From camp to city. Obstacles to overcome

Jorren Bosmans Student number: 01303878

Supervisor: Prof. Joachim Declerck

Master's dissertation submitted in order to obtain the academic degree of Master of Science in de ingenieurswetenschappen: architectuur

Academic year 2018-2019

Acknowledgements

To professor Joachim Declerck, who provided assistance and guidance in a field that was previously unknown to me. To Yousef Abu-Safieh and his wife Maghboobe, who presented me with a home in a foreign country and cared for me like a son. To Taha Albess and Mohamad Elayan, who helped me understand the inner workings of the Palestinian refugee crisis and who work daily to lighten the burden of the many refugees in the . To Mousa Anbar, who provided inside knowledge on life in camp and who showed me the most interesting places inside the camp’s urban jungle.

The author gives permission to make this master dissertation available for consultation and to copy parts of this master dissertation for personal use. In all cases of other use, the copyright terms have to be respected, in particular with regard to the obligation to state explicitly the source when quoting results from this master dissertation. 28/05/2019

Abstract

In recent decades, refugee camps have existed for increasingly longer periods of time. Protracted refugee situations have become the new norm due to prolonged conflicts and due to both humanitarian agencies and host governments preferring to keep refugees in camps. Although refugee workers are aware of long-term possibilities, in practice refugee care is mostly aimed at the initial emergency assistance. Refugees are perceived to remain in this initial stage until one of the long-term solutions to a refugee crisis can be achieved. Despite this prejudice, refugee camps are observed to undergo transformations over time. Authors have described how camps become urbanised when refugees start their own businesses, new identities get formed and camps become connected to the rest of the country due to the exchange of goods, people and information. With a couple interventions, the camp management could stimulate further urbanisation, to be used as a development tool for refugees in the intermediate future. This allows for the initial steps towards self- sufficiency, which will drastically lower refugee costs. Additionally, this will also stimulate interaction between the refugees and local habitants in the hopes of creating a symbiotic relation, where both groups can profit of each other. Lastly, a development model will also allow the refugees to take back control over their lives and regain some of their humanity.

Key words: refugee camps, urbanisation, protracted refugee situations, development

Vluchtelingkampen blijven steeds langer bestaan. Het idee van een kamp als tijdelijke oplossing blijkt achterhaald. Hulporganisaties en de landen waar de optreden verkiezen vaak een kamp boven andere oplossingen, wanneer ze geconfronteerd worden met een instroom van vluchtelingen. De visibiliteit die een kamp biedt, maakt het een gegeerd instrument om assistentie te bekomen van internationale donors. Bovendien maakt een kamp het gemakkelijker om vluchtelingen op één plek te houden, met het oog op repatriatie in de nabije toekomst. Ondanks hun tijdelijke karakter, hebben verschillende auteurs beschreven hoe kampen transformaties zullen ondergaan. Deze urbanisatie vertaalt zich in het feit dat de vluchtelingen het kamp naar hun hand beginnen zetten, de ruimte beginnen transformeren en een prototype ‘kamp-stad’ ontstaat. Dit gebeurt meestal ongepland, aangezien de meeste kamp planning gericht is op korte termijn assistentie. Verschillende factoren zullen de evolutie van het kamp beïnvloeden. Met een paar gerichte ingrepen kan men deze evolutie positief stimuleren, zodat de vluchtelingen hiervan de vruchten kunnen plukken. Deze vernieuwde kijk op kamp planning zorgt voor meer persoonlijke ontwikkeling bij de vluchtelingen, wat hun levensstandaard zal verhogen en hun meer kansen biedt op een vruchtbaar leven buiten het kamp.

Contents

Acknowledgements Abstract List of illustrations/tables List of abbreviations

Introduction 1 Part I – The as spatial entity 1.1. Refugees and the UNHCR 3 1.2. Camp planning strategies 7 1.3. The camp as the best solution? 13 Part II – Case study: refugee camps in Palestine 2.1. Background information 16 2.1.1. The Arab-Israeli conflict 16 2.1.2. Obstacles to peace: the Israeli settlements 23 2.1.3. The presence of UNRWA 25 2.2. Jalazone refugee camp 27 2.3. refugee camp 40 Part III – The camp and the city 3.1. The reality of protracted refugee situations 47 3.1.1. Definition and numbers 47 3.1.2. Causes 51 3.1.3. Consequences 53 3.1.4. Responding to prolonged exile: the development approach 55 3.2. The urbanisation of refugee camps 60 3.2.1. The informal nature of urbanisation 60 3.2.2. Urbanity according to Agier 62 3.2.3. Urbanity according to Montclos & Kagwanja 65 3.2.4. Benefitting from a refugee camp 67 3.3. Instruments of further urbanisation 70 3.3.1. Economic possibilities 70 3.3.2. Integration and the host/refugee relation 75 3.3.3. Refugee policies 81 3.3.4. Refugee identity 84 Part IV – Conclusion 87 Bibliography 91

List of illustrations/tables

Part I – The refugee camp as spatial entity 01. States adhering to UN refugee law p. 04 02. Standard camp layout model p. 08 03. Overview of Za'atari refugee camp p. 10

Part II – case study: refugee camps in Palestine 04. UN partition plan for Palestine, 1947 p .17 05. and the Occupied Territories, 1967 p. 19 06. Areas A, B and C in the Westbank, 1995 p. 21 07. Israeli settlements in the Westbank, 2016 p. 24 08. Original camp setup using tents, 1950 p. 27 09. Construction of concrete shelters, 1952 p. 27 10. Horizontal expansion of refugee shelters, 1982 p. 28 11. Shelter typology, used by UNWRA in the 1950s p. 28 12. Overview of Jalazone camp, from the east side p. 30 13. The camp is located alongside the main road Jerusalem-Nablus p. 30 14. Courtyard of the girls’ school p. 30 15. Israeli watchtower overlooking Jalazone camp, 1991 p. 31 16. Overview of Jalazone and the neighbouring settlement Beit-El p. 32 17. The UNWRA boys’ school with the in the background p. 33 18. Builing block inside the camp destroyed by the IDF p. 33 19-20. Small windows in the UNWRA school, facing the settlement p. 33 21. The urbanisation context of Jalazone camp in 2006 p. 35 22. Concrete pillars are visible on top of buildings, ready for future expansion p. 36 23-24. With increased verticalisation, outside stairwells are now common practice p. 37 25. Gradual expansion of the houses has reduces the street width significantly p. 38 26. House expanded on with a new room, suspended over the alleyway p. 38 27. Old utility pole that got swallowed up by the building extentions p. 38 28. Job distribution in Jalazone camp p. 39 29. Overview of and Al-Bireh p. 40 30. The main street of Qaddura camp, filled with shops p. 41 31. The camp is located inside the agglomeration of Ramallah city p. 41 32. Luxery appartments, owned by non-refugees within the camp borders p. 41 33. Non-refugee buildings in Qaddura camp p. 43 34-35. The camp has become indistinguishable from the surrounding city p. 44 36. Job distribution in Qaddura camp p. 45

Part III – The camp and the city 37. Protracted refugee situations under the UNHCR mandate at the end of 2017 p. 48 38. The participation ladder in a DAR program p. 57 39. Kennedy’s proposed location improvement for future refugee camps p. 73 40. Conceptual framework for integration p. 77

List of abbreviations

UNHCR The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNWRA The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East IDP Internally Displaced Persons WHO World Health Organization NGO Non-governmental organization UNICEF The United Nations Children's Fund IDF Israeli Defense Force PLO Palestine Liberation Organization OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries PNA (PA) Palestinian National Authority DORA Department of Refugee Affairs JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency ARIJ Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem PCBS The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PRS protracted refugee situations DAR Development Assistance for Refugees ICIP Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Program WFP World Food Programme ROSCA Rotating Savings and Credit Associations

Introduction

Refugee numbers are on the rise. With the recent conflicts in , Iraq and Myanmar the refugee problem reaches once again all-time highs (UNHCR, 2018). Tens of millions of people worldwide are forced to abandon their homes due to conflict, economic reasons or political prosecution. Problems around shelter and health ask for faster and cheaper solutions. The UNHCR, the United Nations refugee agency, is the biggest international body to assist and resettle refugees. An estimated 87,6 percent of all refugees helped by the UNHCR are accommodated in officially designated camps1 (UNHCR, 2018). The refugee camp, the traditional solution to this problem, will be examined and its underlaying problems exposed. The refugee camp has historically been a ‘specialty of poor countries’ (Cambrézy, 2001, p. 72) with the majority of camps located in Africa and Asia, where camps house 83.2% and 95.9% of all refugees respectively. In Europe however, only 14.3% of the refugee population is housed in camps (Cambrézy, 2001). An explanation for the significance of camps in the global South is the increasing interest of host governments in grouping refugees in camps for repatriation and security reasons, instead of allowing refugees to live among the local population (Johnson, 2011). With frequent refugee influxes in these regions, camps have become an ideal solution due to their great cost-efficiency on a bigger scale. Still, there is this persistent stigma around camps being a burden and draining resources from the host country. Are camps truly a problematic relic from the past? Or can the refugee camp make the jump towards a sustainable long-term solution? Planners have since long tried to get a grip on the camp and its life within. Planned camps allow for a more efficient distribution of services and to maximize control and administration (UNHCR, 2007). In theory, refugee camps are a temporary solution until the refugee problem can be solved. But with recent conflicts not appearing to end soon, camps are more and more becoming long-term solutions (Kennedy, 2005). In practice, their existence can extend over multiple generations with some older camps almost becoming indistinguishable from neighbouring towns. Authors like Agier (2002), Montclos & Kagwanja (2000) or Misselwitz (2009) have described signs of urbanisation among these established refugee camps. They showed how urbanisation occurs mostly informal, despite camp planning or refugee policies sometimes hindering its progression. This thesis will try to expand upon their research, showing the benefits of camp urbanisation and how this progress can be further stimulated. It will try to detail which factors will influence the camp’s development and how to use camp urbanisation as a tool to enrich the refugees’ lives. Are these ‘urbanised camps’ the natural end state of camp planning? How do these ‘city-camps’ work? And what are the key factors that will influence their evolution? Part I of this thesis will examine the theoretical framework behind camp planning. It starts by introducing refugee assistance and the rulesets that are in place. Secondly, it will look at the different strategies planners use when designing a new refugee camp. Some common critiques on the UNHCR and their camp planning will be explored and justified.

1 Numbers only account for official UNHCR refugees 1

Part II explores the refugee camps in Palestine, in particular the camps of Jalazone and Qaddura. These are protracted refugee camps, which have been there since the 1950’s. The camps were examined during a 10-day case study in the Westbank by the author of this thesis. Multiple interviews were conducted with members of local government, bureaucrats of responsible refugee departments and camp habitants. The urbanisation of both camps will be explored, each will show a unique outcome due to a widely different context. Their underlying issues and outsider influences will be revealed. The result will show many discrepancies between the reality of urbanised camps and the theoretical camp models, as proposed in part I. Part III of the thesis will focus on the different contextual parameters that influence the evolution of a refugee camp. This part will show how limited the camp planner’s influence is and which outside factors are most important. It will examine the different forms of camp urbanisation and how this affects life inside the camp. Additionally, some great strategies for handling long-term refugee situations will be considered and the possibility of a symbiotic relationship will be explored, where local habitants can benefit from the refugee presence. Lastly, part IV will be a brief summary, meant for camp planners (or anyone in this field), on how to handle a refugee crisis and the possibility of it becoming protracted. It will show the optimal strategies, both for the short and long term, in trying to create fulfilment in the refugees’ lives and how to stimulate camp development.

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Part I – The refugee camp as spatial entity

1.1. Refugees and the UNHCR

The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950, in the wake of the second World War. Meant as a temporary organisation, its goal was to handle the refugee crisis in a war-torn Europe in a humanitarian way. Camps were a standard procedure for dislocated groups during this post-war era. They were an efficient solution to security concerns first off and a humanitarian problem secondly, a way of thinking that still lies at the roots of current refugee procedures (Hyndman, 2000). Following the 1951 Refugee Convention in Geneva, a much-needed declaration was approved that created the groundworks for the official status of refugees and subsequent UNHCR policy. This was later expended on with the 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographical focus on Europe and officially made the UNHCR the global leader in refugee situations (Misselwitz, 2009). At the end of 2017, the total number of refugees under the UNHCR’s mandate was just shy of 20 million with another 5.4 million refugees under the UNWRA jurisdiction (UNHCR, 2017). The official definition of a refugee has undergone a couple changes over the years. The current definition stands as: ‘A refugee is someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so.’ (UNHCR, 2018). This definition still expresses the necessity of crossing international borders in order to become an official refugee (Hyndman, 2000; Kennedy, 2004). The UNHCR’s mandate has been later expanded on to also incorporate other ‘persons of concern’ such as IDP’s (internally displaced persons). These are people who are forced to flee from their homes but still remain within their home nation’s borders. They make up the majority of the world’s forcibly displaced people, at just under 40 million individuals at the end of 2017 (UNHCR, 2017). Unlike refugees, IDP’s are not protected under international law, as they fall under the authority of their own country. This makes it harder to assist them and requires an official mandate from that respective country before any aid can be provided (Misselwitz, 2009). Over 140 countries have signed at least one of the international treaties, promising cooperation with the UN to ensure the refugees are granted protection, access to court and potential asylum if repatriation is not possible. In general, this treaty is a public sign of goodwill as the UNHCR has no means to impose these laws. But it can make it easier for a country to attract international beneficiaries once a refugee problem arises. Still, the UNHCR regularly has to deal with nations, who neglect part of the made agreement (Napier-Moore, 2005). The Agency is also still active in countries that didn’t ratify the accords such as Nepal or Malaysia, who don’t want to sign in fear of attracting more refugees to their nation. This complicates their relationship, often making it harder to obtain benefits for the refugees, although not impossible in most cases (Banki, 2004).

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02. States adhering to UN refugee law. Source: www.unhcr.org

The UNHCR is involved in over 150 refugee camps worldwide2, advising governments in their refugee policy and asylum procedures, as well as providing aid for disaster relief. The goal of the UNHCR is to reach a durable solution to a refugee crisis. This can be achieved in one of three ways: repatriation to the homeland, local integration or resettlement to a third country. Repatriation can be organized by the UNHCR or can be spontaneous by the refugees and has historically been the most used and favoured option. Resettlement means that the refugees are transferred to another country where they are granted asylum. Preferably, the refugee load is spread out over a handful of countries. The third option, local integration, offers citizenship in the country of first asylum (Jacobsen, 2001; Misselwitz, 2009). The UNHCR often corroborates with other UN agencies and NGO’s to achieve its goals. In that case, it appoints certain responsibilities to specific agencies, who specialize in one aspect, like health to the WHO and nutrition to UNICEF. The UNHCR mostly just oversees camp management and arranges emergency shelter. Joint assessments are used to determine specific needs and strengthen collaboration between the different organisations (Misselwitz, 2009). A critique that’s regularly repeated is the UNHCR’s stubborn focus on their durable solutions to end a refugee crisis instead of focussing on the current camp situation in the foreseeable future (Kennedy, 2004; Banki, 2004). Refugees are often stuck for years at a time, unable to go back home or resettle, with no real progress towards new development opportunities (Banki, 2004). Kennedy (2004) also points out that no survey has ever been taken among refugees about which ‘durable’ solution they prefer, strengthening the image of a heavily bureaucratic UNHCR (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Kennedy, 2004).

2 Not including IDP camps, source: Misselwitz (2009, p. 39) 4

Critics point out that the refugee guidelines, first established in 1951 in a post-war setting, have become outdated. Jacob Stevens (2006) published a criticizing article, where he questioned the role of the UNHCR in past refugee crises. He discusses the refugee situations in Iraq, the Balkan, Rwanda and Afghanistan, guided by the memorials of former High Commissioner Sadako Ogata. Stevens calls the UNHCR a political pawn of the Western nations due to its financial structure. Because the UNHCR receives no set budget from the UN, but relies solely on donations from donor countries, it makes it significantly harder to go against those countries’ interests (Stevens, 2006). This is a valid criticism that regularly gets reiterated, see also Harrell-Bond (1986), Hyndman (2000) or Slaughter & Crisp (2009). Stevens describes how in both Iraq after the first Gulf War and in the Balkan, the UNHCR was unable to protest the closure of borders by countries that hosted US military facilities. Refugee camps were apparently set up at tactical locations, that strengthened ethnic concentrations to enable further state meddling by the West. In Africa, the UNHCR helped to redirect hundreds of thousands of people back into volatile Rwanda. Even going as far to hire local militia to ‘search and rescue’ 700 000 Rwandan refugees who had fled deeper into neighbouring Congo, on the run from civil war. He concludes how the idea of voluntary repatriation, set out in the original 1951 Refugee Convention, had completely been abandoned. It no longer seemed that repatriation was used to benefit refugees, but was used as a strategic tool. This policy condemned an enormous number of refugees to miserable circumstances in established ‘safe havens’ (Stevens, 2006). In response, UNHCR Special Envoy for the Gulf War and the Balkan, Nicholas Morris (2007), sketches a more nuanced image of past UNHCR interventions. During the Iraq and Balkan conflicts, the UNHCR did criticize certain nations’ policies, openly going against the Western coalition. But it often lacked the international support to strengthen its position and ensure the refugees’ best interest. This resulted in working with NATO and the US to, at least, still be as involved as possible. Morris notes how the UNHCR faced a difficult situation in Rwanda and Congo: armed militias were hiding among the fleeing refugees and further attacks were carried out on Congolese soil. The UNHCR chose not to retreat its operation like other NGO’s did, to not abandon the genuine refugees. Rwandan attacks ramped up to hunt down the fleeing militias, making the UNHCR consider repatriation a safer option for most refugees than remaining in Congo (Morris, 2007). Another joint response from Amy Slaughter, UNHCR partner, and Jeff Crisp (2009), head of Policy Development and Evaluation Service at the UNHCR, leads to more insight in the UNHCR’s inner working. Post-Cold War, the UNHCR had trouble balancing its involvement with camp management and participation with the host government. States with limited capacity were quick to shift all responsibilities to the UNHCR, absolving themselves from their international obligations. The UNHCR was forced to take responsibility for the rapidly emerging camps, while being limited in its ability to do so, due to continuous armed conflicts and states eager to exploit the refugee situation. Still, they acknowledge the lack of ambition to solve these protracted refugee situations and the passive role the UNHCR played in the international debate (Slaughter & Crisp, 2009).

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While the UNHCR is far from a perfect organisation, in reality it will continue to be the leading organisation amidst a refugee crisis. The lack of supervision of the UNHCR is definitely a reason for concern, as it has already proven itself to be susceptible to political influence and demands by the host states. ‘The very organization set up to monitor the extent to which refugees enjoyed their human rights had assumed de facto sovereignty over them. Who could monitor the monitor?’ (Verdirame, Harrell-Bond, Barbara, Lomo, & Sachs, 2005, p. 17). Lacking independence, the UNHCR is sometimes used as a political pawn to control refugee flows and host states (Stevens, 2006). Still, the organisation is filled with people who are passionate about helping refugees. They constantly produce assessments and research papers, in the hopes of proving better assistance, tailored to the situation in the field (Crisp, 2001). Morris (2007) concludes that the UNHCR is often faced with hard choices: choosing between bad and worse options. And while the UNHCR’s policies are open to criticism, it’s important to understand the different factors at play (Morris, 2007).

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1.2. Camp planning strategies

The UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, with its latest update in 2007, is the primary tool used by UNHCR staff and its partners in the field. It provides a broad range of information on refugee assistance, operation planning and the vital factors needed in emergency response. Camp construction and camp management are only discussed in a single chapter of the Handbook, namely chapter 12 Site selection, Planning and Shelter, although other relevant information for camp planning can also be found in other chapters like Commodity distribution, Water, Sanitation, … (Kennedy, 2004; UNHCR, 2007). The information provided in the Handbook will be discussed in short, in addition to some relevant historical camp planning strategies. In between, critical views on the used planning policies from different scholars will be examined. Ideally, an elaborate study proceeds the installation of a new camp. Site selection is based off a checklist with several key factors such as terrain orientation, water supply, drainage and climate conditions. Site planning establishes a basic layout for the camp with fixed locations on sanitation, administration and entrance roads. Efficiency of operation should be the prime consideration in this arrangement (UNHCR, 2007). The Handbook suggests 45 square meters for each person as a rule of thumb when designing a camp, with a bare minimum of 30 m². But in this 45 m² is area included for shelter, nearby roads and other public infrastructure (UNHCR, 2007). Kennedy (2004) calculated this number to be too low, as too much surface area is given up to public services, overlaps and firebreaks. He found that a more realistic number would be closer to 60m² per person3 (Kennedy, 2004). Resources for infrastructure, shelter and sanitation are to be committed early in the development of the new camp with enough opportunities to grow and evolve once the camp is occupied (UNHCR, 2007). Adaptation is the new keyword when it comes to camp planning and is perceived as necessary by lots of authors (Huynh, 2015; Kennedy, 2004; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Starting from the 1960’s, criticism on the top-down urban planning strategies from the Modernism planners began to formulate. The strict planning order was seen as rigid and boring, whereas more interesting urban behaviour was identified among the streets of vibrant local communities. A more engaging bottom-up approach started to get traction that opted for a participatory planning approach (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). The push towards more participation from the refugees themselves in areas such as camp management and resource distribution is believed to lead to more beneficial results all-around (UNHCR, 2007). The act of contribution can have a big effect on the improvement of social cohesion, as it makes people feel like they belong to the place they helped create, giving a sense of meaning to the camp. Additionally, it can make it easier to overcome previous barriers like talking to the distant camp management (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). However, Kennedy warns of the idealisation of refugee participation and still argues for the need of a camp planner on top that oversees and allocates plots and boundaries. Whereas he suggests the refugees can have a say in the positioning and orientation of their shelter (Kennedy, 2004).

3 This value is obtained after a growth period of 10 years for the camp. At the beginning of this duration, the value per person would be closer to 89 m², source: Kennedy (2004, p. 44) 7

Another big push towards the bottom-up approach came from F.C. Cuny’s (1977) impactful work in Disasters Magazine. In his conclusion piece on several field studies under the INTERTECT banner, he stated that ‘(…) successful operation of a camp is directly related to the layout of the camp. (…) Most successful were those camps which were laid out on a use-area plan, i.e. common activities were provided land so that they could be grouped together.’ (Cuny, 1977, p. 127). The article discussed the benefits of clustering shelters into ‘communities’, following the observations Cuny made in his fieldwork. Although hard scientific evidence to back-up this claim is technically non-existing, his work is generally accepted as truth (Kennedy, 2004). Up until then, camps were often modelled after military camps with a strict orthogonal layout, following the refugee camps in the post-WWII era where a lot of shelters were needed. Refugee camps resembled barracks, designed to control large groups of people efficiently. Of course, when the focus shifted towards the social and humanitarian aspect, military grid camps were met with a lot of criticism (Malkki, 1995). Nevertheless, orthogonal structures are still widely used today as they are very efficient, but a more nuanced approach is necessary for a successful implementation. The new bottom-up approach became the new standard across different camp planning guidelines. Camps originated from the UNHCR use a modularity model, starting from the most basic family unit as the primary building block. The needs of the family (distance to services, cultural housing traditions) are put first (UNHCR, 2007).

