislation, it is in charge of establishing the EU’s “political direction and priorities”

(European Council 2016, np). The European Council sets the EU’s political agenda by highlighting key areas of concern and suggesting solutions to addressing these challenges, which are directly determined by the prevailing economic and political environment. The political direction of the organization is of utmost importance when trying to establish how an organization’s priorities impact subsequent behavior. Led by heads of government, this institution holds significant political leverage. Despite not writing legislation, it is implied and expected that policies will adhere closely to the agenda set by the European Council. Therefore, the agendas set by the heads of government bear significantly on EU outcomes.

Conversely, the Council of the European Union (referred to legally as the Council) is the main legislative institution of the EU and serves as the principal decision-maker. While the

Council shares a similar name to the EU Council, their roles differ quite considerably. In conjunction with the European Parliament, the Council creates laws with the propositions submitted by the European Commission and manages the budget. The Lisbon Treaty specifies that the Council of the EU “shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political direction and priorities thereof” (Schoutheete

2012, 45). The Council exercises no legislative functions. Rather, its role is to ensure that the EU maintains its focus on “strategic guidelines, decision-making, foreign-policy, open methods of

communication, and treaty amendment” (Schoutheete 2012, 56). Accordingly, the European

Council can be considered as a crucial component of EU’s political position.

The Council presidency rotates among the 28 members every six months, with each starting their respective terms on January 1st and July 1st. In order to further ensure that all countries had a role in the organization, it was established in 2007 that the Council would be subject to a three-part presidency. In this situation, three members are to succeed each other as president and conform to a common program and objectives. While this is an interesting manner of encouraging continuity and accountability, there is no way to ensure that all three countries share a “common” goal. The concern here is that if priorities shift between leadership then what does this mean for democracy efforts within the organization (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np)?

Considering that multiple elections occur every year, this means that leadership during this time is also shifting. Consequently, elections to be observed at different times within the same year are subject to different leadership. Whether this affects political dynamics would be of interest.

Do policies advocated for by one president challenge that of another? What issues take priority at a given time? In addition, members of the Council meet on a need-be basis to negotiate and adopt community legislation. In addition, the Council is assisted by a committee of permanent representatives (COREPER) that is also in charge of preparing meeting agendas. The role of the

Council is important because it sets the legal tone of the organization though the European

Commission is tasked with executing these policies.

Specifically, the European Commission is responsible for the practical tasks of the Union.

The constitution mandates that the Commission set the EU’s legislative agenda and has complete autonomy when it comes to the initiation and drafting of policies. In certain cases, the Council or the Parliament can request the drafting of an initiative and have it denied by the Commission

(Art 211) (Hooghe and Kassim 2012, 178). The Commission is also mandated to serve the

European interest and be independent from any national government. Its role can be categorized as policy initiator, legislative facilitator, executive roles, legal guardian, mediator and broker, and external representative and negotiator (Hooghe and Kassim 2012, 179). The Commission is in charge of dealing with affairs at the community level and plays an important role in tackling

European politics. In addition, the Commission serves as the EU’s administrative center that works on submitting European law proposals to the Council of the EU and the European

Parliament to vote. Prior to the submission of these legislative texts, the Commission undertakes interviews with member state governments, industry and union representatives, and other experts to gauge their positions on various initiatives. In doing so, the EU attempts to ensure the inclusivity of its members. This channel of communication is of interest because the organization then serves as a reflection of the population’s sentiment, making the EU highly susceptible to the pressures of the international arena (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np). The importance for this project is that it must enact policies that reflect the EU’s interests. For example, if the organization and its citizens want to scale back their involvement at the global level to focus on internal affairs, the Commission has to respond to take this into serious consideration.

Furthermore, the Commission is tasked with other central roles as “guardian of the treaties” it ensures that the Community legislation is properly implemented; it is in charge of implementing the Union’s common budget; and it represents the Union’s interest on a global scale (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np). With its wide reach, the Commission has significant influence on the manner in which the EU operates. So, if the Council is the face of the EU then the Commission is the vehicle by which its activities are undertaken.

EU Commissioners are granted five-year terms with each placed in charge of areas such as education, transportation, health, and energy. The president of the Commission is in charge of determining the head of each commission at the start of their term. Nevertheless, decisions are still made by majority during weekly meetings held at the headquarters in Brussels. If held during the European Parliament plenary session, the meetings then take place in Strasbourg, the official seat of Parliament. Most importantly, these commissioners are independent of their member states and represent the general interest of the European Union. However, they remain answerable to the European Parliament, which has the power to censure the Commission and demand that commissioners leave their positions. Even the European Council, though headed by heads of government, has a clear role: to be the political face of the EU and provide direction

(Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np). This intricate checks and balances system within the EU is unlike that in the other organizations under investigation in this dissertation. Even the European

Council, though headed by heads of government, has a clear role: to be the political face of the

EU and provide direction (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np).

Last is the European Parliament. The European Parliament offers a platform for EU citizens to directly participate in European political affairs. The president of the Parliament is appointed for a two and half year period. Each member state appoints its deputies for a five-year period for a total of 751 directly-elected members from the 28 member states. However, the number of deputies does not always reflect the population size, which leaves certain deputies representing smaller constituencies than others. Interestingly, the deputies are not grouped together by their national affiliations but rather by seven political groups: Group of the European

People's Party (EPP); Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the

European Parliament (S&D); Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

(ALD); Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA); European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left

(GEU/NGL); and Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group (EFD). The differentiation by political affiliation may lead to fluctuations in the direction of the Parliament decisions due to the fact that the parties might have various positions on these issues, with some parties possibly prioritizing certain political agendas over others. These members are in charge of debating legislature prior to it becoming law (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np). Consequently, it provides a crucial link between the European citizens and the European Union.

Since its inception in 1957, the role of the European Parliament has grown considerably.

The Parliament shares the budgetary power with the Council of the European Union and has the right to modify, to an extent, the manner in which money is spent. In addition, the Parliament is able to reject the entire budget for “important reasons” (Strasbourg l’européene 2016, np). As such, it plays a central role in determining what activities the EU is actually able to undertake.

For this dissertation, the importance of the European Parliament lies in its active engagement in election observation activities with the aim of strengthening the legitimacy of national electoral processes and increasing the public confidence in the protection of elections and human rights. Indicative of the consistency of EU mission deployment, 2016-2017 saw the delegations sent to observe elections in the Ukraine, Egypt, Tunisia, Moldova, Tajikistan,

Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Kyrgyzstan, Haiti, Tanzania, Burma/Myanmar, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Peru,

Mongolia, Zambia, and Gabon. Of these seventeen countries, eight are in Africa. In sending these missions, the Parliament requires that elections be held at the national level, that the EU or

European Parliament has been expressly invited by national authorities, and that a long-term mission is present. These missions do not tend to be stand-alone ones; rather they are integrated

into the EU election monitoring missions or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE). The Parliament is consulted on the identification and planning of the EU missions and on the period following. Thus, though the Parliament is not involved in planning the political activities of the Union, it is invested in the election observation process (Lerch

2016). Again, we observe a partnership to tackle the election observation more efficiently. This ability to work together in this area highlights the importance placed on election observation in the EU’s democracy promotion efforts. Further, their partnership signals that they consider this area to be of political significance beyond the European sphere of influence.

The EU as Promoter of Democracy

Over the last several decades, following the move to include former communist nations, the EU has become a pivotal actor in the promotion of democracy and human rights. The new member states were beneficiaries of the push towards democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. The inclusion of countries like the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and the Baltic republics of

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania led to the support for increased EU funding for human’s rights and democracy work (Lloyd 2010, 548). But, while the European Union was formed to tackle

European issues, it remained aware of the global place it held and developed the external action department that seeks to encourage economic, social, and political development in other parts of the world. Therefore, in keeping with this ideology, the organization has over the years been increasingly involved in democratization efforts in the developing world. It is this global involvement that has set the EU as “standard” for election observation.

While the EU’s process has set this standard for election assistance and observation in the region, the organization continues to find means of further instilling the commitment to encouraging democratic norms across the world, with Africa being one of its key partners. For example, in 2009 the EU Council adopted the “Democracy Support in EU External Relations”

and EU Agenda for Action which called for a country-specific approach to democracy that promoted greater coherence and the participation of all stakeholders. Consequently, democracy and human rights were incorporated into all policy areas. Additionally, the EU Commission’s

Agenda for Change in 2011 emphasized the need to support human rights, democracy, and good governance as a part of the EU’s development policy. In response to the Arab Uprisings in 2011, for example, the EU updated its current European Neighborhood Policy to introduce conditions for support, namely the provision of economic support in return for a commitment to encouraging democratic transitions or “deep democracy” promotion. These incentives, which include “deeper economic integration, greater financial assistance, enhanced mobility of people, and access to the EU’s internal market, were proposed to countries open to adopting political reforms” (Lerch 2016, np).

In addition, the EU reiterated its commitment to democracy by adopting the Strategic

Framework and Action Plan of Human Rights and Democracy in 2012. This plan called for more systematic follow-ups on election observation mission reports as a measure of offering broader support to democracy efforts. The allocation of funding to these initiatives, especially that of election observation, further demonstrated the EU’s commitment to these efforts. The European

Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) “finances projects, programmes and EU

EOMs, and awards grants to civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and human rights defenders” while the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) “provides financial assistance for the promotion of the rule of law, political dialogue and reforms, democratisation, media pluralism and election observation” (Lerch 2016, np). Other potential financiers for these democracy development efforts include the Neighborhood Civil Society

Facility, the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), and the EU’s Instrument contributing

to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Additionally, the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) was established in 2012. Though it operates as a private law foundation, its role is to “support political and civil society actors striving for democratic change in the EU’s eastern and southern neighbourhoods by providing tailored financial assistance in a quick, flexible and non- bureaucratic way” thus offering a financial alternative outside the traditional EU networks.

However, it does maintain ties to the EU as its governing board and executive committees include EU member states and institutions and are chaired by members of the European

Parliament (Lerch 2016, np). These institutions are open to their various “neighbors.” Here we observe the continued efforts by the EU to further consolidate its financial and political relationships with countries working towards establishing their democracies.

Focusing on their relationship with Africa, the EU is driven by two main frameworks: the

Cotonou Agreement and the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (Tristl and Bachman 2015, 83). The

Cotonou Agreement has undergone two revisions since it was first signed in 2000, in 2005, and in 2015. The latest revision serves as the “multiannual financial framework” for 2014-2020 and represents an acknowledgement of the changing economic and political environments, in addition the climate crises that are impacting the development of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (European Union 2014).3 The document was established to encourage cooperation among the partner countries and promote their shared values. The “central objective of the ACP-

EU cooperation is poverty reduction and ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and progressive integration of the ACP countries into the world economy” (European Union 2014,

37). Consequently, the EU places itself as a vital partner in Africa’s development. Traditionally, democracy features prominently as the driver of sustainable economic development: “respect for

3 These countries are formally referred to throughout the document as the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP).

human rights democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpins the ACP-EU

Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement” (European Union 2014, 23). So, using the democracy mantle provides an avenue to encourage economic development but also influences the political identity of these countries. Like the AU, political relations with SADC are also conducted within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (EEAS 2016b).

Along similar lines, but with a more political focus, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy emphasizes the shared history of the two continents and the need to build upon past agreements such as the Africa-EU Strategy of 2005 in light of the changing global environment: “there is now a need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint

Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas” (AU/EU 2007, 1).This document calls for a shift away from the “traditional relationship” to one that places the two continents as equal partners in the development process. This is important because it establishes the changing relationship between the actors from Africa as a dependent to a partner. However, this ideal is not yet a reality because the EU remains far more financially viable in comparison to the AU.

Still, despite the economic disparity, the rhetoric is key for changing perspectives and for dictating how the EU comports itself during its election observation missions, as these serve as a physical manifestation of their involvement in the political affairs of these countries. Once again, the organization notes the ownership of African countries in this process: “EU support to Africa has been and continues to be guided by the principle of African ownership” and that of existing

EU documents (AU/EU 2007, 5).

Similar to the Cotonou Agreement, the Joint Africa-EU Strategy emphasizes that “the promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central feature of the Africa-

EU dialogue and partnership” (AU/EU 2007, 7-8). In turn, this encourages the implementation of

African initiatives, like the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Charter on

Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ibid.).4 Regarding elections, the AU and EU made the commitment to prioritizing the electoral process in African countries and ensuring that they adhere to international and regional standards through election assistance and observation. As such, the EU seeks to “reinforce the role of the AU, the regional organizations and of civil society in election observation” (AU/EU 2007, 9).

As will be highlighted in the following chapters on the AU and SADC, the relationship between the organizations has had an impact on the manner in which their missions operate and attitudes that certain leaders have towards election observation. With its heavy presence, the EU has supported the efforts of these organizations but there are still disparities in mission management and how the organizations view their role in a given election. There also remain challenges as to how the EU is perceived considering its role as both donor and election monitor.

The 4th EU-Africa Summit, held in Brussels, led to the adoption of the Roadmap 2014-

2017 which focuses on five priority areas: peace and security; democracy, good governance, and human rights; human development; sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration; and global and emerging issues (European Commission 2016a, np).

Previous action plans, for 2008-2010 and 2011-2013, focused on eight areas—peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; regional economic integration, trade, and infrastructure; Millennium Development Goals; climate change; energy; migration, mobility, and

4 The African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance is discussed in the chapter on the African Union, as this document is central to its democracy promotion agenda.

employment; and science, information society space (ibid.). By limiting the priority areas for cooperation, the EU signaled its prioritization of governance as a crucial component of development highlighting this increased EU presence and interest in the political dynamics of their partner countries. With this interest comes an increase in budgetary allocations to support the growing number of programs being implemented and the deployment of long-term election observer missions. The higher level of investment highlights the importance placed on democracy promotion beyond European borders. These modifications in priority areas contribute to changes in the EU’s election monitoring process as the organization moves its missions in line with its agenda at a given time. These temporal shifts will be explored in later chapters.

However, this increase in funding to democracy and development efforts in the world means that the EU is involved in a significant number of activities. These are the same countries in which it is monitoring elections. From this standpoint, there is a serious risk of a conflict of interest due to the significant investments in their political processes. Consequently, this conflict of interest dictates how it manages its missions and deployment patterns. The EU has significant interests and investments in Africa, especially given their proximity to each other: “Africa has built continental institutions and established ambitious policies and initiatives in many key areas that are of direct interest to the EU” (European Commission 2016b, np). This strategic interest may influence its missions and how they operate once on the ground.

However, while the EU does require that member states meet the democratic requirements in order to attain and retain membership, it does not undertake election monitoring in these states like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) does. This is an area of democracy promotion that is limited to outside actors. The fact that the EU does not monitor its own member states, yet insists on undertaking this activity in other countries is a

notable factor. While one can assume that they do not want to double the efforts of the OSCE, when one considers that elections in the developing world are subject to multiple actors, this position proves insufficient. The EU has an obvious interest in establishing itself beyond its own borders, but why? What does an increased EU presence in the world mean for Europe? One can only assume that the organization and its members have strategic interests for their involvement as evidenced by their considerable efforts to establish themselves as a “strategic development partner” for many countries.

In an effort to solidify its place on the international stage, the EU established the External

Action Service (EEAS), which was created by the Treaty of Lisbon signed in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. However, the Council’s decision to establish the EEAS was made in 2010 but formally launched on January 1, 2011. The EEAS was established as an autonomous EU body under the authority of the High Representative/Vice-President (HRVP). The role of the HRVP is that as outlined in the EU charter (Article 18) (The Council of the European Union 2010,

201/30). There are a number of expectations that come with the role of HRVP: they are expected to oversee foreign and security policy on behalf of the EU; coordinate the EU’s foreign policy tools (development, trade, neighborhood policy, humanitarian aid, and crisis response); build consensus between the 28 EU member states and their respective priorities; attend regular meetings between the European Council leaders; speak at debates at the European Parliament on foreign policy and security; represent the EU at international meetings; and head the European

Defense Agency and EU Institute for Security Studies (EU 2016b, np). The HRVP holds a central role in EU foreign policy and determines the manner in which the organization interacts with the rest of the world.

The EEAS serves as the EU’s diplomatic service and represents the EU and its people in foreign countries. Its main role is to assist the High Representative for Foreign Affairs in carrying out the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (EEAS 2016a, np). As such, it serves to strengthen the EU political system and allows for the improvement of democracy promotion and international assistance efforts, under which election-monitoring falls. The establishment of this entity further highlights the EU increasing commitment to democracy promotion over the years. So, while it was established after the EU began monitoring elections, it reflects the widening range of activities in which the EU is participating in around the world. It also represents the centralization and streamlining of these activities.

This section has articulated EU’s policies towards democracy and democracy promotion at the international level. It has outlined how EU policy has translated into its various activities over time. Importantly, it highlights how the organization views itself as a global actor and how it places itself in relation to its counterparts; in this case mainly African. The next section will examine the EU’s role in election observation and how this process has evolved in response to the shift from internal democracy efforts to international ones.

The European Union and Election Observation

The European Union has monitored over 120 elections, with a total of about 11,000 observers, since 2000.5 In 2000, the EU Commission assessed its growing role in election observation efforts that led to the adoption of the Communication on EU Election Assistance and

Observation (EU 2016, 17). This document emphasized the need for a coherent strategy; renewed approach to mission deployment; the importance of supporting regional and local elections; introducing exploratory missions; taking into account all stages of the electoral

5 The first EU election monitoring mission was actually deployed in 1993 and followed by several other missions. However, they were not operated in a systematic manner until 2000 (EU 2016, 17).

process; coordination among EU institutions and international actors; increased EU visibility; resources should be appropriately allocated depending on the political objective; streamlining of

EU procedures; and better training provided and field guidance provided for electoral observers

(EU 2000, 5-10). This list was compiled from the experiences the EU had during its experimentation with election observation in the 1990s. The document goes on to establish the circumstances under which observation missions should be deployed: Is EU participation advisable? viable? useful? (EU 2000, 16).6 By outlining the EU’s position in this manner, the document highlights the involved process undertaken by the EU in establishing its missions as the “standard” for election observation.

Expectations for the missions remain similar to those in place now as the EU began its involvement in election observation in an official capacity much more transparently than its IO counterparts. While this initial communication was a mere 46 pages total in comparison to the current 225-page handbook, it remained much more comprehensive than those produced by the other organizations.7 In order to further streamline the efforts of election observation, the EU

Commission funded the Election Observation and Democratic Support (EODS) capacity building

6 These three circumstances (advisable, viable, and useful) are further distilled into specific questions for each mission. When asking if their attendance is useful “Would the presence of an EU EOM be a constructive contribution to the electoral process? Would the presence of an EU EOM contribute to deterring fraud and election- related violence? Would the presence of an EU EOM support the role of civil society in the electoral process? Would the presence of the EU EOM contribute to stakeholder confidence to participate in the electoral process?” (EU 2016, 123). Concerning whether their presence is feasible “Can suitable logistical arrangements be made to enable an EU EOM to conduct credible election observation? Do security conditions provide for safe deployment of EU observers? Can acceptable security arrangements be put in place? Is it likely that the EU will receive a written invitation to observe from the host country’s authorities? Is it likely that the State and electoral authorities would each agree to sign a separate Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the European Commission in advance of deployment?” (ibid.). Last, when considering whether or not their participation is advisable “Can an EU EOM be deployed without taking any unnecessary risks and while maintaining a duty of care to EU observers? Is there interest and support from election stakeholders, including the host authorities, political parties and civil society, as well as EU Member States and the wider international community, in the deployment of an EU EOM? Is it likely that final report recommendations produced by an EU EOM will be considered and implemented before the next election?” (ibid.).

7 For example, the African Union handbook, which is now 156 pages after its finalization in 2014, was non-existent, suggesting that the election observation process was not as systematic as it could have been. As will be discussed later, this allowed for confusion and manipulation during the observation process.

project in 2013. The three main areas of support of this project are to strengthen EU Election

Observation Mission methodology; train election observation specialists in EU methodology election principles; and share the methodology with regional organizations and networks. This project was established as a continuation of the Enhance Electoral and Democracy Support

(NEEDS) project launched in 2001, which was followed by NEEDS II and NEEDS III, completed at the end of 2012 (EODS 2013, np).

The NEEDS project was run by “a consortium of organizations with expertise in the field of elections, good governance, public information, domestic observation, security and logistics” led by the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) along with the International Organization for Migration (IOM), EISA-Promoting Credible

Elections and Democratic Governance in Africa (EISA), the Inter-American Institute of Human

Rights through its Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (IDH CAPEL) and Internews

Europe (Needs Project 2012, np). The geographical coverage of participants in this organization emphasizes the importance that the EU places on election support and observation.

For the EU, “election observation missions and election assistance programmes are a fundamental part of [its] action to promote democracies, human rights and civil society participation worldwide” so much so that the New Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy

(2015-2019) highlights the importance of follow-up Observation Missions (Mogherini 2016, 9).

Consequently, these EU missions observe election processes over a long period of time in order to assess how they adhere to international standards and if they follow the best practices for genuine democratic elections because “electoral observation is not just the task of one day”

(ibid.). This long-term approach allows the missions to cover all phases of the election cycle: pre-election, election day, and the period following the elections. These missions are in addition

to technical and material support to electoral processes. This style of observation has been in place since the inception of EU observation missions and has been reflected in the various iterations of its election observation handbook (EEAS 2016, 11).

Trying to maintain its distance from internal state politics, the EU makes it clear that despite the provision of technical and material support, the missions do not seek to impede on the planning and execution of the actual election. Rather, they engage in data collection and “analyse factual information concerning the election process and provide an independent public assessment” (EEAS 2016b, np). These missions follow a set protocol in preparation for deployment.8 The first step is the selection of priority countries where the HRVP, in consultation with the Council of Ministers and European Parliament, identifies the countries where EU election observations missions (EOMs) could be deployed. The second step involves the sending of an exploratory mission, which assesses whether the deployment of an EOM is “advisable, feasible and useful” and also establishes the conditions that must be met by the host country to allow the mission to operate. This includes the proposal of implementation arrangements.

Third, the HRVP appoints the chief observer, who is usually a member of the European

Parliament. Following the appointment of the chief observer, the experts for the core team are chosen from a pool compiled by the Commission following a call for interest on its website.

Once the experts are selected, observers are appointed by the Commission and EEAS from a roster of candidates proposed by member states. In addition, the European Parliament may also decide to send a separate delegation to observe the elections. This parliamentary delegation is integrated in the EU EOM and works closely with the chief observer and does not issue a separate assessment (EEAS 2016, np). The observers are bound by an EU observer code of

8 A process map outlining the steps involved in the EU’s election observer deployment process can be found in Appendix D.

conduct9 along with those outlined by the Declaration of Principles for International Election

Observation (EU 2016a, 21). The mission structure and size are based up the exploratory mission report which suggests a number for the core team, LTO and STO positions based on the countries’ geographical size, “political significance or technical complexity of the election process, and field deployment protocols” (EU 2016a, 126). Political significance is key because the EU takes this into consideration when creating its missions, but there is no description as to what a politically significant election is. One can assume that these are founding elections or post-conflict elections, which is most likely true, but it leaves enough ambiguity for the organization to prioritize elections that are in its political interests.

During the period under observation, the observer missions meet with “election officials at national, regional and local levels, political parties, candidates, civil society and media throughout the country. The elections are assessed against international standards, regional commitments undertaken by the host country and national laws” (EEAS 2016b). Within these missions, each member is tasked with various jobs. During the process, the Chief Observer is present in the country during crucial moments on the mission, as he or she is responsible for the mission in its entirety. Typically undertaken by a member of the European Parliament, their job is to serve as spokesperson for the mission. The Chief Observer is supported by the Deputy Chief observer and core team experts, who set out the “analytical framework for the mission, carry out specific tasks such as media monitoring and manage the work of the observers” (ibid.). The core team experts focus on several areas, ranging from legal issues, electoral administration, human rights and gender security, logistics, media monitoring, and public relations. As such, they are able to assess on multiple areas of the process. Other core team experts are knowledgeable in areas such as legal issues, election administration, human rights and gender security, logistics,

9 Due to the length of this document, a copy of the Code of Conduct can be found in Appendix H.

media monitoring and public relations. In addition, the members of the core team are highly experienced in election observation and are recruited through specific calls for applications. The applications are made and successful candidates are then placed on a roster so the organization always has a group of people from whom to select. A typical mission thus consists of a chief observer who oversees both the project manager and deputy chief observer. The project manager oversees the operations expert, security expert, IT expert, finance and contract expert. This team works with the core team led by the deputy chief observer who oversees a political analyst, legal analyst, election analyst, observer coordinator, data analyst, media analyst, press officer in addition to the long-term, short-term, and locally recruited short-term observers (from the EU diplomatic community) (EU 2016a, 126). These observers are expected to fulfill certain criteria:

previous experience as an election observer and/or relevant experience or specific training (at national or international level); professional capacity in mission working languages (English, French, Portuguese or Spanish); interpersonal skills (capacity for balanced judgement, ability to work in teams, ability to cope with difficult situations, respect for local attitudes and customs, good communication skills, readiness to work in a multicultural environment); ability to maintain professional independence and strict impartiality in the conduct of duties in the host country; ability to work with computers, internet and technological equipment (including satellite phones, radios, etc.); commitment to the support of democratic governance and human rights; and have EU Member State or partner country (Norway, Switzerland and Canada) citizenship (EU 2016a, 129).

Additional criteria are considered when selecting LTOs and core team members:

familiarity and experience with electoral laws and procedures (including experience with administrative and legislative procedures for elections), preferably in different electoral traditions; knowledge of human rights and democratization issues; basic knowledge of EU institutions; analytical and drafting skills; participation in and successful completion of training courses; appraisal(s) of the observer from previous missions and training courses included on the roster; and experience of training, co-ordination and people management where relevant for management positions (ibid.).

Certain missions may have other requirements depending on the country under observation: “knowledge of the host country or region and/or the political situation; knowledge

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of relevant languages in the host country; experience of challenging working and living conditions; good physical condition; previous security training and experience of difficult security environments” (ibid.). Training and preparation for missions is provided through the

EODS, discussed earlier, and prior to their deployment. However, there are various outlets that offer courses, often paid, aligned with EU observation methodology. Unfortunately, the main concern with these courses is that they are limited to those who can afford the fees.10

In addition, though not part of its official missions, the EU values the role of citizen election observers. As an organization that does not monitor elections in its member states, the

EU needs a local partner. For the EU, unlike the AU and SADC, language skills and familiarity with the regional dynamics are not a given. So, it is important for its missions to enhance the legitimacy of the process by liaising “closely with citizen election observer groups and welcome information from them on the conduct of the electoral process” (EU 2016a, 24). But, the EU is clear in stating that it draws its own conclusions on the process despite any collaboration with local groups (ibid.).

These EU missions are divided into long- and short-term observation in order to assess all stages of the election process with a commitment to impartial and independent assessment, non- interference in the electoral process, cooperation with the host country, and transparency in their work (EU 2016a, 35-38). Observation missions focus on the following areas: political context; legal framework; election administration (including electoral system); voter registration; election campaign; election campaign; electoral violence; media; online election-related content; complaints and appeals; human rights (including participation of women, minorities, and persons

10 Examples of election observation training courses are those offered by the European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratization. Their upcoming March 2017 module starts at 450 Euros, a sum not affordable to all (https://eiuc.org/education/training-seminars/international-electoral-observers/fees.html).

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with disabilities); role of civil society; election day; results and post-election environment (EU

2016a, 35).

Upon arrival, the mission holds meetings with host country officials and the EU

Delegation (diplomatic mission). Following these meetings, a press conference is held to announce the start of the mission. The core team then continues to meet with stakeholders while preparing a briefing for the LTOs (EU 2016a, 131). Once they arrive, the long-term observers

(LTOs) are usually deployed about a month before election day and remain in-country until the results are officially announced. As such they are around to observe resolutions to observation disputes that may have arisen during the process. These observers are placed all over the country and observe the electoral campaign. In addition, they address specific issues like the use of public resources by candidates.

On the other hand, short-term observers (STOs) are deployed to observe the polling day and the preliminary ballot count. These missions are deployed in teams of two. Long-term observers, who are already in place prior to their arrival, submit reports to the STOs and prepare them for observation in their given area. Further, there is support staff who work as project managers, security officers, drivers, translators, IT professionals, etc., and are present to assist the observers in fulfilling their duties (EEAS 2016b, np). So, overall the mission is deployed about 6-8 weeks prior to the election followed by the LTOs arrival 4-5 weeks before polling and finally, STOs join shortly before polling (EEAS 2016, np).

Two days after polling, the EU EOM presents its preliminary findings at a press conference. Soon after, STOs are debriefed and leave followed by LTOs two weeks later. A mission is expected to be complete three weeks after election day barring mitigating circumstances (EU 2016a, 132). The final report is completed within one to two months from the

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end of the mission and contains recommendations for electoral reform and improvements to the process (EEAS 2016b, np; EU 2016a, 132).

The assessment of the elections is based on seven criteria that echo regional and international standards.11 As will be established in subsequent chapters, these guidelines are similar to those employed by African organizations as they are often referred to as guides for the politics adopted by these institutions, and as such provide insights into why organizations do not always abide by the protocols outlined in these documents. Divergence from these “norms” occurs for a variety of reasons. This divergence between the EU and its counterparts will be addressed in later chapters because it does impact dynamics during the period under observation, especially considering the support that these missions received from other members of the international community.

Conclusion

As previously discussed, the EU considers itself to be a key development partner in

Africa and this results in its ideologies being echoed throughout its initiatives. Subsequently, the

EU’s goal is to establish whether or not there has been progress since the last electoral cycle given the support provided even before polling. Most importantly, this means that the EU expects certain outcomes as a result of its involvement and support to African countries, which may create a bias through which it assesses results and determines future action. Its relationship with the African countries differs from that of the other three organizations under investigation.

Specifically, the EU is the only organization under investigation in this dissertation that does not

11 These seven criteria are the degree of impartiality shown by the election administration; the degree of freedom of political parties and candidates to assemble and express their views; the fairness of access to state resources made available for the election; the degree of access for political parties and candidates to the media, in particular the state media; the universal franchise afforded to voters; any other issue which concerns the democratic nature of the election, e.g., campaign violence, rule of law, legislative framework; and the conduct of polling and counting of votes (EEAS 2016b, np).

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have African countries as members, which may lead to different incentives, considerations, and biases on their part. As a European organization and a development partner, this places it at somewhat of a distance from African countries and can be a source of “otherness” or “forcing its ideologies” on systematically disadvantaged countries. These are the factors that impact behavior on the ground and will be assessed in future chapters. These also point to the merit of undertaking this comparative study.

The next two chapters assess the democratic development of the African Union and the

Southern African Development Community. Taking into account the influence of the EU on the manner in which their election observation missions have developed over the years, makes it possible to investigate how they have respectively appropriated the process. As organizations composed solely of African countries that are then tasked with monitoring elections in African countries, their positioning provides them with a perspective that differs from that of their

European counterpart.

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CHAPTER 5 THE AFRICAN UNION, DEMOCRACY, AND ELECTION OBSERVATION

Introduction

Chapter 4 focused on the political development of the European Union and established its experience with democracy promotion over the last several decades. It also discussed how the

EU has set the benchmark for international election monitoring. This chapter takes a closer look at the African Union (AU), while Chapter 6 focuses on the Southern African Development

Community (SADC). These organizations are two major and controversial actors on the African continent in the area of election monitoring and efforts at democracy promotion writ-large. With the marked shift to encouraging democratic norms in their member states, there has been an increased emphasis on ensuring that electoral processes are protected and properly supported.

Consequently, this chapter investigates how, if at all, these shifts in outlook and rhetoric impact behaviors in the undertaking of election observation missions. Relying on archival data, elite interviews with key actors in election observation, election observation reports, meeting reports, public opinion data, and secondary sources, this chapter takes a much-needed look into the political determinants of African regional IO mission behavior. It employs content analysis to chart the changes in rhetoric, tone, attitude, and behavior as the organization evolves over time.

In doing so, as with Chapter 4, this chapter draws attention to events that have influenced the

AU’s identity and stance towards democracy promotion. Considering that the protocols concerning election observation are modeled on that of the European Union, as outlined in

Chapter 4, this chapter indicates potential areas where differing mandates and positioning vis-à- vis member states may impact observer behavior in the field.

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Redefining the African Union

This section explores the African Union’s history and experience with democracy promotion efforts and election monitoring. It traces its “democratic development” over the last few decades to contextualize the organization’s behavior in terms of the politics surrounding elections and election monitoring process. It also examines the AU’s organizational structure and how it influences its programming efforts. From its inception, the organization has undergone numerous changes with each having varying results. This work is interested in linking these impacts to their subsequent behavior in election monitoring.

The AU was established in 1963 as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with the sole aim of freeing the African continent from the oppressive presence of colonial powers

(Selassie 1963). At this point in its history, democracy was not a priority item. Rather, these countries were solely aligned to fight the pressures of colonialism. Their goal was to defend their sovereignty and take ownership of their member countries. This attitude was crucial to attaining their goals considering that these countries were such an amalgamation of different, often disparate, parts.

The OAU was established through intense negotiations by two groups: the Brazzaville

Group, which later evolved into the Monrovia Group, and the Casablanca Group, as the states aligned themselves in promotion of particular agendas. The Brazzaville Group “emphasized the sovereignty of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states while rejecting political integration” while the Casablanca Group, led by President Kwame Nkrumah, the champion of

Pan-Africanism on the continent, “sought a political union and the creation of a United States of

Africa along federal lines under a High Command” (Naldi 1999, 2). While these were stark political differences, their shared focus on issues concerning colonialism, apartheid, the various security challenges facing the continent, economics, culture, science, and technology offered

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grounds for agreement. However, this agreement left little room for political issues (ibid.). The détente led to the signing of the OAU Charter in 1963. As such, the organization was built on the premise of sovereignty and survival, not regime type. The charter established that the

Organization would have the following purposes:

to promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; to coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence; to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (OAU 1963, 2).

As expected, the emphasis was clearly on cooperation and maintaining a united front against a common enemy as shown by the call for member states to align their policies on the following areas: political and diplomatic relations; the economy; education and culture; health, sanitation, and nutrition; science and technology, and defense and security (OAU 1963, 2).

However, apart from listing these principles and outlining the structure and establishment of the organizations, the charter did not offer much in terms of concrete plans. As a result, the potential for state manipulation was high leaving the organization as one that required extensive restructuring to be successful in anyway. Specifically, as noted earlier, the OAU was formed to combat the colonial presence. With this prioritization of power struggles and the fear of political uncertainty, these leaders sought to uphold three tenets: colonial state boundaries, territorial and state sovereignty secured by non-intervention, and the security of heads of states feeling threatened by both insurgents and legitimate opposition groups. These tenets led to their being coined as a “mutual preservation club” (Makinda and Okumu 2008, 11). While the AU has shifted away from OAU policies, negative perceptions of the OAU legacy still remain where current limitations are often attributed to the practices put in place by the “old guards.” As an organization, it continually struggles to distance itself from the ever-present OAU shadow, and

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though it was built on the “infrastructure of its predecessor, which was infamous for turning a blind eye to bad governance, [the AU] is a radically different organization in several ways”

(Makinda and Okumu 2008, 2). Consequently, when considering AU actions, even on the part of those working within the organization, it is always set against the backdrop of its evolution from the OAU (Addis Ababa 2015). Thus, understanding the AU and its approach to dealing with political affairs on the continent requires having a background on its predecessor the OAU.

Decisions made by the OAU created a non-democratic culture within the organization, one that the AU has actively sought to change, but still remains bound to in certain ways. The lack of attention paid towards democratic ideals is one of these discrepancies.

It was this identity crisis, and inability to address the challenges faced on the continent, that led to the creation of the AU as Nkrumah warned that “a weak Africa was vulnerable to external pressures and manipulation, and could only ‘become one of the greatest forces for good in the world’ if it was united” (Makinda and Okumu 2008, 28). Tackling the challenging economic, social, and political transitions at the time required that the OAU reinvent itself. This reinvention led to the Heads of State and Government meeting in Sirte, Libya in September 1999 where the Sirte Declaration was signed. The necessity of this declaration was articulated at the

Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria earlier that year in July.

Continuing to emphasize the importance of unity, solidarity, cohesion, and cooperation, the leaders noted that they needed to be cognizant of the challenges that the OAU could no longer address under its existing structure. Consequently, in this declaration they decided to establish an

African Union that was committed to the objectives of the charter and the provisions of the treaty establishing the African Economic Community; accelerate the process of establishing the treaty, which meant shortening the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty and the establishments

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provided by it (e.g., African Monetary, African Court of Justice and the Pan-African Parliament); and strengthen and consolidate the regional economic communities (RECs) as the pillars in achieving the set objectives (OAU 1999, 1-2). During this period, there was a discernible though still minimal shift in attitudes and the level of participation and commitment on the part of the

OAU. It began showing signs of taking its mandated role more seriously by committing itself publicly to issues where it had been “notably reluctant to” before (Anglin 1998, 486). Still, the fact remained that, though the legal change was tangible, political leaders were not willing to cede their power so easily.

Upon the signing of the declaration, the process to formally establish the AU began, which culminated with the signing of the Constitutive Act that was adopted at the Lomé Summit in Togo and entered into force in 2000 (AU 2001). Signed by 53 African countries, this document emphasized their desire to “promote and protect human and peoples’ rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law” and to take all necessary measures to strengthen their common institutions and enable them with the powers and resources to undertake their respective mandates (AU 2001, 3).1

The most notable of these objectives is that of the promotion of democratic principles and good governance, as it marks a stark departure from the goal of mutual preservation. It is in this

1 This document outlined that the aim of the Union was the achievement of “greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa”; to defend the “sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence” of member states; accelerate the process of continental political and socio-economic integration; to promote and defend the African common position; the encouragement of international cooperation; to “promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; [to] promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance”; to promote and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the relevant international human rights instruments; to “establish the necessary conditions which will enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations; [to] promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies; [to] promote co-operation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples; [to] coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union; [to] advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in science and technology; and work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent” (AU 2001, 5-6).

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vein that the AU took a more visible role in addressing political issues across the continent.

Specifically, it began to increase its activity in the area of election monitoring. Election monitoring came about when the AU realized that with elections comes a dispute over power, which tends to result in conflict following polling (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014).

By June 2003, the AU reported that it had monitored over 100 elections in 43 member states

(African Union 2011). However, Kelley and Kolev (2010) offer a more conservative estimate of

48 by 2004. Recent numbers show the AU as having monitored 423 elections between 1989 and

2013 (Aniekwe and Atuobi 2016). Nevertheless, despite the discrepancy, these numbers indicate an increase in political involvement that cannot be disputed.

To complicate matters, election observation is viewed as a relatively new phenomenon where Africa is facing the challenge of having to map its own democratic identity within the struggle of adapting to the domination of European and United States actions and models as it does not have the culture of monitoring itself (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6,

2015). In this case, AU member states view democracy as a “borrowed system” from the West where its suitability for the African context is doubted leading to the often-asked question of whether liberal democracy is the right form for Africa. In considering the reinvention of the AU as defenders of democracy, it is important to note that the manner in which democracy is understood plays a part. During my conversation with an AU official, this point was reiterated several times and it was stressed that the emphasis should be on social and developmental democracy (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6, 2015). Taking this position into account it is clear that agendas are very much intangible constructs for these organizations (i.e., the Secretariat) as they are dependent on the ones making the rules (i.e., Heads of State or

Government). Moving beyond the understanding of democracy at the international level, it also

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remains a challenge for citizens where 20.5% of people surveyed in a number of Southern

African countries did not know what democracy was in 1999/2001, 26.9% in 2005/2006, and

22.9% as recently as 2014/2015 (Afrobarometer 2016).2 There is significant variation in attitudes across the continent considering that the patterns were slightly different in Western Africa, with

13.2% not knowing what democracy was in 1999/2001,3 19% in 2005/2006, and 14.5% in

2014/2015 (ibid.). In East Africa,4 29.8% did not know what democracy was in 1999/20015 with little change in 2005/2006 with 29.7% of the sample population stating that they did not know,6 and 25.5% in 2014/2015.7 This regional variation8 is important because with a rotating

Chairpersonship their understanding of democracy, be it civil liberties and personal freedoms; government that is by, for, and of the people; voting, elections, and multipartyism, among other indicators, may impact what they prioritize while in office (ibid.). In addition, similar dynamics occur depending on the observer mission leader’s nationality as to how their country conceptualizes democracy, and what constitutes a fair election, can influence what they prioritize once deployed. This ambiguity further highlights the complicated nature of election monitoring

2 The countries included in this analysis are Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. While this is not a comprehensive list of the SADC nations, it still provides insight into regional behavioral trends. The question asked to the respondents was “What, if anything, does “democracy” mean to you (Afrobarometer Rounds 1, 3, and 6).

3 This number includes missing response and respondents who had nothing further to add (Afrobarometer Rounds, 1, 3, and 6).

4 In order to avoid overlap, I have excluded Tanzania from this sample as it is also a member of SADC and thus considered part of Southern Africa.

5 Uganda was the only country surveyed in Round 1.

6 In Round 2, Kenya and Uganda were both surveyed. When the data was disaggregated, the values showed that the population of Kenyans that did not know what democracy was 33.5%, slightly higher than Uganda’s 27.7%.

7 In Round 3, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi were the three countries surveyed. In these three countries, Burundi’s population of people that did not know or did not understand the question was 6.4%, Kenya’s 30.1%, and Uganda’s 30.6%.

8 Data on this question is not available for the North African countries surveyed by the Afrobarometer (i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia).

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in Africa. As an interactive activity, election monitoring is not only dependent on the observers, and their respective organizations, but on the country being monitored and perceptions held by its citizens. It is this complex nature that this work seeks to explore as the resulting tensions directly impacts mission behavior on the ground. Prior to further articulating the more recent developments that have contributed to this dynamic, it is imperative to outline how the AU is organized and its implications for the undertaking of democracy promotion initiatives, and more specifically election observation.

The AU is organized into multiple structures, each tasked with upholding the various pillars of the institution, and knowledge of these various sectors aids in understanding the operational dynamics of the organization. Understanding how the organization operates clarifies the decision-making process. Establishing how the AU is organized helps investigate where observation missions obtain their instructions and the types of internal challenges that they might face. The structures established by the Constitutive Act are the Assembly of the Union; the

Executive Council; the Pan-African Parliament; the Court of Justice; the Commission (AUC); the Permanent Representatives Committee; the Specialized Technical Committees; the

Economic, Social and Cultural Council; and the various financial institutions (AU 2001, 8).

Presently, these organs remain quite similar with the addition of Legal Organs and Judicial and

Human Rights Institutions and the removal of the Court of Justice. This project focuses on the structures directly linked to political affairs, because while the other organs do play a role in the politics of the organization, they do not make the decisions when it comes to election monitoring. Thus, the organs of substantive interest are the Assembly of the Union and the

Commission. This project also focuses on the Executive Council as it is in charge of monitoring the implementation of the Assembly at the state level and discusses the progress of program

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implementation in detail at its bi-annual meetings. Therefore, in their capacity as foreign ministers, they offer a link between the IO and the population. Further, the Executive Council is responsible for the publication of summary documents and minutes that provide insight into what the AU is prioritizing and issues that may affect the deployment of election observation missions.

The Assembly resembling the EU’s European Council serves as the supreme body of the

Union and is comprised of Heads of States and Government, or their appointed representatives, and meets yearly unless extraordinary meetings are called regarding time-sensitive issues. The

Assembly is mandated to further political and socio-economic integration on the African continent. As such, it is able to give “directives to the AU Executive Council and Peace and

Security Council on the management of conflicts, war, acts of terrorism, emergency situations and the restoration of peace” (AU 2001, 8). In keeping with the upholding of political values, the

Constitutive Act allows the Assembly to intervene or sanction member states but this mandate was delegated to the Peace and Security Council in 2004. However, the Assembly is still allowed to delegate its powers and functions where deemed necessary. In addition, the Chairman is elected by fellow member states and holds the position for a year (ibid.). Consequently, the

Assembly holds considerable political power for both the AU as an organization and as an international actor. The Assembly undertakes functions that are central to the operation of the organization. It selects the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, it appoints the Commissioners and determines their functions and terms of office, considers requests for AU membership, adopts the AU budget, receives, considers, and makes decisions on reports and recommendations from the other AU organs, and establishes new committees,

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specialized agencies, commissions, and working groups where deemed necessary. Of these functions, the most politically salient is the task of selecting the head of the AU Commission.

The Chairperson of the AU Commission plays a crucial role in the organization in that he or she serves as the “face” of the AU. Therefore, their political attitudes and relationships with other heads of government become central to how they approach regional matters and uphold their legal mandates. While the presidency of the Assembly is rotational by design, the

Commission Chairperson is elected by their peers and the implication is that they have in some way proven themselves worthy of this position or have found a means to gain the support of the other heads of government. For this reason, the AUC Chairpersonship is a highly-coveted position with crucial political implications.

The regional power play that results from the interactions between member countries was especially apparent during the 2012 election for AUC Chairperson, a competition between the incumbent, former Gabonese Foreign Minister, Jean Ping, and his South African challenger, and eventual winner, former South African Minister of Home Affairs, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma

(BBC 2012, Jobson 2012, Marrian 2012). Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya are considered the most powerful economic and political players9 on the continent, so ascending to the position of Chairperson is seen a threat to smaller, less dominant, nations. Rumors surrounded this election, insofar as claims that these larger African countries had a “gentlemen’s agreement” to not hold leadership positions in the organization (Marrian 2012). Yet, despite this agreement, South Africa sought to ensure that its nominee was given the position due to the political status associated with the position.

9 This power dynamic may have shifted with Morocco’s, as the fifth largest economy in Africa, return to the African Union in January 2017 after its departure in 1984. However, this event occurred after the timeline with which this dissertation is concerned but has implications for AU activities in the future.

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Basically, the competition for AUC Chairperson became a reflection of all the tensions that existed at the Assembly level. This dynamic merits particular attention when examining election monitoring missions because AU mission leaders tend to be former Heads of States, or dignitaries, who continue to play, or have at some point been a part of, the political game. This competition manifested itself as one between Western and Southern Africa as each candidate received the majority of their support from their respective regional blocs: “It’s going to be a tough call. The critical issue would be trying to find a balance between Anglophone and

Francophone countries in the hierarchy of the AU Commission” (Mr. Trevor Maisiri, quoted in

Marrian 2012). Prior to both Zuma (2012-present) and Jean Ping (2008-2012), the AUC

Chairpersons were Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali (2003-2008) and interim Amara Essy of Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2003), highlighting the existing sentiments that it was time for a different region to direct the organization (AU 2016, np). This harkens back to the argument that the country from which the Chairperson hails matters for the direction that the organization takes and serves as a reflection of the internal dynamics.

The complex nature of the Commission Chairperson selection process highlights the entangled nature of the two entities and, as such, they must be investigated in tandem in order to reveal the extent of political manipulation at the organizational level. The Commission, modeled on the EU’s European Commission, was established by the Constitutive Act, Article 20 and

Commission Statutes, Article 2, and in its role as the AU Secretariat runs the day-to-day activities of the organization. The Commission is composed of a chairperson, deputy chairperson, eight commissioners and other staff and as of January 2014, the Commission had

1,444 staff, including those at the headquarters and regional offices (AU 2016b). The Assembly elects the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson for renewable four-year terms and appoints the

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Commissioners, who are elected by the Executive Council for four-year mandates. All action on the AU’s part is often attributed to the AUC and its Chairperson and, as alluded to earlier, there is no denying the centrality of the Commission’s role. Its functions include representing the AU and defending its interests under the guidance of, and as mandated by the Assembly and

Executive Council; initiating proposals to be submitted to the AU’s organs as well as implementing decisions taken by them; acting as the custodian of the AU Constitutive Act and

OAU/AU legal instruments; providing operational support for all AU organs; assisting member states in implementing the AU’s programs; working out AU draft common positions and coordinate Member States’ actions in international negotiations; managing the AU budget and resources; elaborating, promoting, coordinating, and harmonizing the AU’s programs and policies with those of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs); ensuring gender mainstreaming in all AU programs and activities; and taking action as delegated by the

Assembly and Executive Council (African Union 2016a, np).

The Chairperson holds the position for four years, with the option to run for a second term. As such, there is a continuity that exists in the Commission, unlike at the Assembly level, where the presidency rotates on a yearly basis. This continuity grants the AUC Chairperson influence and accountability for actions undertaken by this organ. In addition, “the Chairperson of the Commission is the Chief Executive Officer, legal representative of the AU and the

Commission’s Accounting Officer” granting them considerable responsibility (AU 2016a, np).

The Chairperson is expected to chair all Commission meetings and deliberations promote and popularize the AU’s objectives and enhance its performance, submit reports requested by the

Assembly, Executive Council, Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), committees and any other organs, prepare the AU budget and strategic planning documents, act as a depository

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for all AU and OAU treaties and legal instruments; facilitate the functioning, decision-making and reporting of all AU organ meetings, and ensure conformity and harmony with agreed AU policies, strategies, programs, and projects; consult and coordinate with Member States’ governments, other institutions and the RECs on the AU’s activities, and carry out the AU’s diplomatic representations; appoint and manage Commission staff; assume overall responsibility for the Commission’s administration and finances; and prepare the annual report on the AU and its organs’ activities (AU 2016a). Most importantly, the Chairperson grants permission for the deployment of election monitoring missions. Without his/her approval, the organization is unable to assemble a team or have access to the necessary funding, highlighting the centrality and influence of this position.

As illustrated by the 2012 election involving Jean Ping and Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the Chairperson of the Commission’s position is a highly contested one and serves as a reflection of the region’s political dynamic. In this case, the relationship between countries impacts the manner in which election-monitoring missions are carried out. If a particular state is at odds with the country holding the election, there is a risk that the process will be undermined. The tensions between the major countries is an important issue moving forward because their dynamics continually risk shifting the nature of the organization and impacting future decisions, especially when it comes to future elections and the election-monitoring process.

In the 2012 Chairperson election, Dlamini-Zuma dealt with significant challenges during her campaign for the position as the race was set against a backdrop of tensions created by powerhouses, Nigeria and South Africa, where her candidacy was rejected by Abuja (Hamill

2015). Though not permitted to speak to the media, certain diplomats were recorded as saying that “Nigeria could spoil the party for South Africa” and that Nigeria, “the largest oil-producing

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country in Africa, was expected to support Ping” (Molele 2012). They also added that “it would probably be joined by the Francophone countries of West Africa, which came under the banner of the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central

Africa” (ibid.). These snippets emphasize the lengths to which the Western African nation would go to ensure that power dynamic on the continent was not shifted in South Africa’s favor. As two of the greatest economies on the continent neither wanted to allow the other to put forth a representative from their region. The tension between the two countries has been longstanding and only risks further undermining the role that international organizations such as the AU can play in serving as strong democracy supporters on the continent because it “risks dividing

African institutions and splitting the continent into Nigerian and South African camps, which could lead to paralysis across a range of policy issues” (Hamill 2015). Concerning elections, this relationship is important because missions may be more lenient in countries where one of the regional powerhouses has significant influence. Along with influencing final mission reports, these tensions might affect funding allocations, training efforts, and access once on the ground.

In light of the 2012 election, there is the possibility that the other influential nations, like

Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Senegal may nominate candidates for seats in the Commission. The greatest risk here would be that “smaller countries may struggle for representation and relevance and have to seek more innovative ways to remain relevant within the AU Commission and AU in general” (Cilliers and Okeke 2012, 2). If this were to occur, then the agendas would no longer be those of the organization but what these larger states consider to be important.

The 2016 AUC Chairperson elections led to a resurfacing of power plays with key member states voicing their support for a given candidate under the guise of maintaining

“regional balance.” Given that Dlamini-Zuma chose not to seek re-election, the race for the

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position was between three candidates: Specioza Wandira Kazibwe (Former Ugandan Vice-

President), Pelonomi Vension Moitoi (Botswana’s Foreign Minister), and Agapito Mba Mokuy

(Equatorial Guinea’s Foreign Minister). Prior to the elections, the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) was reported as having called for a postponement of the election as it considered none of the candidates to be well suited for the position. Still, the elections took place. However, the elections were eventually postponed because none of the candidates had the required two-thirds majority. AU Commissioner, Martial De Paul Ikounga, confirmed that 51 countries took part in the election of which 28 abstained leaving 23 countries, below the required quota. It was said that the ECOWAS countries chose not to participate in order to force a postponement. As such, the elections were tabled until January 2017. The issues among dominant member countries led to the inability to elect a new Chairperson, a situation that led to heightened strain at the continental level (Akwei 2016, Long 2016). Since then, a new

Chairperson has been elected, former Chadian Prime Minister, Moussa Faki, who recently entered the race for Chairperson and undercut the favorites to win, Kenya’s Amina Mohamed and Senegal’s Abdoulaye Bathily (Aljazeera 2017).

Last, this project also investigates the Executive Council. The Executive Council, like the

Commission, supports and is responsible to the AU Assembly. It consists of the Foreign

Ministers of all member states and is mandated by Article 13 of the AU Constitutive Act “to coordinate and take decisions on policies of common interest to Member States, consider issues referred to it and monitor the implementation of Assembly polities” (AU 2016b, np). As mentioned earlier, Foreign Ministers provide a link between the organization and the citizens of their respective countries. Their role is to assess how well policies have been implemented and they also tend to be more engaged at the member state level than the delegates based at the

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headquarters and regional offices. As a result, their Executive Council reports are very telling of both international and domestic realities and serve as a source of valuable information.

Before going any further, when establishing IO agendas, it is important to establish the inherent contradictions within their principle documents and their potential impact on election observation processes. In the case of the AU, though the prioritization of democracy and governance are listed in its principles, it exists alongside certain values that risk undermining this goal. These principles include “sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union” and the “non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another”

(African Union 2001, 6-7). The challenge of these two principles is that they can be manipulated by the more powerful states in the Union, which can lead to inactivity during challenging times.

Again, this is indicative that the political leanings of the more powerful states have a direct impact on IO behavior. For example, in an interview with a senior AU official, it was noted that there is an existing hierarchy within the Union, referred to as the “P5” consisting of Egypt,

Libya, South Africa, Nigeria, and Algeria (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6, 2015).

Not only are these among the richest countries on the continent but they also boast the strongest militaries (Africa Ranker 2016). In the more complex cases, like Egypt and Libya, navigating the political situation is even more difficult. For example, following Egypt’s suspension in 2013, monitoring was immediately affected due to it no longer being an active member of the organization (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6, 2015). While the mission was still arranged despite this suspension, the political environment remained tense as the observer team was deployed a mere two days after the Peace and Security Department condemned the removal of President Mohamed Morsi as “unconstitutional” and “a violation of the bloc’s charter”

(Gulhane 2014). International observers present noted incidences of violence, limited space for

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opposition to challenge the process, and restricted access to areas outside of Cairo during the electoral period (EU EOM 2014). These issues raised serious concerns regarding the nature of the Egyptian election. In such situations, member state politics are at the center where decisions and actions on the part of missions are often limited by tensions between countries and the organization. Egypt’s current political space, after more than a decade of the AU’s evolution and experience monitoring elections, suggests that larger countries, especially the P5, had as much, if not more, influence in the earlier years of the AU’s development.

However, despite these inherent contradictions and limitations on the organization, the

AU considers itself to have a large role in advancing Africa’s political development especially in the monitoring of elections and call for the continued need for observation due to the apparent

“backtracking of democracy” in Africa (Interview in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6, 2015).

These elections serve as indicators of its member states’ democratic consolidation process (ibid.).

The AU arrived at its current position through a series of debates where, with each consecutive meeting, its role in democracy promotion and governance issues was increasingly brought to the forefront. Every report made for and by the Commission outlines goals and challenges faced by the Union. In doing so, the reports to the Assembly and Commission highlight the existing culture and the priorities during a given year. These reports are the link between the Commission and the Assembly, where high-level decisions regarding the organization are made. The reports will be used as critical evidence in establishing the nature of relationships within the organization and the decisions made regarding election monitoring efforts. Assessing these reports also offers insights into notable shifts in behavior, attitudes, agendas, and subsequent biases of the organization. Relying on these reports, the following

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section outlines the AU’s recent developments and how these have contributed to the use of election-monitoring as a tool for encouraging democratic consolidation in member countries.

Advancing the Democratic Agenda: Introducing Election-Monitoring as a Governance Tool

As noted earlier, the transition from the OAU was challenging, and the AU has dealt with a host of difficulties in advancing its democratic agenda. Specifically, at times it has proven a challenge to garner consistent support for the institutionalization of election monitoring from member states due to vocal critiques and outright violations of the democratic process from longstanding leaders like Robert Mugabe. These challenges affect the organization’s ability to fully engage with its mandate, because as member states subject themselves to monitoring by the organization, any affront to the democratic objective or to AU missions must be taken seriously.

An unsupportive member state risks casting doubt on the AU’s ability to successfully, and objectively, carry out monitoring missions. AU Chairperson Reports to the Commission and

Executive Council, starting from the early 2000s to the present, document these issues and discussions surrounding them.

It has been established that the AU officially transitioned from the OAU in 2002, which, in response to the global push towards democracy, shifted the organization towards political affairs and governance. However, in the first few years, implementation remained an issue so tangible solutions had to be created. Thus, at the Seventh Ordinary Session, held in Sirte, Libya on June 28 to July 2, 2005, several issues pertaining to the execution of the organization’s mandate were discussed. One such effort to promote its mandate was the Institutional

Transformation Project (ITP) of the African Union Commission that was launched in February

2005 and emphasized the need for a “strong, dynamic and creative Commission” through a thorough overhaul of the Commission’s administrative and financial systems, its operational

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methodology, and overall culture (Executive Council 2005:1). The project consisted of three components: culture (attitudes, values, and leadership), process (reorganization of the operational system), and priority projects (accelerating operational activities that are vital to the transformation process) (ibid.). This was also an opportunity to learn from other organizations that had undergone similar transformations, for example, the European Union (EU), the African

Development Bank (AfDB), the United Nations (UN), and the Economic Commission for Africa

(ECA). Culture, while a difficult term to conceptualize, is an important aspect of an organization and commonly invoked in conversation regarding the role and “place” of international organizations. For example, there are tensions that exist between what is expected from

“African” culture versus the demands of the Western legal structures where a de jure subscription to the charters and constitutions does not equate to a de facto operationalization of these legal documents. However, it remains a difficult variable to measure lending to the ambiguity discussed earlier.

