THE JAPANESE ARMY IN MANCHURIA: COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE ROOTS OF KWANTUNG ARMY INSUBORDINATION Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Weland, James Edwin, 1935- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 24/09/2021 03:46:00 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/290442 INFORMATION TO USERS This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted. 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The University of Arizona, Ph.D., 1977 History, Asia Xerox University MicrofiSms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 THE JAPANESE ARMY IN MANCHURIA: COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE ROOTS OF KWANTUNG ARMY INSUBORDINATION by James Edwin Wei and A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 19 7 7 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by James Edwin We land entitled The Japanese Army in Manchuria: Covert Operations and the Roots of Kwantung Army Insubordination be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy W- & Dissertation Director Date As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read this dissertation and agree that it may be presented for final defense. yn il. f'rul&JZ**Jl f, /?7 r*>% s rtll MJU s . 10-7 J Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense thereof at the final oral examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable with­ out special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his judgment the proposed use of the ma­ terial is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author. SIGNED TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS vi ABSTRACT vii I. INTRODUCTION 1 Organizational Structure and Policy-Making: A Conceptual Framework 4 Routines and Programs 6 Information Systems 7 Adaptation Processes 7 Organizational Process in the Japanese Army as a Prelude to the Manchurian Incident 8 II. THE ARMY: GROWTH OF AN INSTITUTION 11 The Mission of the Army 12 Legitimacy and Social Acceptance 16 Tactical Doctrine 23 The Officer Corps 27 III. THE POLITICS OF MANCHURIA 31 Traditional Manchuria 31 Foreign Interests: The Russian Initiative 34 Foreign Interests: The Japanese Initiative 38 The Chinese Response 43 The Rise of Chang Tso-lin 46 The Entangling Web 53 IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND THE KWANTUNG ARMY 54 Military Intelligence and Manchuria 54 The Intelligence Problem 61 Japanese Military Intelligence 64 The Kwantung Arrny : 74 The General Staff 78 V. THE GROWTH OF A TRADITION OF CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS . .82 The First Manchurian Independence Movement 86 The Twenty One Demands 92 ii i iv TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page The Second Manchurian Independence Movement. ...96 Warlords 102 Clandestine Operations During the Siberian Expedition 104 Creation of the Kwantung Army 110 The Legacy 112 VI. MANCHURIA AND THE POLICY MUDDLE OF THE TWENTIES ... .114 The Washington Conference Agreements 114 Army Strategic Perspectives 118 The Problems of Manchuria 126 Attempts to Find a Solution 128 VII. THE BEGINNING OF INDEPENDENT ACTION: THE JAPANESE AND CHANG TSO-LIN 134 VIII. THE SEARCH FOR A NEW POLICY. 144 Formulation of the Policy: The Eastern Conference 148 The Policy in Action 155 The Policy Unravels 159 The Assassination of Chang Tso-lin 169 IX. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INSUBORDINATION 180 Alienation of the Officer Corps 182 Domestic Difficulties 182 The London Naval Treaty 187 The Mounting Crisis in Manchuria 190 Plans and Programs 202 In Army Headquarters 202 In the Kwantung Arny 213 The Independent Army 222 X. THE DUTIFUL INSUBORDINATES: SECOND DEPARTMENT AND KWANTUNG ARMY OFFICERS IN THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT . .224 Implementing the 1931 Estimate 224 The Crisis Erupts 238 Reasons for tha Plot's Success 248 V TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued Page XI. THE MAKING OF MANCHUKUO 251 Conscious Insubordination 254 Ingredients of an Independence Movement 259 Step One: Establishing Local Governments 263 Step Two: Establishing Independence 258 Step Three: Making of Manchukuo 270 XII. CONCLUSION.' . 276 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 283 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Operational Lines of Command of Special Service Organs. .57 2. Traditional Military Line-Staff Organization 72 3. General Staff Organization 73 vi. ABSTRACT It is a well-established fact that a cabal of mid-level army officers plotted and executed the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and en­ gineered the creation of Manchukuo. Why did some of the most promis­ ing of Japan's professional officers knowingly enter a conspiracy to disobey their military superiors, subvert the foreign policy of their country, and take this unauthorized direct action? This thesis argues that the immediate cause of their insubordination and the reasons for its success lay largely within the army itself. The army provided the motivation, the means, and the opportunity for these officers to act. To a considerable extent the Manchurian Incident resulted from the army's attempts to solve its major military problem. Lacking sig­ nificant heavy equipment, the army developed a tactical doctrine empha­ sizing rapid mobility, surprise and shock power on the attack. It depended for its success on highly-disciplined, well-trained men, and was designed to fight a short, sharp war, not a long war of attrition. From 1907 until the China Incident of 1937, every Japanese na­ tional defense plan named Russia as the army's most likely adversary. The operations plans called for the decisive battles to be fought in northern Manchuria. The success of the plans depended upon unhampered movement of the army through Manchuria and accurate information about the area. The Kwantung Army was responsible for keeping the lines of communication secure, while the Second Department of the General Staff— Intel!igence--was charged with providing the information. The Second vii vii i Department developed its own corps of "China Experts" versed in clan­ destine operations. The early structure of the Kwantung Governor Gen­ eralship involved the Kwantung Garrison in the execution of Japan's policy toward Manchuria. When political power in China became fragmented, the Second Department and Kwantung Army were the army's principal agencies for avoiding civil conflict in Manchuria that could interfere with Japa­ nese war plans. Between 1912 and 1930 the Second Department engaged in a series of attempts to either separate Manchuria from China or to support a stable Manchurian warlord regime friendly to Japan. The Kwantung Army on occasion used its military power to prevent the civil war from disrupting Manchurian stability. While these clandestine ac­ tivities were sanctioned by army headquarters and were carried out in pursuit of accepted army goals, the actual control of operations lay with Second Department and Kwantung Army officers. Both organizations developed traditions of and capabilities for independent political ac­ tion in Manchuria. These traditions became significant in the later nineteen twen­ ties when the increasing intensity of the Chinese civil war threatened to restrict the Japanese army's use of Manchuria.