A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis of Eurosceptic Influence Over Mainstream Political Parties

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A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis of Eurosceptic Influence Over Mainstream Political Parties Contesting Europe: A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis of Eurosceptic Influence over Mainstream Political Parties A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Alexandru Filip Bremen, 10.01.2017 Dissertation Committee: Dr. Arndt Wonka, University of Bremen Prof. Dr. Philip Manow, University of Bremen Assoc. Prof. Thomas Persson, University of Uppsala Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS) ii iii Contents Contesting Europe: A Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis of Eurosceptic Influence over Mainstream Political Parties ........................................................................................................ i List of Tables .......................................................................................................................... v List of Figures ......................................................................................................................... v Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. viii 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 Why Eurosceptic Contagion Merits Exploration .................................................................... 4 The Growth of Euroscepticism: Popular Discontent, Mainstream Immobilism and Populist Pragmatism ............................................................................................................................. 6 Outline of the Study .............................................................................................................. 16 2. Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................................... 23 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 23 The Causal Mechanism ............................................................................................................. 25 Spatial (Proximity) Theory ................................................................................................... 25 Influence Parties and Challengers ......................................................................................... 27 The Past election model ........................................................................................................ 29 Salience ................................................................................................................................. 31 Salience and Niche Parties .................................................................................................... 33 Populist Contagion ................................................................................................................ 35 Populist Contagion and Euroscepticism - The Radical Party Hypothesis ................................ 38 The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion ...................................................................... 44 What Motivates Parties to co-opt Eurosceptic positions?..................................................... 48 The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion Revisited – an InstitutionalTake .................. 57 Rounding up and Coming Round again ................................................................................ 60 3. Research Design .............................................................................................................................. 62 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 62 Estimation Technique - Cluster Robust Prais-Winsten Regression ...................................... 67 Data and Measurement ......................................................................................................... 69 The Dimensionality of the EU Issue ..................................................................................... 74 iv Further Conceptualization and Operationalization ............................................................... 77 Eurosceptic Parties ................................................................................................................ 82 Cases and Data Points Omitted from the Analysis – ‘The East’ .......................................... 86 Further Variables and Indicators ........................................................................................... 88 4. Eurosceptic Trends and Eurosceptic Contagion .................................................................. 92 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 92 Trends and Cross-Country Comparisons .............................................................................. 93 Testing the Main Hypothesis .............................................................................................. 107 The inverse model ............................................................................................................... 113 Eurosceptic Contagion and the Electoral Threshold ........................................................... 114 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 117 5. The Circumstances and Dynamics of Eurosceptic Contagion ...................................... 119 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 119 The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion .................................................................... 120 Linear Contagion? .............................................................................................................. 132 The Motivations and Dynamics behind party policy adjustments ...................................... 136 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 170 6. An Institutional Take on Eurosceptic Contagion .............................................................. 173 European Elections Revisited ............................................................................................. 174 Strategic Voting, Euroscepticism and Contagion ............................................................... 177 European Elections as Protest Voting or EU Issue Voting ................................................. 190 Conclusion: Second Order Elections and Eurosceptic Contagion? .................................... 192 7. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 195 Recap and Empirical Review .............................................................................................. 197 Discussion ........................................................................................................................... 199 Europe Evolving.................................................................................................................. 199 Opposition to ‘Europe’ ....................................................................................................... 202 Successful challengers ........................................................................................................ 205 A Changing Landscape ....................................................................................................... 208 An Invitation to Contemplation .......................................................................................... 211 Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 215 v Appendix ............................................................................................................................................. 226 List of Tables Table 1: the first regression analysis, disaggregated models 110 Table 2: the first regression analysis, aggregated models 112 Table 3: testing whether Eurosceptic success is actually a function of mainstream party position change 114 Table 4: testing the radical party hypotheses when controlling for Eurosceptic proximity to the electoral threshold 115 Table 5: The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion (A) 121 Table 6: The Circumstances of Eurosceptic Contagion (B) 122 Table 7: Non-linear and Threshold Contagion 133 Table 8: Eurosceptic Contagion and Strategic Considerations 139 Table 9: Eurosceptic Contagion and Strategic Considerations (B) 140 Table 10: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations 149 Table 11: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations (B) 150 Table 12: Eurosceptic Contagion and Ideological Considerations (C) 157 Table 13: Eurosceptic Contagion and Geographical Variation 164 Table 14: Eurosceptic Contagion and Geographical Variation (B) 165 Table 15: Eurosceptic Contagion and European Elections 176 Table 16: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral Proportionality 184 Table 17: Eurosceptic Contagion and Electoral Proportionality 188 Table 18: Government-Public Dissonance and European Elections 192 List of Figures Figure 1: Eurosceptic Success over the years 9 Figure 2: Changes between the 7th European Parliament (left) and
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