Financing was a key item on the agenda especially in relation to increasing funding to three critical areas: the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson, and Political Affairs. These departments are crucial to the support of political efforts, such as election monitoring. The AU actively sought to increase funding to these areas thus indicating a political shift towards a prioritization of these efforts on the continent. However, despite these intentions, the ability to execute the budgets continued to be a challenge with member states failing to pay their dues with only ten fulfilling their pledges. As a result of these member states inability, or refusal, to contribute, the total amount received was $21,517,796.53, which represents 36% of the budget

(Executive Council 2005, 9) compared to the EU’s €27 million allocated solely to the observation of 13 elections in the same year, higher than its average of €13 million for 8-10

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elections (European Union 2017b). The AU’s lack of funding for its programs made it impossible for the organization to monitor all 19 elections held on the continent that year, thus limiting their scope of influence.10 The AU was limited in comparison to its larger, better- financed European counterpart.

Another point of contention for member states was that not all countries had signed onto the Peace and Security treaty. Botswana, Cape Verde, Eritrea, and Tunisia had yet to sign while

Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Democratic Republic of Congo,

Seychelles, Somalia, and Swaziland signed but had not ratified. This refusal to support the Peace and Security Council (PSC) suggested that some of these countries were not willing to fully commit themselves to the demands made by this document, which mandated the PSC to serve as the “standing organ of the AU for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts” and acts as a crucial component of the overall African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

(Executive Council 2005, 11). This is not an issue that I observed with the EU, where agreements such as this are made through deliberation, allowing for all parties to contribute to the process (EU 2017b, np). Along with addressing all issues pertaining to security matters on the continent, the Peace and Security treaty’s core functions consist of conducting early warning and preventive diplomacy, facilitating peace-making, establishing peace-support operations, and in certain circumstances recommending intervention in Member states to promote peace, security and stability (AU 2016, np). Therefore, by undermining its existence certain countries were

10 The 19 elections held in 2005 (listed in order in which they were held) were in Burundi (Constitutional Referendum); Central African Republic (Presidential and National Assembly); Zimbabwe (House of Assembly); Djibouti (Presidential); Togo (Presidential); Ethiopia (House of People’s Representatives); Chad (Referendum); Guinea-Bissau (Presidential); Burundi (National Assembly); Mauritius (National Assembly); Uganda (Referendum); Somaliland (House of Representatives); Liberia (Presidential, Senate, and House of Representatives); Burkina Faso (Presidential); Kenya (Constitutional Referendum); Zimbabwe (Senate); Gabon (Presidential); Tanzania (Presidential and National Assembly), and Congo-Kinshasa (Constitutional Referendum). While not only elections are eligible for monitoring as the AU focuses solely on presidential and parliamentary elections, this list highlights the changing nature of politics in Africa.

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placing themselves at odds with the organization’s mandate and causing regional tensions. These tensions are central to this project because the relationship between the various countries impact the manner in which the organization behaves where the calculations made on the part of member states reflects their positions at a given time. Occurring relatively soon after the transition to the AU, this reality reflected the difficulty the organization faced in establishing itself as a continental body.

Moving forward, the overarching goal in 2005 was to “seek the African common position” and work on the AU’s harmonization with the regional organizations. For the AU, increased continental collaboration was a means to gain respect for Africa in the “concert of

Nations” (Executive Council 2006a, ii). This position led to the Conference on Security,

Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA).11 This conference highlighted the importance of peace, security, and stability on the continent. These are important areas that can directly impact what the organization considers important during the deployment of its election observer missions.

Furthermore, the 2006 Executive Council report lamented that there remained a significant reliance on external donors when it came to planning activities. As will be discussed later, this reliance on external donors also poses similar issues for the Southern African

Development Community (SADC). For example, a plan to build capacity and develop the skills of the AUC staff was drafted by the Commission but required the approval of the United Nations

Development Programme (UNDP) as it was funding the effort (Executive Council 2016, 9). In

11 This conference was focused on the consolidation of a roadmap for the work on the interim Economic, Social, and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) development of action for practical, effective and sustainable relations between CSOs and peace, security, democracy and governance agenda of the AU and to facilitate the operationalization of Article 22 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol; development of the African Diaspora process; and the transformation of CSSDCA into Citizens of Diaspora Organizations Directorate (CID0) (Executive Council 2016, 4).

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regard to election monitoring, and what impacts IO agendas, several questions emerge: At what point does this overlap begin to influence the decisions made by the organizations themselves?

How do donors position themselves vis-à-vis political issues, and at what point does their oversight of this funding risk distorting an organization’s interests and priorities? This confusion is apparent at the domestic level as organizations focus on protecting their image in front of these same donors during missions. This conflict of interest risks interfering with the goals set by the

Commission itself (Interview in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6, 2015). The Commission is thus bound by the demands of both its financiers and citizens. Consequently, the Commission began to seek ways of gradually putting in place the machinery to allow for the implementation of the activities of Strategic Policy Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Resource Mobilization

(SPPM) process. These activities included “the work of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Committee on the Scale of Assessment; proposals on alternative modalities of financing the African Union; and discussions aimed at enhancing the partnership between the AU and international partners”

(Executive Council 2006a, 9). This position highlighted a commitment on the part of the AU to actively shift from talking about improving efforts to increasing support to governance and democracy promotion efforts, under which election monitoring falls, to actually finding ways to uphold the standing agreements. This shift is key because it indicates the AU’s awareness to the fact that its agendas are sometimes set by an outside party and there is a need to limit this in order to regain accountability.

Efforts to garner financial support for the organization remained consistent. These efforts consisted of regular and structured dialogue with international partners in an attempt to streamline and harmonize donor procedures to reduce transaction costs and improve the nature of development assistance; the establishment of a database on project information and

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recommended funding allocations; designing a means of presenting project files to international partners and of preparing detailed project documents; strengthening relationships with existing development partners and forging new ones; following up on pledges made by member states and development partners; and exploring available financing opportunities on the continent.

However, this list proved to be too ambitious for the AU and was not completed in its entirety despite the organizations’ best efforts. Considering its on-going financial challenges, efforts were centered on the AU’s fundraising activities to improve the allocation of funds to its various programs. These included instilling procedures, program planning, and the monitoring and evaluation of the Commission’s departments and directorates; the creation of a database of projects to be submitted to donors to secure funding; and conducting multiple bilateral meetings with partners to follow-up on pledges or seek new funding sources (Executive Council 2006a,

17). Even with the exploration of these avenues, member state contributions remained insufficient where the total receipt for 2005 was $45,190,814.78 with an outstanding balance of

$24,295,893.11 and outstanding arrears of $55,824,290.80. Unfortunately, these contributions were just enough to cover staff costs and some operating costs but nothing for programs was received until very late towards the year. As of January 2006, only Ethiopia and South Africa contributed to the solidarity budget (ibid.). Conversely, the EU’s budget for 2005 was set at

106.3 billion Euros, representing 1.004% of the EU’s Gross National Income (GNI) and marked an increase of 4.4% in comparison to its 2004 budget (European Commission 2004, np). Of this

106.3 billion, 5.2 billion Euros was allocated to efforts focused on restoring peace and democracy (ibid.). So, while funding is crucial to the AU’s operation, not all member states share the political will to support the organization’s activities in a similar manner to its European counterpart. For the AU, every program proposal appears to come with a disclaimer that reads:

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“if funding permits.” These numbers highlight the financial challenges that the organization faced limiting their ability to carry out activities in the same manner as the EU. It also emphasizes the challenges of getting member states to come together on crucial matters and their inability to prioritize funding for the AU’s political affairs.

Along with funding, security issues were also priority agenda items as efforts were made to increase the speed at which the organization addressed security issues. The Continental Peace and Security Architecture placed particular emphasis on the African Standby Force (ASF), the

Continental Early Warning System, and the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Executive

Council 2006a, 17). Though related, these security issues shifted significant resources away from democracy promotion programs to defending the state in order to allow for future installation of a democratic regime. These issues ranged from coup d’états to the undemocratic use of constitutions. However, the challenges the AU faced did not go unnoticed with calls for the organization to re-evaluate its methods and regulations concerning election observation.

Specifically, there were discussions on the provision of assistance for electoral processes prior to, and after, the declaration of results (Executive Council 2006a, 38).

It is important that the organization noted this weakness in its election observer methodology because it recognized that, amid the security challenges, a lack of focus on political matters might exacerbate any domestic issues and undermine its efforts at ensuring peace and security. This would not have been a priority agenda for the OAU with its rhetoric of self- preservation and marks the AU’s clear departure from the shadows of its predecessor. During this period, the organizations’ priorities seemed to center on regional stability and the reduction of violence prior to, during, and after elections. This will be reflected in the 2004 Malawi

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elections where its attention to the domestic process and apprehension in stating outright whether the election was fair served as an indication that its aim was to ensure that the situation remained peaceful. Election observation missions were slowly beginning to expand their mandate.

In keeping with its prioritization of democratic affairs, election observation missions were deployed to Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Liberia, and Burkina Faso in 2005

(Executive Council 2006a, 40). The AU considered its role in these elections, especially those occurring in countries that had dealt with civil conflict such as Burundi, Guinea Bissau, and

Liberia, to be very important. According to its reports, “the involvement of the African Union in the peace process in these three countries and the fielding of an observer mission are a result of its commitment to work resolutely for the consolidation of peace, a sine qua non for the success of Africa’s harmonious development from the political, economic and social standpoints”

(Executive Council 2006a, 41). Though the finances were a challenge as suggested earlier, the rhetoric in support of democracy efforts and the importance of playing a role in election observation is a step away from the promotion of autocratic governance often viewed in the organization’s earlier years.

Along with continental efforts, there were also plans to send a Special Envoy to Haiti, with a mission to “help the government authorities to organize transparent elections in peaceful atmosphere with the participation of all the political forces” (Executive Council 2006a, 40). This wanting to observe the Haitian election, which required moving beyond their continental borders, served as a nod to the AU’s mandate to support democracy. However, the feasibility of this exercise was doubtful due to the financial limitations given by the presidential and parliamentary elections to be held on the continent at the time, for example in Ghana, Malawi, and South Africa

(African Elections 2012).

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Following this attempt to monitor elections in Haiti, talks moved forward on how to finally establish the Democratization and Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) and the Electoral

Assistance Fund, as stipulated by the Durban Declaration of July 2002 in the Principles

Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. At this point, the AU had monitored over 100 elections and sought to consolidate its presence in this area (AU 2011). Therefore, in July 2005, the Commission held consultations with the United Nations Organization in New York, the

Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm, the European

Commission for Brussels, and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(ODIHR) in Warsaw on best practices in the area of election assistance and monitoring. These consultations led to the undertaking of feasibility studies and the creation of a draft charter on

Democracy, Elections and Governance, which was then submitted for critical consideration by

Independent African Experts at a meeting held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from November 21st to

23rd, 2005. Following their assessment, this draft was to be submitted for consideration and validation by government experts and the policy organs of the union. The Independent Experts also considered the Report of the Review of the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on

Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa. Some aspects of this Declaration were then incorporated in the Draft Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (Executive Council

2006a, 41). The last outcome from this meeting was the decision that there would be a report on the feasibility of the production of a manual for observers and a critical review of observer missions carried out to date by the African Union. The aim of both the feasibility study and review was to establish how election monitoring efforts by the organization could be improved.

Consequently, the norming of democracy in the region emerged as a priority item for the AU. I expect that this will impact the importance placed on democracy programs and financing to

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election observation. Subsequently, this shift should result in democracy efforts featuring more prominently on its agenda after 2004 leading to changes in behavior on the part of its election observation missions.

Consequently, the recurring theme in the 2006 Executive Council report was governance and democracy. The report emphasized the shifting direction of the organization marking 2006 as a key year in the organization’s development regarding its role in election observation.

Specifically, there were the Cotonou Meetings on Constitutional and Political Practices where the Commission reflected on current practices in Africa and drew attention to the “phenomenon of manipulation” while making a series of recommendations on how to consolidate democracy in

Africa by encouraging the respect of constitutional provisions. The Commission used this as a platform to engage African citizens on these issues, and all recommendations were centered on the strategies of preventing and managing political and constitutional crises to “strengthen peace, stability and development” (Executive Council 2006a, 42).

Following this series of discussions on managing political issues on the continent there was a Forum on Governance in Africa held in Addis Ababa from November 24th to 26th, 2005.

This was considered to be a “new innovative approach of partnerships to foster the implementation of the priority programs on Governance” (Executive Council 2006a, 43). This forum emphasized the need for member states to be more involved, admitting that the member countries and their respective agendas play a considerable role in how the Commission operates when it comes to tackling democratic affairs and agendas:

The democratic transformation, which was set in motion a few years ago by Africa, continues with great difficulty, with its ups and downs. What should be emphasized is the declared will of our leaders to make the process irreversible. That was the task the Commission focused on and pursued during the period under review. The involvement of States through the promotion of democracy and good governance,

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and above all the peoples of Africa, through the appropriation of the process has proven to be particularly decisive in this regard (Executive Council 2006a, 50).

The next session, the Ninth Ordinary Session, was held in Gambia with concerns and agendas that echoed that of the one held earlier. Funding remained an issue for the organization with arrears at the beginning of the year resulting in a budget deficit (Executive Council 2006b,

16). There remained conflict situations on the continent to which some of these funds were directed for mediation purposes: the on-going Darfur crisis; tensions in Chad; difficulties in brokering a peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea; and post-construction efforts in Liberia, the

Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Burundi (Executive Council 2006b, 20). In addition to these on-going issues, the Commission deployed observer missions to Uganda, Chad, and the

Comoros.

Staying with the theme of democracy promotion as a key agenda item as adopted by the

Executive Council in 2003, the Commission held a series of meetings of independent experts, government experts, and Ministers to examine the draft African Charter on Democracy,

Elections and Governance that had been created earlier. Following these meetings, held in Addis

Ababa in April and May 2006 and Brazzaville in June 2006, the charter was finalized and submitted to the Executive Council for consideration and adoption. In a similar vein, the

Commission carried out two feasibility studies concerned with election observation: one on the establishment of a Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit and the other on the establishment of the Democracy and Electoral Assistance Fund. These studies were assessed by experts in

Addis Ababa between May 2nd and 4th, 2006 and then by government experts in June, prior to submission to the Executive Council. The decision-making process by any organization is wrought with checks and balances, as observed with the EU in Chapter 4, but in this situation the

AU appears quite limited in its actions by the member states. The government experts are most

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likely chosen by the respective states that make the initial assessment, which is then vetted by the

Executive Council, which consists of foreign ministers. Though the ministers may claim to be objective, I expect that their interests will always lie with the government that put them in office.

This reality plays into all decisions made regarding the amount of authority given to the observer missions.

Moving forward, the report stated that the evaluation of the AU’s work on electoral observation had begun. The aim of this study was to allow “the Organization to learn from past experiences, with a view to improving its future election observation activities” (ibid., 53). It was also stated that a guide for election observers was in its planning stages. This report is important because it highlights the increasing prioritization of election observation efforts and should result in changes in mission behavior. Namely, there should be more emphasis on the professionalization of missions with increasing funding dedicated to these missions. With this increased professionalization, we should expect more efficient missions that commit strongly to updating their mandate while in the field. Last, another agenda item was the convening of Pan-

African national electoral bodies to allow for a sharing of their experiences with electoral management and observation (ibid.). The AU was focused on encouraging a sense of unity and support among its member states as a means of furthering democracy and gaining favorable attention to election observation on its part.

The Report of the Chairperson of the Commission for the period of January to June 2007 once again returned to the importance of this unity at the continental level. The Chairperson,

Alpha Oumar Konaré, emphasized that the organization

must recognize the fact that our States cannot individually on their own, attain these objectives; and even if some of them are capable of so doing, they will not be able to stand the pressure from the big powers and the environment of undeveloped neighbors. Their role should thus be that of engine of development. Similarly, the

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objectives of sustainable development cannot be achieved through aid alone, indebtedness or whatever form of external assistance. We have to build our development of our own human and natural resources (Chairperson Report 2007, i).

However, these efforts remain a challenge due to the expressed need for continued partnership with international partners as evidenced by the pressure to finalize an EU/Africa

Joint Strategy.

Following the Khartoum summit, the AU and the EU were mandated, with the supervision of the AU/EU Troika, to draft an EU/Africa Joint Strategy for adoption at the 2nd

EU/Africa Summit. As a result, a series of meetings on the subject were held in both Brussels and Addis Ababa (Chairperson Report 2007, 68). This meeting suggested a closer political relationship between the two organizations in their approach to election observation, and therefore we should observe the AU moving closer to an EU-style of election observation.

Again, the period following 2004 should be marked by missions further emulating the “standard” form of election observation. In this same year, the 8th Ministerial Meeting of the Africa-EU

Troikas was held in Brussels, Belgium on 15 May 2007, which was preceded by Senior Officials meeting from the 12-13 May 2007. At this May meeting, the Ministers considered the draft outline for a Joint Africa-EU Strategy; the preparations for the Second Africa-EU Summit of

Heads of State and Government scheduled for December 2007 in Lisbon, Portugal; and issues pertaining to the strengthening of the Africa-EU dialogue, peace and security, good governance, regional integration and trade, and key development issues. Last, ministers endorsed the outline for a Joint Africa-EU strategy and adopted a communiqué seeking to improve and increase the economic ties between the AU and EU countries (Executive Council 2007, 116). Once again, the focus was on securing financial relationships.

Despite the discussion on economic dependency, Konaré’s report outlined several crucial issues pertaining to the political events at the time. He emphasized the importance of monitoring

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the progress of democracy, elections, governance, and human rights on the continent as the region continued to work towards the consolidation of these values. This report also highlighted the notion that “free, transparent and fair elections” were an integral aspect of democracy and means of ensuring stability in member states. As such, African citizens and leaders are seeking various ways of supporting these processes. For example, during this period the organization focused on the promotion of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combatting

Corruption (and related offences) in order to secure ratifications on the part of member states. In addition, the protection of human rights, in keeping with the requirements of a democratic system, was actively pursued through increased advocacy and domestication of the existing international and region treaties. This included strengthening the African Union human rights mechanism in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and active leadership within the realm of Governance, Democracy, Elections and Human Rights

(Chairperson Report 2007, 55). While these are not directly linked to election observation they align with the accepted understanding that elections are a fundamental right and indicate the changing rhetoric at the international level. Specifically, their adoption suggests that by strengthening these various areas, they are also increasing the impact on the part of election observers.

Continuing the governance and democracy promotion efforts, the International

Conference on Sustaining Africa’s Democratic Momentum was held in South Africa, from

March 5th to 7th, 2007. In addition to serving as an opportunity to reflect on democracy progress on the Continent, the conference, in partnership with the Electoral Commission of South Africa

(IEC) and the International Institute for Democracy, proved to be a platform for conversations on governance, democracy, and election issues. It sought to garner support for the African Charter

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on Democracy, Elections and Governance and emphasize its importance as a key instrument for the AU when engaging with member states on these matters. In conjunction with this push, the

Commission began mapping governance with initiatives as a means to identify all the partners active in governance and establish their roles to encourage stronger cooperation, partnerships, and coordinating interventions (Chairperson Report 2007, 55).

This section of the 2007 Chairperson report, outlining the progress in the region, ended by charting plans for the future of election observation on the continent. The plan was to continue the promotion of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, in close collaboration with the Regional Economic Communities and other partners. Additionally, the Commission also set out to undertake an evaluation of election observation by the African

Union to determine how this observation can be improved by giving it more credibility.

Particular emphasis was placed on the need to monitor electoral processes before and after the election itself. Focusing on elections as a cycle rather than a single process echoed the approach taken by the EU and other actors in international development, like the United Nations

Development Programme in its approach to election assistance (Field Notes, Lilongwe, Malawi,

2013). While managing these missions, the AU has sought to embody the expectations set forth by the various charters it has adopted over the years. However, the legal documents on which these policies are based are often derived from international charters and guidelines established by institutions with a longer history in democracy support and observation. In doing so, the AU has been able to engage with other international actors and align itself with the international agenda which points to a level of commitment on their part. However, as established earlier, this has an impact on AU ownership of the process and whether member states choose to embrace an institution that is not inherently their own.

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The AU sought to establish itself as an international organization and modeled itself on that of the longer-standing EU: “at the same time integration processes in both continents have accelerated – the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has been transformed into the African

Union (AU) and has integrated the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as its socio-economic programme, while the European Union (EU) has nearly doubled in size”

(Chairperson Report 2007, 118). This observation encouraged the AU to reassess its relationship with the EU with the aim of strengthening and deepening it, especially in light of the global challenges noted at the time and the increased interdependency at the international level.

According to the Executive Council, this reality made it “imperative that a new relationship based on a real partnership of equals be developed and a Joint Strategy is meant to concretize this strategic partnership” (Chairperson Report 2007, 118). Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ghana,

H.E. Nana Akufo-Addo, acknowledged that the EU served as a model and the AU’s legal framework was heavily influenced by it in that the “EU model clearly accepts a gradualist, step- by-step approach to the question of integration – an approach that is based on the systematic spread of common policies” (Chairperson Report 2007, 133). He noted that the Ethiopian

Minister was correct in stating that the “EU has been a spectacular example of success in the integration of sovereign states for common purposes” but does acknowledge the fact that the organization needs to manage its own process in Africa in order to fully establish itself (ibid.).

This move to establish itself as a major player on the continent did include not only working with the EU but also forging stronger political and economic ties with regional bodies, acknowledging the fact that the organizations develop at different rates and have various means of measuring their success. Closer relations with the EU, along with other actors in the democracy efforts, should influence AU monitoring missions as the organization further

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integrates itself into the process and seeks to establish itself as a key actor in election observation. It is paramount that it sets an example by strengthening its position as a continental political actor. These efforts included the AU’s attendance at the meetings held by the other organizations: the Commission of the African Union attended the 12th Summit of the Common

Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Authority of Heads of State and government that took place in Nairobi, Kenya May 22nd to 23rd, 2006. There were also meetings of the Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) Council of Ministers and Committee on peace and security comprising of ministers of foreign affairs (Chairperson Report 2007, 119). There were continued calls for the cooperation between the COMESA and other regional economic communities (RECs) and the African Union (ibid., 120). This pressure for cooperation between the RECs and the AU highlights the AU’s attempts to increase its involvement at a regional level. This increased interaction raises the question of how their agendas may overlap or differ and what this means for their actions on the ground.

Following the establishment of the DEAU, the efforts in addressing democracy and democracy issues on the continent remained a priority on the Commission’s agenda where the enhancement of the AUC leadership on governance and democracy issues was considered crucial. The emphasis was placed “on building an overall architecture for governance and on promoting the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” (Chairperson Report

2007, 119). In addition, the Commission continued to be active in the observation and assistance of African elections, particularly through building the capacity of election management bodies.

The AUC also focused on its partnerships aimed at supporting governance and democracy issues, which involved direct engagements with the European Union, International IDEA, and Deutsche

Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammernarbeit GmbH (GIZ). With International IDEA, a

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Memorandum of Understanding was signed for the implementation of a Joint Action Programme

(JAP). The JAP sought to build the efficiency of direct capacity assistance provided to the AUC.

GIZ provided assistance on behalf of Germany towards specific activities and the procurement of computer equipment (Executive Council 2009a, 120). This engagement with other organizations was a step forward for the organization but it also indicated that it remained dependent on outside actors. This dependence creates an identity crisis within the organization where it is unclear whether they have the political space to make independent decisions. This was a concern echoed on multiple occasions (Fieldwork interviews, 2011-2015).

The next report saw the same push for democratic governance on the continent but also emphasized the importance of stronger relationships with the RECs. The Chairperson noted that progress had been made in implementing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on

Cooperation in the area of Peace and Security between the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for

Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, signed in Addis Ababa on 28 January 2008.

Consequently, the Commission has continued to work closely with the Regional Mechanisms on peace and security issues. Six of them, namely COMESA, East African Community (EAC),

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and SADC, have appointed Liaison Officers to the AU. Similarly, the AU plans to establish liaison offices within their organizations (Executive Council 2009b, 15). Closer relationships between the organizations can help support the agendas set by the organization but risk leading to confusion in practice. Specifically, when it comes to election observation, each organization subscribes to certain international norms but is also dictated by their own agendas. In this case, there is the

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chance that encounters on the ground may lead to conflict. These issues can range from mission practices, deployment decisions, and tensions at the leadership level.

Increasing OAU Establishing a Increased focus on Prioritization of Evaluation and updating partnerships with Transition to "common African financing governcance and of election observation more established AU position" mechanisms democracy guidelines IOs

Figure 5-1. Moving Towards Improved Election Observation Guidelines

The AU’s relationships with other IOs continue to impact its role in election observations across the continent and will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Its push for encouraging the democratic agenda continues, and will be explored in the chapters on Malawi’s election, but its efforts at using election observation as a tool continue to be hindered by financial concerns.

The Challenges of Financing Election Observation

The AU has committed considerable resources to the promotion of democracy in Africa.

However, navigating its various political relationships requires robust financing and, as suggested above, the sources of these funds vary considerably. Given these issues, this section outlines the financing of AU activities over the last two decades in an effort to examine how these funds are allocated in election monitoring efforts to support the commitments discussed above.

Unfortunately, as suggested by the Chairperson’s notes, financing for the AU continues to be one of its greatest challenges with member countries failing to pay their dues in a timely manner, if at all. Though the issue has been acknowledged, no real measures have been put in place to secure reliable sources of financing. There was a clear need for the Union to secure credible and reliable sources of financing for the implementation of its programs. Without adequate funding, the election observation missions are unable to successfully fulfill their

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mandates. In 2009, the Commission submitted proposals regarding alternative sources of funding to the ministers of Finance, but this issue was not resolved. This discussion was then postponed to the next Ministers Conference to be held in 2010. From this point, member states were challenged to find a solution to this problem for which no progress has been made since the decision to address this problem was made in July 2003 (Executive Council 2009b: 2). 2010 saw the same issue with the Chairperson appealing to the policy organs of the Union to find solutions to the challenge of financing the Strategic Plan and reduce its reliance on external partners. The need for financial independence was tethered to the notion that it was the sole way for the AU to be a successful actor on the continent, and on a global scale: “an organization which is increasingly acquiring a pride of place both in the Continent and in the world at large and should, for this reason, be endowed with resources commensurate with its ambitions and growing responsibilities” (Executive Council 2010a, 1). In speaking on these issues, the Chairperson, Mr.

Jean Ping, made the point that “African stinginess ‘does not do honor to the African cause’” (The

Economist 2011). One can sense the Chairperson’s frustration with the continuing challenges associated with the inability to fund programs. Here, we see language associated with a shared culture, a position that does define the AU and its operations. This rhetoric lends support to the argument that the AU holds a different position from that of the EU given the nature of the relationships between the countries, one that the EU, as an entirely foreign body does not share.

Currently, the African countries pay for only about 40 percent of the AU’s total budget with China, the European Union, and the United States paying for the rest. Unfortunately for the

AU, much of this support comes with expectations. These financial relationships and the expectations that come along with them may explain the AU’s increasing adoption of EU norms and protocols for election observation. In the following section, I discuss the various components

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of the AU’s observation deployment process and how it, at times, replicates EU protocols, especially with the publication of the AU observer manual in 2013. Erastus Mwencha, Deputy

AUC Chairperson, noted that “it's not possible that the partners will always align themselves to your priorities. That is always the danger you face. Partners have got their biases and rightly so”

(The Economist 2011). These are the same biases that undermine any efforts at establishing a truly “African” form of continental governance and continue to create tension within the organization. For this reason, Mwencha argued that the commission wanted to fully finance itself by relying on contributions made by member states. According to him, the AUC operating budget is 100% financed by member states in an effort to reduce foreign dependence. However, program funding remains a challenge and the current goal is to achieve 45% foreign and 55% domestic financing for these efforts. In line with a $308m budget that has been adopted by the

Executive Council for the work of the commission for the year 2014, peace and security and socio-economic development remain top priorities and will consist of 55 percent of the budget

(The Economist 2011). Unfortunately, this does not leave much for anything else.

As part of fundraising efforts, the AU has been partnering with more established and financially viable institutions like the European Union with whom it established The African

Union Capacity in Election Observation Program to be held during the years of 2015-2017 (AUC

2014). The grant of 6,500,00 Euros is to support projects and the AUC in the procurement services (ibid., 1). While this project does not fall in the timeframe under observation for this project, future work may wish to explore how this partnership has redefined AU missions in more recent elections and the influence the EU has had on their process. The main objective of the project is to ensure that the AU is able to conduct long-term election observation that adheres to international standards. The specific objectives of the project tackle different aspects of

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developing and implementing a long-term methodology including the development of human capacity, the development of a methodological and technical basis, and the deployment of long- term missions. The current proposal covers the period 2014-2017 but if considered successful, the funding could be extended to 2020 (AUC 2014, 1). Three EU Member States, United

Kingdom (UK), Sweden, and Denmark, have pledged to support DEAU activities for the period

2014-2016 to the tune of USD 2.1 million a year under a pool fund called Joint Financing

Agreement (ibid., 5). Under this project, the main vehicle for ensuring donor coordination is the

AU Partners Group (AUPG) for the shared values pillar, co-chaired by the UK and the AU. The

AUPG meets formally at least twice a year with the AU's Department of Political Affairs to discuss the implementation of agreed activities. The co-chair of the AUPG calls for coordination meetings among partners on a more regular basis (once every six weeks on average). In 2014, the

AUC signed with several partners, including the EU, UK, Sweden, Denmark, and Netherlands, a

Joint Partnership Agreement to support the activities undertaken by the Department of Political

Affairs.

International partners remain crucial to election observation efforts where many EU funded programs have been implemented to build capacity. Despite continual calls for decreased dependence on external donors, the EU continues to be among the larger contributors to the

AU’s operational budget. As alluded to earlier, these financial relationships have significant impact on the extent to which, and the manner in which, the AU adheres to the EU “standard.”

In 2013 and 2014, the AU Support Programme provided 1.1 million US dollars to the AU to undertake EOMs and also funded the participation of DEAU staff at trainings for EU observers.

Furthermore, in 2013 the Joint African-EU Strategy (JAES) Support Mechanism funded a seminar on comprehensive and long-term election observation further strengthening the

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relationship between the two organizations. Beyond this seminar, the EU project Election

Observation and Democracy Support (EODS) has been providing technical assistance to the

DEAU since 2013 in the form of trainings and elaboration of instruments and has contributed to strengthening regional and domestic observation in Africa under the auspices of the European

Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (AUC 2014, 4).

These funding concerns link to issues of member support and prioritization of what they consider to be important. Conferences on this subject have been, and continue to be, held to solicit further support from member states to commit to the documents that have been drafted and signed on to by the Commission. For example, in July 13-15, 2015 there was a conference in

Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire to discuss ways of promoting the ratification of the ACDEG. As of now, the document has been ratified by only 24 countries (Department of Political Affairs 2015, 2).12

Without the support of member states, there is no incentive to push the democratic agenda forward. Programming efforts are highly dependent upon member state funding; however, member states are subject to their own political wills. Consequently, what they choose to ratify or pledge money for is highly indicative of the sentiments held by members at a given time and what their respective agendas are.

The following section discusses the specifics of AU observer missions. Beyond funding, the organization still faces a number of logistical and technical issues that make the observation process challenging, and may serve as explanations for the differences between AU and EU missions and the other organizations to be discussed in the later chapters.

12 The countries that are yet to ratify the ACDEG are South Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sahrawi, Sudan, Chad, Togo, and Zambia. 23 states have signed but not yet ratified the document are Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan, Tunisia, and Uganda. Last, six have neither signed nor ratified and they include Botswana, Egypt, Libya, Seychelles, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

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The AU as an Election Observer

The AU bases its election support and monitoring guidelines on four key documents:

African Union’s Constitutive Act (2002); the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing

Democratic Elections in Africa (2002); the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and

Governance (ACDEG) (2007); and the Guidelines for AU Electoral Observation and Monitoring

Missions. In addition, the organization is a signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (1948), the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of

Conduct for International Elections Observers (2005). The Universal Declaration of Human

Rights (UDHR) establishes participation in electoral and political processes as a fundamental human right, which is then reaffirmed by the Declaration of Principles that presents the scope and methodology of international observation. The timeline in which these charters were adopted limits the scope for observation at the country level and it is for this reason that this dissertation focuses solely on elections monitored after 2002, when monitoring was institutionalized and considered a core expectation for the organization.

The AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa emphasizes the obligations of AU Member states in the promotion of democracy through the establishment of relevant institutions. The guidelines for AU electoral observation go further in this endeavor and outline “the procedure and preconditions for the deployment of an African

Union election observation mission (AUEOM) and determine the scope of participation” (AU

2013, 13). Notably, the “guidelines require countries holding elections to invite the AU” (ibid.).

While this requirement was only formally established after the tumultuous 2007 Kenyan election, it has always been an expectation on the part of the organization that they be allowed to monitor elections in all member states (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 5, 2015). This statement establishes a key difference between the EU and the AU when it comes to election

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observation. Namely, the AU has the political space to make such pronouncements because a similar requirement from the EU would be considered as an imposition by the West. Put differently, this example indicates the manner in which the participation in election observation by African actors can redefine the process.

The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) advocates for the “respect for human rights and democratic principles; holding of regular, transparent, free and fair elections; effective participation of citizens in the governance of public affairs; and strengthening political pluralism and recognizing the role of opposition parties” (ACDEG 2007,

15). In terms of elections, the charter requires that states commit to the establishment of independent and impartial EMBs and national mechanisms for dispute resolution; ensure fair use of state resources, especially with the media; establish a code of conduct for electoral stakeholders; and encourage the acceptance of election results (ibid., 15). This document enhances the AU mandate by establishing “a clear link between the electoral process and the wider governance context in Member states” and stipulating a mechanism for the application of these established principles (ibid., 15). The ACDEG was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in

2007 in an effort to entrench the promises made on the continent thus far regarding its commitment to democracy promotion and the strengthening of democratic institutions on the continent (ACDEG 2007, 20). By expressly stating the centrality of election monitoring to this process, it emphasized the importance of the AU’s role, in that it is “convinced of the need to enhance the election observation missions in the role they play, particularly as they are an important contributory factor to ensure the popularity, transparency and credibility of elections”

(ibid., 1). With this statement, the AU solidifies its commitment, one that, prior to 2007, existed without any legal provisions.

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Keeping in line with these commitments, the AU in 2013 published their African Union

Election Observation Manual that outlines AU protocol for election observation in the region and was “designed to provide guidance to observers on the benchmarks and the methodology for observation of elections by the AU” (AU 2013, 5). This manual notes that simply holding regular elections is not sufficient for a country to successfully democratize, suggesting that the quality of the election is of utmost importance. Consequently, observation is the “international best practice for assessing elections” and has now become a more accepted practice in African elections, where it plays a “critical role in the promotion of the integrity and credibility of electoral processes” (ibid., 7). According to the manual, election observation seeks to safeguard the integrity of the electoral process; promote the openness and transparency of the process; enhance public confidence; diffuse potential tensions; deter improper practices and attempts at fraud; increase political credibility; contribute to the acceptance of election results; and disseminate and strengthen international standards and electoral best practices. Moving forward, based on the agreement that AU EOM reports be published and made available, the Commission created a

Follow Up on Recommendations program to ensure “broader interaction with election stakeholders in Member States and support them in the implementation of the recommendations of AUEOM reports” (Executive Council 2015,15; interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2015).

As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, one of the pilots of this program was held in Malawi in 2015. By establishing guidelines and clarifying that reports should be made available, the AU showed an increased level of transparency. This transparency allowed for a closer assessment of its positions on key issues suggesting that the AU is increasingly embodying the democratic ideals that it mimics.

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The increasing level of commitment, signaled by the adoption of protocols that challenge existing conventions, on the AU’s part in recent years suggests a variation in attitudes towards election monitoring. In other words, the organization that was established in 2002 has evolved over the years and thus we should observe varying patterns of behavior given the fact that election observation is emerging as a key tool for democracy promotion in the region.

As noted above, certain key principles and charters drive AU operations. Focusing on the encouragement of these values through election assistance and observation, the Democracy and

Electoral Assistance Unit (DEAU) was formed with the aim of further establishing and supporting domestic political institutions. The unit’s mandate is to coordinate and organize

African Union election observer missions to Member States of the Union. In addition, it is expected to enhance the national electoral processes of Member States through the provision of direct technical and electoral assistance to Election Management Bodies in Africa (DEAU 2012, np). This mandate relies upon the improvement of methodologies and practices of elections in

Africa, prioritizing research and data aggregation to ensure that the electoral process continues to evolve and improve. This process relies heavily on the DEAU’s ability to disseminate information. Most importantly, the DEAU is to inform all stakeholders and its mandate constituency of its activities and what remains to be done for every election. For example, it must produce publications that outline the outcome of events held, instruments used and methodology of elections, and information on election management (ibid.).

The AU takes an electoral cycle approach to election monitoring in order to assess the various stages of the process and employs standard methodology for election observation through the compilation of information pertaining to all aspects of the election. The AU’s approach to election observation is based on that of the EU, which had established its own model

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of observation well before the AU standardized its own. The various missions are fact-finding missions, pre-election assessment missions, long-term election observation missions, short-term election observation missions, technical assessment missions, and pre- and post-election audits.

Each of these missions provides an insight into the nature of the process. Establishing the different types sent to a particular election, and the circumstances under which they were deployed, is rather telling of the AU agenda at a given time. Questions include: How many observers are deployed? Was the mission short- or long-term? Was a pre-election assessment team deemed necessary? What did they find? These are all questions pertaining to the specificities of a given election and the decisions surrounding it. The section below outlines the

AU’s election observation mission process.13 It also compares the AU’s process to EU’s, highlighting their similarities and differences. This template will serve as means of analysis when assessing the determinants of mission behavior in the field.

First, the AU deploys a Pre-election Assessment Team three months prior to elections.

According to the AU, these teams are sent for every mission, but whether they are, and the length in which they are in country, varies per election. This expectation was only explicitly stated in the 2013 publication, leaving missions held up to this point a lot more flexible. The potential for ambiguity of mission observations prior to 2013 suggests a difference in the AU’s attitude towards election observation, moving it closer to the EU model. Consequently, we should observe the missions behaving more similarly to EU missions after 2013. This team makes a preliminary and impartial assessment of the country’s political, electoral, and security context in accordance with the established documents and their team’s Terms of Reference (ToR). In doing so, the team establishes whether the environment is amenable to the holding of genuine and

13 An overview of this process can be found in Appendix E.

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credible elections. Where necessary, the team is expected to provide clear recommendations on the feasibility of the AUEOM or any other AU interventions. Following the mission, it produces an advisory report that provides an analysis of the political context of an election (AU 2013, 24).

The government is then tasked with assisting in this project with the provision of meetings with government and public institution representatives,14 election related documents,15 maps, figures, and security reports.

Missions may consist of DEAU staff (coordinator), a political analyst, a regional or country expert, a legal expert, an election expert, a logistics expert and a security expert. The team is in the country for 7-10 days prior to determining the type of mission that should be sent: limited observation mission, short-term observer mission, and expert mission/technical assessment mission. Similarly, the EU sends a mission consisting “of two European External

Action Service staff (a member of the election team who leads the mission and the geographical desk), one Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) staff (project manager of the mission in charge of security, logistics and, budgetary aspects), and three external experts in elections, security, and logistics” that are in the country for approximately 10 days (EU 2016a, 123). If unable to deploy a full observer mission to the election, the EU may decide, based on the recommendations, to deploy an Election Expert Missions (EEM) and External Assessment Team (EAT) (ibid.). Again, we observe the manner in which the EU sets an example for the AU election observation process. 2013 marked the AU’s progression towards embracing the standard EU model.

14 These government and public institution representatives include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior or Territorial Administration, national electoral commission, political parties civil society organizations, local interest groups, the media, citizen observer groups, the office of Special Representative of the AU, and/or the AU liaison office (where applicable).

15 These documents include constitutions, election legislation, reports on previous elections, information of the election administration, country data, election budgets, and recent exchange of correspondence.

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The nature of the mission sent is telling because it provides information on the level of resources allocated to the mission, the nature of the election, and the considerations on the part of the organization. Every mission has different considerations and concessions to make once on the ground. Therefore, these pre-election assessment missions offer an opportunity for dialogue between the organization and the member state holding the election prior to the arrival of the actual mission, thus setting the tone for future interactions.

Short-term observation missions (STO)

The AU has deployed over 300 short-term observation missions (STOs) across the continent and these STOs form an integral part of LTOs. The EU does not send stand-alone STO missions but has monitored 77 elections in Africa since 1994 (EEAS 2017, np).16 Their activities are managed by the core team that is then joined by a team of AUC and Pan-African Parliament

(PAP) staff during STO deployment. However, these missions can be deployed on their own based of the recommendations made by the Pre-Election Mission. When the mission is a stand- alone one, it is managed by a coordination team composed solely of AUC and PAP staff and their technical partners.

The missions stay in the country for 10-14 days and focus mainly on the days before election day, election day, and up to 72 hours after polling has occurred (AU 2013, 30). For the

EU, STOs arrive around a week prior to the start of polling and are in country for 10-12 days. All their work is undertaken under the supervision of an observer coordinator and their designated

16 1994 - Mozambique, South Africa; 1999 - Mozambique, Nigeria; 2000 - Tanzania, Zimbabwe; 2001 - Zambia; 2002 - Congo, Kenya, Madagascar, Sierra-Leone, Zimbabwe; 2003 -Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda; 2004 - Malawi, Mozambique; 2005 - Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia; 2006 - Congo, Mauritania, Uganda, Zambia; 2007 - Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra-Leone, Togo; 2008 - Angola, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Zambia; 2009 - Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, South Africa; 2010 - Burundi, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo; 2011 - Chad, Congo, Nigeria, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia; 2012 - Algeria, Libya, Malawi, Senegal, Sierra-Leone, Togo; 2013 -Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Swaziland (EEM); 2014 - Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Tunisia; 2015 - Burkina Faso, Burundi, Guinea, Nigeria, Tanzania; 2016 - Gabon (EOM), Somalia (EEM), Zambia (EOM), Ghana (EOM), Uganda (EOM) (EEAS 2017, np).

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LTO team (EU 2016a, 158). Given their shorter period on the ground, they rely heavily on the briefings and notes provided by the LTOs (AU 2013, 30). Their key outputs are a preliminary statement and the mission’s final report. Using checklists provided by the technical team, these reports assess the opening of polling stations, the ballot, and other election materials; presence of the security forces; location and layout of polling stations; the voting process and secrecy of the ballot; presence of party agents and independent observers; accuracy of the voters’ roll; closing the poll; vote counting; and announcement of results at the polling stations, centers or districts levels. Like the AU mission, EU STOs meet with a number of local actors and electoral stakeholders. These include “members of the local EMB, polling station officials, and counting officials; candidate representatives and political party representatives in polling stations; citizen and international election observers; officials from local government (e.g., mayors) and police; and, occasionally, journalists” (EU 2016a, 159).

Following the election, a debriefing is held within 48 hours to discuss findings. The debriefing period is a crucial point in the election monitoring process because organizations can take this opportunity to modify their findings and tweak their statements to the press. This ambiguity, and the concerns it raises, was mentioned on multiple occasions by various political stakeholders during fieldwork and draws attention to the fact that organizations make certain political calculations on several occasions during the election monitoring process. The timing of these decisions is highly dependent on IO agenda and the dynamics between the mission and country once on the ground. Consequently, these political calculations are very telling of an organization’s intentions during a given election. It provides an opportunity for the organization to decide what it feels should be emphasized and what does not merit any further attention.17

17 This discussion will be elaborated upon later in this dissertation as it pertains to all organizations and mission types.

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Like the EU, the AU mission’s preliminary findings are presented at a press conference followed by observers holding a report validation session where the draft of the final report is discussed and validated by all observers (AU 2013, 32). For an STO that is part of an LTO mission, the report is only finalized once the mission has been completed.

Long-term observation missions (LTO)

Long-term observation missions (LTOs) are a relatively new type of AU mission, carried out before but only formalized by the 2013 observation guidelines, due to funding challenges.

Such missions serve as complements to STO missions. As mentioned earlier, LTOs have been a trademark of EU election observation, with the organization carefully selecting countries that it considers to be “priorities” to ensure that it is able to deploy a full mission, circumstances permitting. On the other hand, the AU has previously been unable to finance such missions, and for this reason their presence in a given election is notable. The formalization of LTOs indicates the AU’s continued adoption of EU norms and should lead to changes in IO behavior. Concerns with the short missions were that they caused issues with representation, management, and providing comprehensive observation reports. In addition, these short missions severely limit the mission’s ability to properly analyze and address the key issues such as the electoral law, gender, and media bias. In order to address these issues, the AU committed to start deploying core teams in 2015 (AU 2014, 3). Therefore, the introduction of LTOs as the “new standard” for the AU is telling of its goal of becoming a crucial political actor in African elections. With the increase in funding allocated to political affairs, training was also provided for LTO missions in order to increase their capacity and ensure improved quality of observation and professionalism. In addition, there has been a gradual improvement in election observation tools and methodology to ensure evidence-based reporting and improve the overall quality of AU EOM reports.

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LTOs span from the start of the pre-election period to the end of election. Due to the extended period under observation, the mission requires that a number of observers be in the country three months before election day. These observers are tasked with providing first-hand information on the crucial aspects of the electoral period and provide the necessary background and country-specific information to the STOs that are deployed immediately prior to the elections. These LTOs are key to ensuring a comprehensive election assessment and they create a final report of the AUEOM’s assessment of the elections. The report combines the findings of the pre-election assessment mission on the pre-election context, its own findings on the immediate pre-election context, the findings of the STOs on election day, and its findings on the immediate post-election phase.

LTOs are deployed to different areas in the country and mandated to observe various election-related activities on-site and gather relevant information from in-country stakeholder meetings and documentation. They are also tasked with meeting relevant stakeholders at the national and regional levels and establishing a database for STOs. As a result, STOs are better prepared for deployment upon arrival but they also risk being limited by the information provided by the LTOs. With these missions, LTOs must be transparent and, if not, they risk compromising the monitoring process.

Using their mandate of democracy and governance, the LTOs collect the following information: impartiality of the EMB; legal and regulatory framework for elections; voter registrations and voter access to the registration process; registration of political parties; party finance regulations and access of parties to public resources; the nomination of candidates; voter awareness and sensitization campaigns; the participation of women and underrepresented groups; the freedom of contesting political parties; candidates’ rights to campaign, assemble, and air their

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views in public; access of political parties; alliances and candidates’ access to public and private media; the voting and counting process; the compilation, tabulation, and transmission of results; the complaints and appeal process; and the announcement of the final results. In addition, they are to focus on the technical aspects of the electoral process such as planning and procurement procedures; training of election personnel; accreditation of observers and party agents; design and procurement of the ballot; and distribution, location, and layout of polling stations (AU

2013, 28). All these pieces of information provide insights as to the nature of the electoral process. Observers are able to establish areas of concern, issues to address, political stakeholders that risk undermining the process, and relationships with other international observers, among other things.

LTOs are recruited through open advertisement and an internal screening process.

Following their selection, they are given a briefing on the mandate and scope of activities, AU observation methodology and code of conduct, country background information, updates on election preparations, political and logistical context of the respective areas of the deployment, as well as reporting requirements and use of checklists (AU 2013, 28). The AU, as is the case with several other election-monitoring bodies, tends to select observers who have some experience in the area of election management. For example, these can be electoral experts, former Heads of

States, ministers, and AU’s Political Affairs staff.

The core team makes all deployment decisions with considerations made to geographical coverage, language, gender, and expertise of the team members (AU 2013, 28). As an African organization, there is often an overlap between the identities of the members of the observer team and the citizenry, a relationship that does not occur within some of its counterparts. This is due to the composition of the organizations. The AU and Southern African Development

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Community (SADC) are made up solely of African countries while the Commonwealth of

Nations (CS) has 11 Southern African countries and European Union (EU) membership is restricted to European nations. This distinction is particularly salient in the case of the SADC and

Malawi due to the proximity of member states, a relationship that will be further explored in the discussion on SADC’s experience as an election monitor.

The observers are usually deployed in teams of two, though in some rare cases an observer team can consist of a single individual. Depending on the length of deployment and the size of the mission, LTO teams may be deployed to a single region throughout the period of deployment to allow for a deep understanding of the region. For smaller missions, the teams may be deployed to a number of regions to ensure wider coverage. The teams receive deployment funds and the AUC provides them with necessary equipment like laptops, internet modems, and mobile phones (AU 2013, 29). Considering the distances that must be travelled, constant and reliable communication is crucial for these organizations. Once deployed, these teams must produce weekly and quarterly reports and incident reports where necessary. They are then joined by the STOs as the polling date approaches.

Expert/Technical Assessment Missions (TAM)

This project does not focus on expert/technical assessment missions as they are very limited in scope and are not sent to countries as often as STO or LTO missions. Rather, these missions serve as alternatives to full observer missions when the circumstances in the host country are not amenable to observation. These missions are similar to the EU’s Election Expert mission (EEM) and External Assessment Team (EAT). However, for the purpose of understanding the AU’s election monitoring procedures, and how they compare to the EU’s, they are briefly discussed here.

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TAM’s consist of three to six members with the necessary expertise and knowledge of the country. In addition to expertise, the AU considers the gender balance of the mission, the language requirements of the host country, and representation of AU staff. While they investigate similar issues during the period right before and after election day, these missions are restricted to the capital city and/or outskirts of the capital mainly due to their size. The key output is a report that presents an expert assessment of key aspects of the electoral process.

Reports may be similar but have limited sources in comparison to AU EOMs who consult with a larger number of stakeholders beyond the national level. Therefore, information gathered from these reports present an extremely narrow image of the electoral process (AU 2013, 32).

Similarly, an EEM consists of two to four experts that include a team leader, an electoral/legal expert, a human rights and gender expert, and, at times, a media expert. This mission is deployed several weeks prior to an election and meets with a number of election stakeholders, using similar methodology to the long-term missions. However, this mission does not conduct standard election-day observation and has no media visibility (EU 2016a, 126). The

EAT is usually composed of a full core team of experts based in the capital but does not include

LTOs or STOs and does not conduct standard election-day observation. These missions tend to be “deployed in circumstances where security constraints” do not allow for the deployment of a large number of observers across the country. However, if conditions allow, a small team of regional analysts can be deployed to follow the process outside the capital. EATs are supported by a service provider (SP) team on the ground and, in certain cases, are headed by a Chief

Observer (EU 2016a, 127).

Pre-and Post-Election Audits

A last component of the process is the pre- and post-election audits. These audits allow the stakeholders “to review the performance of systems, processes, institutions and procedures in

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order to verify and certify the integrity and validity of an electoral process” as mandated by the

AU guidelines for electoral observation (AU 2013, 32). The aim of this exercise is to find ways of improving the manner in which elections are managed. Prior to the election, these audits serve to evaluate the areas that may prove to be challenging and alert the various stakeholders. It also assesses the post-election audit from the past election. The post-audit is an opportunity to review the process in its entirety in the form of a workshop preceded by a consultation visit to each of the EMBs of the member States. During these meetings, the AU addresses the challenges faced during the electoral process, identifies electoral dispute triggers, and measures compliance with the ACDEG. Malawi’s first ever post-election audit was held in August 2015, in an effort to establish whether AU recommendations had been taken into consideration and how to best prepare for the 2019 elections (Interview, Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015).

Conclusion

Moving through the AU’s development and the role of democracy in its involvement in member states, the reports issued by the Executive Council and the Chairperson’s report to the

Commission outline the trajectory taken when it comes to translating these mandates and discussions into action. Therefore, much of this chapter presented evidence that the African

Union’s rhetoric has been changing over the years and these changes are often reflected in the organization’s behavior. With 54 member states, political relationships tend to be messy and therefore the organization has to harmonize its expectations with the reality in which it operates.

This chapter showed that funding, member states’ behaviors, regional tensions, and political attitudes impact the organization’s operation efforts when it comes to democracy promotion and support, and election monitoring more specifically. Markedly, as will be explored in Malawi, the tone of election observer reports has reflected these shifts. Over the years, the AU has become more critical and missions more transparent as to what its intentions are. In this vein, it is moving

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more towards the “standard” EU-model. However, it remains apparent that regional politics still underlie many of the actions undertaken by this organization and are reflected in the decisions made on its part.

The next chapter focuses on The Southern African Development Community (SADC). In a similar vein to this chapter, it outlines the SADC documents pertaining to political affairs on the continent and how its development has determined attitudes and programs concerning election monitoring in the region.

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CHAPTER 6 THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

Introduction

The previous chapter explored the African Union’s (AU) relationship with democracy and the development of its election monitoring process over the last two decades. Specifically, it examined the conversations surrounding these two areas and how this rhetoric shifted depending on the situation that the organization faced. Chapter 5 compared the AU’s development to that of the European Union and found that while the AU has increasingly adopted EU election observation protocols which has influenced its process, its behavior is still determined by its identity as a regional actor. Limitations placed on the AU’s activities surrounding election observation are often due to financial constraints making it difficult to operate at levels similar to that of the EU. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), like the AU, supports efforts on the part of its member states and faces similar financial constraints. Often funding is provided by the larger, more influential countries and these relationships impact how SADC responds to political changes and the degree to which it adopts the current election observation

“standards.” However, when ranked by their impact, the EU is always considered to be the most organized, with the AU falling second due to its tendency to “work as a club” at times, and

SADC placing third as it focuses much of its energy on regional politics (Interview, Lilongwe,

Malawi, July 11, 2014). This chapter is organized in a similar manner as Chapters 4 and 5, assessing SADC’s political development over the years and how this has impacted its policies on, and involvement in, election observation in the region.

From SADCC to SADC

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was first established as the

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). SADCC was established in

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an effort to reduce economic dependence on apartheid South Africa “but also on any single external state or group of states” (SADCC 1980, 3). SADCC’s establishment was a culmination of the efforts made on the part of the Frontline States1 who had begun to discuss the possibility of development coordination in 1977. In May 1979, the foreign ministers of these countries met in Gaborone, Botswana followed by a meeting of the economic ministers in July 1979 in Arusha,

Mozambique (Lee 1989, 4). As a result of this goal of achieving economic independence, the leaders and representatives of independent states in Southern Africa gathered in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1st, 1980 to sign the Declaration Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation marking the official establishment of the organization.

The signatory countries, Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, felt the need to distance themselves from the oppressive governments and economic systems in their neighboring nations. Echoing similar sentiments to those expressed at the initial formation of the African Union, SADC’s mission was “not the quest for liberation, but

[to tackle] the entrenched racism, exploitation and oppression which is the cause of conflict in

Southern Africa…Economic liberation is, therefore, as vital as political freedom.” (Lee 1989: 4).

The intention was to eventually extend membership to all eligible “genuinely independent

Southern African States” (ibid.).

However, these countries, emerging from single-party regimes and economic instability, were not prepared to tackle the challenges that the region was facing. At one of the first meetings held after the SADCC was formed, President Mugabe lamented the lack of autonomy that the countries faced regarding their economic resources. Mugabe was especially upset at the fact that the SADCC nations had shifted from a political to an economic dependence on a foreign power, which to him presented a greater challenge considering that economic goods could be physically

1 The Frontline States were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Mozambique.

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removed from the continent. In his opinion, this removal of goods from the continent produced

“a mouse’s share for us and a lion’s share for [them]” (SADCC 1980, 12). His counterparts in the other countries echoed this sentiment. Thus, despite its good intentions, it was clear that

SADCC had a long road ahead of it due to the economic, political, and social challenges the continent was facing. Consequently, there was a sense of utter helplessness on the organization’s part to regain control of its states that implied that it had allowed this situation to occur and led to leaders asking themselves: “is there any wonder that we have been turned to either economic puppets of perpetual beggars?” (SADCC 1980, 12).

In response to this frustration, SADCC made attempts to strengthen its positions on some of these issues. It became apparent that the region had to “get organized in a methodical way” in order to allow it to attain the economic liberty and self-reliance that it sought (SADCC 1981, 16).

However, at the same time, SADCC was reminded by the Botswanan Minister of Finance and

Development Planning that the organization must always stay true to what it is: “As we move forward, therefore, let us not forget who we are or lose our African personality. That is the essence of SADCC” (SADCC 1981, 18). Similar to the “us against them” culture at the OAU’s onset, there was a sense that SADCC was at odds with an oppressive common enemy, that of apartheid South Africa:

Here in Southern Africa we have a situation which is unique in Africa. We have a neighbor, from an alien culture, practicing a social and political philosophy which denies the black man any voice in the government of his own country. That neighbor continues to dominate our economic lives and actively seeks to ensure that we remain weak and divided vassals of his dominion. SADCC has been created to give the lie to that proposition (SADC 1981, 18).

These sentiments are important to note because they set the tone for the organization.

Here we see an organization at odds with not only its colonial legacies, but with a regional power. The tension between the smaller SADCC countries and the more powerful regional actors

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is one that resurfaces at key points in the organization’s existence and impacts its political trajectories. This challenge severely undermined its efforts to tackle political issues like the encouragement of democratic institutions. Rather, power was given to the Heads of Governments and actions depended on “political will” requiring that members of the organization defer to them (SADC 1981, 20). Leaders were often derailed by more pressing issues as it was acknowledged that the organization had given priority to lesser issues: “there are areas where more could have been achieved if we had given more of our time, given a higher priority to

SADCC, than to other pressing and important demands” (SADC 1981, 20). As expected, this deferment proved challenging because, despite the expressed commitment to ensuring the organization adhere to a form of bureaucracy, it led to a lack of clarity as to how SADCC was expected to fulfill its expectations. Even more problematic was the continued emphasis of

SADCC as a “brotherhood.” While this may have nurtured a spirit of camaraderie among the leaders, it also seemed to encourage a lackadaisical attitude. It was clear that the organization needed to clarify its goals and how it sought to achieve them.

In order to make these efforts more concrete, the signatories signed a Memorandum of

Understanding at the Institutions of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference on July 20th, 1981 in Harare, Zimbabwe, and had it amended on July 22, 1982, in Gaborone,

Botswana. This document served as its charter. Echoing the statements made in the Declaration, the charter went a step further and outlined the institutions and their roles, the plans for fiscal management, and the legal capacity in which SADCC was to operate (SADC 2012c, np). As with the AU, the culture of economic and political preservation on which the SADCC was first founded set the tone, and to some extent still does, for member state interactions and behavior.

Moving towards the transformation to SADC, achieving economic independence remained the

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priority with the focus placed on transport and communications, agriculture and food security, industry, mining, manpower development, and energy; all were areas considered crucial for development (SADCC 1984, 9). As a development community, SADCC saw economic development as the solution to address the other challenges, including the political ones, but recognized its inability to do so successfully.