02. Standard camp layout model Source: Herz (2013, p. 46)

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Shelters are grouped together to form a community, a block, a camp sector and ultimately the whole camp. Each scale is related to certain infrastructure e.g. latrines, water taps, schools and health centers (Herz, 2013). Between the different scales are roads installed of growing size, used secondly as fire breaks. These roads often act as the spines for the camp, being the main connectors (Kennedy, 2004). One interesting observation is that the smallest unit of planning in the UNHCR guideline, and consistent across other guidelines, is conceptualized as the family unit, and not the individual refugee. People who fall out of this category (unaccompanied minors or elders) seemingly don’t belong in this equation (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Even though their presence is highly likely after a conflict and they are even recognized as an expected demographic in the refugee population (UNHCR, 2007). How to incorporate these individuals in the planning strategy is not mentioned in the Handbook (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). ‘Clustering’ and ‘community building’ became the buzz words of the new camp planning policy. Despite their intentions being undoubtable noble, questions can be raised about their effectiveness. Kennedy (2004, p. 30) argues that that ‘a community is not a universal, objective quantity, of uniform size, number and actions.’ A specific scenario is required for each refugee population which considers multiple social and cultural factors. While the Handbook acknowledges this, it then gives one standard for numbers anyway (Kennedy, 2004). Herz (2008) points out that the same camp model is applied across the world, in regions that differ immensely. And that once applied, the failure of the general camp model becomes apparent (Herz, 2008). Herz concludes that it is exactly this neutrality, in order to be a solution for all, that makes this planning approach so susceptible to failure (Herz, 2007). Kennedy goes on to warm about the downsides of modular planning. When a small-scale element is chosen as foundation, there is the danger of the overall result lacking coherence. An extra layer is needed to hold the modular building blocks together, i.e. communal facilities who form social centres for the camp. Kennedy argues that a lot of the camp life takes place not within the modules, but in the space between different modules, and this should be designed with care (Kennedy, 2004). Design models for an entire camp are surprisingly scarce in the available literature. They tend to be low in detail and often lack certain necessities. The few examples that do exist, are accompanied by disclaimers of lack of precision and context-bound implementations. Just like in real cities, the resemblance of order gets lost the more the camp grows and they develop an irregular shape (Kennedy, 2004). A recent example of camp planning is Za’atari camp in , established in 2012. Following the civil war in Syria, camp planners had only two weeks to conceive a plan to accommodate the 120 000 fleeing refugees. The camp started in the north-west corner area, with a fairly unstructured high-density zone. The camp then spread out in a more controlled manner, following an orthogonal model (see figure 03). The majority of shelters were originally grouped in smaller clumps but this model was not sustainable due to a continuous stream of new habitants increasing the camp density. Families are first given a tent which can later be upgraded to a prefabricated caravan. Main roads were later implemented to connect the different districts of the camp (Huynh, 2015).

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03. Overview of Za'atari refugee camp Source: UNITAR/UNOSAT

The initial layout felt too ‘internment-like’ which prompted a lot of refugees, once given a caravan, to rearrange the straight lines of settlements into U-shape compositions. Families and clans started grouping their shelters together, forming communities on their own. The camp also heavily suffers from drainage problems due to insufficient organisation (Huynh, 2015). Za’atari camp endures a lot of the same troubles most refugee camps must face: When a crisis suddenly appears, the people responsible for housing the refugees don’t have enough time to come up with a fully developed response. Camps become a ‘work-in- progress’, constantly trying to improve its living conditions. There is a constant need of adding new installations and services to accommodate the growing camp population. Problems with insufficient infrastructure such as electricity or water are unfortunately common. Later stages of the camp might require reverting previous design decisions if suited (Kennedy, 2004; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Overall, it can take many years before a camp reaches the living standard prescribed by the UNHCR Handbook. Among authors and designers alike, a bigger focus seems to lie on the design of the individual shelters or small refugee communities. Various publications describe in great detail the workings of their ‘perfect little society’ which can be used as an adaptable building block. There is however no guarantee that these theoretical models actually form a working community once applied because a sense of community is, as Kennedy (2004, p. 68) puts it ‘a

10 social construct, not a physical structure’. Manuel Herz (2008) gives an interesting example of his case-study on the Gondje camp in Chad: nomads of the Buel tribe, traditional cattle herders, were assigned big plots of land in the camp, meant as extra space for vegetable growing. This way, the tribe could farm their own products, as a means of self-sufficiency and job security. A set way of life was forced upon the nomadic tribe, who normally don’t eat vegetables. This act of self-sufficiency, made with the best of intentions, caused serious social consequences among the tribespeople. Most of them were not pleased with this blatant attempt at changing their lifestyle, and grieved their lost cultural values (Herz, 2008). Kennedy offers another example: the clustering of shelters around a courtyard, a typical approach used to encourage a sense of community, would not work for Afghan refugees, as it does not align with their cultural tradition of separating men and women (Kennedy, 2004). The Handbook states a boundary of 20 000 habitants for a camp that’s controllable.4 Something that Kennedy says to not be a sustainable number due to rapidly increasing population numbers and lack of camp expansion possibilities (Kennedy, 2004). A more detailed research by Cosgrave (1996) showed that larger camps benefit mostly the agencies operating the camps rather than the refugees themselves in terms of logistics, scale of economic activities, attractiveness to the media, … While larger camps may seem more attractive to refugees for security reasons and centralised management, they limit access to external resources, exert a detrimental load on the environment and reduce integration with the local community. The study concludes that camps with over 50 000 people are going to face significant troubles with resource provision and cost-efficiency (Cosgrave, 1996). In conclusion, the universal guidelines, set out by the UNHCR Handbook, seem to fall a bit short. They are very clear about their objective: the achievement of a ‘community based’ environment with clear order and hierarchy. But nowhere does the Handbook actually provide real tools to achieve these intentions. Lacking are clear guidelines on how to achieve involvement from the refugees in camp planning and management. Additionally, no instructions are given about the implementation and construction of secondary services, such as educational and medical facilities (Kennedy, 2004). Camp planning is done from an aerial point of view, with strict order and rulesets. Although some informal pop-ups are to be expected according to the Handbook, the most recurrent example corner stalls, it is not mentioned how they might be spatially planned for or even used as positive development (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011; UNHCR, 2007). That clear separation of uses and functions reminds Herz (2007) of the idealistic cities of the early modernist movement of the 1920s. Planners strongly believe in a structured organization, indictive of the optimism that order and hygiene can solve all problems. This separation is further pushed on the population with different ethnic groups or tribes often placed in different sectors of the camp. Refugees are kept away from the humanitarian workers, whose base of operation is set up at the edge of the camp, ready for a quick escape. (Herz, 2007). ‘For fear of mistrust and violence between different refugee communities, and other people in the camp, the refugee camp moves towards a place of segregation’ (Herz, 2007, p. 5).

4 For reference, the largest refugee camps in the world are: Kutupalong, Bangladesh (900 000); Bidibidi, Uganda (285,000); Dadaab, Kenya (235 000) 11

The same model for camp planning is used across in the world, among cultures that differ immensely on how they want to live (Herz, 2007). This strategy of uniformity for all circumstances becomes more and more problematic once one looks at the smaller scale solutions. It seems the guidelines are reduced to a list-like prescription of goods, i.e. the number of latrines per 100 habitants or the amount of schools per camp block. Some going even absurd (the exact ratio of footballs to people), indictive of the flawed method of ‘one size fits all’ and the persevering micro-managing in order to solve the refugee problem (Kennedy, 2004).

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1.3. The camp as the best solution?

Refugee camps often seem synonymous with the refugee phenomenon in third world countries from the Western point of view (Schmidt, 2003). Planned camps take up the majority of the UNHCR Handbook and while alternatives are definitely discussed (smaller independent settlements, integration with host families, …), the camp seems to be the go-to response for large-scale situations. While the Handbook clearly states that it wants to avoid camps if viable alternatives are possible, authors have had interesting debates about their viability and the UNHCR’s agenda to push towards camps or seek alternatives. Scholars such as Anna Schmidt (2003) have criticized the camp typology for its obvious shortcomings such as socioeconomic restrictions that contribute to poverty, dependence on international organizations and dehumanisation of refugees (Misselwitz, 2009; Schmidt, 2003). Schmidt argues that a camp setting prevents local integration, ignores the resources and capacities of the refugees themselves and neglects the impact of the refugee influx on the local population (Schmidt, 2003). She favours the settlement-based model, where segregated agricultural enclaves are implemented. This approach emphasises the development of self-reliance, active engagement, and still offers a controlled environment. The scale difference would show a clearer image of its evolution and in turn make it more interesting for investors (Misselwitz, 2009; Schmidt, 2003). These rural settlements became a popular alternative to camps in the 1980’s in Africa for a while, mostly in Tanzania and Uganda (Jacobsen, 2001). People started to realise that refugee situations could extend beyond their short life expectancy and began looking for alternatives. Although the upfront international support for a camp was high, this quickly diminished while the expenses stayed the same. It became clear that more sustainable long-term solutions were required. The agricultural enclaves were established under the premise that the African population were primarily farmers (Harrell-Bond, 1986). These communities could achieve self-dependence while also contributing to the economy of the host state. Assistance was given initially up until the point where the settlements became self-sufficient and trade was established with the local population (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Jacobsen, 2001). Contradicting these statements, Sarah Meyer (2006) warns against the idealization of these settlements. Her studies of the rural settlements in Uganda have shown an opposite effect: the secluded location of these settlements had actively hindered its integration (Meyer, 2006; Misselwitz, 2009). For economic ventures to succeed, the refugees need to move their product to a viable market. These organised settlements are, mostly by demand of the host government, isolated spaces, which automatically obstructs this process (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004). Tania Kaiser (2006) came to a similar conclusion with her research on some of these rural settlements. She concludes that the settlements felt political, economic and social excluded from developmental activities in Uganda and their existence had been of little humanitarian success (Kaiser, 2006). Often times, the settlements had a high demand of land which made the host country reluctant to support many of these enclaves (Misselwitz, 2009). Richard Black (1998a) openly argued for alternatives to refugee camps with his critical article on the established refugee procedures. Despite some research endorsing self-settlement as a

13 viable alternative, the UNHCR has shown bias according to Black towards camp implementation (Black, 1998a). He warns of research that focusses on making camps work, as it ‘may already have conceded the most important battle’ (Black, 1998b, p. 31) and calls for an open mind for how refugees should be settled (Black, 1998b). In response, a combined statement from Jeff Crisp and Karen Jacobsen (1998) put forward the argument that camps may just be inevitable. As large groups of refugees congregate, they form large-scale settlements which eventually become institutionalised. They note that it is understandable if a refugee would want to stay close to its fellow kinsmen instead of mingle and disappear among the local population (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). Supported by Kibreab’s (1983) research, they conclude that in most situations it is the host country’s government that insists on grouping the refugees together in camps (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). Kibreab noted how it is the government’s concern to maximize profit for themselves and their citizens, while minimizing the burden passed upon them (Kibreab, 1983). Many host governments will actively dismiss other solutions, which makes the camp the only remaining solution (Misselwitz, 2009). Reasons for this include: - The host country may be involved in the conflicts causing the refugee crisis and attempts to use the refugees for its own political goals (Misselwitz, 2009). - Governments fear civil unrest and conflict due to shifts in the ethnic balance and distribution of goods if the refugees are mixed with the local population (Lawrie & Van Damme, 2003; Milner & Loescher, 2011; Misselwitz, 2009). - Large visual refugee camps make it easier to present to international beneficiaries in order to get financial support (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998). - The host government wants to keep refugees grouped, close to the border, in order to facilitate repatriation as early as possible (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998).

In 1951 the United Nations held the Refugee Convention where they declared the human rights all refugees should receive. This includes basic services firstly but also the opportunity to self-develop, roam freely and get a chance to build a future for themselves. It is almost shameful to admit that there are still many refugees who enjoy few (or none) of these rights (Smith, 2004). Although few people actually see the refugee camp as an ideal solution, many regretfully conclude the camp to be the only practicable response for many refugee contexts (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998; Kaiser, 2006). The camp is still the principal response in the short, medium and long term in many African countries (Kaiser, 2006). While there are many problems to be found in camps around the world, it is not always productive to only look at its downsides. Merrill Smith (2004) talks in the conclusion of his article ‘Warehousing refugees’ about the ease of condemning refugee camps and the moral high ground of which scholars are preaching human rights. Smith notes how all the goodwill in the world does not give the refugees the power to speak the local language, to fight off discrimination and find a self-sustainable job. Whether is opted for a camp or an alternative solution, he argues that it is the international community’s duty to shift away from policies treating refugees as cattle and towards honouring them as human beings (Smith, 2004).

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Part II – Case study: refugee camps in Palestine

2.1. Background information

2.1.1. The Arab-Israeli conflict

The conflict between and Jews in the Middle-East has reached peak heights in the last century, escalating into full-on warfare between multiple nations. In order to understand the stakes in the present conflict, the history leading up to the current refugee crisis will be sketched in short. Of course, conflict is nothing new to the Palestine region with multiple religions claiming strong ties to the city of Jerusalem. Armed conflict has been waging for centuries to hold control over the Holy City. In the 19th century, nationalism started to spread through Europe, eventually leading to the events responsible for both World Wars. Zionism, the idea of a Jewish state in the Palestine region, gained rapid popularity. In this new state Jews would be safe from the prosecutions (pogroms) that had plagued their people on the European continent for centuries. More and more Jews started immigrating to Palestine, a region where the great majority of people were Arab at the time (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). Before World War I, the majority of the Middle East had been under Ottoman control for over 400 years. British forces defeated the Ottomans in 1917 with the help of local Jewish and Arab revolutions. Britain took control over the region, that translates to today’s Israel/Palestine, Jordan and Iraq, and issued the Balfour Declaration, stating their support for the eventual establishment of a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in the Palestinian area (Fraser, 2015; Gilbert, 2005). Palestinian Arabs saw the rising influx of Jews, combined with the perceived preference from the British, as an attack on their own sovereignty. The 1920’s were filled with protests and violence from primarily Arab side, culminating in the August 1929 riots where 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were killed, with hundreds more being wounded (Karsh, 2014). The British struggled to maintain peace between the two sides. They imposed restrictions on Jewish immigration and land purchases to please the Arab communities. But this came at a time when anti-Semitism was exploding in Europe, with the rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany. Immigration continued at a rapid pace, albeit now often illegally. Jews were smuggled into the country, past British sea blockades (Karsh, 2014; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). Finding it impossible to secure an agreement between both sides, Britain announced plans for a two- way partition of Palestine. The Arabs rejected this proposal, insisting on independence for one state under majority Arab rule. Violence continued the next few years with the English finding it increasingly harder to maintain peace in the region. Finally, in 1947, The British turned over Palestine to the newly formed United Nations who held a vote regarding the partition of the region. The voted was passed with a two-third majority with all Arab nations voting against the ruling. Jewish authorities in Palestine accepted the resolution while the Arab leaders rejected it. The following months would be plagued with increased attacks on Jewish villages (Gilbert, 2005; Tucker & Roberts, 2008).

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04. UN partition plan for Palestine, 1947 Source: Tucker & Roberts (2008, p. 1037)

While Arabs still outnumbered the Jews two to one in Palestine, Jewish militias were way better organised and equipped. In the weeks prior to the British mandate ending, armed forces took control of all territory allocated by the UN to the Jewish state, already creating a large number of Arab refugees. On May 14th 1948, the official end day of British rule, Jewish leaders declared the birth of the State of Israel. That same day, combined armed forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq launched an attack on the newly formed state, marking the beginning of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). The newly formed Israeli Defense forces (IDF) was able to withstand the invasion due to the Arab coalition lacking coordination with each faction trying to achieve its own objectives. An UN arms embargo further weakened the Arab forces. After 10 months of fighting, treaties were signed with each of the attacking countries. The State of Israel now controlled the entire Jewish area of the UN mandate plus almost 60% of the Arab area. The Jordan government annexed the remaining area of the West Bank to its territories and Egypt took control of the . Around 700 000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were forcefully removed from their homes, in an event they named the ‘Nakba’ (catastrophe) (Bickerton, 2009; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). In the following years, hundreds of thousands of Jews would immigrate to Israel from nations across the world, strengthening its claim on the region. Meanwhile, Arab leaders refused to acknowledge the State of Israel as a sovereign state. Tensions remained high at the border areas with frequent attacks, infiltrations and provocations (Bickerton, 2009; Gilbert, 2005).

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In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, a strategic waterway that linked the Mediterranean Sea with the Indian Ocean. Israeli ships were now forbidden to use the canal. Previously, the Canal had been neutral territory with Great-Britain and France as major stockholders. Combined with the closure of the Straits of Tiran by Egyptian forces, Israel was now stripped of 2 major waterways. A joint attack was launched where Israeli paratroopers were backed up by French and British assault forces. The entire Sinai desert, including the Gaza strip, was conquered in three days with the Egyptian army suffering a crushing defeat. It’s suggested that Israel used the blockade, which was more inconvenient than threatening, as an excuse to participate in the joined attack. The Israelis sought to undermine Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was spearheading a pan-Arab coalition. A possible Arab collaboration posed a serious threat to the young State of Israel (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). Nevertheless, the victory was short-lived, as international pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union ensured a hasty retreat from the Sinai Peninsula. UN military personnel were deployed to ensure Egypt’s demilitarization of the Sinai desert and to discourage any new Egyptian blockades ((Bickerton, 2009; Gilbert, 2005). The years leading up to the 1967 war were again filled with unrest and systematic violence along Israeli borders. The newly established Palestinian movement, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) strived for an independent state for the Palestinian Arabs with its biggest militant wing al-Fatah carrying out terrorist attacks on Israeli targets in order to provoke war, which they hoped would lead to an Arab victory. These attacks would continue to increase in occurrence in the years to come. (Bickerton, 2009; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). In May 1967, Egyptian forces were deployed into the Sinai desert in order to deflect Israeli attention from the Syrian border, due to a controversial Soviet report indicating a possible invasion of Syrian land (Fraser, 2015). President Nassar ordered the departure of UN forces and restored the previous blockade of the Straits of Tiran, in clear violation of the established peace treaties. In response, Israeli forces were mobilized and moved to the border area. Egypt forged treaties with Syria and Jordan, in order to deter an Israeli retaliation of the Sinai annexation. In the early morning of 5 June 1967, Israel launched a devastating surprise attack on Egyptian air bases, destroying almost the entire Egyptian Air Force in a couple of hours. Syrian and Jordan air bases were quick to follow, gaining Israel full air superiority for the rest of the war. The following days, Israeli forces would push through the Sinai desert, completely overpowering the Egyptian forces with equal successes on the other fronts (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). The conflict was called the Six-Day War, indictive of its short lifespan and one-sided victory. The lack of resistance took even Israel by surprise, who originally planned to conquer much less ground and force peace negotiations. The Israelis took control over the Gaza strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the entire West Bank including Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. New peace negotiations were not on the table, as the Arab leaders collectively decided on ‘three NO’s to Israel’: no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. Israel in return saw no reason to make easy concessions to those who had so recently threatened them. The result was a stalemate (Bickerton, 2009).

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05. Israel and the Occupied Territories, 1967 Source: Bickerton (2009, p. 121)

Israel now had full control over the Palestinian Arab territories with the acquirement of the Gaza strip and the Westbank. Disappointed by the recent events, the PLO decided to take measures into its own hands. Being controlled by a Fatah majority under Yasser Arafat, they intended to launch a civil revolution against, what they called, the Zionistic oppressors. They employed guerrilla tactics to target Israeli civic centres such as markets or bus stations. The PLO had slowly evolved into an outright terrorist force, eventually leading to attacks on a global stage with the Munich Olympics Massacre and the Entebbe Hostage Taking in Uganda (Fraser, 2015). Counter-operations quickly drove the PLO out of the Westbank and into Jordan and , where they continued to raid border villages. Meanwhile, Israel launched settlement endeavours in the Westbank and Gaza, seeking to further strengthen its grip on the region and exert its claim on these territories (Fraser, 2015; Gilbert, 2005; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). It came to final clash between Israel and its neighbouring countries on 6 October 1973, Yom Kippur day, an important holy day of the Jewish calendar. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal and quickly overpowered the Israeli defences. The Israeli forces were caught off guard and took three days to mobilize its army. Simultaneously, the Syrian army tried to retake the Golan Heights, causing huge losses on Israeli side. The following days, the Israelis were once again able to withstand further advances and started winning ground back with tactical counter-attacks. Israeli forces pushed through the Egyptian offenses, threatening to circle

19 around and cut off two major divisions. At the same time, Syrian forces were pushed back out of the Golan Heights and into Syrian territory (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). With another Arab defeat seemingly imminent, attention now turned increasingly to diplomacy. With the Soviets threatening to support its allies, Syria and Egypt, and the US supporting Israel, a conflict between the two superpowers seemed likely. Members of OPEC placed an embargo on oil export to the US until Israeli forces withdrew to their 1967 borders, further heightening the pressure (Bickerton, 2009). Syria and Israel signed a treaty in 1974 to disengage their forces and establish a demilitarised zone, patrolled by the UN (Gilbert, 2005). Following the Camp David accords, Israel and Egypt signed a historic peace-treaty in 1979. Egypt was the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel as a state, ensured the right of free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and recognized the Strait of Tiran as an international waterway. In return, Israel withdrew from the Sinai desert but held on to the Gaza strip and the Westbank with the promise of a possible Palestinian government in the future (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). The Palestinian Arabs felt betrayed by their greatest ally Egypt, condemned to remain under Israeli control. Other Arab nations were quick to disavow Egypt, suspending Egypt’s membership of the Arab league and OPEC and imposing economic sanctions (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). Nevertheless, the Arab-Israeli conflict had now shifted from an external conflict between nations to an internal conflict. Protests and attacks against Israel continued, as the Israeli government seemed unwilling to honour their promise of a Palestinian state (Fraser, 2015). In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon, after continuous missile barrages on Israeli villages coming from the southern part of Lebanon. The PLO had intensified its presence here over the years, with approval of the Lebanese government. Officially, Israel wanted to halt the attacks and eliminate the Palestinian fighters. But with mounting international pressure for a Palestinian state, they wanted to eradicate the PLO in order to break the largest Palestinian resistance to an annexation (Fraser, 2015; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). Israeli forces pushed all the way through to the capital Beirut with lots of casualties in its path. International diplomacy eventually ended Israel’s campaign, after enormous backlash due to the large number of civilian casualties. But not until the year 2000 did Israel withdraw all its forces from southern Lebanon. Overall, the Lebanese campaign turned out to be unsuccessful. The PLO suffered losses but were still considered the main voice for Palestinian Arabs. Israel’s firm policies on Lebanese controlled areas would further entice resistance from the local population, aiding in the eventual creation of Hezbollah (Fraser, 2015; Gilbert, 2005; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). On 9 December 1987, an uprising known as the First Intifada began in Gaza that quickly spread to the Westbank. Palestinians regarded it as the resistance against the Jewish oppressor, leading to mass protests, boycotting of Israeli products and attacks on Israeli settlements. Israel’s firm response, using live ammunition and excessive violence, didn’t seem to stop the protests and only earned them international backlash (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). The first Intifada ended in 1993 with the signing of the . Israel officially recognized the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinian people and allowed the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), a governmental body for the Palestinian territories, which was one step closer to an independent Palestinian state.

