DOCSLIB.ORG

The Development of German Defensive Tactics Incyrenaica-1941

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Development of German Defensive Tactics Incyrenaica-1941 SPECIAL SERIES NO. 5 OCTOBER 16, 1942 THE DEVELOPMENT OF GERMAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS INCYRENAICA-1941 PREPARED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE WAR DEPARTMENT ARMY WA?( .. Et..... GAF1ISLEUY8p US. Army Military Histoy Research Collection MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE SPECIAL SERIES WAR DEPARTMENT No. 5 Washington, October 19, 1942 MID 461 NOTICE 1. The publications of the Special Series are for the purpose of providing officers with reasonably confirmed information from official and other reliable sources. 2. Nondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similar to the approved distribution for divisional commands. as follows: INF DIV CAYV DIV ARMD DIV l)iv Iq .8 Div 11q . .. 8 Div Hq - .. 11 Rcn Tr.-. ........ 2 Ord Co 2 Rcn Bn.- . .......7 Sig Co _------ 2 Sig Tr ------------ 2 Engr Bn ------ - _-- 7 Engr Bn _-------- 7 Rcn Sq-.. ........7 Med Bn ------ _--- 7 Med Bn -_-------- 7 Engr Sq..-.....---- 7 Maint Bn ----- 7 QM Bn ----------- 7 Med Sq ----------- 7 Sup Bn ----------- 7 Hq Inf Regt, 6 each_ 18 QM Sq- -... ..7 Div Tn Hq -.----- 8 Inf Bn, 7 each ----- 63 Hq Cav Brig, 3 each_ 6 Armd Regt, 25 each_ 50 Hq Div Art.y ------ 8 Cav Regt, 20 each . 80 FA Bn, 7 each ------ 21 FA Bn, 7 each ------ 28 HIq Div Arty- 3 Inf Regt - . ........25 _ FA Bn, 7 each . .....21 150 - 150 150 Distribution to air units is being made by the A-2 of Army Air Forces. 3. Each command should circulate available copies among its officers. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the information is safeguarded. Attention is invited to paragraph 10a, All 380-5, which is quoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will be classified and * * * marked restricted when information contained therein is for official use only, or when its disclosure should be * * * denied the general public." 4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited. Any correspondence relating to Special Series may be addressed directly to the Evaluation and Dissemina- tion Branch, Military Intelligence Service, War Department. Washington, D. C. LI ahtA > ARMY WAR COLLEGL CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA. PROPERTY OF U.S. ARMY TABLE OF CONTENTS Page SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION______ 1 II. NEW DEFENSE PLANS, MAY 7-JUNE 15, 1941_ 3 1. Original Doctrine 3 2. The Plan Unfolsls -. 5 111. THE THEORY TrESTE:I) ON T'HE FItONTITE .. - 21 1. (General 21 2. The Action at Ha(lfar1ya. 24 :3. The Action a.t IPOilt 208 26 4. The Action atl P:'6int 20()f6i . 27 5. The Mobile Infantry Reservwe - 27 6. The Tank Striking Force . 29 IV. NEw- THEORY FROM EXIPERIEN(CE ON T'HE FRONTIER . 33 1. Neumann-Silkow 33 2. Slnmm'nermanln . 34 :3. Ravenste(in -..- 35 4. Roinmel .-. 38 V. 'IHE ACTION AT '!'OIRITi . .. 45 VI. ITHE NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE . 50 VII. COMMErNTS AND LESSONS ...... 58 1. General . 58 2. AnttimnchanizeIDI ()bst.el csS . 59 3. Artillery .. 60 4. Itecoinn a issance . 60 5. .MAorahle 60 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page MAP No. 1. The Libyan Theater ... ..... vl MAP NO. 2. Egypt-.-ihya Frontier ... 20 MAP No. 3. The Gazala Sector . ..... .. 44 FIGuRE: 1. Typical Gernman Trefoil (Platoon Illustrated) . 17 FIGURE 2. The Main Antitank Effort: of a German Position, Placed to C*over the Most Iikely Avenue of Tank Approach . 51 FIauRE 3. Typical Organization of the G(rolind in Front of a German stfitzpunkt --------------------------- 59 FOREWORD German military doctrine has stressed the offense, and the ability of the German Army in attack is well known. However, it should not be assumed that when the Ger- mans are thrown on the defensive, they will not know what to do; the Libyan campaigns are evidence to the contrary. At certain periods in this campaign, the Germans had to take a defensive role and develop defensive techniques in a terrain and type of warfare entirely different from those in other theaters. They showed ability to adapt the old principles of defense to these conditions, and this resourcefulness may be expected in the future. It will take imagination, thorough preparation, and careful reconnaissance to deal with the defensive tactics that may be expected from the Germany Army. 4 ·i r i O ms2'3 w m 5 L::: c··: c·P,'-r.·. ::I;:·"-'i niil ; Hs·: S I ·.. :· -.ln..?i·ii"iii: :"'.'?Yfi.i:,.·i·;·- vL1 t cr, ;·::'.·'·I· i::;'':·':·:i:l-·· ·· 'n .E :, ;·:.:··.:· ?i :· ..=.