Learning to Fight from the Ground Up: American Antiaircraft Artillery

S UMM1I{ 2018 VOL. 24 No. 1 ON POINT THE JOURNAL OF Avw HISTORY

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ARMY HISTORY

UAHNNGTOHGHT FHOMTHFGHOONGUP AMERICAN ANTIAIRCRAFTARTILLERY IN WORLD WAR II By Bryon Greenwald

In combat, no one really cares who gets credit for the changes tion have multiple, overlapping causes. Indeed, military historians a unit makes to survive and win. The paternity of victory is ir Freelyaccept the non-linear nature of change and expect every in relevant; learning while fighting is key, getting better is good, and novative or adaptive effort to include several “schools” favored by living beats dying. those looking for distinct causality. Not so when one studies military innovation and combat ad This article briefly examines how the U.S. Army of World War aptation, where some scholars look for specific causality, while II learned to stop shooting at its own airplanes and start down others take a broader, non-linear approach. Those who focus on ing Axis aircraft. It traces the evolving antiaircraft artillery (AAA) causality fixate on whether the change was led from the top down, force from its first battles at Pearl Harbor, Clark Field, and Kasser pushed from the bottom up, or created from the middle out; the me Pass, through the process of wartime learning and adaptation to degree of inter- or intra-service rivalry; and if single- or double- its ultimate success in air and ground battles across the Mediterra loop learning occuned. Most military historians, by instinct and nean and Northwest Europe. Much like the larger Army it upport training, however, maintain that military innovation and adapta ed, the AAA Forcemade several mistakes in the rapid transition

Doughboysfireamachinegun ata Germanobservationplane near

PlateauChemin desDames,France,%March1918. TheU.S.Army enteredWorldWarIwith nodedicatedantiaircraftartillery (AAA) units but it hastily formed the Antiaircraft Serviceto train some 12,000soldiersto shoot downenemyaircraft. (NationalArchives) but

Coast artillerymen train on an Ml 918 3-inch mobile antiaircraft gun in September 1926. After World War I, the Coast Artillery Corps assumed the responsibility for AAA units. (National Archives)

F—..—

-— I, a p-I from peace to war. Frequently under- Italian, German. and Japanese air trained and ill-equipped. anliaircraft craft, a figure that in isolation is ol’ units initially lost out to more numer INTHEEND,THISBRIEF no significance. Added to the 15.880 ous Axis pilots who flew higher and EXAMINATIONOF WORLD aerial victory’ victories granted to faster than expected. As antiaircraft the U.S. Army Air Forces during the units transitioned from defending WARIIAMERICANMA war, the total accounts for over twen static assets to protecting mobile SUGGESTSTHATNO ty-five percent of all Axis aircraft forces, learning and positive change downed by air or land forces. These occurred at all levels. Stateside train SINGLETHEORY—TOP same forces also destroyed more than ing became more realistic, In-theater DOWN,BOTTOMUP 2,637 V-I pilotless aircraft, either in coordination between air and an England or on the continent. In the tiaircraft units reflected a growing MIDDLEOUT INTER end, this brielexamination of’World appreciation for the importance of ORINTRA-SERVICE War II American AAA suggests that a synchronized air defense scheme. no single theory—top down, bottom Finally, work with combined arms RIVALRYORSINGLE up, middle out, inter or intra-sen’ice forces in training paid off in combat ORDOUBLELOOP rivalry, or single or double loop as antiaircraft units not only enforced leaming—is sufficient to understand local air superiority over their divi LEARNING—ISSUFFICIENT how innovation and adaptation oc sions and corps, but also provided TO UNDERSTANDHOW curs in combat. In this case, change, them with deadly accurate direct and like combat, often occurs on multiple indirect ground fire, in many cases INNOVATIONAND fronts and in several dimensions. saving ground units from complete ADAPTATIONOCCURSIN The U.S. Army entered World destruction. War I with absolutely no antiair Along the way, this force de COMBAT craft units, doctrine, or equipment, stroyed or severely damaged 5,518 through modification of French