Eventually, SADCC’s continued inability to address the multitude of issues that the region faced led to SADC’s establishment in 1992. SADC was an effort to formalize the institution and give it a more established place in the international community. At the Summit of

Heads of State or Government, in Harare, Zimbabwe, it was decided that SADC should be formalized to “give it an appropriate legal status…to replace the Memorandum of Understanding with an Agreement, Charter, or Treaty” (SADC 2016a, np). SADC was then formally established on August 17, 1992 at a Summit held in Windhoek, Namibia, where the Heads of States and

Government signed the SADC Declaration and Treaty that effectively transformed the SADCC into SADC. The organization was thus established under Article 2 of the SADC Treaty by the member states, represented by their respective Heads of State and Government, or duly authorized representatives, to spearhead the economic integration of Southern Africa (SADC

2016a, np). From this point, SADC existed as an intergovernmental organization tasked with promoting “sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security among fifteen Southern African Member States” (SADC 2016b, np).

At this point, all countries in the region had been granted membership in the organization.

The shift from the SADCC to SADC was considered a necessary step in strengthening the organization and holding the states accountable for the commitment made to the process, but

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the SADC still faced its share of challenges to economic integration. While multiple scholars have explored the economic efforts by SADC,2 there has been a lack of investigation into the political dynamics that inevitably arise when multiple countries attempt to merge their economies. This point is particularly important given SADCs marked shift towards tackling political issues at both the national and international level. An example of this is the support given to Mugabe by SADC following the West’s announcement that Zimbabwe would be sanctioned. The organization took a stance in defense of its regional block with Tanzanian

Foreign Minister, Jakaya Mrisho Kiwete, stating that, “We are 14 countries in SADC. The EU can either fund us as a group or keep its financial aid” (Sirota 2004, 343). It was made clear that

SADC sought to expand its role in the international political arena. SADC’s navigation of this political sphere is of interest to this dissertation, especially given the manner in which this environment affects their policies towards democracy efforts and election observation, more specifically.

SADC and the Move towards Democratic Governance

SADC, as did the AU after its transformation from the OAU, embraced the notions of democracy and good governance. Given the timing of its establishment, it was part of the post-

Cold War democratic wave. As such, SADC abides by the following principles: sovereign equality of all member states; solidarity, peace, and security; human rights, democracy and the rule of law; equity, balance and mutual benefit; and peaceful settlement of disputes (SADC 2014,

5). Echoing the principles of organizations like the EU and AU, these broad principles require that SADC tackle a multitude of issues. Of particular interest to this work is the promotion of political values, systems, and other shared ideals through democratic, legitimate, and effective

2 Examples of this literature include Hansom and Peter-Berries (2002), Schiff and Winters (2003), Lee (2003), and Khandelwal (2004), to name a few.

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institutions; and the consolidation, defense, and maintenance of democracy peace, security, and stability. These two objectives inform the programming on democracy assistance and election monitoring. While the others are important in terms of establishing the organization’s wider foci, they are not directly relevant to the questions under investigation.3 The following section outlines the steps undertaken by SADC to ensure that democracy remained a priority for the organization.

On August 14th, 2001, in Blantyre, Malawi, the Heads of State and Government signed an agreement amending the 1992 SADC Treaty to establish the Regional Indicative Strategic

Development Plan (RISDP) (SADC 2016a, np). This plan was then approved in 2003 and implemented in 2005. The RISDP serves as a wide-ranging 15-year strategic plan to assist

SADC in achieving its long-term social and economic goals. In order to do so, it provides well- defined guidelines to aid the Secretariat, and other institutions, in the implementation of SADC’s social and economic polities. With the clear articulation of SADC policy and expectations, the

RISDP “reaffirms the commitment of SADC Member States to good, political, economic and corporate governance entrenched in a culture of democracy, full participation by civil society, transparency and respect for the rule of law” (RISDP, 5; SADC 2016c, np). Therefore, the

RISDP was put in place to enforce the commitments made by SADC and reiterate those made by the AU and NEPAD. This agreement emphasized the AU’s expressed commitment to work

3 The complete list of objectives are to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic development; enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration; promote common political values, systems and other shared values through democratic, legitimate and effective institutions; consolidate, defend, and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability; promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of member states; achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programs; promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources of the region; achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; strengthen and consolidate the long standing historical, social, and cultural affinities and links among the people in the region; combat HIV/AIDs and other deadly communicable diseases; address poverty eradication in all SADC activities and programs; and mainstream gender and the process of community building (SADC 2014, 6).

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alongside regional actors in ensuring that the democratic goals were met. As will be explored later in this chapter, SADC is purported to have a number of partnerships in its election observation efforts. Consequently, placing itself in line with other international agendas furthered its own process. This commitment to rule of law was all done in an environment where macroeconomic factors remained a critical agenda item. Annual reports released during this period simply noted the move towards democratic consolidation at the regional level with the continued holding of elections indicating that even with the adoption of a comprehensive policy the economy continued to overshadow the politics (SADC Annual Reports 2000-2003).

Expressly, “the overall objective of SADC remains the achievement and economic growth and sustainable development of the whole region” (SADC 2002, 8). Yet, despite this expressed prioritization of economic development, the organization moved forward with increasing its role in democracy support. However, as with the AU, one must keep in mind how this focus on economic affairs can influence program financing.

Consequently, in addition to the amendment of the 1992 SADC Treaty, the Protocol on

Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (ISPDC) was signed into effect. This protocol conveyed the support of member countries to establish democratic norms on the continent.

Taking their mandate from the UN Charter, which recognizes the role of regional arrangements in dealing with matters in relation to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action (SADC 2001, 1), SADC recognized and reaffirmed the

“principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighborliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs of other States” (ibid., 1). Notably, the 2001 protocol echoed similar sentiments to that of the OAU at its establishment, which, in that situation, led to tensions between the

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emphasis on democratic institutions and non-interference in the affairs of member states. So, the main challenge here was ensuring that SADC organization created the political space to address the pertinent issues. Considering the SADCC legacy of “brotherhood and unity” this would prove to be an issue for SADC.

Following this pattern of reaffirming its commitment to instilling democratic norms in its member states, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security

Cooperation (SIPO), hereafter referred to as the Organ per protocol,4 was adopted on August 26,

2003 to establish the legal bounds on which the countries had agreed. This charter was important because since the inception of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation in 1996 there had been no plan put in place for its mid- to long-term activities and at this point there was pressure being placed on the organization from outside and within (SADC 2001, 12).

SIPO marked a step forward in strengthening SADC’s role and position in the region (SADC

2003, 8). As the main sector of SADC in charge of dealing with political affairs, the Organ on

Politics, Defense, and Security Co-operation, and the documents to which it subscribes, are of importance to this project.

The SIPO is divided into four main sectors. These sectors are the political, defense, the state and security, and public security. While this project is focused on the political sector, the three other sectors may have an impact on how political affairs are dealt with. This is especially the case with security matters. The political sector takes into account several objectives, of which several fall into the purview of this project: the promotion of political co-operation among member states and the evolution of common political values and institutions; the observation and

4 The official SADC documents refer to their various departments as organs and this often how it is referred. For the purposes of this dissertation the terms Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security Co-operation will be used interchangeably unless stated otherwise.

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encouragement of state parties to implement the United Nations Charter, African Union

Constitutive Act, and other international conventions and treaties and treaties on peaceful relations between states; and the design of common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and the advance of such policy collectively in international for a (SADC 2001,

21).5

Each objective outlines several strategies and activities to allow for their “fulfillment.”

These goals are to:

establish common electoral standards in the region, including a code of electoral conduct; promote the principles of democracy and good governance; encourage political parties to accept the outcome of elections held in accordance with both the African Union and the SADC Electoral Standards; establish a SADC Electoral Commission and define its functions; establish a Regional Commission for promotion of and respect for human rights; and strengthen Members States judicial systems (ibid., 20).

As noted earlier, SADC, as a regional economic organization, aligns itself with several organizations in the establishment of its political protocols. Given the AU’s nature as the larger continental body, the incorporation of AU norms into the SADC agenda is central to their partnership in addressing Africa’s political challenges. So, while the AU increasingly aligned and modeled its efforts on the EU, SADC sought to establish itself within the continent. This difference in goals impacts how the organizations behave during the election observation process. SIPO was later revised in 2012 following an assessment and review launched in 2007.

5 The complete list of objectives includes to protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra-state and inter-state conflicts; to promote political co-operation among Member States and the evolution of common political values and institutions; to prevent, contain and resolve inter and intra-state conflict by peaceful means; to promote the development of democratic institutions and practices by State Parties and encourage the observance of universal human rights; to observe and encourage State Parties to implement the United Nations Charter, African Union Constitutive Act and other international conventions and treaties and treaties on peaceful relations between states; to develop peacekeeping capacity of national defense forces and coordinate that participation of State Parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations; to enhance regional capacity in respect of disaster management and coordination of international humanitarian assistance; and to design common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policy collectively in international fora (SADC 2001, 21).

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The need for this review was the various challenges that needed to be addressed due to the changing geopolitical and global dynamics (SADC 2012, 5). Despite the achievements under the original SIPO, namely the establishment of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC),6 the organization still felt that there were some issues that SIPO failed to address (ibid.). This move towards revising SIPO was indicative of SADC’s increased involvement in member state politics. The Summit in January 2013, attended by Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and South

Africa, noted that it was imperative that SADC address the political and security situations in the

Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe. In each country efforts were being made to move beyond their current conflicts and facilitate a return to democratic governance

(SADC 2013b). Further talks on this matter were held at the Extraordinary Summit in May 2013 and on other official occasions (SADC 2013d).7 These meetings were a continuation of the discussions held at the Extraordinary Summit held in December 2012, called in order to address the escalation of the respective situations in each country. The consistent emphasis on democratic governance and return to rule of law highlighted SADC’s commitment to democracy but also its prioritization of regional stability. Previous versions of the organization would have sought stability but would not have prioritized peaceful elections to an extent that the organization, as it is exists now, does (SADC 2012b).

These commitments resonated beyond SADC, and were demonstrated in its partnerships with other IOs, particularly the AU and EU. For example, in 2013, SADC held a SADC-EU

Ministerial Political Dialogue, which highlighted the fact that these dialogues had begun 19 years

6 The SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) will be discussed further in this chapter.

7 To highlight the importance placed on addressing these political challenges, the issues facing these three countries were addressed at the Summit in May, the Extraordinary Summit in June, and the Summit in September of the same year (SADC 2013e, 2013f, 2013g). However, one should note that these three countries were a subject of conversation in other forms.

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ago in an effort to support SADC’s political development. Several issues were discussed in this meeting, focusing mainly on matters of EU foreign policy towards Africa given its own economic, political, and social situation. Of particular interest to this work is the emphasis on ensuring credible elections where the “EU and SADC reiterated their commitment to work with any Government formed as the result of a peaceful, transparent and credible electoral process”

(SADC 2013b, 4). This pledge was key because it showed that SADC was willing to take a stronger stand towards member states that challenged the principles of free and fair elections. As is known, this eventually led to Madagascar’s suspension from SADC with reinstatement contingent upon its return to democratic governance (Massey and Baker 2013). This suspension was then lifted by the Summit in 2014 following the return to constitutional order in the country with the inauguration of President Hery Rajaonarinampianina on January 25 of that year (SADC

2014b, 3). SADC sought to efficiently manage the pressures placed on democratic governance in the region and implemented a variety of activities to encourage its development in its member countries, with election monitoring continuing to be one of those initiatives. Considering

SADC’s smaller size in relation to its counterparts, managing these political dynamics required partnerships with the AU, as it also suspended Madagascar due to its violation of membership requirements (McGreal 2009). These joint efforts served to strengthen the political role of these

African organizations in continental affairs with SADC establishing itself as a regional actor and increasing its ties to the AU. The efforts led to SADC moving closer to resembling the EU and

AU election observation processes but with differences that stemmed from the proximity of its member states due to its smaller size.

Taking into account the above expectations, certain bodies within the organization are placed in charge of various activities in order to allow for the maximization of their resources.

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This division of labor is important because it shifts some power away from one entity, which is necessary in such an organization because, without the differentiation of roles, there is the risk from the onset that one body may consolidate its responsibilities. By distributing the responsibility, it is easier to establish where the organization veers from the norm given a particular instance. With South Africa being the economic and political regional player that it is, a lack of checks and balances risks skewing the organization’s priorities and agenda items in the direction that best suits South Africa. As a regional powerhouse, South Africa has significant influence within the organization. Unlike the AU, which has faced the challenge of multiple big personalities, SADC is more likely to be subject to the political whims of a single political entity pushing it in a certain direction.

Given this distribution of tasks, SADC’s organizational setup is similar to that of the

African Union, and other international organizations. The similarity to other organizations is important because it indicates that differences in IO behavior when it comes to election observation are not due to the organization’s structure but to how it prioritizes the issues it faces.

Rather, the similarities in structure resulting in differences in behavior indicates the tensions between the de jure and de facto existence of IOs harkening back to the discussion of organizations that are independent actors and those that serve as extensions of the powerful states. As we will see over the three Malawian electoral cycles, SADC often falls into the latter category. SADC is comprised of the Summit of Heads of State or Government; the Organ on

Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation; the Council of Ministers; the Sectoral and Cluster

Ministerial Committees; the Standing Committee of Officials; the Secretariat; the Tribunal; and

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SADC National Committees (SADC 2014, 9). This system of governance is referred to as the

Troika.8

Southern African European Union African Union Development Community

EU Council AU Assembly Summit of the Troika

Troika of the Organ on SADC EU Commission AU Commission Executive Council Politics, Defense, and SADC Council Security Secretariat

Department of Sectoral and Cluster EU Parliament Political Affairs Ministerial Commitees

Standing Committee of Officials

Figure 6-1. The European Union, African Union, and Southern African Development Community’s Political Institutions

The Troika of the Summit consists of the Chairperson of SADC, the incoming

Chairperson (who serves as Deputy Chairperson) and the outgoing Chairperson. Each position is held for a period of one year. In addition, the Summit consists of the Heads of State, or

Government, of all member states, and serves as SADC’s supreme policy-making institution.

The Summit is responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC.

As noted above, it elects a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson from among its members for one year on a rotational basis and is required to meet at least once a year. Unless otherwise provided in this Treaty, the decisions of the Summit shall be by consensus and shall be binding

(SADC 2014, 9). It is apparent that the Summit has tremendous discretionary power where all its decisions are binding, leaving no real room for negotiation unlike the EU’s intricate checks and

8 To be specific, the Troika refers to the Summit, the Organ, the Council, the Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees, and the Standing Committee of Officials (SADC 2014, 9).

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balances system. Notably, this level of adherence to decisions is not extended to the other SADC organs, suggesting that the Summit has the authority to disagree with actions made with the other departments. This is particularly important when taking into account election observer behavior because if a situation is not in the Chairperson’s or majority of the Summit’s best interest, there is the risk that they would undermine the process by limiting funds or observer mission access once deployed. This dynamic further highlights the centrality of personalities in international organizations and the role they play in shifting agenda items.

The Troika of the Organ, answerable to the Summit, is organized in the same manner. It consists of the Chairperson of the Organ, the incoming Chairperson that serves as Deputy

Chairperson, and the outgoing Chairperson (SADC 2001, 5). It is very clear that the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of the Summit shall not simultaneously be the Chairperson of the

Organ. To limit the confusion created by the simultaneous use of the term “Troika,” this dissertation will refer to the assembling of the Heads of States (similar to the AU Assembly) as the Summit and the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, as noted earlier, the

Organ.

Ultimately, each Troika functions as a steering committee of the institution and is responsible for decision-making, facilitating the implementation of decisions, and providing policy directions. They have the power to create committees on an ad hoc basis, are able to determine their own rules of procedure, and may co-opt other members as and when required.

Next, the Council consists of one minister from each member state, preferably the minister responsible for economic planning or finance. The Council’s responsibilities are quite vast and central to the organization’s operation. The Council resembles that of the AU’s

Executive Council in that its members serve as crucial links between SADC and its member

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states. The Council’s main role is to oversee the functioning and development of SADC. In addition, it is expected to oversee the implementation of the policies of SADC and the proper execution of its programs (SADC 2014, 9).9 Further, the Council is important because it serves as moderator of activities. By serving as moderator, it seeks to ensure that attention is being paid to the activities carried out by the organization. This role appears to present a balance within the organization, where despite the power granted to the Summit, the Council has a say in the manner in which the activities are planned or are at least able to trace project implementation. In doing so, it is able to hold SADC accountable at the member state level. For an organization seeking to further democratic norms and implement programs to this effect, this accountability is crucial. Additionally, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council are appointed by the

Member States holding the Chairmanship and Vice-Chairmanship of SADC, respectively. As with all SADC Directorates, these positions are responsible to the Summit. Last, the Council is also expected to meet at least once a year with all decisions to be made by consensus (SADC

2014, 9).

The Sectoral and Cluster Ministerial Committees consist of ministers from each member state whose responsibility includes overseeing the activities related to the core areas of integration.10 In addition, the Committees are in charge of monitoring and controlling the

9 Their other roles as to advise the Summit on matters of overall policy and efficient and harmonious functioning and development of SADC; approve policies, strategies and work programs of SADC; direct, coordinate and supervise the operations of the institutions of SADC subordinate to it; define sectoral areas of co-operation and allocate to Member States responsibility for coordinating sectoral activities, or re-allocate such responsibilities; create its own committees as necessary; recommend to the Summit persons for appointment to the posts of Executive Secretary and Deputy Executive Secretary; determine the terms and conditions of service of the staff of the institutions of SADC; convene conferences and other meetings as appropriate, for purposes of promoting the objectives and programs of SADC; and perform such other duties as may be assigned to it by the Summit or treaty (SADC 2014, 9).

10 The core areas related to integration are trade, industry, finance and investment; infrastructure and services; food, agriculture, natural resources, and environment; social and human development and special programs (health and HIV/AIDs, education, labor, employment, and gender); politics, defense and security; and defense affairs and judicial matters) (SADC 2014, 12).

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implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), providing policy advice to the Council, and creating permanent or ad hoc subcommittees as deemed necessary. Consequently, the Committees are granted the power to ensure the rapid implementation of programs approved by the Council and fall under their jurisdiction. Last, they are expected to meet at least once a year and it is required that all decisions be made by consensus (SADC 2014, 12).

The Standing Committee of Officials consists of one permanent secretary or an official of equivalent rank from each member state and reports to the Council. Again, it is preferable that the minister is the one responsible for economic planning and finance in their home country. In addition, the Standing Committee serves as a technical advisory committee to the Council and

Committees. The chairman and vice-chairman of the Standing Committee are appointed from the member states holding the chairmanship and the vice-chairmanship, respectively, of the Council.

Last, the Standing Committee shall meet at least once a year and all decisions can be by consensus (SADC 2014, 13).

While the above-mentioned departments play a key role in the political affairs of the organization, one of the most importance in terms of election observation, with the Summit and

Council, is the Secretariat, because as is the case with the European Union Commission and the

African Union Commission, it controls the day-to-day activities of the organization. It is also in charge of the programming and the allocation of funds. In both the current and original charter the Secretariat is mandated to serve as SADC’s principal executive institution and is responsible for:

strategic planning and management of the programs of SADC; implementation of decisions of the Summit and of the Council; organization and management of SADC meetings; financial and general administration; representation and

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promotion of SADC; and coordination and harmonization of the policies and strategies of Member States (SADC 2014, 14).11

Given the environment within which SADC operated, the Secretariat’s role continued to adapt over time. The expectations of this body are highly dependent on the direction being taken by the organization.

The Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary who serves as the key link in all

SADC affairs. The Executive Secretary is responsible for the following duties: consulting and coordinating with governments and other member state institutions; undertaking measures aimed at the promotion of SADC objectives and enhancing its performance; promoting cooperation with other organizations; organizing meetings of the Summit, the Council, the Standing

Committee and any other meetings convened on the direction of the Summit or the Council; acting as custodians of SADC property; appointing Secretariat staff; managing the administration and finances of the Secretariat; preparing annual activity reports; preparing the SADC budget and audit accounts for submission to the Council; serving as public relations for the organization; and serving other functions as deemed necessary by the Summit and Council. In addition, the

Executive Secretary liaises closely with Commissions, and other institutions, in order to guide, support, and monitor the performance of SADC in the various sectors to ensure that its actions are in line with the agreed policies, strategies, programs and projects. The Executive Secretary holds this position for four years with the possibility of renewal after the first term (SADC 2014,

16).

11 Later, it was added that the Secretariat was also responsible for gender mainstreaming all SADC programs and activities; harmonizing all policies and programs; assembling and disseminating information on SADC and maintaining a reliable database; developing the capacity, infrastructure, and maintenance of intra-regional information and communication technology; securing resources and working with cooperating partners to devise means of self-financing and generating additional income and investment; and undertaking research on the community-building and the integration process for the Council” (SADC 2014, 14).

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As suggested above, this work is especially focused on the role played by the Summit, the Secretariat, and the Executive Secretary because these departments deal with issues pertaining to political affairs, and election monitoring, more specifically. Namely, the main focus of these institutions is to support efforts towards democracy in member countries. As the political organs of the organization, drawing their respective mandates from both domestic and international documents, their actions provide insight into the organization’s decision-making process.

Establishment of Embracing the Adopting a more Increased Transition partnerships with ideals of prominent position involvement in from SADCC other democracy and in security issues election assistance to SADC organizations, eg. good governance on the continent and monitoring AU and EU

Figure 6-2. Putting Democracy on the Agenda

SADC and Updating its Election Observation Procedures

Against the backdrop of this move towards embracing a more democratic identity, SADC became increasingly involved in election assistance and monitoring. This increased involvement meant aligning itself with the guidelines adopted by the EU, and the AU. Thus, SADC is a signatory to the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of

Conduct for International Election Observers.12 It also supports and builds on the principles and guidelines set by the OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Elections in Africa and the AU Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions.

Moreover, SADC adheres to the Principles for Election Management, Monitoring, and

Observation in the SADC Region (PEMMO) that was adopted on November 6, 2003 in

12According to the document the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC-PF) was the only ones who had signed to the original document in 2005 but there is no mention of the SADC. However, SADC’s status as signatory to this document was mentioned on multiple occasions and I shall take this as a given unless I come across a document that proves otherwise.

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Johannesburg, South Africa. PEMMO outlines the rules for election observation in the region and voices the commitment by nations to move the democratic agenda forward. Not only does it discuss matters pertaining to election monitoring but it also outlines measures for the improvement of electoral management in the region. These principles address:

the need for a comprehensive constitutional and legal framework; the importance of transparent and accessible pre-election procedures (including the delimitation process, voter registration and candidate nomination); the equitable use of the media and public resources and issues of political party finance; the organization and management of the election phase, including the location of polling stations, their layout, and access to them; the secrecy of the ballot, and the counting process; the post-election phase, including the settlement of election; disputes and ways of ensuring that results are acceptable; the requirements for unhindered, credible, professional and impartial monitoring and observation of the electoral process (EISA 2003, 2).

It is imperative that an organization like SADC be clear in its politics in order to better address issues when they arise. This is especially the case in more challenging types of

“intervention” like election monitoring where ambiguities can lead to confusion on the ground

(Sirota 2004, 353). For example, as is the case with the AU, SADC attempts to but does not clearly differentiate between observers and monitors. The EU does not share this issue as it explicitly mentions in its electoral handbook and in observer reports that the role of its observation missions is to offer an impartial assessment of the electoral process. This includes the remaining objective throughout the process. Specifically, observers are to “undertake their duties in an unobtrusive manner” and though they are allowed to inform election officials on irregularities they observe, they are not allowed to “give instructions or countermand decisions” made by the election officials” (EU 2016a, 21). Thus, according to the EU, an observer is considered to have no influence in the electoral process; rather, their role is to just watch and assess the situation. However, SADC monitors are able to make suggestions and have direct impact on electoral institutions (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014).

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SADC, unlike the EU, makes the fuzzy distinction between election monitoring and observation and puts forth two rules. Election monitoring begins prior to elections with advance teams in the country. These advanced teams are SADC diplomatic missions present at the time that are asked to observe, offer technical advice where necessary, and provide financial support.

In certain cases, countries have to move ballots or supplies by air, and other SADC countries have to chip in. Consequently, these monitors have a high level of investment in the process.

Observation, on the other hand, must be impartial without any interference. Observers must simply serve as unbiased sampling collectors (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).

Yet, as eluded to above, this differentiation is not clear on the ground.

Similarly, the AU, even with its increased adoption of EU standards, since its updated election observer guidelines came into effect, does not make this distinction between observation and monitoring clearly. In the 2017 Kenyan elections, Head of the AU EOM, former South

African president, Thabo Mbeki emphasized the importance of the AU’s role in observing these elections and that this can include active involvement in the process. Even though this occurred after the period under observation in this project, it highlights the changing attitudes and IO roles in election observation. For Mbeki, the AU was to serve as “first port of call” if issues were to arise and that, while its role was to observe, the AU could be approached by political stakeholders and asked to address complications that arise. In such cases, he argued that the AU

“can’t observe something going wrong and say: ‘oh, our task is to observe and report it. Once we notice it surely, to say: ‘this is wrong please don’t do it’…We don’t want to be that observer that will observe and then write a negative report. Because our task would be to have peaceful, credible, free and fair elections” (du Plessis 2017, np). His statement directly challenges the differentiation between observer and monitor and presents a position that is opposite of the EU’s.

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As noted in Chapter 2, election observers are increasingly seeing themselves as more than

“passive observers” and these changes, as indicated in the Kenyan example, and will be examined in Chapters 8-10, have real implications for election observation.

The lack of differentiation can be problematic for election observation because it grants

SADC the ability to manipulate missions on a case-by-case basis and offers missions the leeway to interpret their mandate as they see fit. The ability to shift approaches given the particularities of an election can lead to behavior that differs from that of the EU, which made concerted efforts to create a template for election observation. In recent years, the SADC has made efforts towards clarifying some of its more ambiguous policies and towards aligning its mission protocols to those used by other international organizations. Variation in SADC monitoring behavior over time may reflect these changing attitudes.

As suggested by the updating of its core documents, SADC observation missions have developed and improved significantly over the years. These missions were initially created to support nationally-defined objectives and increase access to political power through democratic institutions. The main driver for this impetus was that independence was fought for the citizens of each member country so “it seemed most appropriate to turn back to the people for the organization’s, and member states’, legitimacy” (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26,

2015). Consequently, SADC sought to engage with assisting and encouraging member states to promote and deliver public services through legitimate elections. As noted earlier, this was to be done through the Organ of Politics, Defense and Security, which sought to promote the participation of citizens, and provide democratic citizens. Consequently, the operationalization of this goal was in establishing the guidelines for election monitoring in 2007 after a series of meetings. However, the decision that SADC members would participate in each other’s elections

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through bilateral and multilateral missions was made prior to this point. Here we observe the impact of SADC’s move towards more explicit guidelines and the policies of its larger counterparts, namely the AU and EU. Once again, these developments have implications for

SADC behavior over time.

Evidence of this regional engagement was the first “official” Organ mission in 2005, where SADC monitored the parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe.13 However, due to SADC’s inexperience with dispatching its own election observation missions, this exercise was wrought with challenges. The issues that observer missions faced stemmed from the fact that the SADC

Secretariat had no human or financial resources; the logistical issues and security concerns associated with electoral observer deployment; and dealing with issues of political will on the part of member governments. Ascertaining the extent of support that the organization (read the

Summit) and the member states were willing to give to the process was a constant problem. As a result, the organization was unsure as to what its mission budget was. However, the biggest challenges were the domestic and international “political games” (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015). The politics of the region severely impacted and limited SADC’s action. Zimbabwe was a key regional actor during the various struggles for independence so presenting a true challenge to the administration would be quite difficult without sufficient political backing by the larger member states. The AU did not deal with these issues to the same extent as the SADC due to the AU’s sheer size. The dynamic between 14 countries is different from that of 53 because there is less room for debate when crucial players take up more political room. However, as observed with Zimbabwe in 2002 and Morocco in 2013, the political

13 It is important to note that why the Organ of Politics, Defense, and Security Directorate was formed rather late, SADC as an entity was involved in election monitoring activities prior to this, as will be evidenced in the case of the 2004 Malawi elections.

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relationships among AU member states do come into play during the electoral process if matters that concern the other states are at stake.

For example, during this period the Organ of Politics, Defense and Security Directorate had only three core staff members. Ultimately, there was need to mobilize all the resources and members of the Organ in order for the mission to occur because no funding had been allocated for political issues. Rather, the priority was on socio-economic issues, an agenda set by the

Frontline states that has remained a consistent priority over the years. Eventually, despite these limitations, 300 observers were deployed on the mission, headed by South African minister,

Pumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, with a total budget of $51,000 (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June

26, 2015). When compared to the EU’s budget of €1,306,000, this sum is rather small (EU

2017b, np). Though the EU mission was only present in the country from February 12-18, following its cancellation,14 the budget allocated for this mission highlights the financial discrepancies between these two organizations. As noted earlier, the logistics of deployment were challenging. Teams had to be sent to multiple constituencies in order to monitor the polling, campaign, and results. Given their limited scope and size, the teams had to rely on sampling, with a rather small population, to render any statement made on the election more legitimate.

Another concern that the mission faced was ensuring that SADC, with its reliance on local staff, did not inadvertently undermine the voting process. For example, when it came to ensuring transportation, SADC had to employ Zimbabwean drivers because of their familiarity of the various areas in order to ensure the welfare of their observers. However, there were concerns as to whether there were provisions in place to ensure that the drivers’ right to select

14 The European Union mission was cancelled following the expulsion of its leader, Swedish ambassador to the United Nations, Pierre Schori, by the Zimbabwean government after being accused of “political arrogance” (Thornycroft 2002). This expulsion was based on claims that officials and representatives from Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Holland, and Sweden favored the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (Latham 2002).

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their leaders is not comprised due to driving responsibilities. Similarly, the mission asked itself were if it should, or could, request for the support of the domestic defense force and, if so, were there provisions in place that ensured their vote. For example, did the law allow for advanced or mailed in votes? The one fear was that SADC’s need to ensure the security of its mission would infringe upon the rights of the citizens involved in supporting the observation process. This would be an inherent violation of SADC’s mandate. In addition, there were concerns as to how observers should interact with media, election monitoring bodies (EMBs), political parties, international observer groups, civil society organizations, local monitors, the diplomatic core, and law enforcement agents. Other concerns included the provision of transportation to law enforcement officers, transporting electoral material, tackling logistical concerns (i.e., security, overnight security, sealing of the ballots) (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).

Taking into account the logistic concerns that arose during the Zimbabwean election, the mission had to prioritize certain issues and worth within the confines of its limited funds. This involved ensuring that the government and political parties were abiding by the law and assisting them where necessary. At the same time, the mission also had to ensure it was not made to “bow down to pressures” placed on it by authorities or intimidation on the part of political parties.

Given the restricted political space given to the mission this was not an easy task. Emphasis was placed on supporting the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and maintaining a secure and stable environment for the elections to take place. SADC sought to highlight the fact that the

ZEC served as referees in the “fight” between political parties that employed all means necessary to win (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).

Overall, its key to ensuring a safe political space was to continually remind all political actors to adhere to the country’s laws, to sensitize political parties to the fact that there will

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always be winners and losers in an election, and to encourage the media to maintain a level playing field by providing adequate space to all political parties.15 However, all these goals required a detailed plan, one that the organization did not provide to its missions (Interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). Observers were expected to address issues as they arose without the full support of the Secretariat. Member countries showed no interest in providing said support and sought to focus on issues of a more economic nature. Here we observe the political tensions created by the manner in which the organization operates as noted in the previous sections.

The implication that there are backdoor dealings when it comes to observation missions was rather telling, because as interviews with SADC officials made clear, it stressed the tensions involved in preparing and deploying a mission. Each member state has its own intentions, agendas, and budgets. Therefore, where and how the states are willing to spend their allocated funds has an impact on what the organization can do.

It is undeniable that running elections in a poor country is hard. This major challenge is the biggest concern, but without funding nothing can really be done. As such, observers are meant to encourage governments and their institutions to be democratic despite their financial circumstances (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). This process is made even harder if the citizens are not seeing their needs reflected at the national level. As responsible to both SADC and its citizens, there is the sense that the observer missions view themselves as a sort of moral compass. In preparing their pronouncements, the observer missions take into account the financial situations of the country and make the argument that given their respective economic situations, one must expect mistakes to occur. This requires that the mission

15 At this point, the SADC official interrupted themselves and noted that the politics surrounding elections and election monitoring reminded him of Machiavelli’s The Prince. Specifically, that elections and election monitoring are centered on the notion of acquiring and maintaining political power.

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differentiate between mistakes done on purpose and those that were a result of limited financial resources. Consequently, observers ask themselves whether the country fully embraced the democratic process, and if so, were the issues that arose legitimate. However, it is apparent that this notion of “legitimacy” is highly subjective. This concern is not limited to SADC, as it is one that the AU also faces; however, with its increased familiarity with national issues, due to the proximity of its member states, the stakes of decisions made on the part of the SADC are higher.

For SADC, member state politics tend to be more complicated. Specifically, the question of

“legitimacy” becomes extremely problematic when facing a direct challenge from a head of state, particularly one that actively seeks to undermine the organization of which its country is a part. These internal challenges can really impact the behavior of the organization. Zimbabwe was once again the center of controversy with its July 2013 election.

While Zimbabwe is an extreme case, its legacy in the region makes it an important one with implications for SADC as an organization. Mugabe is a vocal actor, whose positions tend to have an impact beyond Zimbabwe, and illustrates how leaders with strong political leanings, whether autocratic or democratic, can impact how organizations undertake their election observation missions. So, while this case was not selected for this project, it provides valuable theoretical insights. This situation was a clear example of the challenge that member states can pose to organizations and subsequently undermine their effectiveness. Only the African Union and SADC were allowed to monitor this election as Zimbabwean authorities blocked all efforts by the United States and European Union to partake in the process. However, despite being allowed entry to the country, SADC activities were severely limited, where criticisms on the timing of the election by the SADC-appointed facilitation team, Lindiwe Zulu, elicited the following attack from Mugabe:

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SADC has no power. Let it be known that we are in SADC voluntarily. If SADC decides to do stupid things, we can pull out. For now, we have a SADC that has good sense. Although from some quotes there was a stupid, idiotic woman saying that elections cannot be held by July 31. Did such person ever think as an independent country we would take such utterances which were stupid and idiotic? (Sibanda and Matenga 2012).

Such a hostile reaction places SADC in a very difficult political situation, and when attempting to monitor an election in such a hostile country, decisions as to where to deploy observers become highly subjective. The mission is effectively limited and forced to decide whether it wants to challenge the leadership or remain within the confines of political propriety.

More often than not, the mission acts in the interest of maintaining the political balance even if it means making alterations to deployment plans and limiting its interactions with those on the ground. All this must be done under the banner of legitimacy and managing the expectations of both state and citizen. Similar statements have been made by Mugabe regarding the EU,

Commonwealth, and other Western election monitoring bodies. As illustrated by the cancellation of the EU’s mission to Zimbabwe in 2002, political dynamics significantly influence the outcomes of election observation missions. How such statements have shifted political biases will be discussed in the chapters on Malawi’s 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections.

Given the pressures under which the mission is placed to ensure that an election is

“legitimate,” the main challenge is to ensure that the actors in these member states abide by the principles. Thus, it must be apparent that they are “not just there to look” (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015). Yet, in cases like Zimbabwe, looking is all the missions can do.16 Due to these continued challenges, there were calls for a more seasoned structure if SADC was to be an effective player in election monitoring. So, in response, SADC has been making concerted

16 Zimbabwean elections have always proven problematic for SADC with severe limitations often placed upon observer missions. It is a representative case of how politics can directly impact the actions of international organizations and their observer missions.

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efforts to address these challenges and establish clearer guidelines and rules for its work, in order to draw the lines as to what their missions are tasked to do despite these intimidations.

Establishing itself as a critical player in election observation meant solidifying the process as a fundamental component of democratic consolidation in the region. This led to the creation of the SADC Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) following a set of recommendations made at a stakeholder workshop in 2005. The initial push was for SADC to integrate the

Electoral Commissions’ Forum of SADC Countries (ECF-SADC), a formation of national electoral management bodies (EMBs) in Southern Africa, into its organization to allow for a regional oversight institution on electoral matters. In doing so, it echoed the organization’s overall mandate to prioritize the instillation of democratic norms in the region. This effort would have legitimized ECF-SADC’s role in democracy promotion and election observation. Later in the chapter, I discuss how the inability to properly integrate its partners has undermined SADC’s election observation efforts by effectively limiting its access to financial and technical resources.

This limitation faced by the organization does impact its role as election observer. The workshop’s proposal entailed that the ECF–SADC and the SADC Secretariat collaborate to create a SADC Electoral Commission (SEC). The SEC would be responsible for strengthening the capacities of national electoral bodies, coordinating SADC Electoral Observation Missions

(SEOMs), and ensuring the implementation of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing

Democratic Elections (SADC 2015, 1). This collaboration would have allowed for election observation efforts to be undertaken in a more structured and cohesive manner.

Based on the recommendations of the Inter State Politics and Diplomacy Committee

(ISPDC), the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) reviewed the workshop’s resolutions and mandated that the Troika of the Organ work with ECF-SADC towards the formation of the

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SEC. However, upon further deliberations on the matter, and with the support of ECF-SADC, the

MCO decided to recommend that rather than a SADC Electoral Commission, the organization created an Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) to support SADC election observation missions.

Following the establishment of SEAC, the MCO adopted the SEAC Structures, Rules and

Procedures in March 2009 and the council was formally constituted in August 2010 in Maputo,

Mozambique. SEAC was inaugurated and initiated on April 13, 2011 in Gaborone, Botswana, and its establishment marked a shift in SADC’s election observation protocol. However, it took years for SADC to commit to SEAC’s constitution, and therefore the expectation that SADC missions would be increasingly prioritized is unlikely. Rather, until 2011, we should continue to observe a reluctance on SADC’s part in committing to improved election observation. SEAC’s role is to serve as the official electoral advisory body of the SADC; advise the regional economic community on elections and conflict mitigation; review and ensure the implementation of the

SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; and provide guidance to member states on elections and the enhancement of democracy and good governance (SADC

2015, 1). The SEAC thus serves as the overseer of activities concerning elections, with a particular focus on election monitoring. The creation of the SEAC, somewhat echoing that of the

AU’s Democratic Electoral Assistance (DEAU), was a move towards making the organization’s role in the process more visible. It can also be considered as a means of drawing the process away from the political influence of member states. With this shift, I expect missions held after

2011 to be more transparent, visible, and effective. Like the AU, SADC missions are increasingly adopting the standards set by EU election observation.

In a further attempt to clarify its position on election monitoring, SADC updated its

Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, which was adopted by the

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Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation on

July 20th 2015, in Pretoria, South Africa. A consultative workshop, which served as the first stage in the review process, was held in Gaborone, Botswana on June 6-7, 2013. The Secretariat convened this workshop to not only revise the principles and guidelines but to discuss the development of the SADC Elections handbook (Salomão 2013, 1). This updated version, unlike that of the 2004 document, highlights the role of the organization in election observation by clarifying the roles of election observer missions, which effectively increased their mandate. For example, the original document only dedicated four pages to the subject of election monitoring in comparison to the more detailed guidelines provided in the revised version. Furthermore, it notes the efforts made by SADC to address the challenges it faced when undertaking election- monitoring missions over the years. Namely, it mentions the establishment of the SEAC and the unified approach of the various SADC bodies engaging in election observation.17

To ensure that its role in support of the electoral process is clear, SEAC’s expectations are explicitly outlined for each stage. During the pre-election period, SEAC is expected to undertake the following:

(a) reflect on possible conflict situations in respective countries on matters pertaining to electoral processes and render advise to the MCO on the development of mediation strategies, before, during and after elections; (b) based on the findings of the Goodwill Mission, report to the MCO on whether the political environment is conducive to the holding of free, fair, transparent, credible, and peaceful elections in conformity with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; (c) encourage the specific SADC Member State holding elections to adhere to international best practices in all elections; (d) advise the specific Member State holding elections on strategies for enhancing and consolidating the capacity of the EMBs; (e) encourage the specific Member State holding elections to uphold and respect the independence and autonomy of the EMBs; and (f) encourage the revision and improvement of electoral laws, codes of conduct and regulation in line with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC 2015, 8).

17 This discussion on the various parties engaged in election observation will be held a little later in the document.

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Given that it does not deploy observation missions, SEAC is limited to an advisory role during the election period. However, it plays a supportive role during the post-election period.

Following an election, it is expected to:

(a) compose a post-election review, which is of particular relevance should there be a conflict situation, and submit such report to the MCO; (b) advise the MCO on the development of mediation strategies to address any post-election conflicts, as necessary; (c) evaluate recommendations emanating from the key electoral stakeholders including reports of the SEOM, Domestic and International Election Observers, the SEAC’s separate report, and any post-election review processes; (d) encourage the EMB of the respective Member State holding elections to convene post-election dialogue forums with stakeholders; and (f) encourage Member States holding elections to, at all times, adhere to the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (SADC 2015, 9).

Accordingly, SEAC, following this mandate and overseen by Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), appraised the region’s normative framework for elections and commenced the review of the Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections from April 2012 to July 2015. In conformity with Article 23 of the SADC Treaty and guided by its mandate, the SEAC consulted with SADC member states and a wide range of stakeholders, including the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the ECF-SADC, the International Institute for

Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the Southern African Research and Documentation

Centre (SARDC), the Electoral Institute for a Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the

African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), the Institute for Security

Studies (ISS), the Southern African Trade Union Coordination Council (SATUCC), the SADC

Council of NGOs, the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), and the African Monitor.18

However, it is important to remember that the SEAC does not perform in the same manner as the

SEOMs. Even with its “goodwill” pre-election missions, its role is solely to provide advice but

18 SADC has a number of crucial partners when it comes to addressing democratic affairs in the region and these relationships do have an impact, not only on their behavior, but that of their partner organizations. This dynamic was observed during interviews with SADC PF, ECF-SADC, and SADC-CNGO.

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even with this clear mandate to serve as advisor, it is clear that SEAC has intentions as well.

Namely, it is concerned about the stability of a state and though critical of the practice of authoritarianism in certain member states this desire for stability can undermine democratic efforts (Tötemeyer 2016, 2).

This review process was driven by several important considerations: the increasing use of technology in electoral management and administration and the voting process, which requires that the SEOMs have a firm understanding of how they operate in order to accurately assess them; emergence of LTOs as a more comprehensive and effective approach to election observation; the need to pay increased attention to members of disadvantaged groups (women, youth, and people with disabilities); changing environment due to migration and diaspora communities seeking civil and political rights; need to ensure gender balance in SEOMs; the need to develop a sustainable electoral observation program; and the requirement that all recommendations be harmonized to align SADC principles with those of the AU (Chirambo and

Motsamai 2016, 2).

The call for stronger oversight by the organization is an attempt to limit behavioral discrepancies among nation states, such as in Zimbabwe’s case. Mugabe gave the organization what seemed to be an ultimatum and this undermined the organization. This move matters because until this point, and as noted in both the literature and in conversation, SADC election observation missions were viewed as “political exercises” rather than technical and professional ones aimed at making a real improvement in their member states. The inclusion of definitions of important conceptions such as “free and fair” will allow for increased transparency and help stakeholders understand how decisions were made. The 2015 framework shows a clear dedication towards moving in this direction but the fact that it has taken so long for the

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organization to get to this point suggests that not all parties might be on board with adopting the changes and committing to improving the nature of election observation in the region. However, the organization has included the expertise of “non-state actors, academics, parliamentarians and election management boards” on missions which might aid in making the process less political and create a sense of regional ownership in the process (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016, 12).

Consequently, these guidelines marked a clear departure from the norm. Akin to the establishment of the SEAC, the expectation at this point is that SADC is moving towards standardizing its election observation protocol to be more in line with the more established EU.

Therefore, there should be observable shifts in mission behavior after 2015. While these elections are beyond the scope of this work, future projects may investigate how this updated protocol has impacted elections. Other issues raised regarding the shortcomings of the original document was the lack of disciplinary methods for members that failed to comply with regulation; no obligation for member states to invite SEOMs to observe their elections; interim reports were made public but this was not always the case with final reports; SADC observers were chosen only by member states with no provisions made for the participation of non-state actors; and SEOMs were only deployed two weeks prior to the election. In addition, the original document did not articulate what was meant by “free and fair,” which caused confusion among the different stakeholders who took that to mean disparate things. These concepts are now outlined at the start of the document listing descriptions for what is meant by credible elections, democracy, democratic election vs. election, electoral process, electoral cycle, electoral integrity, electoral justice, and free vs. fair elections, all key terms for the election process that were previously unclear to certain political stakeholders (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016, 5).

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Additionally, the new document outlines the updated approach to monitoring with its emphasis on monitoring the process beyond election day. Thus, this new document placed

SADC in line with the EU’s longstanding, and the AU’s more recently adopted, electoral cycle approach to election monitoring. The four types of missions are election day observation, short- term or enhanced short-term observation, specialized observation, and long-term observation.19

These are very similar to the types of missions sent by the other organizations in this study, indicating the attempts by international organizations to normalize the observation process. The first is the commonly practiced election day observation method. This continues to be an option for missions but is “considered to be ‘primitive’ and unscientific by political stakeholders”

(Chirambo and Motsamai 2016, 11). Therefore, there has been a marked shift away from pronouncing the quality of an election based solely on the observations made on polling day.

Second, short-term or enhanced short-term observation serves as an improvement from election day observation (ibid.). The third type of mission is specialized observation, which is a research- based method that targets specific aspects of the process. These missions may focus on areas such as state expenditure on social programs and whether these programs can be used as electoral leverage. Considering their more limited focus, these missions tend to consist of specialized agencies, such as media monitoring bodies or interest groups focused on comparative studies of legal frameworks (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016, 11). While these missions can be compared to the smaller ones dispatched by the EU and AU, they tend to be more limited in scope than the EU’s Election Expert mission (EEM) and External Assessment Team (EAT) and the AU’s Expert/Technical Assessment missions (TAM). This is because the EU and AU missions, despite political and/or financial limitations, still attempt to provide an overview of the electoral process so they do not target their missions in the same way that SADC does.

19 A more detailed overview of SADC’s election observation process will be discussed later in this chapter.

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SADC’s specialized missions point directly to the theoretical assumptions made at the start of this dissertation, where observer missions can send teams to investigate specific areas. It can be expected that each mission has different reasons for targeting particular areas. Members of the diplomatic corps can also conduct these missions on behalf of their respective governments. The sending of these “diplomatic observers” is indicative of political interests where certain influential states may seek to protect their interests by sending members of their missions to assess the situation. The assumption here is that they might be searching for something in particular. Therefore, the implication is that targeted monitoring is not limited to this specific mission; rather it is an attitude adopted by all electoral observation teams.

Last is long-term observation, the preferred observation model for most international agencies, which involves “the systematic assessment of the entire or major segments of the electoral cycle, for as long as three months or more” (Chirambo and Motsamai 2016, 11). This longer observation period allows for a more thorough examination of the legal and constitutional frameworks, civic and voter education, the nomination of candidates, voter registration, campaigning, polling, vote tabulation, the announcement of the results, and the post-election period. In addition, this new approach to election observation strengthens the implementation of the SADC security cooperation plan as it serves as a holistic approach that takes into account “a broad and longer-term view of election monitoring and governance” (Chirambo and Motsamai

2016, 11). SADC has sent increasingly larger missions over the years, but this document serves as a commitment to improving not solely the size of the missions but quality of election monitoring across the region. By adopting this new updated protocol, SADC is in keeping with the increasingly democratic rhetoric at the institutional level. The election observer missions are expected to follow these specific protocols that reflect the increased importance placed on the

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holding of democratic elections during the electoral process, moving the organization closer to the “ideal type” of election observation.20

As per protocol, election observation missions are invited by the respective member state.

Following the invitation, the missions are constituted and deployed by the Chairperson of the

Organ. There is the requirement that the mission has sufficient time to undertake its tasks assigned during the pre-election, election, and post-election periods while in country. With these parameters in place, mission length is determined by SADC and is dependent on the tasks undertaken by the mission (SADC 2015, 9). SEOMs are generally made up of “electoral experts, representatives of EMBs, national governments and legislatures, civil society and eminent personalities from Member States, based on the principles of balanced national representation and gender equality” (SADC 2015, 10). These observers are selected from a roster created by the

SADC Secretariat where experts and trained observers are categorized according to their country of origin, gender, language skills, prior election observation experience, and occupation. This approach marks a shift from the traditional practice of observers being deployed by their respective countries resulting in a more transparent approach to observer selection. Again, the protocols introduced by the 2015 document fall outside this project’s purview but future work will explore the shifts in behavior that may arise from such changes. Considering that observers are citizens of member countries, SADC expects states to, wherever possible, to base their nominations for a given mission on this roster of approved observers. These lists submitted to

SADC take into account “gender balance, physical fitness, linguistic skills, technological skills, occupational balance, and prior experience of electoral observation in Africa” (SADC 2015, 23).

Once these names are provided, the SADC Secretariat is in charge of determining the actual

20 A figure outlining the process can be found in Appendix F.

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number of observers to deploy based on the political context and geographical size of the country. Deployment decisions are also contingent on the organization’s financial capacity (ibid.,

23). There are a number of expectations for a member of a SEOM.21

Preparations for deployment begin once the mission has been selected. Training for election observation has also proven to be a challenge over the years with missions not always receiving the necessary level of preparation and thus reverting to political biases created by an unfamiliarity with the process and/or country. For example, the standard SADC Observers

Training Manual consists of almost 200 pages of text ranging from the history of election observation in the region to a list of what missions are to look for once in the field.22 It also provides the international documents to which SADC is signatory along with a code of conduct for observers. On May 28-30, 2009, a training, held in partnership with the Electoral Institute of

Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale

Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) was held in Gaborone where in two days the training covered: The Role of SADC in Elections; The Utility of the Electoral Cycle; Regional Election Benchmarks; SADC

Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; 6 Principles of Elections; Electoral

Systems and Legal Framework; Election Observation Mission – Best Practice; Expectations of

SADC of their observers; Observation Work in Practice; and Election Day Observation (SADC

2009). The sense here was that training was overwhelming with a lot of information shared in a short period of time (Field Notes, Gaborone, Botswana, June 2015). Despite there being time set

21 The SEOM Observer Profile is as follows: they must be citizens of the member state nominating them; should be in good health and sound physical condition to undertake the election observation assignments; should possess basic knowledge of the history of the SADC region; should possess basic knowledge of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections; should be prepared to undergo intensive election training organized by the SADC Secretariat; should be prepared to spend indeterminable lengths of time outside their own country; should be prepared to abide by the Code of Conduct for SEOMs; should be reasonably competent to undertake electoral observation; should have basic knowledge of any or all of the official languages of SADC (English, Portuguese, and French); and last, observers should have no criminal record (SADC 2015, 23).

22 The SEOM Observer Profile is provided in Appendix E.

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aside for questions and role-play, one cannot expect an observer to be fully versed in observation techniques after two days. A highly trained observer team is better equipped to navigate challenges that may arise while on the ground. Consequently, the level of training provided to missions is imperative for their success in the field as observed by the emphasis placed on preparation by the EU and, increasingly so, by the AU. Considering the magnitude of the election, especially for first-time observers, there is a sense that the training provided is insufficient (ibid.).

These same issues with ambiguity arise in the selection process. SADC observers, prior to the 2015 updates, were sent by their respective nations. Traditionally each country was expected to send and finance two delegates (Interviews, Lilongwe, Malawi and Gaborone,

Botswana, 2015). It is this method of deployment that is employed throughout the period under observation in this work. This is a highly subjective method and one that raises questions regarding how one gets chosen if there are no explicit criteria. Most importantly, this form of deployment raises questions as to the political implications under which missions are carried out.

Countries send these observers as representatives of the state so their positions can never be completely neutral. Both the EU and AU send their missions on behalf of their respective

Secretariats lessening the opportunities for disparate agendas and priorities within the same observer mission.

Prior to the election, certain things the missions look for are levels and types of political participation; language being used; presence of another party flag or posters; and the defacing of other party materials (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). This process is similar to that of the EU, AU, and Commonwealth and allows the mission to focus on what it considers the more important aspects of the electoral process. This pre-election checklist differs from that used

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on voting day. During the electoral period, the SEOM is expected to gather information and record concerns with polling stations, voting and counting arrangements according to the list provided (SADC 2015, 16). Items on this list include whether the polling stations opened on time; how polling day went overall; if people had identification documents; were the booths identifiable and accessible, etc.; did the polling station obey the process for closing; were ballot papers counted in the proper manner; were the ballots sealed and put away; were ballots verified by serial numbers; were the results clearly marked by the type of election (presidential or legislative); and was the filling of the bulletin observed by witnesses (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015). The new guidelines, with their differentiation between the pre-, during, and post-electoral stages, are significantly more comprehensive than in previous years marking a clear change in SADC election observation protocol (SADC 2015, 18).23 In order to fulfill the expectations of this mandate, the observers are to be granted full access to the electoral process by the country holding the election.24 In addition to its expectations of the host country and the standards to which its elections are held, SADC outlines a code of conduct for their observers.25

23 Considering the length of these expectations, I provide the list in its entirety in Appendix F.

24 Full access to the process requires that observers are free to move within the country; there is timely accreditation of the missions; observers are allowed to communicate freely with the EMB or appropriate electoral authority and administrators; access and freedom to communicate with the media; observers are granted free access to all legislation and regulations governing the electoral process and environment; free access to all information pertaining to the electoral process; they have unrestricted access to all polling states and counting centers; they are able to communicate freely with all competing political parties, candidates, other political and civic associations or organizations; and they must be given the freedom to communicate with voters without undermining the secrecy of the vote (SADC 2015, 11).

25 Observers are expected to “comply with all national laws and regulations; maintain personal discipline and behavior that is beyond reproach; maintain strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and shall at no time express any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, parties and candidates in contention in the Electoral process. They are not to display or wear any partisan symbols, colors or banners; Neither accept nor attempt to procure any gifts, favors or inducements from a candidate, their agent, the parties or any other organization or person involved in the electoral process; Disclose to the relevant SADC structures any relationship that could lead to a conflict of interest with their duties or with the process of the observation and assessment of the elections, as soon as the observer becomes aware of such conflict; Base all reports and conclusions on well documented, factual, and

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Unfortunately, observers are unable to enact this mandate at every polling station.

Though ideally missions are deployed at random, in some countries this is not the case as deployment is limited because the missions are “simply unable to be everywhere” (interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). This is an issue shared with the other organizations.

However, for the EU, and to an extent AU, the challenge is lessened when larger missions are deployed. More observers ensure the ability to cover a greater area. If SADC was able to mobilize its partner organizations, it may be able to better navigate this challenge. So, in reality, rather than being randomly assigned their areas, mission deployment depends on the following: density of population; distance to the capital; security; the presence of other observers with whom they can share information (i.e., AU, SADC PF, and ECF-SADC); highly contested areas; and areas of high economic interests. The distance to the capital is important as farther distances may also indicate that a constituency is more prone to political party manipulation. Security is a concern in that as much as the mission would want to go to these more dangerous, vulnerable areas to protect the vote of those that require its presence, it also has to take into account the safety of its observers. However, within these considerations also comes the fact that there exists a level of “game playing” by international observers. Specifically, it was noted that the interests of regional observers might differ from that of Western ones and the ever-present sense that one

verifiable evidence from a multiple number of credible sources as well as their own eye witness accounts; Seek a response from the person or organization concerned before treating any unsubstantiated allegation as valid; Identify, in their reports, the exact information and the sources of the information they have gathered and used as a basis for their assessment of the electoral process or environment; Report all information gathered or witnessed by them honestly and accurately; When meeting election officials, relevant state authorities and public officials, parties, candidates and their agents, inform them of the aims and objectives of the SEOMs; Carry any prescribed identification issued at all times, and will identify themselves to any interested authority upon request; Undertake their duties in an unobtrusive manner, and will not interfere with the electoral process, polling day procedures, or the vote count; Refrain from making personal or premature comments or judgments about their observations to the media or any other interested persons, and will limit any remarks to general information about the nature of their activity as observers. In this regard, observers shall channel all communication with the media through the Head of Mission; Participate in the briefings or training provided by the SEOM; Provide their reports on time to their supervisors and attend any debriefings as required; and work harmoniously with each other and with observers from other organizations in their area of deployment” (SADC 2015, 12-13).

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should monitor the monitors to see what they want. Why are they there? What economic interests would they be protecting in these areas? From this perspective, at least one official suggested that we should expect to observe patterns of political manipulation that stem from international agendas and pressures and impact the operations of observer missions (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015). Mission deployment patterns may shift while on the ground in response to the sentiment that “foreign forces” are undermining the electoral process.

SADC is usually aware, prior to an election, which of these other organizations will be present. Usually, it expects both ECF-SADC and SADC PF, diplomatic missions, and The

Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA), as they regularly observe elections in the Southern African region. Attendance on the part of these other actors is established by their observation of previous elections as there are a number of organizations that monitor elections in the region. In addition, SADC’s advance teams are able to confirm who is present prior to the deployment of the remaining observers. It is important for SADC that it liaise with the other missions and exchange deployment patterns to avoid duplication. As noted above,

SADC observers are curious as to why particular organizations focus on a particular area during a given election. Specifically, these missions serve as a sort of “checks and balance” for the others where the question raised is “who observes the observer?” as there are sometimes observers who seek to jeopardize the electoral process. This attempted subterfuge was the case in

Zimbabwe where the intentions on certain observers were unclear, where they sought to point out any and all negatives, and accused the media of having been “manipulative.”26 These relationships with other observer missions are crucial because they impact the nature of election monitoring on the ground that observers may react to perceptions on the ground. For example,

26 There were no specific names mentioned in this part of the interview though it can be alluded to given the nature of our conversation that these were the “Western” organizations.

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SADC has a position on good politics for the region that differs from the rest of the world and at times does not resonate with the rest of the world (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, 2015). Like the AU, SADC makes the argument that democracy within the region differs from that in the

West. This is the position on good politics to which the SADC official was referring to, and for this reason, elections cannot and should not be held against the accepted norms of “democracy.”

Elections in Africa, and the politics of the countries in which they are held, are complex, and by applying a standard adopted elsewhere, one risks misunderstanding and misjudging the process.