··· O C31 I :·I· m,· Q "· m ;c: 1'··" Section I. INTRODUCTION The German force that was concentrated in Libya dur- ing February and March 1941 was indoctrinated with a zeal for the offensive. This spirit was founded both on an aggressive national philosophy and on a body of tactical doctrine that emphasized the importance of achieving and maintaining the initiative. Officers had been taught that attack and its exploitation were the keys to success in battle. In their service schools they had solved ten offensive problems for every defensive one. While one German training manual did set forth in detail the organization of the defense, this lesson had not been mastered. But the Germans were to face a new problem in North Africa, where supply by sea and desert logistics largely condition tactics. When they failed to take Tobruk in early April 1941 and were again repulsed on May 1, Marshal Rolmmel's Afrika Korps 1 found itself for the first tine seriously on the defensive. I The German Afrika Korps comprised the 15th and 21st Armored Divisionls and the 90th Light Motorized Division. They were made up approximately as follows: 15th Armored Division--8th Tank Regiment, 115th Motorized Infantry Regiment (?), 33d Artillery Regiment, 15th Motorcycle Battalion, 33d Motorized AA/AT Battalion, and services. 21st Armored Division-5th Tank Regiment, 104th Motorized Infantry Regiment, 115th Artillery Regiment, 3d Motorized Reconnaissance Battalion, 39th AT Battalion, 200th Engineer Battalion, and services. 90th Light Motorized Division---155th Infantry Regiment, 361st Infantry Regiment, 361st Artillery Battalion, 190th Engineer Battalion, 190th AT Battalion, and services. 2 GERMAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS IN CYRENAICA-1941 With characteristic German adaptability, commanders devoted themselves to learning the technique of position warfare. While doing this, however, they did not forget their maxim that "The object of the defense is to wear down an attack before launching a counterattack." Led by Rommel and his staff, many lower commanders made important contributions during this experimental period. The story of the development of German defensive tactics, with its new theories, successes, and failures, has been pieced together from captured German documents. This account is valuable both because it gives an inside view of the enemy defensive system and because it demonstrates the ability of the German Army to learn from experience. The three maps included in this bulletin were drawn by the Military Intelligence Service, and defensive posi- tions indicated on them are of necessity only approximate. Map No. 1 is included for the purpose of orienting the reader in the North African theater; map No. 2 shows the German front line defenses on the frontier as of November 1941; map No. 3 is included to allow the reader to follow developments in the Gazala-Tobruk sector. Figures are schematic representations of German defensive positions. Section II. NEW DEFENSE PLANS, MAY 7-JUNE 15, 1941 1. ORIGINAL DOCTRINE A sound defensive system existed in the German Army prior to the Libyan campaign, but it had to be expanded and altered to meet special conditions existing in the desert. The German doctrine of defense, which formed the basis of the system developed in Libya, may be summarized as follows: (1) Effective fire is more important than cover. (2) The object of the defense is to wear down an attack before launching a counterattack, generally with armored troops. (3) Reconnaissance must be made to discover enemy intentions and to screen one's own positions, which are organized in depth. (4) A linked fire plan must cover the entire front. (5) Most of the fire should be concentrated to cover the stiitzpunkt 2 which is the key to the position and the 2 Militdrisches Wmrterbuch, a German dictionary of military terms, defines Stiitzpunkt as "A strongly constructed and armed point in a defensive position which is capable of being defended when the enemy has forced his way into the defensive position and is able to attack the position from the flanks of the break-through. One must be careful that the staitzpunkt is well camouflaged in order that it may not be prematurely recognized and neutralized by fire." Because of the difficulty of giving an exact and concise translation of ,Statzpunkt in U.S. tactical language, the German word is used throughout this bulletin. 3 494596:--4 2-....2 4 GERMAN DEFENSIVE TACTICS IN CYRENAICA-1941 objective toward which the enemy is likely to put forth his main effort. (6) A series of mutually supporting centers, each capable of all-around defense, must be organized in depth. For the defense, troops are disposed in three main positions: (1) Vorgeschobene Stellungen, or advanced positions. (2) Gefechtsvorposten, or battle outposts. (3) Hauptkampflinie, or chief battle line, corresponding to the U.S. main line of resistance. This main defensive position is designed to be held until the counterattack. In a paper written in early June 1941, a German major lamented the fact that "Our people know next to nothing about the construction of defenses. We have scarcely any exercise in this phase of warfare in our peacetime training. The junior commander does not realize that positional infantry warfare is 60 percent with the spade, 30 percent with the field glasses, and only 10 percent with the gun." In the same paper the major indicates his belief in the superiority of British camouflage and deception.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Forgotten Battlefields of Libya