VOLUME 24 ISSUE I 37 Gunners ofthe7lst Coast Artillery Regiment (Antiaircraft) train on M3 3-inch antiaircraft guns at Fort Story, Virginia. The M3 became the Army’s standard AAA piece in 1928. (National Archives)

4’. 1’

I_I i._.

doctrine and use of French equipment, the Antiaircraft Service and poorly prepared to face determined attacks by better trained trained 12,000 artillery gunners (firing the French 75mm gun) and and equipped Japanese pilots. At Pearl Harbor, the four antiaircraft machine gunners, fielded Four battalions (two gun and two ma regiments had eighty-six of their authorized ninety-eight 3-inch chine gun), and sho down fifty-eight aircraft in a very short time guns. As for (heir automatic weapons, which were more valuable at the front. After the war, most of the manpower and equipment against low-flying attackers, the regiments possessed just twenty disappeared and the fledgling AAA branch of the Coast Artillery of 120 (sixteen percent) of their 37mm guns and 113 of 246 (for Corps beuan a two decade bureaucratic battle to develop modem ty-one percent) of their .50 cal machine guns. More importantly, equipment and field a modest force amid national retrenchment. while the joint Army-Navy force trained regularly together and the Great Depression, and limited budgets. had demonstrated a month earlier that it could detect and intercept Toward the end of’the interwar period, however, interest in an attacking air three, on 7 December this force had only three of antiaircraft capability grew as airplanes became more numerous the six SCR-270 radar sets operating, one of which picked up the and capable. Furthermore, reports from Spain and China high Japanese formation 132 miles out just as it shut down for the day lighted the capabilities of airpower and the value in having AAA around 0700. Unfortunately, when this crew reported their radar to defend against it. Accordingly, the purchase of antiaircraft artil contact, the only people in the air information center were a radio lery pieces became the top priority for the War Department from operator and an untrained duty officer. The officer subsequently 1937to 1939. Lnfonunately, it took more than money to overcome waved off the track as a flight of inbound B-17s and told the radar the extreme deficit in modem equipment and trained manpower operator to “forget it.” The warning, however, would have made needed initially to defend the Western Hemisphere and America’s little difference for the Army antiaircraft force, as most the AAA possessions, particularly in Hawaii and the Philippines, and even ammunition was still in the ammunition supply point because the tually begin global operations against Axis forces. Chief of Ordnance in Hawaii refused to release it for fear it would Thus, it was in December 1941 that the antiaircraft forces at get dirty and become corroded, Of the thirty-one separate antiair Pearl Harbor and Clark Field were both woefully under-equipped craft batteries assigned to Hawaii, only four retrieved their am-

38 ARMY HISTORY ON POINT ‘r ‘fl iI

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munition and reached their positions before the attack ended. Of just as the interceptor command there received a teletvpe report all these forces, just one fixed 3-inch gun batten’. prepositioned (between 1130and 1145)ofinbound bombers. Compared to Pearl on Sands Island, proved it was both trained and ready as the crew Harbor. at least the air warning system seemed to work. No one. broke into its crate of ready ammunition and opened fire, downing however, thought to alert the 200th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) two Japanese aircraft. In contrast, the Navy, which was manning Regiment, located on the same compound at Fort Sioisenberg, to just one quarter of its 780 onboard antiaircraft weapons continu the threat. The “Old Two Hon’erd,” a New Mexico National Guard ously, had all of its weapons firing within ten minutes. Thus, at regiment, was in the chow hail eating pork chops and chocolate Pearl Harbor, veil known strategic and operational failures en cake when the Japanese attacked and did not learn about it until the abled the Japanese to get close to Oahu, but tactical failures en air raid siren sounded at 1215. gendered by a penurious administrative policy and tired leadership Not that it would have mattered. This collection of Mexicans, lost the day. Anglos, and Indians had served as the 111thCavalry Regiment un On 8 December in the Philippines, a similar fate struck U.S. til late 1940, when itjoined over 100 other formations the War De forces on Luzon, only this time General Douglas MacArthur’s Far partment hurriedly and clumsily convened to AAA units. Amaz East Air Forces (FEAF) were well aware of the impending Japa ingly, less than a year later on 17August 1941, the Army declared nese attack. At 0400, intercept controllers dispatched a squadron the “200th.. .the best anti-aircraft Regiment (regular or otherwise), of P-40s from Iba Field eighty miles north of Clark Field to search now available.. .for use in an area of critical military importance.” I’orJapanese bombers heading toward Corregidor At 0930, the Unfortunately, “best” was far from good enough. The regi 30th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field sent more P-40s toward Ro ment received a large portion of its actual antiaircraft equipment, sales to intercept the Japanese while simultaneously ordering the particularly automatic weapons, as it boarded the USS President FEAF’s B-l7s airborne. None of the patrols found the Japanese, Pierce and the USS President Coolidge in San Francisco. During some of whom were clearly conducting a feint to draw protection training at Fort Bliss, Texas, the 37mm batteries had a single 37mm away from the airfields. At 1130,the B-l7s returned to Clark Field gun, but no ammunition. Men “simulated guns from boxes and