It is for this reason that it is important to pay special attention to actions of other, especially

Western observers. These tensions obfuscate the nature of election monitoring in the region.

However, despite this confusion, SADC still sees the importance of its role in observing elections in the region while observing the “other” observers. It sees its role as being “the last call for countries” (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).27 Therefore, in order to move democracy in the region forward, SADC needs to tackle the politics that arise with the election observation process. As will be established, these changes at the institutional level, for example, the adoption of new policies or protocols, impact how the organization addresses the issues that arise.

Moving past the actual elections, and in line with SADC’s “culture of democracy and good governance,” the SEOMs with assistance from the Secretariat are expected to assemble mission notes and issue a preliminary post-election statement immediately following the close of polls. The final report is then compiled for submission to the member state holding the elections and the EMB. Once the report has been publicized the host country may take the recommendations made by the SEOM into consideration and/or submit a response to the Chair of the Organ (SADC 2015, 16). How the state chooses to react to the report is entirely up to them.

27 This discussion is crucial to the argument put forth in this dissertation and will be revisited in subsequent chapters.

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The following section discusses two SADC partner organizations and the evolution as actors in election observation. It also outlines how SADC interacts with these organizations that fall under within its institutional umbrella. These interactions are especially important because

SADC, as a Secretariat, has not always been at the forefront of election observation efforts. In this situation, it appears that SADC suffers from a discrepancy between its rhetoric and action, a point that will be illustrated further in Chapters 8, 9, and 10. For this reason, it is important to understand how other actors in the region complement or complicate the SADC’s approach to election observation.

Partners in Monitoring?

Organizations within the SADC region have been active in the push for election observation by member states as evidenced by the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF), which developed the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC Region in 2001. These

Norms and Standards were used in several key elections and continue to serve as a critical election observation tool for missions in the region. However, this was not considered to be a

“SADC instrument” considering that the Parliamentary Form is not a legislative organ of the organization. As such, there are operational tensions arising from the fact that it is an autonomous institution within SADC with no reporting relationship with the other SADC structures. Therefore, the organization did not regard the treaty as a legal binding document.

This disconnect between the various political bodies is apparent when observing the

SADC’s structure and how it serves as an umbrella for multiple organizations. While each of these organizations benefit from the SADC name and agenda, there exists a lack of unity at the operational level. This was demonstrated in 2005, with SADC’s inability to formally include the

SADC Election Commissions Forum (ECF-SADC) in its political efforts within the region. This is a key difference between SADC and the other organizations. While it works in partnership

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with other organizations, these other organizations are not considered as “part” of the organization. For SADC, these bodies appear to be subsumed under the organization’s umbrella, but this is not done in a way that is sustainable. Ideally, SADC PF’s role should resemble that of the EU Parliament and allow it to support SADC’s legislative efforts. Having a parliament like the EU’s, would offer SADC another avenue for checks and balances within the organization and allow it to harmonize the various legal frameworks. Doing so would contribute to a stronger, more efficient organization. However, SADC PF has not been granted an established position within SADC. Rather, “the [SADC PF] does not have a reporting relationship to Summit and other SADC Institutions, but works together with them on matters of common interest” (SADC

2017a, np). This statement effectively diminishes SADC PF’s legitimacy and is particularly interesting given that SADC PF is listed as one of SADC’s “institutions” (SADC 2017b, np).

The legitimacy granted to other institutions within the organization creates a larger, more efficient team for election observation. With more partners to the process, the EU is better able to allocate funding to the missions and prioritize these items, unlike the organizations that are more limited in their abilities to do so.

This governance gap is particularly problematic for the observation process with disengagement between the above-mentioned organizations, SADC, SADC PF, and SADC ECF-

SADC, three major actors in election observation within the region. It is often difficult to ensure that all parties are working together and one is not undermining the other’s progress (Interviews,

Gaborone, Botswana, June-July 2015). This presents an interesting political dynamic. Despite this complicated political dynamic, SADC PF and ECF-SADC, though to a lesser extent, play a role as a part of the organization and promoter of democratic norms and should be acknowledged.

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SADC Parliamentary Forum

SADC PF is composed of fourteen member parliaments committed to democratic development, political science, human rights, good governance, and norms of election observation. The organization focuses on the promotion of democracy, good governance, observation of reform, and initiating reforms in the conduct and management of elections.

Approximately ten years ago, SADC PF leadership noted the prevalence of outdated observation methods, which led it to push for the adoption international best practices. As a result of this move towards being on par with international norms, there has been a combination of good practices, addressing existing shortcomings, and the judgment of multiple elections. In addition, over the last 14 or 15 years, the organization has highlighted the need for electoral reform and led to all countries in the region establishing EMBs in the form of independent EC’s. However, the level of independence still varies across member states (Interview, Malawi, May 19, 2014).

Within Southern Africa, there have been positive developments in the realm of overall election management due to SADC PF’s involvement. Namely, all countries seek transparency in their counting processes; distances to travel to vote have decreased; streams have been introduced at polling station; codes of conduct have been developed for political parties; and provisions have been put in place for those who may be disabled or illiterate. However, despite these developments, challenges still remain. These challenges include the unhindered use of state resources and incumbent privilege; the issues of political party funding; uneven media coverage; and maintaining gender equality (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). It is clear that moving towards increased democracy is a consistent priority for this organization. The fact that the organization has been emphasizing the promotion of democratic norms in the region implies that all the work done and challenges faced are with the aim of moving forward. This priority on

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moving forward suggests that SADC PF is preset towards progress bias. However, as a SADC partner, its biases are influenced by those of the larger organization.

The organization has also made concerted efforts to include the domestic non-partisan election observers to expand the legitimacy of the process. The role of civil society organizations in election monitoring is one that has increased over the years but still remains complicated. It is agreed that the role of domestic actors is crucial but their relationship with SADC can be problematic. One group of domestic actors view SADC as an organization sent to protect its peers, namely the ruling party. This group tends to be made up primarily of the opposition. The other group views SADC as helping them fulfill their franchise unhindered. For the group that supports SADC’s presence, they argue that SADC has been entrusted with the role of ensuring that the government and EMB comply with the rules of an election. However, the presence of the media complicates matters due to push back from the private media and certain NGOs. Concerns are that the foreign funding of the private media and NGOs might impact how SADC is perceived, and the image of a supportive body is one that the organization wants to protect. Still,

SADC is aware that there are issues within its member states where even the public services have their weaknesses and biases. Regardless, some in the organization prefer “the devil we know” and prefer to engage with these public entities (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).

SADC PF, though acting in its capacity as an international organization, prioritizes the involvement of local observers in this exercise, and this position could lead to tensions between the SADC and SADC PF. However, their divergent opinions have not impacted SADC PF’s focus on developing means to enhance the monitoring process in Southern Africa using all available resources. For example, on October 30-November 1, 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia, a SADC

Regional Election Monitoring Workshop entitled “Recruitment and Training of Election

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Observers and Drafting of Election Statements” was held. This workshop resulted in the

“Planning for Election Observation” field guide to complement existing reference tools, such as the National Democratic Institute’s (NDIs) How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: A to Z Guide and The Quick Count and Election Observation.

The 2007 SADC document that resulted from this election monitoring workshop addresses multiple issues pertaining to election observation and how missions should best prepare themselves. Focusing on the organization’s objectives (realistic and measurable), namely goals, activities, timeline, resources (human and financial), and expected outcomes, which all begin with a “needs assessment” which looks into a country’s legal framework, the political landscape, election administration, media environment, women’s participation, national minorities, and election observation (SADC-ESN, NDI, and EISA 2007). As a result of these efforts, interaction with domestic groups has more recently been touted as central to the organization’s activities but the reality on the ground sometimes appears to be quite different from that which is put forth by the organization.

SADC Electoral Commissions Forum

The next SADC partner organization of interest is the SADC Electoral Commissions

(ECF-SADC) that also incorporates key political stakeholders into the observation process. ECF-

SADC was established in 1988, and unlike the SADC Secretariat, is focused on the electoral monitoring bodies (EMBs) and not the government, as governments are SADC’s main focus. It was for this different focus that the 2005 workshop sought to further integrate ECF-SADC to encourage regional oversight in all electoral matters and strengthen SADC’s capacity in electoral support and observation in the region (SADC 2015, 1). While this did not occur, ECF-SADC and

SADC were mandated to work together on establishing a SADC Electoral Commission, which

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led to the eventual creation of SEAC (ibid.). This interaction indicates the potential for productive collaboration between these institutions.

ECF-SADC was created to strengthen cooperation between the EMBs; promote conditions to support transparent elections; support the EMBs by encouraging the capacity building of commissioners, staff, resources, technical experience; strengthen each other; and mediate their observer status. In doing so, the EMBs serve as reference point for each other and assist during elections as a means to encourage their positive development (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 25, 2016).

Operationally, ECF-SADC consists of three structures. First, the annual conference that serves as the policy-making body. At this annual meeting, the various parties discuss the challenges, and the continuing relevance and validity of the constitution. The Chairperson of this body is elected every two years. Second, the Executive Committee, which consists of seven of the fifteen Commissions, is tasked with implementing what was agreed upon at the annual conference. There are Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) that discuss issues and feed to the

Executive Committee in order to facilitate the setting of guidelines for the organization. It consists of permanent sub-committees: finance and audit (deal with the budget), employment and remuneration (job searches, salaries, etc.), and editorial (distribution of reports). This Committee is expected to meet three times a year. The Botswana Electoral Commission is an ex-officio member due to it being host to the ECF-SADC headquarters. The last structure is the Secretariat which consists of liaison offices and is focused on capacity building, fundraising, and supporting the commissions through training, economic and political support, etc. Funding for the organization is based on the membership fees paid by the Commissions but these tend to be insufficient for all the operational requirements. In order to manage and undertake its activities,

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the ECF gets additional support from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the

European Union (EU), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and The

Centre for International and Strategic Analysis (SISA) (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 25,

2016). So, ECF-SADC not only benefits from financial support from organizations other than

SADC but does so in a way that increases its capacity to uphold its mandate to support electoral administration processes in member states.

In preparation for elections in a member country, there is an annual orientation for new commissioners to go over the specifics of voter registration, voters’ rolls, nomination processes, electoral concepts, familiarization with regional trends, and support tours within and beyond the

SADC region. These tours sometimes include visits to the EU region to assess how it prepares for elections. Election observation is a key activity for ECF-SADC because it offers an opportunity for the organization to assess how their fellow Commissions are managing their respective elections. Consequently, the missions are emphasized as opportunities for both observation and learning. Namely, they are opportunities to assess what the country is doing during a given election and what the commissioners can learn about the country. This exposure aids in the region’s democratization process and serves as a means for member states to hold each other accountable. Also, these missions increase the ECF-SADC’s familiarity with the political situations in its member states.

However, mission deployment tends to be very expensive, and as a result its missions tend to be purely technical, consisting of just the ECF-SADC and a number of commissioners.

These missions are led by the Chairperson of Commissions and are selected via an electoral roster. An ECF-SADC official described these missions as “peer support missions” that assess how the commission in a specific country operates; how their ballots are stored, and in the case

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of Malawi in 2014, why ballots were being printed in South Africa and not domestically; how the staff is trained; and voting hours, among other things (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, July

25, 2015). They also interact with domestic organizations while in the field to gain a complete understanding of what is occurring on the ground.

Interestingly, each mission uses its own instruments and rules depending on who is leading the group. They deal with technical issues such as staffing to thematic issues, like the problematic nature of party funding and activities that may impact electoral quality. This reality raises the question of how this impacts the monitoring process during the election. The reliance on multiple instruments and observation criteria impacts mission behavior and their interactions with other organizations. This is especially problematic for SADC, which has to differentiate itself from these other partner organizations while also emphasizing that all of the organizations are working towards the same cause, that is, the improvement of elections at the regional level.

Prior to the elections, funds permitting, ECF-SADC sends three to four people on pre- election missions to meet with stakeholders, NGOs, and commissioners to establish how prepared they are for the election. At this point, the EMBs are usually ready for the election but are upfront regarding the challenges they face, especially regarding resources, such as not being given the budget, not having people aware of the elections, or no signage provided. Once the mission is satisfied with preparation efforts, it reports to the forum that the elections will be credible. As stated earlier, missions tend to be smaller due to financial constraints and average at about 10 observers per mission compared to 15 in earlier missions. Their respective countries provide transportation and accommodation for all delegates, with the ECF-SADC Secretariat responsible for all logistics on the ground. Again, there is a missed opportunity to coordinate its mission in line with SADC Secretariat’s and strengthen both their election observation missions.

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Still, while the missions are rather small on their own, there are many opportunities to liaise with other election observers while on the ground. The organization benefits from the wider reach that the SADC Secretariat has, and thus it is able to get people from all sectors such as priests, officers of the law, etc., through a Memorandum of Understanding signed with SEAC.

This memorandum is the basis for the partnership that exists between the two institutions.

However, as a regional organization, the ECF-SADC also has political relationships with EISA,

SADC-PF, SADC Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (SADC-CNGO), and the SADC

Electoral Support Network (ESN) in efforts to address the challenges associated with election administration. However, the coordination aspect is very challenging because each organization has its own mandate and focuses on issues that tie into its respective agendas (Interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, June 25, 2015). As a result, there are multiple instruments used to assess the election quality and election monitors sometimes come to different conclusions. This lack of uniformity at the ground level, despite expressed shared goals, allows the mission significant flexibility while directly challenging the assumption that election observers adhere to a set of guidelines. Thus, instead of simplifying the process these relationships risk undermining the process.

In addition, resources matter significantly where higher access to funds means an increased profile. For example, missions in countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo are especially challenging with the country’s population of 30 million, lack of adequate infrastructure, and limited access to the various constituencies. Consequently, organizations such as the United Nations are better able to support these processes (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana,

June 25, 2015). However, organizations are also limited in what they observe due to what they consider to be important. This lack of uniformity extends to the composition of the missions and

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“delegate quality” where not all observers are trained in the same manner. Considering these various mandates, the organizations set their deployment plans according to what their respective goals are. Even upon completion of the mission, the observers return to their home countries and push for the implementation of what is most in keeping with its mandate. For example, the PF may be focused on gender representation at a given time while ECF-SADC tends to focus on electoral management (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 25, 2015). Therefore, the mandate determines what the mission does with what it has seen and also drives how the organizations tackle deployment and the issues that they choose to highlight. Balancing the sometimes disparate mandates and agendas of partner organizations, is imperative for SADC’s election observation process.

Conclusion

SADC has tackled similar issues to the EU and AU as it establishes itself as a political actor within the Southern African region. Over the years there have changes to policies that should result in different behaviors for its election observer missions. However, 2011 and 2015 marked the most monumental turns in its approach to election observation. The establishment of the Southern Electoral Advisory Council (SEAC) in 2011 and the revised SADC Principles and

Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections in 2015 indicated a progression in SADC’s observation process. In addition, there are points of convergence and divergence between SADC and its partner organizations that impact the manner in which they work together on matters concerning elections and election observation. Therefore, we should observe a marked difference in the nature of election observation and mission behavior over Malawi’s three electoral cycles.

The next chapter examines the political development of the Commonwealth of Nations

(Commonwealth). The Commonwealth, like the EU, is a European-based organization; however, it is composed of both African and non-African countries which include Asian and European

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members. Its mixed membership raises questions regarding what it prioritizes during its election observation missions and how it tackles issues related to democracy and governance considering that, unlike the EU, it deploys missions to its member states. These questions, and their implications, will be explored in Chapter 7.

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CHAPTER 7 THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Introduction

This chapter explores the political developments of the Commonwealth of Nations

(Commonwealth) and how this organization’s election observation process has evolved. The

Commonwealth is a unique case, and offers a great opportunity for comparison, because it is the only one of the organizations under investigation that includes both African and European member countries. In other words, the Commonwealth represents a mixed organization, one that combines both regional and European interests. Consequently, I expect it to behave differently under certain circumstances from both its fully European (i.e., EU) and fully African (i.e., AU and SADC) counterparts. This chapter, then, pays particular attention to the dynamics of this mixed organization in an attempt to understand how they influence the Commonwealth’s behavior when it comes to democracy promotion efforts on the ground.1

As with Chapters 4-6, Chapter 7 explores the Commonwealth’s political development over the years. After establishing its legacy, this chapter then outlines the Commonwealth’s political development and that of its election observation process. It draws attention to how the

Commonwealth’s push for democratic development risked being at odds with its emphasis on member countries being part of a voluntary association. As a voluntary association, with a colonial legacy, it had to be careful in imposing measures on its members. In doing so, this chapter argues that the Commonwealth’s election mission behavior was largely driven by its relationships with member countries. Once it was able to disengage itself from this dynamic, we

1 The Commonwealth is the most understudied of the organizations under investigation in this dissertation with the majority of work done on it published in the 70s and 80s (see Harris 1975, Groom and Taylor 1984, Moore 1987, and Chan 1988).

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observe a shift in its behavior, placing it more in line with its European counterpart, the

European Union (EU).

Moving Beyond a Colonial Legacy

The Commonwealth was first established in 1926, when the United Kingdom and the dominions under her rule agreed that they were “equal in status, in no way a subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by allegiance to the

Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”

(Commonwealth 2017). These dominions were the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand,

South Africa, and the Irish Free State (ibid.). In 1931, the British Parliament formally instituted the association when it proclaimed, via the Statute of Westminster that the Commonwealth was an association of self-governing dominions united by their shared allegiance to the British Crown

(BBC 2014a). In doing so, it “gave legal recognition to the de facto independence of the dominions” (Commonwealth 2017). During this time, the Commonwealth faced challenges from countries like India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, that sought their independence from Great Britain.

By allowing countries to remain members of the Commonwealth, yet not recognize the United

Kingdom monarch as their head of state, the organization faced a constitutional crisis which ended up furthering its move towards being a “multiracial Commonwealth” (ibid.). Therefore, in

1949, the Commonwealth prime ministers issued the London Declaration that changed membership from one that required countries to recognize the British monarch as their head of state to one that saw the monarch as head of the Commonwealth (BBC 2014a). By shifting this mentality, the United Kingdom granted autonomy to its member states as it moved towards including countries that were cutting ties with their colonial pasts and redefining their relationships with the Commonwealth.

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As alluded to above, the Commonwealth was created as an association of countries with a shared history that sought to shift away from the colonial banner under which these relationships were formed: “members see the connection as natural because they have a shared past, a common language and, despite their differences, an enhanced capacity to trust one another”

(Commonwealth 2016a, np). As such, the organization emphasizes its voluntary nature as crucial to its existence. Using the notion of “association” was an attempt to emphasize that these countries were no longer British subjects but partners: “when countries had recently achieved their independence from the UK, it was important for them to stress the change in their relationship, from dependent status to equal partnership” (ibid.). This approach was the only way to ensure that the organization could assist in the development of these new nations without being accused of continuing the colonialist legacy.

All Commonwealth member states except for Mozambique and Rwanda (who joined in

1995 and 2009, respectively) had been subject to direct or indirect British rule or shared an administrative link to another Commonwealth country. In addition, in 1997, at a summit in

Edinburgh, Scotland the member states decided that to be considered for Commonwealth membership a country must have had “a constitutional association with an existing

Commonwealth member state; that it should comply with Commonwealth values, principles, and priorities as set out in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991; and that it should accept

Commonwealth norms and conventions” (Commonwealth 2016, np). These membership requirements, like that of the African Union (AU) and Southern African Development

Community (SADC), are not as rigorous as that of the European Union (EU). For the

Commonwealth, like the AU and SADC, creating partnerships among its member states based on a shared history was the priority. This sets it apart from the EU because though it is a Western

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organization, it is limited by the nature of the relationship among the countries. For example, the

EU is able to enact certain policies within its Commission through debates with EU policymakers and citizens, but the Commonwealth does not have the benefit of this distance. The policies it enacts must take into account the input by member countries and how its actions will be perceived. This conflict of identity comes into play during its observation missions and will be explored in Chapters 8-10.

Notably absent from this friendly assembly of nations today is Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe became a member of the Commonwealth after its independence in 1980 but was suspended in

March 2002 due its highly problematic presidential election. This election saw high levels of political violence, which led to the inability of voters to freely undertake their right to vote

(Commonwealth 2002, np). This suspension required that President Mugabe search for avenues of reconciliation with the opposition. In doing so, the suspension signaled that he had failed to adhere to the international expectations that elections be held in a free and fair manner (Reid

2002):

the presidential election in Zimbabwe was marred by a high level of politically motivated violence and intimidation, which preceded the poll…it is our view that most of these perpetrated by members/supporters of the ruling party against members/supports of the opposition (Commonwealth Observer Group 2002, 43).

The Commonwealth observer reports emphasized the need for an end to politically motivated violence through the establishment of institutions and mechanisms that promote peace initiatives at the central and district levels (ibid., 44). The lack of these crucial governance structures left Mugabe largely unchecked. In December 2003, the Commonwealth Heads of

Government decided to extend Zimbabwe’s suspension due to its inability to comply with the organization’s demands. Specifically, they noted no change in Zimbabwe’s political situation (La

Guardia 2003). However, in response to hearing the news of the continued suspension from

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Jamaica, Nigeria, and South Africa, Mugabe decided to quit the organization by responding that

“this is unacceptable. This is it. It [Zimbabwe] quits and quits it will be” (ibid.). Attempts to get him to reconsider were in vain. As previously observed with Mugabe’s interaction with the

SADC mission, the behavior of a vocal member can significantly impact the organization’s dynamic. Unlike the EU, that also faced Mugabe’s wrath and was expulsed from these elections but was able to maintain its distance from the country, the Commonwealth lost one of its own member states. This loss helped define the Commonwealth’s attitude toward violations of its rules.

The decision to maintain Zimbabwe’s suspension was an effort on the part of the

Commonwealth to send the signal that it may be a voluntary association but clear violations to its principles would not be tolerated. This move slightly altered its image as a permissive organization, moving it closer to the position taken by the EU. Effectively following this show of strength, the Government of Zimbabwe withdrew from the organization (Commonwealth 2003).

By setting a standard, the Commonwealth has signaled its commitment to its declared values and implied that it would not be partial to member states. Its adherence to democratic principles has been echoed on several occasions over the course of the organization’s development. Again, we observe the continued emphasis on the idea that the Commonwealth is an organization seriously committed to democratic governance.

Despite a shared values agenda and an apparent commitment to democracy and good governance ideals, the Commonwealth did not create a formal charter until 2012, much later than the EU, AU, or SADC. Rather, the organization was established with the Declaration of

Commonwealth Principles at a meeting of Heads of Government in Singapore in 1971. The aim

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of this document was to establish a mutually beneficial relationship between the countries to preserve this delicate balance:

We believe that international co-operation is essential to remove the causes of war, promote tolerance, combat injustice, and secure development among the peoples of the world; we are convinced that the Commonwealth is one of the most fruitful associations for these purposes…the association is based on consultation, discussion and co-operation (Commonwealth 1971, 2).

The Declaration of Commonwealth Principles was amended in 1977 and 1979, where statements on Apartheid in Sport and The Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice were added, respectively (Groom and Taylor 1984, 5). The statement on apartheid in sport, also known as the Gleneagles Agreement, was issued on June 15, 1977 and marked the “first international move in the global campaign to isolate [apartheid] South Africa”

(Commonwealth 1977). This move represented its commitment to supporting good governance and human rights. Further, the Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial

Prejudice, built upon these sentiments and reaffirmed the Commonwealth’s desire to protect all its citizens and emphasize the fact that “everyone has the right to equality before the law and equal justice under the law” (Commonwealth 1979, 1). Once again, the organization is managing perceptions by completely distancing itself from any sort of government that uses the system to oppress members of the population.

Following this period of establishment, the Commonwealth relied upon its procedures, traditions, and statements that emphasized its commitment to achieving the goals outlined in these documents. Like the European Union, it saw the importance of managing perceptions and limiting the opportunities for the creation of an “us versus them” mentality by encouraging fraternal relations between states. Yet, unlike the EU, these dynamics can be observed within the same organization causing a different type of tension. Without a clear charter, the

Commonwealth was not able to establish itself as firmly as the EU which limited its abilities as a

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political actor. Due to these limitations, the Commonwealth had to rely on establishing a stronger relationship among member states. Most importantly, the United Kingdom no longer wanted to be associated with its colonial legacy and this impacted the manner in which it behaved towards and interacted with African countries (and other former colonies).

With former colonialists, like the United Kingdom, more financially viable than many of the smaller countries emerging from years of colonial rule, it is imperative to assess the subtleties that arise. One can expect this sentiment to play a role in the interactions between states and give an insight as to why the Commonwealth is so adamant about protecting the ideal of good governance and rights for all citizens. It is important to assess how these positions translate when monitoring elections in countries where fraud is not so apparent.

These efforts were led by the member states that worked together to influence global events and create programs through bilateral engagement or the Commonwealth Secretariat.

Consequently, the Commonwealth’s current mandate, reiterated in the 2012 charter, was established by the 1971 declaration which states that the organization is “a voluntary association of independent sovereign states…consulting and cooperating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace” (Commonwealth

2016a, np). However, this document is barely two pages long, and while it provides a sense of what the group wanted to achieve, it does not offer much in terms of specifics. It is even more limited than the AU and SADC charters, organizations that are conventionally considered to not prioritize legal agreements. This lack of information is problematic, because by trying to avoid the semblance of hierarchy, the organization inherently leaves itself without a clear form of management. Without this structure, the organization risks leaving more powerful countries with room to intervene in the same manner that the Commonwealth sought to avoid. While this may

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be curbed by a strong Secretariat, it still offers an opportunity for the organization to be undermined.

Like the other organizations under investigation, the Commonwealth adheres to the ideal of non-interference, but it emphasizes that member states should not behave in a manner that requires their involvement. One example is the case of South Africa and its apartheid government. South Africa was forced to withdraw from the Commonwealth in 1961and was unable to join until it held its first non-racial elections in 1994 (O’Malley 1961). During this period, the Commonwealth demonstrated its “commitment to principles of equality and empowerment” by debating how to best deal with the South African apartheid government at each Heads of Government meeting (Commonwealth Secretariat, n.d.). The “universal abhorrence of apartheid policies” led to the Commonwealth garnering support from other actors like the United States, and promoting dialogue with South Africa in efforts to challenge the regime (ibid.). As the Secretary-General stated, regarding the transgressions by Uganda’s Idi

Amin, despite the “long and necessary tradition of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. No Commonwealth country (indeed, who anywhere in the world?) is above reproach in some respect or other” (quoted in Groom and Taylor 1984, 6-7). So, while the Commonwealth does not share the same level of institutionalization as its counterparts, it regularly asserts that it prioritizes the shared values of the international community and these values determine its behavior.

The adoption of a more formal charter in 2012 sought to further establish the

Commonwealth’s place as a member of the international community but, despite its adoption in

2012, the Commonwealth Charter was only signed into effect in March 2013. Consequently, as with the other organizations, we can expect the adoption of this charter to impact the behavior of

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Commonwealth missions. The initial aim of this charter was to outline the organization’s

“governance arrangements, roles of principal Commonwealth agents, rights and responsibilities of members in that organization.” Yet, following deliberations with the Eminent Persons Group

(EPG), the charter eventually sought to establish the “spirit” of the organization that embodied the collective purpose of the Commonwealth community by including perspectives from national governments as well as civil society organizations. The 2013 charter did not indicate a departure for the organization, however, as it reiterated much of what was written in the initial declarations. Nevertheless, the charter did serve as another signal that the Commonwealth considers itself to be an important player in the political development of its member states.

Understanding the Commonwealth

As discussed in the previous section, the Commonwealth adheres to shared guidelines and principles but does not have the same level of institutionalization as some of its counterparts.

Yet, despite this less concrete identity the organization should not be discredited. According to

Groom and Taylor (1984, 4):

the Commonwealth is real significant and relevant to the attempted solution of a wide range of contemporary problems. It encompasses a network of ties at government and non-governmental levels in virtually every domain; it has grown out of and facilitates an impressive amount of goods, services, ideas, and people in a remarkably non-coercive framework…The way of conducting business is a matter of evolving practice that has no constitutional definition, though the practice can be described, and while the Commonwealth is devoid of a constitution, it does have explicit principles which reflects its values.2

In sum, then, the organization has sought and continues to seek to establish itself as a potential partner in the development processes of member states. It is also granted legitimacy by its respective member states and the international community. Therefore, the manner in which

2 As previously mentioned, the Commonwealth adopted a charter in 2012 but for decades this fluidity defined the organization and informed many of its actions over the years.

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the Commonwealth operates is similar to other international organizations and can be analyzed as such.

Southern African Commonwealth of European Union African Union Development Nations Community

Commonwealth Summit of the Troika EU Council AU Assembly Secretariat

Troika of the Organ SADC SADC Deputy Secretary EU Commission AU Commission Executive Council on Politics, Defense, and Security Council Secretariat General of Political Affairs

Sectoral and Cluster Department of Political Division EU Parliament Ministerial Political Affairs Commitees

Standing Committee of Officials

Figure 7-1. The European Union, African Union, Southern African Development Community, and the Commonwealth of Nations’ Political Institutions

Specifically, the leaders hold consultations and discuss the pertinent issues at hand. These

Heads of Government, and the ministers responsible for education, environment, finance, foreign affairs, gender issues, health, law, tourism, and youth, meet on a regular basis. Ministers of other sectors and senior officials meet on a less regular basis. However, when tackling particular issues areas, consultations are held with the respective heads of institutions and policy-making officials.

The aim of these meetings is to ensure that all Commonwealth policies and programs reflect member interests and provide governments with an understanding of what is occurring in their fellow member states. Even its meetings are held in a more collegial, flexible manner and tend to last a full week in comparison to the one to two days of its counterparts:

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Their special style and format are cherished because they allow full play to the Commonwealth spirit of friendship and understanding natural among the members of a family of nations which share a heritage of similar practices in education, law, business and administration, and a common respect for pluralism and democracy (Commonwealth Secretariat 1987, 3).

As noted in the previous section, there is continued emphasis on personal contact and fostering strong relationships among the leaders (ibid., 4). This prioritization on building strong relationship among leaders impacts how the Commonwealth addresses, or fails to address, issues that arise during the election observation process.

The activities undertaken by the organization are done at three levels: governments working together at international forums, regular meetings, and the management done by the

Secretariat (Commonwealth 2016c). This three-leveled approach suggests that the

Commonwealth engages in checks and balances throughout the decision-making process, though program management is handled by the Secretariat.

The Commonwealth Secretariat, like the EU Commission, the AU Commission, and

SADC Secretariat, manages the day-to-day affairs of the Commonwealth and “provides guidance on policy making, technical assistance and advisory services to Commonwealth member countries” (Commonwealth 2016f). It is divided into three areas: political, corporate, and economic and social development. These areas are handled by the Secretary General’s office

(ibid.). The Secretariat staff is recruited from the various member countries to ensure their geographical representation (Doxey 1984, 22). The Secretary-General heads the Secretariat and is appointed for five years by the Heads of Government. Due to this selection process, the

Secretary-General is able to interact with these world leaders if the situation arises (ibid.). This fact suggests a close relationship between the Secretariat and Heads of State. A close relationship implies that the Secretary General has some input when it comes to the operation of the organization.

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Similar to the AU and SADC, these relationships risk the introduction of personal politics into the organization. However, unlike the other organizations under investigation, it appears that the Commonwealth is not as compartmentalized. This could imply that ideas are handled more efficiently due to the more limited bureaucracy, but it could also mean that politics at the level of

Heads of State become more salient and their priorities translate more easily into action. Without the demarcation of institutions, the leaders can confer and make suggestions on issues that they value and consider important. It is possible that leaders are able to set mandates and agendas without much resistance from the organization because the system is created in a way that allows it. This possibility leads to questions about whom the Secretary-General defers to and whose opinion is more important. Considering how fluid the organization is, close attention must be paid to the nature of political relationships.

In terms of organization, the Secretary-General oversees the organization and has three

Deputy Secretary-Generals: one in charge of political affairs, another economic and social development, and a third responsible for corporate and management issues. For the purposes of this project, I focus only on the Deputy Secretary-General of Political Affairs.3 Four departments fall under this office: the Human Rights Unit (HRU), Political Division (POL), Rule of Law

(ROL), and the Communications Division (COM) (Commonwealth 2015).4 The Political

Division, along with a number of issues, deals with the various world regions and electoral support, the topics most directly under investigation.

3 If interested in the organizational structure of the Deputy Secretary-General of Economic and Social Development, more information can be found via the Commonwealth’s website at http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/CW-Structure-Chart_Updated-November-2015.pdf.

4 The Political Division (POL) in divided into five sections: Africa, Asia and Europe, Caribbean and Pacific, Electoral Support, and Good Offices. The Rule of Law Division (ROL) is divided into two sections: justice and law development. Last, the Communications Division (COM) is separated into four sections: Media and Public Affairs, Web & Social Media, Publications, and the Knowledge Centre (Commonwealth 2015).

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The Secretariat serves as the main promoter of “democracy, rule of law, human rights, good governance and social and economic development” and considers itself to be “a voice for small states and a champion for youth empowerment” (Commonwealth 2016f). The organization’s focus areas are set at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting that is held every two years. So, while the Secretary General has relative autonomy, they are still bound by the limits set by member governments (Doxey 1984, 23). By outlining the focus areas, the country leaders set the agendas and priorities that drive the organization. Therefore, “it is no exaggeration to say that the Secretary-General has become the personification of the

Commonwealth at the level of high politics” where politics and political decisions are influenced by member states (ibid., 25). This reality is a consequence of the manner in which the organization was developed where a distinction, albeit an unclear one, was made between “high politics” and “low politics.” Here, the former refers to the Commonwealth as “a forum for discussion [among high level officials]” and the latter as a “functional cooperation at which it has some of the attributes of a service agency” (ibid., 26). The distinction is blurry because high- level politics was a staple of the organization during its formative years where discussions and programs were held prior to the official establishment of the Secretariat. So, even as the organization evolved, the power dynamics never really shifted downwards. Thus, the practice of

“high-level” politics continues to define Commonwealth behavior (Doxey 1984, 26;

Commonwealth 2016). However, the role of the Secretariat is to navigate this divide and maintain the order that is so essential for the organization to function.

In terms of operating costs, each member is expected to financially contribute to the cost of running the Secretariat. The country’s population and national income determines the amount that it contributes. As membership size increased, the scales were continually adjusted to reflect

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the changing economic environment. However, within years of its establishment, the original members, Britain, Canada, Australia, and India, were providing the majority of the funding

(Doxey 1984, 20). In addition, the “annual budgets for the Secretariat’s general fund…are considered by a finance committee composed of Commonwealth high commissioners in London and a representative of the British government, and submitted to Commonwealth governments for their approval” (ibid., 21). The organization, as is the case with a large number of organizations reliant on financing through contributions from member states, still faces financial challenges as approximately 70 percent of its budget is funded by Britain, Canada, and Australia

(Sanders 2013). However, despite the financial shortfalls, democracy and development still serve as its “overriding objective” (Adefuye 2005, 34).

The Commonwealth and Democracy Promotion

The Commonwealth’s role in international politics began in the 1960s. It became one of the major drivers of global pressure against racism, especially in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and

Namibia. With this directive, the Commonwealth sought to establish itself at an international level, which led to the creation of its Secretariat in 1965 in London. This was an important development because it was able to facilitate consultations and other means of coordination at the country level. In addition, in the same year, the Commonwealth Foundation was instituted as a means of linking members of similar professions. In addition, it offered support to non- governmental organizations and civil society, and promoted arts and culture in its member states

(Commonwealth 2016c, np). 1971 saw the launch of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical

Cooperation to serve as mechanism for member countries to assist each other in their development processes. However, this effort was not created as a financial fund; rather, it offered a market for the exchange of skills and served as a means of “technical cooperation” among the countries (ibid.). This allowed Commonwealth countries the opportunity to cultivate expertise

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that allowed for the “advancement of women, protection of the environment and participation of young people in development” (Commonwealth 2016c, np) Furthermore, the Commonwealth of

Learning was established in 1988 to “encourage development and sharing of open learning and distance education knowledge, resources and technology” (ibid.).

In a similar vein, the organization sought to encourage economic development in its member countries through the “reform of the public sector, encouragement of the growth of the private sector, and promotion of trade and investment – through the setting up of a

Commonwealth Business Council, the Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative, and the

Trade and Investment Access Facility” (Commonwealth 2016, np). The Commonwealth was considered to be especially beneficial to the smaller nations due to its emphasis on “fraternity” and was established as a bridge between nations, as well as peoples, where “its ties at the non- governmental level give it a substance that is denied to many regional organizations manufactured by governments [and] so frequently ignored by people” (Groom and Taylor 1984,

10). The Commonwealth sought to set itself apart by its more inclusive nature and encouraged all to be part of this community. Again, the rhetoric of camaraderie was invoked. Even as recently as 2015, following the Commonwealth’s summit theme of “Adding Global Value” the

Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamesh Sharma was quoted as saying that "The

Commonwealth is distinctive because of what it is: a family of 53 countries that has come together in affinity and kinship despite the diversity of its members and their distance from each other” (Commonwealth 2015a). Specifically, the camaraderie expressed by the Commonwealth was, and continues to be, one of “we are all in this together” while the African Union and SADC seemed to rely upon the mantra of “us against them [West].” Both attitudes were a marked

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difference from the EU’s apparent “help us help you” mentality. The dynamics within each organization then seem heavily reliant on this mentality.

Given the changing international political environment, the Commonwealth has continually increased its role in the support of democracy and the political development of its countries. The adoption of the Harare Commonwealth Declaration in 1991 signaled this move towards greater emphasis on democracy. In addition to reaffirming the members’ commitment to the principles established in its founding declaration, the document notes that the organization seeks to ensure “the protection and promotion of the fundamental political values of the

Commonwealth” and “democracy, democratic processes and institutions which reflect national circumstances, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government” (Commonwealth 1991). Since the adoption of this document, the promotion of democracy has gained a key place in the organization’s policies and activities. For example, the

Commonwealth implemented a self-disciplinary mechanism in 1995 through the Millbrook

Programme and the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), that deals with “serious or persistent violations” of the principles contained in the Harare Declaration. Consequently, violators of these principles would be subject to disciplinary action on the part of the

Commonwealth.

As a key political group, CMAG has shown its commitment to its role with the suspension of Fiji, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe for violating the principles of this document. Suspension calls attention to the country’s political shortcomings and creates a need for the Commonwealth to get involved to monitor the country’s progress towards reinstatement. Thus, being suspended is considered to be humiliating where being ‘CMAGed’

“carries a stigma that no country wants” (Banerji 2008, 816). The Commonwealth’s enforcement

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of violations to its agreed principles is particularly interesting given the voluntary nature of the organization. However, its actions are always couched in the language of unity and family, and it uses this unique identity to encourage member states to address their challenges and work towards a “common good”:

“[The Commonwealth is] a ‘family of nations’ whose signature truly represents the adage of ‘unity in diversity’ – diversity of cultures, diversity of economic power, diversity of development, diversity of traditions, that nonetheless come together to seek common ground, to seek common interests, to see what can be done to make this world a better place for our families and for our children” (Gonzi 2015).

This enforcement mechanism highlights the Commonwealth’s aim to establish itself as defender of democracy and good governance. The image is crucial for an organization that is known for being one that emerged from years of colonial rule (Commonwealth 2016). It is especially critical because nothing can be imposed on member states. The Secretariat is at the forefront of these efforts. In order for it to achieve these goals, the Secretariat is expected to undertake the following activities:

assistance in creating and building the capacity of requisite institutions; assistance in constitutional and legal matters, including with selecting models and initiating programmes of democratisation; assistance in the electoral field, including the establishment or strengthening of independent electoral machinery, civic and voter education, the preparation of Codes of Conduct, and assistance with voter registration; observation of elections, including by-elections or local elections where appropriate, at the request of the member governments concerned; strengthening the rule of law and promoting the independence of the judiciary through the promotion of exchanges among, and training of, the judiciary; support for good government, particularly in the area of public service reform; and other activities, in collaboration with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and other bodies, to strengthen the democratic culture and effective parliamentary practices (Commonwealth 1995, 3).

The 2012 Charter reiterated this prioritization of instilling and consolidating democracy by affirming its commitment to the documents that been signed by the member countries (The

Commonwealth 2012, 20). In this charter, the Commonwealth states that it recognizes the right of all citizens to be involved in democratic processes, especially in the participation in free and

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fair elections. It also notes that governments, political parties, and civil society are responsible for upholding these values. Other important stakeholders are parliaments and local government.

If these principles are not protected, then it supports “the role of the Commonwealth Ministerial

Action Group to address promptly and effectively all instances of serious or persistent violations of Commonwealth values without any fear or favour” (ibid., 20). With that said, it repeated its

“commitment to promote good governance through the rule of law, to ensure transparency and accountability and to root out, both at national and international levels, systemic and systematic corruption” (ibid., 21). All these statements echo those made in its defining declarations over the years.

The Commonwealth charter, unlike the declarations, ends with a statement that highlights the Commonwealth’s commitment to being an “effective association” that is “responsive to members’ needs, and capable of addressing the significant global challenges of the future”

(Commonwealth 2012, 24). It also aspires “to [be] a Commonwealth that is a strong and respected voice in the world, speaking out on major issues; that strengthens and enlarges its networks; that has a global relevance and profile; and that is devoted to improving the lives of all peoples of the Commonwealth” (ibid., 24). However, like the declarations, there is no real outline given as to how they intend to do so. This lends to the fluidity in how the Commonwealth operates. While the strategic plans do offer some insight into how the Secretariat intends to address the challenges that it faces, they still do not provide a clear picture of when or how the organization makes decisions. Without a well-defined agenda and profile the organization is fundamentally limited in what it is able to achieve. This lack of agenda emphasizes the importance of understanding how what the Commonwealth says, and how it defines itself at a given period, manifests in its actions and behaviors. It is particularly crucial when assessing its

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use of election observation as a tool for democracy promotion in member states. With the gradual iterations of the Commonwealth’s attitude towards democracy and how it is articulated, one can expect a shift over the years in the behavior of its observer missions. The 2004 mission to Malawi, for example, should be inherently different from the one deployed in 2014. Given the adoption of its charter in 2012, the main observable difference is the level of professionalism of the observer mission due to having clearer guidelines in place and increased scrutiny in the process due to the Commonwealth’s expressed support to democratic norms. Second, we can expect more funds to be allocated to the 2014 election given the increased prioritization of democracy assistance and promotion efforts. Other potential differences include larger mission size and a more critical report.

The Commonwealth Secretariat plays four main roles in democracy support and promotion in its member countries: election observation, providing technical assistance for democracy efforts upon request, workshop organization, and publication production

(Commonwealth 2016g, np). One example of these initiatives is The Commonwealth Electoral

Network (CEN) that “aims to promote good practices in the field of elections management, to facilitate experience-sharing and to foster a sense of community among Commonwealth election management bodies” (Commonwealth 2016e, np). This network focuses on “voter education and electoral participation, voter registration, the independence of election management bodies, managing the influence of incumbency, and political party expenditure and campaign financing”

(ibid.). To discuss these issues, the CEN meets every two years at a biennial conference coordinated by the Commonwealth Secretariat (ibid.).

Democracy promotion features prominently in discussions held by CEN and within the

Secretariat. It is an especially salient issue because of the fact that certain members continue to

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struggle with the consolidation of democratic practices and institutions. The Commonwealth is cognizant of these shortcomings and of the fact that half of its member states are considered

“flawed democracies,” “hybrid regimes,” or “authoritarian regimes” (Commonwealth 2016e, np). However, it notes that twelve of these countries have moved from single-party to multi-party systems which represents a move forward in the organization’s overall democracy level. Taking these political realities into consideration, the organization has implemented “Programme 2:

Democracy and Consensus-building” that focuses on two key areas: the electoral cycle of member countries and national and international political developments (ibid.).

Its efforts include the improvement of the quality of member country democratic practices (with an emphasis on the conduct of elections), deepening democratic culture, and the capacity building of key institutions (The Commonwealth 2016e, np). Therefore, the aim of this democracy promotion program is to increase levels of adherence to democratic principles and processes; strengthen existing democratic institutions; and encourage the “participation of women, youth, other vulnerable groups and civil society organizations in decision-making institutions and processes” (ibid.). For the Commonwealth, “the key element in [this] democracy programme has been election observation” (Sives 2001b, 514).

Focusing on election observation, the Commonwealth has observed over 130 elections in

36 countries since it began in 1980 (Commonwealth 2016e, np). However, prior to 1980, though this year marked the launch of the Commonwealth’s first “official” mission, observer missions were deployed in a less official capacity in 1964 to British Guiana (Sives 2001a). In addition, the organization sent thirteen democracy experts to six countries within a 13-month period (June

2002-June 2003) along with the organization of workshops for chief election officers, leaders of political parties and civil society (Commonwealth 2016c).

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The Commonwealth as an Observer

As a signatory to the Declaration for Principles for International Election Observer adopted by the United Nations in 2005, the Commonwealth draws its mandate from this document in addition to the commitments made in the Harare Commonwealth Declaration

(Commonwealth 2016d, np). This mandate is to observe and assess the factors that impact the quality and credibility of the electoral process in its entirety (ibid.). Specifically, “the observers will judge whether the elections have been conducted according to the standards for democratic elections to which the country has committed, including national legislations and relevant regional, Commonwealth and international commitments” (Commonwealth 2016d). The

Commonwealth’s stated position is that it values this international commitment as it is meant to create “consistency among international organizations observing elections; a transparency of the modalities for assessing an election; and a better understanding on behalf of governments and election commissions of what is required” (ibid.).

As noted earlier, the Commonwealth has been monitoring elections in an official capacity since 1980, and its inaugural mission was to Zimbabwe’s founding election (Commonwealth

1980, np).5 Since the onset of its election observation missions, the organization has observed different types of elections: regional, general, presidential, and referendum in multiple countries and contexts. The goal of these missions is to limit electoral abuse and increase confidence in the electoral process. One innovation by the Commonwealth in this regard was the introduction of the interim statement “on the basis that it was important to present a view of the election day before the results were announced” (Sives 2001b, 501). The purpose of this statement is to encourage those who lost the election to accept that the results represent the general will of

5 A figure outlining the process can be found in Appendix G.

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people (ibid.). Furthermore, the Commonwealth reports are one of the few international observer reports written by the observers and are agreed upon, and signed in country, prior to their departure. Other missions tend to write the reports once they have left the country and are edited by their directorates. This is the case for the EU, AU, and SADC, which issue preliminary statements and release the final reports within 30 days of the election, or promise to and do not always deliver, as will be observed with SADC in Malawi. Therefore, the benefit of this arrangement is that it ensures “that (a) the report is not ‘moderated’ by the organization and (b) there is a sense of ownership of the report by the independent observers” (Sives 2001b: 501).

Handling the reports in such a manner limits the potential for political manipulation. Again, this emphasizes the Commonwealth’s commitment to transparency in its efforts to support democratic development but also preserve the image that it has no intent of undermining a fellow member state.

Emphasizing that reports are signed in country offers support for the argument put forth in this project that mission activities are influenced by political pressures, and these pressures can stem from the organization itself or from the countries under observation. IOs are very much aware of these realities. These are similar to concerns raised by SADC highlighting the fact that international pressures and agendas cannot be ignored when investigating the actions of international organizations. Additional sources of pressure and tension for Commonwealth missions are that between 1990 and 2001, the majority of observers were from the United

Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. These are the largest donors to the Commonwealth and none of them have requested that their elections be monitored (Sives 2010b, 514). Still, these reports are being written for a particular audience, so even if the mission is seeking to reduce manipulation at the headquarter level, it still has to take into account the sentiment of the country in which the

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elections are being held. The manner in which politics impact activities on the ground, including the wrap-up at the end of a mission and the method through which information is conveyed, is essential to understanding how international organizations express their interests and preferences through interventions like election observation.

The observer missions are directed by Heads of Government Guidelines written in 1991.

These guidelines put forth the formal requirements to be met prior to the deployment of a

Commonwealth Observer mission. The first is that the Commonwealth must be invited by the government and have the support of political stakeholders in the country holding the elections

(Commonwealth 2016d, np). Prior to determining if this invitation can be accepted, the

Secretary-General sends an assessment team that meets with involved parties to ensure that there is support for the mission. In addition, the assessment team establishes whether the conditions are conducive to the holding of a free and fair election. If the report states that this is not the case and preparations are not being made to ensure that international standards are respected, then the

Secretary-General will refuse the invitation. Another stipulation made in the guidelines is that considering the rate at which international and domestic observer missions were increasing,

“consideration would have to be given as to whether in the context of the presence of other groups which may also have been invited, the Commonwealth per se has a special role to play in the process” (quoted in Sives 2001a, 142).

The Commonwealth observer missions are composed of “eminent persons” who hail from a multitude of areas. These include electoral commissioners, parliamentarians, and experts on legal, gender, human rights, and media issues. Observers are recruited from a number of member countries. The larger missions, or Commonwealth Observer Groups, tend to range from

10 to 25 observers. While the head of missions is usually a former head of government or a

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senior political figure, the Commonwealth ensures that its observer groups are “independent and autonomous” (Commonwealth 2016d, np). However, as with the AU and SADC, one has to assume a level of political bias from a mission headed by a “political figure” with potential ties to the country under observation. The probability of conflicts of interests to arise must be considered when investigating these missions. Smaller missions, classified as Commonwealth

Observer Missions or Expert teams, consist of two to four observers. Both teams are assisted by the Secretariat (ibid.).

Once on the ground, the observers spend a maximum of two weeks observing the elections, unless on a “special” mission. This two-week period was established due to busy observer schedules and a limited operating budget (Sives 2001b, 516). Assessing the observer reports from the first in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) in February 1980 to the most recently available Botswana 2014, the methodology has not altered much (Chan 2017a, Commonwealth

Observer Group 1990, 2014). Alternatively, the EU, though the basis of a long-term mission has not changed, and has continually improved its election observation process over the years. The

Commonwealth teams arrive in country a few days prior to polling and meet with a number of political stakeholders ranging from the electoral commission, political parties, civil society organizations, youth groups, the media, diplomatic missions, national and police commissioners, and other international election observation missions (Commonwealth Observer Group 2014, 1).

The mission protocols resemble that of the EU, AU, and SADC.

One challenge is that observer mission protocols are not clearly outlined, similar to those employed by the AU and SADC in earlier years, so one must evaluate observer deployment patterns through a review of their reports. However, observer reports have become increasingly detailed in the information they provide so this can be done. Along with the nation’s political

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background, the reports provide a list of observers, where they are deployed, who they met with, along with other pertinent information. Each mission is given a checklist to evaluate its assigned polling stations and once the voting is complete, the observers all return to the capital to issue their interim statement. After the release of this statement, the mission drafts the final report with the Secretariat team and departs (Sives 2001a, 145). While its methodology echoes that of other international organizations, it “is not statistical in the way that the European Union or the

Carter Centre methods are” (ibid.). Rather, the Commonwealth reports tend to provide an overview of the electoral process due to their more limited funds (Sives 2001a, 147). Still, this suggests that the systematization of election observation by the Commonwealth is not complete.

Also, Commonwealth observer missions expressly state that they do not interfere with the process; however, if the election results are not accepted by the incumbent, the mission chair may have to “exercise a ‘good offices’ role” in order to assist in the transition process:

“In working closely with the Chair of the Commonwealth Observer Group, or ‘COG’, I sometimes had to use my good offices to encourage a President or Prime Minister to accept a manifestly fair result and agree to relinquish power; and to persuade others, in their moment of electoral triumph, to behave with magnanimity and decency.” - Former Secretary General, Chief Emeka Anyaoku (1989-1999), The Round Table 2011 (Commonwealth 2016d, np)

In such a situation, where it considers the democratic process to be under threat, the organization may find it necessary to intervene. The Commonwealth prides itself on the ability to offer criticism to states that display a complete disregard for its principles in that its observers claim to “not rubber-stamp the legitimacy of elections” as evidenced by challenge to Nigeria’s

April 2007 and Kenya’s December 2007 elections (Banerji 2008, 817). Again, the

Commonwealth’s vocal position on these issues is notable given its expressed want to preserve its identity as a “family of nations.” Here, despite its mixed membership, we see it acting in accordance with the expectations of a Western organization, highlighting the ways in which

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organizations can maneuver the political landscape in efforts to adhere to their mandates.

Considering this mindset, election observation continues to serve as a useful tool for democracy promotion for the Commonwealth. Over the years there has been the increased institutionalization of its process by increasing the length of time in the field and recognizing that election observation must be prioritized as a key strategy in the encouragement of democracy consolidation in member states (Banerji 2008, 817).

However, it is apparent that the Commonwealth is not as transparent as some of its counterparts. This makes it more challenging to assess some of the mechanisms through which it operates. Still, this seeming lack of a systematic approach provides an insight into how its observers perceive their roles. By not being as rigorous in its methodology as some of the other organizations, the Commonwealth signals to the member state that its observers are there in the capacity to support and lend credibility to the process: “having Commonwealth observers present has become virtually a badge of honour for countries” (Banerji 2008, 817). Politics plays a significant role in these missions.

Zimbabwe’s suspension discussed above, though telling, was an extreme case, as were the cases of Nigeria (2007) and Kenya (2007), where the observer missions felt the need to challenge the process in order to remain credible. If the situations had not been as extreme, the question is whether these reprimands would still have occurred considering the Commonwealth’s continued emphasis on the “common bonds” among their nations; that is, where the “The

Commonwealth is truly a ‘Commonwealth of people’ committed to common ideals and principles despite diverse cultures, religions, and ethnicities” (Eminent Persons Group 2011, 15).

This organization sets itself apart from the other organizations involved in election observation and democracy promotion:

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The point is that its trusted partner relationship with its members provides the Commonwealth with an unusual degree of access to and acceptance by member states in terms of their own national governance. There is no other organization to my knowledge where member states, in ever increasing numbers, ask for their intervention in resolving vexed and sensitive domestic political situations…The Commonwealth definitely is a force for democracy in the 21st century (Banerji 2008, 818).

Conclusion

As emphasized in this chapter, the Commonwealth prides itself on the fact that its organization is not only voluntary, but promotes a sense of fraternity among its organization.

This position leads to a prioritization of the relationship among member countries. Yet, the

Commonwealth seeks to establish itself as a defender of democracy in member states. This project is concerned with how the Commonwealth reconciles these seemingly conflicting identities in the deployment of its election observation missions.

By comparing the Commonwealth with the EU, AU, and SADC, this chapter emphasized that the Commonwealth’s different approach to election observation is a result of its membership and that while it is a Western organization, its mixed membership gives it a proclivity to behavior that at times echoes that of the African organizations rather than the EU. That is, the

Commonwealth is subject to similar political limitations as the AU and SADC because it monitors elections in its member states. However, even though the EU is set apart from the three other organizations in this manner, it still bears its own biases that stem from its interests as both a donor and election observing body. Chapters 4-7 illustrated the similarities and differences between these organizations and the implications of their respective biases will be examined in the subsequent chapters.

The next three chapters investigate the determinants of IO behavior by assessing the impact of the complexities that exist within an organization. The identities of these organizations are tied to the political environment which directly impacts the nature of election observation. By

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focusing on the case of Malawi, Chapters 8-10 assess these dynamics during its 2004, 2009, and

2014 elections. These chapters directly compare the behaviors of the EU, AU, SADC, and

Commonwealth observer missions and how their actions serve as reflections of the political agendas and biases of their dispatching organizations. Chapter 11 summarizes the findings from these chapters and outlines why it is necessary to understand how the politics of international organizations can influence mission behavior. That chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings for election observation in Africa moving forward.

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CHAPTER 8 MALAWI’S 2004 ELECTION AND ITS OBSERVERS

Introduction

This chapter and the two to follow explore election observation outcomes determined by the type and political biases of organizations as they operate within Malawi. These chapters assess the political positions of the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the Southern

African Development Community (SADC), and the Commonwealth of Nations

(Commonwealth) during each electoral cycle. Considering their profiles and respective priorities and biases, the focus is on how international and regional politics play out at the national level during multiple election cycles. Specifically, I evaluate the actors involved, their intentions, and how their behavior serves as a manifestation of the IOs’ biases and priorities. By directly comparing the behaviors of the various missions during the same elections in the same country, I am able to test the level of conformity to the expectations associated with a given bias.

As previously established, this project focuses on Malawi’s last three elections—2004,

2009, and 2014—as these are elections that all organizations had the capacity to monitor. Prior to this period, election observation was not as institutionalized. The inability of these international organizations to undertake their own missions was especially apparent given that they had yet to create election-monitoring guidelines. For instance, the first large-scale Commonwealth election observation mission was to Zimbabwe in 1980. In preparation for this mission, even the organizers “had no advanced idea of what [they] were doing” (Chan 2017a, 2). Given the limitations of these earlier missions, Malawi’s 1994 and 1999 elections are not included in this study. Records show that while African organizations may have been present, they were not in the position to deploy stand-alone missions. For example, while there were over 300 observers present at the 1994 elections, they were mainly participating under the auspices of the Joint

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International Observer or Commonwealth Groups (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994, np). These situations serve as examples of how new the process was and render any investigation into the role they played during earlier elections incomplete. However, by 2004, all four organizations had established missions, though they varied in degree, and had experience with monitoring elections in emerging democracies. There were identifiable mandates and guidelines in place regarding international election observations processes (see Chapters 4-7).

The time period selected also allows for electoral experience at the national level. With

Malawi having held two elections prior to 2004, it is better able to address the issues that plague, and undermine, founding elections, which include limited resources and poor community outreach (Bratton 1997, 81). So, by 2004, I expect that Malawi is better able to address problems that would severely limit the people’s ability to vote freely. Furthermore, it avoids the issue of declining electoral quality, such as increased instances of electoral mismanagement and allegations of fraud, associated with second elections in Africa (Bratton 1998). Thus, by the third election, the country, both its leadership and citizenry, are more familiar with holding elections and the IOs are more aware of what the election monitoring process entails. However, even though the 1994 and 1999 elections are not explored in this project, they set the political stage for subsequent elections and thus serve as a reference point for election observers and political stakeholders. For this reason, they will be referenced, where necessary.

From the onset of multiparty politics in Malawi, the country has always shown a willingness to submit itself to monitoring (Pitso 2004, M’buka 2009). Even during times that the country was at odds with donors, there was no concern that election observers would be barred or only certain missions allowed access. This is a key point to note moving forward because this openness grants election observers and their respective organizations the liberty to execute their

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mandates as the dynamics of election observation are impacted by the different levels of cooperation (electoral commission, government, regional actors, etc.) (Interview, Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia, August 6, 2015).1 As observed in the Zimbabwean case, limiting the actions of election observers significantly undermines not only the mission but the organization as well.