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In return, the PLO under Arafat renounced terrorism and recognized the right of statehood for Israel. The majority of the Gaza strip was handed to the Palestinian Authority, followed by the withdrawal of Israeli troops out of these territories. Similarly, the control over the city of Jericho in the Westbank was also handed over to the PNA, in preparation for further transfer of authority in the Westbank (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). A further agreement two years later introduced the areas A, B and C to the Palestinian territories: Area A under full Palestinian control, area B with Palestinian police for civilian authority and Israeli forces for overall security, and area C under exclusive Israeli control. Area C still made up the most territory with Israel only surrendering 30% of the Westbank to full or partial Palestinian control. The presence of these zones still plays a huge role in current Palestinian-Israeli relations (Bickerton, 2009).

06. Areas A, B and C in the Westbank, 1995 Source: Bickerton (2009, p. 175)

Not everyone on both sides was content with the newly brokered peace. The radical Islamic movement Hamas, founded soon after the outbreak of the first Intifada, continued hostilities against Israel in order to invalidate the fragile peace agreement. A streak of violent suicide bombings on Israeli civilians would continue to complicate relationships in the years to come. On the Israeli side, the government felt the pressure of right-wingers who didn’t want to concede any territories. The Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had created the peace agreements with Arafat, was assassinated by a radical anti-peace militant. Afterwards, 21 settlements continued again to be built in the Westbank around Jerusalem, to great oppositions of Palestinians. Deadlines for further redeployment were continuously postponed, indicative of the little trust between both sides (Bickerton, 2009; Gilbert, 2005). In September 2000 Ariel Sharon, who would be elected as prime minister a few months later, visited the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) in Jerusalem, accompanied by a 1000 men strong police unit. This visit was perceived as highly provocative by the Palestinians, seen as a statement that Israel would never give up its control over Jerusalem. The ensuing protests would quickly spread and give birth to the Second Intifada. Continuous violence made peace talks unsuccessful. The increasing attacks eventually pushed Israel to invade the Westbank in 2002. Key populated areas were quickly conquered and the PNA was overpowered (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015). Construction was started on a wall, separating Israel from the Palestinian territories. While its purpose was to safeguard the Israeli people from further attacks, the wall extended partly beyond the 1967 division, threatening to pre-empt where a future border between the two states might ultimately lie. Violence increased again as the wall was being constructed (Fraser, 2015; Gilbert, 2005). A peace treaty was signed in early 2005 between Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas, the new president of the PNA after Arafat had died the year before. Israel also withdrew all its settlers from the Gaza strip, ending the Jewish presence there (Bickerton, 2009). A new setback occurred when Hamas had a surprise victory in the 2006 parliamentary election, leading to the appointment of a Hamas government under the Abbas presidency. Israel of course saw no future in dealing with a movement whose goal was Israel’s destruction, as stated in Hamas’ founding charter. The Israeli forces intensified their attacks on Gaza, from where regular incursions towards Israel occurred. Meanwhile, the IDF launched a new invasion of Lebanon, seeking to destroy Hezbollah for good. Once again, the costly operation was unsuccessful in reaching its goals (Bickerton, 2009; Tucker & Roberts, 2008). Under threat of a new war, Fatah and Hamas followers clashed in the streets, eventually leading to Hamas taking control over the Gaza strip in 2007. Palestinians were now divided between a Fatah-ruled Westbank and a Hamas-rules Gaza, cutting off former companionship. Israel tightened its blockade of Gaza, limiting the access of food, medicines and fuel, and ended cooperation with the leadership there. Israeli forces would execute multiple military operations in the years to come, after continuous Palestinian attacks. The actions taken by both sides only confirmed peace in the Palestine region to still be a distant dream (Bickerton, 2009; Fraser, 2015).

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2.1.2. Obstacles to peace: the Israeli settlements

The described ‘Israeli settlements’ refer to the residential communities, built by Israel in the occupied territories after the Six-day War in 1967. Settlements were built in the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza strip and the Westbank (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). The presence of these communities serves as a constant source of conflict between Arabs and Jews and poses one of the biggest hindrances to peace. International critique has been harsh on the settlement policy but short of a couple intermissions, construction has steadily continued over the years (Fraser, 2015; Lesch, 1977). The Alon plan was carried out shortly after the 1967 war, creating settlements at key strategic positions across the Palestinian territories. The goal of the plan was to create an easy defendable border for the Jewish state in the low-populated areas of the occupied territories (Newman, 1982). The plan sought to redraw state borders along the main topographic feature in the region, the Jordan Rift Valley. A strip of land would be annexed, from the Golan Heights all the way down to the Sinai desert. This land would offer maximum security with minimal Arab presence (Weizman, 2012). The low presence of Arabs in these territories was a key feature of the plan, as Israel wanted to embody as little Palestinians as possible, in order to uphold the essence of the Jewish state (Newman, 1982). Along this line, rural settlements were to alternate with military outposts. Combined civilian/military presence would be essential to validate the future annexation, when peace negotiations would force them to return occupied land. The vision set out by the Alon plan was later abandoned for more ambitious goals (Weizman, 2012). Different religious groups joined together in 1974 to form Gush Emunim, whose ideological goal was the building of settlements in areas of significance to the Jewish people. They actively tried to settle deep into the Westbank, beyond the areas in the Alon plan, to re-establish Jewish presence there. They simple saw the current Israeli territory as the landing ground of the first wave of Jewish immigrants and wanted to expand this area to achieve to full Jewish control of Palestine (Tucker & Roberts, 2008; Weizman, 2012). Support from the Israeli government was lacklustre, with many seeing these settlements as a provocation the Arabs. The group continued to build settlements without governmental approval, seeking to achieve its legitimacy afterwards by mere presence. They tried to build many settlements in areas that the government otherwise probably had receded from under international pressure, forcing it to hold on to these territories (Weizman, 2012). With a change of government in 1977 towards more right-leaning factions, Gush Emunim ideology became more and more entangled with government policy, and the group was eventually officially recognized (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). The settlement projects transformed from an improvised undertaking to an official state project. New settlements were disguised as ‘work camps', 'military bases' or 'archaeological sites’ to political opposition and continually expanded on until their existence and scale offered them legality (Weizman, 2012). The settlements now also received grants, like any new settlement in the country, and roads were constructed to better connect the outposts with Israel (Newman, 1982). Settlers moved out for religious or economic reasons, as living in the settlements is heavily subsidized (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). 23

The legality of these settlements is often questioned. The establishment of civilian settlements is illegal under article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits the transfer of the occupiers' civilians to the occupied territories. A loophole is present however, that permits the occupier to build security outposts (Lesch, 1977). The Israeli government systematically uses the ‘security value’ of their settlements as a justification for their existence. The civilian settlements are considered forward outposts, able to inform about surprise attacks of the enemy. To get a legal ruling for land requisition from the Palestinians, the government stresses its ‘pressing security needs’ and the fact that it is a ‘temporary situation’, in accordance with international law. Continuous violence only further strengthened the ‘security’ narrative. Although, one should question the establishment of permanent settlements on land, requisitioned for temporary use (Weizman, 2012). Settlements are built on strategic hilltops, overlooking the Palestinian territories, or on land of religious meaning such as the case of the settlements around . All settlers are considered Israeli citizens, enjoying infrastructure such as roads (designed to bypass Arab villages), water and electricity provided by the State of Israel. This, in often sharp contrast with neighbouring Palestinian villages (Fraser, 2015). Settlers have been recalled from the Sinai desert and the Gaza strip when Israeli forces withdrew from these territories but are still present in the Westbank and Golan Heights. Approximately 250 000 Jews are living in settlements in the Westbank, with another 150 000 in East Jerusalem, an area still considered occupied under international law (Tucker & Roberts, 2008).

07. Israeli settlements in the Westbank, 2016 Source: Americans For Peace Now

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2.1.3. The presence of UNRWA

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) was established in 1949 to provide relief efforts to the refugees from the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. Originally meant as a temporary organisation, UNRWA’s mandate has been continually renewed in the absence of a solution for the . UNRWA is unique in that it is committed to one group of refugees, unlike the UNHCR who deals with refugees in general. It provides education, health and food services and social assistance to the displaced refugees and their descendants. UNRWA’s decree has been expanded on to also include refugees of later Arab-Israeli conflicts (Tucker & Roberts, 2008). UNWRA has grown to become the UN’s largest agency, employing over 30 000 people, a large majority of them being Palestinian refugees (Dumper, 2007). UNRWA developed a definition of who would be recognized as a refugee and receive corresponding aid. Palestine refugees are defined as ‘persons whose regular place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.’ Descendants of refugees are also eligible to register as refugees. The UN estimated that more than 700 000 Palestinian fled, or were forcibly removed, from their homes as a result of the 1948 war. Currently, UNRWA provides services to over 5 million registered refugees, spread out over Gaza, the Westbank, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The Gaza strip houses almost 1,5 million refugees and 8 official camps, while the Westbank has 1 million refugees and 19 camps (UNRWA, 2017). Over the years, UNWRA had to endure lots of pushback from host governments and donor states whose policy didn’t line up with UNWRA’s approach. Israel has oftentimes criticised the Agency for taking up the role of a human rights watchdog, as this is not detailed in its initial mandate. At the same time, the Agency relieved Israel of any responsibility regarding provision of assistance to the Palestinians (Dumper, 2007). Although UNWRA’s work is humanitarian of nature, it has been deeply involved in the political context of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict. UNRWA relies solely on donations from willing countries to fund its operations. This way, it depends on the political stand of donor countries, something that may change over time (Al Husseini, 2010; Bocco, 2009). Only recently has The United States, UNWRA’s biggest donor, expressed its willingness to stop funding UNWRA. This, in light of the pro-Israel stance of the Trump government (The Washington Post, 2018). At the same time, other donors chose to relocate funds towards the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) instead of UNWRA, in an attempt to strengthen the PNA’s political position (Dumper, 2007). While it is not UNWRA’s task to find a durable solution to the Palestine refugee problem, it is definitely the face of injustice that has been dealt to the Palestinians. This proximity to the refugees had led to accusations of the agency becoming hostage to the refugees’ political claims (Al Husseini, 2010; Bocco, 2009). There has been much debate about the role UNWRA should play in the future of the Palestinian conflict. Supporters of UNWRA emphasise its crucial role in the forefront of any possible return of reintegration, as the Agency has already proven itself to be flexible and experienced in dealing with the refugees. Others call for a replacement by a more competent and involved agency, who sole purpose would be negotiating possible solutions to the 25 conflict. The PNA is often suggested here as a logical successor, given its political position as representatives of the Palestinian movement (Dumper, 2007). UNWRA’s relationship with the Palestinians has always been complicated. Early resettlement programs were quickly cancelled after Palestinian opposition refused to cooperate with any program that endangered their right to return (Al-Husseini, 2000). It wasn’t until 1994, one year after the establishment of a Palestinian government, that an agreement was reached between UNWRA and the PLO (Dumper, 2007). ‘(…) in absence of an internationally recognized Palestinian national institution, UNRWA became the quasi-political representative for the Palestinians on the international stage, both as witness to the refugees’ plight and as a reminder of their right to return.’ (Al-Husseini, 2000, p. 53). UNRWA upholds a rather top-down approach to managing the camps, meaning it does not maintain full administrative control over a camp after its establishment. The actual administration and security are the responsibility of host authorities. UNWRA solely provides services to the camps (Dumper, 2007). Committees of refugee volunteers are in charge of different day-to-day functions with UNRWA meeting their representatives. These ‘people’s committees’ are often considered the representative leadership of the camp, as they present and try to act on the complaints of refugees (Al Husseini, 2010; Dumper, 2007). In addition to its service provision, there is a renewed interest for refugee development through special programs focussing on monetary assistance and personal development. UNRWA also employs refugees to work as assistants, teachers and other personnel to provide its services around the camp (Rempel, 2009). Refugees are free to leave the camps, as a way to not enforce the idea of them being ‘professional’ refugees. They are encouraged to live a normal life among the urban fabric of the host country (Al Husseini, 2010).

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2.2. Jalazone refugee camp

Jalazone camp is located a couple kilometres north of the city of Ramallah, adjacent to the village of and the Israeli settlement . The name Jalazone is a combination of two words, meaning ‘the area of springs’ in . It was established in 1949 to house Palestinians coming from villages in central Palestine, current day , a population that consisted mostly of farmers. Relative to other camps in the Westbank, Jalazone is a medium sized camp, at 0.25 km² to house an original population of around 2500 people. Extensive population growth since its establishment has resulted in overcrowding, overburdening of infrastructure and land disputes. Currently, the camp has an estimated population of 16 000 refugees, while its surface area has barely been increased. UNRWA started their services at the camp in 1949, providing emergency aid and shelter to the arriving refugee families. Before that, the Red Cross was responsible for the distribution of tents. The location of several refugee camps, including Jalazone, was more than likely a random occurrence, incited by local factors such as the presence of water or an important roadway (Misselwitz, 2009). The agglomeration of refugees and refugee assistance prompted even more refugees to gather on this location, eventually leading to the formation of Jalazone camp. At the time, there was still this idea that the refugee crisis would be solved soon, and that the camps were a temporary solution. Communities often tried to stay together, leading to the creation of certain camp quarters that were named after the place of origin. Refugees would also regularly migrate to other camp in order to restore pre-war communal connections. Family and community are an important asset in Palestinian culture and were used as a support network in these times of crisis (Misselwitz, 2009). The layout structure was fairly strict, with mostly orderly rows of tents, divided in different sectors. Bigger tents were set up to be used as a clinic or a distribution centre for food or tools. The camp’s perimeter was indicated by a circle of public toilets surrounding the camp.

08. 09. Original camp setup using tents, 1950 Construction of concrete shelters, 1952 Source: GaHetNa (Nationaal Archief NL) Source: The Palestinian-Aged Friends Charitable Society

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In 1952, the tents were replaced with concrete houses. UNWRA divided the camp into plots of land, on which the houses could be constructed on. The previous camp setup was completely discarded and a new plan was constructed for the camp, using a grid structure and division of functions (how much of the planned grid was actually implemented is unclear). More powerful families used their influence to obtain larger plots or to be placed in better locations. Infrastructure such as electricity was only set up with a limited population size in mind. The Israeli occupation of 1967 resulted in refugees all across the Westbank fleeing the camps towards Jordan. This was the most prominent in the camps around Jericho, where 80% of the population fled. On the other hand, the occupation led to certain opportunities for the remaining refugees. The newly available plots were quickly sold or re-distributed to families that needed them. Israel opened up the labour market to the refugees who could find work as daily wage workers in the construction sector. This new input of financial means led to a construction boom inside the camps, where many houses where expanded on with extra rooms, kitchens or toilets (Misselwitz, 2009). Until the 1980’s, UNRWA supervised the camp layout closely, allowing only one-floor units. Previous expansions had only been horizontally, with extra rooms being added to the existing UNWRA shelter. Street perimeters were to be respected, under treat of diminishing food services to those families. Refugees felt compelled to follow UNWRA’s rules, which limited the range of construction possibilities.

11. Shelter typology, used by UNWRA in the 1950s 10. Source: Misselwitz (2009, p. 166) Horizontal expansion of refugee shelters, 1982 Source: UNWRA Film and Photo Archive

In 1982, UNRWA started lowering their services to the camps due to financial reasons. The mass distribution of food was terminated and only families in the Special Hardship Cases program (SHC) continued to receive food rations (Bshara, 2014). Getting less help from UNWRA, the refugees felt more audacious now to go against the wishes of the UN agency and take action into their own hands. Houses were expanded with extra stories, gradually diluting the established planning rules. The once wide streets became small alleyways as more rooms were added for the growing families. New entrances and balconies further fragmented the existing order. The disappearance of food reduction as a viable deterrent led to a widespread vertical expansion across the Palestinian refugee camps (Misselwitz, 2009).

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Many houses now consist of 2-3 stories, although their foundation wasn’t built to handle these loads. Unplanned construction ran rampant in the camp, as no authority existed to instil order. Although UNWRA discouraged further vertical construction, most refugees simply ignored their request. Eventually, refugees were asked to sign a release form that relieved the agency of responsibility in case a building collapsed (Misselwitz, 2009). As a result of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the camp fell under the newly established Palestinian Authority (PA), as did most other refugee camps. Without the constant threat of the Israeli forces, the political climate calmed down. The refugees now got the chance to represent themselves via the people’s committees and invest money in projects they preferred like the construction of community centres and a mosque. A considerable investment was also made in improving the general infrastructure (street pavements, sewage, water and electricity). It also meant the removal of the fences around the camp, put up by the Israeli troops (Bshara, 2014). With sharp demographic increases, expansion of the houses continued consistently, eventually leading to the congested camp centre that is present today. Those with financial means sometimes opt to leave the camp and settle somewhere else to start a new life (Misselwitz, 2009). Unfortunately, many refugees do not have that option. Real estate prices across the Westbank increased dramatically as credit became widespread, partially due to UNRWA’s finance programs. Buying land in the neighbouring towns of Jifna or Bir Zeit became impossible for most refugees, let alone in Ramallah where the increased prices were felt the most (Bshara, 2014). As a result, Jalazone camp finds itself in a dangerous situation, as the camp is almost completely saturated with buildings. Soon there will be no place left to house its ever-growing population and leaving the camp won’t be an option due to the inflated housing market. Jalazone has two UNRWA schools (a boys’ school and a girls’ school) just outside the entrance gate to the camp, along the main road. Both schools were reconstructed around 2013, as the previous schools had become seriously outdated. Previously, the schools provided classes in two shifts, one in the morning and one in the evening, to accommodate the large number of students. Parents were obviously concerned about sending out their children in the dark, leading them to look for other schools. The new schools have way more capacity and equipment to provide quality education to all refugee children at the same time. The schools are open to all Palestinian refugees, not only Jalazone habitants, with the girls’ school being one of the largest in the Westbank with over one thousand students. The schools are considered one of UNWRA’s flagship projects, getting provided with all sorts of modern equipment such as a computer room, libraries and a science lab with the support of the US government. Children from the ages 6-15 can attend the schools, afterwards they need to go to a state or private school to finish their secondary education. The nearby town of Bir Zeit provides one of the largest non-private universities in the Westbank, for those refugees fortunate enough to get a chance to attend it.

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12. Overview of Jalazone camp, from the east side

14. Courtyard of the girls’ school Source: UNRWA

13. The camp is located alongside the main road Jerusalem-Nablus Source: UNRWA

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Jalazone camp has a long history of clashing with Israeli forces. The main road next to the camp, connecting Jerusalem with Nablus, is considered of high tactical value to Israel. Although newer roads to connect the two towns have been constructed, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) are keen to keeping control over the road. Following the 1967 war and Israel taking control of the Westbank, incursions from Israeli forces became a regular occurrence in the camp. Portions of land were confiscated from the refugees to build watchtowers overlooking the camp. Arrests were common and could affect an entire family: houses of prisoners could be sealed, leaving the family of the arrestee homeless. In extreme cases, houses were even completely destroyed. The few open spaces in the urban fabric of the camp, filled with rubble, are reminiscent of this practice. Collective punishment was standard procedure during the occupation of the camp. Throwing a stone or resisting arrest led to punishments for the entire camp. This could include shutting off water or electricity, or installing a curfew on the camp. Violence and counter-actions by the IDF increased after the First Intifada, leaving many residents taken prisoner and even wounded or killed. Jalazone camp had to endure the longest curfew of the entire Westbank and Gaza. For 40 days, people had to stay indoors, in fear of getting arrested. Food quickly became scarce and families had trouble feeding their children. Only in rare instances people were allowed to go outside during a set period in order to buy food at the local store, only to end in complete disarray. Books and clothes were burned by a lot of families to keep bread ovens running. During the Second Intifada the main roads leading to Jalazone were destroyed with a bulldozer, so no car or truck could reach the camp anymore. The camp was isolated from the outside world, in order to suppress insubordination from the refugees.

15. Israeli watchtower overlooking Jalazone camp, 1991 Source: UNWRA Film and Photo Archive

After the Oslo Accords the camp area was declared area B, under joint Palestinian-Israeli control and all watchtowers were removed. The main road was considered area C, for its importance to the Israelis. IDF forces sometimes enter the camp in periods of unrest, leading to arrests and injuries. The camp is still very much dependant on Israel, as water is provided solely from Israeli sources. Even though the camp is named after its spring-rich region, independent water provision is not allowed by the Israeli authorities, leading many families to

31 manage with a limited water supply. The water supply is used as leverage to uphold power over the camp. Water tanks on the roofs of the houses, as seen everywhere in Palestine, make an easy target for snipers as a simple non-lethal method to assert control over the camp’s population. Investing in further development of the camp is also very difficult, as Israel controls the border areas and can easily deny passage to potential willing investors. The camp is rendered helpless on purpose to maintain under Israeli control. Further confrontations often occur due to the presence of the nearby Israeli settlement Beit-El on a hill overlooking Jalazone camp to the east. Established in 1977 on private land of Palestinian ownership, the settlement was envisioned as a civilian addition to a nearby military base. The current population is around 6500 settlers. Due to its close proximity to the camp and its expansion over the years, clashes between the refugees and the IDF occurred regularly. A fence is currently present in the valley between the two towns, with watchtowers along the Israeli side. A concrete wall is being constructed around Beit-El to further protect the settlement. With its presence right at the border of the Israeli settlement, the UNWRA schools are in the forefront of much of the conflict. The schools fall just outside the camp borders, in area C under Israeli control. Over the years, the schools have been fired on with live ammunition and bombed with gas grenades. The main street, separating the two schools, is considered unsafe for the children as patrols regularly pass by. An overhead walkway was constructed to combat this problem. The Israeli authority also imposed special security measures when the schools were renovated. Windows on the east side, overlooking the settlement, were restricted to a height of 50 cm and placed way above eye level, as to not give an advantageous lookout point upon the settlement.