VOLUME 24 ISSUE I 39 broomsticks., fired rocks for ammunition and shouted bang.” The World Wart, and they didn’t work.” regiment trained primarily with 3-inch guns and M1903 Spring After more than an hour, the attack ended. By achieving com field bolt action rifles. Alter shipping out, several of the regiment’s plete tactical surprise, the Japanese had destroyed eighteen of the 3-inch guns went overboard during a typhoon encountered west of original thirty-five B-17s and fifty-three P-40s. The attack dam Hawaii, leaving the gun battalion with twelve of twenty-four guns. aged many other planes along with Clark and Iba Fields. killed one of which was later sent to Corregidor for repair. Beyond that. eighty personnel, and wounded 150 others. Japanese losses the regiment had one battery of.50 caliber machine guns, twenty- amounted to seven aircraft. Despite obsolete weapons, bad am two of thirty-two 37mm guns (seven of which were defective and munition. and limited training, the “Old Two Hon’erd” scored five sent to Manila for repair), confirmed kills during the and a few SCR-268 radar attack. UnI’ortunately, they sets, which were unusable as also shot down at least one ihey were missing the con P40 during the confusion, necting cables and the M4 probably not the first inci directors. Ironically, while dent of fratricide of the war the Philippine Department and certainly not the last. received a higher priority for The 200th Regiment, as well reinforcements than Hawaii as the 60th Coast Artillei’y, or the Panama Canal, the a Regular Army antiaircraft same Ordnance Corps rules regiment on Corregidor, apparently applied. One sol would go on to fight with dier noted his platoon “sas valor until forced to surren definitely told. ‘DC) NOT der, after which those not BREAK THE SEAL on the killed in action spent the rest ammunition box.’ So prior of the war in captiity. to the day’ot’ihe war, we had With the United States never seen a Ike round.” now at war, and recogniz As a result. the first time ing the need for more an any soldier fired a 37mm gun tiaircraft units (as vell as was in combat. In one case, forces of all types), the a poorly trained soldier fed Army moved quickly to .50-caliber ammunition into establish them. This situa a 37mm gun and jammed it. tion, however, exacerbated So overwhelmed, the battery the training and equipping was “blowing holes through problems faced by units like trucks and tents.” The crews the 200th Coast Artillery. As on the 3-inch guns fared no units formed, they placed an better. Most of’ the ammu ever-increasing demand on nition was manufactured in limited amounts of antiair 1932. An abnormally high craft equipment. Moreover, percentage of the rounds On 9 March 1942, the Army formed the Antiaircraft Command (AAC) the rush to deploy forces. were duds and “most of the separate from the Coast Artillery Corps and named Major General Joseph particularly antiaircraft for Green commanded the Coast fuses were badly corroded.” Green as AAC’s commanding general. had mations. cut unit training Artillery Corps from April 1940 until his appointment as AAC commander. About one in every six shells time, spread the number of (Library ofCongress) actually bred. According trained officer and noncom to First Lieutenant Rus missioned officer cadre too sell Hutchinson, “the shell thin, and ensured that the casings were green with corrosion. Every time we fired a shot, quality of the training was minimal. [the rounds] had to be cleaned to go into the breechblock, and we In a significant “top-down” move, the War Department created had to break the frozen ‘useswith a wrench. We had World War the Army Ground Forces in March 1942 under Lieulenant General it I weapons, and our modified ammunition had too much muzzle Lesley J. MeNair to produce trained and equipped units. As did pressure for the guns to withstand.” Several gun tubes blew up, so, the War Department also established the Antiaircraft Command injuring a number of soldiers and killing one. Adding insult to in (AAC), cleaving it from the Coast Artillery Corps and establish jury, most of the shells that did fire exploded 2.000 to 4,000 feet ing its headquarters in Richmond. Virginia. In a smooth transition, short of’their targets. The men of a .50 caliber machine-gun bat Major General Joseph Green. previously the Chief of Coast Anil tery found themselves equally confounded. Sergeant Earl Harris lerv, took over the AAC and continued expanding the antiaircraft angrily commented that “Our machine-gun ammunition was made training bases across the United States. The AAC created training in 1918, re-inspected in 1929, and issued to us in 1941. We had to regimens and standards for deployment, published training inspec polish the corrosion off with steel wool before we could get it into tion checklists in the Coast ,liillcn’ Joitnial to spread the word the belt. The guns were 1918. The mounts werejury-rigged during vertically and horizontally across the rapidly expanding force, and