In addition, unlike Nigeria or Mali, where observers sometimes find themselves constrained for security reasons or by the sheer size of the country,2 Malawi is a relatively safe country with few limitations on travel within it. Moreover, its land area of 94,280 sq. km3 grants missions the ability to monitor all parts of the country, if they so wish (World Bank 2016).4

Given the fact that these election observers are equipped with all-terrain vehicles, any additional concerns with transportation are further decreased. The MEC also provides the missions with detailed maps and distance estimates5 to allow them to plan their travel logistics beforehand

(Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 8, 2014). Therefore, Malawi offers the opportunity to assess the behavior of international organizations and how their interactions with member states influence their decision-making processes. This work does not argue that conditions in Malawi are ideal by any means, but Malawi offers the baseline requirements in terms of political openness and stability that allow for the possibility of successful observation missions.

1 This openness to the presence of international observers may also be linked to the fact that Malawi receives a considerable amount of “democratization aid” or “aid for democracy” since it embraced multiparty democracy in 1993 (Chirwa 2009, 123). Much of this aid is given by bilateral donors but multilateral organizations like the European Union also provide significant assistance (ibid., 124).

2 For comparison, Nigeria’s land area is 129,733,127 sq. km and Mali’s land area is 1,220,190 sq. km (World Bank 2016).

3 Malawi has a total surface area of 118,480 sq. km making it roughly the same size as Eritrea or the state of Arizona (World Bank 2016).

4 World Bank 2016.

5 A copy of this distance calculator can be found in Appendix J.

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Drawing from fieldwork done in Malawi over different periods between May 2011 and

December 2015, the next three chapters offer insight into what the dynamics among IOs, their observation missions, and member states are on the ground. This chapter is organized as follows:

The first section briefly provides a background of Malawi’s elections and discusses the 2004 elections, more specifically, to establish the situation that these observers were placed in. It then examines expectations of each mission, given their respective mandates and situations, and investigates how they responded to the political environment based on their priorities. The analyses are supplemented with interviews conducted with citizens and non-governmental organizations to assess the degree to which election observer behavior is influenced by the dispatching IO.

Malawi, Elections, and Observation

As noted earlier, Malawi has undergone five electoral cycles, granting it familiarity with the process. As with all non-established democracies, we still observe tensions in the political process and these tensions, grounded related to Malawi’s prior electoral history, set the stage for the 2004 elections.

Elections are run by the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), created under Section 75 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi which along with the Electoral Commission Act

1998 (The EC Act), the Parliamentary and Presidential Elections Act (the PPE Act), and the

Local Government Elections Act (the LGE), mandates that the MEC manage presidential, parliamentary, local government elections and referenda.6 As such, the MEC “exercises its

6 These documents were harmonized in 2013 prior to the 2014 Tripartite Elections. This harmonization process sought to ensure that these three documents stated the same rules due to the discordance between crucial issues such as the voting registration age, where it was unsure if one could register if they were going to be 18 by the election or 18 upon registration. These laws had to be debated and gazetted to become law (Fieldwork, Lilongwe, Malawi, 2013). In addition, though the Tripartite Elections were first held in 2014, they were initially called for in 2004 but this required the amendment of s.147 (5) of the Constitution and other laws. The relevant bills were drafted by the

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powers and functions pursuant to Section 76 of the Constitution as read with Section 8 of the EC

Act” (MEC 2004, 3). The Commission is divided into several committees: Legal Affairs,

Finance and Administration, Civic and Voter Education, Campaign Monitoring, Research,

Training, Logistics and Operations, Media and Public Relations and The Secretariat. Other departments include Personnel and Administration, Electoral Services, Media and Public

Relations, Civic and Voter Education, Finance and Procurement, and Information Technology

(MEC 2004, 5-6). Each of these committees is responsible for different aspects of the election management process.

The MEC plays a central role in this process as it not only deals with the logistics of holding the election but it also accredits the organizations involved in election observation. In keeping with Section 105 of the PPE Act, the Commission extends invitations to international and local observers to observe the electoral process (MEC 2004, 15). Given this mandate, the

MEC can control who verifies Malawi’s electoral process and serves as a key partner to the international organizations as they navigate the political arena. As will be shown, the three elections under observation in this manuscript have been highly contested ones. With each election cycle, there has been an increase in the number of political parties and overall participation in the process. During the electoral period, the process of democratic consolidation is often at stake, raising interest in the process by both domestic and external actors. This tension is observed in the increasingly narrow margins and high turnover of candidates in parliamentary elections. The challenge in Malawi, as with all emerging democracies, is that holding elections can be difficult. So, the observers are tasked with assessing the political

Ministry of Justice and tabled in the National Assembly in December 2003 but were not passed due to objections from civil society organizations and some political parties (MEC 2004, 7).

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environment, but the nature of their response is dependent on a host of factors. Previous elections provide insights into these political environments.

Malawi held its first multiparty elections in 1961, which were quickly followed by it gaining independence on July 6th, 1964. However, the inclusive environment put in place in 1961 was altered once President Kamuzu Banda cancelled the elections to be held that year and implemented a one-party state in 1966 naming himself President-for-life (Rakner et al. 2007,

179). Consequently, his Malawi Congress Party (MCP) led the nation for 30 years until a referendum was held on June 14, 1993 to decide whether there should be a re-introduction of a multiparty system. The years between independence and the referendum were marred by personal politics, the stifling of competition, and frustration with the one-party state, which led to approximately 65% of eligible citizens voting in favor of a multiparty system (African Elections

2013). Multiparty elections were then held a year later. These founding elections were followed by elections in 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014.

The election in 1999 was challenging, with problems ranging from the lack of preparedness of the MEC, unclear electoral laws, delayed and inefficient procurement process, among others (IFES 1999). Unfortunately, these issues set a tense stage for the holding of the

2004 election to the extent that Deputy Chief Elections Officer, Willie Kalonga, referred to the

2004 election as “characterised by chaos” (Statement made in Lilongwe, 1 July 2004 quoted in

Gloppen et al. 2006, 7). The biggest challenge was the constant change in political alliances between the three major parties: the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), the United Democratic Front

(UDF), and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). These parties dominated in their respective geographic areas: AFORD in the North, MCP in the Central region, and UDF in the South. In

1994, MCP and AFORD established a parliamentary alliance to take advantage of their regional

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strongholds. This quickly changed in 1995 when AFORD joined UDF as a junior partner in government. However, this alliance was short-lived and swiftly followed by a split in the party with some members remaining and others joining the opposition. The alliances shifted again in

1999 when AFORD joined forces with MCP (Gloppen et al. 2006, 15). When there was the debate over whether a President could serve a third term, in an attempt by President Muluzi

(UDF) to hold onto power, AFORD rejoined the UDF government (ibid.). Consequently, this entire period was one of electoral uncertainty among the various political stakeholders.

The main reason for the uncertainty was the continued pattern of ethnic voting in the country, where campaigns centered around the candidate’s personalities rather than the issues the candidates raised. This culture of division resulted in significant animosity among the various candidates. In addition, there was confusion regarding the voter registration exercises.

Originally, the MEC had scheduled the 14-day registration process to begin in November 2003 but it was postponed until January 5th and scheduled to end on the 18th. However, the registration process was extended to the 25th. Therefore, though the MEC had scheduled voter registration to take place over a period of two weeks from January 5-18, 2004, this extension led to its official conclusion on the 28th (Patel 2004, 2). These delays decreased the population’s confidence in the electoral process where an Afrobarometer survey, taken soon before the elections, indicated a relative lack of trust in both the government and electoral commission by citizens. Forty-eight percent of respondents expressed that they had none or a little trust in the president and 53% stated that they had none or a little trust in the electoral commission (Afrobarometer 2002).7 This lack of confidence signaled to political stakeholders, including election observers, that there were underlying issues to be aware of as polling day approached.

7 This was a survey of 1200 respondents.

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The lack of confidence in the electoral commission was compounded as the ruling party also engaged in behaviors that perpetuated the fears among the people regarding the upcoming election. For example, a ruling party official was caught in Lilongwe with stolen registration materials, and though the official was fired following this exposure, the situation raised questions as to how deep the corruption ran. To make matters worse, the police arrested 16 alleged members of the ruling UDF party for registering twice. When questioned on this matter, Mary

Kaphwereza Banda, UDF Deputy Publicity Secretary retorted, “What difference would 16 votes make?” (Phiri 2004). This political situation led to voter apathy and low registration. Even with government’s emphasis on the fact that one would be unable to vote if they did not register, referred to as the “no registration, no vote” campaign, there was an overall reluctance on the part of citizens to register to vote. When interviewed for the national newspaper, potential voters stated that this reluctance was due to the inability of an opposition party to create an alliance or field a candidate that could win against the UDF/AFORD candidate (Flora Jana, Limbe); frustration due to the MEC unpreparedness and their families being sent back as a result (Gides

Chimombo, Mbayani, Blantyre); and an overall sense of apathy and discontent with the electoral process (Phiri 2004). The problematic behavior on the part of the officials associated with the electoral process places a certain burden on the observer missions to assess the country’s political state and make decisions on the ground knowing that their concerns with registration and pre-electoral fraud are well-founded.

Adding to the rising tensions, prior to the election, there was a briefing held by the

Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) for international observers during which it was announced that the election had been postponed. The High Court of Malawi postponed the election following a petition by the Mgwirizano Coalition, a group consisting of opposition parties. The

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Coalition had petitioned the authenticity of the Voters’ Roll, called for the extension of the verification of the Voters’ Roll, and drew attention to the withdrawal of the 1.3 million excess ballot papers and the misuse of public resources by the ruling party (AU EOM 2004, 14). The

High Court allowed for the election to be postponed, but by no more than seven days. Adhering to this timeline, the election was held on May 20, two days after they were scheduled (Mail &

Guardian 2004a, 2004b). While this appeared to be an inconvenience for the missions, there were no signs given that it in anyway impacted the overall observation process. Therefore, there were no noted changes made to any deployment schedules. Overall, the election went well despite the background against which they were held (AU EOM 2004, EU EOM 2004).

However, it ended on a more problematic note with the announcement of polling results on May

23rd leading to rioting in Blantyre and the death of seven people.

These tumultuous events were immediately followed by the inauguration of the new

President, Bingu wa Mutharika, on May 24th, which placed the MEC under immense pressure to finish the aggregation process. Still, despite this pressure, the MEC was unable to meet the May

28th deadline for publication of the final results in the Government Gazette, which was only done on July 16th, 2004 (EU EOM 2004, 5).

The tension surrounding the 2004 election set the political stage where interactions between the country and its international partners dictated various behaviors and responses.

Many of these exchanges were an attempt to navigate the existing political challenges. The dealings ranged from meetings with international partners, budget discussions, and the provision of technical assistance. International election observers, as in future elections, were tasked with navigating the tense political landscapes.

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The international organizations were aware of the potential political challenges that arose during the election prior to polling. To address some of the concerns prior to the election, the

Malawi German Programme for Democracy and Decentralization (MGPDD) held the first meeting of the National Elections Consultative Forum (NECOF) at Le Meridien Capital Hotel in

Lilongwe on August 29, 2003. The NECOF initiative had been formally launched in November

2002 but no meetings had been held. The aim of the August 2003 meeting was to set the tone for the 2004 election by highlighting the current challenges the nation faced and offering a forum for political parties, civil society, the media, traditional leaders, and development partners to discuss what was necessary to ensure a “free, fair and transparent election” (MGPDD 2004, 4). This meeting is significant because it provides insight into the international organizations, namely the

Western ones, and what they considered to be important.

A wide range of issues were discussed, but of particular interest was the role of international observer missions during the 1999 election and the question “When does Malawi practice democracy?” (MGPDD 2004, 4). This question hints at the ongoing confusion in the country regarding the current state of elections and democracy. The discussion also alludes to the fluidity of the entire electoral process in 1999 where citizens remained unsure as to what the observer roles were and the observers themselves were unclear as to what an election that led to increased consolidation of democracy was supposed to be like. Therefore, the point of this meeting was to outline what was expected of the country by the donors and the domestic political stakeholders to address some of the problems that arose in previous electoral cycles. Several major issues were raised during this meeting, ranging from questioning the MEC’s capacity to

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undertake the 2004 election, given the 1999 experience, to funding concerns to disagreements between political parties.8

The concerns noted during this meeting drew attention to citizen attitudes towards the process and how they perceived their “ownership” in the elections, because not only did they not play a central role in the planning or execution, but they appeared to be uncertain as to what the process was. In his concluding remarks, Mr. Bodo Immink, Programme Coordinator for the

Malawi German Programme for Democracy and Decentralization, made the point that there was a lot more at stake than simply focusing on polling day when deciding whether an election was

“free and fair.” He noted that, as an organization, the German Organization for Technical

Cooperation (GTZ or Gesellschaft für Technishe Zusammenarbeit)9 sought to add as much as it could to the quality of elections but there were cultural differences that existed when qualifying democracy, ones which international actors must be aware of. For example, Immink made the point that one often hears statements like “Democracy is a Western concept!” or “The way elections [are] monitored is based on foreign concepts!” regarding international election observation and the standards to which elections are held. This argument echoes those made by

AU and SADC officials regarding the divergent conceptions of democracy between African and

Western organizations (Interviews, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015 and Addis Ababa,

Ethiopia, August 6, 2015). While Immink did acknowledge the fact that democracy is a concept derived from Europe, he further noted that the Malawian population chose to introduce democracy to their country through a multiparty system, and thus their voices should be further

8 The challenges faced in 1999, and the lack of understanding of what election observers were tasked to do, highlight why its inclusion in this dissertation would undermine a careful look into the election monitoring process in the country.

9 As of January 2011, the German Organization for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) is now known as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) (GIZ 2017, np).

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incorporated into the process. He also acknowledged efforts on the part of African organizations such as SADC to overcome this cultural divide and develop norms and standards for Africa:

“norms and standards have been developed by Africans for elections in Africa. Maybe, if all of us would refer to these SADC norms and standard when assessing elections, this could contribute towards [expanding] the discussions” (MGPDD 2004, 12). Here, Immink actively sought to distance GTZ from the idea that election observation was a European concept, a concern that has been echoed by several political stakeholders.

Here we see the importance placed on focuses shared by GTZ’s European counterparts, the EU and Commonwealth. The August 2003 meeting set the organizations apart from one another and placed agency on African institutions. By focusing on the increased involvement of

African organizations, Immink wanted to shift the discussion to highlighting the importance of these actors and emphasizing that Africa was taking ownership in the process. This shift points back to the role and impetus of African international organizations and what they seek to achieve when they send their missions. His position lends support to assessing the international organizations as separate entities rather than as a collective of “election monitors.” As such, one must play close attention to the mindset of these organizations and of the population as they prepare to dispatch their election observer missions. As suggested in the brief discussion on the

2004 election, it was being held amid considerable political tensions with citizens questioning the role of democracy and that of election observers in supporting it. So, observers were expected to take these political realities into consideration.10

The European Union, as the standard for international monitoring, is expected to have tackled this situation in the most objective manner. As such, it is presented first to establish the

10 For a more complete discussion on the 2004 elections please see, among others, Maroleng 2004, Gloppen et al. 2005, Dulani 2006.

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model to which the more “integrated” organizations assert to adhere to. With the EU as precedent, I can identify areas in which the other three organizations diverge from this “ideal.”

Therefore, the following sections examine the behaviors of the four organizations given the realities of the 2004 election. Specifically, these sections assess deployment patterns, what missions focus on in reports, how missions address concerns that arise during elections, the organization’s attitude towards the host country, and how decisions made while in the field serve as a reflection of these attitudes.

The European Union 2004 Election Observation Mission

The European Union (EU) has been a key cooperation partner of Malawi’s for several decades through its European Development Fund (EDF), launched in 1959 as the main instrument for the provision of development aid to Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and overseas countries and territories (OCTs) (International Cooperation and

Development 2017, np). Outside the EDF framework, the EU provides assistance through the

European Investment Bank which provides financing with capital investments or loans. EU support to Malawi has been consistent over the years in terms of the projects that it supports.

Specifically, the aid is targeted towards nationally-expressed needs, taking into consideration what the country considers to be a priority and these needs tend to remain consistent over time

(Clifton et al. 2011, 2). The preferred method of support has been through national budget support resulting in it being tied to how the government manages its allocated resources. For example, in May 2001 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) declared that Malawi was “off track,” placing foreign investments at risk with the threat of key donors withdrawing their support (ibid., 5). This budget support is critical for Malawi as it serves as a “powerful tool with excellent absorption capacity for the beneficiary country, and sector-wide approaches are the preferred modalities of both the Government of Malawi and the Commission of the EU” and

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remains the model form of support (ibid., 7). Consequently, Malawi remains reliant on this source of financial aid though its implementation is constantly plagued by institutional capacity issues (ibid.).

Prior to 2001, the EU implemented EDFs 7 and 8, that focused on various issues areas:

“natural resources, health and transport infrastructure with non-focal areas including private sector development, promotion of democracy, rule of law, social sectors and revenue collection”

(Clifton et al. 2011, 21). In addition, these EDF’s highlighted the importance of gender and the environment (ibid.). These issues remained as key focal areas in subsequent development agendas.

In 2002, the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP) emphasized the need for a “united, secure, and democratically mature nation with full participation” along with other critical aspects for development such as access to healthcare, increases in per capita income, fair distribution of wealth, and food security. The EDF 9 (2001-2007) was designed and adapted to these national expectations. This program aligned itself with the MPRSP by focusing on issues that echoed those in EDF 8 and identified cross-cutting issues such as governance, institutional development, and capacity-building (Clifton et al. 2011, 22).

A country-level evaluation of these projects was undertaken in 2003 which recommended that governance be made a priority of all cooperation “as both an end in itself (across sectors) and a means (to achieve impact and sustainability)” (Clifton et al. 2011, 17). This evaluation highlighted democratic governance and accountability as being of paramount importance to the success of all other interventions. The evaluation also stated that the Commission should strengthen the articulation between development aid, political co-operation, and trade policy. In addition, it noted that enhancing the capacity of non-state actors to express themselves, to

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demand accountability of local and central governments, and to participate in policy-making was a key element of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy (Clifton et. al 2011, 17). So, moving into the 2004 elections, governance was key concern for the EU along with a focus on enhancing the capacity of the domestic institutions. As a development partner, its goal was to ensure that Malawi remained in line with this agenda.

As noted earlier, the European Union (EU) missions serves as the “standard” due to the organization’s history with, and allocation of resources to, election observation. However, as argued earlier, all election observation missions hold biases that stem from the mandates of their dispatching organizations and direct their resources accordingly. Considering the EU’s economic and political involvement in Malawi, the promotion of the projects in these respective areas undoubtedly drives its agenda. Thus, in Malawi’s case, I expect the EU to be subject to the progress bias, because without progress it is difficult for the organization to rationalize its continued support to the country. Protecting its investments and programs in the country is a priority for the organization so emphasizing that the elections mark progress in Malawi’s democratic trajectory helps ensure continued financing.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the EU prioritizes its role as development partner, under which election observation falls, as central to maintaining the good governance need to support strong economic institutions. Given this position, the European Commission, European

Parliament, and concerned Council Working Groups stated that the 2004 election was considered priority for observation. For them, this election represented an important moment in “Malawi’s democratic development, in which a broad and pluralistic electoral competition was expected to take place against the background of controversies in the consolidation of political institutions”

(EU EOM 2004, 5-6). This statement indicated that the EU was aware of the fragile political

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situation Malawi faced. As a result, an exploratory mission was deployed from January 23 to

February 2, 2004 that established Malawi’s eligibility for election monitoring. For the EU, the

EOM served “as a practical expression of the EU’s on-going support for the process of democratization in the country” (ibid., 43). So, the EU is more likely to draw attention to areas that can be supported and improved without completely challenging the national government as it needs to ensure continued cooperation at that level. As a result, I expect the EU to allocate a larger portion of its resources to its monitoring missions to ensure its comprehensiveness as predicted by its proclivity to the progress bias.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), along with several domestic and international organizations,11 was invited by the Malawi Electoral Commission

(MEC) and was one of nineteen organizations to monitor the elections.12 This invitation followed the exploratory mission and a Memorandum of Understanding signed on April 4, 2004 after the mission’s arrival (EU EOM 2004, 6).

11 Invitations to monitor the elections were sent to British High Commission, Commonwealth Secretariat, United Nations, American Embassy, Chinese Embassy, Japanese Embassy, Mozambique Embassy, SADC Parliamentary Forum, Civil Liberties Committee, South African Embassy, Women’s Voice, Malawi CARER, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, Public Affairs Committee, World Vision International, Media Knight International, National Electoral Commission of Rwanda, Episcopal Conference of Malawi, Human Rights Consultative Committee, Democracy Consolidation Programme, Pan African Civic Educators, Church NGO Consortium, Malawi Institute for Democratic and Economic Affairs, Electoral Commission of Tanzania, National Initiative for Civic Education, Church and Society (Livingstonia Synod), Church and Society (Blantyre Synod), SADC Electoral Commission Forum, Elections Commissions of India, Civil Rights Advocacy, Malawi Electoral Support Network, Centre for Human Rights and Rehabilitation, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Muslim Association of Malawi, Evangelical Association of Malawi, Association of Progressive Women, Electoral Commission of Zambia, Lesotho Electoral Commission, South African Electoral Commission, Swaziland Electoral Commission, Seychelles Electoral Commission, Namibia Electoral Commission, Mozambique Electoral Commission, Mauritius Electoral Commission, Botswana Electoral Commission and the Centre for Social Research (MEC 2004).

12 There were nineteen organizations that accepted the invitation to participate in the observation (number of observers in parentheses): European Union (81), Commonwealth (22), American Embassy (40), Electoral Institute of Southern African (40), African Union (13), SADC Parliamentary Forum (55), South African High Commission (6), Royal Norwegian Embassy (21), Civic Aid International Organization (CIOA) (10), Dan Church Aid (10), German Embassy/GTZ (29), National Electoral Commission of Rwanda (4), Mozambique Electoral Commission (4), Netherlands Consulate (4), Japanese Embassy (1), Electoral Commission of Bangladesh (1), Pan African Civic Education (5), Centre for Social Research (University of Malawi) (38), and the National Electoral Commission of Zimbabwe (38) (MEC 2004).

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Moving into the election, perceptions of the EU were mixed. 53.7% of the sampled population stated that they did not know or had not heard enough about how effective the organization was, while 20.9% found the EU to be doing very well at their jobs (score of 10 out of a ten-point scale).13 Less than 1% of the population considered them to be performing very badly (0) where 7.4% rated their performance between 1 and 5 and 17% between 6 and 9

(Afrobarometer 2002/2003). These statistics help gauge attitudes towards the organization, which is important for a major development partner like the EU. Awareness of how it is viewed by citizens of the countries in which it is involved helps the organization better place itself.

Given these statistics, it was in the EU’s best interest to encourage the positive perception of their involvement in Malawian affairs. As a donor organization, the EU must be careful as to how it is viewed by the citizens of the monitored country but also bear in mind the reactions of its member countries. This attitude echoes that put forth by GTZ and highlights the need for these foreign bodies to establish themselves as partners and not as dictating policy. Considering the EU’s continued engagement in and funding provided to the country, the perceptions of citizens do matter as they can influence the political space granted to these observer missions.

The election observer mission was headed by Chief Observer Marieke Sanders-ten Holte.

At the time of the mission, she was a member of the European Parliament (Netherlands), Vice

President of the European Parliament Development and Co-operation Committee, and member of the Africa Caribbean Pacific-European Union (ACP-EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly. The

EU EOM consisted of a core team of six, 22 long-term observers (LTOs), and 52 short-term observers (STOs) and was deployed to Malawi for two months, from April 5th to June 5th (EU

EOM 2004, 3). The other Core Team members were Mr. Alister Baird (United Kingdom);

13 The full question is worded as follows: “Giving marks out of ten, where 0 is very badly and 10 is very well, how well do you think the following institutions do their jobs? Or haven’t you heard about the institutions to have an opinion? European Union” (Afrobarometer 2002/2003).

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Deputy Chief Observer; Ms. Maria Rosaria Macchiaverna (Italy), Legal and Election Expert;

Ms. Cristina Ramos Alves (Portugal), LTO Coordinator; Mr. Javier Gutierrez (Spain), Media

Expert; and Mr. Stuart Poucher (United Kingdom), Operations Expert. The Core Team arrived in

Malawi on 5 April (ibid.). Expectedly, not a single member of this mission was non-European.

The 22 long-term observers (LTOs) were deployed in pairs (11 teams) across the country for a period of five weeks. Their deployment was as follows: three teams were sent to the North

(Karonga, Mzuzu, and Mzimba); three to the Central region (Lilongwe, Kasungu, and Salima); and five to the South (Blantyre, Zomba, Mangochi, Mulanje, and Ngabo). In addition, 47 short- term observers (STOs) were deployed prior to election day to observe “the end of the political campaign, election day, counting and aggregation of results at the district level” (EU EOM 2004,

6). These observers were joined by six locally recruited STOs from the British High Commission and the Dutch Consulate. This resulted in the EU Mission having 53 STOs in total (ibid.). The

EU also capitalized on its ties with member embassies based in Malawi, in addition to the EU delegation, and increased the number of observers during the electoral period. This ability to coordinate with actors beyond the EU mission itself highlights the level of resources the EU has at its disposable. During this election, it liaised with economically-viable member countries that shared their interest in Malawi’s political stability and lent support to the EU’s democracy promotion efforts. Consequently, the organization was not limited to observers sent directly from

EU headquarters. These partnerships also indicate the level of investment that these countries have in the electoral process.

Further, there was a delegation of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group and

European Union (ACP-EU) Joint Parliamentary Assembly, headed by Ms. Karin Junker MEP

(Germany) and Mr. Ephriam Kamuntu (Uganda) present in the country during this period shared

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the conclusions of the EU EOM’s preliminary statement on May 22. The presence of this delegation creates a link, though small, between the EU and its African counterparts. Having a

Ugandan affiliated with the EU mission at this level slightly reduces the distance between the organization and the host country created by the prevalence of European nationals. During the entirety of the mission, the Chief Observer and other Core Team members met with various political stakeholders, which included President Muluzi; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the

Chairman of the MEC; political parties and their respective presidential candidates; media; civil society; and the international community. While in country, the Chief Observer held three press conferences where she emphasized the mission’s independence and “that its purpose was to observe and not to interfere with any aspect of the election or the affairs of government” (EU

EOM 2004, 5). The STOs left after the sharing of the preliminary statement (May 22-23) while the LTOs stayed to monitor the aggregation and complaints process. Certain members were in country until the 1st and 2nd of June and the Core team was the last to depart on June 5th (ibid.).

According to the electoral reports, the mission visited all 28 districts prior to polling and monitored the elections in 27 of the 28, for a total of 540 polling stations on election day (EU

EOM 2004, 4). This expansive reach sets a high bar for its counterparts and highlights its commitment to surveying the process in its entirety. In these areas, voting was found to have proceeded smoothly in the majority of the 540 polling stations visited with polling stations generally conducting their duties in a professional manner with a large presence of candidate representatives present. Despite issues with the voters’ roll across the country, both the voters and the polling staff remained patient and orderly (EU EOM 2004, 4). Here, the EU is praising the country for its ability to maintain a peaceful attitude despite discrepancies and emphasizing signs of progress in the democratization process.

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During its time in the field, the EU mission assessed the extent to which the election complied with international standards for democratic elections and found the MEC’s overall performance to be disappointing. Specifically, it found the planning for election day and training of officials to have been satisfactory but it was disappointed in the MEC’s inability to address complaints filed by political parties, provide sufficient instructions to polling officials, or allow observers and party representatives to attend its meetings. This failure led to decreased confidence in MEC on the part of election stakeholders (EU EOM 2004, 3). To make matters more challenging, the counting process and subsequent “aggregation of results was slow, inefficient and seriously lacked transparency” (ibid.). Furthermore, the various verification measures were not implemented. In addition, the delayed announcement of the results led to the results not being known by all citizens by the time the final EU report was circulated.

Consequently, stakeholders were not fully able to establish the accuracy of the results without these numbers and “this failure to produce a breakdown of results damaged confidence in the democratic process and undermined the credibility of the results announced by the MEC” (EU

EOM 2004, 5). For the EU, the priority was to build the capacity of Malawi’s political institutions and this was evident in how it articulated its concerns.

In addition, and rather problematic for the EU, President Muluzi stated that the EU observers had found the elections to be “free and fair” though neither term had been used in the preliminary statement or the press conference held when it was released (EU EOM 2004, 5).

President Muluzi recognized the political importance of EU support, especially during this uncertain period, and took this opportunity to make the point, though erroneous, that the elections had be pronounced as “free and fair” as quickly as possible. For Muluzi, the EU’s position in the international community grants it an authority enjoyed by few, so an endorsement

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from it is taken more seriously. Therefore, given its position as both donor and political partner, there is always a balance that must be maintained for the organization to distance itself from its economic interests while remaining committed to its image as a crucial player in democracy promotion. The EU’s emphasis on the installation and capacity-building of domestic governance institutions requires that it maintain its distance from the regime to avoid being seen as influencing domestic politics. By stating that the EU found the elections to “free and fair,”

Muluzi was blurring this distinction and undermining the EU’s claim to objectivity.

In keeping with its mission’s mandate, the EU EOM noted a few key recommendations to aid future elections in adhering to international standards. It is important to note that these recommendations are made with an emphasis on capacity-building and put forth as a challenge to the procedures undertaken by the MEC. The first of these recommendations was that changes needed to be made to the composition of the MEC to increase confidence in its ability for election administration. Second, the MEC needs to “address complaints on all issues within its competencies as outlined in electoral legislation in a timely and professional manner” (EU EOM

2004, 5). Third, “serious efforts should be made to ensure a level playing field for political contestants, in particular by taking action against the abuse of public resources and media bias”

(ibid.). Fourth, “the roles of the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) and the MEC in regulating the media during an election campaign should be clarified and the competencies of each body clearly defined and effectively implemented” (ibid.). Last, the

“electoral results should be published within the legal deadline and clearly broken down to the polling station level” (EU EOM 2004, 5). These recommendations illustrate what the EU mission was focused on while in the field. As expected, it was looking at ways in which governance structures were undermined during the process and how these issues can be addressed prior to

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the 2009 elections. As a result, the nature of recommendations highlights what the EU considered to be its role during this election cycle.

However, despite the noted issues, the EU mission makes a point to express its gratitude to the various election stakeholders involved in the process. The expression of gratitude and solidarity with Malawi highlighted its commitment to establishing itself as a “partner” in the process and not a foreign entity telling the country what it needs to do. The statement also highlights the diplomatic nature of election observations, though their purpose is to support democracy, the missions themselves remain a political act. The diplomatic nature behind these democracy promotion efforts is why it is important to understand the decisions that the missions make and the reasoning behind them.

The EU also extended its appreciation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the MEC, and other political stakeholders who lent their assistance throughout the process. This included election stakeholders who gave their time during the election process. The mission also thanked the MEC staff and election officials for their patience. In addition, the mission expressed its gratitude to the European Commission Delegation in Lilongwe, especially the Head of

Delegation, Mr. Wiepke Van der Goot, for the invaluable support provided along with the resident diplomatic missions, especially the German Embassy and British High Commission.

Last, the EOM expressed its appreciation to the other international observation groups from the

Commonwealth, African Union, SADC Parliamentary Assembly and Electoral Institute of

Southern Africa (EISA) for their useful co-operation and exchange of information (EU EOM

2004, 7). Again, election observation was established as a partnership with the acknowledgement that various partners took place in and supported the process. With this emphasis, the EU places itself as a part of a team of international actors supporting the national process rather than an

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imposer of Western ideals holding African countries to standards that they did not initiate or endorse.

The EU is clear in its desire to support Malawi in its democratization efforts. The report notes that the organization is “willing to assist the authorities and civil society of the Republic of

Malawi in continuing to improve its electoral process and encourages the people of Malawi to continue to peacefully work for genuine, democratic elections in line with international standards” (EU EOM 2004, 5). Throughout this election, and with its deployment of larger teams, the EU made the concerted effort to distance itself from domestic politics. As a considerable donor to Malawi, the EU seemingly did not want to conflate its position as donor and observer. A mixed perception of the organization is problematic because it limits the ability of national stakeholders to view them as objective towards the electoral process. Therefore, the tone of the report is professional yet quite critical of the process in Malawi but to the point where one can still take the report as an overall endorsement of the electoral process. Therefore, the citizens can see that the EU is not merely present to “rubber stamp” the electoral process and the government does not feel the need to defend its position to a major donor. Maintaining this distance from the national government is easier because Malawi is not a member of the EU. For the EU, its statements are not ones of solidarity, as might be the case with the AU or SADC, but more of tutelage as the country has much to learn from the democratic processes that EU member countries have already embraced. This behavior is expected considering the nature of

EU relations with its non-member development partners. The EU’s position allows it to contribute to national political processes without similar concerns of retaliation by member countries as it does not monitor elections in its member countries.

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However, as mentioned above, the EU is careful in how it places itself in relation to the other international organizations as it is very much aware that they also have a role to play. This is apparent when considering the members of the observer mission. Though the EU mission was primarily made up of EU citizens, the presence of Mr. Ephriam Kamuntu, a Ugandan national, suggests a consideration on the EU’s part that this mission was in partnership with the host nation, and region, more generally. Mr. Kamuntu’s presence slightly lessens the “foreignness” of the mission. In a way, it also further legitimizes the EU’s presence in Malawi.

In addition, the EU mission, composed of 75 LTOs and STOs, was the largest international observer mission in the country, granting it an advantage over the other organizations. The size of its mission allowed the EU to monitor polls in 27 of the 28 districts, which set the bar for monitoring these elections. While this work does not argue that EU election observers are ideal, by virtue of its economic and political connections, it is able to dispatch more comprehensive missions in comparison to its counterparts.

Most importantly, and as will be discussed in the following sections, its resources allow it to navigate the politics of election observation in a different way from that of the AU, SADC, and the Commonwealth. As the only organization with no African member state, the EU is in a unique position in comparison to its counterparts. Its position allows it to adhere closer to its expressed mandate than its counterparts which is why it is able to maintain its political relationships with Malawi via the progress bias which emphasizes democratic development.

Consequently, while it does not have the same political restrictions as the AU and SADC and to an extent the Commonwealth, it does have to be careful in how it is perceived. The figure below highlights considerations that impacted the EU’s resulting bias during this election.

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EU is a key development partner for Malawi. There was a continued emphasis on the adaption of development programs in the country

Malawi was considered a priority country by the EU. Thus, the mission was viewed as an expression of support to existing governance efforts and validated their involvement

Efforts to establish "democracy" but separate it from the Western ideals, ie. this was Malawi's process

Criticisms centered on Malawi's political insitutions but tone maintained the idea that this was in support of current democratization efforts

Progress Bias Figure 8-1. Determinants of EU Mission Bias in the 2004 Election

The following two sections investigate the actions on the part of the AU and SADC missions and how they navigated the observation process in Malawi’s sensitive political environment. The sections articulate how their identities as African organizations influence their respective agendas and yields assessments and behavior that may differ from the EU’s.

The African Union 2004 Election Observation Mission

This section explores the election observation decisions made on the part of AU election observer mission during the 2004 election. As discussed in Chapter 4, the AU was originally formed as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to combat colonial powers and not as an economic community as were the EU and SADC. Thus, the AU boasts a duty to continental solidarity and a focus on encouraging the development of its member states. So, while the support of democratic measures is central to the AU’s agenda, the continuity of the Union remained a priority especially considering that Malawi’s elections were held two years after the official launch of the African Union at the Durban Summit in South Africa (AU 2017, np). As a young organization seeking to redefine itself, the AU was in a rather challenging position.

Considering its recent transition, the AU was still grappling with funding challenges in

2004. With its more inclusive mandate and ambitious agenda, it had to secure financing to carry

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out the proposed programs within their member countries. Unlike the EU, the AU does not serve as a donor to its member states. So, while the AU participates in national programs and bilateral agreements exist between member states, it does not operate as a development partner. As a result, the relationship with the AU and its member countries tend to center on cooperation and partnership rather than an EU-style tutelage (AU 2001). So, rather than provide budget support, it facilitates the relationships between its member states.

An outcome of this closer relationship among AU member countries is that the organization is more likely to be subject to the glasshouse bias as it seeks to encourage stronger relationships. This focus risks limiting its willingness to challenge situations of fraud and encourages it to take a more restricted stance in the electoral process. In addition, the fact that a majority of the leadership in AU member countries are members of the OAU and not particularly democratic, it may be unwilling to point out the faults in elections for fear that other member states would be challenged when their turn arrived. This is a clear example of the glasshouse bias. The factors discussed above will be taken into consideration when assessing the AU’s mission during the 2004 Malawi election.

The African Union Observer Team arrived a few days prior to the May election and attended multiple consultative meetings and briefings with electoral stakeholders. The mission met with the African Ambassadors accredited to Malawi, the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) Resident Representative and United Nations (UN) Coordinator, the

Executive Secretary for the Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGOMA), the

SADC Parliamentary Forum Observer Team, and the Leader of the European Union (EU)

Observer Team. The AU Team had also been scheduled to attend a debate by the five presidential candidates organized by the Economic Association of Malawi but it was cancelled.

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In addition to these briefings and meetings with electoral stakeholders, the mission attended seven political rallies and used these opportunities to observe and assess the nature of political campaigns and the overall mood of the population. The mission expressed concern that rather than focus on the key political issues, campaigns were built around personalities and character assassinations. As a result, the language used throughout this process “was often intimidating, provocative, and insulting” and it was apparent that handouts were being used to influence voters (AUEOM 2004, 15). From this perspective, at least the AU appeared willing to uphold the integrity of the electoral process, which is unexpected given the anticipated glasshouse bias.

In 2004, it was also clear that the mission prioritized the involvement of all political stakeholders in the process prior to the start of the election. Therefore, the observers used their time collecting information to express what it was these political stakeholders sought from

Malawi in this election. This attitude differed from that of the EU because the EU was mainly focused on providing an overview of the process and establishing the capacity of the political institutions. The AU mission targeted the actors to ensure that they could participate in the process unhindered. Specifically, it explored how the AU could assist Malawi in achieving its goal of holding elections and did not target the institutions themselves in the same manner that the EU did. In reading the reports, there appeared to be a sense of camaraderie between the organization and the country under observation. Given the AU’s position at this point, with the

2004-2007 Strategic Plan emphasizing the importance of the African countries working together and the call for a stronger Commission, its amicable and lenient approach was in keeping with its agenda at the time. Consequently, with its focus on preserving the status quo to ensure

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reciprocity in future elections, one cannot expect the organization to be as critical in its reports or make the most effort to reach out to areas that may challenge their position.

Following this period of data collection, the members of the African Union Observer

Team were deployed on Sunday, May 16, 2004 to the three regional constituencies of the

Republic of Malawi. These were the Northern region, covering Mzuzu, Nkhata Bay, Karonga, and Rumphi; the Central region, covering Lilongwe, Mchinji, Kasungu, and Salima; and the

Southern region, covering Blantyre, Zomba, Mangochi, Thyolo, and Mulanje.

This deployment schedule shows that the observer missions covered only 13 of the 28 constituencies (46%) with four in the North, four in the Central region, and four in the South. In terms of geographical spacing, the constituencies in each region are rather close to each other and surround the main cities in each area—Mzuzu, Lilongwe, and Blantyre. Though Malawi is a small country, it is highly densely populated. In 2004, the population was 12,400,000 with a population density of 132 people per sq. kilometer (World Bank 2016). As a result, a mission needs to spread out much more substantially to ensure that the broad instances of fraud are noted and not displaced into the unmonitored areas. For example, using the distance calculator provided by the MEC (see Appendix J), it shows that the distance from Mzuzu to Nkhata Bay is

47 km, from Mzuzu to Karonga is 226 km, and Mzuzu to Rumphi is 68 km. This suggests that the missions visited cities in close proximity to one another. Given this rationale, the observer missions could have also visited other cities as well, like Mzimba, which is located 117 km from

Mzuzu. The proximity of these cities allowed the EU to visit polls in 27 districts but the AU was unable to dispatch a mission of this size. While financial concerns played a role, we will observe in future elections that the deployment of a more comprehensive mission with limited funds is possible. Organizations are able to use finances as a rationale for political behaviors.

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The pattern is similar for the other areas. Even if the observers were rallying around a central city for convenience, the AU mission could have slightly expanded its reach to accommodate the other cities. While these decisions could be considered “fair” if the process truly was “random,” the fact that observers make conscious decisions when it comes to deployment suggests otherwise. Indeed, it is known that the process is not random due to the limitations and considerations on the part of mission, especially in terms of their respective budgets (Interview, Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015). The three major cities are the most amenable in terms of transportation and accommodation as missions seek to be as comfortable as possible (Interview, Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015). This is mainly the case for missions less familiar with the country. However, considering that missions are equipped with vehicles able to tackle long distances and drivers who know the area, it again draws attention to why they selected the given areas. In addition, like other observers, the AU observers have access to the

MEC for assistance (ibid.).

At the end of the 2004 mission, the AU observer team expressed its “appreciation to the

African Union and the Government of Malawi for the opportunity and challenge offered to the

Members to come to Malawi to observe and report on the conduct of the 2004 Presidential and

Parliamentary Elections which were held on 20th May 2004” (AUEOM 2004, 22). This falls in line with the diplomatic expectations of these election observation missions. In addition, the team congratulated the people of Malawi for holding the election without violence and that expressed that it had been conducted in a “free and peaceful atmosphere” (ibid., 22). However, there was no clear statement as to what the mission’s verdict was. The use of the term

“challenge” in reference to its monitoring of this election is notable because it implies that the process was not as smooth as it could have been. Though election monitoring is not an easy task

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by any means, the process is more streamlined where the conditions are amenable. It was apparent that these conditions were less than ideal.

The AU mission was clearly apprehensive about stating outright that the election was free and fair; rather, it ended its report by stating that it “pray[ed] that all parties will accept the results and that there will be a smooth transfer of power and a spirit of reconciliation in the interest of progress for the nation of Malawi” (AUEOM 2004, 22). Considering the tense background against which the election was conducted, this statement gives the sense that the process may not have gone as intended. Bearing in mind the number of recommendations made on the part of the EU mission, ranging from the lack of capacity of the MEC regarding the mismanagement of the elections to the uneven playing field, the challenges associated with these elections are clear, yet the AU chose not to classify the election as problematic. Rather, the AU showed leniency in its report which is in line with expectations. Given the “chaotic” political atmosphere, there was concern on the mission’s part that the elections would destabilize the country, so issuing a report that would not aggravate an already tense situation was in line with the AU’s agenda of maintaining the stability of the country, and even the African Union itself.

With multiple elections planned during the same year, in countries like Cameroon (October),

Niger (December), and Mozambique (December) that are not considered as democracies, it was in the AU’s best interest to limit its criticisms of Malawi’s process given that future elections may prove to be more problematic (African Elections 2012).14 This is an example of the AU’s glasshouse bias.

Knowing that the political situation was as tense at it was, a deliberate choice to avoid conflict was made on the part of the organization and this was shown by its limited travel

14 Other forthcoming potentially problematic elections, planned for 2005, were the Central African Republic (May), Guinea-Bissau (June/July), and Gabon (November) (African Elections 2012).

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schedule. Malawi is a small country with no history at this point of any large-scale violence, especially surrounding elections, in comparison to the other countries being monitored in the region during this time, such as Cameroon and Namibia, with more turbulent political histories.

Therefore, it was not in the organization’s best interest to call attention to a nation that for all purposes has held a “peaceful election” and continues to garner a lot of international support.

Specifically, Malawi has at times been referred to as a “donor darling” or “darling of the West” due its reliance on outside donors and apparent commitment to the instillation of democratic norms (The Economist 2016, Herskovitz 2012). As a result, the country has been granted certain liberties by the international, and mainly financial community placing any organization that wants Malawi’s external financing to continue in a difficult position. The AU, whose member countries are recipients of outside aid, has to ensure that it preserves a positive image of Malawi to maintain its access to this aid and to protect the integrity of the larger organization.

So, if the AU was aware of any transgressions, it placed itself in a position where its observation of these was limited. In doing so, it lent support to Malawi’s process while protecting its economic relationship with outside donors and with the member state. Even considering the mission’s statement to the press that the election did not occur on a “level playing field,” its report takes a less definite approach which again highlights the importance of reading beyond the reports when investigating election observation in the region (Recorder

Report, 2004).

Given the relatively short history of the AU, 2004 was marked by a focus on economic stability and the maintenance of regional relationships. Its goal was to facilitate integration and this was evident in the behavior of its missions. Here we saw the organization focusing on its own regional agendas resulting in the glasshouse bias, where the ties between the countries were

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crucial to the development of the organization and democracy at the national level was not prioritized. This bias protected the AU from imminent and future instability.

The most significant difference between the EU and AU missions was funding, with a smaller mission the AU mission was unable to have the same level of involvement as the

European mission. During this election, the AU mission was limited in its reach within the country so it had to make considerations for these limitations. These limitations, as observed above, led the mission to be selective in the districts it chose to observe and the aspects of the election on which it focused. However, these limitations could have been dealt with in a manner that facilitated objective and comprehensive election monitoring than what actually occurred. As noted above, the deployment pattern of the mission was not only a product of limited funding. It also reflected the AU’s goal of preserving the union and of not disturbing the relationships between member states. In addition, by not challenging the election outright in its reports, the

AU mission is able to fulfill this mandate.

AU was a relatively new organization seeking to move beyond its OAU legacy

Faced financial challenges and remained dependent on political will of member states

AU focused on the countries working as a collective, sense of camraderie

Deployment of a limited mission without much financial and political support - a "rubber-stamping" mission

Glasshouse Bias

Figure 8-2. Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2004 Election

The following section focuses on the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) and how its membership and mandates informed the behavior of its mission during the elections. As an African organization, it shares similarities with the AU but the circumstances surrounding its establishment subject it to different biases.

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The Southern African Development Community 2004 Election Observation Mission

This section investigates the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and observes interesting patterns in behavior due to its history and composition. Consisting of 14 countries, in comparison to the AU’s 53,15 SADC is a closer knit political community. Member state proximity and shared history makes SADC susceptible to different priorities than those of the larger, continental AU.

The manner in which SADC sends its mission also sets its process apart. By sending individual members from each country, it places responsibility for the missions on the respective countries (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014 and Gaborone, Botswana, June 26,

2015). However, the fact that these missions are sent from individual countries increases the likelihood of biases on the part of missions. While the missions are trained as a unit once in the country, there is a relative discordance among the observers (ibid.). Further, the approach to elections differs from that of the AU and EU. SADC tends to “focus on dispute resolution” and

“allegedly produces two reports: one for the public which is general and friendly to the hosting country and a second detailed, secretive, and constitutes inter-government communication meant for targeted political intervention” (Maundeni et. al. 2016, 22).16 Last, there are multiple organizations that operate under the SADC banner, pulling political stakeholders from all 14

SADC nations, and the Secretariat is mandated to act as a liaison for these various organizations, which allows for SADC missions to increase their reach within a country (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 25, 2015). However, this level of coordination is not always the case and can lead to disorganization on the ground (ibid.). This disorganization is especially apparent when

15 This number excludes the recently admitted South Sudan and Morocco.

16 This is an allegation that echoes conversations I had on multiple occasions in the field.

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trying to access the final observer reports17 and is reflected in the manner that the missions are carried out.

The manner in which the SADC missions are held and the relatively small size of its organization makes the relationships between countries even more important than they are at the continental level. As a result, SADC is especially likely to be subject to the special relationship bias. In addition, its missions may be limited, and with the level of disorganization at the organizational level it is highly unlikely that SADC would challenge the Malawian electoral process.

The SADC observer mission was present for both the voter registration exercise and the actual election period. The only other organization to have done so is the Commonwealth. While the other missions noted that they had dispatched pre-election missions to assure that the circumstances would allow for a full mission, none of them mention sending a pre-election mission to observe the registration process. So, by observing the pre-election mission, SADC was in a position to understand the process in its entirety. Unfortunately, the mission was operating on the original schedule and sent a SADC observer team, led by Honorable Mihas of

Lesotho (Minister of Justice), consisting of 8 MPs and 4 Forum Secretariat staff for the established two weeks (ibid.). The disconnect here is apparent as the mission was unable to remain in the country for the full amount of time due to either misinformation or inadequate planning. However, it still carried out its mission as planned despite concerns as to whether the time was sufficient.

Following the SADC visit to 66 registration centers in 19 of Malawi’s 28 districts, the team issued a statement that the process had been affected by a flawed registration process.

17 SADC reports are difficult to procure and there is constant confusion as to which member of the mission have the report or, if they were given to government, who had access to these copies.

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These issues included low voter turnout due to a lack of civic and voter education and the timing of registration (SADC PF 2004, 62). These concerns were echoed by the organizations accredited to engage in voter education. One such organization was the Justice and Peace

Commission (affiliated to the Episcopal Church), which deployed observers in seven Southern districts to monitor the registration process and issued a report on its findings. The report cited a shortage of administrative materials such as batteries and film, daily registration account forms, amendment cards, and security envelopes. Also, despite the already extended registration process, the SADC PF 12-member advance team still recommended that the registration should be extended due to the “lackluster response to voter registration efforts” (SADC PF 2004, 19).

The mission’s concern was that the MEC would be excluding a significant portion of the voter population. This attitude is telling of SADC and its partner organizations, because for them the importance is placed on the stability of the political situation and this requires the inclusion of the voting population. For SADC, as was the case when it was founded, citizen participation is essential to ensure the organization’s legitimacy (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26,

2015). Specifically, SADC is only able to maintain the special relationships among its member states if there is no challenge put forth by citizens.

Given these criticisms, the MEC was tasked with deciding how it would handle the issues raised but there was no response from the MEC as to whether it would address them. Thus, despite the issues it noted and its regional and political proximity to Malawi, SADC was not in a place to influence the process prior to the elections.

Both SADC and SADC-PF missions were present in the country for the 2004 election

(Dougherty 2004, np). The SADC PF mission had a total of 51 members, which consisted of 26

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Members of Parliament, 16 SADC staff from 12 SADC Parliaments,18 and 9 PF Secretariat staff.

The Mission Leader was Honorable Emmerson Mnangagwa, member of the Executive

Committee of the Forum and the Speaker of the National Assembly of Zimbabwe, with co- deputies Hon. Aniceto Hamukwaya of the National Assembly of Angola and Chairperson of the

Standing Committee on Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation and Hon. H. Mahase of the National

Assembly of the Kingdom of Lesotho and a member of the Standing Committee on the Regional

Women’s Parliamentary Caucus. The overall mission coordinator was Dr. Kasuka Mutukwa,

Secretary General of the SADC Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF 2004, 8). The mission mandate stemmed from the terms of reference (TORs) laid out by the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region.19 As a Zimbabwe national, with this election following so soon after the disputed Zimbabwean election, the expectation is that Mnangagwa will take a more lenient approach to the observation, especially given that one of his deputies, Hamukwaya, was from a country considered to be “not free” by Freedom House (Freedom House 2017). Though Lesotho was classified as “free,” its limited position within the organization due to its dependency on

South Africa, did not offer it much political space to operate.

Prior to the start of the mission, there was a 3-day Mission Orientation Program held from May 6-8, 2004 at the Le Meridien Mount Soche Hotel in Blantyre to help prepare the mission staff for their respective roles. The aim of this orientation was to familiarize the mission with the TORs that informed its mission; explain the logistical and administrative details involved in observing the Malawi elections; provide the mission with background and context of the upcoming elections by organizing meetings with key political stakeholders; emphasize that

18 The 12 countries were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

19 The SADC mission mandate as outlined by the Norms and Standards for Elections in the SADC region is discussed in Chapter 6.

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observers are expected to submit a report after the elections; “acquaint Parliamentary staff with their responsibilities in supporting SADC members of Parliament observing the Malawi

Elections; and acquaint staff on the use and management of the contingency fund” (SADC PF

2004, 10). SADC PF also held discussions with SADC High Commissioners and Ambassadors, the AU Observer Mission in Lilongwe, the Commonwealth and the EU Observer Missions.

SADC PF also met with the EISA20 mission in Blantyre. There was no mention of interaction with the SADC Secretariat mission.

In terms of deployment, the mission was divided into 13 teams to cover all districts, each consisting of two MPs and one Parliamentary staff. These teams were deployed on May 9th and visited a total of 657 polling stations. These teams were determined by member country representation, party representation, gender representation, leadership of forum organs especially in considering team leaders; language; geographical neighborliness which places some MPs in

Malawi districts that are near their countries of origin; and participation in previous election observation and geographical coverage. The composition of the mission highlights the “closeness between the missions in comparison to that of the other missions”—there is a cultural affinity between the mission and the population. The commitment to establishing an affinity between the organization and the voting population is emphasized by the nationalities of the heads of mission, especially with a Zimbabwean mission head and a Zambian mission coordinator, both countries that share a history with Malawi.21

20 The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) is a non-governmental organization established in 1996. It seeks to encourage “an African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment” (EISA 2017). It is based in Johannesburg, South Africa and undertakes election observation missions in the region.

21 Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe were all part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland under the British Empire (United Kingdom National Archives, n.d.)

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The specifics of its deployment are as follows: one team was sent to Blantyre (urban and rural districts); Chikwawa and Nsanje; Chiradzulu/Thyolo/Mulanje/Phalombe (4);

Mwanza/Neno/Ntcheu (3); Zomba/Machinga/Balaka (3); Mangochi; Lilongwe (urban and rural districts); Dedza/Mchinji (2); Kasungu/Ntchisi/Dowa (3); Salima/Nkhotakota (2);

Mzimba/Rumphi (2); Mzuzu/Nkhata Bay/Likoma Island (3); and Karonga/Chitipa (2).

The SADC PF mission was the largest, following the EU, in terms of size. Though exact numbers were not provided in the report, the MEC lists the mission as having 55 observers

(MEC 2004) and one can establish a fairly accurate estimate given the details provided. As a result, the mission covered 29 districts in comparison to the smaller AU team.22 This fact does not go unnoticed as the mission stated that “the significance of African observers was that they brought a wealth of experience that was African and therefore very appropriate and relevant not only to Malawi, but to the region as well” (ibid., 24). The organizations are aware of their value to the process and that African organizations have a place in this process. The SADC PF

Secretary General echoed this sentiment during an interview prior to the 2014 May elections

(Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014).

For SADC countries, the elections in Malawi are of great importance; so attesting to having monitored a larger area, rather than leave these districts to the Western organizations, is in line with its agenda. This behavior echoes a statement made during an interview with a SADC official where they noted concerns on SADC’s part regarding the intentions of Western observers (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). Taking this into consideration, it is understandable that SADC, and its related entities, seek to establish its presence as key actors in election monitoring and democratization efforts. This attitude lends support to the argument that the SADC mission is there to support a member country, aware that their position means

22 The African Union mission consisted of 13 observers (MEC 2004).

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something to the process. Rather than limit its mission, like the AU, SADC chose to target all electoral districts. The decision to do so renders its pronouncement on the process more valid.

Considering the concerns raised during its pre-election mission, this would be the only way to assure the population, and other international observers, that it was able to adequately assess whether these issues impacted the process.

The mission’s decision to deploy their observers in this manner can be viewed as a response to the concerns raised during the pre-election mission but sufficient resources were still not allocated to accommodate the more comprehensive mission. Given the lack of interaction between SADC and SADC PF, it highlights how the lack of coordination and cooperation can undermine the success of a mission. Beyond the statement that SADC was present at the mission, no final reports on the mission’s behalf were issued. Working together would have enhanced the mission and helped mitigate the contradictory conclusions discussed below.

The mission report outlined several issues with the electoral process. As previously discussed, it reiterated its concerns with voter registration and recommended that “all stakeholders need[ed] to be involved in continuous and comprehensive voter education”; that a single identity document for registration and voting purposes needed to be introduced; and emphasized the “need to strengthen the National Elections Consultative Forum as an elections conflict resolution mechanism and the need for MEC to put in place effective logistical and administrative arrangements to manage the electoral process” (SADC PF 2004, 19). Other concerns raised were with the multiple sets of voter’s rolls observed in the field along with incomplete voter information; the lack of civic and voter education, the haphazard delimitation of local boundaries despite the law mandating that it be done in intervals no longer than five

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years;23 the ambiguity of candidate nomination processes; the limited participation of women and youth; insufficient and/or poorly trained polling staff; and insecure ballot boxes (ibid., 20-25).

The recommendations made were targeted towards the MEC’s lack of preparedness and supported the concerns from their earlier mission.

Overall, the SADC PF found there to be an uneven spread of the use of conflict resolution mechanisms such as the Multi Party liaison committees (MPLCs), District Electoral

Supervisory Teams (DEST), the National Elections Consultative Forum, and the police. As with the AU team, the mission noted that the campaigns began rather early and, while peaceful, they were not issue-based and consisted of character assassinations of the other candidates (SADC PF

2004: 26). This contributed to the already tense political environment. In Karonga and Chitipa, areas that had not benefited from conflict resolution mechanisms due to funding challenges, the mission saw the overt display of wealth, meat, and food as a means of buying votes (ibid., 27). It also noted that the media coverage was unequally distributed (ibid., 27). Last, it found the transmission of results slow and difficult (ibid., 29).

The mission also noted the presence of local monitors, both civil society organizations like the Catholic Commissions for Justice (CCJP) and the National Initiative for Civic Education in Malawi (NICE), and statutory bodies like the Human Rights Commission. Unfortunately, there was a lack of funding for some of the groups with only four of the 22 accredited receiving their funds. Donor organizations were said to not have provided the necessary funds.

However, despite these misgivings and the overall tone of the observer report, SADC PF found the election to have been an opportunity for the people to freely exercise their democratic

23 Rather than be held every five years, boundary revisions occurred at random or according to the government, where necessary due to population changes in each constituency. In Malawi, these revisions occurred in 1964 [53], 1973 [63], 1983 [101], 1987 [112], 1992 [141], 1994 [177], and 1998 [193] (SADC PF 2004, 21).

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right to vote and be voted for. The SADC mission report took this one step further and called the elections “free and fair” (Dougherty 2004). Rather than admit the shortcomings as did the PF mission, it announced that these elections were successful even before the elections were complete. Its statement, issued on May 21, considered the voting process “‘free and fair” and credible in terms of transparency and accepted electoral practices’ and praised the MEC's overall management of the elections. It urged stakeholders to accept the (then still unannounced) final results, calling them a "true reflection of the wishes of the people of Malawi, committed to further consolidation of peace, stability, freedom and democracy in this sister country and full member of the SADC" (Dougherty 2004). Its confidence in the process was apparent.

