DOCSLIB.ORG

Kant on Intuition and Experience

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Kant on Intuition and Experience Kant on Intuition and Experience Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophie an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München vorgelegt von Xing Nan Aus Hubei, China 2017 Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Axel Hutter Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Thomas Zwenger Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 13.07.2017 To my Father Zusammenfassung Anschauung ist einer der bedeutendsten, aber zugleich verwirrendsten Begriffe in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie. In dieser Abhandlung versuche ich die genaue Bedeutung dieses Begriffs zu erklären, indem ich seine systematische Rolle in Kants Theorie bzw. Metaphysik der Erfahrung untersucht. Der kantischen Unterscheidung zwischen Anschauung und Begriff liegt seine Unterscheidung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand zu Grunde, die m.E. dadurch erklärt werden soll, dass man sie mit derselben Unterscheidung bei zwei wichtigsten Vorgängern, nämlich Aristoteles und Leibniz, vergleicht. Sofern Kant Anschauung und Begriff deutlich entgegensetzt, scheint ihre Unterscheidung in naher Beziehung zu der aristotelischen zu stehen. Aber die aristotelische Unterscheidung führt zu vielen schwierigen Problemen, insbesondere dem Problem der Möglichkeit der rationalen Erkenntnisse von sinnlichen Gegenständen, welche Probleme im Rahmen einer strengen Entgegensetzung der Sinnlichkeit zum Verstand nicht zu lösen sind. Dagegen wird die Leibniz’sche Unterscheidung zwischen sinnlichen und intellektuellen Erkenntnissen häufig von Kant kritisiert. Es wird aber gezeigt, dass die meisten Kritiken Kants auf Missverständnisse basiert sind, und dass der Hauptzweck seiner Theorie bzw. Metaphysik der Erfahrung erst dann verständlich wird, wenn man die Leibniz’sche Unterscheidung und Humes Herausforderung an sie genauer betrachtet. Auf den historischen Teil folgt eine kritische Prüfung von Kants Lehre der Wahrnehmungs- und Erfahrungsurteilen in Prolegomena sowie ihrer Verwandlung in der B-Deduktion. Es wird gezeigt, dass es trotz vieler wichtigen Einsichten dem gesamten Argument Kants nicht gelingt, eine zufriedene Erklärung für die Natur der bloß subjektiv gültigen und der objektiv gültigen Vorstellungen zu geben und Humes Herausforderung zu beantworten. Meine Kritik bezieht sich hauptsächlich auf zwei Punkte: erstens ist der Zusammenhang zwischen den logischen Formen der Urteilen und den Kategorien besonders fragwürdig, zweitens werden in Kants Argument unterschiedliche Ebenen des Ichs bzw. des Selbst involviert, die Kant nicht immer deutlich unterscheidet. Deshalb kann er die Existenz eines durchgängig identischen Ichs nicht einfach behaupten. Nach der Kritik an Kants eigenen Argument versuche ich, ein neues, sich aus der Rekonstruktion anhand einiger zentralen Einsichten von Kant ergebendes Argument zu präsentieren, das von allen von mir genannten Problemen frei ist und eine Antwort auf Humes Herausforderung anbieten kann. Zum Schluss schlage ich vor, dass Kants Begriff der Anschauung nach dem Leibniz’schen verworrenen Begriff verstanden werden soll. Contents Note on Sources and Abbreviations 1 Introduction 3 Chapter 1 Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in the Aristotelian Tradition 23 Chapter 2 The Genesis of Kant’s New Doctrine of Sensibility 42 Chapter 3 Leibniz, Hume, and the Problem of Experience 65 Chapter 4 What is Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience? 87 Chapter 5 Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience 112 Chapter 6 Objectivity and the Categories 142 Conclusion What is Intuition? 173 Bibliography 177 Acknowledgments 183 Note on Sources and Abbreviations References to Kant: References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the pagination of the first (A) and/or the second (B) editions of it. Other references to Kant are to the volume and page of the Akademieausgabe (AA), i.e., Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Preussische (later Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900-), with the abbreviations suggested by Kant-Studien. All translations of Kant’s works are from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992-), with occasional revisions. Kant’s original emphases are marked in bold, and the emphases added by me are in italics. A complete list of Kant’s works quoted or referred to in the present study is the following: A/B Kritik der reinen Vernunft Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (AA 07) Br Briefe (AA 10-13) DfS Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen (AA 02) FM Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolff's Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? (AA 20) GUGR Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume (AA 02) KpV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (AA 05) KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (AA 05) Log Logik (AA 09) MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (AA 04) MSI De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (AA 02) Prol Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (AA 04) R Reflexion (AA 14-19) UD Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral (AA 02) !1 V-Lo/Blomberg Logik Blomberg (AA 24) V-Lo/Wiener Wiener Logik (AA 24) References to Other Authors: DA Aristotle. De Anima. Books II and III. Translated by D. W. Hamlyn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993. Other references to Aristotle are to Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. All references to Aristotle are according to the Bekker pagination. ST Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Available on-line. References are to part, question, and article. PPL Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Philosophical Papers and Letters. Edited by Leroy E. Loemker. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1973. NE Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. New Essays on Human Understanding. Edited by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. References are to book, chapter, paragraph, and page. EHU David Hume. An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. References are to section and paragraph. THN David Hume. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. References are to book, part, section, and paragraph. !2 Introduction I Kant opens the Transcendental Aesthetics with a definition or elucidation of the notion of intuition: In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, at least for us humans, is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility. Objects are therefore given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us intuitions. (A 19/B 33) For someone who reads this passage for the first time, he is not likely to find it especially difficult to understand. For it seems that intuition means nothing other than the familiar idea of sense-data1: Both refer to something given to us immediately; both are resulted from the impingement of the things on our senses, a process which is appropriately called affection; and both may serve as the foundation of our empirical knowledge. One will become baffled, however, as soon as one learns more about the Kantian intuition. First, a close reading of our citation tells us that intuition is first defined without any reference to the sense or sensibility. We cannot, according to Kant, “assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition” (A 254/B 310). Rather, as Kant emphasizes in the B-edition, it is only “for us humans” (this phrase is added in the B-edition) that an intuition can be given only by affection or through the sensibility. And our sensible, derived intuition (intuitus derivativus) is to be contrasted with the idea of an intellectual, original intuition (intuitus originarius) (B 72). Now it is not the time to discuss the significance of this contrast, but it should be clear enough that Kant admits no conceptual link between the notion of intuition and that of sensibility. In order to know what the Kantian intuition means, we cannot simply appeal to the idea of sense-data. Second, just one page later, Kant introduces the concept of pure intuition, which “occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind” (A 21/B 35). The pure intuition is also called formal intuition (cf., e.g., B 207), and Kant holds that space and time are just such intuition. 1 See Russell, Problems of Philosophy, ch. 5, for a clear statement of the idea of sense-data. It seems that this reading is endorsed by Dieter Henrich, as he claims that Kant’s theory presupposes the “data-sensualism” of cognition, and construes the Kantian intuition as “an indeterminate multiplicity and sequence of simple particular sensations” (“Identity and Objectivity,” p. 133). !3 But no one could reasonably take space and time, or our ideas of them, as sense-data, if for no other reason than the Kantian thesis that they are not resulted from the impingement of the objects on us, but are rather presupposed as its condition. Thus, to accommodate the idea of pure or formal intuition, we cannot
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry
    Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Chemistry Jaap van Brakel Abstract: In this paper I assess the relation between philosophy of chemistry and (general) philosophy of science, focusing on those themes in the philoso- phy of chemistry that may bring about major revisions or extensions of cur- rent philosophy of science. Three themes can claim to make a unique contri- bution to philosophy of science: first, the variety of materials in the (natural and artificial) world; second, extending the world by making new stuff; and, third, specific features of the relations between chemistry and physics. Keywords : philosophy of science, philosophy of chemistry, interdiscourse relations, making stuff, variety of substances . 1. Introduction Chemistry is unique and distinguishes itself from all other sciences, with respect to three broad issues: • A (variety of) stuff perspective, requiring conceptual analysis of the notion of stuff or material (Sections 4 and 5). • A making stuff perspective: the transformation of stuff by chemical reaction or phase transition (Section 6). • The pivotal role of the relations between chemistry and physics in connection with the question how everything fits together (Section 7). All themes in the philosophy of chemistry can be classified in one of these three clusters or make contributions to general philosophy of science that, as yet , are not particularly different from similar contributions from other sci- ences (Section 3). I do not exclude the possibility of there being more than three clusters of philosophical issues unique to philosophy of chemistry, but I am not aware of any as yet. Moreover, highlighting the issues discussed in Sections 5-7 does not mean that issues reviewed in Section 3 are less im- portant in revising the philosophy of science.