40 ARMY HISTORY ON POINT in

the

er to

and the

the 41

shot

de re

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In Many more

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Eisen

Africa,

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antiair

best only of an

Attacks

and

but General identify

slightly

Forces

units and

airplanes.

American

transport

to After

the

guns

they let

as so

rushed

and Forces

the

his had challenges

need

on,

D. Air

assignment armed Major

LtifhrafiL’.

more Allied

Department.

Air

between

ports

to territory area,

North properly

AAA

Air

United bases

and

downed the minimal.

well area.

occurred

commander

the antiaircraft

increased. been

antiaircraft issue, for essentially

Green’s artillery.

invasion

enemy early relented

several

their led

maneuver

wanted those War

ensure Lieutenant the as

air rear Army

machine

Army

also

divisions

had the

the were soldiers mastered Despite seen Army aircraft, ing lorts,

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tured as expanded. frequently, need voys craft Dwight on Lieutenant and fending

hower craft choose had

ever-increasing

and the the

issue to

the area,

forward

theater

activity

the

American whether

they

protect

caliber

home

units

this

destroyed

to again.

the during

air

within

rear

battalions,

units

with corps. but

inter-service

coordinator,

Eisenhower

.50 over

the NbrId resistance that

war

wanted and

fratricide,

forces

standard

commanders it be

enemy

theater, commanders

quad

forward

the

rebuffed

problem

forces

weapons

error

training

aircraft.

Forces defense

training

: environment, paratroopers,

initial

antiaircraft

the

about

antiaircraf

Army’s

what of

units

senior

to all,

Department.

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divisions rich

area

inland,

joint

die

little over

thvolvcmcnt

enemy to antiaircraft

seemed

across

Ground

for particularly

s.r. force “S.

push only

War

assign

rear

automatic

command

After met

all

dozens halltracked

target

U.S. fratricide

intra-sen’ice

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Army-Navy

air

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between of

served units

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Army

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assigned

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issue

forces

Army

theater a

control

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their

and airfields,

that

While

too

significant combined

opportunities

the

37mm

established

If of

of the

divisions.

rebuffed

earlvycars

antiaircraft service MeNair should

Allied friendly combination

ever-increasing down the M4

With

ber to concerning it sought be ing ily, and most newed planes

tion Eisenhower mobile became

iá a Sr

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This

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Field

units,

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through

antiair

and

suffered

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increase

elements. Kasserine

provide command

with

across was

fifty

any

antiaircraft

(shown

areas.