    BV Travel - North Africa 4pp 3/6/10 00:29 Page 2 The Forgotten Battlefields of Libya British Veterans Travel offers the opportunity for those who fought in North Africa during WWII, particularly in Libya, to return to their battlefields and remember lost comrades. This short trip is supported by the Heroes Return scheme which provides funding to eligible individuals and a partner or carer. Until now, visiting all the battlefields of the Western Desert Campaign of WWII has not been easy due to closed borders and red tape. British Veterans Travel, working with operators in Libya, is pleased to announce a trip that visits the strategic points of the campaign from Sidi Rezegh, Gazala, Tobruk and on to Benghazi. This Commemorative Tour will take place in October 2010 and offers the chance for WWII Veterans to visit Libya, for so long a country closed to tourism, and remember comrades whose graves remain carefully tended. Highlights • A jeep drive into the battlefields near Tobruk, including Sidi Rezegh and Gazala • Opportunity for Remembrance at the Knightsbridge and Commonwealth War Cemeteries • Chance to see the Australian Fig Tree Dugout Hospital, Rommel’s Operations Bunker, Tobruk Harbour and the remains of the Lady Be Good aircraft lost on a sortie in 1943 • Visits to the ancient cities of Leptis Magna & Cyrene www.britishveterans.co.uk BV Travel - North Africa 4pp 3/6/10 00:29 Page 3 The Forgotten The Itinerary The itinerary is as follows (subject to change) Day 1 – Thursday 7th October Battlefields PM Flight to Libya; London to Tripoli
    [Show full text]
  • Libya and Egypt
    Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Libya (Tripolitania & Cyrenaica) & Egypt By Henry L. deZeng IV Benina/North 21.02.41 Shown: 10 hangars (7 of which are partially destroyed), administrative and related buildings, barracks, quarters, storage buildings and a number of others, airfield operations buildings and the munitions dump. Benina/South is at the bottom right of the photo Edition: March 2016 Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Copyright © by Henry L. deZeng IV (Work in Progress). (1st Draft 2016) Blanket permission is granted by the author to researchers to extract information from this publication for their personal use in accordance with the generally accepted definition of fair use laws. Otherwise, the following applies: All rights reserved. No part of this publication, an original work by the authors, may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise), without the prior written permission of the author. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. This information is provided on an "as is" basis without condition apart from making an acknowledgement of authorship. Luftwaffe Airfields 1935-45 Airfields Libya and Egypt Introduction Conventions 1. For the purpose of this reference work, “Libya and Egypt” means the borders that existed on 10 June 1940, the date Italy declared war on Britain and France, with hostilities commencing along the Libyan-Egyptian border the following day. 2. All place name spellings are as they appear in wartime German, Italian and Allied documents with the addition of alternate spellings where known, these mainly being transliterated spellings from Arabic.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Terrain on British Operations and Doctrine in North Africa 1940-1943
    University of Plymouth PEARL https://pearl.plymouth.ac.uk 04 University of Plymouth Research Theses 01 Research Theses Main Collection 2014 The impact of terrain on British operations and doctrine in North Africa 1940-1943. Dando, Neal http://hdl.handle.net/10026.1/3035 Plymouth University All content in PEARL is protected by copyright law. Author manuscripts are made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published version using the details provided on the item record or document. In the absence of an open licence (e.g. Creative Commons), permissions for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher or author. The impact of terrain on British operations and doctrine in North Africa 1940-1943. A thesis submitted to the Plymouth University in partial fulfilment for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY School of Humanities Neal Dando Plymouth University January 2014 Copyright Statement This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author's prior consent. Abstract This thesis focuses on the extent to which the physical terrain features across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia affected British operations throughout the campaign in North Africa during the Second World War. The study analyses the terrain from the operational and tactical perspectives and argues that the landscape features heavily influenced British planning and operations. These should now be considered alongside other standard military factors when studying military operations.
