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Intuition As Evidence in Philosophical Analysis: Taking Connectionism Seriously

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Intuition As Evidence in Philosophical Analysis: Taking Connectionism Seriously Intuition as Evidence in Philosophical Analysis: Taking Connectionism Seriously by Tom Rand A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Ph.D. Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto (c) Copyright by Tom Rand 2008 Intuition as Evidence in Philosophical Analysis: Taking Connectionism Seriously Ph.D. Degree, 2008, by Tom Rand, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto ABSTRACT 1. Intuitions are often treated in philosophy as a basic evidential source to confirm/discredit a proposed definition or theory; e.g. intuitions about Gettier cases are taken to deny a justified-true-belief analysis of ‘knowledge’. Recently, Weinberg, Nichols & Stitch (WN&S) provided evidence that epistemic intuitions vary across persons and cultures. In- so-far as philosophy of this type (Standard Philosophical Methodology – SPM) is committed to provide conceptual analyses, the use of intuition is suspect – it does not exhibit the requisite normativity. I provide an analysis of intuition, with an emphasis on its neural – or connectionist – cognitive backbone; the analysis provides insight into its epistemic status and proper role within SPM. Intuition is initially characterized as the recognition of a pattern. 2. The metaphysics of ‘pattern’ is analyzed for the purpose of denying that traditional symbolic computation is capable of differentiating the patterns of interest. 3. The epistemology of ‘recognition’ is analyzed, again, to deny that traditional computation is capable of capturing human acts of recognition. 4. Fodor’s informational semantics, his Language of Thought and his Representational Theory of Mind are analyzed and his arguments denied. Again, the purpose is to deny traditional computational theories of mind. 5. Both intuition and a theory of concepts – pragmatic conceptualism - are developed within the connectionist computational paradigm. Intuition is a particular sort of occurrent signal, and a concept is a counterfactually defined set of signals. Standard connectionist theory is significantly extended to develop my position, and consciousness plays a key functional role. This extension – taking connectionism seriously – is argued to be justified on the basis of the failure of the traditional computing paradigm to account for human cognition. 6. Repercussions for the use of intuition in SPM are developed. Variance in intuition is characterized – and expected - as a kind of bias in the network, either inherent or externally- provoked. The WN&S data is explained in the context of this bias. If SPM remains committed to the use of intuition, then intuition must be taken as a part of a larger body of evidence, and it is from experts – not the folk – that intuitions should be solicited. ii For my parents, Peter and Cynthia - scientists, artists and philosophers. What do we know about intuition? What idea have we of it? It’s presumably supposed to be a sort of seeing, recognition at a single glance; I wouldn’t know what more to say.1 - Wittgenstein Good Quinean that I am, I think that it is always up for grabs what an intuition is an intuition of.2 - Fodor 1 Wittgenstein, Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness , 18:10 2 Fodor, Concepts ., pg., 87 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT. II OVERVIEW . 1 ARGUMENT FORM. 6 1. INTUITION . 7 1.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 7 1.2 INTUITIONS ABOUT KNOWLEDGE ASCRIPTIONS: WEINBERG, NICHOLS AND STICH’S NORMATIVITY PROBLEM .................................................................................................................................................... 11 1.2.1 The Normative and Descriptive Projects................................................................................... 11 1.2.2 Epistemic Romanticism & Intuition Driven Romanticism.......................................................... 12 1.2.3 The Normativity Problem..................................................................................................... 13 1.3 FOLK INTUITIONS; EVIDENCE OF WHAT? HYPOTHESES VS. EVIDENCE ................................................ 16 1.4 TWO CONTEMPORARY ANALYSES OF INTUITION; GOLDMAN & PUST, PUST.......................................... 21 1.4.1 Goldman & Pust; The ‘Reliabilist’ View................................................................................. 21 1.4.2 Pust.................................................................................................................................. 25 1.4.2.1 Particularist versus Generalist Intuitions .............................................................................. 25 1.4.2.2 Narrow and Wide Reflective Equilibrium, General and Global Intuitionism .................................... 26 1.4.2.3 The Nature of Intuition as “Intellectual Seeming”................................................................... 30 1.4.2.4 Intuition and Belief........................................................................................................ 31 1.4.2.5 Intuition and Necessity.................................................................................................... 33 1.5 INTUITION, A DEFINITION........................................................................................................... 35 1.5.1 H-Intuition; Reliable Hunches ............................................................................................... 36 1.5.2 O-Intuition; Intuiting the Obvious.......................................................................................... 40 1.5.3 Introspective Support and Epistemic Necessity.......................................................................... 41 1.5.4 Intuition writ Large: H- and O-Intuitions as Pattern Recognition.................................................. 46 2. PATTERN METAPHYSICS . 48 2.1 METAPHYSICS OF PATTERNS – THE LANDSCAPE ............................................................................... 49 2.1.1 A Quick Note on Physicalism ............................................................................................... 50 2.2 DENNETT AND REAL PATTERNS.................................................................................................... 52 2.2.1 Barcodes and Noise .............................................................................................................. 54 2.2.1.1 The Indeterminacy of Signal Choice; Expediency, Interests & Abilities ....................................... 56 2.2.1.2 The Indeterminacy of Underlying Explanatory Processes .......................................................... 59 2.2.2 Life, Chess and a Multiplicity of Perspectives .......................................................................... 60 2.2.3 Lessons: The Indeterminacy of Real Patterns ............................................................................ 62 2.2.4 Dennett; Cautions & Conclusions.......................................................................................... 64 2.2.4.1 Support for Ontological and Epistemic Continuity.................................................................. 66 2.3 HAUGELAND; CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE AND NORMATIVITY ............................................................... 68 2.3.1 Strong Context-Dependence................................................................................................... 69 2.3.2 Normativity, Objecthood and Discernability ............................................................................. 72 2.3.3 Concluding Remarks: Are Constitutive Standards Recognition-Independent?................................... 75 2.4 DREYFUS; THE KINDS OF PATTERNS WE RECOGNIZE ........................................................................ 78 2.4.1 Three Kinds of Patterns ........................................................................................................ 78 2.4.2 Facts, Patterns and Language; The Ontological Assumption........................................................ 82 2.5 PATTERNS; A HIERARCHY OF COMPLEXITY .................................................................................... 85 2.5.1 Amenability to Algorithmic Description.................................................................................. 85 2.5.2 Mind-Dependency................................................................................................................ 89 iv 2.5.3 Degree of Context-Dependency............................................................................................... 91 2.5.4 Comments on Pattern Complexity ......................................................................................... 93 2.6 FINAL DEFINITION OF PATTERN.................................................................................................... 96 3. PATTERN EPISTEMOLOGY OR ‘RECOGNITION’ . 98 3.1 THE PATTERN-REC STANCE AND A NEW COMPUTING PRIMITIVE.......................................................100 3.2 (HUMAN) PATTERN-RECOGNITION TRAITS – OR – WHY WE ARE NOT COMPUTING ...............................102 3.2.1 Fringe Consciousness .........................................................................................................104 3.2.1.1 Accumulated Past and Present Actions as Context...................................................................106 3.2.1.2 Heuristics Top to Bottom ?..............................................................................................108 3.2.1.3 Ambiguity of sub-Pattern
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