but

four

accelerate

tL units

soldier -

(one regiment

not

few

of ground

maneuver

only

not

cycle

enough

commanders forces

should caliber around

well,

combat

contact

include

the

automatic position automatic

enormous forward

low-Ilyingaireraft

.50 total

could

joining

with

and

with a to

not

could

batteries

the Arcluves)

between

and individual in

fought

theater

1943,

eight

antiaircraft training

did against

units

experience.

gun

units were 4%&- need

recruits

Corps—approximately

rear

antiaircraft legitimate

industry

one training

issue

reinforced

commanders

and

II Corns

Korps

maneuvering

the

total),

(National a

Beset A

the

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first

weeks

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only

Februan’ ______II.

battalion

Department r Al combat the

the

expertise.

learned

machine

was

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but —

A/i’ika

deploying

with units.

four

‘Thewater-coolcd AAA Xar mobility,

Pass, their

training,

American

The

War

with

between

whether

Army,

battalions

AAC

activated

inter-service

area,

with (lie lessons distribution

unit

early develop

personnel,

separate

the

equivalent

an the

154 the the

end

cycle. to over supporting

of forward and

until

rear

armored ISSUE

outfit

1942 train the

these

first

deal.

forces Rommel’s

from (eight

Forces to

Army long,

landed the firepower,

targets. forward Kasserine

units four

flood

or Despite

could the several

the

both

equipment, sufficient

battalions

and rest

to battalions

the of

Operation

Air in

campaign, Africa

by forces,

weeks

The

and

antiaircraft

and

During

and

nor great back

for of

training

proficient

authorized forward

those of

Envin

enough

the

surprised

of towed weeks

few a

forces

Allied

with Tunisia completely problems.,

lack

made

mistakes,

led weapons

time

positioned

“produced”

infantry

Unfortunately, ammunition,

ammunition

the a eight

in regiments

commanders

Army like

ratio

One

their

November

North

1942. part they

allow

the

attempted

and erything.

out twelve of

with

and AAC numbers demand units training, ing

provide

the enough

to become their mid-1943, AAC’ battalions these

antiaircraft in as Germans 8

joined as units, TORCH. American !!Tangement ensuing learned forces major Marshal cluding Pass from

aircraft

conveyed At and, craft equivalent) battalions) battalions, battalion to three

theater

\OLUME

its

and

air

for

was

most

peri

units

how

POINT Allied

...

the

worked

aircraft

vehicles

the

twenty

inner

effective,

extremely

the

radar

created

antiaircraft

them,

certain

battalion

mountainous

four

commanders

for

planes

techniques

These

along

very

and

crews

friendly

antiaircraft

the

move,

worked

during battalion

using

units.

the

None

Eventually,

artillery

concern

Normandy.

[enemy]

proved

allow

position

comply one

due

antiaircraft

bottom-up

system

shooting

three-man

attacks.

and

aircraft

system

not

the

radar

fire

were

air

range

The

fighters.”

fratricide. antiaircraft

continual

with

area

avoid

both

warning,

defended

several

antiaircraft

invasion

would

for

units

own

the

restricted

enemy

kept

them

the

avoid

early

SCR-268 were

information

bases, “withhold

pilots

degraded

our

approach.

zones

that

and

adopted

perimeter

and

areas.

after

and

air

The

front alert

sort

the

had

antiaircraft

rear

artillery

troops

created

suffered

positioning

free-fire

Allied

clear

success

some

warning

the

fratricide,

avenues

overzealous

presence

miles

and

where

were

foolproof:

field,

get

particularly

supported

air

the

early

frequently

used

became

the

raids

Often

pilots

areas

reduced

were

radios

antiaircraft

middling

zones

unit

and

mostly

forces,

fire.

the

well,

probable

with

terrain. twenty-five

seldom

own

ward

air

with

ods

craft

urged cause

gunners

improve during

but to

ever,

air By

but

into

and

each

kQ27J

1943,

com

Bulle

all

which

Beyond

distribu

attached

that

down

McNair.

divisions

examples

the

McNair,

information.

officers

exchange

theater

objective

centralization

slow

artillery,

antiaircraft

theaters.