    [Show full text]
  • ENTREPRENEURSHIP in CONFLICT ZONES Doctorate of Business
    ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN CONFLICT ZONES (LIBYA AS A CASE STUDY) BY BADREDDIN A ABDUGADER AKREIM Doctorate of Business Administration 2020 DISSERTATION Submitted to the International University of Leadership in Partial Fulfillment, of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctorate of Business Administration December, 2020 1 Copyright © 2020 Abstract This study emphases on the Entrepreneurship opportunities in Libya and discusses in depth its related features. The research explores the concept of entrepreneurship, its evolution, forms and theories. A special case of entrepreneurship has been carefully taken where the entrepreneurship opportunities in conflict zones have been studied and the case of Libya has been chosen. Where, an investigation has been made for a potential entrepreneurship opportunity for anyone who is interested in taking any opportunity available in Libya whether Libyan citizen or a foreigner. The research helps in drawing conclusion whether the opportunities available in Libya are indeed affordable for a potential entrepreneur or not? For this purpose, a special questionnaire has been established to collect the data from a sample population of 319 potential entrepreneurs who have already started business in Libya or willing to start in near future. Results of the study provides significant output and highlight that doing business in Libya requires lots of experience as well as some motivation behind given the concentration of security risk. Data shows that on average each potential candidate who wants to do business in Libya has on average five family members to take care of. This highlights the drastic situation in Libya which may signifies the high unemployment levels in Libya and a person may be willing to start his/her own business to support the family rather than waiting to find an employment opportunity.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya Weekly Operational Preview
    . Libya Weekly Operational Preview May 02, 2021 Prepared by: Risk Analysis Team, Libya © 2021 GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld Proprietary GardaWorld 1 202 1 © Table of Contents Outlook .................................................................................................. 3 Short Term Outlook .............................................................................................................................. 3 Medium to Long Term Outlook ............................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ............................................................................... 3 Political Developments ......................................................................................................................... 3 Military Developments .......................................................................................................................... 4 Security Developments ......................................................................................................................... 4 Oil & Gas .............................................................................................................................................. 4 Coronavirus .......................................................................................................................................... 5 Infrastructure .......................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • STRIKING BAC K ENERAL Wavell's Message to General Morshead
    CHAPTER 5 STRIKING BAC K ENERAL Wavell's message to General Morshead, which had sombrely G told him that the defence of Egypt depended largely on holding th e enemy at Tobruk, epitomised Morshead's grave responsibility: a much heavier responsibility than a divisional commander normally bears . Usually the commander of a division in the field can refer in critical moments t o his corps or army commander ; likewise a corps or army commander usuall y shares the burden of decision on grave issues with his superiors . But Morshead, because of the very isolation his task imposed, had to bear hi s responsibilities alone. If a crisis arose, the decision would be his alone to take. He had already made clear the spirit in which he would conduct th e defence. On the evening before the withdrawal into Tobruk, he had calle d his brigadiers together . "There'll be no Dunkirk here, " he had said. "If we should have to get out, we shall fight our way out . There is to be no surrender and no retreat." So each unit, as it had moved into its allotted position within the perimeter had been told (and had heard wit h relief) that this time it would hold its ground and give the enemy n o quarter. The men under Morshead's command numbered about 35,700, but not all of them were combatant troops. Apart from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, the strength of the fighting units was approximately 24,000, of whom 14,270 were Australian and approximately 9,000 British .