16. Overview of Jalazone and the neighbouring settlement Beit-El The pink buildings (UNWRA schools) are located right next to the Israeli outpost

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17. The UNWRA boys’ school with the Israeli settlement in the background

18. Builing block inside the camp destroyed by the IDF 19 -20.

Small windows in the UNWRA school, facing the settlement. Very little lights enters the classrooms Source: The Palestinian-Aged Friends Charitable Society

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To anyone driving by the refugee camp, Jalazone seems just like any other urban agglomeration in the area. The dense network of concrete houses is reminiscent of the neighbouring towns of Jifna and Bir Zeit. The old gateway stands as the lonely reminder of its refugee context along the road. Once entered, visitors are directed through the camp via the busy main road. This road is filled with all sorts of shops, a mosque and the offices for UNWRA services. Jalazone has the appeal of an active village, far from the traditional view of a refugee camp as a place of despair and misery. In relation to a lot of urban features (density, available services, …), Jalazone camp appears to be equally urbanised to nearby towns. The camp was constructed on 263 dunams of land (0.26 km² or 26.3 hectares), rented from the Jordan government by UNRWA, for a period of 99 years. Only a small part of the camp area was leased from local landowners. Expansion of the camp boundaries is not allowed, with the entire camp area falling under area B, under shared supervision with the Israelis. This rule has quickly led to overpopulation in the camp. The camp started out with an estimated amount of around 2500 refugees which has since then grown into a staggering population of 16 000 people, according to a source inside the camp5. This number is still an estimate, based on surveys, but has no definitive source. The exact number is difficult to determine, as some people choose to live in anonymity, away from UNWRA services. Additionally, instances are known of family members not reporting the dead of their relatives in order to continually receive benefits in that person’s name6. A study from 2006 noted an annual population increase of 3.5%. The mean family size was 6,3 persons, indictive of a high reproduction rate (Al Khatib & Tabakhna, 2006). A collaboration between a team of the University of Stuttgart and UNWRA, under the guidance of Philipp Misselwitz, completed a detailed study of the Palestinian refugee camps in the Westbank. They gathered survey data in 2006-2007 and used aerial photographs and city archives to determine the scale of urbanisation across the different camps. Their findings relevant to Jalazone camp are shown in figure 21. To clarify some of the criteria that were calculated: Building area refers to the amount of land within the camp boundaries that is used for buildings or private open areas, like gardens or courtyards. This is an indication for the amount of public space that is available in the camp. Built-up area excludes all public and private open spaces, purely showing the area that is occupied by a building or similar structure. The inverse of the built-up area is shown in the open area, which includes all open spaces (public or private). The most interesting parameter they calculated is the Floor Space Index (FSI). This is the built-up area multiplied by average number of levels, divided by the total area of the camp. This is a good indicator of the level of congestion in the camp, and shows the potential of future vertical expansions.

5 The latest numbers from UNWRA in 2016 counted 13 000 registered refugees with an estimate of around 2000 unregistered persons living in the camp. This seems to confirm the estimate of 16 000 people living in Jalazone. 6 For more information on the discrepancies regarding refugee numbers, see Crisp, J. (1999). Who has Counted the Refugees? UNHCR and the Politics of Numbers. Geneva: Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 34

Population density Build. Area Built-up area Open area FSI (Numbers from (Persons/ha) (%) (%) (%) 2006) Jalazone 476 72.5 46.3 53.6 1.34

Westbank 485 78.5 47.4 52.6 1.14 average 21. The urbanisation context of Jalazone camp in 2006 Source: Misselwitz (2009, p. 152)

At first sight, Jalazone’s values appear to lie very close to the average values of the entire Westbank. UNWRA determined the camp’s density to be over 500 people/ha in 2016, which reaffirms the steady population growth in the camp. Camps in Gaza are even denser populated, averaging around 700 people/ha, which is one of the highest population densities in the world. Being so close to the average values doesn’t undermine the fact that the Palestinian refugee camps are still heavily overpopulated. Built-up area is an excellent indicator to quantify the saturation of the camp. For reference, the built-up area of Tokyo7 is 41.7%, a historic example of high-density agglomeration. The one criterium where Jalazone stands out is with the Floor Space Index (FSI), residing at 7th place of all 19 Westbank camps. This is the result of the rather small surface area of the camp, combined with a steadily growing population. Open space has become a rarity, only to be found around the edges of the camp. The majority of the camp has turned into a highly congested area, forcing inhabitants to continually add new stories to their houses. Vertical expansion has become the norm across the camp. A study by Al-Khatib and Tabakhna in 2006 found that a considerable portion of households within the camp experience high-density living conditions: 61% of families within Jalazone housed 3-5 people per room. More than 16% of households even had more than 5 persons living in the same room (Al Khatib & Tabakhna, 2006). This further strengthens the numbers obtained by the UNRWA-Stuttgart cooperation. The population density is way too high to support sustainable living. The 2006 study further found evidence of increased health risks, associated with the poor living conditions inside the camp. Dampness was present in 72.5% of houses, 50.5% had mould and 37.0% had some sort of leakage. The researchers also noted an increased risk for asthma and the common cold among the younger population (Al Khatib & Tabakhna, 2006). All around the camp new buildings or building extensions are erected at a high tempo. Everywhere you look, there are concrete pillars on top of existing buildings, waiting for new floors to be constructed. Steel reinforcements are sticking out, fully exposed to weather conditions. Most buildings have visible layers of different materials or appearances, resulting from the different time period each floor or room was created. This successive construction is very characteristic for camps across Palestine. Bshara (2014) notes how the constructions in

7 Data from 2014, source: stats.oecd.org 35 the camp are entirely made possible by specialized refugees from Jalazone itself. Certain refugees act as engineers and contractors simultaneously, often utilizing local workers to complete the job (Bshara, 2014). These engineers elect to use certain ‘untraditional’ building methods, forced by the inferior conditions inside the camp. Concrete is often not fully cured, in order to speed up the construction process. Getting the concrete on the build site is no easy task either, as the narrow streets hinder its transport. Construction is sometimes halted mid-project, if the owner’s resources are depleted, and continued when new materials can be purchased. Nevertheless, these makeshift engineers try to make ends meet with the limited tools at their disposal. The vast majority of buildings are constructed using a concrete skeleton that gets filled up with hollow concrete blocks (Bshara, 2014). Only a few buildings in the camp are build using limestone, a common building practice across the Westbank. Bshara suggests this is caused by the refugees’ resistance against the normalisation of the camp setting. The concrete structures, clearly different from other villages, reinforces the temporary character of Jalazone camp (Bshara, 2014). Overpopulation of the camp obviously had negative consequences upon the camp’s infrastructure, which was not designed to handle these capacities. A newly installed electricity tower reduced the frequency of power outages. Still, the cables are easily accessible as they run along the walls of the alleyways, as do most water boilers. Most other services are still lacking substantial upgrades. The west side of the camp has a lot of problems regarding sewage. When heavy rain falls, water frequently enters the refugees’ houses. Along the small alleyways where water rapidly gathers, homeowners have installed stone barriers in front of their doors to divert the water. The overflowing sewage even causes frequent problems for the neighbouring village of Jifna, which is positioned downhill from Jalazone camp. Improving the available infrastructure has been a slow process due to insufficient funds.

22. All around the camp, concrete pillars are visible on top of buildings, ready for future expansion

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23 - 24. With increased verticalisation, outside stairwells are now common practice, leading directly to the 2nd or 3th floor of a building

Congestion of the camp has led to endless expansions of the housing units, both vertically and horizontally. More and more public space gets gradually claimed by the addition of a new room or balcony. Street widths have increasingly been reduced over the years, leading to the creation of even more small alleyways. In most places, the old sidewalks are inaccessible because of buildings expanding outwards. Around the camp, stairs are a common sight on the outside of the buildings, leading directly to the second or third floor, as different families are living on top of each other. These stairs are often very steep, leading to potentially dangerous situations. With vertical expansion reaching its limits, a new trend has emerged in recent years inside the camp. Additional rooms are being built above street level that encompass the entire width of the avenue. They occur mostly around the tight alleyways, where expansions from both sides get connected. These ‘skybridges’ can only be found in a few locations around the camp, but are predicted to increasingly appear in the following years. Due to the increased building density, the refugees have to endure rough living conditions. The investigative research from 2006 found that only a miserable 41.5% of households experienced direct sunlight. Most households had only 1 or 2 bedrooms, making privacy a rare occurrence (Al Khatib & Tabakhna, 2006). These high densities also form a health risk, as diseases can spread more easily, especially in combination with the frequent sewage problems. People gather on the sidewalks outside to escape the busy homes, socializing in front of the butcher or the marketplace. Kids are forced to play on the busy streets or amidst the rubble of destroyed houses.

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25. Gradual expansion of the houses, both left and right, has reduces the street width significantly

26. This house was expanded on with a new room, suspended over the alleyway, creating a tunnel

27. This old utility pole got swallowed up by the building extentions

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A study conducted in 2012 by JICA, a Japanese organisation focussed on providing aid to less developed areas, showed a very high unemployment rate: 46% of all men and 86% of women in the camp don’t have a job. These numbers are supported by a general survey, conducted by the Al-Jalazun Camp Services Committee in 2011, which concluded a similar unemployment rate of 47% in the camp. Another study was conducted by a team of the Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ) in 2011 to determine the distribution of economic activities in the camp. Jalazone residents are mostly housed in the government or private sector, which employs almost half of the work force. The camp has a history of labour workers, who depended on jobs outside the camp but these job opportunities have decreased significantly in recent decades. After the Intifadas and the construction of the border wall, it became much harder for the Palestinians to work jobs in Israel, where most of the labour jobs are located. Multiple roads were closed off to Palestinians and movement was severely restricted. Special passes are now needed to cross the border, only provided in limited capacity to a select group of workers. Anyone with any sort of criminal record gets automatically excluded, which is surprisingly common in the Westbank. Even then, passes can still assert select days and hours of passing, making it even more difficult to get consistent jobs in Israel. Even for college graduates it can be very hard to find a job, forcing them take on low-paying jobs where they are totally overqualified. One of the few job openings in the camp are under the UNWRA umbrella, who provides just over a hundred jobs, mostly as teachers in one of the two schools. Other UNWRA jobs in the camp include sanitation workers, health assistants and administration assistants. Some residents choose to open their own shop, most of them located along the main street. Here you can find grocery shops, multiple bakeries and butcheries, a barber, a telecommunication shop, a pet store, cafes and several others enterprises. The established presence of shops, makes the camp attractive to people from the neighbouring villages. Mainly during Ramadan, people from outside the camp come to Jalazone to take advantage of the low prices.

Unemployed Employment Israeli labour Trade Services Agriculture Industry (Numbers sector market sector from 2011) Jalazone 47% 26% 3% 11% 10% 1% 2%

28. Job distribution in Jalazone camp

Source: ARIJ, 2011

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2.3. Qaddura refugee camp

Qaddura camp is an unofficial refugee camp, right in the centre of agglomeration between the two cities of Ramallah and Al-Bireh. It is an unofficial camp, meaning that it is not a UNWRA-established camp but rather a spontaneous gathering of refugees in one location. There are no UNWRA services currently present at the camp as UNWRA can’t build on land they don’t officially own and the organisation prioritises new investments towards their own official camps. The habitants however are officially recognized as refugees and can use their refugee status to obtain UNWRA services in other refugee camps. Its unofficial nature means that the camp has no official UN management institution and statistics and maps of the camp are scarce. An estimated 2500 people reside in the camp. Qaddura camp was established in 1948, on private land. The camp was named in honour of Youssef Qaddura, the original owner of the land, who granted the refugees permission to settle on his property. Originally, the camp was located in an open field, outside the city. UNWRA services were not present, aside from a small open kitchen that occasionally provided meals to the refugees. If the refugees wanted to visit a health clinic or send their children to school, they had to walk to the nearby UNWRA camp of Al-Am’ari, which is located 1 km further south. Over time, the nearby cities expanded to form one big urbanised area, absorbing Qaddura camp. The camp is now located right in the middle of the two cities, with its majority located in Ramallah and a small part in Al-Bireh. The main street of the camp, where all non-residential activities are located, continues all the way to the souq (market) in the centre of Ramallah.

29. Overview of Ramallah and Al-Bireh The pink area (Qaddura camp) is located in the middle of the two cities The UNWRA camp Al’Amari is nearby

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30. The main street of Qaddura camp, filled with shops Source: Ames, 2012

Source: UNRWA Source: UNRWA

32. Luxery appartments, owned by non-refugees within the camp borders

31. The camp is located inside the agglomeration of Ramallah city Source: UNRWA

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The camp falls currently under the jurisdiction of the Ramallah Municipality. With the introduction of the people’s committees in the 1990’s under the PNA, the camp could be formally represented for the first time. The surface area of the camp is very small, at only 51 dunams (0.051 km² or 5.1 hectares). Nevertheless, the camp has a high density: between the few main roads that mark the borders, a highly dense slum area resides. The remaining plots were quickly filled up, even by outsiders, as its excellent location in the middle of both cities makes it a desired place to live. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) did a survey in 2007, totalling 1136 residents in 289 housing units. The population was projected to exceed 2000 people after 2010. This would corroborate the estimated current population of 2500 people, made by the people’s committee representative. A large part of the population was still very young, with 36% under the age of 15. This is very common among the Palestinian refugee camps, indicative of the rapid population growth. Walking around Qaddura, the camp has a completely different feel from traditional refugee camps like Jalazone or Amari. Highrise apartment buildings stand next to old refugee shelters, creating an interesting juxtaposition of old and new, of camp and city. As an unofficial camp, the refugees from Qaddura didn’t have access to the standardised shelters, provided by UNWRA. Instead of an abundance of shelters, Qaddura camp consists of a mixture of limestone apartment buildings and concrete houses. Old refugee houses from the 1950’s or 1960’s stand next to six story-high apartment blocks, meant for well-off city dwellers. Due to its prime location in downtown Ramallah, many non-refugees also now live within the border of Qaddura, further blurring the lines between the camp and the city. These apartments are worth a lot of money due to their excellent location in the middle of the city. On multiple occasions, the descendants of the Qaddura family have filed lawsuits in the American courts in order to reclaim ownership of the camp ground. Due to its profitable nature, the land area is desired by many. President Arafat eventually froze all claims in 1996 until the Palestinian refugee situation would be solved, further postponing the problem. Still, this did not stop outsiders from buying plots of land to construct apartment buildings and create residential areas within the camp. Some refugees chose to sell their plot of land, enticed by lucrative offers, and moved out of the camp. ‘(…) the PNA’s extremely weak stance on matters of land use, land pricing, and strategic planning – and the impossibility of reinforcing decisions in the context of Israeli occupation – generates a void of authority that is exploited by private interests.’ (Misselwitz, 2009, p. 293). In between the main streets lies the central area of the camp, with small alleyways leading deep into a maze of refugee quarters. The surrounding high apartment buildings cause even less sunlight to reach down into the alleys. Here, hidden out of sights, reside the poorest of refugees in very crowded conditions. Ruins of old refugee shelters, dating as far back as 1950, are present everywhere. Some completely abandoned, others retrofitted with a new makeshift roof to house a family. In stark contrast, maybe 100 metres west is a construction boom going on creating new multi-story buildings in high tempo. The eastern corner of the camp is defined by expensive apartment blocks, standing at a sizeable distance from each other. These areas are completely bought out by people from outside the camp. Old refugee houses were destroyed and replaced with apartment buildings, which generate enormous incomes due to the inflated housing prices that plague Ramallah. This has created a situation

42 where the refugees are evidently trapped inside the camp, as they have no method of affording a house or apartment in the surrounding city. The only way out would be moving far away, where prices are affordable again. This would mean abandoning their refugee claim and their social link to the people in the camp. The excessive housing prices create a feeling of entrapment for the refugees of Qaddura camp, a reoccurring theme for the camps in the Ramallah periphery. As more and more people moved in the camps perimeter, attracted to the ideal centre location between Ramallah and Al-Bireh, the camp’s identity got further blurred. The new wave of overspill from the city into the camp caused the camp borders to become completely porous. In certain locations inside the camp, refugees are barely represented, making this territory basically an extension from the city on camp ground.

33. Non-refugee buildings in Qaddura camp Most of them are residential buildings, located along the main streets The south-east corner of the camp houses multiple luxery apartment buildings

The dense centre of the camp still remains, reminiscent of its refugee past, but distinguishing its outer border with the surrounding city is no longer possible. Many refugees have opened up shops along the main roads of the camp, further drawing in outsiders. Unlike other refugee camps, Qaddura camp has no official border, although the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) is currently working on a map of the camp to give it some clarity and legitimacy. While other camps often have clear markings that signal the presence of a camp, especially around the main entrance with a gateway, Qaddura camp has no such features. And without the presence of UNWRA shelters, there is no clear distinction in building techniques and materials with the surrounding city. People pass frequently through the camp, as its main road is a quick way to get around the city, by foot or by car. All of this makes it very difficult to distinguish the camp from the surrounding city, making the camp not feel like a traditional refugee camp but more like any other poor neighbourhood within the city.

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34. The camp has become indistinguishable from the surrounding city, eastern border Left: The city of Al-Bireh Right: Qaddura camp

35. The camp has become indistinguishable from the surrounding city, north-eastern border Left: Qaddura camp Right: The city of Al-Bireh

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Alongside the continually expanding agglomeration, new opportunities have presented themselves to the refugees. The nearby presence of the city opens up a whole new assortment of shops and services. While previously, all refugees had to walk to Am’ari camp for school or health services, newly established institutes provide the same services nearby. The main street of the camp ends at a hospital, the biggest medical complex in all of Palestine. People come all the way from Gaza to visit the hospital for its modern equipment and special disease treatment. It is the first medical facility to allow Palestinians to undergo complex medical procedures such as transplants and heart surgery. Refugee children also get the opportunity to go to governmental schools in the city, all the way up to high school. A public university was established in the 1980’s right next to the hospital, to provide affordable higher education. In terms of infrastructure, the camp is better off than most camps. The Ramallah Municipality provides the camp with waste collection and disposal. Almost all houses are connected with the electricity, water and telephone network and 90% of houses are connected to the sewage network. The city offers reduced prices on, or often even free, water and electricity for the refugee population. Only those who can afford to construct new buildings pay the full amount. Overall, Qaddura camp seems almost fully integrated into the city network, further blurring the line between camp and city. Whereas refugees in Jalazone had to mostly look inside the camp in order find a job (the UNWRA schools or their own business), Qaddura camp relies mostly on the surrounding city for job opportunities. Without UNWRA present in the camp, there are also no employment possibilities within its organisation. A distinct increase in jobs in the services sector can be observed, coming from the big companies all around the city. Refugees also have the option of opening their own shop, as they have a much larger market in comparison to other camps, to promote their products. Still, job opportunities are apparently scarce, as roughly 65% of the registered refugees are unemployed8. The refugees find it hard to compete with the better educated and wealthier city dwellers, who easily surpass most refugees for job openings.

Unemployed Employment Services Trade (Numbers sector sector sector from 2011)

Qaddura 65% 10% 18% 7%

36. Job distribution in Qaddura camp Source: ARIJ, 2011

8 Source: Qaddura Camp Services Committee, 2011 45

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Part III – The camp and the city

3.1. The reality of protracted refugee situations

3.1.1. Definition and numbers

The goal of the UN refugee agencies is to reach a durable solution to a refugee crisis. Despite their best efforts, the search for solutions has become increasingly difficult and refugees had to spend longer times in exile as a consequence (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Loescher, Long, & Sigona, 2014). The UNHCR estimated that the average duration of major refugee situations has increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in 2003 (UNHCR, 2004). This inability to find a timely solution for the refugee problem has given birth to the phenomenon of protracted refugee situations (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014). The UNHCR defines protracted refugee situations (PRS) as ‘one in which refugees find themselves in a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo. Their lives may not be at risk, but their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain unfulfilled after years in exile. A refugee in this situation is often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance.’ (UNHCR, 2004, p. 1). This state of limbo is critical to PRS as the refugees are unable to return to their homeland where often the situation is still unsafe, and at the same time are unable to settle in the host country because that state refuses them asylum (Crisp, 2003). The UNHCR uses a rough measurement for PRS of ‘25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality that have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given asylum country’ (UNHCR, 2017, p. 22). This description is obviously limited, as it excludes certain refugee populations: camps that act as a transit point with continuous arrival and departure of refugees; and camps with a relatively small refugee population (Fiddian- Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; UNHCR, 2017). In a protracted refugee situation, the refugees have moved beyond the initial emergency phase, which focuses on life-saving care and assistance, but have not yet achieved a durable solution. And with their current prospects, this seems unlikely in the nearby future (UNHCR, 2017). Loescher (2008) remarks a lot of limitations to the definition used by the UN refugee agency. It reinforces the idea of protracted refugee situations as static and unchanging with passive populations that are simply warehoused inside a camp. Camp populations are often fluid with many refugees repatriating or actively immigrating to safer areas. These deficits are then quickly filled up with new arrivals that keep the overall population steady. Clandestine refugees who live among the local population in urbanized areas are also not counted in this definition, as the UNHCR requires them to live in camps (Loescher et al., 2008). ‘The camp is officially a transitory, so to say, an ‘exceptional’ space, in which the refugee is supposed to spend only a limited amount of time. Yet, everywhere the refugee camp has today become a ‘permanent’ location and the transient condition of the refugee extends indefinitely, becoming an irrevocable and permanent situation, freezing into non-negotiable, rigid structures.’ (Diken, 2004, p. 93).