November

his

percent

routine.

with

send

that

Information

not

for

several

guns,

adaptation,

their

bypassing

and

fairly

and

deferred

combat

AAC

disseminate

pooling

championed

achieve

recommendation

one

thinking

was

the

ninety-five

and

machine

arranged

also

officer.

coordination

Eventually,

just

and

middle-out

regularity,

Circulars

that

importantly,

Green’s

plan.

and

Eisenhower

Green

caliber

Green

situation

training

employment

believed

received

AAC

most

this

destroyers.

theaters,

.50

learning.

the

this

end,

antiaircraft

area

and

increasing

the

forces, tank

approved

the dual

Intelligence

efficient

vetoed

supervise

however,

recommended

with

adjustment,

disapproval,

HISTORY

between

troops

invasion,

communication

division

AAC

such

institutional

include

linked

American

one

Green

the

ARMY

however,

Department

McNair,

nandv

officers

theaters

divisions.

staff

divisions

Antiaircraft

ensure

forward

allow

guns

McNair’s

forces,

least

middle-out

from

War

theater,

theater

the

tins

tion

double-loop this McNair,

spite

general

manders,

combat the

units

tacking

would in

other

attacks.

protect 37mm AACcmployedanumberoftedmiques and innovations to prevent fratricide and improve early warning of enemy air attacks, including the use of the SCR-268 radar set, such as this one used by the 184th AAA Battalion in England in October 1943. (National Archives)

the .N115Multiple Caliber .50 Machine-Gun Mount entered sen ice in 1942 and equipped tile Army’s antiaircraft al-tiller’—automaneweapons (AAA-AW) battalions. Its iburM2 .5Ocalibermaehinegunsmadcit an dice tis C capon against low—lb ing enemy a’ rcnft. It Was also devastating against ground targets luLlearned tile nicknanies ‘meat chopper” and “knot ,nosverT ibis example served with die 435th AAA-AN Battalion. (Nationai Archives) F. -L4•-

INTHEEVER-INCREASING TARGETRICHENVIRONMENT, ‘I AMERICANAM UNITSSHOT DOWNA NUMBEROF ENEMY AIRCRAFTBUTTHEYALSO DOWNEDSEVERALFRIENDLY PLANES.AFTERALL,TRAINING ATHOMEHADBEENRUSHED ANDTHEOPPORTUNITIES FORJOINTTRAININGWITH THEARMYAIRFORCESIN THEUNITEDSTATESWERE - MINIMAL.

‘-I

VOLUME21 ISSUEI 43

and

unit

and,

anti

Ger

gun

field

envi

3,151

crews

added

Africa,

used ground

theaters

from

live

southern

protected

526

improve

andwell

destroyed

proximity

places

‘Sntiaircraft

twenty-five

sounds QOmm

forces,

possible,

guns

effective

at or

and

North

combat

weeks,

another

fires

they

extensive

for

Ardennes.

use

a the

combat

adjustments,

assisting

battle-condition- Europe,

II)

antiaircraft

collective

way,

the and

(VT)

the

ground

destroyed

90mm

highly

continued

1945)

and

much

American

the

fourteen

indirect

them.

and

marches

and

entering with

well-equipped.

Time

units

Pacific.

with

May

skies

specifically soldiers

rigorous

(Category

Northwest

instituted

Along

innovations,

the States

before

forced

the

eight

crews,

Corsica’Sardinia.

velocity

produced

along

expanded

and

training

block

actually

Okinawa,

Variable

5,518.

equipment,

1944

and

eventually

from

antiaircraft

high

United

Italy,

enemy

acclimate

866.

also

series

the

courses,

destroyed

clearing

well-supplied,

weeks

before

field

June “Meatchoppers”

the

Beach.

the

and

training,

included

antiaircraft

period

total

two-week

combined

aircraft

Green

full

produce

eight

another

travails,

battle

away

obstacle

Day

caliber

975

non-linear

Sicily

probably

Omaha

forces.

snipers

with

guns—ultimately

expose

extremely

capable

targets.