    [Show full text]
  • Experience Verification Form
    Tennessee Department of Education – Office of Educator Licensure Experience Verification Form The information listed below is to be completed by the current or previous employer (Superintendent, Headmaster, Agency Director, or Designated Personnel Officer). Principals are not authorized to sign this form unless they are the designated personnel officer. Use one line for each change in status. Do not include leave of absence periods. Only include experience that is not in the TN state data system. Name of Educator: ________________________________________________ Social Security Number: _________________________ Information below to be completed by the SCHOOL SYSTEM where the teaching was performed. Experience Record: Please list experience yearly, each year on a separate line, beginning with July 1 and ending June 30. Name School Position Fiscal Year, July 01 - June 30 Time Employed % Time, Total of System and State Beginning Date Ending Date Months / Days Ex. Part-time, Days in Month/Day/Year Month/Day/Year Full-time School Year School Grade Level Per Year Check one of the following: Public School Private School * Charter School * U.S. Government Service Teaching Program * ** Please note: If non-public school you must identify accreditation. The above school/school system was fully approved or accredited by the ____________________________________________________________________ at the time the service was performed. (State Department of Education, or Regional Association of Colleges & Schools, or recognized private school accrediting
    [Show full text]
  • Moral Relativism
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Publications and Research New York City College of Technology 2020 The Incoherence of Moral Relativism Carlo Alvaro CUNY New York City College of Technology How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/ny_pubs/583 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] 1 The Incoherence of Moral Relativism Abstract This paper is a response to Park Seungbae’s article, “Defence of Cultural Relativism”. Some of the typical criticisms of moral relativism are the following: moral relativism is erroneously committed to the principle of tolerance, which is a universal principle; there are a number of objective moral rules; a moral relativist must admit that Hitler was right, which is absurd; a moral relativist must deny, in the face of evidence, that moral progress is possible; and, since every individual belongs to multiple cultures at once, the concept of moral relativism is vague. Park argues that such contentions do not affect moral relativism and that the moral relativist may respond that the value of tolerance, Hitler’s actions, and the concept of culture are themselves relative. In what follows, I show that Park’s adroit strategy is unsuccessful. Consequently, moral relativism is incoherent. Keywords: Moral relativism; moral absolutism; objectivity; tolerance; moral progress 2 The Incoherence of Moral Relativism Moral relativism is a meta-ethical theory according to which moral values and duties are relative to a culture and do not exist independently of a culture.
    [Show full text]
  • INTUITION .THE PHILOSOPHY of HENRI BERGSON By
    THE RHYTHM OF PHILOSOPHY: INTUITION ·ANI? PHILOSO~IDC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON By CAROLE TABOR FlSHER Bachelor Of Arts Taylor University Upland, Indiana .. 1983 Submitted ~o the Faculty of the Graduate College of the · Oklahoma State University in partial fulfi11ment of the requirements for . the Degree of . Master of Arts May, 1990 Oklahoma State. Univ. Library THE RHY1HM OF PlllLOSOPHY: INTUITION ' AND PfnLoSOPlllC METHOD IN .THE PHILOSOPHY OF HENRI BERGSON Thesis Approved: vt4;;. e ·~lu .. ·~ests AdVIsor /l4.t--OZ. ·~ ,£__ '', 13~6350' ii · ,. PREFACE The writing of this thesis has bee~ a tiring, enjoyable, :Qustrating and challenging experience. M.,Bergson has introduced me to ·a whole new way of doing . philosophy which has put vitality into the process. I have caught a Bergson bug. His vision of a collaboration of philosophers using his intuitional m~thod to correct, each others' work and patiently compile a body of philosophic know: ledge is inspiring. I hope I have done him justice in my description of that vision. If I have succeeded and that vision catches your imagination I hope you Will make the effort to apply it. Please let me know of your effort, your successes and your failures. With the current challenges to rationalist epistemology, I believe the time has come to give Bergson's method a try. My discovery of Bergson is. the culmination of a development of my thought, one that started long before I began my work at Oklahoma State. However, there are some people there who deserv~. special thanks for awakening me from my ' "''' analytic slumber.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Chemistry: an Emerging Field with Implications for Chemistry Education