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37. Protracted refugee situations under the UNHCR mandate at the end of 2017 Source: UNHCR (2017, p. 23)

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Extended stay for refugees has become more and more common: during the 1990’s, half of all refugees were in a protracted refugee situation, currently this number sits at two-thirds of the refugee population (UNHCR, 2017; Loescher et al., 2008). Figure 37 shows the current state of PRS across the world. Over 13 million refugees were in a protracted refugee situation at the end of 2017, a number that steadily increases each year (UNHCR, 2017). It is important to note that the almost 5 million refugees under UNWRA care are not represented in this graph. As noted by Chimni (1998), the end of the Cold War changed the global perception on refugees. During the Cold War, public displays of refugee assistance were used as a tool by the West to show off their moral superiority over the Soviets and simultaneously ensure power in weakened areas of the world. After the Fall of Communism, refugees lost their ideological and geopolitical value and the refugee policy of many countries shifted towards a containment approach (Chimni, 1998). The early 1990’s saw a spike in refugee migrations. The independence of Soviet States and subsequent conflicts across these nations caused massive flows of migration towards the West. Millions more were displaced as a result of the ethnic conflicts in the Balkan, Central and West Africa, Iraq and Central Asia (Loescher et al., 2008). These sudden mass displacements prompted many countries to install stricter refugee legislation. Refugees were to be contained in their country of origin or host nation as part of preventive protection for Western countries (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Hamlin, 2012). This introduction of restrictive policies and the inability of UN agencies in providing solutions are responsible for the increase in protracted refugee situations, starting from the 1990’s, as can be seen in figure 37. Decades later, many of these post-Cold War refugee situations still remain unresolved. Not only does the number of refugees in PRS keep rising, protracted refugee situations often occur in the most unstable regions of the world, making it very difficult to establish quality refugee assistance in the field. Sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest concentration of PRS in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. In contrast, the Middle- East has fewer protracted refugee situations, but accounts for a significant portion of the refugee population with the PRS in Afghanistan and Iraq (Loescher et al., 2008). Palestine has always historically been the clear example of a protracted refugee situation. Ever since the initial war of 1948, Palestinian refugees have been part of the longest protracted refugee situation in the world. Due to the rule allowing the refugee status to be transferable across generations, the number of Palestinian refugees has steadily increased over the years. With UNWRA now providing aid to almost five million (official) refugees9, this unprecedented scale has challenged traditional refugee approaches and forced the refugee workers to re-evaluate and reorganize multiple times along the way (Rosenfeld, 2009). Only around 30% of Palestinian refugees have actively lived inside a camp, but this number quickly climbs beyond 50% for the Palestinians in Gaza. The rest of the refugees live across villages and cities in Palestine and neighbouring countries. (Misselwitz, 2009; Sayigh, 1998). The refugees who live outside the camps are also generally wealthier, with only 20% living in extreme poverty versus 40% of refugees who live in camps (Sayigh, 1998).

9 An estimated extra 1,5 million Palestinian refugees never bothered to register, source Misselwitz (2009, p. 123). Palestinian sources place the number closer to 2-3 million, source: http://www.badil.org 49

The case of the Palestinian crisis is a very political one, with both sides showing no sign of backing down from their claims (Misselwitz, 2009; Takkenberg, 2009). Israel has often accused the UN to artificially prolong the Palestinian crisis in order to support the political interests of the Arab countries. They blame the agencies for spreading false information in order to blow the refugee problem out of proportion. The State of Israel calls for an immediate cease of refugee assistance, as UNWRA is allegedly keeping the refugees back from development of their own (Katz, 1973). On the other side, the right of return is so firmly embedded in the Palestinian society that the 4th generation of refugees still holds on to the rights of their ancestors. As a result, UNWRA’s mandate is continuously extended with no end in sight (Sayigh, 1998; Takkenberg, 2009).

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3.1.2. Causes

Protracted refugee situations arise from the continuous violence that occurs in the countries whose instability causes long-term insecurity. PRS are closely related to the rising phenomenon of ‘fragile states’ since the end of the Cold War. Refugees that originate from states like Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, … are living in limbo as the instability in these countries has dragged on for many years, making it impossible to return to their homeland (Crisp, 2003; Loescher et al., 2008). It is important to look at these regions as a whole, as many of these states have porous borders and conflicts quickly spread across nations (Loescher et al., 2008). These conflicts are characterised by high levels of ethnic antagonism, organized violence and overall crumbling of society. The fighting is often sustained by various actors who benefit from the continuous instability, like politicians, militia groups and international business concerns (Crisp, 2003). Long (2011) indicates how not all PRS occur in a country with a weak government in place. The persecution of certain minority groups, sometimes with governmental support, can cause a protracted refugee situation for a specific group of people, like the case of Myanmar (Long, 2011). The UNHCR argues that ‘Protracted refugee situations stem from political impasses. They are not inevitable, but are rather the result of political action and inaction, both in the country of origin (the persecution or violence that led to flight) and in the country of asylum. They endure because of ongoing problems in the countries of origin, and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment possibilities, and confinement to camps.’ (UNHCR, 2004, p. 1). This analysis shows how both factors relating to the situation in the country of origin and policy responses in the country of asylum impact the duration of a refugee crisis. Failing to resolve the situation in the home country prevents the refugees to return. Failing to support the host nation results in them treating the refugees like a burden with anti-social restrictions as a result (Loescher et al., 2008). Generally, it is up to the international community to resolve armed conflicts and human rights violations in these unstable regions. Their investments in some of these regions and disinterest in others often dictates their efforts and pace at which conflicts are resolved. In Africa, the economic stakes have been much lower for the industrialized states, resulting in armed conflicts and subsequent refugee crises, that have lasted much longer (Crisp, 2003). Declining donor support for long-term refugee assistance has further diminished the aid the UNHCR could provide for the refugees. A decrease in financial support and developmental programs has security implications, as refugees come in direct competition with the local population for the scarce resources, and further reinforces the idea of the refugee burden falling upon the host state (Loescher et al., 2008). This often results in even stricter asylum policies, as host nations feel that they carry a disproportionate share of the refugee responsibilities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014). This was apparent in the case of Tanzania, a country that was historically very open towards refugees. Continuous budget cuts in international support programs have forced the Tanzanian government to heavily reduce its refugee initiatives and install movement restrictions upon the camp dwellers (Loescher et al., 2008).

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Thirdly, the UNHCR has a history of promoting repatriation as the primary solution for a refugee crisis, neglecting the possibility of integration via self-sustainability. This again pushes the narrative of warehousing refugees in camps until repatriation becomes viable (Crisp, 2003). Repatriation, which was the dominant doctrine throughout the 1990s, had failed for a multitude of reasons: host states felt that they carried the majority of the burden, refugees were regarded as a threat to the local society and anti-refugee sentiments were an ideal rally point for local politicians to gain popularity (Crisp, 2003; Misselwitz, 2009). This resulted in very few encouragements for local integration and refugees were simply put in long-term 'care-and-maintenance’ programs. With unceasing instability in the country of origin, the life of the refugees was simply put on hold, with no progress towards learning new skills or self- reliance programs (Crisp, 2003). Crisp also points towards the concept of ‘residual caseloads’: these are refugees who decide to stay behind when the majority of the same population has been able to repatriate or resettle. This is often prompted by the refugees fearing prosecution or further violence in their homeland. This results in a lingering refugee presence and requires extended refugee support (Crisp, 2003). Sometimes refugees get so used to the assistance and opportunities provided by the camp that their connection to the homeland get weakened (Crisp, 2003; Misselwitz, 2009). UNHCR expert Louis Neumann gets cited in Misselwitz (2009) saying that ‘Refugees quickly get used to dependency and living conditions in the camps. Health care and schooling provided by UNHCR and other agencies is in most cases by far better than in their native environments. (…) Why would someone who has lived in a camp, started a business or new trade want to go back to his original village and start farming again? What about all his additional new family members who do not fit into his old house?’ (Misselwitz, 2009).

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3.1.3. Consequences

Durieux (2009) notes how the concept of protracted refugee situations refers not only to the time factor (how long refugees remain in exile) but also to the quality of life had by the refugees. As time goes on and solutions remain absent, living conditions remain mostly depressing and refugees only enjoy the most basic of commodities (Durieux, 2009). Human rights violations are common practice in PRS. Although the 1951 Refugee Convention clearly dictates the basic rights all refugees should receive such as free movement and wage-earning possibilities, many countries still infringe on these rights with restrictive measurements for the helpless refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Milner & Loescher, 2011). As a result of these restrictions, refugees become dependent on minimum-level assistance and lead a live of poverty and frustration. Violence and abuse are far too common among the refugees’ everyday lives (Loescher et al., 2008). The UNHCR has remarked on PRS that ‘Most refugees in such situations live in camps where idleness, despair, and, in a few cases, even violence prevails. Women and children, who form the majority of the refugee community, are often the most vulnerable, falling victim to exploitation and abuse.’ (UNHCR, 2001, p. 1). As time passes, the international community understandably loses interest in providing seemingly unending support. Funding gets reduced and shortages arise in food, shelter and other material needs (Milner & Loescher, 2011). Tania Kaiser (2001) describes how the food rations in Guinea are constantly reduced due to faltering international support. The UNHCR is forced to continuously remove people from their assistance programs, reducing the number of recipients (Kaiser, 2001). Due to the lack of investments in refugee development and the minimal aid that is provided, most of the refugees inside a camp live in poverty (Crisp, 2003). Prolonged exile further exposes the vulnerability of certain groups of refugees, especially women and children but also people who are too sick or too old to make a living (Loescher et al., 2008). These groups of people are often living in extreme poverty, solely dependent on a male breadwinner. When this is absent or insufficient, the refugees are forced to resort to less than favourable survival tactics (UNHCR, 2001). Significant increases in domestic violence and sexual abuse have been recorded over periods of prolonged exile. Sexual exploitation is considered widespread, as many women see no other choice with the limited means they receive. Unfortunately, this fate is not limited to adults as also children’s bodies are used as currency in some camps. Shocking reports have disclosed cases where abuse of power by humanitarian workers has maintained the exploitation as well as the agency’s personnel being among the main perpetrators (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Loescher et al., 2008). Men are also affected by the prolonged displacement, often taking a toll on their mental health. The traditional social order is discarded as skills that were taught to young boys are no longer relevant. Men coming from typically poor regions of the world are no longer responsible for growing certain crops, maintaining livestock and being the patriarch of a community. This leads to feelings of worthlessness and depression with negative behaviour as a result. Young teen boys are very prone to these anti-social attitudes as they often feel they have little possibility of establishing a sustainable adult livelihood inside the camp (Crisp, 2003; Turner, 1999).

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Education for the refugees is very important as it enables them to develop their skills and strengthen their chances of reaching self-sustainability and a better future. To many, providing quality education seems just as important as the provision of food and medicine (Crisp, 2003). By international law, host states and the UN agencies are required to provide non-discriminatory education for the refugee children. Unfortunately, long-term funding is often difficult to uphold, with many budget cuts to be expected. Degrees obtained in the homeland are sometimes not recognized in the asylum country. This makes it, even for refugees with a higher degree, difficult to find a job in the host state. Additionally, opportunities for higher education are often denied for refugee children, leading to low attendance levels, starting from adolescent age (Loescher et al., 2008). Additionally, extended refugee crises can have serious political and security implications. They can negatively affect the diplomatic relationship between the host state and the country of origin, as both countries disagree on how to handle the refugee situation (Fiddian- Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Loescher et al., 2008). The prolonged presence of a refugee population can cause regional conflict by triggering an armed intervention, leading to counterattacks from the other parties involved or from militant fractions among the refugees (Milner & Loescher, 2011). States who offer asylum are often scared of fighters among the refugees, especially if the crisis is a result of violent clashes in the country of origin. These fighters hide among the fleeing refugees, using the newly established refugee camp as a base of operations for further militant actions (Loescher et al., 2008). This militarization of the refugee camp is a serious security threat for both the country of origin and the host state. The militant fighters can use the camp to carry out attacks on the homeland but also to easily spread violence to new regions. This could drag the state of asylum into what was previously a distant conflict (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Loescher et al., 2008). The failure to address refugee problems in a timely manner, can cause resentment and a form a breeding ground for further violence. This was the case for Rwanda, where Tutsi refugees and their descendants, who lived in exile for 30 years, launched attacks on the country from their refugee camps in the early 1990’s, leading to the conditions of the Rwandan genocide (Loescher et al., 2008). ‘Refugee populations are increasingly being viewed by host states not as victims of persecution and conflict, but as a potential source of regional instability (…)’ (Loescher et al., 2008, p. 34). Other security concerns include arms trafficking, drug trade, human exploitation and the recruitment of child soldiers (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014). Protracted refugee situations can also have indirect security implications. Tensions can arise between the refugees and the native habitants as the refugees are often perceived as receiving preferential treatment when it comes to access to food, education and health services. Xenophobia further dehumanises the refugees, as refugees get blamed for the poor living conditions of the local population (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Loescher et al., 2008). As donations get reduced over time, competition becomes fiercer over the scarce resources. This could then lead to even more security concerns as people opt for thievery and violence (Milner & Loescher, 2011).

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3.1.4. Responding to prolonged exile: the development approach

Ending a protracted refugee situation is no easy task, often made even more difficult by an opposing local governments and uncertain security considerations. The UNHCR has had mixed results when it comes to ending a refugee crisis (Crisp, 2003). Many refugees put their fate in the UN agencies who are often the face of humanitarian aid. Different authors have suggested that the UNHCR should spearhead the negotiations for durable solutions, as they are in a central position to do so. The UNHCR could use its status to negotiate durable yet realistic responses. They emphasise the importance of developing strategies that acknowledge long-term implications but are directed on improving the immediate situation (Loescher et al., 2008; Milner & Loescher, 2011). The focus of the UNHCR should lie on ensuring three aspects: providing the refugees with security (physical, legal and economic), removing barriers to self-reliance, and creating opportunities for the refugees (UNHCR, 2004). The first aspect (security) involves basic human rights, as established in the 1951 Refugee charter. The second element (removal of barriers) enables the refugees to fully live their lives and reach their full capabilities. The third aspect (opportunities) widens the possibilities of the refugees via loans, projects and teaching (Crisp, 2003; Loescher et al., 2008). For the last two decades, the UNHCR has made increased effort to fully understand the refugee problem through workgroups and research papers. They launched special refugee programs which promoted self-reliance and local integration, in order to move away from the endless loop of established ‘care and maintenance’ programs (Milner & Loescher, 2011). The UNHCR aims to put in place ‘multi-year, comprehensive durable solutions strategies to resolve protracted refugee situations, developed in collaboration with relevant actors, which contemplate the strategic use of resettlement and local integration (…) UNHCR will promote refugee livelihoods whenever possible, and make self-reliance and empowerment a policy priority in situations where short-term solutions are not available (…)’ (UNHCR, 2007, p. 30). Accepting failures of the past, the UNHCR looked to deliver better assistance to the refugees with their Framework for Durable Solutions, a toolset that allows for a more detailed approach to a refugee influx (Loescher et al., 2008). ‘Utilizing only traditional relief-based solutions to refugee assistance (eg. care and maintenance), have proved largely inefficient and need to be complemented and if necessary replaced by new programming approaches to address the protracted nature of many refugee situations.’ (Jallow & Malik, 2005, p. 6). To make the shift towards a solution-oriented approach, Loescher argues for the need to fully engage with the asylum country and the donor states. At the same time, the involvement of other actors in the peace and security communities is required, as without it, the agencies would only be able to provide short and fragmented approaches. ‘As such, it is only with the support of a broader set of actors that solutions can be truly comprehensive.’ (Loescher et al., 2008, p. 354). Betts (2006) concluded that a good approach to resolve a refugee problem should possess three characteristics: Firstly, it is comprehensive, evaluating all possible solutions. Additionally, the plan should be cooperative, with engagement from both the international community and the regional actors. And lastly, it should be collaborative, involving a broad range of agencies and NGO’s, who each bring their experience to the table (Betts, 2006; Loescher et al., 2008).

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The part of the Framework that is relevant to protracted refugee situations is the Development Assistance for Refugees (DAR) Programme which provides basic guidelines for situations where one of the durable solutions (integration, resettlement or repatriation) is not obtainable in the near future. The DAR guidelines mark a recognition for the reality of PRS where refugees remain in limbo for years on end (Jallow & Malik, 2005; Misselwitz, 2009). The DAR program prepares the refugees for an eventual solution via a wide range of measures, ranging from actions affecting the entire community (upgraded infrastructure, reducing disparities between refugees and hosts) to measures for the individual refugee (income generating possibilities, access to legal assistance). Mainly, the program aims at preventing the refugees from becoming passive, as dependency patterns are hard to get rid of. For that reason, DAR initiatives are best implemented as early as possible to help avert the creation of a protracted refugee situation (Jallow & Malik, 2005). As part of this new invigorated refugee approach, participatory planning has become a much- appreciated staple of progressive refugee procedures. In urban planning, the profession has similarly shifted away from the traditional top-down approach, towards a more involved bottom-up approach, using participatory planning. It can create more efficient cities, as locals can better identify their needs and the planners can react accordingly (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Implementing this approach in the refugee context seems contradictory at first, as most camps are considered restrictive environments with a top-down process of humanitarian assistance (Cooper, 2007; Hallam, 1998). Nevertheless, one of the main strengths of a participation model is empowerment, with participants undergoing a transformation to become more confident and involved with their surroundings (Freire, 1970; Nelson & Wright, 1995; Slocum, Wichhart, Rocheleau & Thomas-Slayter, 1995). Other authors have described how the participatory process can give a voice to oppressed groups such as women or ethnic minorities (Ewick & Silbey, 2003; Nelson & Wright, 1995). ‘If they are adaptable to different contexts and easily used by people of any class, gender, or culture, they can enable women and men to take greater control of their lives.’ (Slocum et al., 1995, p. 29). As noted by multiple scholars, camps can induce a sense of powerlessness and despair, where the refugees feel bored and helpless. The refugees have no control over what is happening to them, they simple undergo life inside the camp (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Herz, 2008). It is worth noting that other authors have criticized this way of thinking about power as being too bipolar. ‘While refugees (and particularly young and female refugees) have been popularized through various advocacy and fundraising campaigns as uniformly powerless people, these caricatures are easily shown to be irresponsible in their reductionism once attention is paid to the everyday lives of individuals who are active in negotiating their relationships, activities and ways of knowing the world.’ (Cooper, 2007, p. 111). Still, using the participation approach offers the refugees a chance to regain some control over their lives. This empowerment is a good catalyst for further development in the refugees’ lives (Nelson & Wright, 1995; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011).

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38. The participation ladder in a DAR program Source: Jallow & Malik (2005, app II, p. 2)

The Handbook also stresses the importance of a participatory assessment as it can ‘strengthen the refugees’ own resources and self-reliance and avoid creating dependency.’ (UNHCR, 2007, p. 94). The goal is to identify unfulfilled needs among the refugee population and react accordingly. The Handbook differentiates three levels of refugee involvement: the first is in organisation and planning, where representatives of the community partake in finding the best solutions to an imminent problem. The second level of involvement is capitalizing upon the skillset of the refugee population. It means placing refugees in jobs such as teachers, cooks, nurses etc. when qualified. This also helps in giving the refugees a purpose post-exile and reduces dependency on humanitarian assistance. The last level is in using the refugees to spread vital information among the population about health, hygiene and nutrition. Refugees tend to easier accept this information, when presented by their peers (UNHCR, 2007). When applying the DAR program, participatory development is a key feature for a successful intervention as it helps identifying refugee needs and interests. Nevertheless, this approach also has some drawbacks. Amidst an emergency, it is not always easy to incorporate a participatory approach due to the speed of intervention that is required to save lives. Still, community-based participation has proven to make relief efforts more effective and supportive of local initiatives. The UNHCR offers a wide range of tools for promoting participation: workshops, social analyses, consultations and initiatives that promote community building. Overall, they offer insights that are invaluable for the successful implementation of a DAR program (Jallow & Malik, 2005). Looking at the case of Palestine, living conditions have barely improved over the years and many refugees are still very much dependant on humanitarian assistance (Rosenfeld, 2009). ‘(…) Palestinian civilians across the oPt [occupied Palestinian territories], including refugees, are becoming increasingly vulnerable and dependent on large scale and expanded programmes of relief assistance. These can mitigate the worst effects of the crisis but are insufficient to reverse its impacts.’ (UNRWA, 2008, p. 4). Despite regular criticism and

57 opposition, UNWRA remains the go-to stabilizing factor throughout Palestine and continues to take on responsibility for the development of the refugees (Misselwitz & Hanafi, 2009; Takkenberg, 2009). Over the years, the agency has implemented a wide range of strategies with mixed results. Participation was always a crucial part of their operations but has gradually shifted from a tool to capitalize upon the workforce of the refugees towards a development asset to achieve a durable solution (Rempel, 2009). ‘It is the Palestinians themselves who will reap the benefit of the international community's investment, and they who can best tell us the benefit they desire.’ (Williams, 1989, p. 161). With UNRWA’s first operations in the 1950’s, focus lied on providing emergency assistance to the almost one million Palestinians who were in dire need of assistance. However, UNWRA quickly realised that the expensive relief effort contributed very little to a sustainable future for the refugees (Takkenberg, 2009). Since negotiations for solving the Palestinian crisis were going nowhere, UNWRA decided to provide the refugees with the means to lead a productive life in the absence of a durable refugee solution (Rempel, 2009). From the 1960’s onward, UNWRA shifted from its relief-centred approach towards a welfare-centred strategy, with its main focus on providing education (Rosenfeld, 2009). Refugees were hired or asked to participate in various programs as a means of economic growth and development for the region (Rempel, 2009). This new approach could provide more opportunities for the steadily growing group of refugee youth (Rosenfeld, 2009). The Agency build over 300 schools in the first years alone, totalling now at just over 700 schools under UNWRA management (Rosenfeld, 2009; Takkenberg, 2009). Special programs were established that focussed on refugee girls, as their enrolment was lacking behind that of the boys. Luckily, this discrepancy was mostly phased out over the following decades. The quality of education rose so quickly that, in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the graduates of UNWRA schools became heavily sought-after candidates for jobs across the Arab states. UNWRA’s focus on education still persists to this day as the majority of the agency’s budget is allocated towards educational facilities and staff (Rosenfeld, 2009). In 1986, UNWRA launched a microfinance and microenterprise program (MMP) that allowed the refugees (and non-refugees) to obtain loans to create self-sustainable enterprises. This approach would prove to be especially useful in the following years, after the outbreak of the First Intifada (Al Husseini, 2010; Misselwitz, 2009). Additional emphasis was placed on assisting female entrepreneurs, as part of UNWRA’s development focus on refugee women (Misselwitz, 2009). To this day, it is one of the most successful financial tools in and abroad Palestine, resulting in around 50 000 loans being approved (Al Husseini, 2010; Misselwitz, 2009). Although, the program has also been criticised for excluding the poorest among the refugees with its high standards for repayment (Misselwitz, 2009). Another new program was established in 2006, called the Infrastructure and Camp Improvement Program (ICIP), which was the first program to acknowledge the urban complexity of refugee camps (Misselwitz & Hanafi, 2009). It was considered an important step towards sustainable development in the camps and made good use of the participation model. From this program came the creation of some much-needed recreational areas, that also could be used for weddings or public gatherings (Al Husseini, 2010; Misselwitz & Hanafi, 2009). The ICIP also marked an evolution in the usage of the participation approach: ‘While UNRWA traditionally viewed participation

58 as a means of programme implementation, the new approach acknowledges participation as a human right with the primary objective of empowering refugees to realize their rights and improve social equity within the framework of the Agency’s mandate, values, and other UN principles.’ (Rempel, 2009, p. 412). Reception of these programs by the Palestinian refugees has been historically mixed: While their impact has been positive, frequent budget cuts have led to frustrations around their scale and implementation (Al Husseini, 2010; Rempel, 2009). Although these opportunities are certainly beneficial for the refugees’ development, transforming them from passive aid receivers into fully-grown citizens, some authors are cautious of the reality they represent. While making the refugees more resilient and responsible, the participatory approach also forces them to accept and go along with the reality of refugee life, instead of resisting life inside a refugee camp (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015). More than ever, the refugee is seen as resilient as far as it adapts to rather than resist its suffering (Reid, 2012). These programs ultimately boil down to adaptation to refugee life rather than bringing meaningful changes to the system (Welsh, 2014). ‘By engaging refugees as participants in camp management, refugees are transformed into residents who are expected to hope for a better future, despite there being little substantial change to the structures and conditions that forced them into these camps in the first place.’ (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015, p. 344). Adopting these programs seems to signal to the refugees to not expect to leave the camp any time soon. Even more, it shows that it would be in their best interest to settle into their new refugee lives (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015; Welsh, 2014). In practice, the participatory processes can easily fall victim to corruption, local power struggles and traditional gender views. Their implementation requires a nuanced approach, building relations over time with the different groups in order to slowly achieve social equity and empowerment (Al-Nammari, 2013).