This clear departure from the EU and AU conclusions emphasizes that SADC has a higher level of political investment in the Southern African region. It also indicates the support that the member countries provide for each other. Within the AU, Malawi is one of 54 countries while SADC is composed of 14 members, leading to higher levels of dependency among its countries. Consequently, SADC must be more careful in what it says as these are “their people” and the channels of communication are much shorter than at the continental level (Interview,

Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). This would explain its efforts, despite funding challenges, to ensure that its mission be as evenly distributed as possible. It also explains why it goes to lengths to ensure that its missions can relate to the population under observation (language, culture, etc.).

However, the fact that one mission oversaw the monitoring of multiple districts and only visited 8% of the polling stations raises concerns as to its limitations. As discussed earlier, the main challenge for missions is that their biases and limited capacities are often correlated where behaviors that reflect their personal interests are attributed to an inability to finance missions.

These missions were most likely unable to fulfill their complete mandates, as subsequent

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conversations emphasize that the desire to assist does not always match with the organization’s capacity. In this situation, the deployment schedule may have served as a reflection of the organizations’ limited funds but the report also indicates an apprehension to fully challenge the process in one of their own member states. The discordance between the various missions under the SADC umbrella, despite the shared biases, contributes to the inability, or lack of willingness, to tackle the observation process in a more objective manner. During these elections, SADC PF took its role as an election observer more seriously, keeping in line with its mandate of strengthening institutions in the region (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). Still, even then, SADC PF found itself subject to the same biases as the SADC itself due to their shared prioritization of political relationships among “their people.” As such, these organizations are present in the capacity to assist the process in one of their own member states. In this vein,

SADC openly chose not to challenge the process and this was shown by its pronouncement that the election was “free and fair” and the unavailability of the final report. While these reports are available for elections held in more recent years, conversations with SADC and government officials all make the point that access to older reports is limited as they are “classified”

(Interviews, Gaborone, Botswana and Lilongwe, Malawi, 2015). Election reports are meant to help stakeholders understand the strengths and weaknesses of the process but keeping them classified undermines their credibility. SADC was not willing to publicly challenge the

Malawian government for how it held the elections and this raises concerns with SADC’s monitoring process. Again, we see SADC’s position as a smaller organization with outspoken members like Robert Mugabe posing a challenge for its role as an influential political actor and emphasizing the importance of maintaining relationships between member states.

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Shared political, economic, and social history

Observers deployed by individual states leading to a lack of cohesion

Lack of communication between the SADC and SADC PF missions

Visited multiple constituencies but few polling stations

Prioritized the relationships among its "people" and supported political ties in the region

Special Relationship Bias

Figure 8-3. Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2004 Elections

The next section discusses the Commonwealth’s observation mission to the 2004 election. As expected, the Commonwealth mission was influenced by concerns that arose from its mixed membership. It is an organization that contains both African and Western countries.

So, while it does not deal with the tensions caused by a regional proximity of all member states, it is also hampered by having countries that represent different ideals.

The Commonwealth 2004 Election Observation Mission

The Commonwealth, as discussed in Chapter 7, considers itself to be an association of states with countries that share a fraternal relationship with one other. With this ideal of a community, the Commonwealth was focused on moving away from being defined by the colonial relations that had previously existed between the United Kingdom and several members of the Commonwealth. So, this group of countries, some more economically and politically stable than others, has a different dynamic from that of the EU, AU, and SADC, where maintaining the semblance of equality among nations is crucial. I would expect it to be more important for the Commonwealth than the other organizations because of the fluidity of its membership requirements. The more influential Commonwealth nations do not want to be viewed as wielding power over the lesser developed members. Even the commitments made prior to the Malawian elections emphasized shared values and ideals: the Coolum Declaration on the Commonwealth in the 21st Century: Continuity and Renewal where the “Commonwealth

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Heads of Government addressed the role of the association, and renewed their enduring commitment to shared values and principles” and on the Aso Rock Commonwealth Declaration on Development and Democracy: Partnership for Peace and Prosperity that expressed

Commonwealth leaders commitment to strengthening development and development “through partnership for peace and prosperity” (Commonwealth 2017, np).

While the Commonwealth is not a donor organization, member states have their own respective economic and political relationships that must be taken into account. These bilateral relationships can influence how the organization operates. This aspect of the organization limits the scope within which it can operate. Though based in Europe, it does not share the same distance from the countries under observation as the EU thanks to this mixed membership.

Unlike the EU, it is not a European organization that boasts a significant financial relationship with its member states. This organization is all about maintaining the image that these countries have moved on from the legacy of colonialism. For this reason, the Commonwealth would likely be subject to the special relationship bias and limit its criticism of the elections due to the importance of maintaining a peaceful and friendly rapport between its member nations. Like

SADC, the Commonwealth sought to maintain a strong relationship between member states as it established itself as a political actor.

The Commonwealth, like the SADC mission, dispatched a pre-election mission to observe the voter registration process. This mission took place in two stages, a mission in

January 2004 consisting of Jamaica’s Director of Elections, Mr. Danville Walker and

Commonwealth Secretariat staff member, Ms. Charlene Lee-Ling, and a mission in April 2004.

This second mission, consisting of former Chief Elections Officer of Trinidad and Tobago, Ms.

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Jocelyn Lucas, and Commonwealth Secretariat staff member, Mr. Linford Andrews, was in the country for the official display of the Voters Register (Commonwealth 2004, 9).

The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Rt. Hon Don McKinnon received an invitation on March 15, 2004 from the MEC to send observers to the Parliamentary and Presidential

Elections scheduled for May 18, 2004. However, before confirming that an observer mission would be dispatched, McKinnon sent a two-person Assessment Mission in April 2004. This group established that the environment would be conducive to the holding of elections. In addition, an Advance Group was sent to assess the electoral environment and report to the full

Observer group upon its arrival. This Advance Group held a series of meetings with the Electoral

Commission, party and NGO officials in Blantyre and Lilongwe, and travelled extensively to meet with voters and assess the pre-election mood and preparations. The full group arrived in

Blantyre on May 10, 2004 and was headed by Justice Joseph Warioba, former Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004a, 5). Tanzania, like Malawi, was classified as “partly free” due to the continued domination of its ruling party that limited the space for political opposition (Freedom House 2017). I expect there to be a degree of leniency on

Warioba’s part in judging the election given his own country’s relatively loose adherence to democratic norms.

The terms of reference of the Group are ones that have been regularly used by

Commonwealth missions. These terms of reference reiterate that observers are present in the country at the request of the Malawi Electoral Commission to observe the election and its accordance to the laws of Malawi. Notably, the laws concerning elections in Malawi are not completely clear leaving ambiguity when it comes to establishing guidelines for electoral quality and expectations. However, following the international principles to which the Commonwealth is

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signatory, the group is mandated to be impartial and independent, have no executive role, and is expected to observe, not supervise, the process, and to form a judgment accordingly

(Commonwealth 2004, 6).

In its arrival statement, the mission noted that it was present per the MEC’s invitation following a visit the month before by an Assessment Mission that consulted with the Electoral

Commission, political parties and civil society. The mission concluded that there would be

“broad support” for the presence of Commonwealth observers and that it would be able to carry out its work unhindered. As with the EU, the Commonwealth mission iterated its impartiality and emphasized that while the observers were selected for their individual abilities, they

“represent[ed] the whole Commonwealth” rather than their countries of origin and thus were not there to interfere (Commonwealth 2004, 66). Like the EU, the Commonwealth, as a Western organization, sought to distance itself from the electoral process.

The plan, as outlined, was to undergo four days of briefing sessions with the Chairman of the Electoral Commissions, the Chief Election Officer, political parties, non-governmental organizations, Commonwealth diplomats and others. The mission was deployed on Friday, May

14, 2004 (Commonwealth 2004, 6). However, the Commonwealth offered one caveat to its statement that was not observed with the other missions. It was honest in its limitations as an election observer stating that “we cannot visit every polling station or be present everywhere.

But we can and will attempt to take a representative sample of the process, so that we can at a broad overview” (ibid., 67). As stated earlier, the Commonwealth is an organization that includes

African and European nations. Consequently, it is not as completely removed from these countries as the EU but is also not completely immersed in the member politics as the AU and

SADC. This cautious approach to election observation is a testament to the Commonwealth’s

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commitment to preserving the friendly relationships between its member states. It also suggests an awareness of its position as a Western-based organization, created under the auspices of the

United Kingdom, monitoring an election in a former colony. With Zimbabwe’s 2002 exit from the organization, this apprehension is understandable (La Guardia 2003).

Following the arrival statement on May 10, 2004, the Chairperson of the Electoral

Commission, Justice James Kalaile, and Chief Elections Officer, Mr. Roosevelt Gondwe, briefed the observer mission. The mission was also briefed by the advance team. The following day, the mission met with the representatives of several presidential candidates and the major alliances and parties competing in the elections. Additional meetings were held with non-governmental organizations though separate sessions were held for the NGO umbrella body, domestic election observers, gender organizations, youth organizations, and human rights NGOs. Again, the mission wanted to show its commitment to impartiality throughout the process. The mission also met with representatives of the main media organizations, media monitors (both from civil society and the Electoral Commission), other international observers, and the Commissioner of

Police. Finally, the mission travelled to Lilongwe, to undergo briefings from the Commonwealth

High Commissioners. Once these series of meetings were concluded, the mission was deployed to its base locations in 10 four-person teams, consisting of two observers, a driver, and an interpreter (Commonwealth 2004, 7).

The leadership deployment schedule was as follows: Chairperson of the mission, Justice

Warioba (former Prime Minister and first Vice-President of Tanzania), accompanied by staff support team leader, Professor Adefuye (Nigeria), travelled from Lilongwe (Central) to Mzuzu

(North), then back to Lilongwe and Kasungu (Central) and then headed to Blantyre (South).

While in Blantyre, Warioba observed the proceedings in Chikwawa (Southwest of Blantyre) and

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Zomba (Northeast of Blantyre). During his time in these districts, he met with election and party officials, international and domestic observers, and voters. In addition, he observed the display of the register, the distribution of ballot papers, and the Electoral Commission’s other preparations for the elections firsthand. The other members of the mission were Senator Rainelle

Andreychuck (Canada), Mr. Victor Ashby (Grenada), Ms. Nicolette Balcome (St. Vincent and the Grenadines), Ms. Justina Cumbe (Mozambique), Senator Alan Ferguson (Australia), Mr.

Michael Holman (United Kingdom), Ambassador Olujimi Jolaoso (Nigeria), Ms. Gugulethu

Matlaopane (South Africa), Ms. Koki Muli (Kenya), Begum Sarwari Rahman (Bangladesh),

Hon. Wavel Ramkalawan MP (Seychelles), Mr. Kingsley Rodigro (Sri Lanka), and Ms.

Elizabeth Solomon (Ghana) (Commonwealth 2004, 62-65). The mission consisted of eight

African nationals, three from Western countries, and four from other countries within the

Commonwealth. The mission’s membership was a reflection of the organization itself. This balanced mission emphasizes the Commonwealth’s position as having all regions actively participating in the democratic processes of member states. Rather than deploy observers from only African countries, or from one specific region, the organization adhered to its more mixed identity, both in terms of nationalities and degree of democratic consolidation.

The other teams’ base locations were as follows. In the North, a total of two missions were deployed to Karonga (1) and Mzuzu (1). In the Central region, three missions were deployed to Kasungu (1), Lilongwe (1), and Salima (1). Last, in the Southern region, four missions were dispatched to Blantyre (1), Mangochi (1), Zomba (1), and Chikwawa/Nsanje (1)

(Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 68). At these base locations, the various teams met with election officials, political parties, civil society organizations, and other observer missions. In addition, they met with “voters on the street, in their places of work and in public places, to hear

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their views on the process” (ibid., 8). From these base locations, the teams moved within their respective areas “making a point of being visible without being intrusive” (ibid.). In the interest of visibility, their vehicles were marked with the blue and yellow Commonwealth and many flew the Commonwealth flag. While on deployment all observers wore blue Commonwealth Observer polo-shirts” (ibid.). The level of detail regarding its deployment is different from that of the other missions, but more interestingly, is the constant effort by the Commonwealth to establish itself as neutral. Considering its mixed membership with European nations that have committed to democratic norms in their own countries, one can understand why this is the case. The

Commonwealth continually placed itself as a part of the larger democratic process while still trying to maintain the spirit of fraternity.

Evidence of this sentiment of being part of a larger process is the mission’s awareness of international organizations and it highlighted the fact that its presence helped avoid overlapping and allowed them to work together. The Commonwealth mission was informed by the MEC on

May 17, 2004 that it had accredited over 300 international observers. The main international groups were the European Union Election Observation Mission (25 long-term and 53 short-term observers, led by Dutch Member of the European Parliament Ms. Marieke Sanders-Ten Holte); the African Union (9 observers, led by Tanzanian politician Dr. William Shija); the SADC

Parliamentary Forum Observer Group (39 observers, led by the Speaker of Zimbabwe’s

Parliament, Hon. Emmerson Mnangagwa); the EISA (Electoral Institute of Southern Africa)

Observer Mission (35 observers, led by former President of Botswana HE Sir Quett Ketumile

Joni Masire); and the Commonwealth Observer Group. To maximize observer effort and minimize duplication, these missions exchanged information, such as deployment plans, and worked together in the field (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 47).

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The Commonwealth team also recognized the role played by the domestic stakeholders during the elections where each political party and candidate appointed an agent, referred to as

“monitors” for the polling and counting process. In addition, the civil society domestic observers, also referred to as monitors, consisted of 11,000 people coordinated by the Malawi Electoral

Support Network (MESN). Of these 11,000, 7,000 would be taken from the Public Affairs

Committee (a coalition of faith-based groups) and the 4,000 from the National Institute for Civic

Education (NICE). Furthermore, the Human Rights Commission (a state body) was to deploy its own monitors. Each organization, MESN and the Human Rights Commission, conducted separate Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) exercises to allow for comparison (ibid.).

The mission observed the elections in all three regions, but given the small size of the missions, its ability to be as comprehensive is brought into question. This shortcoming, as shown earlier, is one that the Chair readily acknowledged (Arrival Statement, Commonwealth 2004b).

However, despite the mission’s limitations, it found the poll to have been conducted well and that the media, monitors of political parties, and properly-accredited domestic and international observers, were permitted to monitor the entirety of the process. Still, the mission was clear in noting that polling day should not be viewed as separate from the rest of the electoral process

(Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 80).

This election had a host of issues, and as mandated, the mission provided its recommendations in what it referred to as a “constructive spirit” with the aims of helping improve the next elections (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 56). However, these recommendations are extremely similar to those put forth in the 1999 report. As a result, the recommendations expressed disappointment in the fact that the MEC failed to manage the elections better considering that it “has known for five years that it had to organize a

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Parliamentary and Presidential Election in 2004” (ibid., 57). Additionally, this lack of preparation is indicative of a lack of political independence. With its accountability to the

President, the MEC lacks the authority and the funding to make decisions on its own accord and would benefit from restructuring.

The mission also noted that there were only 154 women candidates, mostly independent, of the 1,248 and urged political parties to choose more women candidates to move forward, the one-third of the candidates in winnable seats being women. It also pushed for gender balance at senior levels in the political parties, whether appointed or elected (Commonwealth Secretariat

2004, 26).

In addition, the mission noted the considerable abuse of state resources and urged the

MEC to introduce regulations that would prevent this abuse in the future. Relatedly, it noted that some candidates were bribing voters as a means of getting their votes. For the parties that benefitted from funding, there are no requirements for them to report their income and expenditure and the mission recommended that laws be put in place to ensure openness and accountability. The observer group also pointed out that the law regarding media coverage is not clear and must be clarified to allow for more balanced coverage in future elections.

According to the mission, the voters could freely express their will on election day but there were apparent problems that led to the process prior to election day being unfair. These issues included the biased state media and the clear abuse of incumbent advantage. It also found that certain requirements of a democratic process were met while others were not and so made recommendations that would hopefully improve the process in the future (Departure Statement,

Commonwealth 2004d).

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Thus, the final statement was not an outright endorsement of the process. Instead, the mission noted the issues with the election and ended their mission statement with the following:

We will now return to our countries, with fond memories of the people of Malawi and the warm welcome we received here. Each of us will follow developments in this country closely. We wish the people of Malawi well in all your work to strengthen your democracy. We hope that our Report will contribute to that effort. As individuals, we will do whatever we can to help. We know that the Commonwealth as a whole will do so too (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 81).

Overall, the Commonwealth recommendations were not particularly detailed but the report emphasized the importance of contributing to the overall democratic process. Again, the

Commonwealth sought to place itself as contributing to the overall nature of the Commonwealth and supporting the democracy at an organizational level. Notably, the report was submitted on

May 25th, just five days after the elections were held and concluded that while the election day went well the process prior to election was “unfair” and that the Commonwealth hopes that the people of Malawi “have a better election next time” (Commonwealth Secretariat 2004, 3). This rushed departure further contributed to the sense that the Commonwealth was apprehensive in its role as an election observer. Its unique positioning as an organization with both African and

Western countries must be acknowledged. It was apparent that this unique positioning did not impact whether or not the mission endorsed the election but it showed how the biases informed by the Commonwealth’s position limited its political space.

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Identity as a European organization consisting of both European and non-European countries

Sought to move beyond its colonialist legacy and figuring out its role in the international arena

Small limited mission, sent as more of a diplomatic mission with an emphasis on maintaining the collegiality of the organization

Final report did not challenge the issues observed during the elections

Special Relationship Bias

Figure 8-4. Determinants of Commonwealth Mission Bias in the 2004 Election

This section illustrated that the organization’s membership impacts its nature and behavior succumbing the Commonwealth to the special relationship bias. It also showed how an organization can be limited in how it functions by the political space it seeks to occupy. For the

Commonwealth, the friendly relationship remains central to its operation and results in more calculated behavior on their part.

Conclusion

This chapter briefly discussed the political background leading to the 2004 Malawi elections and established the environment within with international elections observers had to operate. As shown in this chapter, each organization approached the process in different ways which led to different deployment plans, attitude, and reports. Figure 8.1 summarizes the biases that impacted IO behavior during the 2014 election.

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Malawi 2004

Southern African Commonwealth of European Union African Union Development Nations Community

Special Relationship Special Relationship Progress Bias Glasshouse Bias Bias Bias

Figure 8-5. Summary of Biases in 2004

The EU, as the “standard” with the most resources had the more comprehensive mission.

However, its position as an outsider limited its political space meaning that it was not privy to the same political liberties as the AU and SADC. As a donor organization, the EU mission targeted its report to reflect the areas it supports as part of its development agenda emphasizing the progress made in Malawi’s democratic development. Its deployment pattern ensured that it visited 28 of the 29 electoral districts, more than the AU and the Commonwealth. SADC PF also deployed a larger mission and visited all 29 districts in Malawi despite their more limited funds.

SADC PF, as representative of the SADC bodies, sent the second largest mission. The size of this mission indicated a commitment on SADC PF’s part to assure that the democratic process was moving forward in the Southern African region. Its composition also signaled an affinity with the country under observation. However, the proximity of SADC missions and the discordance between the various entities led to confusion. The mission outcome was limited as a result. The AU mission proved to be limited as well, with only 13 electoral districts observed.

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However, their position as a continental actor set it apart from both the EU and SADC. For this reason, it had to prioritize these regional relationships resulting in the special relationship bias.

As a continental body, the AU’s mission was to establish itself after its relaunch in 2002.

Though democracy was introduced as a key ideal for the organization, its need to self-preserve was greater and this placed it in a rather challenging political space. So, it was limited both financially but also in the sense that it did not want to alienate any of its members. Having only been established in 2002, the AU was placed in a more vulnerable position compared to its older, more established, counterparts. This explains its susceptibility to the glasshouse bias. The

Commonwealth shared similar concerns to the AU yet found itself subject to a different form of bias.

The Commonwealth, though it has rules and regulations, is a relatively fluid organization with no real enforcement mechanism. For this reason, it placed itself as a balanced organization that sent a mixed mission that openly expressed its limitations. Facing the identity crisis of being a European-based organization with multiple African countries, it must address concerns that arise regarding elections carefully. For the Commonwealth, the relationship between its member countries are important. Thus, its concerns echo those of the African organizations rather than its

European counterpart, the EU. This resulted in it being subjected to the special relationship bias.

This chapter gives an idea of the way politics can impact how missions are carried out.

First, it discussed how mission composition can impact how lenient the missions are and what biases they have. Not only how the missions reflect the biases of the organization but as influential actors in their respective states, how they understand “democratic elections” is subjective. This was especially relevant for the smaller, more politically integrated Southern

African nations. Second, these missions all deviate, to an extent, from the EU “standard.”

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However, taking a closer look at the biases of these organizations, one notices that there is a significant overlap. Interestingly, despite their differences in background and agenda, these organizations overlap in terms of their biases. This is important to note because it supports the argument that all organizations, no matter how advanced in their monitoring efforts, face political limitations due to their respective identities. These determinants of behavior may be subject to change with the organization’s political and economic circumstances and the electoral environment of the country under observation. Moving forward to the 2009 and 2014 elections, we observe that priorities and biases shift in response to economic and political pressures. These changes occur as the organizations develop and modify their election observation protocols. It is important to reiterate the complicated nature of election observation where biases risk conflation with limitations in capacity. Paying attention to how organizations articulate their observations given the existing environment is telling. For example, the Commonwealth was clear that its limited capacities would not undermine its mission, and while its report showed leniency in line with its special relationship bias, it suggests that IO interests have as big a role to play in mission behavior as their financial considerations.

The next chapter discusses the 2009 Malawi election and how the organizations tackled the election observation process given their political positions during this time. Five years, especially for the AU, gives the organizations time to develop their mission protocols and address some of challenges faced during this election.

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CHAPTER 9 OBSERVING THE 2009 ELECTION

Introduction

Chapter 8 outlined the dynamics of election observation by the four organizations of interest during the 2004 Malawi election. It offered support for the argument that these organizations operate in a distinct manner from one another and that their behavior depends on their respective mandates and mission goals. However, Chapter 8 also showed that seemingly distinct IOs may share similar biases and behaviors, which is important to note moving forward.

Additionally, it contended that an organization’s limited capacities can be used as an explanation for mission behavior. However, as articulated by SADC officials (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, June 26, 2015), the goal of its missions is to support the national agenda, so in the case of limited financing, the manner in which these funds are allocated matters. This mentality is applicable to all the organizations under investigation. All organizations must make decisions about what to prioritize regardless of financial considerations. In other words, IO intentions during a particular election do matter. For example, in the 2004 election, the EU demonstrated that even as an organization with more resources at its disposal, the decisions it made in mission deployment reflected its mandate to encourage the capacity building of governance structures.

Basically, the point is that the EU has its biases too, which will be further explored in this chapter.

This chapter, then, assesses the observer missions in 2009 to establish whether the trends observed during Malawi’s 2004 continue. Chapters 4-7 outlined the development of the EU, AU,

SADC, and Commonwealth illustrating that these institutions have undergone changes to their policies and regulations relating to election observation. As the organizations, especially the AU and SADC, adopt protocols that are more in line with that of the EU’s election observation

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standards we can expect their behavior to emulate that of the EU. With democracy promotion moving to the forefront on political agendas for these African organizations, their behavior should reflect these shifts in priorities. In addition, as the African organizations sought to establish themselves as major political players, with the increased support of the traditional actors in this area, for example partnerships with the EU, these organizations became more visible over time. That is, as African organizations saw themselves as central to addressing

Africa’s issues, they increasingly began to limit the political space allocated to the Western organizations. Again, due to these changing political relationships, there should be observable shifts in behavior from the previous electoral cycle as a result. Specifically, we will observe the

EU’s move towards a focus on stability while the AU embraces more aspects of the EU’s mission protocol. I begin by briefly discussing the 2009 Malawi election to provide context for these international election observation missions.

Contextualizing the 2009 Election

The 2009 election was wrought with challenges similar to those in 2004. Existing tensions were heightened by the fact that the incumbent, President Bingu wa Mutharika was running for re-election under the banner of a different party than the one with which he won.

Soon after being elected in 2004, Mutharika defected from the United Democratic Front (UDF) and formed his own party, Democratic Progress Party (DPP), following a power struggle with his predecessor, Bakili Muluzi, who had handpicked him for this role (BBC 2005). In response to this challenge to his party, Muluzi sought to run for a third term to reinstate the UDF, citing that the constitution only specified that the President was limited to two subsequent terms and not two in total. This move was challenged by the Supreme Court and eventually blocked (BBC

2002b). The blocking of this motion was considered a move forward in Malawi’s democratic process as it was rare for the judicial system to successfully manage political matters. Still,

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Muluzi’s voiced interest in running for a potential third term further upset the delicate political structure because it undermined the democratic culture being established in the country.

In addition, Mutharika’s defection caused a significant number of ministers to shift parties and pledge their alliance to his new party. The fluidity of the political system led to controversy surrounding Section 65 of the Malawi Constitution.1 The instability of the party system raised real concerns regarding Malawi’s political situation. It was especially concerning given the high level of party fragmentation that already existed following the 2004 election where Mutharika won with a mere 35% of the vote (Patel and Wahman 2015, 81). This fragmentation was further compounded by the lack of confidence in the party system by voters indicated by the rising vote share of independent parliamentary candidates (ibid.). In addition, in an Afrobarometer survey administered soon before the election, 8.3 percent of the population said “not at all” and 16.8 percent stated that that they had “just a little” when asked how much trust they had in the Malawi Electoral Commission (Afrobarometer 2008/2009). On the other hand, 23.5 percent said “somewhat” or “a lot” when asked the same question (ibid.). Regarding trusting the government, 15 percent stated that they did “not at all,” 14.8 percent had “just a little,” 18.4 percent said “somewhat,” while 48 percent said “a lot” (ibid.). The population of respondents who indicated trust in the government is significantly higher at this point than it was

1 Section 65 of the Malawi Constitution states: “1.) The Speaker shall declare vacant the seat of any member of the National Assembly who was, at the time of his or her election, a member of one political party represented in the National Assembly, other than by that member alone but who was voluntarily ceased to be a member of that party and has joined another political party represented in the National Assembly. 2.) Notwithstanding subsection (1), all members of all parties shall have the absolute right to exercise a free vote in any and all proceedings of the National Assembly, and a member shall not have his or her seat declared vacant solely on account of his or her voting contradiction to the recommendations of a political party, represented in the National Assembly, or which he or she is a member (Malawi Constitution 1993). The wording of this section is what caused significant confusion in government given the constant shuffle in party allegiances within the government. The background to this election was that Mutharika was elected as member of the UDF party and with the formation of the DPP, there was a move by several MPs to this new party. His former party cited this law claiming that these moves were illegal. The claim was challenged by the DPP because if proven illegal then all their new members would need to be re-elected leaving the President without a party base. This caused a standstill in government because the opposition was pushing for the resolution of this issue and refused to vote on other matters brought to Parliament (Dissanayake 2011).

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prior to the 2004 election. Still, despite these relatively favorable perceptions of the MEC and the government, as expected, trust in opposition parties was low with 40.7 percent of the surveyed population stating that they had “not at all” and 22.8 percent with “just a little.” On the other hand, 13.5 percent of the population said they had “somewhat” trust in the opposition while 18.8 percent said “a lot.” Patterns were similar in 2003/2004 which indicated a continued apprehension towards political parties in Malawi. However, despite these political tensions, the international organizations present on the ground depicted the electoral process as successful.

Though still tense, the success of the High Court in the case against Muluzi suggested a strengthening of political institutions. This strengthening of governance structures as well as the longer tenure of the African organizations involved in election observation contributed to a different political environment than that of 2004. Thus, the election introduced new challenges and opportunities for the organizations. The following sections explore how the organizations navigated this political space.

The European Union 2009 Election Observation Mission

Strengthening domestic political institutions and supporting economic development remained a priority for the EU during the 2009 election. Specifically, just prior to this election, the Country Strategy for Malawi (2008-2013) was signed between the Malawian Government and the European Union outlining the plans for the use of 605.49 million Euros allocated under the 10th European Development Fund. This plan prioritized improvements to “agricultural production and food security and upgrades to road infrastructure with neighboring countries,” general budget subject, and reforms in education and health. Other focus areas included good governance and institutional capacity-building. The signing of this agreement highlighted the continued financial relationship between the EU and Malawi. Consequently, this election was held amid the backdrop of a push for further and improved economic development. Specifically,

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“the main policy objective is to create wealth through economic growth and infrastructure development as a means of achieving poverty reduction” (European Commission 2013, np). So, while governance remained a focus area, it appeared that significant emphasis was placed on existing and future development projects.

Considering the emphasis on development projects, I expect the EU’s goals to have shifted to reflect this position. So, instead of focusing solely on the capacity of political institutions, the EU is expected to have a more watchful eye on its economic investments. In discussing the drivers of international election-monitoring in Africa, and other regions with developing democracies, a SADC official emphasized two main factors: economic and philanthropic (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). According to this official, economically-motivated IOs seek to protect their investments through the encouragement of stable, legitimate institutions and to ensure unhindered access to natural resources. On the other hand, IOs driven for philanthropic or humanitarian reasons are invested in assisting “humanity across the world” through development aid that promotes a democratic agenda (ibid.). Yet, even these organizations are not completely altruistic where there is “nothing for mahala (free)” and thus political interests still drive their behavior (ibid.). The EU as a principal donor and election observer straddles this blurry distinction. As a result, I expect the EU to send an even bigger mission and make the concerted effort to visit all districts. By visiting all electoral districts and a higher number of polling booths, the EU mission will be in a better place to evaluate development efforts on the ground.

In addition, I expect the collaboration with other EU actors on the ground to continue considering its economic and political investments in the country. Given this mindset, the EU mission is more likely to be subjected to the subtlety and stability biases, biases that prioritize

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keeping the peace at the national level even if doing so means ignoring occurrences of fraud on polling day or downplaying areas that may cause political disruptions. In other words, I expect the EU’s prioritization of its development projects and the instability that followed the 2004 election and led into the 2009 elections to move the IO away from the progress bias that characterized its 2004 mission. By focusing on more egregious forms of fraud, like registration and ballot counting, the EU is able to attribute electoral challenges to areas that cannot be ignored but in all do not show signs of undermining the process allowing the population to freely cast its vote. The ability for citizens to freely cast their vote is essential to maintaining stability during an election process.

The European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was present in Malawi from April 7 to June 13, 2009 following invitations to monitor the election from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC). The mission was led by Luisa

Morgantini, Vice-President and Member of the European Parliament. As expected, this mission was larger than the previous one, with 77 observers from 23 EU states, and Norway, deployed to all 28 districts to “assess the electoral process against international and regional standards for elections as well as the laws of Malawi” (EU EOM 2009, 3). The EU mission, as with previous ones, emphasized its independence and how its monitoring process adhered to the Declaration of

Principles for International Election Observation signed by multiple organizations in 2005. The

EU, as discussed previously, must maintain its image of political distance from elections due to its significant economic presence in the country. Therefore, its mission must emphasize that it is there in its capacity as an international organization to monitor elections by the guidelines to which the international community has subscribed. However, this does not diminish its political interests in the outcomes of the process but it does impact how it behaves and interacts with

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other political stakeholders on the ground. Unlike the African organizations, who are permitted a certain familiarity during elections in member states, the EU must maintain a clear distance from the process.

First, the observer report acknowledges the uncertain environment in which this election took place and notes that despite the election being held “in an environment in which fundamental freedoms and rights of assembly, expression, and movement have been generally respected,” there was an overarching lack of confidence in the MEC’s ability to manage the election (EU EOM 2009, 3). Though not a direct challenge to the MEC, this statement draws attention to the instability of the political environment. The EU EOM also drew attention to the role played by other domestic actors. This was important because it indicated the EU’s interest in incorporating other political actors to hold the existing institutions accountable. Accountability is the only way to ensure that its development projects remain viable and it is helpful to have other stakeholders involved in this process. In addition, maintaining accountability is integral to maintaining political stability during an election.

In line with these efforts to promote stability by not focusing on major faults in the polling process, the EU EOM noted that civil society organizations, alongside international actors, played an important role during this election, especially when it came to increasing transparency at polling stations and during the counting and aggregation process. Given the lack of faith in the MEC, domestic observers were crucial in instilling confidence in the electoral process. In addition, these organizations sought to broaden the debate by publishing their own manifesto for civil society. Election monitors were deployed to almost all polling station in the country. The majority of these monitors were deployed by NICE, which deployed 4,200 monitors, and MESN, which deployed 1,400 monitors (EU EOM 2009, 20). This occurrence is

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important because it highlights the inclusion of other actors and the opening of Malawi’s political space which not only allows the EU to operate but allows organizations like the AU and

SADC to challenge the shortcomings of a fellow member state. This political openness is thus important for both the country itself as well as for election observation on the continent. For the

EU, the integration of domestic observers is important because it contributes to civil society groups as part of its democracy assistance programs. This support has been given through efforts like the Capacity Building for Non-State Actors (NSOs) Programme established in 2006 (ended in 2011); the Civil Society and Local Authorities instrument, and the European Instrument for

Democracy and Human Rights (EEAS 2016d, np).

Considering this political background, the EU observers visited 471 polling stations in

125 of the 193 constituencies (EU EOM 2009, 3). Interestingly, this mission visited 89 polling stations less than the previous mission despite having about 20 more people. This deployment strategy suggests a more focused approach by the EU, where by concentrating its missions it was able to monitor a wider area. However, one notable factor in this report is how apolitical it was compared to the previous report. There are no details on deployment decisions and the EU is quite vague as to what the circumstances surrounding the election meant for the democratic process in Malawi, which was alluded to in the 2004 election. Given the previous report, this is surprising but it also lends support for the argument that the EU was focused on stability, a focus that might require providing less information, to avoid criticism on the part of local actors.

In addition, the report is heavily focused on providing a background to the election and summarizing the mission’s findings, with no extra information, and refrains from directly addressing the Malawi Government. The tone of this mission shifted from that in 2004 where the mission’s energies were directed towards political capacity building. While there was the overall

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sense that the election was problematic, the only indicator of this are the lengthy recommendations provided under Election Administration (EU EOM 2009, 26-28). The report outlines various stages of the electoral process and the areas that proved problematic: the political context; the legal framework; electoral system; election administration; candidate registration; gender; human rights; and the media. These are all areas of the election that involve issues that occur prior to election day, lending support for the argument that the EU was subject to the subtlety bias. Apart from these recommendations, there was no direct challenge to the integrity of the process. This neutrality is noteworthy because it supports the argument that the

EU was focused on ensuring the stability of the country during this election. It is also worth mentioning that, despite not challenging the process in 2009, the EU still felt the need to implement a follow-up mission to establish its expectations for the 2014 election. This mission was the first of its kind. Officially, Malawi was selected due to having hosted EU observer missions in the past but, considering EU investments in the country, its interests are wide- ranging (EU EOM 2012, 5).

The primary goals of the follow-up mission were to assess the “status, usefulness, and viability of EU EOM recommendations” and hold a roundtable to discuss the implementation of existing measures (EU EOM 2012, 10). The AU based its 2014 election follow-up mission to

Malawi in 2015 on this EU incentive. The follow-up mission highlights how the EU positions itself as a development partner. For this organization that prioritizes neutrality or the appearance of it, it was unable to directly challenge the government during the election. Maintaining political stability required that its observer mission not make statements that may be used by the opposition to rationalize disruptive behavior. However, the introduction of the follow-up mission provided an avenue to do so and one can see the benefit that such a mission would have for the

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AU as well. As an organization committed to continental unity and cooperation, it will be interesting to explore the circumstances that moved it to adopt an avenue to communication outside the limitations of an election observation mission. These dynamics are discussed in

Chapter 10.

The EU’s dissatisfaction with Malawi’s progress was directly linked to the increased level of economic support being given to the country. By carrying out this follow-up mission, the

EU showed that it was not satisfied with the progress Malawi was making in terms of its development and was able to use the challenges with good governance and democratization to tackle this issue. As such, this mission, along with the introduction of a mid-election follow-up mission, set the stage for an increased EU presence. This increased presence reflects the institution’s growing economic and political presence in Malawi. There is a valid concern, as echoed in the agreements between the EU and Malawi, that issues with governance directly impact the integrity of the economic projects in place.

Recent adoption of the 10th European Development Fund, highlighting the EU's continued commitment to support development efforts in Malawi

Importance placed on the outcome of these investments and priorization of improving financial management of aid

Larger mission was sent to these elections, highlighting that more was at stake and that more finances has been allocated to the mission

Concerns of stability given the political situation in the country and preservation of the development projects. The EU also did not want to be viewed as undermining the process in anyway given its economic ties to the state.

Stability and Subtlety Biases

Figure 9-1. Determinants of EU Mission Bias in the 2009 Election

The 2009 election highlighted the continuation and, to an extent, escalation of bias on the part of the EU mission in Malawi. Unable to observe improvements in areas of concern, the

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organization sought to increase its reach within the country through a larger, more comprehensive mission and with the introduction of a follow-up mission where deemed necessary. Consequently, this section highlighted the EU’s subjectivity to the subtlety and stability biases as it was clear that its main goals were to maintain the grounds for successful development programs and not undermine the country in which it had significant investments.

During this same time period, the AU, like the EU, was increasingly pushing for the increased adoption of democratic norms and emphasized member state stability, though not for the same reasons as the EU. Rather, the AU was mainly focused on aligning itself with the political agendas of AU member states. While this position still advocated for democratic institutions, the process was much more incremental as it was not of the utmost importance. With many countries in Africa holding their third, or fourth, multiparty elections, maintaining the

Union through these political transitions was more important than the outcome of the election.

This is especially true considering that countries like Zimbabwe and Uganda have been led by the same leaders since the introduction of multiparty elections. Presidents Robert Mugabe and

Yoweri Museveni, respectively, have longstanding ties with the organization, and along with their counterparts may not support true efforts to install democratic institutions.2 Rather, it was easier to focus the agenda on issues that all members could support and maintain the image that these member states were moving towards a more democratic union. The next section outlines the AU mission and how it navigated the political environment during the 2009 election.

The African Union 2009 Election Observation Mission

The AU’s financial challenges continued in 2009 with the unpredictability of program funding due to the insufficient contributions by member states. As discussed in Chapter 5,

2 The list of presidents that have been in power long enough to make their political mark on the AU include Equatorial Guinea’s Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (37 years); Angola’s Jose Eduardo dos Santos (37 years before stepping down in August 2017) and Paul Biya (34 years) (Hanna 2017, np).

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financing AU programs and election observation, more specifically, was a constant challenge for the organization. Moving into Malawi’s election, the organization sought to establish ways to continue financing its initiatives on the continent: “it is crucial for the Union to have predictable resources from credible and regular sources of financing to avoid the hazards of the recurrent phenomenon of contribution arrears which seriously hamper the effective implementation of approved programmes” (AU 2009a, 1). There were also measures put in place to make the organization more fiscally responsible along with finding alternate funding sources (AU 2009,

1). Namely, there was a study on Alternative Sources of Financing for the African Union and the

Report of the Extraordinary Conference of African Ministers of Economy and Finance (CAMEF) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on January 14, 2009, putting in place mechanisms to encourage fundraising efforts on the part of Member States (AU 2009, 1, Assembly/AU/Dec.214(XII)).

Still, the move towards expanding the organization’s mandate, establishing continental legal frameworks, promoting maternal, infant and child healthy and development, and addressing the financial and economic crisis in the international financial system, along with other areas, placed a significant strain on AU resources (ibid.).

The budget set aside for the African Union Commission, in charge of political programming was $62,692, 472, approximately 45% of the organization’s total budget (AU

2009, 1). In 2009, there were thirteen countries that held presidential and/or parliamentary elections, and would potentially require observation, for which the budget would be allocated from the AU’s political programming fund.3 Considering that the European Union (EU) has an average annual budget of 38 million Euro for election observation and deploys about 10 full missions, consisting of a core team along with long- and short-term observers, one can see the

3 The thirteen countries that held elections in 2009 were Algeria, Botswana, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Somaliland, South Africa, and Tunisia (NDI 2017).

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fiscal deficit at which the AU is operating (European Commission 2016c, np). Despite these financial challenges, the organization pushed its agenda for democracy across its member states and encouraged partnerships, namely with the EU, to support these financing efforts to assure that programs are funded. Furthermore, a stable and democratic Union would help the AU gain support in its efforts to participate in G84 programs to reform the financial system (ibid.). These are organizations and countries that prioritize good governance in their development efforts. So, for the AU, maintaining these special relationships was the goal, taking relative precedence over objectivity during this election. As a result, I expect the AU’s mission to be subject to the progress bias, which reflects the organization’s goal of establishing itself as a key partner in democratic efforts on the continent. I also expect to observe evidence of the stability bias as the

AU uses its mission as a means of preserving the peace within the country and organizational unity. These biases overlap with those of the EU in 2004, highlighting the progression of the AU missions over time as it increasingly aligns itself with EU standards.

The 2009 AU Election Observation Mission, as with the previous 2004 AUEOM, was deployed in keeping with the Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in

Africa by the AUC Chairperson, H.E. Mr. Jean Ping. Going into this election, the AU was aware of the “political challenges Malawi faced…and the prevalent disharmony amongst its political actors that threatened to undermine the democratic gains the country has already made”

(AUEOM 2009, 1). Coming into this electoral period, the level of distrust in the electoral commission had decreased from 52 to 25 percent, with a similar trend in terms of trust in the president (down from 48 to 19 percent). Still, despite this decrease in level of distrust in the

4 The G8 or the “Group of Eight” countries, now G7 following Russia’s exit in 2017 following its suspension in 2014 over its annexation of Crimea, refers to the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Japan, Italy, and Russia (Batchelor 2017).

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electoral commission and president, there were changes in the level of satisfaction with democracy in the country between the 2004 and 2009 elections.

The level of satisfaction with democracy in Malawi saw some fluctuation in the two surveys taken between the 2004 and 2009 elections: in 2005/2006, 69.4 percent of the sampled population found that the country was not a democracy or they were not all or not very satisfied with democracy in the country which dropped to 38 percent just prior to the 2009 election

(Afrobarometer 2005/2006, 2008/2009). Despite the increase in trust, and in the number of respondents that considered Malawi a democracy, the period after the 2004 election highlighted the challenges that the electoral process faced and the subsequent need for reform. These numbers emphasized the political instability that existed moving into the 2009 election. For this reason, the observer mission was preceded by a High-Level Mission to Malawi and by Mr. Ping, just prior to the deployment of the Mission. The AU saw the need to intervene in order to ensure that the election was successful.

AU High-Level Missions are sent to countries facing political turmoil to address security concerns. The fact that the AU dispatched such a mission indicates the difficulty of the domestic situation at the time and the level of engagement that the organization has with the country.

Namely, the presence of this mission echoed the democratic sentiment outlined in the

Chairperson and Executive Council reports released during this period. However, the calls for democracy were still undermined by the political realities at the organizational level. Member countries were focused on ensuring the political stability of the AU to preserve the relationships with development partners. With the deployment of the High-Level mission, we see the AU employing the democracy rhetoric to signal to the international community that it was committed to this agenda and to signal to the Malawian population that the stability of their country was its

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priority. This situation illustrates how election observation can be used to express the political agendas and priorities of international organizations. However, the conflicted nature of the organization given its priorities highlights how these political tensions can influence mission operations.

The High-Level mission was headed by the former Mozambican president, Mr. Joaquim

Chissano and former Ghanaian president, Mr. John Kufuor. Both presidents were known for their roles in democratizing their respective countries, again lending support to the AU’s move towards the deployment of missions that reflect its expressed commitment to encouraging democratic norms in its member states (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2017, Foster 2011). The mission was deployed to Malawi from February 20th to 26th to meet with President Bingu wa Mutharika, former President Bakili Muluzi, and other political leaders and stakeholders.5 The aim of these consultations was to assess and determine the political situation in Malawi (AU 2009, 5).

Specifically, the mission sought to use these meetings as a means of identifying areas of political agreement and discord, to facilitate dialogue between the two major parties, diffuse tensions that may lead to violence, and to establish an understanding from the various political parties and stakeholders to ensure the necessary restraint for peaceful election (ibid., 5). Given the political situation caused by President Mutharika’s defection and Muluzi’s expressed interest in running for a third term, the AU mission was aware that there were unresolved issues that may result in political violence. It was imperative that the AU manage these tensions to ensure Malawi’s democratic progression.

5 Other key leaders were the Hon. John Tembo (leader of MCP), Mr. Kamuzu Chibambo (leader of the People’s Transformation Party (PETRA)) and Mr. Dindi Nyasulu (leader of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) Party)). Further, the High-Level Mission also met with the MEC, its Chairperson, Justice Anastasia Msosa, and His Lordship the Chief Justice of the Republic of Malawi, Justice Lovemore Munlo. Further, the delegation met with civil society leaders, the African Ambassadors and High Commissioners resident in Lilongwe.

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With these concerns in mind, the High-Level mission held a second round of consults with President Bingu Wa Mutharika, former president Bakili Muluzi and the Malawi Electoral

Commission. President Mutharika reiterated the Malawian government’s commitment to

“credible, free and fair elections” and engaging in productive dialogue with party leaders to address their current difficulties (AUEOM 2009, 5). The aim of these conversations was to establish the AU’s expectations during the upcoming election and ensure that all parties could work together to make them run smoothly.

Prior to its departure, the High-Level mission “appealed to Malawians to exercise maximum restraint to avoid escalation of tension, and to pursue all issues of disagreement through dialogue and due process of law” and highlighted “flashpoints” that risked undermining the country’s peace, security, and stability. Avoiding these “flashpoints” meant the creation of an environment conducive to holding a free and fair election, adhering to the rule of law, leveling the political playing field, and addressing the political hostilities between the various political parties (AUEOM 2009, 6). To emphasize the importance of the visit, the High-Level mission was followed by the AUC Chairperson, Jean Ping, who was in Malawi soon before the election.

The High-Level mission, along with a visit from the Mr. Ping, was notable because it established a landmark foundation for the participation of the AU Observer Mission to the May 2009

Malawi Presidential and Parliamentary elections (ibid.). With this “democracy first” attitude, one would expect that the AU mission shift its protocol from the last election and expand its reach by observing the process in a higher number of electoral districts.

The observer mission was headed by former President of the Republic of Sierra Leone,

Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, along with 21 other high profile personalities from other member countries. The other members of the observer team were Mr. Teshome Gabre-Mariam, Mr.

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Robert Patrick Conteh, Edward Nyalay, Hon. Professor W. Ogenga-Latigo (Member of

Parliament and Leader of Opposition, Uganda), Hon. Kadeh Mamma (Member of Parliament and Member of Pan-African Parliament, The Gambia), Hon. Mooka Maitlhoko (Member of

Parliament, Zambia), H.E. Prof (Ambassador to Malawi, Nigeria),6 H.E. Wilfred Emvula

(Ambassador to the African Union, Namibia), H.E. Qerty Kwesi (Ambassador to the African

Union, Ghana), Amb. Bala Sana (former Diplomat, Nigeria), Rev. Simane (Civil Society

Organization, Botswana), Mr. Nour Edine Dris, former International Civil Servant, Algeria), Mr.

Leshele Thoahlane, Mr. Steve Ngwenya, Mr. John Munuve, Mr. Theophilus Gambe, Mr. F.

Shindige, and Mr. Chefeke Desalegn (AU EOM 2009, 7). The composition of this mission indicated a keen regional interest in the process due to the standing of these members, all influential members of their respective nations. These are not electoral observers recruited solely on their experience monitoring elections. Rather, these are actors with political clout and leverage at the continental level. The potential for political influence of these actors supports the argument that the AU was heavily invested in the outcome of this process from an international standpoint. In addition, former Sierra Leonean president, Dr. Kabbah, attributed with establishing peace in Sierra Leone and installing democratic institutions after the end of the civil war, was an advocate of peace and stability in the region (Agence France Presse 2014, BBC

2014b). As indicated by the biases of this mission, the political leanings of the mission’s leadership do influence mission behaviors.

In support of this mission, a four-member Secretariat, headed by Ms. Shumbana Karume, was created. The Secretariat team arrived on May 5, 2009 and was based at the Sunbird Mount

Soche Hotel, Blantyre. The rest of the team arrived on the 11th and 12th (AUEOM 2009, 7). Upon

6 The full name of this observer is not provided in the text and was most likely an oversight on the part of the ones compiling the report.

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arrival, the AU observer mission created a program of activities that covered both the pre-polling and polling phases. This program included preparation and dissemination of the Mission Arrival

Statement; pre-polling consultations and assessment of the electoral process; field deployment to observe the election; preparation and issuance of the Preliminary Observations Report; and preparation and submission of the Final Mission Report to the African Union Commission (ibid.

16).

The pre-polling phase was important in gauging the political climate considering the previously observed trends in Malawi. During this period, the mission was mainly concerned with accreditation, consultations with the MEC and various stakeholders, analysis of relevant electoral materials, and preparation for field deployment. It met and discussed issues with MEC officials to gain an understanding of the arrangements that had been made regarding election management. In addition to the MEC, it met with political parties to learn more about the process from their perspective and identity areas that would require further attention. Further, the mission attended several campaign rallies held in Blantyre and assessed the access to media by political parties to establish the democratic space granted to key actors (AUEOM 2009, 17). From these interactions, the mission noted that the MEC was facing serious challenges from opposition parties claiming that the President violated the constitution in his appointment of the MEC commissions. In addition, the MEC’s funding had not yet been issued and as a result, the appointed Commissioners were unable to undertake their responsibilities. This severely undermined their ability to ensure “smooth and free elections” (ibid., 15). Though the MEC is considered an independent electoral commission, it is reliant upon the government for its operational funding. As a result, it often faces difficulties when it comes to electoral management and must rely upon external donors to ensure that the process is not completely undermined. This

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reliance on external financiers severely limits its ability to operate efficiently and creates an attitude of resentment towards the government and international donors (Field Notes, Blantyre,

Malawi, June 2013).

This resentment on the part of key actors like the MEC made all interactions between the political stakeholders during the process more difficult. There were issues in formal communication between the MEC, political parties, and the AU observer mission. In the period prior to the election, there was the constant lack of response to inquiries, which heightened the already existing tensions. These tensions were further compounded by the challenges of election management: voter registration, voter list availability, and suspicious political parties (AUEOM

2009, 15). With an awareness of these issues, the AU mission was deployed to its respective areas.

For this mission, 22 members were deployed on May 16th, 2009 to all the provinces in

Malawi: Two observers were sent to the Districts of Blantyre; six were deployed to Mulanje and

Thyolo, and three monitored the polling in Zomba for a total of 11 observers in the Southern

Region. Two observers were sent to Mangochi in the Eastern region with the remaining ten deployed to Lilongwe and Kasungu in the Central region. The mission was similar in size to the previous one (in 2004), but this time the report noted that the deployment schedule took into account the size and population of the region in an effort to get a representative sample of the

Malawian political landscape, how elections were organized and conducted, and how the voters were tabulated and consolidated (AU EOM 2009, 14). There appeared to have been an effort by the mission to not let its financial limitations undermine the process. The attempts to ensure that the polling stations monitored were a representative sample harkens back to the argument that organizations use their financial limitations as a cover for their respective biases. As seen in this

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case, there are ways in which the missions can navigate these challenges if in line with the interests of their institution. Unlike the 2004 mission, the observers in 2009 seemed to be much more aware of what was at stake with this election as there was no mention of its deployment process in the previous reports. Once in the field, the mission was tasked with verifying the pre- election conditions and familiarizing themselves with the electoral constituencies and officials prior to polling. To further establish the political environment, the mission spent the days prior to the election talking to election officials, the media, and district commissions (who served as the district level coordinators of the electoral process) (ibid.).

All members arrived at their first polling station before 6 am on polling day to observe the start of the voting process. The mission visited over 240 polling stations in 24 electoral districts in the three regions. So, despite its limited number of observers, the mission covered more electoral districts than it had in the previous election. The AU’s ability to deploy its observers to a wider area lends support to the fact that its decision to limit the constituencies in the 2004 election was a conscious one. The AU is consistent in the sending of its monitors and works closely with the local stakeholders (Interview, Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015).

This familiarity allows it the ability to request additional support where necessary. As suggested, by its actions prior to the election, the AU was positioning itself as a supporter of democratic norms and demonstrating its commitment through the strengthening of its missions moving it closer in line with EU and Western standards, making its appeals for financial support by these actors more likely.

The AU mission noted the presence of other observers at various polling stations throughout the day. These missions included monitors from the European Union, GTZ, the

Dutch Embassy, the British High Commission, Common Market of East and Southern African

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States (COMESA), SADC Election Commissions Forum, SADC Parliamentary Forum, the

Commonwealth, and the United States Embassy. Local observers were The National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), along with Red Cross staff to assist with first aid provision (AU EOM 2009, 22).

Upon completion of its mission, the AU mission reported that “overall the elections went smoothly without serious incidences” with no reported complaints on the part of voters or party agents and no reports of anomalies (AU EOM 2009, 23). Additionally, the mission found the election to be “efficient” and that it was conducted in a “free and open atmosphere (ibid. 24).

However, the monitors noted that though there were no major transgressions that severely undermined the election or any cases of interference or intimidation, there were issues that require future attention from the MEC and all electoral stakeholders. First, it found that the number of voters was not proportionate to the number of polling stations which led to long wait times, because while the well-operated stations were expected to handle 400 to 600, the number tended to exceed 1000. Second, even though most stations observed had the required material when they opened, the voter register was not always made available on time for examination.

Third, the observers noted inconsistencies in the timing of the vote count with some regions starting the count as soon as the polls closed (6 pm) with others starting at 8 pm. Fourth, the mission noted high voter turnout in all polling centers with a few centers recording higher number of votes cast than the number of registered voters at that center. Still, this was not considered a concern due to provisions in that law that allowed registered voters to vote at centers other than the one at which they are registered. Last, it noted the clear need for additional training to limit the delays during ballot sorting and counting (ibid.).

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It is important to note these criticisms from the AU mission because they are a departure from the report issued after the 2004 election that seemingly held back on its level of criticism.

This report resembles the EU’s 2004 and 2009 ones in that it sought to highlight key areas of concerns that would need to be addressed prior to the 2014 election. Like the EU’s missions, the

AU, though not in as much detail, focused on areas in which the election could be improved.

Following this discussion on the election’s shortcomings, the mission then proceeded to offer recommendations on how these issues could be addressed moving forward. The breadth of these recommendations in comparison to the limited discussion in the 2004 report lends support to the argument that the AU increased the capacity of this particular mission. The AU seemed determined to support its fellow member state as it moved towards democratic consolidation and highlight avenues for improvement. Overall, despite the noted shortcomings, the mission was happy with how the election was carried out and commended the people of Malawi, the MEC, and all the political parties for participating in a very successful poll (AU EOM 2009, 26).

Notably, following these recommendations, the AU included a directive to itself on how to improve its process in the future:

The AU should beef up its election observation capacity, by deploying in good time, to avoid last minute rush. It was observed, for example, that most observer missions in Malawi had arrived 30 days before election day, while the AU Mission came 9 days before polling (AU EOM 2009, 25).

This personal directive is not standard practice given that these reports are meant for consumption by the various political stakeholders. By highlighting its own shortcomings, the organization indicated an increased shift in its position in terms of how it carries out missions. It is clear that the AU mission is comparing itself to the more established EU, whose LTOs typically arrive five weeks prior to polling and are preceded by the service provider team, Chief

Observer and core team by one to three weeks. So, the EU is usually present in country up to

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eight weeks prior to election day. As discussed in earlier chapters, this EU model serves as the standard for election observation. Even in the report, we observe a more detailed, though not as complete as the EU report, as to who attended the mission and the areas to which they were deployed. This highlights a change in the political environment and the organization itself. In the

2014 election, we will observe this continued shift in the AU’s role as an important actor in election observation.

Sought alternative ways of financing to supplement the lack of member contributions

Worked on establishing partnerships for democracy assistance efforts with donor organizations like the EU

Higher level of political involvement leading into and during the election

Bound by the committments made in agreements with partner organizations but also limited by the goal of maintaining peace considering the political situation in Malawi and within the continent

Progress and Stability Bias

Figure 9-2. Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2009 Election

Prior to the 2004 election, the AU was starting to establish itself, with the transition from the OAU in 2002 and the adoption of the major documents soon after. However, as indicated in

Chapter 5, the period between 2004 and 2009 was a transformative one for the organization where it sought to push members to be more democratic, instill measures that encouraged democracy during program implementation, and create bodies and mechanisms to enforce these initiatives. This was evident in the deployment patterns employed during this period. These deployment patterns and subsequent report indicated the AU’s willingness to engage with its mandate. However, despite the increased commitment to its mandate, considering the tense nature of this election, its mission understood the importance of political stability in the country and within the organization, in moving forward with its democratic agenda. The AU is acutely

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aware that “without peace and security there is nothing” (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30,

2014). For these reasons, its behavior during the 2009 election was in line with its inherent progress and stability biases. These biases were evident in the composition of its high-profile mission, its continued efforts to ensure that the country remained stable to allow for the involvement of outside actors and the articulation of its concerns with the current state of election observation by the organization.

The following section examines how the SADC mission managed its election observation process during the election. It takes into account the challenges raised by the tense environment and its implications for the organization that shares an unparalleled proximity to Malawi.

Southern African Development Community 2009 Observer Mission

SADC has always been a key advocate for stability in the Southern African region with the prioritization of peace and security in the region (SADC 2001). With the tensions building in the 2009 Malawi election, this goal remained at the forefront of its mission. This mission was deployed against the backdrop of the political crises in Zimbabwe (March 2008) and Madagascar

(March 2009) so avoiding further political disruption within the region was critical (Cawthra

2010). To this effect, unlike the 2004 election, SADC’s presence was clear and documented in

2009, and it was apparent that the other missions dispatched under the SADC umbrella were there to support the mission and not take the leading role as SADC PF did in 2004. This increased visibility on the part of the organization reflects the changing political environment and the need for SADC to execute its mandate. Here, SADC prioritized its role as insurer of political stability in the region and I expect it to be subject to the stability bias. So far, the EU and AU have also shown a propensity for stability indicating that IOs expected to act differently from one another can often behave in the same manner where different causes yield similar outcomes.