    DOCUMENT RESUME ED 434 811 SE 062 822 AUTHOR Erduran, Sibel TITLE Philosophy of Chemistry: An Emerging Field with Implications for Chemistry Education. PUB DATE 1999-09-00 NOTE 10p.; Paper presented at the History, Philosophy and Science Teaching Conference (5th, Pavia, Italy, September, 1999). PUB TYPE Opinion Papers (120) Speeches/Meeting Papers (150) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS *Chemistry; Educational Change; Foreign Countries; Higher Education; *Philosophy; Science Curriculum; *Science Education; *Science Education History; *Science History; Scientific Principles; Secondary Education; Teaching Methods ABSTRACT Traditional applications of history and philosophy of science in chemistry education have concentrated on the teaching and learning of "history of chemistry". This paper considers the recent emergence of "philosophy of chemistry" as a distinct field and explores the implications of philosophy of chemistry for chemistry education in the context of teaching and learning chemical models. This paper calls for preventing the mutually exclusive development of chemistry education and philosophy of chemistry, and argues that research in chemistry education should strive to learn from the mistakes that resulted when early developments in science education were made separate from advances in philosophy of science. Contains 54 references. (Author/WRM) ******************************************************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. ******************************************************************************** 1 PHILOSOPHY OF CHEMISTRY: AN EMERGING FIELD WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR CHEMISTRY EDUCATION PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS Office of Educational Research and improvement BEEN GRANTED BY RESOURCES INFORMATION SIBEL ERDURAN CENTER (ERIC) This document has been reproducedas ceived from the person or organization KING'S COLLEGE, UNIVERSITYOF LONDON originating it.
    [Show full text]
  • Freewill and Determinism: the African Perspective and Experience
    Global Journal of Arts Humanities and Social Sciences Vol.3, No.2, pp.75-82, February 2015 Published by European Centre for Research Training and Development UK (www.eajournals.org) FREEWILL AND DETERMINISM: THE AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE AND EXPERIENCE Augustine Chidi Igbokwe, Department of Philosophy, Caritas University, Amorji – Nike P.M.B 01784, Enugu Enugu State – Nigeria. ABSTRACT: Whether Freewill and/or determinism has been an age long heated debate in the history of Western philosophy. The African metaphysical enquiry attempts a resolution by establishing a complementarity parlance between the two. Reality then becomes a paradox of harmony of opposites. In the midst of this harmony, a realization comes that the more a society turns modern, the more freedom is identified, subjecting deterministic tendencies to the periphery. As Africa is on the process to modernity, the system of communalism that had hitherto served Africa now gives way to individualism. In the same vein, there is need for a conscious change from unorganized but effective brotherhood to corporate and efficient governance to synergize this paradigm shift KEYWORDS: Freewill; Determinism; Communalism; Individualism; Free-Determinism. INTRODUCTION The philosophical argument on freewill and determinism which dates back to the ancient period still takes the front burner in our philosophical discourse today. How free are our actions and the choices we make? This question becomes pertinent when we juxtapose it with the long assumed assertion that every effect has a cause. If our actions as effects are all caused, then how morally responsible are we in our actions? This is usually the major paradox in the discourse on freewill and determinism and this is the major rationale behind the insistence on the heated debate.