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3.2. The urbanisation of refugee camps

3.2.1. The informal nature of urbanisation

Due to prolonged conflicts, refugee camps have more time to develop beyond the early crisis period. Camps undergo certain transformations, trading activities are established and the refugees start interacting with their surroundings (Kennedy, 2005). Over time, refugees develop routines and innovative solutions to handle daily life in the camp (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Camps started to display urban features and scholars were challenged to rethink these spaces as city-like (Agier, 2002). This evolution is widely discussed among authors, yet seems to be absent in the camp planning strategies. The terminology of ‘protracted refugee situations’ even shows a static image of a crisis state that endures, unable to think beyond the emergency care that is required at the initial moment (Misselwitz, 2009). The humanitarian agencies and their planners always preferred refugee camps with a short lifespan. They are easier to control and require no long-term commitments from donors (Kennedy, 2005; Napier-Moore, 2005). From the early 1980’s onward, planning guidelines started to tone down on long-term settlement implications. A process that was initiated by the removal of vocabulary references to permanent features, such as ‘streets’, ‘villages’ and ‘housing’, which was replaced by ‘shelters’ (Kennedy, 2005). Another example is the tactical abstinence of the word ‘citizens’ in all planning guidelines (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Although the UNHCR guidelines remind the planner of long-term possibilities, there is still this notion of camps as a temporary permanence, meant to ‘warehouse’ refugees (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015; UNHCR, 2007). For a camp to develop, it is important to look beyond the initial emergency state. Agier (2008) remarks how ‘At the beginning, it all seemed quite straightforward. Emergencies raised only technical operational problems. Then the social complexity of the camps began to emerge, day after day. (…) the humanitarian mechanism for their survival becomes for them [the refugees] a network of relationships within which a semblance of social hierarchy arises. How in due course, the empty space begins to fill and take life, and how a kind of town takes shape without ever having been envisaged.’ (Agier, 2008, p. 50). Agier describes how this evolutionary process begins immediately after the initial trauma and transforms the camp as time goes on. But from the humanitarian agencies’ perspectives, camps remain in the ‘emergency state’ and any changes they undergo are ignored (Misselwitz, 2009). This has resulted in situations where the spatial strategies and design decisions for temporary intended support have become the permanent reality (Herz, 2008). As camps enter prolonged periods of existence, they have shown to be capable of development of their own, not dependent on external aid (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Yet, even in more temporary camps, various facets of daily living are visible that are required for long-term settling, just like cities (Isin & Rygiel, 2007). A few decades ago, Cuny (1977) concluded that when a large number of people are gathered in a small area like a refugee camp, this place actually becomes a small city. A city that is accompanied with all the problems of a real city (Cuny, 1977). He warned about the necessity of addressing camp

60 planning in the same way as urban planning, saying they should ‘build settlements, not emergency shelters’ (Cuny, 1977, p. 133). Instead, camps are usually set up as emergency situations, regardless of the urbanisation that takes place after its formation. Plot sizes are so arbitrarily strict that family expansion quickly leads to overcrowding and all self-made innovations simply do not fit (Misselwitz, 2009). ‘Urbanisation therefore primarily occurs informally, “despite” planning, with refugees making do with the constraints of the technocratically implemented “diagram”-like camp’ (Misselwitz, 2009, p. 74). Purely looking at the numbers, many camps can form agglomerations of impressive scale (Misselwitz, 2009). Kibreab (1993) describes how in the mid-1980’s, the camps of Jalalaqsi formed the third largest human concentration in Somalia (Kibreab, 1993). Other big camps like the ones in Kenya or Chad would be considered among the largest cities in their country, but they are not officially contemplated as worthy ‘cities’ on that list (Herz, 2008; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Manuel Herz (2008) illustrates how in the Goma region (Congo) multiple camps were located around a base of humanitarian operations, forming a huge network of 750 000 people. The camps, forming the network, were described as ‘immense cities of huts’, with an agglomeration challenging the largest cities in the nation (Herz, 2008). While some camps completely disappear, others leave behind infrastructure such as roads or power networks. These remnants of their existence can be used by other future settlements (Misselwitz, 2009). Looking at the necessities of city planning (mobility of vehicles and pedestrians, housing, public meeting places, schools and hospitals, …) a lot of similarities with camp planning can be observed (Isin & Rygiel, 2007). Applying the definition of ‘urbanity’ to the refugee camps can be a tricky issue, as many scholars have different opinions of what defines ‘urban’. Certain features are often echoed like ‘number of inhabitants’, ‘population density’ or ‘residential concentration’. As the case studies have shown, these are some urban characteristics that can be easily applied to refugee camps (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Other authors focus on the presence of a juridical organ, the city as a ‘polis’, a place of governance and progress. With this definition, we can see the shortcomings of the camp (Agamben, 1998). Refugee camps are regulated by international organisations and do not possess juridical institutes, who rely on some degree of participation from its citizens. Refugees simply undergo life inside the camps. The key difference here between a city and a camp lies in the right to self-determination for its residents (Misselwitz, 2009).

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3.2.2. Urbanity according to Agier

French ethnographer Michel Agier made an impactful work with his study of the refugee camps of Dadaab in northeast Kenya in the year 2000. He contemplated the conceptual model of refugee camps as ‘city-camps’. He calls the refugee camps paradoxical devices, located somewhere ‘between war and the city’. For Agier, camps are both the symbol of the collective quarantine of the most undesirable, rejected people on the planet, and the humanitarian assistance that is provided to them. Camps are created following an emergency, often among unsafe conditions, to provide basic needs such as food and safety. They gather tens of thousands of people, for most likely a considerable time. NGO’s then intervene and provide assistance, structuring the camp and its inhabitants (Agier, 2002). He observed how a transformation takes place ‘of the initially empty spaces where the camps are constructed; the camps gradually become the sites of an enduring organization of space, social life and system of power that exists nowhere else.’ (Agier, 2002, p. 322). What starts as a simple adaptation to the camp life, eventually leads to the transformation of the physical structure of the camp. As previously mentioned, Agier determined this transformation process to start immediately after the camp’s establishment (Agier, 2002; Misselwitz, 2009). Michel Agier would go on to differentiate three different signs of a new urban context among the displaced refugees in Dadaab, or as he calls it ‘three sketches of a probable form of urban life’ (Agier, 2002, p. 324):

- The symbolic of space refers to the fact that multiple anonymous spaces were named by the inhabitants as a means to ‘make it their own’. Agier gives the example of Hagadera camp where the market area at the entrance of the camp has become ‘the town’ or magalo in Somali. Here the refugees gather to trade food rations, drink coffee or use electronic devices in one of the many shops. Similarly, the most used street of the camp has been named ‘main street’ with another important road being dubbed ‘highway’ (Agier, 2002). This process is linked to the theory of humans forming a natural connection with the place they inhabit. A sense of place contributes to a person’s identity and this emotional link is used as part of a complex process for humans to define themselves. The refugees make the camp their own, their albeit for now ‘home’ (Convery, Corsane, Davis, 2014). Agier cites Michel De Certeau’s ‘inventions of everyday life’ which marks the resistance of citizens to the existence of non-places and the anonymity of urban space (Agier, 2002; De Certeau & Mayol, 1980). This aspect is very similar to Jane Jacobs’ phrase ‘eyes on the street’ where she praised the unplanned, inefficient state of her own neighbourhood whose wealth in activity contrasted with the ‘mild boredom of order’. She emphasised that the production of space was the embodiment of power, creating a sense of belonging and community for the inhabitants (Page & Mennel, 2017; Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Similar events were remarked by Herz (2013) in the camps for the Sahrawi nomads at the border of Algeria with the Western Sahara where some shelters were completely decorated with frescos on the inside. Others were enriched with symbols above the entrance, the imagery reminiscent of their cultural traditions. These refugees had put a part of themselves into their surroundings (Herz, 2013).

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- Social differentiation is the class difference that comes to exist as a result of the ability to self-provide within the camps. The Dadaab camps have no official market area in the camp but some small-scale businesses are tolerated: small market stands for the (re)sale of food rations, vegetables and craft items can be found on most street corners. These stands are encouraged by the international NGO’s, as they occupy the population and provide social and educational benefits. Other agencies even employ some refugees as workers and provide small salaries. With the option to earn money, social differentiation sets in within the camp. This resulted in Agier differentiating 4 social classes in the Dadaab camps: from basic recipients of minimum aid to respected ‘notables’ as top traders (Agier, 2002). The ability to trade gives hope for the development of a future market town which could provide the refugees when the humanitarian aid would cease (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).

- Identity change is the idea that camps can create identity, both ethnic and non-ethnic. ‘From this point of view, camps are just as relational and dynamic an experiment on and with identity as that which marks the fate of refugees who are not ‘processed’ by humanitarian agencies but self-settled on the edges of urban centres’ (Agier, 2002, p. 333). Agier further differentiates some nuances on how camps can create identity: ‘the bricolage of new identities’ indicates how multiple communities get together for the first time due to the new camp setting, creating a new collective entity. ‘(…) in the Sudanese refugee block stands another place of worship also built as a large mud house. It belongs to a quite new ‘United Church of Christ’, invented by the refugees a few years ago. It brings together followers of the Anglican, Pentecostal and Orthodox churches and of the African Inland Church, who, separately, were not sufficiently numerous to constitute a church. This pragmatic accommodation to constraints of space and number leads to a coming together and, at the very least, the formation of a new religious label’ (Agier, 2002, p. 333). While it is policy for the UNHCR to divide the camp according to ethnicity, communal areas such as the health centre or the well result in interaction between ethnicities that normally would be unthinkable (Agier, 2002). Agier’s second nuance is ‘the strengthened particularisms’ where traditional ethnic dominions get challenged in the camp society. Agier recalls the fate of non-Somali immigrants in Dadaab, known as the Bantuus, who are treated as outcasts by the Somali population. ‘(…) on the ethnic chessboard of the camp as a whole, they have gradually achieved autonomous recognition, as apparently separate from the Somali grouping. (…) The camp thus enables them to shed a devalued and devaluing intra- ethnic position.’ (Agier, 2002, p. 334). The inter-ethnic exchanges have led the immigrants to contemplate their ancestry and try to repatriate to other countries, where their tribe originated from. Agier gives a second example of the Twa pygmy group who finally got some sort of official recognition among the Rwandan refugees in Congo. They have been able to form their own associations, what would have been impossible back in Rwanda (Agier, 2002).

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Throughout his works, Agier stresses the notion of victims with no voice slowly beginning to emancipate. The voice of the people is so powerful that it can upset traditional and restrictive power structures, eventually leading to more individual freedom and better gender equality. He marks this phenomenon as the birth process of a cosmopolitan city (Agier, 2008; Misselwitz, 2009). This rhetoric clashes of course with the traditional humanitarian thinking of refugees as helpless victims. ‘In emergency situations all that matters is victims, and victims, in humanitarian thinking, have no social or political affiliation, and thus no voice.’ (Agier, 2008, p. 64). Agier further emphasises the importance of this ‘voice-giving’ via politics and associations. ‘All these forms of initiative and speech make conceivable a transition from the camp to the city, in the sense of the polis as well as that of urban sociability.’ (Agier, 2008, p. 65). Ultimately for him, it comes down to a clash between the voiceless humanitarian victim and a person that socializes and brings life to public places. Agier is critical of the ‘order of emergency’ getting in the way of this ‘socialisation’ as it hinders the development of the city- camps (Agier, 2008; Misselwitz, 2009). In the end of his conclusion, Agier remarks that the camps he visited were close to urban but ‘not yet’. ‘Even when stabilized, the camp remains a stunted city-to-be-made, by definition naked. Why does it not manage to turn into a genuine space of urban sociability, an urbs, and from there to realize itself as a political space, a polis?’ (Agier, 2002, p. 337). He argues that camps are stuck in transition, being held back by the constant reminder of the chaos that was the reason for their existence. Humanitarians keep focussing on the emergency state and refuse to look beyond. Camps are hindered in their evolution by the stubborn refusal of this transformation by the agencies. Refugees remain ‘refugees’ due to camp politics, unable to become fully-grown citizens (Agier, 2002; Misselwitz, 2009). ‘(…) the camp-towns are neither completely closed nor completely open, refugees are neither completely dead as subject, nor completely alive.’ (Agier, 2008, p. 65).

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3.2.3. Urbanity according to Montclos & Kagwanja

Similar long-term research on urban behaviour was done in the Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps in northern Kenya by Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos and Peter Mwangi Kagwanja. These camps are the remnants of a previous wave of Ethiopian refugees during the early 1990’s. Nowadays, the camps are populated by refugees from Sudan and Somalia. The researchers observed how the camps came to emerge as urban centres in one of the most desolate areas of Kenya (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Yet, they argue that the camps are not isolated, as networks have developed (both local and international) that connect the camp with the surrounding agglomeration. ‘(…) the urbanization process at work in the refugee camps is not only a question of cultural change; it also involves integration to a broader urban network.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 212). Montclos and Kagwanja noted, similar to Agier, how the camps had transcended the state of basic emergency settlements. They conceptualized a parallel model of their own: the camp as a ‘virtual city’. ‘Their size, their population density, their layout, their concentration of infrastructures, their socio-occupational profile and the trading activities they have developed are evidence of urbanization.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 205). However, the growth of the camp and its longevity are dependent on a couple of factors. In their work, the researchers stress how crucial the relationship between the refugees and the indigenous population is. For Montclos and Kagwanja, this relationship is not of ethnic nature but relies more on a multi-beneficiary approach. While the arrival of a new refugee camp to a region is usually looked down on, the local population can most certainly benefit from the refugees’ presence. With the influx of large groups of refugees, an abundance of cheap food and goods become suddenly available to the local habitants. A symbiotic relationship can form where both locals and refugees can profit from the forced coexistence (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Whitaker, 2002). In an interview with Misselwitz (2009) Montclos describes how refugee camps can become enormous urbanised ‘virtual cities’ in rural areas. The camps attract the rural populations who seek to benefit from the infrastructure and services, provided to the refugees. This way, camps and nearby towns alike have experienced explosive populations growths (Misselwitz, 2009). ‘In the case of the Dadaab refugee compound in northern Kenya (consisting of the three camp areas of Ifo, Dgahelvy and Hagadera, currently home to 300,000 refugees), the local village population doubled to more than 10,000 who now live in more urbanised conditions.’ (Misselwitz, 2009, p. 87). The researchers address the importance of economic integration as this is key to self- reliance and eventual long-term existence of the camp. ‘(…) the development of a viable market town which could possibly support some refugees when the humanitarian aid stops.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 213). Good urban planning is here absolutely necessary in order to create an efficient camp that still allows enough room for further expansions. ‘After a certain period of time, refugees appear to be some sort of 'urban dwellers in the making' and camps to be a preliminary step towards urbanization.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 206). Additionally, humanitarian aid can only support the camp for so long. Economic possibilities and local integration with the urban network are needed to ensure a durable outcome. ‘Refugee camps can become market

65 towns and their urban style has obvious implications for humanitarian actors.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 219). Just like Agier, Montclos and Kagwanja also stress the importance of political will, as the host government can dictate movement and trade restrictions (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Furthermore, the researchers comment on the sociocultural changes a camp can induce. Refugee camps are responsible for mixing communities and cultures which, combined with some progressive programs from the NGO’s, can lead to upsetting of cultural living traditions. This is of course very similar to Agier’s identity change paradigm. ‘Like cities, the camps are responsible for mixing populations and genders. Looked at in these terms, Kakuma is the most cosmopolitan camp in Kenya.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 211). A shift was noted among the refugees’ occupation: former farmers were forced to take up jobs in other, more urban sectors. Traditional roles, that were in place for generations, are challenged for the first time inside the camp. While some refugees see this as a downfall of their society, positive evolutions have been noted towards more equality (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000; Turner, 1999). The camps also pioneer gender relations with specific programs focussed on educating girls. ‘The rule requiring boys and girls to eat together has encouraged the co-educational idea, in sharp contrast to traditional practice, particularly for the Sudanese in Kakuma.’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 211). Montclos and Kagwanja focus on the possibilities for the refugees, as they are believed to be the key to define urbanity (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000).

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3.2.4. Benefitting from a refugee camp

Refugee camps are generally perceived as a burden upon its host country, draining resources and requiring special services and infrastructure. While the downsides of a refugee camp are well documented, it can be interesting to look at potential benefits that come alongside the arrival of a camp. For Montclos and Kagwanja, a symbiotic relation between the camp and local town dwellers was key to successful long-term existence (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Local communities have a chance to flourish, economies can grow exponentially and a possible strengthened society can emerge. In general, there are two ways that native habitants can profit from a refugee crisis: from the international assistance that flows down or from the refugee population themselves (Jacobsen, 2002). Examples from Uganda and Tanzania will be discussed, as the effects on these regions are documented best. It’s important to note that not all locals benefit equally from a refugee camp. Multiple studies have shown how the difference in income defines opportunities for locals. People with meaningful funds have ample opportunities to capitalize on new economic endeavours. Meanwhile, the lowest income citizens come in direct competition with the refugees on the labour market, but cannot use the social safety net of a camp. Refugees receive free nutrition from organisations, making them able pick up jobs at very low wages, of which locals are not capable of competing with (Kreibaum, 2016; Whitaker, 2002). The arrival of refugees in Uganda created a shift in job distribution, forcing locals out of traditional physical labour jobs such as agriculture (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). Therefore, it’s not uncommon for the most vulnerable citizens to pass themselves off as refugees in order to obtain assistance from relief organisations, or even go work for a refugee (Jacobsen, 2002). International assistance is normally provided to the refugees but often tends to dribble down onto the local population. Refugees can trade or sell their food and non-food aid items, which is sometimes their only way of gaining currency (Jacobsen, 2002). According to estimates by the World Food Programme (WFP), Tanzanian refugees traded three-quarters of their food rations. Vegetable oil, soy beans, flour, plastics and soap were traded in bulk by the refugees, making these items suddenly become available to locals at very low prices (Jacobsen, 2002; Whitaker, 2002). Trade networks were established that exported the sold food rations to nearby bigger towns (Landau, 2001). While local farmers previously had to travel long distances to reach suitable markets, the arrival of the refugees opened up opportunities for local distribution. Refugees turned to local famers to provide them with sought after delicacies, not included in UNHCR food aid. Due to the high demand, prices went up and the farmers who previously cultivated these crops enjoyed huge profit margins. Contrastingly, farmer who produced certain products, standard to the refugee assistance, saw their prices tank (Whitaker, 2002). Over the years, NGO’s have established programs that specifically focus host communities, in order to raise local perception of the camp and to offset the oftentimes heavy environmental load (Whitaker, 2002). An initial welcome response can turn bad quickly if the community perceives the refugees to be causing more problems than benefits (Jacobsen, 2002). Local communities are sometimes compensated for hosting the refugees by the construction of schools, clinics and water systems (Whitaker, 2002). It is estimated that 40% 67 of UNHCR assistance in Kibanda (Uganda) was directed at the areas surrounding the settlements (Kaiser, 2000). Jacobsen saw first-hand how Tanzanian official tried to bargain the establishment a new refugee camp, far from previous development in order to force the construction of new roads and a bridge (Jacobsen, 2002). Similar ‘state demands’ were reported by Herz (2008) in Chad and by Landau (2001) in Tanzania where the governments actively encouraged the UNHCR to build extra refugee camps in order to secure more humanitarian assistance and development projects (Herz, 2008; Landau, 2001). The UNHCR established environmental programs, upgraded roads and supported local development with the construction of more than 50 primary schools and 4 district hospitals in Tanzania (Jacobsen, 2002; Whitaker, 2002). Infrastructure that is built to better suit a camp (transportation and utility) also makes it easier for locals to reach camp services. In some cases, natives were allowed to utilize health services inside the camp. In Uganda, communities were likely to have access to primary schools run by NGO’s, thus increasing the general level of education. The infrastructure that was built could then continue to be used long after the disappearance of the refugee camp. (Kreibaum, 2016; Whitaker, 2002). The international relief effort also provides multiple job opportunities for the host population. NGO’s offer a wide variety of jobs including administrative staff, teaches, drivers, accountants and security personnel (Whitaker, 2002). For example, the UNHCR provided financial support for gear and training to the Tanzanian government in order to train security personnel, who would patrol the camp area (Jacobsen, 2002). Salaries were often way higher than similar positions in other regions, making these jobs very desired among locals. Of course, this had the negative side-effect of all qualified personnel leaving their jobs to work for an NGO. In response, local businesses had to increase their salaries in order to keep up their attractiveness (Whitaker, 2002). The other way local communities can benefit from the refugee crisis is from the presence of the refugees themselves. The refugee population provides cheap labour forces that can be utilised to strengthen the local economy. Refugees also bring with them specific knowledge, obtained in the homeland, that might be used to benefit the local society (Jacobsen, 2002). Research shows that the refugee influx in Tanzania had increased the likelihood of farming/livestock being the main economic activity of the locals. The increased supply of low- skilled labour forces was shown to benefit agriculture the most (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). The presence of the refugees means an increased demand for food, especially for products not provided by the agencies. The refugees expand the region’s capacity and productivity, allowing local farmers to intensify their efforts (Jacobsen, 2002; Whitaker, 2002). Jacobsen also points out how governments are forced to control the refugee problem, once it arises, in fear of it getting out of hand. This way, it causes governmental activity towards the border area, regions that are often contested by rebel groups in Africa, where its renewed activity strengthens its presence at the peripheries of its territory (Jacobsen, 2002). Of course, the impact of a refugee camp on an area varies due to multiple factors. In general, communities closer to the camp have more opportunities to take advantage of the trade markets opening up and labour forces becoming available. Simultaneously, they were also subjected to most of the negative consequences like environmental load and criminal

68 activity. Development for local endeavours is also strongly tied to the presence of the refugees. For example, border villages in Tanzania had to bear the load of the initial refugee influx while not being able to profit from business opportunities once the refugees were relocated more land-inwards to new settlements. The Tanzanian government rightfully feared that local investments would cease as soon the refugees would leave, and with them the agencies (Whitaker, 2002). Policies from the UNHCR and other agencies were directed at short-term ‘relief-only’ investments. They focussed on returning the refugees, instead of tackling the underlying problems that caused the crisis. This is further explained by the explicit divide between relief and development workgroups among agencies (Waters, 1999). Secondly, the ability of hosts to benefit from the refugee situation also strongly depends on their access to refugee markets and services inside the camp. Government policy can restrict or loosen the in-/outflow of refugees and resources. This confines interactions between refugees and locals to a rather small area around the camp perimeter. Refugees in Uganda used their newly obtained right to work, but only within commuting distance from the camp (Kreibaum, 2016). During 1994 and 1995, refugees were free to leave the Tanzanian camps and the economy bloomed accordingly. Refugees worked on farms in the area, and local citizens came frequently to the camp to conduct business and utilize camp services. From 1996 onward, the Tanzanian government diminished the free movement policy and installed passes in order to leave or enter the camp. Trading activity decreased drastically and the interaction between locals and refugees was cut off. Villagers protested that they were not able to sell their product on refugee markets and a lot of refugees were no longer able to work outside the camp (Whitaker, 2002). One interesting observation from the Kreibaum (2016) research on Uganda, is that people who live near the camp, on average, feel that they are worse off than before the refugee influx. Even though, objectively their welfare had increased across the board (Kreibaum, 2016). This is supported by similar findings from Kaiser (2000), Dryden-Peterson & Hovil (2004) and a general survey, conducted by the Ministry of Finance in Uganda. A likely explanation is how refugees are perceived by native residents. The Ugandans have expressed negative feelings from witnessing trucks filled with food enter the refugee camps. This perceived injustice more than likely offsets the self-assessment of the local population (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004). For this reason, the UNHCR stresses the importance to include local residents in the provided services, in order to avoid resentment and possible conflicts (Kreibaum, 2016).