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The SADC Electoral Observer Mission to Republic of Malawi (SEOM) was invited by

Malawi to observe its election held on May 19, 2009. Upon receipt of the invitation, a mission was constituted by the Chairperson of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security

Cooperation, King Mswati III of Swaziland. SADC Executive Secretary, Dr. Tomáz Salomão, was then placed in charge of the administrative and logistical support for the mission (SEOM

2009, 2). The mission itself was headed by Magobetane Patrick Mamba, Minister of Labour and

Social Security of the Kingdom of Swaziland and was officially launched on May 11, 2017

(ibid.). Unlike the leadership of the AU mission, Mamba hailed from a country known for its restrictions on civil liberties and political rights. For example, Swaziland only held its first parliamentary elections in November 2008 as expected under its 2006 constitution.

Unfortunately, while these elections were peaceful, political parties were banned and the

“legislature was unable to initiate legislation” (Freedom House 2017). So, this suggests that the mission was present in solidarity with a fellow member state, not to emphasize an adherence to democratic norms. Yet, SADC’s Executive Secretary, Dr. Tomáz Salomão, during the launch, pointed out that Malawi had “demonstrated [its] commitment and adherence to the consolidation of democratic processes” and the observers were being deployed to monitor the election “as a way of showing support to the people of Malawi as they undertake the democratic process”

(Mkandawire 2009). Here, we see the Executive Secretary maintaining an image for the sake of the Malawian population, as involving the population was SADC’s way of gaining legitimacy and ensuring a peaceful process (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). However, this statement made by Salomão indicates the discordance between the SADC Secretariat and the

Heads of Government, because as will be observed in this election and given the political dynamic in the region, stability remains a focus throughout. The stability bias introduced by the

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Head of Mission, Mamba, echoed that of his dispatching country, and overrode any apparent adherence to democratic norms. Still, Salomão’s assertion emphasizes the importance of rhetoric in IO behavior in managing perceptions with the monitored population and within the IO itself. It also illustrates how IOs can use this rhetoric to signal their intentions to each other.

Another indicator that the mission was present to support Malawi’s stability is that prior to the mission’s deployment, there was an advance team present in Malawi made up of diplomatic and consular missions accredited to the Republic of Malawi (SEOM 2009, 6). This advance team “laid the foundation for the formal and institutional electoral observation mission”

(ibid.). The presence of an advance team granted SADC information regarding the political situation on the ground prior to arrival. So, its mission was privy to information that would enable it to act and dispatch its teams where it saw fit. This team was able to establish which areas were problematic prior to polling day and keep track of issues as they arose. As representatives of other SADC countries in Malawi, this advance team is able to facilitate the mission due to their proximity. This relationship is one that the EU and the Commonwealth, along with the AU to a lesser degree, are not privy to. Though the establishment of an advance mission may send the message that SADC is shifting its focus to democracy, the concern with regional stability during this time was considerable, and considering that SADC never made the full report available for “political reasons,” one must question its intentions and ability to move beyond its “regional politicking” (Field Notes, Gaborone, Botswana, June 2015, Interview,

Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11, 2014).

Prior to the election, the SADC mission met with several stakeholders to assess the electoral process in its entirety. These stakeholders included incumbent President Bingu wa

Mutharika; SADC High Commissioners and Ambassadors accredited to Malawi (who also

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served as the advance team); members of the diplomatic corps; government ministries; the

Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC); the Malawi Council of Churches; the Council of Non-

Governmental Organizations in Malawi (CONGOMA); Malawi Chapter of the Media Institute of

Southern Africa (MISA); all political parties contesting in the election; and other international election monitoring organizations, including observer groups from the SADC region (SEOM

2009, 3).

Deriving its mandate from the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic

Elections, the mission was deployed to all three regions: North, Central, and South. This deployment pattern was to allow the mission to observe all the electoral districts (SEOM 2009,

5). In addition, “field teams were created and given the responsibility to cover their areas of deployment so that the Mission could have a full picture of the electoral process in the country and be in a position to provide an informed assessment” (ibid., 5). The mission consisted of 77 observers from SADC member states and included members of parliament, civil servants, and representatives from civil society. All their activities were coordinated by the Operations Centre based at the Sunbird Capital Hotel in Lilongwe, Malawi. This center was staffed with officials from the Troika of the Organ and the SADC Secretariat (ibid., 6).

The difference in the nature of the 2004 mission is apparent in that the special relationships among the member states in the previous election, where the goal was to preserve the organization and protect a fellow member state, was no longer being applied. In this election, the mission was concerned with ensuring that it is able to maintain stability in the region, and thus it was quick to establish a sense of comradery with the country but not in order to protect the member states but rather to let the citizens know that it was available to them. In addition, it was clear in stating why this election was credible rather than stating that the election was “free

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and fair” without providing context. The effort to offer a clearer statement is important because it provides a semblance of credibility. In a statement, the head of the mission expressed the mission’s gratitude at being able to share their observations with the country and congratulated the “people of Malawi for holding credible, peaceful and free elections on 19 May 2009” (SEOM

2009, 11). He further stated that,

[T]he way that the people of Malawi have been able to express their will in an expressively instructive manner is a valuable contribution for the consolidation of democracy and political stability, not only in Malawi but in the SADC region as well as in the African continent at large (ibid.).

Knowing that the election was not entirely free of challenges, it is clear that this statement was made to overemphasize that fact that polling day went smoothly. For SADC, as with the previous election, the ability to vote assures stability and moving beyond a successful election was not a priority at the time. Again, emphasizing that the organization is focused on supporting the “national agenda” of its member countries despite what this might mean for regime type, because as observed in the case of Mugabe and Zimbabwe, the “national agenda” may be to stay in office as long as possible.

For this reason, the final report was once again not made available to the public because it contained “sensitive” information. Manipulation of observer reports is an accusation that has been made towards SADC missions, where reports are not shared or altered if they fail to serve the organization’s purpose at the time (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana July 9, 2015; Maudeni et al. 2016). So, despite its presence in this election and their clear opinion on the results as stated in the preliminary statement on the results, no further information can be found.7 The mission’s concern ended with the successful holding of peaceful elections. The fact that the mission did not make the report available, as is common practice by other IOs, completely undermined any

7 During my fieldwork in Botswana, I was asked to consider why an organization such as SADC would consider documents that should be made available to all relevant stakeholders to be too “sensitive.”

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semblance that the mission may have been leading towards supporting or encouraging democracy. Here, we observe the true dynamic of SADC election observation alluded to previously: the Secretariat’s position can easily be undermined by the Heads of State and prominent members of Government. As mentioned earlier, this is an example of SADC’s engagement in “regional politicking” (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11, 2014).

The ECF-SADC was also present at this election and consisted of electoral commissioners from Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,

Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (ECF-SADC 2009, 6). Their presence provides further insights into how the election was perceived at the regional level. In addition, ECF-SADC, given its emphasis on supporting governance institutions (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 25,

2015), is expected to share SADC’s stability. As partner organizations that work to attain

“common goals,” there tends to be an alignment in attitudes and behavior especially given ECF-

SADC’s interest in supporting a fellow Electoral Commission in the execution of its mandate to hold a credible election.

Like SADC, ECF-SADC missions obtain their mandate from The Principles of Electoral

Management, Monitoring and Observation (PEMMO), a joint effort between the Electoral

Commissions Forum, and Electoral Institution of Southern Africa (EISA). ECF-SADC was invited by the Malawi Electoral Commission on June 15th, 2008 to observe the 2009 election and agreed to deploy a 22-member observer mission (ECF-SADC 2009, 5). The first members of this mission, headed by Mr. Lazarus Shatipamba, a Commissioner at the Electoral Commission of

Namibia, arrived in Blantyre, Malawi (ibid., 6). The mission was accredited by the MEC along with the other international and local observers. This included the filling of application forms along with passport-sized photos and a fee of $100 per applicant. However, the ECF-SADC was

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the only observer mission to be exempted from paying this fee due to its composition as a group of the MEC’s peers (ibid., 20).

The mission was deployed to two of the three regions. Four teams were sent to the

Southern Region: Blantyre, Chikwawa, Mwanza, Neno, Balaka, Zomba, Chiradzulu, Thyolo, and

Mulanje while three teams covered the Central Region: Lilongwe, Mchinji, Dowa, and Salima.

These teams were in the field for five days, including pre-polling day visits within their assigned districts to familiarize themselves with the location of the polling stations, assess the election preparations, and observe all pre-election activities (ECF-SADC 2009, 6). As discussed in

Chapter 6, ECF-SADC serves as more of a support mission to the SADC organization than a strong standalone observation mission. Consisting of the members of the Electoral Commissions in the region, its presence also serves as a learning opportunity for other EMBs. This practice of learning from the processes of other countries in the region is common, with MEC

Commissioners having travelled to more established countries like Botswana and South Africa to more problematic elections in Zimbabwe and Kenya to see what they can learn from (Interview in Blantyre, Malawi, September 23, 2015). However, interestingly ECF-SADC is more open to challenging the status quo and pointed out some of the serious issues with the electoral process.

So, while it positions itself as a support mission, it is clear that ECF-SADC does also deviate from SADC’s “norm” highlighting the tensions discussed in Chapter 6. This deviation is demonstrated by its comments on the electoral process.

These recommendations included the delayed opening of polling stations, the lack of signage at certain polls, the potentially intimidating presence of the police and armed security forces, inadequate lighting that slowed down the counting process, transportation challenges, and unreliable communication systems, among a number of other issues (ECF-SADC 2009, 23, 26-

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27). The issues raised were focused on matters of electoral management, which is in line with

ECF-SADC’s agenda of improving Malawi’s democratic institutions. However, its final statement suggests the problematic nature of the election noting that the “process of elections was generally in compliance with the recommended Principles for Election Management,

Monitoring and Observation in the SADC region” (ibid., 28). This statement implies that there were several areas where the process could have been improved in order to attain the standards expected for a successful election. Still, given its position and importance placed on regional stability these issues were not emphasized.

The presence and findings of the ECF-SADF mission draw attention to the shortcomings of the SADC mission, as did the SADC-PF mission in 2004. SADC’s aim of political stability regardless of regime type and quality of institutions plays into regional politics and highlights how the respective positions of international organizations can greatly impact their behaviors during missions. SADC’s behavior is in line with the expectations of its stability bias built from its tendency to “support incumbents in power” and where “presidents and states act in mutual support of each other” (Cawthra 2010, 7). Alternatively, ECF-SADC, though also limited by its stability bias, was focused on whether this election was in line with established electoral standards. It was concerned with what the MEC could learn from its conclusions and recommendations to ensure peaceful elections in the future. As an organization consisting of other Electoral Commissions it has the political space to challenge the MEC, where necessary, without destabilizing the country due to its ability to communicate directly with them (Interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, June 2015). ECF-SADC’s closeness to the MEC presents an opportunity of strength for SADC but SADC’s continued inability to coordinate with its partner

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organizations limits its ability to send fuller missions and take advantage of its ties to ECF-

SADC.

Was dealing with a number of political crises in the region, namely Madagascar and Zimbabwe

Prioritization of the integrity of the organization as a regional body

Chairperson at the time was King Mswati III of Swaziland, not known for his commitment to democratic norms

Remarks on the election emphasized its importance for "political stability, not only in Malawi but in the SADC region as well as the African continent at large"

Stability Bias

Figure 9-3. Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2009 Election

The next section investigates the behavior of the 2009 Commonwealth Observation

Mission. Unlike SADC, the Commonwealth was not as focused on what its report meant for the stability of the area, given that it had previously challenged the manner in which the

Zimbabwean election was held, but rather the preservation of its relationship with Malawi.

Despite increasingly trying to establish itself as a firm defender of democratic norms within the organization, without a formal charter, the organization had to remain mindful of its identity as an “association” and take into account the shifts in political dynamics since the 2004 election.

Therefore, the mission to the 2009 observation served as a reflection of the Commonwealth’s changing political identity.

The Commonwealth 2009 Observation Mission

The 2009 Commonwealth Observer Mission was dispatched during a period where the organization was moving towards establishing itself as key actor within its member states. Since

Malawi’s 2004 election, the Commonwealth held various meetings aimed at strengthening the partnerships between its members. Related to political affairs, there was the Kampala

Declaration on Transforming Societies to Achieve Political, Economic and Human Development

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that called “for the inclusiveness of transformation, to involve citizens at every level, and to be as much a declaration transformation as an economic one” (Commonwealth 2017, np). So, similar to the 2004 election, the Commonwealth was committed to continued coordination among the

Heads of Government and maintaining these established relationships. For this reason, I expect this mission to have been subject to the special relationship bias, as it was in 2004. Unlike the

EU, AU, and even SADC, the Commonwealth, as a mixed organization without a set charter, did not hold a clear established space in political affairs in the region. This lack of political space impacted the operation of election observation missions despite the organization’s persistent calls for the norming of democracy in its member states.

The Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Kamalesh Sharma, upon the invitation of the

Chairperson of the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), Justice A. Msosa, authorized the

Observer Group for the May 19 Malawi Parliamentary and Presidential Elections. The Group was led by H.E. Mr. John Kufuor, former President of Ghana, and comprised of nine other eminent persons: Mr. Mahfuz Anam (Bangladesh), Ms. Alexandra Devon (Canada), Mr. David

Henry (New Zealand), Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim (Nigeria), Hon. (Ms) Sheila Kawamara-Mishambi

(Uganda), Mr. Desmond McNulty (United Kingdom), Mr. Malleh Sallah (The Gambia),

Ambassador Tabitha Seii (Kenya), and Mr. Mohamed Zahid (Maldives). This mission was supported by a five-member staff team from the Commonwealth Secretariat. Two were focused on democracy, two political, and one tasked with media (Commonwealth 2009, 36). The fact that this mission was headed by former Ghanaian president, John Kufuor, who had co-led the AU

High Level Mission, is important. First, it indicates the level of overlap between the AU and the

Commonwealth and why these organizations may, at times, share similar concerns. Second, sending an important person like Kufuor, who is already familiar with the challenges Malawi

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faced during this election, emphasizes the fact that the Commonwealth sought to establish itself in the world of election observation. As with its 2009 mission, the delegation composition was varied, pointing to the Commonwealth’s commitment to diversity and representation within its missions.

The mission was tasked with assessing any factors that risked impinging the credibility of

Malawi’s electoral process. Especially, the mission was expected to determine if the election was held in line with existing international and national election-related legislation and commitments.

Prior to its deployment, the mission was very clear that it was required to be impartial and independent and would “conduct itself according to the standards expressed in the International

Declaration of Principles to which the Commonwealth is a signatory. It has no executive role; its function is not to supervise but to observe the process as a whole” (Commonwealth 2009, 1). The mission also noted that it was able to propose recommendations for change on institutional, procedural, or other areas that would contribute to successful elections in the future. The final report was submitted to the Commonwealth Secretary-General who then shared it with the

Government of Malawi, the Chairman of the Malawi Electoral Commission, political and civil society organizations and thereafter to all Commonwealth Governments (ibid.). The forthcoming nature of this statement is very different to the statements made by the other missions. Unlike

SADC, for example, the Commonwealth is clear as to what will be done with its report and indicates that this report is for the benefit of the country and not for a select few. The explicit outlining of its mission’s process demonstrates the Commonwealth’s adherence to the norms of election observation. It is emphasizing its adherence to protocols that are expressly practiced by its more established counterpart, the EU.

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The Commonwealth mission arrived in Malawi on May 12th and its arrival was followed by four days of briefings with the MEC, political party representatives, civil society groups, the media, Commonwealth High Commissions, international organizations, and domestic and international observer missions. Following these briefings, the group was deployed to all three regions on May 17th and divided into two-person teams. These teams coordinated closely with other domestic, regional, and international observers in order to ensure a comprehensive picture of the conduct of the process. During this deployment phase, the Commonwealth mission also met with District Commissioners, Returning Officers, security officials, regional representatives of political parties, candidates, media, polling agents, polling officers, and voters (ibid., 22). The teams were sent to Blantyre, Chikwawa, Zomba, Mangochi, Lilongwe Center (Dedza, Kasungu),

Salima, and Mzuzu (one in each area).

Once the mission was complete, the Chairperson issued an Interim Statement on May 21st and the final report was completed prior to its departure from Blantyre and given to the

Commonwealth Secretary General on May 26th (ibid., 1). The mission was rather limited due its small size which affected what it was able to do once on the ground. As demonstrated by its limited mobility, the goal of the mission was not so much to significantly impact the improvement of Malawi’s political institutions but rather to show solidarity with a fellow member state. Given its limited political space, the Commonwealth used this election to express its affinity with Malawi as a member state and show that it was committed to supporting its institutional processes. Beyond that, however, there are no indicators in the report that the organization was trying to achieve much beyond that.

An assessment of the Commonwealth’s recommendations indicated a concern with the

MEC’s management of the process, a need for strengthening of Malawi’s legal framework to

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address issues that arose regarding the media, the importance of civic education, and it discussed general improvements to the polling process (Commonwealth 2009, 30-2). Much of the report was spent outlining Malawi’s political background and legal provisions pertaining to elections

(ibid., 3-20). The report did not show a commitment to challenging Malawi’s process. It is for this reason that I argue that the Commonwealth was subject to the special relationship bias rather than the progress or subtlety biases. For the Commonwealth, the goal was to establish itself as an election observer and supporter of the Malawian process in order to build its relationships with member states and give itself the political space to develop further.

Still had not adopted its constitutive charter which contributes to unclear guidelines

Adopted new agreements in line with increased role in political affairs but remains limited in its role as an IO

Have to maintain a delicate political balance given its position

Focus on the relationships between the state leaders

Special Relationship Bias

Figure 9-4. Determinants of Commonwealth Mission Bias in the 2009 Election

Conclusion

This chapter outlined the behaviors of the international observer missions during the 2009

Malawi election. This election was wrought with political tensions and posed a challenge for all four international organizations. Measures on how to best support a stable and successful election were considered alongside how to ensure that the organizations were operating in line with their best interests. As was the case with the 2004 election, there were overlaps in organization biases, with different priorities and agendas leading to similar behaviors. Figure 9.1 summarizes the biases that impacted IO behavior during the 2009 election.

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Malawi 2009

Southern African Commonwealth of European Union African Union Development Nations Community

Stability Bias Progress Bias Special Relationship Stability Bias Subtlety Bias Stability Bias Bias

Figure 9-5. Summary of IO Biases in 2009

For example, both the AU and SADC wanted to ensure that the Malawian election remained stable. The AU saw this election as an opportunity to further establish itself as a promoter of democracy on the continent and show its Western counterparts, namely donors such as the EU that the AU could operate on their level. Doing this required that the AU remain stable and show that its member states were aligning themselves with international standards. This prioritization also led to its focus on the progress thus far in Malawi in terms of its democratic consolidation process. For SADC, stability was not so much tied to the democratic evolution of its member states but rather awareness that tensions were high in Malawi and the organization sought to avoid the escalation experienced in Madagascar and Zimbabwe. Its partner organization, ECF-SADC shared a similar bias but its reasons differed slightly from SADC’s in that it wanted to encourage stability to allow for the consolidation of governance structures rather than in support of a particular country.

Unsurprisingly, the EU mission was also influenced by the stability bias. So, its report steered away from using language or offering suggestions that indicated how problematic the election was showing that it was also subject to the subtlety bias. Highlighting major

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transgressions on election day risked destabilizing a country in which it had considerable financial investments in accordance with its development initiatives. Rather, it focused on larger issues that occurred prior to polling that could be argued to have not undermined the integrity of the process and sent a follow-up mission to address the issues it was unable to during the electoral process. The Commonwealth, though a European-based organization, is limited by its identity as a mixed organization in the process of establishing its political space. So, this election saw the continued emphasis on building and maintaining its relationship with Malawi.

It is important to note how these biases have shifted, or stayed the same, from the 2004 election. This pattern illustrates the changes in the country being observed, changing relationships between the IOs and the country, and changes in the IOs themselves. As will be observed in the 2014 election, these biases are in continuous flux in response to the political position in which the organization finds itself. Chapter 10 explores these IO behaviors during

Malawi’s 2014 election.

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CHAPTER 10 OBSERVING THE 2014 TRIPARTITE ELECTION

Introduction

The previous chapter investigated the behaviors of the election observer missions deployed by the EU, AU, SADC, and the Commonwealth during the 2009 election. It highlighted, as did the analysis of the 2004 election, that election observation processes, like elections, are complicated and are influenced by a host of factors. It also illustrated how organizations with different agendas and priorities can engage in behaviors that support similar biases. This supports the project’s argument that all organizations have agendas, even those that proclaim neutrality, like the EU. With shifting political attitudes at the international level, the

2014 election saw the organizations faced with different challenges that again led to changes in mission behavior in response to different economic and political conditions.

The years between the 2009 and 2014 elections saw an increase in democratic rhetoric in the international community especially on the part of African organizations. These African institutions were stepping up to address the challenges faced by their member states, especially in areas of governance and rule of law, which required their commitment to signed agreements and protocols. Given this transformation being undergone by the organizations, the 2014 election saw a marked shift in behaviors, especially for the European Union (EU), the Southern African

Development Community (SADC), and the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth). The

African Union (AU) continued to strengthen its position as a political actor in response to the changing political landscape. This chapter outlines this shifting political environment and how this impacted observer mission behavior during this period.

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Preparing for the Inaugural Tripartite Election

The 2014 election was the most competitive in Malawi’s history. Specifically, this was the first election where there was true uncertainty as to who would win the election.

Furthermore, it was the first time that three elections, presidential, parliamentary, local council, referred to as the tripartite election, were to be held concurrently. To make matters more complicated, the local council elections had not been held in ten years following a series of postponements, posing an additional challenge for the electoral commission (Dionne, 2011). So, observers were tasked with monitoring the election amid all these political tensions.

Due to its complicated nature, the 2014 election saw the resurfacing of underlying political issues and, in spite of the positive outcome of the 2009 election, the goodwill that had been created by this election appeared to have dissipated moving into 2014. The EU’s follow-up mission did not appear to have addressed the political concerns that had been raised in 2009.

Instead, the election was especially challenging as it followed the constitutional crisis that occurred with the death of President Bingu wa Mutharika on April 5, 2012. Mutharika’s death highlighted the political feud that existed between the President and Vice President Banda, who had formed her own party, the People’s Party (PP), while in office following her expulsion from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in December 2010 after criticizing the President (The

Economist 2012). Despite political maneuvers by the ruling DPP to place the President’s brother,

Peter Mutharika, into office, Banda was sworn in as President of Malawi on April 7, 2012, as mandated by the Malawi Constitution (BBC 2012). This inter-party battle was reminiscent of

Mutharika’s break away from the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 2005 while in office, where once again Malawi was being ruled by a party that was not voted into office. As a result, gaining support in Parliament meant encouraging the defection of members from other parties to join the now ruling party (Face of Malawi 2012, Nyasa Times 2012).

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For two years, Banda sought to reverse many of the policies put in place by Mutharika.

Her first agenda item was to regain the confidence of international donors as Mutharika’s policies had led to donors reducing aid to the country (Banthu Times 2013). However, Banda’s tenure received mixed reviews with her facing both support and significant opposition from other political stakeholders. Banda received praises for increasing press freedoms and for bringing back the confidence of donors but faced major challenges regarding her apparent lack of fiscal management due to travels despite budgetary restrictions and lack of oversight over public funds.

Even more challenging, and what significantly heightened the tensions during this election, was the occurrence of Cashgate. Cashgate is a term coined in reference to the “massive looting of government funds” on the part of civil servants (Maseko 2014). A government clerk in Lilongwe was found with $300,000 in his car, followed by the shooting of Malawi’s budget director, Paul

Mphwiyo. These events led to the discovery that an estimated total of $32 million had been stolen from government coffers in the span of six months, a significant sum for a poor nation like

Malawi (J. O’s 2014, Malawi Today 2013). International and domestic stakeholders, alike, saw these events as an affront to the democratic values Banda had promised to uphold and subsequently lost trust in Banda’s administration (Malawi Voice 2014).1 Still, certain international donors felt that she was better than the alternative which was a return to the DPP- era (Field Notes, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 2014).

Given this confusion at the national level, preparations for the 2014 election were not without their issues. Days before the election, it was apparent that the international community was concerned as to how the process was going and how the election itself would go. Namely, this was due to an unprecedented level of competition; for once in Malawi’s electoral history, there was no clear frontrunner. This caused concerns on the part of the donors and contributors to

1 For a more detailed conversation on the 2014 elections, see Dulani and Dionne 2014 and Patel and Wahman 2015.

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the electoral process. Donors noted that the main challenges highlighted in the preparation for the election were logistics and communication. The various political stakeholders were seemingly at odds with one another. Another issue voiced was the lack of accountability, especially where donor funds were concerned, with significant amounts of money being given to civic and voter education with no justification of what was being done with it. Though it was agreed that this was not Malawi’s first election, and the country knew how the process worked, the fact that this was the first tripartite election posed new organizational and funding challenges.

However, despite the apprehension, an AU official was adamant that the election observation mission in Malawi had not noted any irregularities in the pre-election assessments (Fieldwork

Notes, April 29, 2014).

Who has the Right to Observe?

The 2014 election was set amid a growing resentment on the continent for Western observers and questioning whether they should be allowed to monitor African elections. In

March 2013, former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo stated that there should be a ban on non-African election observer missions monitoring polls in Africa. His argument was that western observers are biased and undermine the sovereignty of African countries. According to him, “election observation in Africa has matured, has come of age to a point that that it should be strictly and wholly an African affair. The reasons for this are many: culture, reality, approach, etc.” (Dickson 2013). Zimbabwe, in agreement with this position, banned Western observers from observing its referendum that month (ibid.). This was not a new position for President

Mugabe as he had previously banned election observers from any western country from monitoring Zimbabwe’s 2005 parliamentary election and expelled the EU mission in 2002. In

2004, he stated that only missions sent by “friends in the Third World” were allowed to monitor

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the elections and that Zimbabwe would not “allow the erstwhile imperialists to judge our elections” (Blair 2004).

The AU echoed the continent’s growing resentment towards Western actors. Its 2011

Summit “revealed an emerging conviction among Africans that their values may not coincide with those of western donors, who are seen in their eyes not as benefactors but as neo- colonialists with less than honorable intentions” (VOA 2011). The positions of these organizations emphasize the limiting of political space for Western actors in that they were unable to vocalize positions that may be at odds with the regional organizations. By challenging the role of Western actors in election observation in Africa, the AU, and SADC were essentially undermining their legitimacy in the process. They are directly calling into question the integrity of Western organizations as observers given their involvement as donors and shifting the political perceptions of their involvement. As will be observed in the following sections, this has implications for IO behaviors.

The European Union 2014 Observer Mission

The challenge that the growing anti-Western sentiment posed for the EU, as both international observer and donor, was that it limited the political space in which it had to maneuver. As the African organizations began to show signs of challenging its presence, the EU had to be conscious in its interactions and declarations made during the election observation process. Preserving these relationships with African leaders would require altering the mission’s behaviors so that the EU presence would be viewed as supporting, rather than challenging, the national government. This limited space should lead to the subtlety bias where the EU still comments on the election but does so in a manner that does not undermine the Malawian government. As such, the EU was still adhering to its mandate to promote and support democracy. Its pronouncement in this election was especially critical given that Banda was seen

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as favored by the international community and her challenger, Peter Mutharika, represented a return to the increasingly autocratic regime experienced under his brother, Bingu. So, the EU’s

2014 bias is similar to that of the 2009 election, but stability is no longer a central part of its rhetoric. More so, the EU was one of the donors that had suspended aid due to Cashgate and highlighted the need for a “clean-up before [it made its] disbursement” so strengthening the capacity of political institutions was critical to this effort (Nyasa Times 2013). However, with this economic investment, it was important to balance perceptions of its political involvement.

Similar to previous missions, the EU observer mission was invited by the Malawi

Electoral Commission (MEC) to monitor the election. The mission was in the country from April

12 to June 19, 2014. The mission was led by Chief Observer, Véronique De Keyser, a member of the European Parliament. There were 85 observers, the largest of the missions sent thus far, from

28 EU member states and Norway, deployed across the country (EU EOM 2014, 11). Given the influx of international actors following Banda’s taking over as president, its investment in the process is not surprising. The core team consisted of seven analysts and experts in support of the mission (MBC News, April 25, 2014). The aim of these observers was to “conduct a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process, based on its own observations, in accordance with Malawi’s national, regional, and international commitments” (ibid.).

During the official launch of the mission, on April 25, 2017, De Keyser stressed the independence of the mission from the EU Delegation present in the country and of the diplomatic missions present in the country. This was its way of ensuring the population that all findings would be its own and not subject to any influence by the interests of the various member countries or their respective missions. The mission did not want to be perceived as a “tool” for

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the West. This behavior is in line with the political situation and challenging economic environment. Specifically, De Keyser stated that:

We [the EU] are totally independent and I have the responsibility of the methodology and of the assessment that will be made at the end of the process. We are assessing the electoral process itself, we don’t certify the result. This is the role of [the] MEC but we will observe, analyze, and collect the data at each steps of the election process…all that is before the election, which is to say the campaigns, the rallies, the possibility for the candidate to express themselves in the media on an equal foot with the rest of candidates from the ruling party, etc. This is part of the legal framework of the process itself… (MBC News, April 25, 2014).

This distance from all external influences was emphasized in the final report along with the mission’s position on what the election meant for the country’s democratic progress (EU EOM

2014, 9). As with its 2009 report, little information is provided regarding its deployment patterns beyond noting that observers had been deployed throughout the country. In addition, there was no mention of whether the EU relied upon assistance from the EU embassies present in Malawi as it had in the last two elections. While its report does mention these delegations, there is no explicit mention that their help made a logistical impact on the process. Again, these actions show signs of the EU mission distancing itself from any interactions that may be considered advancing an “imperialist” agenda. It did not want the population to consider the mission to be an extension of the tensions that existed at the international level. This political distance was maintained throughout the observation process.

Overall, the report found that the MEC acted impartially throughout the election and that, despite the political environment, the MEC had made all efforts to ensure that voters were able to vote in the election. In addition, “key stakeholders expressed a reasonable level of confidence in the integrity of the Commission” (EU EOM 2014, 15). The mission noted that the holding of three elections concurrently was challenging in itself. Consequently, the issues it observed were caused by tight deadlines, issues with communication and information exchange, the

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“geographical dispersion of the MEC commissions, frequent deployment of commissions and senior election staff to the field, and inexistent election administration physical structures at the district and constituency levels” (ibid., 15). It was apparent that this election was not an easy one to carry out, but despite the apprehension noted in its follow-up report, the EU refrained from directly challenging the elections despite the clear violations observed during the process (Field

Notes, Lilongwe, Malawi, April/May 2014). By focusing on a few larger issues, it was able to shift its attention to subtler instances of fraud that occurred during polling. Noting the clear violations to the electoral process but still endorsing the process, as these violations are not considered harmful to the integrity of the process, is an indicator of its subtlety bias.

However, while the mission sought to stay neutral during the election, the difficult environment required that the observers address Banda’s call for the nullification of results. The

EU asked the public to stay calm while waiting for the official electoral results and to maintain the patience that prevailed during the electoral period (MBC News May 22, 2014). Considering the support given to Joyce Banda by the West, staying completely silent on this issue may have been construed as lending support to her statements that the election had been rigged by the opposing DPP. This was the first time that an incumbent had accused the opposition of rigging the election and especially pertinent because the MEC had previously claimed that it had been undermined from the start by both Banda’s government and international donors. Lazarus

Chakwera of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), and favored to win this election, also agreed that there were anomalies during the process and that a recount of the ballot was necessary

(Cammack 2014). This development also mattered because it indicated the heightened political tensions during this electoral period. Given this expressed sentiment on the MEC’s part, the EU position was an especially sensitive one (Field Notes, Blantyre, Malawi, May 2013).

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The election report also discusses the presence of other IO observation missions. This level of explicitness regarding other observer missions and their deployment patterns was not a feature in previous reports. Previous reports never went beyond noting the presence of the other missions. Specifically, the mission highlighted the presence of African organizations. It noted the observer mission details of the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development

Community (SADC), and the SADC Electoral Commission Forum. It also pointed out that the diplomatic missions based in Lilongwe which include the United States, United Kingdom,

German, and Japanese embassies also deployed observers during the election (EU EOM 2014,

20).

The careful attention paid to which and how many observers were present is telling because it supports the argument that the EU wants to promote the election observation process as a shared endeavor. It sought to establish that it is not the only international body invested in this process and to emphasize the presence of the other partners in international election monitoring. Specifically, it wanted to bring attention to the African organizations engaged in election observation. This position echoed GTZ’s call for increased inclusion of African organizations (see discussion in Chapter 8) and statements regarding the role of Western observers in African elections. With the seemingly growing resentment against Western observers, due to their roles as both international election monitors and donors, the EU mission had to be particularly conscious of the political space that it occupied.

The limited space in 2014 suggests that the EU is limiting its role in order to ensure that the EU was not viewed as “imperialist.” The EU is an independent actor, serving as a model of election observation, and must navigate its political atmosphere in a manner that keeps it as close in line to its mandate as possible. By focusing on non-negotiable violations such as

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“organizational mismanagement, significant logistical shortcomings, and the failure to transmit results electronically,” allows the EU to signal that it will not ignore any effort to undermine the election process (Capital Radio Malawi 2014, np). However, this focus on issues that create

“‘significant concerns’ about the integrity and authenticity of the results” means that it can ignore subtler forms of fraud that occur on election day itself (ibid.). This report marked a shift in EU behavior where rather than focus on the smaller issues, it places its attention on more obvious issues which still indicated its interest in the country’s democratic consolidation process and encouragement of the continued improvement of governance structures without coming across as manipulation every detail of Malawi’s political process. As observed during the preparation for the elections, there was resentment on the part of MEC officials that the international development partners were not allowing them to administer the elections in the manner they saw fit due to restraints created by the donor-recipient relationship (Field Notes,

Blantyre, Malawi, 2013).

The EU was operating in a challenging international environment given the increased call for "African solutions for African problems"

Increased partnerships with African organizations, ie. the AU. Shifting the attention to these actors.

Drawing attention to its position as a "partner" to the African organizations

Did not want to be viewed as focusing on all the smaller issues in the elections given the attitude towards international actors, especially Western observers

Subletly Bias

Figure 10-1. Determinants of EU Mission in the 2014 Election

The following section investigates the 2014 AU election observation mission and assesses how it navigated the challenging political situation created by the holding of the tripartite election. Given the EU’s apprehensive position, I examine if the AU saw this election in a similar manner, considering its attempt to place itself at the forefront of the democratization

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agenda on the continent, or if its loyalties to the legacy of “an African Union” undermined its adherence to this mandate. This factor is especially relevant given the continued calls for

“African solutions for African problems” (VOA 2011).

The African Union 2014 Election Observation Mission

The increased calls for “African solutions for African problems” positioned the AU at the forefront of the move to address Africa’s political challenges at the continental level and limit the role of Western actors. Though the sentiment is not shared by all actors on the continent, it was clear that there was apprehension on the part of certain actors given that Western organizations provide considerable funds to elections and also monitor them (Dickson 2013). In the period leading up to the 2014 election, the AU was moving towards stricter guidelines for election observation and for the inclusion of political stakeholders. However, similar to the 2009 election, this effort to establish itself as the rightful leader on issues of democratic consolidation meant that the AU risked subjecting itself to the progress bias. For the organization, it was important that other political stakeholders saw it as encouraging and supporting democracy within its member states. So, the AU is more likely to challenge issues of fraud or highlight the areas for improvement for capacity-building. Still, it is important to keep in mind that the AU has its own definition of what it considers to be “democracy” so moves towards the EU standard, with the backdrop of this anti-Western attitude, also have a political impact on AU election observation (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 2015). Specifically, the AU considers

African countries to be better suited to a social and development democracy. This definition of democracy differs from the more comprehensive Western definition and echoes that of SADC.

With its mandate to encourage democracy, even if its definition of democracy does not match that of the Western organizations, the African Union Election Observation Mission in

2014 has been the most progressive of the missions to date. As alluded to earlier, at this point the

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AU had seriously begun to examine its role and the intentions behind election observation. Here it began to question itself regarding what happens after its missions have been to the country, observed its election, and written the final report. The question of “then what?” featured prominently as a means of establishing what the AU’s role was in the supporting of democratic institutions in member states (Interview, Addis Ababa, August 5, 2015). In keeping with its commitment to enhance its observation efforts, the 2014 Malawian election witnessed an increase in time on the ground and larger mission deployment by the AU. Furthermore, Dr.

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, the AU Commission Chairperson, paid a visit to Malawi from May

14-16, 2014. The visit, echoing Jean Ping’s in 2009, was part of her efforts to encourage

“peaceful, democratic elections on the continent” (AU EOM 2014, 9). Dr. Dlamini-Zuma took the opportunity to meet with the leadership of political parties and their candidates, the MEC, and government officials, including then President Joyce Banda. Her visit took place in the middle of the AU’s mission deployment headed by Namibia’s first president, Sam Nujoma, and consisted of a total of 52 observers of which 10 were long-term observers and 42 short-term observers drawn from the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), member of the Permanent

Representative Committee (PRC), election management bodies (EMBs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and experts from 22 AU member states. Notably, this was the first mission to Malawi that included long-term observers, signaling the AU’s adoption of more comprehensive election observation protocols reflecting those of the EU. Deploying a more effective mission highlights the AU’s commitment to establishing itself as an important political actor. In addition, it also limits biases associated with an organization tied to its member states by reducing opportunities for political manipulation by Heads of Government, marking a critical development by the organization and a step towards the institutionalization of its process. This

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mission was deployed in the country from April 12 to June 7, 2014 and was supported by a technical team of staff from the AUC, PAP, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable

Democracy in Africa (EISA) (ibid., 7). Nujoma is known for the establishment of a presidential democracy in Namibia where democracy has developed despite the same party being in power since independence (Melber 2015). His position of encouraging a variation of democracy on the continent echoed the AU’s where its emphasis was on supporting democratic institutions even if they did not replicate that of the Western countries.

The AU EOM protocol for this mission was quite straightforward and had an unprecedented level of preparedness, in part thanks to being the AU’s third mission to Malawi.

First, there was the deployment of the long-term Observers (LTOs) for a period of 8 weeks (12

April to 7 June 2014) to 27 districts in the three regions. During this time, the LTOs met with stakeholders, which included the MEC, relevant government agencies, political parties and civil society groups (AU 2014, 8). The arrival of LTOs was followed by that of 42 short-term observers (STOs) on May 12, 2014. Upon the arrival of the STOs, the AU EOM released its

Arrival Statement on May 12, 2014 in Blantyre (ibid.).

The STOs underwent an intensive 3-day orientation program during which they received briefings from electoral stakeholders including the MEC, the media, civil society groups, and various election experts. The orientation and briefing program served as an avenue for information gathering and refresher training on observation methodology to prepare observers for deployment. Following this training and initial assessment, the AU EOM issued an interim assessment statement on the pre-election environment at a press conference held at Mount Soche

Hotel, Blantyre, on 15 May 2014 (African Union 2014, 8). Following the pre-election statement, the STO’s were deployed in 22 teams to all the regions of Malawi, covering 174 constituencies

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in 24 districts (ibid., 14). Their deployment prior to polling allowed the mission to assess the preparations made prior to election-day and allowed for discussions with electoral stakeholders at the district and constituency level. Careful consideration was made when assembling these missions and the AU was especially aware that governments try to influence the observer mission process. However, the AU was adamant that it does not allow its missions to be manipulated and the mission coordinator is responsible for managing the observation process and mission. In addition, LTO’s, in covering the country in its entirety, identify “hotspots” or highly contested areas that require attention. As such, areas that are “hot” are not ignored (Interview,

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia August 5, 2015). The assumption here is that it is imperative to support areas that show signs of instability or else they may undermine the country’s democratic consolidation. This statement suggests a systematic approach that was not evident in the AU’s

2004 and 2009 missions indicating that the publication of the AU observer handbook in 2013 may have contributed to positive changes in the AU’s mission deployment process. The introduction of the observer handbook, and subsequent adoption of the new protocols, was a signal that the AU was embracing a more institutionalized process, which suggests the fluidity of

IOs in regards to their political identities and priorities.

On election day, the mission visited 262 polling stations to monitor the process from opening of polls to vote counting. For the first time, the deployment plan was disaggregated by long- and short-term observer status with two separate deployment plans provided for each team

(African Union 2014, 31). The availability of this detailed deployment is telling of the AU’s increased transparency in its approach to election observation. Even more remarkable, is the fact that this level of detail is not provided by its more established counterpart, the EU. The EU serves as the model for election observation and its procedures are often used by African

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organizations, so, for the AU to adopt measures that the EU does not overtly share, is telling of the shift in political environment with the African organizations playing a larger role in the process. This development highlights the AU’s evolution and it being allowed to take up more of a role in this process. Beyond this election, this reality has implications for future missions because it is ultimately redefining who holds responsibility over the monitoring of elections in

Africa as the AU shifts its focus to democratic development rather than encouraging the status quo as it did in 2004, and less so, in 2009.

Long-term observers were placed in teams of two and deployed to the Northern, Eastern,

Central, and Southern regions of the country. Prior missions divided the country into three missions so this meant that the mission was already larger than the previous one. In the Northern region, the mission was deployed to Chikwawa, Mulanje, Mwanza, Nsanje, Thyolo, Phalombe,

Neno, and Blantyre (8). In the Eastern region, the mission was deployed to Balaka, Chiradzulu,

Machinga, Mangochi, and Zomba (5). In the Central region, the mission was deployed to Dedza,

Dowa, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Mchinji, Nkhotakota, Ntcheu, Ntchisi, and Salima (9). Lastly, in the

Southern region, the mission was deployed to Chitipa, Karonga, Likoma, Mzimba, Nkhata Bay, and Rumphi (6). As such, the LTOs covered 28 of the 30 electoral districts (ibid.).

The STOs were deployed to supplement the LTOs and were thus deployed as followed.

The leadership of the mission was stationed in Blantyre. For the rest of the mission, in terms of deployment, similarly to the LTOs, STOs were sent in groups of two to all four regions. In the

North, Chitipa (two teams), Karonga, Mzimba, Nkhata Bay, and Rumphi (5). In the Eastern region, observers were deployed to Zomba, Machinga, Balaka, and Mangochi (4). In the Central region, Dedza/Ntcheu. Dowa/Ntchisi, Kasungu, Lilongwe 1 (City), 2 (East), and 3 (West), and

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Nkhotakota/Salima (8). Last, in the Southern region, Blantyre 1 and 2, Chikwawa, Mulanje,

Thyolo, and Mwanza (5) (African Union 2017, 32).

Interestingly, in this election, certain districts received multiple teams. In this case, two teams were sent to Chitipa in the North, three to Lilongwe in the Central region, and two to

Blantyre. Previous deployment patterns have not shown this overlap. Considering the highly competitive nature of this election and the fact that Lilongwe was the stronghold for the MCP that was increasingly being viewed as a key challenger for office, it might explain why observers were so present in this area. Blantyre or the South more generally, has always been considered a regional stronghold for the former DPP. The North was where the incumbent Joyce Banda hailed, so it was apparent that this mission’s deployment pattern was dictated by the “political noise” on the ground. The AU mission was aware that each electoral district and polling area had a different dynamic and an understanding of these is expected. Each polling area has a different dynamic so, an awareness of what these are, is expected (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

August 5, 2015). So, this behavior supports the theory put forth in this project as it acknowledges that IOs preempt events in these areas and deploy their missions accordingly. Specifically, the awareness of the political dynamics on the ground indicates the value of the proximity to the country under observation afforded by being a regional organization.

Following the election, STOs returned to Blantyre for debriefing and establishing the mission’s preliminary assessments of the electoral process. To this regard, a report was issued on these findings and conclusions at a press conference held in Blantyre on May 22, 2014. Once this statement was released, the mission stayed in the country to observe the post-election process which included the vote tallying, cases relating to the election being brought the High Court, announcement of results, and the swearing of the new president (AU 2014, 9). In addition, LTOs

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were expected to remain in Malawi to observe polling in centers that were postponed beyond the initial delay in 45 polling centers (ibid., 14). This election observer mission showed a commitment to monitoring the election in its entirety unlike previous missions. Again, this marked improvement indicates the alignment with traditional observers and efforts to establish the AU as a leader in election observation on the continent.

The final report was produced after the completion of the mission in its entirety. In comparison to the previous reports, this one was much more detailed and organized. In addition, it was much more systematic in outlining the mission’s plan and approach to monitoring. One thing that was made clear is that the AU had embraced a more holistic approach to the process.

This was apparent in it sending its observer mission weeks before election day, holding meetings to establish where the country stands, and not departing immediately after polling was over. In addition, there was a concerted effort to ensure that the report was fair and were in no means manipulated by external parties. Upon completion, the report was shown to the observers with no need to send it to the Head of the Unit to receive approval. The final report is considered an informational document for the national government (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August

5, 2015). The AU’s inability to deploy longer term missions was often attributed to a lack of funding, but as this mission shows, these decisions are a result of political will on the part of the

AU’s leadership. With the financial support provided by the EU in support of the AU’s election observation efforts, there is increased accountability for its missions (EEAS 2016, np).

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Operating with the formally adopted 2013 election observer handbook

Placed itself as a crucial player in election observation on the continent, increased its questioning of the need for Western observers

Shifting of political positions

AU sought to make the case that Africa was ready to embrace democracy, had to make sure that this was the common perception

Progress Bias

Figure 10-2. Determinants of AU Mission Bias in the 2014 Election

The African Union has shown that the organization is increasingly adopting behaviors that reflect its changing mandate to embracing democracy. These efforts continue despite the persistent uncertainty at the leadership level as to what this term means for the continent and how

Africa can map its own democracy destiny (Interview, Addis Ababa, August 6, 2015). Even considering the nature of the organization, where it can be difficult to get countries to ratify key documents, there is still an emphasis on the idea of the “Spirit of the Union” where the organization must take into account the overall well-being of the organization as a continental body. In light of this position, the AU is careful when making statements regarding its member countries because it is not a donor, so the outcome is not its concern in the same manner in which it is for the donors like the UN and EU. As a result, the AU statements offer a broader picture, especially considering that its missions cannot be at every polling station; rather, the areas monitored are chosen by identifying “hotspots,” as well as by taking into consideration distances and finances (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014). For the organization, it is key that it maintains its position as an “African union” and this is something that is articulated in their missions. Yet, this broader picture still shows the AU’s progression towards limiting its political

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biases and being in line with the more established election observation bodies and indicates its more systematic approach to mission deployment.

In considering this “spirit of the union,” the AU tried to remain neutral and pronounced the election as free and fair despite its shortcomings. At press briefings, this neutrality is accepted by other observers. For example, at the joint press briefing held after the election there was an awareness that the AU was the “parent body” as European organizations, namely the EU, did not want to be seen as interfering in African affairs (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30,

2014). So, the AU’s political space, afforded to it during this election by this prominent actor in election observation, was clearly defined. This was reflected in its observer report, where the emphasis was placed on instilling measures that would strengthen Malawi’s political institutions.

As the largest international organization on the continent, the AU has a critical role to play in political affairs. Nevertheless, SADC remains as a strong regional player, especially in regard to peace and security efforts in Southern Africa, where its interactions, or lack of, with a given state can influence the direction in which the mission takes. However, there appears to be a disconnect between the two bodies when it comes to observation missions, and their ultimate goals. While both express a commitment to moving forward with an “African agenda,” SADC countries send its respective observers on behalf of the Secretariat and there was no communication with the

AU mission during the 2014 election (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014). With this in mind, the next section outlines SADC’s process during this period and how its respective agendas and biases dictated mission behavior.

The Southern African Development Community 2014 Election Observation Mission

The 2014 election was held after the establishment of the SADC Election Advisory

Council (SEAC) in 2011 and during the updating of the SADC Electoral Observation guidelines that were published in 2015. Therefore, given this transformative period, SADC’s priority was to

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improve its process so that there would no longer be a need for observers in the future “as their presence indicates a lack of trust in the system” (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015).

SADC officials expressed an understanding for the need for election observers in the short-term and that this need would continue until national institutions are fully developed. They also articulated that SADC’s goal is to build citizen’s trust in domestic institutions to remove the reliance on election observation by the AU and SADC (ibid.).

Amid these developments, the SADC mission became much more visible in the field of election observation and was also more present during the tripartite election. These efforts echo the AU’s push for “African solutions for African problems.” SADC’s changing attitude towards its role in the region suggests that it is seeking ways to shift the responsibility for democratic consolidation back to its member states and lessens the requirement of a regional body when it comes to addressing political affairs. This goal would mean that it is SADC’s best interest to make Malawi look competent during this election. If the country is able to hold fair elections without SADC’s oversight, SADC is better placed to make the argument for limiting election observation missions. This could mean focusing on its progress, which also entails prioritizing efforts that maintain peace in the region beyond elections. It also suggests that member states may seek to limit access to future missions rendering them unable to make proper assessments on their electoral processes. In doing so, it created the semblance that its countries were moving towards SADC’s ideal of democracy.

So, unlike the AU that is pushing for an “African solution” by promoting election observation by Africans, SADC is hoping that there will ultimately no longer be the need for observers. This sentiment explains its apprehension in challenging member states during the election observation process. Considering the organization’s position, I expect it to be subject to

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the progress bias in efforts to highlight Malawi’s democratic development over its last five electoral cycles. Establishing Malawi as a successful democratic country would support the argument for reduced IO involvement.

The 2014 SADC Observer Mission followed a process similar to that of the previous ones. At this point, the 2015 protocol of having the Secretariat dispatch observers, as is the case with the other three organizations, had not yet been adopted. Observers were selected by their respective countries and then deployed on behalf of the organization (Interview, Gaborone,

Botswana, 2015). Prior to the SADC mission, SEAC sent a goodwill and assessment mission in

April 2014. SEAC, as established earlier, was created as a tool to facilitate and improve SADC’s election observation process. Like the assessment missions sent by the EU, AU, and the

Commonwealth, the purpose of this mission was to “assess the level of preparedness and readiness of the country to hold the elections” (SEOM 2014, 4). The SADC mission highlights the change in methodology employed by SADC, because prior to this mission there is no mention of assessment missions beyond the considerations made by the diplomatic missions on the ground that served as “advance teams.” During this training period, the SEAC mission, deployed by SADC, “familiarized itself with the constitution and the electoral laws of Malawi” and held meetings with a number of key stakeholders to assess the political environment and security situation. Its meetings with the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC) helped the mission establish how well-prepared the MEC was to administer the election (ibid.).

Following the SEAC’s mission, SADC deployed its election observers. This observer mission was formally called for by Namibian president, and Chairperson of the SADC Organ on

Politics, Defense, and Security Cooperation, Hifikepunye Pohamba. Pohamba appointed,

Netumbo Nandi-Ndaitwah, Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs to head the mission. As usual,

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the SADC Executive Secretary was in charge of facilitating the process. As stated, both the

SADC Chairperson and the head of the SADC mission were from Namibia, a country considered stable and democratic, with scores of two for both its civil liberties and political rights in 2014

(Freedom House 2017). However, the ruling South West Africa’s People’s Organization has been in power since 2009 suggesting that, though democratic, Namibia does not adhere to the traditional definitions of democracy (SWAPO 2009, np). As discussed earlier, SADC subscribes to its own definition of “good governance,” so the heading of a SADC mission by a mission leader from a country considered to be democracy, regardless of its level of democracy, is a reflection of its goal to establish Malawi as having moved closer to a consolidated democracy.

His leadership of this mission matters, because to the international community, an evaluation by representatives of a democratic country carries more political weight.

The mission, consisting of 147 observers, arrived in Malawi on May 1, 2014 and immediately participated in a two-day refresher training course. Following the refresher course, the missions were deployed to all regions of the country. With 147 observers, the mission was larger than previous SADC missions and those dispatched by the other monitoring organizations.

The dispatching of a larger mission highlights the impact of the changes to SADC election observation protocol. Particularly, its adoption of protocols that were more in line with those of the EU and SADC led to a visible commitment to improving its standards of election observation. This development highlights how changes can occur over time within an organization in response to different political stimuli. As discussed in earlier chapters, the organizations continue to adopt new standards, and to modify existing ones, for their democracy promotion efforts and election monitoring processes. The 2014 SADC mission is an example of how these translate into action.

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Unlike the 2004 and 2009 elections, the mission’s report was not classified as “sensitive” and the mission leader made it clear that the final report on the election would be issued within thirty days of the election (SEOM 2014, 7). This appeared to be a positive development, but unfortunately, this was not the case and a final report has yet to be available to the political stakeholders and public. Notably, the report was not available from SADC’s Malawi contact or the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), both expected to maintain records of all reports issued by election observers. Similarly, full reports were not made available for the elections held in

South Africa and Botswana that same year. SADC thus serves as an example of how even organizations considered as credible actors in democracy promotion efforts can have flawed election observation processes. Even if the preliminary statement noted logistical challenges during the process, this statement is an insufficient demonstrator of SADC’s role in election observation and simply presents an organization that is willing to engage in a democratic rhetoric but not execute the said actions. This reality is problematic when examining the changing political role of African organizations because it indicates a challenge of the existing system but reluctance to take a leading role, calling into question SADC’s intentions as a regional actor and its role in election observation moving forward.

With this reluctance to challenge the status quo and maintain the image that Malawi is a democracy, the mission concluded that the election was “peaceful, free, transparent and credible, reflecting the will of the people of Malawi” (SEOM 2014, 6). Further, Nandi-Ndaitwah, head of the mission, noted that the “environment on polling day remained conducive to the holding generally peaceful elections” and dismissed what he considered “unfounded rumours of rigging which had the potential of poisoning [the] peaceful environment” (SEOM 2014, 5). According to him, the election was carried out as expected but without a report, and considering the political

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environment at the time and the issues raised by the other organizations, one can only wonder what the final report contained that limited its circulation. The mission went as far as to state that the election was “free.” Again, this situation highlights the necessity of understanding the political realities surrounding election observation and how these dynamics change as IOs themselves undergo transformations.

The mission’s use of the term “free” is notable because it is one that EU has made a concerted effort to not employ in official statements. This course of action is increasingly becoming the standard for other established missions as both practitioners and the literature argue that “the use of the terms ‘free and fair’ is not a satisfactory approach to evaluate an election; specific reasons for this include the all-encompassing, ‘black and white’ nature of the terminology as well as the lack of a sufficient internationally-agreed definition” (ACE Project

2013, np). So, it is noteworthy that despite adopting protocols that are more in line EU standards, SADC continued to embrace this rhetoric. Its behavior emphasizes the liberties that organizations can take in election observation to get their respective agendas across. In this instance, as in 2004 and 2009, we observe a leniency towards Malawi on SADC’s part. Echoing the sentiment by other actors that, of these international organizations, SADC has the capacity to do a lot for the electoral process in its member states and the democratic process, but is unable to do so due to its political relationships with member states (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11,

2014; Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 9, 2015). Again, we see SADC prioritizing the

“national interests” of its member state. In closing his statement, the mission leader thanked

Malawi for the treatment they received during the electoral process: “I also express our sincere gratitude to the Government and the people of the Republic of Malawi for their friendship, hospitality and cooperation during our mission here” (SEOM 2014, 7). The SADC mission was

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only one to use the term “friendship” in its statement regarding the election, again emphasizing the political proximity between SADC and its member states.

As discussed earlier, SADC does not provide a framework that allows these organizations to share their goals for, and work within, the Southern African region and operate in an institutionalized manner within SADC. This is the case for IOs like SADC Parliamentary Forum

(SADC PF) and the SADC Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF-SADC) which have monitored multiple elections in various regions. Other organizations in the area that are often involved in election monitoring processes include SADC’s Council of Non-Governmental Organizations and

SADC Lawyers Association (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, July 9, 2015). The lack of political space afforded to these missions is unfortunate because these actors significantly contribute to election observation efforts. For example, a SADC PF official noted prior to the election that the proliferation of regional observers has further contributed to the rising sentiment that the countries “do not need outsiders.” Given this anti-Western rhetoric, which has been expressed by the AU as well, there is pressure for regional observers to establish themselves in the process.

SADC PF considers itself particularly able as it is composed of members of parliament who are products of SADC elections. Therefore, its missions know who is on the ground and what they need to observe. For SADC PF, its missions are examples of “sending a thief to catch a thief”

(Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). This is especially so in Malawi’s case as this mission marked its third to the country (SADC PF Interim Statement 2014, 3).

As a result of its familiarity with the process, SADC PF missions are viewed positively by member nations where electoral commissions are keen to receive its reports. For example, following its mission to Botswana’s 2009 election, SADC PF was contacted by the electoral commission due to the apparent delay in releasing the report (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May

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19, 2014). In addition, its missions are welcomed due to its expressed commitment to transparency, its “open nature,” and the perception that there are no “secret intentions behind their monitoring efforts” (ibid.). Thus, for SADC PF it is imperative that final reports be issued in a timely manner. This approach differs from that of the SADC Secretariat that tends to issue its reports in a less systematic manner drawing attention to why it would choose to publish reports for certain missions and not others. Potential implications of this will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

In terms of this election, SADC PF deployed 33 observers, members of parliament, staff from SADC Parliaments, and SADC PF officials from eight member states. This mission was led by Abdool Razack Mahomed Ameen Peroo, Speaker of the Parliament of Mauritius and SADC

PF President. Observers arrived in the country on May 9th and were deployed to all three regions from May 13th to the 21st. Similar to previous missions, the mission gathered information on the constitutional and legal framework governing elections in Malawi; consulted with key electoral stakeholders; observed the campaigning process; and monitored the mass media (SADC PF

Interim Statement 2014, 4). One difference between the 2009 and 2014 missions is that the 2014 mission explicitly stated that it exchanged information and observations with other election observation missions, namely SADC, the AU, the EU, and ECF-SADC. Interactions with other missions highlight the overlap that can occur in election observation and the potential for missions to share critical information that may impact their behavior. Specifically, this may result in stronger, more accurate reports, or conversely, risk tempting missions to alter their reports. Instances of such behavior in other elections have already been observed (Interview,

Gaborone, Botswana, July 9, 2015). One such case was in Zimbabwe 2013, with Mugabe considered as one of the “big dogs” in the region, there was apprehension on the part of major

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election observation missions—AU, the Common Market of East and Southern Africa

(COMESA), and SADC—to publish their mission reports (ibid.). Their vested interests in

Zimbabwe, or any country where their observations can have significant impact on perceptions by the international community, influence the manner in which reports are written and the information they contain (ibid.). In addition, as seen with SADC, reports are not always made available for “political reasons” as a means of protecting relations between SADC and its member states, which is clearly at odds with any purported adherence to supporting democratic institutions (Field Notes, Gaborone, Botswana, June-July, 2015). Last, if missions come in with the mindset of writing what they want rather than the reality they observe, it risks undermining the foundation on which election observation was established.