    [Show full text]
  • Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts
    OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/10/2011, SPi 3 Perceptual Causality, Counterfactuals, and Special Causal Concepts Johannes Roessler On one view, an adequate account of causal understanding may focus exclusively on what is involved in mastering general causal concepts (concepts such as ‘x causes y’ or ‘p causally explains q’). An alternative view is that causal understanding is, partly but irreducibly, a matter of grasping what Anscombe called special causal concepts, con- cepts such as ‘push’, ‘flatten’,or‘knock over’. We can label these views generalist vs particularist approaches to causal understanding. It is worth emphasizing that the contrast here is not between two kinds of theories of the metaphysics of causation, but two views of the nature and perhaps source of ordinary causal understanding. One aim of this paper is to argue that it would be a mistake to dismiss particularism because of its putative metaphysical commitments. I begin by formulating an intuitively attractive version of particularism due to P.F. Strawson, a central element of which is what I will call na¨ıve realism concerning mechanical transactions. I will then present the account with two challenges. Both challenges reflect the worry that Strawson’s particularism may be unable to acknowledge the intimate connection between causa- tion and counterfactuals, as articulated by the interventionist approach to causation. My project will be to allay these concerns, or at least to explore how this might be done. My (tentative) conclusion will be that Strawson’sna¨ıve realism can accept what interventionism has to say about ordinary causal understanding, and that intervention- ism should not be seen as being committed to generalism.
    [Show full text]
  • A Defense of Ethical Relativism One Entry in a Long Series of Possible Adjustments
    A Defense of Ethical Relativism one entry in a long series of possible adjustments. These adjustments, whether they are in mannerisms like the ways of showing RUTH BENEDICT anger, or joy, or grief in any society, or in major human drives like those of sex, prove to be far more variable than experience in any one culture would suggest. In From Benedict, Ruth "Anthropology and the Abnormal," Journal of General Psychology, 10, 1934. certain fields, such as that of religion or of formal marriage arrangements, these wide limits of variability are well known and can be fairly described. In others it is Ruth Benedict (1887-1948), a foremost American anthropologist, taught at not yet possible to give a generalized account, but that does not absolve us of the Columbia University, and she is best known for her book Pattern of Culture task of indicating the significance of the work that has been done and of die (1935). Benedict views social systems as communities with common beliefs problems that have arisen. and practices, which have become integrated patterns of ideas and practices. One of these problems relates to the customary modern normal-abnormal Like a work of art, a culture chooses which theme from its repertoire of categories and our conclusions regarding them. In how far are such categories basic tendencies to emphasize and then produces a grand design, favoring culturally determined, or in how far can we with assurance regard them as absolute? those tendencies. The final systems differ from one another in striking ways, In how far can we regard inability to function socially as abnormality, or in how far but we have no reason to say that one system is better than another.
    [Show full text]
  • The Natural Power of Intuition
    THE NATURAL POWER OF INTUITION: EXPLORING THE FORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF INTUITION IN THE PRACTICES OF THREE VISUAL ARTISTS AND THREE BUSINESS EXECUTIVES by Jessica Jagtiani Dissertation Committee: Professor Judith Burton, Sponsor Professor Mary Hafeli Approved by the Committee on the Degree of Doctor of Education Date 16 May 2018 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education in Teachers College, Columbia University 2018 ABSTRACT THE NATURAL POWER OF INTUITION: EXPLORING THE FORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF INTUITION IN THE PRACTICES OF THREE VISUAL ARTISTS AND THREE BUSINESS EXECUTIVES Jessica Jagtiani Both artists and business executives state the importance of intuition in their professional practice. Current research suggests that intuition plays a significant role in cognition, decision-making, and creativity. Intuitive perception is beneficial to management, entrepreneurship, learning, medical diagnosis, healing, spiritual growth, and overall well-being, and is furthermore, more accurate than deliberative thought under complex conditions. Accordingly, acquiring intuitive faculties seems indispensable amid present day’s fast-paced multifaceted society and growing complexity. Today, there is an overall rising interest in intuition and an existing pool of research on intuition in management, but interestingly an absence of research on intuition in the field of art. This qualitative-phenomenological study explores the experience of intuition in both professional practices in order to show comparability and extend the base of intuition, while at the same time revealing what is unique about its emergence in art practice. Data gathered from semi-structured interviews and online-journals provided the participants’ experience of intuition and are presented through individual portraits, including an introduction to their work, their worldview, and the experiences of intuition in their lives and professional practice.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is Meant by “Christian Dualism” (Genuine Separation
    Jeremy Shepherd October 15, 2004 The Friday Symposium Dallas Baptist University “Christian Enemy #1: Dualism Exposed & Destroyed” “The Fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge, but fools despise wisdom and discipline.” - Proverbs 1:7 “Christianity is not a realm of life; it’s a way of life for every realm”1 Introduction When I came to Dallas Baptist University I had a rather violent reaction to what I thought was a profound category mistake. Coming from the public school system, I had a deeply embedded idea of how “religious” claims ought to relate, or should I say, ought not to relate, with “worldly affairs.” To use a phrase that Os Guinness frequently uses, I thought that “religion might be privately engaging but publicly irrelevant.”2 I was astonished at the unashamed integration of all these “religious” beliefs into other realms of life, even though I myself was a Christian. The key word for me was: unashamed. I thought to myself, “How could these people be so shameless in their biases?” My reaction to this Wholistic vision of life was so serious that I almost left the university to go get myself a “real” education, one where my schooling wouldn’t be polluted by all of these messy assumptions and presuppositions, even if they were Christian. My worldview lenses saw “education” as something totally separate from my “faith.” I was a model student of the American public school system, and like most other students, whether Christian or not, the separation of “church/state” and “faith/education” was only a small part of something much deeper and much more profound, the separation of my “faith” from the rest of my “life.” Our public schools are indoctrinating other students who have this same split-vision3, in which “faith” is a private thing, which is not to be integrated into the classroom.