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3.3. Instruments of further urbanisation

3.3.1. Economic possibilities

When disaster strikes, most refugees are forced to leave everything behind. They arrive at the camp, having no funds at their disposal. Their items of value got used as a bribe or get stolen during their flight. Large fees are often required for save passage, when using illegal human trafficking routes. The majority of refugees arrive, having only their skills and knowledge as a possible means of advancement (Jacobsen, 2005). As refugee situations become protracted, monetary support from donors is often reduced over time. Most donors have no interest in sustaining an endless cycle of food, shelter and healthcare (Loescher et al., 2008). With their assistance getting reduced, refugees are forced to search for alternative ways to provide for themselves and their families. The sale of food rations is a common solution across refugee camps to earn a little extra credit (Alloush, Taylor, Gupta, Valdes, & Gonzalez- Estrada, 2017; Jacobsen, 2005). Sometimes refugees are forced to look for clandestine options, as alternatives prove to be insufficient. Prostitution is unfortunately a common reoccurrence among the poorest refugees. Young boys may also be enticed to join militias or gangs, leading to all sorts of negative behaviour (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2014; Loescher et al., 2008). Trading goods in the market area is by far the most common practice to earn extra currency in the camp. Some camps have a designated market area, while in other camps informal retail stall appear on street corners or in public spaces (Jacobsen, 2005). Montclos and Kagwanja showed the importance of developing a strong market town in creating a self-sustaining urbanised camp. The established trade routes would provide the camp long after the emergency aid has ceased (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). The poorest refugees can choose to trade part of their food rations to receive a little bit of income. Food rations are widely sold around most camps, even though agencies try to implement rules to deter any sales. The downside of this practice is that it forces the refugees to stay in the camp as long as the food rations keep coming. (Agier, 2002; Dick, 2001; Jacobsen, 2005). A survey from 2016 in three Rwandan camps found that an astonishing high 89% of households sold part of their food rations. They sold on average one-fifth of their food portions. The amount differed per food item: one-quarter of all maize was sold, with only low amounts (2.5%) of beans. Interestingly, salt was not sold at all (Taylor et al., 2016). Other items that can be traded include clothes, household items and some of the materials they receive, used to upgrade their shelters. Others go outside the camp to gather wood, in order to sell on the market. The refugees sell these items and buy cheaper replacement products on the local market, gaining them a small profit (Jacobsen, 2005). Richer merchants often engage with people far beyond the camp, sometimes travelling from market to market to do business. Given the merchants’ origin, they might even be connected to the markets in the refugees’ home country. Big traders bring in desired goods and delicacies, that are otherwise unobtainable for the refugees (Werker, 2007). Herz (2008) observed how the refugees in Chad had a small market area, where refugees could sell vegetables that they grew in their little gardens, or clothes they made with tools provides by an NGO. Specialized stalls appeared, dealing in meat, electronics and music

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(Herz, 2008; Jacobsen, 2005). Montclos and Kagwanja noted a remarkable difference in trade between the communities in the protracted camps in Kakuma, Kenya. The Sudanese market appeared very basic, with only a few basic and local goods on display. Participation in the market was marginal and only served to compensate for lacking humanitarian assistance. On the contrary, the Ethiopian market was thriving with stalls specialized in specific stuff, like video hardware, coffee or locally brewed beer. The Ethiopian refugees came from an urban setting and appeared more willing to participate in business and work their way up through social progression. The market quickly adapted to these less-fortunate buyers by providing goods in smaller quantities, e.g. a single bag of tea or individual cigarettes (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Beside the established market often resides another layer of black-market trade, where items get traded that are not welcomed by the official agencies (Lindley, 2011). Refugee camps are considered excellent waypoints for illegal cross-border trade, as they are oftentimes in close proximity to border regions with security measures mostly lacking. Camps play a part in the growing ‘transborder shadow economies’, as described by Duffield (2014). The illegal trade routes have proven to be adaptable and resilient. Most of them deal in somewhat legal goods that are rationed or price-fixed in a certain region (Duffield, 2014). Those refugees who succeeded in gathering a small capital may start their own business. The refugees’ capital has proven to have a large impact on the scale of the economy that eventually will arise in the camp. Limited access to credit has shown to be detrimental in establishing refugee businesses (Alloush et al., 2017). The established money transfer bureaus like Western Union are immensely popular, as it allows the refugees to receive money from relatives abroad (Agier, 2002; Dick, 2001). With easy access to a cell phone, refugees are now connected more than ever with their family members across the globe (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). For some refugees, these regular money transfers are absolutely vital for maintaining their businesses (Jacobsen, 2005; Werker, 2007). Some agencies, like UNWRA, choose to promote credit programs to the refugees. They can take out loans at affordable rates in order to start their own business ventures (Al Husseini, 2010; Misselwitz, 2009). These services are unfortunately not available everywhere and exclude certain fractions of the refugee population (Misselwitz, 2009). Refugees might be drawn to local moneylenders and loan sharks instead, who profit from the refugees’ problem. One interesting community strategy is the use of Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCA) schemes in established camps across Africa, where a group of people pay a regular amount and the total money gets passed along to be used in business ventures. A decent income to begin with is required to join such groups (Alloush et al., 2017; Jacobsen, 2005). The demand for new services is always increasing around a camp. Some refugees might choose to open up small cafes, serving tea or coffee. Others drive people around the camp on motorised bikes or busses, as makeshift taxi services (Jacobsen, 2005). With the creation of the cell phone, telecommunication shops were all the hype around the camps. Refugees would come to these shops to make (inter)national phone calls at small fares. Over the years, more and more refugees got a cell phone of their own and these shops declined in popularity (Dick, 2001; Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). As the work environment in the camp gradually diversifies, it starts to resemble the modern complexity of an urban town. Educated refugees who can speak international languages are hired by the NGO’s to work as assistants or

71 teachers (Jacobsen, 2005; Lindley, 2011; Rempel, 2009). Other educated refugees might look to nearby cities or even other countries in search of job opportunities. They look for any job opening, going in direct competition with the local population (Dick, 2001; Rosenfeld, 2009). If they found work nearby the camp, they might opt to live inside the camp’s perimeter as this is almost always way cheaper (Dick, 2001; Jacobsen, 2005). The lesser-skilled refugees have little options besides becoming dayworkers, completing physical labour jobs for locals or even other refugees. This includes mostly jobs in agriculture and some in construction (Dick, 2001; Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2015). They might work the fields around the camp or work as contractors to build houses for newly arriving refugees, using the skills they were taught by NGO’s. These builders would provide the materials, sometimes even illegally making their own bricks in order to gain a small profit (Dick, 2001; Herz, 2013). In order to partake in sustainable economic activities, the refugees need continuous accessibility to resources, job opportunities and a viable market for their products (Jacobsen, 2005). This access may be limited due to restrictions, mostly stemming from the refugee policies of the state of asylum. Camps are often secluded, established in isolated, rural areas with low population numbers (Kok, 1989; Meyer, 2006). This creates extra costs for transportation, as the refugees will have to travel significant distances to reach local markets or find job opportunities outside the camp (Jacobsen, 2005; Werker, 2007). The long distances also form an extra barrier for merchants, resulting in less price competition for the refugees to profit from. The few who do come to all the way to the camp, then possess little information on current price rates on other markets. Lastly, isolated markets are less likely to specialize, which reduces overall productivity and purchasing power of the inhabitants (Werker, 2007). Kennedy (2004) emphasises the importance of location in relation to the available road infrastructure, saying that ‘economic integration through physical proximity to a local host community is probably one of the best insurances against possible friction’ (Kennedy, 2004, p. 25). Camps can become part of a trading network, creating jobs and business opportunities for the refugees (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Unfortunately, camps are traditionally located far away from the main routes, only connected via a single new road leading to the camp. This is very counterproductive, as roads are the camps’ only connection to the rest of the word, bringing in products, information and social contact. In contrast, regular villages are usually found right next to or on both sides of a road. Kennedy suggests constructing refugee camps next to or even surrounding main roads, as it allows for easier access, a stimulated economy and a better local integration (Kennedy, 2004). Camps are also regularly built in desolated areas, with little agricultural value, in order to not waste any valuable soil and upset local farmers (Jacobsen, 2005; Kok, 1989). Montclos and Kagwanja note about the camps in Kenya how ‘The government feared that the refugees might become settled in valuable areas of the country, especially in the highlands. Accordingly, the Kakuma and Dadaab camps were located in a semi-arid environment with a density of less than 0.05 inhabitants per hectare (…)’ (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 207). This makes it harder for the refugees to farm their own products and forces them to travel greater distances in search of viable land or become employed under local farmers (Ruiz & Vargas- Silva, 2015).

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39.

Kennedy’s proposed location improvement for future refugee camps Source: Kennedy (2004, p. 27)

Another important factor is the degree of freedom in which the refugees are allowed to leave the camp, in pursuit of business ventures (Jacobsen, 2005; Werker, 2007). Most host governments put restrictions on refugee movement due to fears of increased crime and instability among the local population (Alloush et al., 2017; Jacobsen, 1996). Some camps require a permit in order to leave the camp, which is often hard to obtain (Jacobsen, 2005; Werker, 2007). Although these restrictive measures are rising in popularity, they are difficult to enforce and rely on strong cooperation of local authorities. This leads to many refugees still being able to leave their camps, sometimes endorsed by local governments, as they themselves can heavily profit from the refugee presence. Still, some governments choose to come down hard on any refugee, caught outside the camp without proper permit, subjecting them to harsh punishments (Jacobsen, 1996; Jacobsen, 2005). The relationship between the host government and the refugee population will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Although the refugees might potentially end up in awful camp conditions, most of them will still actively engage with the host country’s economy. ‘Interactions with the host country result in a divergence of refugee households’ income from the assistance they receive.’ (Alloush et al., 2017, p. 1). Studying the economic impact of a refugee influx on a host country can be complicated, as these camps end up in low-populated areas and data on the before-state of the surrounding villages oftentimes does not exist. A wide range of factors that can have an economic impact have to be considered, some of them not refugee related, making it hard to quantify the exact effect of the refugee influx (Taylor et al., 2016). Some effects can be felt almost immediately after the refugees’ arrival like local markets getting flooded with an abundance of food or the sudden option of cheap labour forces (Jacobsen, 2002; Kok, 1989; Whitaker, 2002). A research group, combined of members of the WFP and a team from the University of California, examined the economic impact of three Rwandan camps on their surroundings towns in 2016. They found a significant difference on impact between the two camps who provide cash to the refugees and the one camp that offers material assistance. The cash assistance had a way higher influence, as it brought in lots of spillover currency to the region (Alloush et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2016).

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Economic spillovers occur as refugees purchase products outside the camp, injecting money in the local markets. One additional refugee increased the total income within a 10km radius with $205 and $253 respectively, significantly higher than $120 and $126 the refugees received from the agencies. The extra trade, caused by the refugee presence, raised local incomes and expenses, which in turn generated further economic stimulation. Trade between the local economy and the rest of the country increased by $49 and $55 per refugee per year. Refugees additionally impacted the region with the supply of labour, as approximately 6-7% of hired workers outside the camp were refugees. In contrast, the material assistance in the third camp had only increased the income in the surrounding area with $145 per refugee. This value is much lower than the cash-provision camps as the extra food supply from the agencies creates negative pressure on food prices. The impact on trade with the rest of Rwanda is also smaller, at $35 per year (Taylor et al., 2016). These results would suggest that shifting refugee assistance from material aid to monetary aid can yield positive economic benefits for the host country, as well as for the refugees themselves (Alloush et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2016).

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3.3.2. Integration and the host/refugee relation

At the time of the UNHCR’s establishment, local integration was seen as a viable solution to a refugee crisis. Host states would make efforts to facilitate refugees and streamline the assimilation and naturalisation process (Crisp, 2004). The UN Secretary-General at the time envisioned that: ‘The refugees will lead an independent life in the countries which have given them shelter. (…) They will be integrated in the economic system of the countries of asylum and will themselves provide for their own needs and those of their families.’ (Crisp, 2004, p. 3). Despite that, the camp typology still became the preferred refugee approach for a multitude of reasons (see 1.3. The camp as the best solution?). Nevertheless, that does not entail that integration is no longer an important factor. Refugees can interact with citizens from nearby towns or villages, leading to possible new job opportunities, social connections and identity changes. Although by definition, integration on a camp scale seems contradicting at first. Refugees are often grouped into camps for the exact reason of dissuading interaction with the local population (Andrews, 2003; Schmidt, 2003). Prolonged conflicts keep the refugees in a static state, unable to return home or resettle in a new location (Banki, 2004). Successful integration can offer up chances for human development as a temporary solution to protracted refugee situations. Harrell-Bond (1986) defines successful integration in the refugee context as ‘a situation in which host and refugee communities are able to co-exist, sharing the same resources - both economic and social - with no greater mutual conflict than that which exists within the host community’ (Harrell-Bond, 1986, p. 7). At the same time, she also recognizes the pitfalls of this definition: unequal access to resources, exploitation and increased violence due to the refugee influx will likely disturb this balance, favouring one community (Harrell-Bond, 1986). Another author, Tom Kuhlman (1991), later expanded on this definition, adding his own terms. The most important points include: - The socio-cultural change they undergo still permits them to maintain their own identity and allows them to adjust psychologically to their new situation. - Refugees are able to participate in the host economy, using skills that are in line with their cultural values. - If the standard of living and economic opportunities for the host community have not deteriorated due to the refugee influx. - Friction and discrimination between the host and refugee communities is not worse than before the refugees’ arrival (Kuhlman, 1991). Both authors stress the importance of both economic and social factors in their definition of successful refugee integration. This will be reiterated through multiple examples in this chapter. To ensure better integration, it is important to acknowledge that integration starts the moment of the refugees’ arrival and only potentially ends years after the fact (Pressé & Thomson, 2007). Ager and Strang (2008) proposed a conceptual framework to describe the integration of a refugee population. They defined ‘Rights and Citizenship’ as the foundational necessities of successful integration (Ager & Strang, 2008). ‘Notions of nationhood, citizenship and rights will vary across settings, but in all cases such ideas are fundamental to

75 understanding the principles and practice of integration in that situation’ (Ager & Strang, 2008, p. 176). Equal rights were seen as necessary for the refugees in order to obtain the necessary respect from locals (Ager & Strang, 2008). Many countries have rules in place to acquire citizenship, demanding the refugees to fulfil certain requirements in order to qualify. Usually this process takes quite a while to complete, as nations are generally cautious of seemingly generous procedures attracting an additional large number of refugees (Smith, 2004; Strang & Ager, 2010). Mulvey (2010) notes how refugees are often judged on their ‘otherness’ in relation to the native population. The goal of the citizenship requirements is to familiarize the refugee with the aspects of the local population they define to be distinct about them, which are considered to be unfamiliar to the foreign refugee. This ‘us versus them’ is very prominent in the legal discourse of many modern states (Mulvey, 2010). To define refugees as ‘other’ immediately identifies them as the problem (Lomba, 2010; Mulvey, 2010; Strang & Ager, 2010). Mulvey describes the perceived ‘degrees of unwantedness’, in which educated and skilled refugees are welcomed more and transitioned quicker than regular labour workers or farmers. Disparities are easier overlooked when it seemingly benefits the host state (Mulvey, 2010). Ager and Strang go on to define two types of barriers against integration: language and cultural knowledge; and safety and security. The first barrier relates to the obvious differences between the refugees and the native population. Refugees often come from different backgrounds than the locals and adjusting to an entirely different culture can be a difficult task. Actively trying to learn about language and culture can be perceived as taking initiative, granting positive feedback from the native population (Ager & Strang, 2008). Social similarities with the host community, through ethnic connections or shared linguistics, will create easier communication and increase the chance of successful integration (Banki, 2004). A case study on the Liberian refugees in Ghana by Porter et al. (2008) stressed the importance of language and cultural knowledge. The older generations of refugees, who were the first to come to the country, are more than capable in the local language (Twi), which allows them to participate and work among the local communities. Most of the older women also dress like the natives, which helps them intermingle with the locals in the market areas. They adopted a new identity as a form of economic survival in the new country. Contrastingly, the latest generation of refugees has shown little interest in learning the language or values of the Ghanaian people. They would much rather learn English and associate with the American culture. The younger people appear to protest any Ghanaian influence, in an effort to retain their Liberian identity in anticipation of going to their dream destination: America. This has caused a rift between the locals and the young refugees, who seem to be confined to the camp area as they are unable communicate with people outside the camp (Porter et al., 2008). Dick (2002) concludes how the Liberian youth seem to prefer the camp as an enclave, rather than fully integrated in Ghana (Dick, 2002). This negative attitude seems to stem from the refusal of the possibility of long-term stay in Ghana, and a recognition of their expectance of going to the United States (Porter et al., 2008). This example also shows how the beliefs and expectations about the temporariness of the refugees’ stay can affect integration. While some refugees will try to maintain their national identity and revoke any efforts to integrate, others will try to settle and create new lives among the locals (Bakewell, 2000; Jacobsen,

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2001). Time is clearly an important factor, as the arrival time and duration of stay will influence the reception of refugees. Over long periods of time, many refugees can become unofficial members of the local community, taking part in the economy and cultural activities. Meanwhile, newer refugees will not enjoy these same privileges (Banki, 2004). There is also generally a fear among older, established refugees of new refugee influxes, causing them more problems (Jacobsen, 2001). As was the case in Ghana, where a lot of older Liberians were distraught with the way younger Liberians interacted with their Ghanaian hosts. This negative impact on the camp was felt in the markets where over time, Liberians were charged more under suspicion of receiving free money from the international agencies (Porter et al., 2008). The second barrier of Ager and Strang’s integration framework is ‘Safety and Security’. Both for the refugees and the locals, a feeling a safety is considered important for successful integration. An area is often well regarded when it is considered ‘safe’. This does not just entail actual violence, but also verbal abuse and the overall appearance of the area (Ager & Strang, 2008). This also calls on refugee perception: if incoming refugees are perceived as rebels and criminals, native habitants will be reluctant towards integration and demand strict separation. Governments are then more likely to oppose local settlements, and instead opt for secluded refugee camps (Banki, 2004; Jacobsen, 2001). A study on refugees’ experiences of certain neighbourhoods in the UK revealed that in those areas where the native residents were unfriendly, the refugees grew increasingly isolated. This in turn affected their ability to speak the local language (Spicer, 2008). Strang and Ager (2010) note how some refugees make conscious efforts to avoid trouble and come across as friendly by simply saying ‘hello’ when passing people in the streets (Strang & Ager, 2010).