    [Show full text]
  • Madi Phd 2018.Pdf
    Bangor University DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY The social, cultural, and political impact of the British Military Administration on Libya, 1943-1951 Madi, Yousef Award date: 2018 Awarding institution: Bangor University Link to publication General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 01. Oct. 2021 School of History, Welsh History & Archaeology The social, cultural, and political impact of the British Military Administration on Libya, 1943-1951 A thesis submitted to the University of Bangor partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Yousef Mohamed Ali Madi Supervisor Dr Peter Shapely April 2018 ABSTRACT This thesis examines the impact of the British Military Administration (BMA) on social- cultural and political organisations in Libya during the period 1943 to 1951. The thesis is grounded on a careful reading of secondary literature which has been integrated into available official documents available in both Arabic and English archival sources, in addition to new oral data generated from interviews.
    [Show full text]
  • 3 FI :LU S : U4 ~- Z )~F Safe (J>A.-T 2)
    Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 6, Nr 2, 1976. http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za 3 FI :LU S :_U4 ~- Z )~f SAfe (J>a.-t 2) In 1884 when Ferdinand de Lesseps, builder and to make proper training possible, Auchin- of the Suez Canal became a member of the leck realized that he needed a pause of French Academy, he was welcomed by Er- about three months to reorganise his troops. nest Renan. In his speech Renan remarked Hence the Western Desert Force was recon- that not only had two inland seas been con- stituted as the Eighth Army under Genl Sir nected, but the site of a future battlefield had Alan Cunningham (who had left East Africa been marked. During the Second World War at the end of August 1941). The new Army his prediction came true when control of the had two Corps under command: the 13 Corps Middle East became of utmost importance under Lt Genl A. R. Godwin-Austen (Com- for the continuation of the Allied war effort: mander of 12 African Division in East Africa) the economic blockade of Europe and the and the 30 Corps under Lt-Genl V. V. Pope" defence of Allied oil supplies depended on to control the armoured forces. Fortified the Allies retaining Egypt and control of the areas were prepared along those already ex- Suez Canal. isting at Tobruk, Mersa Matruth and Bagush The Italian offensive near the end of 1940, to meet a possible Axis thrust from the was easily warded off but after the arrival of a North while these preparations were being implemented.
    [Show full text]
  • Dav Vandenbroucke: Replay/AAR
    Cauldron: Battle for Gazala After-Action Report David A. Vandenbroucke [email protected] June 15, 2014 This is an after-action report of a solo play-through of Decision Games’ Cauldron: Battle for Gazala1, published in 2010. This game is part of DG’s “Fire and Movement” series of folio games. The series is an update of the SPI quad games line, for both World War II and later titles. Indeed, the design credits are given to Howard Barasch, who designed the game for the North Africa quad, and Redmond Simonsen is given credit for the cartography. Eric R. Harvey is credited for the redesign. While I never played the SPI North Africa quad game, I have played others of their World War II modern-era quads. Thus, I know the system well enough to spot the similarities and differences between the SPI and DG rules. The games are intended as small, quick-playing, and simple. There is no stacking, supply, or command control. The games use a differential CRT, with terrain integrated into combat resolution, essentially by providing column shifts. Both sets of rules use a move-fight player turns, in which the player is allowed to move and attack with all of his units as he sees fit. However, the DG rules add a mobile phase. Mobile units (armor and mechanized) that sit out the regular phases may instead move an attack in the mobile phase, which comes after. Thus, the player may commit reserves in response to the results of his regular player turn. Although the rules don’t specifically say so, it appears that each game turn represents one day.