    [Show full text]
  • BEYOND EXPERIMENTALISM and the RATIONALIST RENAISSANCE By
    IN DEFENSE OF INTUITIONS: BEYOND EXPERIMENTALISM AND THE RATIONALIST RENAISSANCE by ADDISON C. ELLIS B.A., University of Illinois, 2009 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Philosophy 2013 This thesis entitled: In Defense of Intuitions: Beyond Experimentalism and the Rationalist Renaissance written by Addison C. Ellis has been approved for the Department of Philosophy (Robert Rupert) (Michael Huemer) Date The final copy of this thesis has been examined by the signatories, and we Find that both the content and the form meet acceptable presentation standards Of scholarly work in the above mentioned discipline. iii Abstract Ellis, Addison C. (M.A., Philosophy) In Defense of Intuitions: Beyond Experimentalism and the Rationalist Renaissance Thesis directed by Associate Professor Robert Rupert This thesis has a negative and a positive goal. The negative goal consists of showing (i) that the standard analyses of intuition are flawed, (ii) that there are a number of unwarranted assumptions that underpin the experimentalist approach to intuitions, (iii) that the experimentalist methodology rests on seriously unstable ground, and (iv) that the standard rationalist response to the experimentalist‘s challenge is inadequate. The positive goal is to demonstrate that it is nevertheless possible to give a sound metaphysical account of intuition reliability. I say why we must think there are reliable intuitions, then I spell out in detail what the structure of the correct account must look like. To Mom, Dad, and Matt v Acknowledgements Many thanks to my thesis committee – Robert Rupert, Michael Huemer, and Dan Korman – for being very generous and patient, and for giving me helpful comments and advice along the way.
    [Show full text]
  • Florida Work Experience Program
    2021-22 Fact Sheet Florida Work Experience Program Section 1009.77, Florida Statutes State Board of Education Rule 6A-20.038 Program Description The Florida Work Experience Program (FWEP) is a need-based program providing eligible Florida students work experiences to complement and reinforce their educational and career goals. Each eligible and participating college, university, Florida college (public community college), career center operated by a district school board and educator preparation institute determines application procedures, deadlines, student eligibility and award amount. Requirements to Receive Funding The student must: • Be a Florida resident and a U.S. citizen or eligible non-citizen. A student’s residency and citizenship status are determined by the postsecondary institution. Questions regarding such status should be directed to the financial aid office or admissions office of the institution the student plans to attend. • Not owe a repayment or be in default under any state or federal grant, loan, or scholarship program unless satisfactory arrangements to repay have been made. • Not have previously received a baccalaureate degree (unless enrolled in an eligible educator preparation institute). • Enroll for a minimum of six credit hours per term or 180 clock hours at an eligible college or university currently participating in FWEP in an associate or baccalaureate degree program, or • Enroll no less than half-time in a career certificate program consisting of no less than 450 clock hours of instruction at an eligible career center, or • Enroll as no less than a half-time student in good standing at an eligible educator preparation institute. • Maintain the equivalent of a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of 2.0 on a 4.0 scale.
    [Show full text]