40. A conceptual framework for integration Source: Ager & Strang (2008, p. 170)

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While the UNHCR generally focuses on long-term solutions to end a refugee crisis, the scholar Susan Banki (2004) calls for ‘integration in the intermediate term’. It refers to the ability of the refugee to participate in the economic and communal life of the host community with relative freedom, while not necessarily having access to political rights such as voting. Complete integration is often a long and difficult process, hindered by a mostly opposing host government. So, focussing instead on certain rights in the near future would give refugees the tools to lead a meaningful life (Banki, 2004; Misselwitz, 2009). Integration in the intermediate term strives to provide the refugees with the means to participate in the local economy, putting them on the path towards self-sufficiency. In order to achieve this, the refugees cannot be restricted in their movements and should be allowed to travel around in search of opportunities. Additionally, they should be allowed to interact and trade with local businesses once commerce options are established. Banki’s approach of integration on the intermediate term would offer a realistic solution for thousands of refugees who feel stuck in protracted refugee situations. The refugees would be able to partially sustain themselves without relying entirely on external aid (Banki, 2004). The integration framework differentiates three ‘indicators of social integration’, which applies Putnams (2001) theory about the possible forms of social interaction: social bonds (with family and other co-ethnic groups), social links (with the state) and social bridges (with other communities). All of these connections are important for the refugees on a personal level but also form a priority to ensure a successful integration (Strang & Ager, 2010). Family is considered a crucial starting point, as it is often the sole remanence of the refugee’s previous life. A field study on the refugees in Germany in 2008 found that refugees, who possessed a better legal status than their relatives, would often voluntarily move to lower quality accommodations in order to be together with their family members. Family was here considered the highest priority for many refugees (Losi & Strang, 2008; Misselwitz, 2009). People prefer to be close to other people who share the same values and cultural practices. This connection plays a large part in letting refugees feel settled (Ager & Strang, 2008; Hale, 1993). Secondly, social links refer to the connection between refugees and the governmental services. When new refugees are housed in a region with an established refugee presence, they will have an easier time accessing services, as the government has experience with their specific needs, e.g. providing assistance in the refugees’ language or setting up refugee workgroups (Ager & Strang, 2008). In order to build ‘bridges’ between different groups, opportunities need to exist where they can meet and exchange ideas. This refers back to the ‘us versus them’ mentality, described by Mulvey (2010). In the case of protracted refugee situations, this takes place in the marketplace, around the local shops, in the schools, … (Strang & Ager, 2010). Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2004) analysed integration in Uganda through two mechanisms, commerce and education. Firstly, economic ventures are an ideal way to promote self- reliance and integration at the same time. Special settlements were created where refugees could farm their own products, which were later sold on local markets. Instead of dependency on international aid, the refugees were engaged in economic activities far beyond their district. Some local governments soon realised the potential benefits for local revenue and endorsed these activities. (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004; Kreibaum, 2016). Secondly,

78 refugee children were integrated into local primary and secondary schools. The schools would receive extra funding for hosting refugees, as an incentive for inclusion. The researchers describe how the shared education created an equal sense of belonging. All children were schooled in mixed groups, creating a unified front. While their heritage was certainly not forgotten (different national flags were present in front of the school), all children strived to work towards a ‘better Uganda’. The stable environment and the extra attention for qualitative education benefitted both the refugee and the native children (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004). However, some governments might try to prevent intermingling of refugees and locals by installing movement restrictions or creating separate facilities for both groups (Crisp & Jacobsen, 1998; Werker, 2007). Circumstances in the host country will of course vary, for instance in population size, ethnic relations, distance between the camp and its surroundings. Integration into densely populated areas is less advantageous, both for the refugees and the locals, as this will most likely lead to resource struggles and movement restrictions (Black & Sessay, 1997). Ideally, a controlled number of refugees is integrated in a low-populated area where their presence creates an influx of money and development to the region. In this scenario, both the refugees and the native habitants can profit. To improve chances of acceptance from the locals, refugees are preferably linked through ethnic bonds or past refugee experiences (Andrews, 2003; Dick, 2002; Pressé & Thomson, 2007). Large camps are best avoided as their impact on the surrounding area is mostly negative due to heavy environmental loads and the general nuisance of large gatherings (Harrell-Bond, 2000; Jacobsen, 2002; Kennedy, 2004). When the size of a refugee population continually increases over time, host communities will feel overwhelmed and fearful of their resources. This will cause increased refugee aversion and threatens host/refugee relations (Banki, 2004). ‘The greatest successes in refugee reception are where the refugees are ethnically related to members of the host country population, are allies in a political struggle transcending ethnic allegiance, and/or where the host country has inclusive, growth-oriented economic policies.’ (Smith, 2004, p. 54). Still, Montclos and Kagwanja observed how camps can be part of a broader urban network. In Kenya, the establishment of refugee camps on major trade routes has stimulated road transport and linked the camp to the rest of the country. Minibuses, named matabu, drive between the camps and adjacent towns, allowing the refugees the freedom to move around the area (Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000). Similar bus services are present in the camps for the Sahrawi people, at the border of Algeria and the Western Sahara (Herz, 2013). Tania Kaiser (2001) raises attention to the issue of host/refugee relations, as she described how little recognition was given to the host population around the Gueckedou region in Guinea. Resentment quickly grew as locals were seemingly continuously penalized at the advantage of the refugee population (Kaiser, 2001). ‘Given the length of time that UNHCR has been operating around Gueckedou, little attention has been paid to the host population in this refugee affected area. Some of UNHCR’s partners feel that there should be a more balanced response to both refugees and hosts’ (Kaiser, 2001, p. 26). Resentment of refugees for apparent preferential treatment can quickly turn into violence, as was the case in Guinea. Refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone had settled in the country throughout the 1990’s, escaping the civil wars in their home nations. In these early years, many participated

79 peacefully in local economies, befriending locals. With the arrival of NGO’s, refugees were categorized as a separate community from native people, receiving assistance while the (often very poor) locals did not (Lawrie & Van Damme, 2003). Disparities in wealth quickly became apparent and anti-refugee resentment cultivated in violent outbreaks in early 2001. The host government did nothing as the refugees were considered an ideal scapegoat for the failing Guinean economy. Angry mobs attacked refugee settlements, resulting in murder and rape of refugees all around the country. Refugees’ belongings were stolen at the hand of civilians and government forces alike. Tens of thousands fled from the violence, back to their home countries that were still plagued by instability (Lawrie & Van Damme, 2003; Onoma, 2013). The case of Guinea shows how the initial refugee assistance created negative consequences for the refugees’ safety. International agencies are now more aware of this issue and promote programs that focus specifically on local development by constructing infrastructure, schools and clinics, specifically for the local citizens (Jacobsen, 2002; Whitaker, 2002). A second important lesson was the necessity of good refugee perception among the local population. While labelling refugees as ‘a burden’ might attract more international support, it can also result in blame being wrongly appointed to the refugees. The UNHCR has since then, created campaigns for host nations that focus on tolerance and sympathy, and explain potential benefits from hosting refugees (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004; Lawrie & Van Damme, 2003).

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3.3.3. Refugee policies

The refugee problem often spills across international borders. Many people get driven out of their home country by armed conflict, natural disasters, economic collapse or other reasons. When refugees arrive in a new country, they fall under the shared jurisdiction of both the host state and the UNHCR. Both parties try to obtain their own goals, which sometimes leads to conflicting rulesets for the refugees. Napier-Moore (2005) describes an entrenched relation triangle between the UNHCR, state governments and the refugees. Both the Agency and the host state battle each other over responsibility, resources and refugee restrictions, leading to reoccurring refugee dynamics (Napier-Moore, 2005). The UNHCR wants to pressure local governments into cooperation, positive refugee treatments and on-site supervision while they take on the role of international negotiator and supplier (Harrell-Bond, 1986, Napier-Moore, 2005). How a host country reacts to a sudden massive influx of people will vary. Some governments respond with kindness and compassion, harbouring their fleeing neighbours and providing assistance. Others will try to prevent refugees from entering and instil heavy restrictions on those inside their borders (Jacobsen, 1996; Napier-Moore, 2005). The resulting refugee policies will determine the location of the camp and the degrees of freedom which the refugees can experience. Policy makers might opt to implement movement restrictions via checkpoints requiring special permits or armed guards around the camp. Additionally, they might not grant the refugees an official status, which makes it harder for them to request legal assistance, travel across borders and acquire citizenship (Jacobsen, 1996). All these policies will severely restrict job opportunities and integration for the refugees. A positive refugee policy will allow for more freedom and refugee development, which in turn can also benefit the state. To better understand policy makings, Karen Jacobsen (1996) differentiated a couple factors that affect the refugee policy of a host government:

- Previous bureaucratic choices. Prior legal decisions about refugee responsibility affects the refugee policy once a new refugee crisis arises. Countries with dedicated refugee institutions, using social workers or some equivalent, are more likely to treat refugees fairly. In contrast, countries who do not possess such agencies, for example the militaristic nations of Thailand or Myanmar, will view the refugee situation from a military standpoint and treat the refugees more like a security threat (Jacobsen, 1996).

- International relations. Refugee policy is one of the few domestic policies that transcends borders. On one hand, the relationship between the sending country and the host country can result in adjusted refugee policies. Governments might treat refugees better or worse if the sending country is an ally or not. Some will try to leverage the refugee situation by negotiating unfavourable deals, or extending their territorial control across borders (Almond, 1989; Jacobsen, 1996). On the other hand, international donors and NGO’s offer financial and organisational help to the host country in exchange for humane and favourable refugee policies. The threat of bad publicity is often a good deterrent for smaller host nations, looking to get in favour with the more powerful countries (Gordenker, 1987). Their relationship is not always 81

smooth as both parties might be pursuing different goals simultaneously. Resentment might lead to government officials might be let out of decisions, or visas of agency workers being rejected (Jacobsen, 1996). Of course, both parties might not hold the same power. Pressure from big nations can persuade small host countries to pursue alternatives refugee policies (Misselwitz, 2009). ‘When a tight-fisted international community says to a very poor country it will provide help for refugees in camps… this evidently encourages that poor country to root out refugees who are integrated and plonk them into camps. It is probably no exaggeration to claim that without any new refugee outflows, the old donor approach might actually lead to growing refugee camp populations in many countries.’ (Smith, 2004, p. 48).

- The local absorption capacity. This is defined as the extent to which a host country is able and willing to take in refugees. The structural ability is determined by factors such as land availability, infrastructure and employment possibilities. High economic capacity allows the local communities to better withstand the resource demands of the refugee influx. The willingness to allocate refugees is influenced by the local culture, kinship, past experiences and general beliefs about refugees. For example, Arab countries continue to accept refugees due to traditions of hospitality in Muslim communities. A shared ethnic affinity and possible shared language positively influence acceptance of refugees (Jacobsen, 1996; Misselwitz, 2009). Similarly, lots of border tribes in Africa and Asia have a history of refugee situations and can be more willing to lend help, especially if they were on the receiving end of that aid in the past (Jacobsen, 1996). Economic capacity and social receptiveness are both dynamic processes, prone to change over time. Attitude and beliefs might change if the local community feels that they have to endure way more costs than benefits. It’s possible that that the community may come to resent the refugees due to prolonged strains on local resources or a perceived injustice with the refugees gaining free access to food, education and health facilities (Jacobsen, 1996; Lawrie & Van Damme, 2003; Milner & Loescher, 2011).

- Security considerations. The influx of large groups of refugees can feel threatening in different ways. Host states are wary of guerrilla fighters hiding among the fleeing refugees, bringing the armed conflict into the host country. Additionally, the strain on local resources and a potential ethnic unbalance might lead to civil unrest and displeasure with the government which weakens its position. Choosing to group refugees into camps makes it easier to control and monitor them (Jacobsen, 1996; Mogire & Mogire, 2011). Further along the refugee influx, the eventual decline in international support might entice some refugees to turn to illicit survival strategies such as banditry, prostitution or gambling, leading to more security concerns (Milner & Loescher, 2011).

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- Perceived sovereignty of the host state. Many countries in Africa have had their sovereignty and strength questioned after their independence when they faced enormous economic and developmental challenges, which limited their state capacity (Jackson, 1993; Mogire & Mogire, 2011). A large refugee influx may threaten their strength once again, as they struggle to cope with the large logistical demands and controlling the now weakened border region. This can create a sense of dependency again, as governments seek international assistance to deal with the refugee crisis. Some host states will then try to shift responsibility for the refugee crisis, as a means of upholding their sovereignty (Jacobsen, 1996; Milner & Loescher, 2011).

All these factors will influence the host state’s decision-making on some level. The weight of the factors varies for each situation, depending on the local context and the level of power of each of the actors involved (Jacobsen, 1996). The troubled relation between agencies and host nations further increase the problem of protracted refugee situations, as decisive actions are often delayed or opposed (Napier-Moore, 2005). In practice, there are basically no repercussions for states who fail to fulfil their obligations towards refugee assistance. Other than protesting the inhumane conditions, the UNHCR is limited in its approach as it wants to keep the host government’s favour in order to continue its refugee assistance. More severe punishments risk the host state banning all international agencies from its territory and denying further aid to the refugee camps, leaving the refugees even worse off than before. While it also has to bear the greatest burden of a refugee crisis, the host state frequently finds itself in a position of power, once the negotiations start. The UNHCR’s hand are often tied, as it is forced to give in to demands, if it wants to ensure the best realistic assistance to the refugees (Jacobsen, 2002; Napier-Moore, 2005). This realisation makes Harrell-Bond (1986) question if the UNHCR is truly capable of fully carrying out its mandate, especially on the territory of certain governments, who are considered big donors to the organisation. She finds their lack of sanctioning host governments, who signed the UNHCR protocols, a troubling sign, as all refugees are dependent on this one organisation (Harrell-Bond, 1986).

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3.3.4. Refugee identity

Over time, refugees will come to reflect upon their presence in the camp, questioning their sudden refugee status and their new life inside a camp. Most will try to make sense of this foreign place by embracing an identity. While some will hold on to their old identity, others will create a new one (Krulfeld, 1994; Rajaram, 2002). This refugee identity fills the gap between having legal citizenship and the refugee status and considers the refugee’s place in his new environment. Understanding how refugee identity is created is key to better comprehend the social interactions of a refugee community. It affects the coherence among the refugee society and will influence the host/refugee relationship. Additionally, it will determine the amount of effort that is required from the camp management to instil interaction and cooperation from the refugees (Krulfeld, 1994). How refugees create an identity can vary greatly, depending on the context. Firstly, refugees might gradually undergo a complete identity change. In doing this, they will assimilate parts of the local culture to create a combination of old and new values. This is mostly the case for protracted refugee situations where the refugees have spent considerable amounts of time among the local population and slowly began to assimilate some of their values and lifestyles (Krulfeld, 1994; Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind, & Vedder, 2001). This was evident in the example of the Liberian integration in Ghana, where refugee children were incorporated in local schools and taught traditional Ghanaian values. The children who grew up in these conditions felt both a connection to their home country of Liberia and their new home of Ghana (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004). Especially for the youth, who have known nothing else but refugee life, it is often easier to accept a new identity configuration (Krulfeld, 1994). Yet, the refugees’ desire to become part of the local society will be influenced by any discrimination or isolation they encounter. Becoming bicultural is a slow process, that requires effort and goodwill from both the refugees and native habitants to succeed. It strongly hinges on a good relation between both groups and will be influenced by different refugee policies (Phinney et al., 2001). Other times, refugees might reject any involvement with the camp life and desperately cling to their old livelihoods, in an attempt to deny their refugee existence. They still see themselves as regular citizens, who are just temporary displaced from their homes. The camp is but an inconvenience, until they can return to their previous lives (Krulfeld, 1994; Phinney et al., 2001). These refugees will often be fearful of long-term investments in the camp, as this is perceived as validation of the camp as a permanent habitation and an acceptance of their refugee status (Al Husseini, 2010; Herz, 2013). In the early years of UNWRA’s mandate, participation in different development programs was very low, as the refugees felt the Agency should instead focus on honouring their right to return. The refugees feared a political agenda that secretly wanted to bury their possible return through programs that focussed on improving their refugee lives (Al Husseini, 2010; Misselwitz & Hanafi, 2009). Eventually, this situation calmed down around the year 2000, when a general consensus was reached that improving the living conditions in Palestine would not relinquish their right to return (Takkenberg, 2009). Herz (2013) noted a general disapprovement among the Sahrawi people of other refugees who made improvements to their shelters that resembled any form of

84 permanence (replacing their shelter with a concrete house or richly decorating the housing units). The Sahrawi people try to hold on dearly to their previous lives and are hostile towards any attitude that resembles settling in the camp life (Herz, 2013). The arrival of new refugee waves can raise existential questions among the older, established refugee population. Once confronted with fresh refugees, the older group will lose part of their refugee claim and accompanying identity (Krulfeld, 1994). ‘Faced with a group of newcomers that on one hand links them to their old country, but on the other hand heightens their awareness of the break they made, the older migration cohort reflects on their own transformation and attempts to give meaning to who they are and what they have become.’ (Krulfeld, 1994, p. 55). This will often result in negative attitudes towards newer refugees, even if originating from the same country (Dryden-Peterson & Hovil, 2004; Krulfeld, 1994). This identity is further influenced by outside actors, who get into contact with the refugees, influenced by a certain prejudice. There is a noticeably narrative present in modern refugee assistance, where refugees are considered to be voiceless victims of a great humanitarian tragedy (Hyndman, 2000, Malkki, 1995). Refugees often find themselves at the bottom of the hierarchy, subjected to rulesets in a foreign country with little say of their own (Napier- Moore, 2005). They are objectified as helpless beings, that need to be fed, healed and taken care of (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Hyndman, 2000, Malkki, 1995). This becomes blatantly clear throughout the depiction of refugees in the media. Pictures always show fragile women or starving children, exaggerating their helplessness. While their purpose is to evoke sympathy and gather more assistance, it simultaneously also reinforces the idea of refugee as suppressed victims (Malkki, 1995; Rajaram, 2002). Furthermore, refugees are always perceived as a group, rather than individuals. The focus lies on the struggles endured by a tribe or community, rather than the troubles of the individual. This narrative is still overly present in refugee agencies, leading to prejudice in policy making and refugee handling (Hyndman, 2000; Malkki, 1995; Rajaram, 2002). Harrell-Bond (1986) notes how this way of thinking creates a self-fulfilling prophecy. Refugees are thought to be dependant and lazy, so the agencies take full control and provide them, leading to a situation where the refugees have known nothing else but dependency (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Napier-Moore, 2005). In fact, it mostly benefits both the agencies and the host governments to keep refugees in a submissive state, undergoing the refugee process. This way, they are easier to control and policies can be implemented with little resistance (Napier-Moore, 2005). Malkki (1995) disputes this image of a helpless refugee by saying how the refugees have the agency to choose their own identity, whether they want to settle in predetermined refugee roles or reclaim power for themselves and make up their own authority (Malkki, 1995). The recent push for development programs has given refugees the chance to take back control over their lives (Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015). Similarly, Agier (2002) described how the ambivalence of camp life gives each refugee the chance of redefining their identity. Refugees get the chance to ‘start over’ through the camp context. Traditional viewpoints get challenged when confronted with a new way of living. Additionally, the congregation of multiple communities can lead to an interesting mixture of cultures (see 3.2.2 ‘Urbanity according to Agier’) (Agier, 2002).

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Part IV – Conclusion

As camps remain the preferred answer to a refugee influx, planners must be aware of the pitfalls this typology holds. Refugee camps can quickly turn into overcrowded and unhygienic agglomerations, as a result of lacking preparation and infrastructure. Planners and designers have historically tried to create harmonious communities, through modular building blocks. By doing so, they tend to overlook the bigger picture of overlaying structure, intercommunal interactions and local traditions. The excessive focus on universal solutions makes camp planning prone to contextual errors. Refugees can feel alienated by culturally different living conditions or day-to-day occupations. The success (or failure) of a refugee camp is a complicated process, depending on multiple factors: political will of the host country, camp policies, cultural context, economic possibilities, … Camp planning alone cannot solve these issues. The camp planner is limited in his impact on the camp’s inner workings. An interdisciplinary cooperation is required to tackle all of these aspects in a coordinated effort. The host government and the refugee agencies will challenge each other over responsibility and resulting refugee policies. Based on observations from Jacobsen (2005), Kennedy (2004) and Meyer (2006), it should be considered crucial that the refugee camp gets implemented in a favourable location, nearby an existing agglomeration. Most governments will try redirect the refugees to isolated areas, in an attempt to suppress the refugee problem or divert resources to this region. But this has shown to have detrimental consequences for the economic possibilities, integration and overall costs of the refugee camp. Securing a good location, that is connected with its surroundings through close proximity and decent road infrastructure, will offer a solid foundation for further camp development. Although refugee camps are meant as a temporary solution until a humanitarian outcome can be achieved, they have existed for increasingly longer periods of time in the last few decades. Protracted refugee situations have become the norm in current-day refugee assistance, due to conflicts dragging on for long periods of time and governments showing less interest in absorbing refugee masses. While camps have generally certain aspects of long-term planning incorporated, refugee policies are focussed on the primary humanitarian assistance. As a result, refugees get stuck in a state of limbo through continuous dependency on external aid and they are seemingly unable to move beyond the initial state of emergency. Despite all that, refugee camps have shown signs of informal urbanisation, transcending the tragic nature of a camp. Refugees start claiming their surroundings, adjusting it to their own preferences and traditions. Camps become meeting grounds for people from different backgrounds, assimilating cultures and evolving identities and world views. The camp can become a place of opportunity, allowing refugees to start over and work towards a future. The current refugee procedures focus mostly on two aspects: the initial assistance, when refugees are to be given shelter and healthcare; and the long-term solutions for a refugee crisis, through one of the durable solutions. Stimulating further urbanisation can be the ideal intermediate solution, filling the void between those two situations. Camps are ultimately still transitional entities and the best guarantee for a successful outcome is by stimulating refugee development. Camp urbanisation is a great tool for refugee growth, putting them on the path towards independence and self-sufficiency. 87

Ideally, a successful refugee approach should consist of the following phases:

1. Phase one would be the initial emergence assistance, where the refugees are protected and given aid. Families are reunited and communities get formed through careful camp planning. This phase consists of saving lives and returning to a stable living environment.

2. Secondly, the refugees should be offered a chance to regain some of their humanity through job opportunities and education. As a result, refugees feel empowered again, as they can provide for their families and develop new skills. Limited freedoms are granted to the refugees, in that they are allowed to leave the camp and interact with native citizens. Agencies should in this phase focus on removing barriers that hold refugees back from fulfilling their potential. This can all be achieved in the intermediate future with careful preparation and lobbying from the refugee agencies.

3. The third phase consists of widening possibilities for the refugees in the long-term. Refugees should get the chance to participate in the governance of the camp or establish their own enterprises through loans and skills they obtained in one of the development programs. The refugees can now fully choose which direction their lives will take and how they view themselves as members of the camp.

4. Lastly, the eventual end of the refugee crisis has arrived. The refugee population gets repatriated or integrated among the host. Preferable, there would be an element of choice involved for the refugees. Using the skillset they obtained over the years and thanks to their excellent education, the refugees are now more than ready to contribute as productive citizens in any potential newfound home.

Still, refugee care is plagued with unpredictable donors and budget cuts. Agencies will have to choose wisely on how to spend their funds. Decisions will have to be taken on what to prioritize. Supported by field research from Banki (2004) and Dryden-Peterson & Hovil (2004), the best options appear to be education and commerce. Both are excellent tools to stimulate refugee development and self-sufficiency. They can be beneficial even if the camp exists only for a short period of time, making them even an ideal investment early on. Additionally, both are also good ways to stimulate interaction between refugees and local habitants, who would otherwise maybe prefer to live separately. Seeing how all parties can mutually benefit from quality education and job opportunities, they are great tools to improve local integration and refugee perception in the short and intermediate term. If a refugee situation starts becoming protracted, interests should shift towards a participatory approach. This model allows for the determination of the exact needs of a refugee community, providing a greater sense of investment and local ownership. While certainly not without flaws, this approach does allow for the transition towards a self- governed camp-city. Additionally, it is a great method to allow for further informal transformations, as praised by Michel Agier. Appearing counterintuitive at first, it is possible to plan for these ‘unplanned interventions’ to appear in certain locations. Good spatial

88 planning allows for spaces that are flexible and adaptive to the changes on the ground. Using the input from the community, planners can determine expectations and needs for this unorganized complexity to appear. Secondly, the participation approach can overcome the final shortcoming of the camp-city typology, namely the camp not being a polis. Refugees would receive the right to co-govern over time, obtaining the privilege to self-determination. Participation should not stop with the refugees, but could also include neighbouring villages. Resentment can often grow over time, as the refugees are perceived to receive preferential treatment over the local habitants. Allowing locals to enjoy refugee services goes a long way towards a multi-beneficiary outcome, where everyone can profit from the advancements that came with the arrival of the camp. This way, the camp can become the centre point of urban development, transcending its tragic origin and be a symbol of humanitarian welfare.

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