All these situations have major implications for the evolution of election observation on the continent, and in other developing democracies. Given the on-going tensions regarding the role of Western observers in Africa, these interactions indicate the shifting political environment where election observation is being redefined, and in some cases undermined, by regional actors.

It also highlights that interests differ among African organizations and so they should not all be considered biased or ineffective as they have been over the years. Understanding the respective positions of African organizations on certain issues matters in that with the receding presence of

Western actors, they are being increasingly looked to by citizens themselves. For certain

Malawian citizens, elections and the election observation process are progressively being seen as

“an African thing” (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 5, 2014). This trend, as indicated by the

AU’s position, might be similar in other African countries. Therefore, IO ability to impact political issues at both the international and national level has been growing over the years so the

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AU’s willingness, and SADC’s apparent reluctance, to embrace this political development has real implications.

Moving towards a more established election observation protocol with the introduction of SEAC and the workshops towards the procedures adopted 2015

Sought to support national goals, at this time centered on gaining a degree of independence from Western influence

Emphasized SADC's role in supporting democracy in the region

Engaged in the process more so than in previous years*

Progress Bias

Figure 10-3. Determinants of SADC Mission Bias in the 2014 Election

The next section investigates the Commonwealth mission’s behavior during this election.

It also explores how growing resentment towards Western election observers influenced its efforts to establish itself as a key political actor on the continent. As a mixed organization, it does have its own interests, but also faces a unique set of challenges.

The 2014 Commonwealth Observer Mission

Despite its mixed membership, the Commonwealth is considered as part of the West by political actors on the continent (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11, 2014). For this reason, it was operating within the same tense political environment as the EU, with the rising anti-

Western election observation rhetoric on the continent. 2009 saw the Commonwealth establishing itself as a political actor. Between 2009 and 2014, efforts were increasingly made to position the Commonwealth as a critical partner in African democratization. The charter was signed into effect in 2013, so this was the first of the three elections under investigation to be monitored under this renewed, and formally established, commitment to support democratic efforts in member states. For this reason, I expect the Commonwealth election observation mission to be subject to the progress bias. By 2014 it is no longer as concerned with maintaining

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its special relationships as these have been established over the years. Rather, it wants to present itself as an organization whose member states adhere to its norms and values, and this preservation of its image will lead to it emphasizing the democratic strides made in Malawi.

The 2014 Commonwealth Observer mission to Malawi was headed by Lt. Gen Mompati

Merafhe of Botswana. Merafhe, Bostwana’s former foreign minister, then Vice President, was known for his vocal challenges to leaders who refused to adhere to democratic norms. During his political tenure, he was involved in Nigeria’s suspension from the Commonwealth for three years in 1995, following its execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa (Mathala 2015). In 2008, he told

Zimbabwean president, Robert Mugabe, at an AU meeting that he had stolen the recent election.

According to Mugabe, Merafhe “even when to the point of telling me that the seat I was in was supposed to be occupied by Tsvangirai” indicating his strong disapproval of how the 2008

Zimbabwean election was carried out (Sunday Standard Reporter 2016). Furthermore, he described Zimbabwe’s 2013 poll as “a circus” where “what was meant to be an election turned out to be something else” highlighting his stance regarding affronts to the electoral principles to which the country should have adhered (Mmegi Online 2013). Hailing from Botswana, known for being one of Africa’s successful democratic experiments, and holding these views regarding democracy, Merafhe’s heading of the mission indicates the Commonwealth transition towards firmly placing itself as democracy advocate among its member states.

The other members of this mission were Dr. Kwadwo Afari-Gyan (Ghana), Ms.

Sudharashana Lakshmi Ayyappa (India), Mr. Boniface Cheembe (Zambia), Ms. Linda Duffield

(United Kingdom), Dr. Leith Dunn (Jamaica), Mr. Malietau Malietoa (Samoa), Hon. Ntlhoi

Motsamai (Lesotho), Ms. Maureen Khamala Mudi (Kenya), Dr. Amos Namanga Ngongi

(Cameroon), and Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (Sri Lanka) (Commonwealth 2014, 30). Of

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these ten members, five hailed from African countries, and though these countries have mixed records when it comes to regime type,2 the fact that a majority of the mission was African illustrated the increased role of African observers. A staff team of four was also deployed to support this observer group. In his arrival statement, Merafhe noted that “the attention of the region, Africa, the Commonwealth is on Malawi. You are in the spotlight. We look up to

Malawi, the Warm Heart of Africa, to continue doing us all proud” (ibid., 32). Again, we observe the rhetoric of a united organization working towards its shared goals. These words are especially salient given Botswana’s status as one of Africa’s democratic success stories whose

President Ian Khama has been vocal on the declining nature of democracy in Southern Africa.

For example, in 2016 Khama made the point that President Mugabe should step down and that

“he should have done it years ago” (Cropley 2016). Previously, Khama also criticized Burundi’s

President Pierre Nkurunziza for running for a third-term despite facing significant opposition

(Mambo 2015).

The expectations of this mission, present in Malawi from May 14 to May 26, were similar to those of previous ones. Prior to the election, Commonwealth observers met with a wide range of stakeholders which included the Malawi Electoral Commission (MEC), representatives of political parties, civil society organizations, media institutions, the police, and domestic and other international observer missions (Commonwealth 2014, 1). The mission was deployed on May 18, 2014, in teams of two to all three regions. These teams worked closely with domestic, regional, and international observers “which allowed the group to widen the span of its coverage and assisted in establishing a more comprehensive picture of the conduct of the polls”

(Commonwealth 2014, 2). Their deployment pattern was as follows (number of observers in

2 In 2014, of these five countries, two were categorized by Freedom House as free (Ghana and Lesotho), two were partly free (Kenya and Zambia), and one not free (Cameroon) (Freedom House 2017).

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parentheses): In the Southern region, teams were deployed to Blantyre (3); Thyolo and

Chikwawa (2); Zomba (2); and Mangochi (2). In the Central region, missions were deployed to

Lilongwe, Dedza, and Kasungu (2) and Salima (2). In the North, a team was sent to Mzuzu (2).

Therefore, the Commonwealth observers were deployed to a total of 10 electoral districts.

Despite its statement that this mission was able to obtain a comprehensive picture of election activities, this mission covered a lot less area than the EU, AU, and SADC suggesting that it was targeting the areas that it considered important. As an IO with limited resources, it was necessary that the Commonwealth deploy its mission in the most efficient manner to protect its image as supporter of democratic development in the country.

While in the field, the Commonwealth mission met with district commissioners, election officials, security officers, representatives of political parties, polling agents and voters. The mission’s report noted several issues, mainly concerned with the MEC’s ability to undertake election administration. These concerns included the distribution of polling materials; the need to maintain transparency and ensure safety in the transportation of electoral materials; the number of streams at each voting center; and the transmission of results among other things

(Commonwealth 2014, 25). The mission also noted a number of recommendations to “further improve the electoral process in Malawi” (ibid., 26). The mission pointed out that some of these recommendations echoed those made in previous reports; however, this report was more detailed than previous ones. In addition, it emphasized that the election “took place in a politically charged atmosphere” hence drawing attention to its role in contributing to the strengthening of institutions to offset these tensions. Notably, this report is much longer and detailed than the previous ones and considering that the charter emphasizing the importance of democracy in the

Commonwealth, this makes sense.

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For the Commonwealth, this election was an opportunity to establish itself as supporter of democracy in its member states. With its newly adopted charter that expressly states its recognition of “the inalienable right of individuals to participate in democratic processes, in particular through free and fair elections in shaping the society in which they live” and supports the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group in addressing any “serious or persistent violations of Commonwealth values without any fear or favour” the Commonwealth was able to clearly articulate its commitment to democratic norms (Commonwealth 2013, 3). The mission, with its continued emphasis on democracy and highlighting this inaugural tripartite election as “an important step in Malawi’s journey to further consolidate democracy” demonstrated the

Commonwealth’s position (Commonwealth 2016, 26). Like the AU and SADC, there is a clear progression in the Commonwealth’s election observation towards the more rigorous EU standard methodology. For the Commonwealth, as a mixed organization that has grappled with its place in international politics, establishing itself indicates that it is transitioning into its role as crucial partner in election observation. It no longer needs to protect relationships with member states but rather work with them in upholding the mandates to which the organization subscribes. By focusing on supporting Malawi and indicating the irregularities that occur, it is also gaining the respect of citizens themselves (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 12, 2014).

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Establishing itself as stronger proponent of democracy, demonstrated by the head of mission

Adoption of clearer guidelines and protocols, namely the charter

Had to be aware of the place it had in the international community so sought to maintain the place of supportive, yet firm partner

Important to emphasize that member states are adhering to the agreed upon norms

Progress Bias

Figure 10-4. Determinants of Commonwealth Mission Bias in the 2014 Election

Conclusion

The years leading up the 2014 election saw significant political transformations within the international organizations under investigation. This transformation led to shifts in biases and behaviors on the part of election observation missions. Figure 10.1 summarizes the biases that impacted IO behavior during the 2014 election.

Malawi 2014

Southern African Commonwealth of European Union African Union Development Nations Community

Subtlety Bias Progress Bias Progress Bias Progress Bias

Figure 10-5. Summary of Biases in 2014

The European Union (EU) began to establish itself as partner to regional organizations, mainly the African Union (AU), through financial and technical support. These increased partnerships were seemingly in response to the growing resentment towards Western observers

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in Africa. With its dual identity as both donor and election observer, the EU was operating in an increasingly limited political space. However, despite this limited space, it maintained its standards for observation and continued to send long-term, comprehensive missions. Balancing these two issues led to it being subject to the subtlety bias. Yet, in evaluating the EU’s process during these elections in response to the ongoing economic and political situation, we observe that the EU was less prominent than it had been in previous years. The 2014 election created a context in which the EU was retreating as a political actor with emphasis being placed on partnerships with African organizations. This changing political environment impacted EU mission behavior during the election, supporting the idea that biases may not only be in response to considerations regarding the country under observation but also created by interactions with other major international actors.

For the AU, the calls for Africa to address its challenges saw it gain political space. In response to this, and with the increased financing by development partners like the EU, the AU began to send larger, more efficient missions. The 2014 mission was not driven by the glasshouse or special relationship biases, ones that indicate a lack of mission independence, but rather the progress bias. These biases suggest that though it may not be entirely unbiased, it is more committed to highlighting issues in elections and supporting processes that show true progress towards democratic consolidation. Even with its economic and political situation,

Malawi has held multiple, competitive elections indicating the opening of a political space.

However, this project focuses on competitive authoritarian governments because this political space may not necessarily be “democratic” as defined by Western organizations. Yet, these IOs are supporting processes that are moving towards these ideals despite the conflicting notions of

“democracy” (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia August, 6, 2015). Still, the 2014 election

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highlighted the challenges of placing IO biases into specific categories because, as we observed,

IOs behaved differently at various points in time. This behavior reflects changes in the IO and how it related to the country under observation at a specific moment in time. As a result, these biases may not directly reflect those outlined in the literature and justifies this investigation into the complexities of election observation in developing democracies. The tensions noted during this election, along with the calls for the AU to take over election observation in the region, may redefine approaches to this process moving forward.

Like its counterparts, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) saw an improvement in its election observation mission in 2014. This mission was larger and employed a more comprehensive deployment strategy. However, despite a democratic bias that stemmed from it wanting to emphasize Malawi’s democratic progress, its geographic and political proximity to the country remained problematic. This proximity resulted in the mission not being as critical of the process as it could have been as it was clear that this election had its share of challenges. Consequently, the proximity of the mission to its member state undermined SADC’s potential contribution to the process as it was unable to provide a critical assessment of the election. In addition, by limiting the SADC Parliamentary Forum’s role as an institution within the organization, SADC was not taking full advantage of its partner in the attainment of common goals. Again, this election highlighted the difficulties with categorizing IO behavior, because while SADC’s rhetoric was one of progress and limiting its criticisms to encourage Malawi’s democratic progress, its behavior pointed to a prioritization of relationships with member states.

These mixed signals explain the frustrations expressed with SADC missions where there is an awareness of their presence but little to no understanding of what their roles are (Interviews,

Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014 and July 12, 2014).

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Last, the Commonwealth also showed its increased alignment with the EU-ideal. Paying attention to Malawi’s democratic development, this mission was in response to the adoption of the 2013 charter. This document formally tied to the Commonwealth to its verbalized commitments and established expectations for its member states. Looking at the AU and SADC, we observe similar trends and biases though their motivations differ. The AU and

Commonwealth wanted to encourage democratic institutions in member states, though their definitions on what that is may differ, but SADC wanted to maintain the image of progress to eventually limit the role of election observers in the region. This was evidenced by its inability to produce a final report indicating a lack of commitment on its part. Even SADC PF failed to provide a copy of its final report for these elections. Considering the accusations levied against

SADC, this inability to produce a report is cause for concern.

This chapter examined the behaviors of election observer missions deployed by the four organizations during the 2014 Malawi election. It showed how the mission deployments have changed in response to developments at the IOs, both formally and in response to political stimuli. Figure 10-1 illustrates how the resulting biases can be similar for IOs with inherent differences. Chapter 11 considers the lessons that can be learned about election observation in

Africa from the behaviors of these four organizations in three Malawian elections.

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CHAPTER 11 CONCLUSION

Introduction

International election monitoring is on the rise in developing democracies. With the continued importance placed on successful elections, as one of several keys to encouraging the democratic process in countries where it is not as established, support to elections is often prioritized as central to development efforts. Increasingly, this support is provided through international election monitoring (Norris, Elkit, and Reynolds 2014, 35). With this rise in the demand for election observers, the type of actors involved in observation efforts are changing. In fact, there has been a decrease in the presence of foreign election observers where some IOs have even stopped sending missions (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). Rather than the traditional, Western “experts,” we are seeing a diversification in the organizations deploying missions. These international election monitoring missions now include observers from Africa,

Asia, and Latin America. This work has illustrated that these unconventional actors, though criticized for being biased in comparison to their more established counterparts, have a critical role to play in the field of election observation. These players are redefining our understanding of election observers and the manner in which they influence the democratization process in countries subject to monitoring. In addition, despite their proximity to the elections under observation, these monitors, at times, hold biases similar to those deployed by the more established organizations. Thus, this work argues that attention be paid to these organizations and their potential impact on the process.

This project compared the development of election observation in four international organizations (IOs), two African and two Western, and analyzed the complexity and subjectivity of the process. Of the two Western organizations, one, though categorized as a European

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organization, is mixed, consisting of members from various regions, further highlighting the complexities of IOs involved in election observation. These IOs were placed in two separate categories—those that exist independently of their member states and those that are reflections of powerful states—and evaluated by how these identities influence their respective agendas and priorities. As these priorities and agendas shifted over the years, international organizations responded accordingly. For example, if an organization is concerned with its economic investments in one particular year, we can expect it to behave differently from a year in which political institutions are the main agenda item. Therefore, this project explored the potential links between international organization dispositions, political agendas, and behavior relating to election observation. With increased calls for improved election monitoring procedures, given that “the protection of electoral democracy today and tomorrow requires tools that cannot simply be borrowed from yesterday” (Chan 2017b, np), evaluating the determinants of IO behavior is imperative. Redefining these tools requires an understanding of the politics behind the election observation process.

While this work outlines the trajectories for IO behavior, it also raises critical questions that offer avenues for future exploration. Election observation is a dynamic area and with this comes the constant redefinition of roles played by the various actors. Comparing the development of these four IOs highlights the manner in which politics influence IO behavior.

Each of these organizations has different backgrounds and this project has shown that IOs operate according to these identities. This chapter summarizes the findings of this work and discusses the political implications and limitations of the process based on discussions with those involved. What does the current state of international election observation mean for the process in Africa? Moving forward, are there implications for other regions as well? Finally, I discuss

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how the questions and hypotheses raised in this work will impact my future research agenda. The following section outlines the arguments presented in Chapters 2-7 and what they tell us about the relationships between IO identities and election observation mission behavior.

Election Observation as a Game of International Relations

This work has shown that the political environment in which IOs operate, referred to in this project as “nature,” and the dynamics at the time of a given election influence the behavior of their election observation missions. The literature on international election monitoring expects

IOs to be subject to certain biases when engaging in international election monitoring. These include the glasshouse, progress, special relationship, stability, and subtlety biases (Kelley 2012).

Briefly, the glasshouse bias refers to organizations that are unwilling to challenge elections in certain countries for fear that future elections in other member states would be criticized for undermining democratic norms. Second, the progress bias refers to election monitoring missions that refrain from criticizing an election due to concerns that doing so would interrupt the country’s democratization process. Third, the special relationship bias refers to monitoring in elections where the IOs have personal interests at stake. Expressly, these are situations where special ties to the country under observation result in more lenient verdicts on the mission’s part.

Fourth, the stability bias occurs when organizations consider the impact that their pronouncement on the election will have on the country’s stability and whether it will incite violence. For these IOs, maintaining peace and stability in the country at a specific time is of utmost priority regardless of their mandate. Last, the subtlety bias suggests that IOs overlook subtler cases of fraud and focus on overt forms that occur during the pre-election and election period and in the legal frameworks (Kelley 2012, 65-72). These biases are presented as heuristics, where the lines between them are not always distinct, and can arise for a variety of reasons. Additionally, these biases are not mutually exclusive, so it is possible that an IO might

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promote stability or emphasize progress in one country, due to a special relationship, but not in another, where this special relationship may be absent. Thus, IOs with certain proclivities in one election are not necessarily going to embrace the same ones in another where circumstances differ.

This project argued that specific types of IOs are more prone to certain biases. The literature posits that international organizations can be placed in two major categories, those that serve as tools for influential states (Keohane 1982; Strange 1988; Krasner 2000) and those that can serve as independent agents (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). The IOs in the first category are ones that do not operate independently from the countries that created them, namely from the interests of the vital political and financial players (Keohane 1982). These state- dependent organizations operate according to laws and treaties that tend to grant power to the more powerful states, effectively limiting the voice of the smaller countries (Krasner 2000).

Consequently, scholars in this camp argue that international organizations were created by, and thus operate at the will of, member states (Hansclever, Mayer and Rittberger 2004). As a result, these institutions are not “politically neutral” and are easily influenced by internal politics

(Keohane 1988, 387). Given their lack of political neutrality, these organizations determine their agendas based on the goals of the member states.

The second category consists of organizations created to operate independently from the member states that instituted them. Therefore, these organizations are permitted to make relevant decisions as they see fit. The assumption in this case is that their Secretariats, run by individuals and empowered by the member states, are not subject to scrutiny by Heads of State (Barnett and

Finnemore 2003). Basically, these organizations adapt to the circumstances as dictated by their mandates rather than individual state preferences. This distinction between the categories of IOs

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is essential to understanding how these organizations create their agendas and how their respective political dynamics affect behavior.

Building off this literature on IO types, this project separates the IOs into two heuristic categories: IOs as embodiments of the state and as independent actors. Each of these IOs were expected to behave in a certain manner due to their political proclivities. Specifically, IOs that served as embodiments of the state were expected to prioritize two key agendas: 1) self- preservation by ensuring the survival of the current regime in the country being monitoring and

2) the protection of national economic interests. Given their proclivity to support fellow member states and preserve the political status quo, I expected them to be more likely subject to the glasshouse, special relationship, and subtlety biases.

For these IOs, their mandate may, at times, be at odds with their behavior as a consequence of the intentions of their member states. For example, if a powerful nation has interests in a particular election, or the country itself is being monitored, there is incentive to preserve the incumbent government. As observed in the Zimbabwean example, President Robert

Mugabe, with his legacy in the region, was a critical player in Southern Africa, and as a result, the Head of the AU at the time, former President Thabo Mbeki, showed leniency towards its

2002 election (Tupy 2008). With this identity established at the onset of the AU’s transformation, the effects of this action were still felt by Malawi’s 2004 election. As a result, the tendency to protect member states still pervaded and influenced the AU’s 2004 mission to

Malawi. The AU, as a recently re-imagined organization, was still grappling with the

Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) legacy where challenges to member states were not the norm. Considering this goal of preserving member states, the organization was subject to glasshouse bias, in line with the expectations put forth. For organizations seeking to establish

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themselves, there exists a crisis of identity created by the discordance between their mandate to uphold democratic norms and the political demands of influential member states. Furthermore, these organizations endorse elections as a means of protecting future political interests and the stability of the country being monitored. Again, we observed this pattern with Malawi’s 2004 election as the AU focused its energies on ensuring its survival as a new organization.

In addition, the tensions that arise within the organization are more likely to shape its operations and dictate decisions made on the part of its observer missions. Effectively, the political decisions made on the part of influential countries risk undermining any decisions made on the part of the IO’s Secretariat. An example of this was observed with SADC during

Malawi’s 2014 election. Even after deploying several election observation missions over the years, SADC’s Secretariat found itself at odds with the priorities of its Heads of States. While the

Executive Secretary, Tomáz Salomão, announced that SADC was there in its capacity to support the democratic progress in the country, and the mission appeared to align itself accordingly, the reality was the complete opposite. For its mission leader, Swaziland’s Minister of Labor and

Social Security of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Magobetane Patrick Mamba, the aim was to highlight the country’s democratic progress as a means of creating an image of the process. So, during this election, all semblance of support for democracy was intentionally aimed at furthering SADC’s goal of decreasing dependence on election observation missions. This is an example of how IOs can manage rhetoric and perceptions to further their respective goals. This behavior highlights the fluidity of biases and how a certain bias can be attributed to an IO that one does not anticipate for varying reasons.

The financial endowments of certain member states allow them to further manipulate the political system. Specifically, these larger, more financially capable countries are able to send

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bilateral missions rather than place their efforts on intergovernmental missions. In addition, these states are able to capitalize on the connections created by their presence in the country, for example, with an embassy. This undermines efforts on the part of IOs that rely on member dues because as countries, like South Africa, send their own missions to countries, they are unable to support organizations in which they play a major role. Without consistent funding, these IOs are unable to deploy as effective and reliable missions. Economic concerns such as these are shared by both categories of IOs, but for the IOs that reflect state interests, these concerns are often driven by an interest in maintaining economic relations with these influential countries. Again, we see a usurping of democratic values as the apparent commitment to democratic ideals is tied to ensuring economic support. So, IOs have to navigate these relationships to achieve certain goals.

Organizations established as regional economic communities, like SADC and the

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), were founded to support economic development in their member countries. As such, one can expect this notion of survival to be more prominent among these organizations, especially when it comes to ensuring the stability of the organization. Without political stability, even if that stability is not built on the Western ideals of democracy, the organization is unable to secure the economic development of its member states. Regional instability has implications for the larger, more economically viable countries, so as previously discussed, they tend to have a larger role to play in these affairs. For such organizations, the holding of the elections is sufficient, even in cases where additional involvement might be needed (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, July 9, 2015). An example of this singular focus on electoral outcome was SADC in Malawi’s 2009 election as SADC claims to always “protect national interests” (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). However,

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protecting these national interests requires navigating and balancing the political relationships with member states. For this reason, its mission was driven by the goal of maintaining stability in the region considering the ongoing political tensions in Zimbabwe and Madagascar at the time

(Massey and Baker 2013). Consequently, the organization is constantly limited by its tendency towards “regional politicking” (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11, 2014).

The situation is further complicated by the manner in which SADC deploys its missions.

Considering that SADC observers, until 2015, were deployed by their respective states, and the

Secretariat had no means of managing its missions (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 5,

2015). Other examples include Lesotho in 2015 where SADC announced the election to be

“peaceful, transparent, credible, free and fair,” due to its proximity to South Africa, despite clear challenges with the process (SEOM 2015, 8). Zimbabwe’s ties to South Africa also led to inaction in its 2002, 2008, and 2013 elections where blatant violations to its electoral process were ignored by key regional players. Overall, these state dependent IOs tend to be limited in their actions and ability to fully engage with their purported mandates.

The second category of IOs are those that act independently from the countries that created them. As discussed in Chapter 2, these institutions tend to “act above the level of intergovernmental cooperation” thus limiting their exposure to potential manipulation by powerful countries (Andrew 2007, 3). Taking this factor into consideration, I expected that these organizations would be better able to execute their mandates and tended to focus on 1) the promotion of a democratic agenda, and 2) establishing themselves as effective, neutral actors.

For these IOs, ensuring that democratic institutions are supported is at the core of their agenda and the goal is to support all efforts that facilitate the democratization process. Therefore, the

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expectation is that these organizations would be subject to the stability, progress, or subtlety biases.

For these organizations, the prioritization of promoting democracy yields a proclivity to progress and subtlety biases, which allows the organization to comment on electoral proceedings, but in a manner that encourages, rather than undermines, the process. These biases indicate the

IOs’ emphasis on democracy promotion, supporting the rule of law, and encouraging the capacity of institutions in efforts to promote political development. In this case, it is still imperative that IOs give the impression that the elections were properly assessed as their perceptions as neutral actors are dependent upon their behavior, or how they are perceived to behave, during an election.

However, as this work highlighted, these ideal types are not static and IOs, with their shifting agendas and priorities, are not bound to a certain identity. Rather, as organizations adapt different protocols, or seek to establish themselves differently in the international arena, their identities and behavior change accordingly. In addition, there is overlap in their biases indicating that there is some fluidity between the two categories. Such mobility signals that an inclination towards a certain bias at one point in an IO’s history does not imply that this bias will be the same at another. Also, as certain organizations become more politically relevant, they alter the behavior of the others. In this project, I referred to this as the political space that IOs have to operate in. Specifically, this term refers to an IO’s ability to undertake its responsibilities without concern of negatively affecting a fellow IO or the country under observation. For example, as

African IO’s began to challenge Western observers, it effectively limited the political role of these foreign observers. Prior to the increased vocalization of discontent with foreign observers, and before the AU’s pronouncement in 2011 and former Nigerian President Olusegun

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Obasanjo’s public statement in 2013, these Western observers were viewed as essential to election observation. But, as African organizations take on a larger role, actions of these Western actors are being placed under further scrutiny thus limiting their political space.

Chapters 4-7 outlined the political development of the European Union (EU), the African

Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth). In assessing the political development of these IOs, it was clear that IOs change over time and the positions in which they are placed at a specific time influences their behavior. Therefore, these chapters illustrated the point above that the organizations exist on more of a spectrum than as rigid ideal types, with the EU (in 2004 and 2009) most representative of the more independent organizations, and SADC (in 2004) representing an organization that is influenced by powerful nations. SADC, though to a lesser extent, still falls into this category, especially in comparison to the other three organizations under observation.

The EU earned its status as the standard in international election observation thanks to its commitment to sending long-term missions and allocating significant funds to the preparation and execution of its missions. Given its financial advantage, the EU is able to undertake larger and more efficient missions. On the other end, SADC has not shown the same level of commitment as its European counterpart, though in recent years it has shown an increased adherence to supporting the democratic values it claims to embody. Instead of being transparent and open in its process, SADC has not been open in the availability of its reports and has not worked with partner organizations as it should. As a result, it has been more easily manipulated by its larger, more powerful states, resulting in an organization that struggles to establish itself as a strong actor in election observation. The AU and Commonwealth fall within the spectrum with the Commonwealth being more independent than both the AU and SADC, but less so than the

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EU. While the AU is progressively moving away from dependence upon powerful states when it comes to election observation, these efforts are still limited by member state politics. For the AU, it is not in its best interest to “set fire to [its] own house, then turn around and quench it”

(Interview, Addis Ababa, August 6, 2015). That is, the AU does not view its role as one that involves actively seeking to undermine its member state only to fix the problems that arise from its criticism of the country’s electoral process. Still, despite their limited objectivity when compared to the EU, both the AU and SADC have taken a more vocal role in election observation over time. With this increased presence on the part of regional actors, there is a sense that the tolerance for Western actors is decreasing, which has implications beyond the time period of interest to this project (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 19, 2014). These changes will continue to shape the behavior of election monitoring missions in Africa.

Chapters 4-7 also highlighted that the shifts in identity influenced the IOs purported biases. In the case of the AU, an organization limited by its membership at its inception, it is establishing itself as a key political partner to its member states and seeking to support democratic institutions even if doing so means criticizing a member state. While it has not reached the EU’s level in terms of mission financing and objectivity, the AU is showing proclivities to biases that are often attributed to more independent organizations. Again, this draws attention to the fact that all IOs have biases. The following section outlines what can be learnt from Malawi’s 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections and what this means for other developing democracies.

Political Implications and Limitations of Election Observation in Africa

Ideally, election observation should contribute to fairer elections and institutions, especially with the increase in African observers that are more familiar with the challenges of the democratic process on the continent. These organizations understand the intricacies of

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democratization in Africa and are able to discern between the issues that truly impede an election versus those that are a consequence of regime limitations. However, as this project has highlighted, there are challenges to the observation process that arise from the political relationships within and among IOs. For example, many of these member states have relationships with one another which can have drawbacks for the process as the IOs’ behavior is limited by how these countries interact (Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014). Therefore, with regional politics taking center stage, the electoral process is not always given the priority it deserves. Rather, the elections serve as a political arena for the expression of IO agendas and interests. The type of IO also matters in this situation: Whether an organization is Western or

African, determines not only its behavior, but how it is perceived by political stakeholders. This work highlighted that interests differ between the organizations composed of all African countries, all Western countries, and mixed.

As demonstrated in Chapters 8-10, these interests have a direct effect on the political space in which IOs operate and the behavior of their election observation missions. Most importantly, these interests shift in response to the IOs’ priorities during a given time period and their capacities change with the adoption of certain protocols. For example, if an organization adopts extensive election observation guidelines then there are fewer avenues for the biases that tend to define the IOs that are less independent. In such cases, we observe the IOs behaving differently from previous elections. Over the three elections in Malawi, we saw this evolution as organizations exhibited certain biases in one election and a different set in subsequent ones while certain IOs were subject to the same biases over multiple electoral cycles. For example, the EU in 2004 was focused on supporting Malawi’s democratization process and encouraging the development of its institutions. However, in 2009, the EU’s increased cooperation and

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development efforts in Malawi, given the country’s difficulties in establishing strong domestic institutions, raised a concern in the viability of its projects. At this point, it was in the organization’s best interest to scale back on its criticisms in order to encourage the stability of the state considering Malawi’s increasingly fragile political environment. This led to EU’s shift from a propensity to the progress bias in 2004 to the stability bias in 2009. Another example is the Commonwealth that showed a proclivity to the special relationship bias in both 2004 and

2009, due to the importance placed on establishing itself as a political partner to its member countries, and shifted to the progress bias in 2014. This progress bias was more in line with its mandate to support democracy in member states but the tensions associated with it being composed of former colonies subverting this goal in earlier elections. These findings, then, indicate that politics are not stagnant and IO behaviors are often in response to the ongoing political pressures at a given time.

The Malawian elections illustrated the biases put forth but also highlighted that these biases are not exhaustive. As IOs increasingly engage in election observation and are faced with changing political incentives, their behavior tends to reflect these variations. Namely, as African organizations become more central in addressing the political affairs of member countries, amid calls for a ban on non-African election observer missions monitoring polls in Africa, the Western organizations have to adapt accordingly. For example, the EU showed signs of political retreat during the 2014 Malawian election. Even though it was focused on significant cases of fraud during the election, the EU’s decision to overlook the subtler forms of fraud was its way of not focusing on every issue that arose during this process. Doing so would have solidified the impression that the EU sought to undermine the country under observation. In addition, this retreat by the EU signals its shift in behavior given the changing political environment. While

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this is an early example of this shifting political space, more recent events have emphasized this dynamic. One example is Rwanda, a country that has vocalized its apprehension regarding

Western actors on multiple occasions. One such occasion was when President Paul Kagame expressed his discontent with the European Union, in July 2017, after it questioned the Rwandan

Electoral Commission regarding its rejection of a presidential aspirant (Akwei and Athman 2017;

Ssuuna 2017). According to Kagame, “diplomatic missions [in Rwanda] are not and should not replace the electoral commission” (Akwei and Athman 2017). These statements reflect his longstanding position against Western influence in Africa and drew attention to this move by certain African leaders to limit the role that foreign actors play in their national affairs (ibid.).

Interestingly, the EU announced in May 2017 that it would be sending its observers to Kenya but not Rwanda. It has been suggested that the EU’s criticism of Rwanda’s 2015 referendum was the reason behind this decision, but the EU claimed that a mission would not be sent due to limited resources and that it felt that “there will be no surprises in Rwanda” (Mugisha 2017). This situation offers a clear example of how national politics can influence decisions made on the part of IOs, regardless of whether or not the countries in question are member states. Though it may not be able to articulate its position as openly as the AU, the EU does have to respond to political issues in the region, and as discussed earlier in this work, the politics surrounding elections influence IO behavior. This situation illustrates the challenges that exist for organizations that serve as both donors and election observers and how they have to account for the political implications of their behavior.

Relatedly, another example are the Joint Communiqués issued prior to and following the

2017 Kenyan election (EU EOM 2017a, 2017b). In these documents, there is a clear emphasis on

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the shared goals of the various international organizations,1 a marked shift from the early years of election observation as Western organizations recognize the role that African organizations have in this process. Here, we see the Western organizations’ awareness that their involvement has ramifications. The African organizations are being given the opportunity to take the lead on these efforts and this process is being facilitated by the traditional actors through the provision of technical training and financial support that allows for the institutionalization of election observation within these organizations. This reality has serious consequences for the process of election observation in Africa, as these African organizations do not always agree with the protocols set forth by these Western institutions and are often torn between these sometimes divergent positions (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, August 6, 2015). So, despite securing financing from organizations like the EU, their growing political presence empowers African organizations to subvert these protocols where they see fit. A clear example of this is the ambiguity between observer and monitor. For Western organizations, like the EU and

Commonwealth, their observer mission protocols clearly separate the organizations from the election under observation. In their case, it is imperative that the country under observation is aware that the mission is objective and that this fact be made clear to all political stakeholders.

On the other hand, African organizations embrace the mentality that they have the ability, and duty, to support the electoral process by any means necessary. This was emphasized during meetings with AU and SADC stakeholders and supported by members of the Malawian population.

1 These joint communiqués were issued by the African Union, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Commonwealth, the East African Community (EAC), the European Union, the International Conference of the Great Lake Region (ICGLR), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), and The Carter Center (TCC).

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By blurring the lines between observer and monitor, represented by former Southern

African President Thabo Mbeki’s call for AU intervention where necessary, election observation is no longer just an opportunity to observe and comment on electoral proceedings (du Plessis

2017). Instead, the AU, and African organizations more generally, have a mandate to encourage their member states rather than reject their elections outright like the EU (Interview, Addis

Ababa, August 5, 2015). In addition, key players in Malawian civil society felt that the EU, with its assumption that its role was to “evaluate” the 2014 election, was unsure as to what its role was. This uncertainty highlights how observer roles have to shift with the political environment

(Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, July 11, 2014). According to members of Malawian civil society, election observers, as they currently operate, are being underutilized and should do more than just observe an election (ibid.). With the rising number of observers present at elections, these changes in attitude are important and raise questions regarding the role of election observers. For example, there were an estimated 5,000 observers at the 2017 Kenyan election, up from 1,834 in

2013 (Oruko and Kimanthi 2017). Though Kenya garnered significant interest, due to the violence that occurred following its 2007 election, this influx of observers in Kenya, and in other countries across Africa, emphasizes the potential impact of these actors. In particular, with the pressures on election observers, one must ask what purpose these 5,000 observers served? As this project as outlined, this is determined by the political stakeholders involved, and as these actors change, so do the guidelines for election observation.

Chapters 8-10, then, illustrated how politics determine the manner in which missions are carried out. These chapters demonstrated how IO interests affected the leniency of their missions and the biases they had. In addition, the respective IOs’ notion of what constituted “democratic elections” also determined what their observation missions chose to focus on during the elections

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and how they formulated their reports. Earlier elections saw the IOs deviate, in varying degrees, from the EU standard protocol, and despite differences in background, agenda, and priorities, there were overlaps regarding their biases. This supports the argument that all organizations, regardless of their history with election observation, face political limitations. Most importantly, these chapters emphasized that these biases are not stagnant and change with the political environment in which the IOs operate. The biases shift in response to changing economic and political pressures and as the organizations align their election observation protocols with their varying modes of operation.

For IOs, the variable nature of relationships between member states, with other international organizations, and with the country under observation, lead to modifications in their behavior. We saw this with the AU’s transition from the glasshouse to stability to progress bias over three election cycles; the EU’s transition from progress to stability to subtlety; SADC’s shift from the special relationship to stability to the progress bias; and the Commonwealth’s subjectivity to the special relationship bias for two years followed by the progress bias in the last electoral cycle. These changes are representative of those that occur in other elections. Notably, these changes are a result of shifting political roles. As indicated by the AU’s move taking a more central role in election observation, IOs behave according to their respective goals. For the

Commonwealth, after a certain point, being bound by the relationships between member states was undermining its ability to move its mandate for democracy promotion forward, leading to its shift in behavior. For the EU, the increased emphasis on supporting African organizations to enable them to undertake such missions themselves, coupled with the fact that Western organizations were being seen as re-introducing a form of imperialism on African countries, led to it shifting its approach to election observation. Especially, it is increasingly adopting a more

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inclusive approach and sharing the responsibility for election observation with the non- traditional actors. These changes highlight the dynamic nature of election monitoring and how it is constantly determined by the political agenda of all the players.

As mentioned earlier, the notion of democracy differs between that embraced by the West and that employed by the African organizations under investigation. Specifically, the AU considers the current perceptions of liberal democracy to be a “borrowed system” where its suitability for the African context is questioned (Interview, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, August 6,

2015). For the AU, social or developmental democracy would be more in line with what its countries are trying to achieve (ibid.). In a similar vein, SADC has its own notion of good politics, one that reflects the national interests of its member states and does not necessarily reflect that argued for by the West (Interview, Gaborone, Botswana, June 26, 2015). This is a position acknowledged by Western actors as well, and as observed with the EU’s apparent political retreat, has an effect on approaches to election observation in the region (MGPDD 2004,

12).

The Malawian elections highlighted the challenge of placing international organizations into set categories and suggested that changing interests of these IOs is what contributes to the complexity of election observation. Despite moves towards standardizing these missions, and the converging of protocols and demonstrations of increasingly similar mission behaviors, the process is not an objective one. Moving beyond the Malawian elections, we observed these trends as recently as 2017. Again, in Kenya’s case, the election was lauded as fair by all international actors who wanted to see the country progress towards stronger domestic institutions with the EU reporting that it saw no signs or apparent fraud, and John Kerry, head of the United States mission, calling the election “a remarkable statement to Africa and the world

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about [Kenya’s] democracy” (Lewis 2017, np; Wairimu 2017). However, soon after it was held, the Kenyan Supreme Court nullified the results, citing numerous irregularities, and called for a new vote within 60 days (Adamcyzk 2017; Peralta 2017). The position that the election was without significant faults was shared by all IOs, even the EU that one expects to be more discerning. Even after the announcement that new polls would be held, the EU stood by its conviction that Kenya continued to serve as an example of democracy on the continent: “As friends, we want to deepen our partnership with Kenya as it moves forward in building this great country. At this historic time, we stand with all Kenyans as they support and reaffirm their democracy, which is an example for Africa and the world” (EU 2017c, np).

This discrepancy between the pronouncement made by the IOs and the Supreme Court’s decision draws attention to IO interests and incentives, emphasizing the fact that all organizations are involved in the process to achieve certain goals. Similar calls were made regarding Malawi’s 2014 election, supporting the need for a closer look at the players in election observation and the implications of their behavior. The mixed signals sent by these organizations, for example, claiming to be advancing a democratic agenda but engaging in behavior that demonstrates otherwise, has serious implications for the viability of election observation as a process. Specifically, this ambiguity adds to the confusion regarding what IO roles are when it comes to elections (Interviews, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014 and July 12,

2014). This lack of clarity certainly encourages the sentiment that IOs pursue this endeavor for self-serving reasons rather than in the interests of the citizens in the countries under observation

(Field Notes, April 2014-September 2015).

Malawi serves as one example of the effects that IO politics has on election observation and this work has pointed to other situations where similar dynamics have been at play. IO

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behavior in Malawi has implications for understanding how they operate in other countries. The following section concludes this project and outlines further avenues for exploration.

Conclusions and Future Projects

As the Kenyan, Malawian, Rwandan, Zimbabwean cases, among others, have illustrated, the politics of election observation are a never-ending game. With the players taking on different roles in the process, there is a need to continue asking questions as to what this means for election observation in Africa and in other parts of the world. Consequently, this dissertation has argued for increased attention to the role that African IOs play in election monitoring. It has emphasized that the biases, of which these organizations are accused, do mimic those of their more established counterparts. As these organizations adopt the protocols and processes of the

European Union and adapt them to their own interests, the field of election observation is shifting. The increased involvement of these IOs has implications beyond election observation.

Their involvement highlights the role that African organizations can play in member state politics and how their personal agendas and biases affect their behavior during these interventions.

Organizations like the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development

Community (SADC) are redefining how organizations like the European Union (EU) are approaching the process. The EU is gradually deferring to these organizations in order to ensure the legitimacy of its process. As African organizations adopt the standards employed by their more established counterparts, we observe a convergence in behaviors highlighting that these organizations are not as different as originally thought. Political agendas and biases have always, and will continue, to determine IO behavior, and as the players in international election monitoring continue to shift, so will the political game. As one AU official stated, the fact that the political actors in election observation all know each other can have its drawbacks

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(Interview, Lilongwe, Malawi, May 30, 2014). Explicitly, as observed earlier in this work, the actions of one IO can have a bearing on those of another. Reiterating what was established in earlier chapters, IOs do not operate in a vacuum and their political environment has substantial effects on how missions behave.

However, to truly solidify this space in the international environment and their role in member states, the African organizations will have to improve their legal documents because the lack of clarity in these documents lead to uncertainty on the ground and as observed, the ambiguity allows for the missions to undertake behaviors that veer from what is stated without much repercussion. Second, there is the need to ensure real political commitment on the part of the leaders of member states, and of IO leadership, to adhere to their legal documents adopted by the organizations. In addition, it is crucial that the organizations improve on their cooperation efforts. One common complaint was that partnerships were not reliable and this led to the underutilization of the resources available (Fieldwork, Gaborone, Botswana; Addis Abba,

Ethiopia, 2015). This is especially the case for SADC that has established partnerships with organizations like the SADC Parliamentary Forum, SADC Electoral Commissions Forum, and

SADC Non-Governmental Organizations but do not fully utilize them. Such relationships would strengthen SADC’s role in election observation and as a political player in the region and would hold it more accountable to other international organizations as well as civil society groups.

This project sought to highlight the importance of focusing on African organizations as they emerge as key players in international relations. However, there were challenges during the execution of this work. Theoretically, there could have been more engagement with the IO literature to further highlight how this project links this body to work to that on international election observation. From a practical standpoint, there were limitations in terms of data

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collection due to sensitive nature of certain documents. An example of this is the earlier SADC election observation reports, which would contribute to a richer understanding of its decisions and behavior. Additionally, I unfortunately did not have the opportunity to travel to the European

Union and Commonwealth of Nations headquarters. Talking to the actors within these organizations rather than relying on secondary sources and their counterparts in Malawi, would have allowed me to further tease out the relationships I investigate in this dissertation.

Future research will continue to examine these changing dynamics and test the hypotheses raised in this project in other regions. Specifically, I would like to explore the dynamics of election observation by the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), and examine how SADC’s counterpart deals with its process and interacts with organizations like the AU and the EU. As elections in Africa continue to be subject to observation, for example, there were thirteen presidential elections in 2015,2 fourteen in 2016,3 and four as of August 2017,4 it is imperative to increase our understanding of how African organizations define their role as observers and how they are adapting their policies and protocols in response to the ever-changing global dynamic (EISA 2017). Their perspectives and behaviors have implications for how we approach election observation by similar actors in other regions. Future research should also explore the implications of election observation in other parts of the world. Specifically, scholars must consider whether the trends observed in Southern

2 The countries that held elections in 2015 Burundi, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Seychelles, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, and Zambia (EISA 2017).

3 In 2016, presidential elections were held in Benin, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, The Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Niger, São Tomé & Principe, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zanzibar (EISA 2017).

4 As of August 2017, elections have been held in Angola, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, with several scheduled for later in the year.

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Africa are present in other regions and how the process in other areas can contribute to our understanding of the role of political interests in election observation.

Moving forward, election observation, due to the nature of elections, will continue to be a source of political contention. As stated by several political stakeholders, as long as elections continue to be manipulated by governments, there will always be need for election observers.

Yet, how this process will look ten years from now, given its subjectivity to political bias, is uncertain.

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APPENDIX A LINKING AGENDAS, BIASES, AND BEHAVIOR

Nature

IOs as IOs as independent embodiments of actors the state

Self-preservation by Establishing ensuring the survival of the themselves as current regime in the effective, neutral Protection of Promotion of a country being monitored actors national economic democratic agenda interests

Glasshouse, Special Relationship, and Stability, Progress, and Subtlety Biases Subtlety biases

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APPENDIX B LIST OF VARIABLES

Afrobarometer

Area (District/Country/Province/Region) Identity Support for democracy Rating of previous system Rating of current system Extent of democracy Satisfaction with democracy Vote does not matter versus vote matters Honest elections Perception of previous elections Trust in the president Trust in the electoral commission Malawi Electoral Commission preparedness How helpful the citizens perceive the African Union, Southern African Development Community, United Nations, European Union, and international non-governmental organizations to be

National Elections across Democracy (NELDA)

Date of the elections Whether regular elections were suspended before the election in question Were these the first multiparty elections? Whether opposition was allowed? Were there significant concerns as to the freedom and fairness of the election? Were international monitors present, and if so, were monitors present? Were some monitors denied the opportunity to be present by the government holding the elections? Did any monitors refuse to go to an election because they believed it would be fraudulent? Is the country said to have a substantial, economic, military, or political relationship with a Western country?

Data on International Election Monitoring 1980-2004 (DIEM)

Pre-election, post-election, and final documents (and paged numbers for each document) coded Number of persons in the observer delegation Number of days that the delegation is in the country Joint observation mission Monitoring organization code Total number of observers present on election day Domestic observers

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Number of domestic observers Number of pre-election assessment visits Number of press statements issues before the election Training of domestic monitors Legal advice provided regarding election administration Voter education Observed campaign rallies Logistical support Observation of voting and counting

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APPENDIX C EU ELECTION OBSERVERS CODE OF CONDUCT

“The Code of Conduct for EU Election Observers was established by the Council Decision 9262/98 and is included as Annex III of the 2000 EC Communication on Election Assistance and Observation (COM 191).” – European Union.

1. Observers will respect the laws of the land. They enjoy no special immunities as international observers, unless the host country so provides. 2. Observers will participate in all pre-election briefings with their supervising officers. 3. Observers will be subject to the direction and management of the observer team leadership, carrying out their written terms of reference and covering the geographical schedules specified by team leaders. 4. Observers should be aware of the presence of other electoral observation groups, and liaise with them under the direction of the EU EOM leadership. 5. Observers will carry with them prescribed identification issued by the host government or election management body, and will identify themselves to any interested authority upon request. 6. Observers will maintain strict impartiality in the conduct of their duties, and shall at no time express any bias or preference in relation to national authorities, parties, candidates, or with reference to any issues in contention in the election process. 7. Observers will not display or wear any partisan symbols, colors or banners. 8. Observers will undertake their duties in an unobtrusive manner, and will not disrupt or interfere with the election process, polling day procedures, or the vote count. 9. Observers may bring irregularities to the attention of the election officials, but will not give instructions or countermand decisions of the election officials. 10. Observers will base all conclusions on well documented, factual, and verifiable evidence, and will keep a record of the polling stations and other relevant places that they visit. 11. Observers will refrain from making any personal or premature comments about their observations to the media or any other interested persons, but should provide, through a designated liaison officer or spokesperson, general information about the nature of their activities as observers. 12. Observers will participate in post-election de-briefings with their supervising officers and will contribute fully towards EU reports on the elections being observed. 13. Observers must comply with all national laws and regulations. Was there limited freedom of assembly or movement about the country, they must note where such rules prevent them from carrying out their duties. 14. At all times during the mission, including during private time away from work, each election observer should behave blamelessly, exercise sound judgement, and observe the highest level of personal discretion.

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APPENDIX D OVERVIEW OF THE EU’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS

Receive invitation to observe Selection of priority countries Send an exploratory mission for observation the election

Typical mission is composed of: Chief observer, deputy chief HRVP appoints the chief The time of departure prior to observer, core team experts, observer and experts for the the election is dependent upon project manager, analysts, press core team are compiled by the the type of mission officer, STOs, LTOs, and Commission from a pool locally recruited STOs

Press conference Mission size and structure is Meet with election officials, LTOs deployed about a month determined by findings of the political parties, candidates, prior exploratory mission. one factor civil society, media, and the EU is political significance Delegations STOs arrive shortly before election day

Final report is issued one to two months after the mission is Preliminary findings shared two complete and includes after polling recommendations for electoral STOs are debriefed and depart reform and improvements to the LTOs leave two weeks later process

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APPENDIX E OVERVIEW OF THE AU’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS

Deployment of a Pre- Invitation from National election Assessment Team Government. All elections that establishes the subject to monitoring after feasibility of an AUEOM or 2007, invitation is a given other intervention

Deployment of STO, LTO, or TAM missions. LTOs were only formalized in the Selection of observers 2013 Election Observation Guidelines

Report issued 30 days after Post-election audit the election

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APPENDIX F OVERVIEW OF SADC’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS

Observers dispatched by STOs arrive in country Receive invitation to member countries (as of and monitor (LTOs were observe elections 2015 they are selected by only formalized in 2015) the SADC Secretariat)

Issue final report to Make preliminary Follow SADC protocols national government and statement following in assessing the political other political election environment stakeholders

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APPENDIX G OVERVIEW OF THE COMMONWEALTH’S ELECTION OBSERVATION PROTOCOLS

An asssement team is If accepted, an observer team Commonwealth deployed to determine is established consisting of Secretariat is invited to whether the invitation "eminent persons" - 10 to 12 monitor the election can be accepted observers for the larger missions

Mission is given a Mission drafts a final checklist to follow and Mission is deployed for a report with the once voting is complete maximum of two weeks Secretariat team and the observers return to unless on a "special departs the capital to issue their mission" interim statement

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APPENDIX F SEOM OBSERVER PROFILE

1. Observers should be citizens of the respective Member State nominating them. 2. Observers should be in good health and sound physical condition to undertake the election observation assignments. 3. Observers should possess basic knowledge of the history of the SADC region. 4. Observers should possess basic knowledge of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 5. Observers should possess basic knowledge of electoral systems and processes within the SADC region. 6. Observers should be prepared to undergo intensive election training organized by the SADC Secretariat. 7. Observers should be prepared to spend indeterminable lengths of time outside their own country. 8. Observers should be prepared to abide by the Code of Conduct for SEOMs stipulated in section 10 of these SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 9. Observers should be reasonably competent to undertake electoral observation. 10. Observers should have basic knowledge of any or all of the official languages of SADC, (English, Portuguese and French). 11. Observers should have no criminal record.

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APPENDIX G SEOM ELECTORAL OBSERVATION AND REPORTING GUIDELINES

These are excerpts taken from the SEOM General Guidelines for Electoral Observation and Reporting (SADC 2015: 18).

13.2 Pre-Election Period

13.2.1 Accreditation is essential for the fulfilment of the SEOM’s and the SEAC’s mandate; therefore, the EMBs, as one of the principal institutions responsible for accrediting domestic and foreign observers as well as party agents, shall ensure that accreditation is done in a timely manner, upon arrival, to enable individual observers’ access to all parts of the country.

13.2.1 In this regard, SEOMs should ascertain whether the requirement for timely accreditation of party agents and observers, upon arrival, enabling individual observers’ access to all geographical areas of the country holding elections is obliged to by the EMB.

13.2.2 In order to evaluate the Implementation of the “SADC Principles for Conducting Democratic Elections” and “Responsibilities of Member States Holding Elections”, contained in sections four (4) and five (5) respectively, the SEOM shall assess whether the legal and constitutional framework guarantees freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and human rights.

13.2.3 Accordingly, the structure and model of the electoral system, the EMB, the Electoral Act and regulations and the nature of civil and political rights; and economic, social and cultural rights as they relate to democratic participation shall be assessed.

13.2.4 SEOMs shall evaluate the establishment, process of appointment and retention of members of EMBs; in addition to assessing the composition, status, independence, impartiality, professionalism and preparedness of the EMB for the election. Accordingly, the following specific considerations shall be taken into account:

(a) The adequacy of funding and contingencies availed to the EMB to deliver a credible and legitimate election; (b) Whether the EMB’s budget is appropriated by Parliament or other representative institution; (c) Whether the composition of the EMB reflects the applicable provisions of the SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, particularly Articles 12 and 13 of the Protocol, which stipulate that State Parties that have ratified the Protocol, shall endeavor, by 2015, to have at least 50 percent women in decision making positions, including electoral administration. (d) Whether appointment and dismissal procedures of EMB commissioners are explicitly stated and articulated to facilitate impartiality, accountability and transparency.

13.2.5 In furtherance of the values of Electoral Justice, the SEOM shall ensure that the delimitation of election boundaries was done in a manner acceptable to stakeholders, and whether the factors that prompted delimitation were in accordance with the laws of the land. To this end, the following elements shall be assessed:

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(a) The independence and impartiality of the Delimitation/Border Commission; (b) The composition of the Delimitation/Border Commission; (c) The criteria for appointing members of the Delimitation/Border Commission; (d) The accessibility of the delimitation process to the general public; (e) Whether the delimitation process was undertaken in accordance with the national law and without undue exclusion of particular groups or political interests.

13.2.6 That the registration of political parties, qualification and disqualification of political candidates are explicitly provided for in national laws. There should be no stringent exclusionary elements in the regulatory framework of political party and candidate registration. Therefore, the following aspects should be observed and assessed by the SEOM:

(a) Whether criteria for registration of political parties and candidates is explicitly defined in the laws and transparently executed; (b) The existence of appeal processes and mechanisms upon disqualification of political parties or candidates; (c) The procedures for nomination and provision of reasonable time frames to allow political parties and candidates to comply with the requirements of the registration process; (d) The existence of a Code of Conduct governing all political parties and candidates; (e) The incidence of international interference in the electoral process, through proscribed financial contributions to electoral contestants, or other activities; (f) Funding to political parties for campaigns, and campaign spending are transparent and oversight of both is in accordance to the laws of the land; (g) The use of public assets and funds for electoral campaigns, including impartial application and their improper use for the electoral advantage of particular political parties, candidates or supporters; (h) The application of anti-corruption laws and other safeguards in the electoral context, including protections for those who expose election related corruption; (i) The neutrality of the security forces in providing election security; and the existence of requisite special voting facilities for security forces to enable them cast their votes; (j) The requirements and practices regarding direct and indirect access to the mass media for political parties, candidates, supporters and the general public; (k) The requirements and practices concerning reporting by state controlled, public and private media about political parties, candidates and supporters or opponents of referendum initiatives, including quantitative and qualitative coverage of electoral contestants and issues that are pertinent to voter choices in elections or referenda; (l) The ability of political parties, candidates and supporters and opponents of referendum initiatives to campaign freely for the support of prospective voters.

13.3 Civic and Voter Education

Member States agree that civic and voter education are indispensable to democratic consolidation, as they allow for the electorate to make informed choices on who decides on their governance priorities. To this end, SEOMs shall assess:

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13.3.1 The capacity and quality of civic and voter education programmes to afford all prospective voters accurate, comprehensible and adequate information upon which to make electoral choices;

13.3.1.1 The adequacy of civic and voter education conducted particularly by state agencies, inter alia, information about where, when, how and why to register and to vote;

13.3.1.2 The adequacy of civic and voter education in relation to the necessary guarantees of the secrecy of the ballot.

13.4 Voter Registration The SEOMs shall assess:

13.4.1 The ability of eligible persons to register to vote and have their required information appear accurately on the voter registry and voter lists;

13.4.2 The extent to which the process enjoys the trust of the electorate, including inclusiveness, accuracy, and transparency, and whether the electorate are able to own and identify with the process;

13.4.3 The sustainability, appropriateness and cost-effectiveness of electoral and voter registration technologies;

13.4.4 Whether there have been regular consultations and engagement by the EMB with all stakeholders by way of trainings, briefings, and dialogue throughout the entire electoral process.

13.5 Election Period

During the Election period, the SEOMs shall assess:

13.5.1 The appropriateness of locations of polling stations, and adequacy and accessibility of their facilities;

13.5.2 The production and distribution to polling stations and storage of ballots and other sensitive election materials;

13.5.3 The presence of special voting mechanisms, in line with national laws;

13.5.4 Whether elderly and incapacitated voters as well as expectant mothers are accorded preference when voting;

13.5.5 The conduct of voting, including assistance to voters, counting, tabulation and announcement of results; the transparency of procedures and adequacy of safeguards against inaccuracies.

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13.6 Post-Election Period

During the Post-election period, the SEOMs shall assess:

13.6.1 The conduct of procedures and processes concerning electoral complaints and challenges by citizens, prospective voters, those seeking election, including the provision of effective remedies for violations of electoral related rights;

13.6.2 The conduct of administrative, civil and criminal processes concerning alleged violations of laws and regulations regarding electoral related rights and responsibilities, including application of appropriate penalties; and

13.6.2.1 The development of changes to electoral related laws, rules, regulations and administrative procedures preceding and following elections;

13.6.2.2 Whether the EMB would convene a Post-Election Review, and gather information concerning any follow-up arrangements that would enable the implementation of recommendations of SEOMs;

13.6.2.3 Accordingly, the SEAC, in conformity with section 1.2.2 of the SEAC Structures, Rules and Procedures, shall collaborate with the EMB on holding Post-Election Reviews depending on the recommendation of SEOMs.

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APPENDIX H MEC DISTANCE CALCULATOR

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Anna Kapambwe Mwaba received her Bachelor of Arts in economics from Smith

College, Northampton, Massachusetts and her Master of Arts in political science with concentrations in Comparative Politics and International Relations from the University of

Florida, Gainesville, Florida. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Florida in the spring of 2018. Her current research focuses on the role of regional and international organizations in

Africa in democracy assistance and election observation, more specifically. It examines the political implications of the increasing involvement of African organizations in member state affairs.

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