program

battle.

added explosives

training

or .50

initial

added

V-F four

occurred period

fire

globe

changes

end, was

the

equipment—like

and

force

Allied

This

another

longer

90mm

sweeping

they

1944,

quad

their exercises,

Salerno. from

aircraft—for the

ground the

that

direct

aircraft.

and

for

through In

These

atmosphere

program

early

four-week

force

U.S. across

both adaptations

Day

Anzio,

France. enemy

(Category aircraft

downed

man

in fuse despite

ments units

tiaircraft

nery

munition

miles a

was portion

ronment. sensations

the

ing training

portion

Bofors

the be

and not

air

that

Bofots

f’rom

real

fired

only

frat-

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to man

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white

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exercising Center

McNair

examples

AAC.

dramatically

this

intervention

responsibility

fiashcards

response Nnrmandy

(Colored)

comprehensively

the Command

units

1944.

and

across

permission

and

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the

their

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and

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local

essential

measures

circumstances

imposed solutions

aircraft

became performing

(National

aircraft

of institutionalized

black

Training

aircraft

1944

captured

personal

January

Battalion

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doubled

top-down

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gained

such

these

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time

Marshall,

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aircraft.

take

trained

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Army

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standard

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crews

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alternating

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AAA-AW

units

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they

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lines,

directed

training

never

cycle

NCOs.

even

/1om

having

five

tow-flying

war

George

officer

1942

United

practice.

invented

450th

commander

90mm

Spccifically

down

unit

and

smoke.

the

were

the

Allied

sport

each

plentiful,

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divisions.

attacked.

units

fratricide,

against

recognition.

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identification

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and

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including

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near

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rounds

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officers

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between

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istic

dard.”

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and challenged

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craft ricide, eliminate, ______

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IN’ .. 4’ 4 r I

(,unnc.rs OFthc 62d Coast ArtiIkr Regiment (Anti urcraft) fin. thur MI 90mm gun in Palermo, Sicily, 15 December 1943. The more effective 9Onungun began replacing the M3 3-inch AAA piece early in %rld War 4. II. (National Archives)

zsrw. -

trained. of top-down, middle-out, and bottom- This force, by virtue AbouttheAuthor up change, continued to learn from its mistakes and improve. As Colonel Bryon Greenwald, USA-Ret., is a profes this brief summary from Pearl Harbor through the North African sor of military history and theory at the Joint Advanced campaign suggests, the antiaircraft forces had to overcome a myr Wathghting School (JAWS), one of the National Defense iad of errors, self-inflicted and otherwise, to provide effective air University’s constellation ofwar colleges, located in Nor defense of fixed sites, like ports and airfields, and maneuvering folk, Virginia. During a twenty-seven-year Army career, units. While this article focused on a brief period and location in he served in Europe and the United States, where he com the war, these units did so across every possible geographic lo manded 2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery (Patriot) cation and under every climatic condition. From North Africa to and, as a garrison commander from 2003-2005, where led Western Europe, from the Southwest Pacific to Okinawa to China the effort to transform Fort Bliss, Texas, into the largest and Alaska, antiaircraft forces adapted to every environment and maneuver post in the Army. He graduated from the Com provided increasingly better protection from air attack, while often mand and General Staff College, School of Advanced adding devastating ground and artillery fires to the mix. Military Studies, and the National War College, and holds As service members discovered in World War II, the enemy an M.A. and Ph.D. from The Ohio State University. He is can come from any direction. As the antiaircraft artillerymen of the author ofSCUDALERT!: The Histon’, Development, World War II learned, and as this article demonstrates, innovation and Military Significance a/Ballistic Missiles on Tactical and change, like enemy aircraft, can arrive from several directions Opeivtions (AUSA, 1995) and TheAnatomy of Change: and on several levels simultaneously. Ft Win’Armie.cSucceed o;•Fail at Transformation (AUSA, 2000). At JAWS, he teaches military history and theory as well as an elective on military innovation and change. He is currently writing the history of U.S. Army antiaircraft artillery development from 1917 to 1945.

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