    [Show full text]
  • 'Steel My Soldiers' Hearts': El Alamein Reappraised.1
    Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 14, ISSUE 1, FALL 2011 Studies ‘Steel my soldiers’ hearts’: El Alamein Reappraised.1 Jonathan Fennell The Oxford Bodleian Library holds 293 titles under the subject of the ‘North African Campaign of the Second World War’, the British Library 308.2 That amounts to over four books a year on the subject, or about one book published every three months, for the sixty-nine years since November 1942. This constitutes a remarkable body of scholarship on what historians today might refer to as a secondary theatre in the Second World War.3 There are a number of possible reasons for this level of interest in the North African campaign. Firstly, North Africa is where British and Commonwealth forces learnt how to defeat the Wehrmacht. It had taken three long years before Britain and her allies celebrated their first decisive victory on land against Germany, at El Alamein, in November 1942. In many ways, the dynamics of the critical campaign in North West Europe, between 1944 and 1945, cannot be understood without first understanding the processes that led to victory in North Africa. Secondly, in a global conflict often characterised by brutality, North Africa represents an oasis of chivalry and sanity, an environment where, in the main, war was contained away from innocent civilians. 1 The title of this paper is from the speech of King Henry before the battle of Agincourt (Henry V, Act IV, Scene I, line 289), ‘O God of battles! Steel my soldiers’ hearts’. Montgomery pinned the quotation to the wall of his caravan before the battle of El Alamein.
    [Show full text]
  • ED DUDA Oct 1941 Kopanski Came Back to Airente with Colvin to Discuss This Information with Burrows
    CHAPTER 1 0 ED DUD A OBRUK on its desert coast had been enveloped in dust by ever y T land-wind for centuries before the heavy transport and armoure d vehicles of two armies had ground its arid fine-clay hinterland to ligh t powder. Airente was the dustiest corner in Tobruk . There, after having been brought back from the embarkation point, the men of the 2/ 13t h Battalion, some of whom had bedded down where they could—but mos t had not troubled—were greeted on 26th October with the densest dust - storm suffered since the siege began . Visibility was only a few feet. The Durham Light Infantry Battalion did its best at short notice to serv e the Australians with a hot breakfast. At midday Brigadier Murray attended a conference with General Scobi e to discuss the disposition of the remaining Australians . It was agreed that the two companies of the 2/15th Battalion would remain in the Pilastrin o area and could be called upon to provide working parties. General Scobie proposed that the 2/13th Battalion should take over the perimeter i n the western sector along the Wadi Sehel near the coast, to carry ou t the role which he had intended to assign to the Polish Officers' Legion , which was to have arrived in Tobruk in the ships that were to take th e last Australians out, but now was not expected to arrive until destroye r convoys were resumed in the November moonless period . Brigadier Murray raised no objection. Soon afterwards General Scobie visited Colonel Burrows at Airent e and offered him a choice between the operational role indicated and a non-operational one.
    [Show full text]
  • Second Libyan Campaign
    CHAPTER 9 SECOND LIBYAN CAMPAIGN RAPIspm German advances in Russia during the first months of their initia l in 1941 presaged a new threat to the Middle East from th e north, for if the enemy reached the Caucasus, an attack could be mad e early in 1942 either through Turkey or through Iran and Iraq . While air, naval and amphibious forces based in the United Kingdom attempted to preoccupy as large an enemy force as possible in western Europe, Genera l Auchinleckl considered that the primary and urgent task of Middle Eas t Command was to eliminate the Axis armies already threatening Egyp t from the west before the new danger materialised . Thus during the late summer, while Cyprus, Palestine, Syria and Iran 2 were all placed in a state of defence, administrative arrangements were begun for an offensive later in 1941 designed firstly to clear the enemy out of Cyrenaica and if possible out of Tripolitania as well, thus securing the entire left flank of the Middle East. Supply difficulties, the absorption and training of reinforcements, and reorganisation of formations on a more mobile basis, all had to be resolved within the Eighth Army (the army in the Wester n Desert), while the main external prerequisite was adequate support from an air force which was itself undergoing considerable reorganisation . Hitherto improvisation and unorthodox methods had stretched th e capacity of the R .A.F. in the Middle East sufficiently to meet, with vary- ing degrees of success, all its commitments 3 in six campaigns undertake n in three continents, but the limit had now been reached and a thoroug h overhaul and re-adaptation of existing machinery was imperative .
    [Show full text]