HSBA HSBAFOR SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN Issue BriefAvailable in Arabic Small Arms Survey Number 27 April 2017 Remote-control breakdown Sudanese paramilitary forces and pro-government militias Introduction to insurgents. Yet paramilitaries have has had clear limitations, in particular not always proved to be either more since prominent militia leaders such Since the 1980s successive governments efficient militarily, or more loyal or as Musa Hilal have unambiguously in Khartoum have fought wars in the committed to the government. Indeed, declared that they have acted on gov- peripheries of Sudan by using irregu- in Darfur they have fought much more ernment orders and asked for their lar or paramilitary forces. These locally against civilians than insurgents, with status to be made increasingly official. recruited militias have increasingly the effect of turning whole communi- More recently, however, distancing become more prominent than the ties into recruits for and supporters of itself from the crimes committed by regular Sudan Armed Forces (SAF).1 what were initially very small rebel militias has seemed less important Over the years this strategy of using factions. The practice continues today: for Khartoum. National Umma Party militias—which has been described as the Armed Conflict Location and Event leader Sadiq al-Mahdi was arrested ‘counter-insurgency on the cheap’2— Data Project estimates that 46 per cent of in May 2014 after criticizing abuses has had several aims and advantages conflicts in Sudan in 2015 involved the committed by Rapid Support Forces for Khartoum, as well as obvious lim- targeting of civilians by ‘political mili- (RSF) commander Mohammed Hamdan itations. Initially, these militias’ ability tias’, especially pro-government ones.3 Dagolo ‘Hemmeti’. to feed themselves off the land and The ability to deny abuses has been This Issue Brief examines the his- reward themselves for their services part of Khartoum’s rationale for rely- tory of Sudan’s militia strategy and the with the booty they plundered may ing on militias. However, this approach role of militias in the country’s armed have appeared less costly to the gov- ernment than using the regular army. Yet over time they have proved to be increasingly expensive, with militia leaders demanding more and more financial and political rewards for their services. Furthermore, their ‘costs’ extend far beyond immediate financial expenditures. Militias have frequently changed their loyalties, sometimes fight- ing against and often antagonizing other paramilitary forces and govern- ment allies. Indeed, their abuses have at times proved to be counterproductive for Khartoum, leading to increased support and recruits for local insur- gent groups, and generally more pro- tracted conflicts. For many years government hard- liners have embraced the myth that militias are militarily more efficient than SAF. This stems from these poli- ticians’ lack of trust in SAF’s ability to win civil wars and in army units that appear either too distant politically from Khartoum or too ethnically close Musa Hilal (L.) salutes his followers upon arriving in Nyala, South Darfur on 7 December 2013. © AFP/Getty Images www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 1 conflicts, notably in Darfur and the militias originate in the government, after 1987, during the country’s second Two Areas of South Kordofan and local administrations, and peace brief ‘democratic’ period under Prime Blue Nile. It discusses the use of para- processes; sources of alternative Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi, when military forces and militias in Sudan income for militia members; guar- Khartoum mobilized murahilin (liter- from the 1980s until the present day, antees and incentives to disarm; ally ‘those of the livestock migratory including their alleged roles in resource and militia members’ engagement route’) to fight in Southern Sudan and exploitation. It then examines the long- in peacebuilding efforts. the Nuba Mountains. Combatants were term economic, political, and social in particular recruited among baggara costs of the militia strategy for the (cattle-herding) pastoralists from the Sudanese state and society. Finally, it Background to the use of Rizeigat and Missiriya Arab commu- discusses the implications of the mili- paramilitary forces and nities, both of whom lived in the areas tia strategy for any future security neighbouring Southern Sudan (the sector reform (SSR) process in Sudan, militias Missiriya also lived close to the Nuba noting that the maintenance of a para- Sudan’s militia war strategy pre-dates Mountains). As Southern rebels rap- military marketplace in Sudan is an the current government. Most current idly divided along ethnic lines, the impediment to peacebuilding there paramilitary forces have their roots in militia strategy was completed by the and in the wider region. Among others, Sudan’s second civil war, which began co-optation of Southern rebels and mili- its key findings are as follows: in 1983. They were used extensively tias, in particular from the Nuer tribe.4 Khartoum has increasingly relied on paramilitary forces and militias, in particular from the Arab tribes of Darfur and Kordofan, to fight successive wars in Sudan’s periph- eries. In spite of the high costs of its militias, the country’s economic crisis, and internal disagreements on the issue, Khartoum has continued to develop militias, most recently with the formation of the RSF in 2013. This militia strategy has come at a high price: militias have often attacked civilians rather than fought insurgent forces, attacked regular forces and government allies, and committed abuses, thus contribut- ing to protracted armed conflicts. Allegations that natural resources such as gold and ivory are fund- ing Sudanese militias appear to be largely unfounded. The available evidence suggests that core govern- ment paramilitary forces remain highly dependent on government funding. Sudanese militias include members with cross-border identities in neigh- bouring countries who have fought in Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, and South Sudan. With or without Khartoum’s consent, Sudanese militias’ willingness to fight in neighbouring countries risks contributing to further regional instability. Any future SSR efforts will need to ensure political representation RSF commaner Mohamed Hamdan speaks to the press in Omdourman after an action to capture Somali and Ethiopian for communities from which the migrants on the Libya–Sudan border, on 8 January 2017. © ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP/Getty Images 2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 27 April 2017 An attempt was made to use the mobilized together with PDF when the war in the Two Areas), the PDF baggara Arabs as a buffer against the war resumed there in 2011. At the were estimated to number roughly Southern non-Arabs, who were mostly time, government officials still referred 100,000 throughout Sudan, but this Christian. This prolonged the colonial to some kinds of paramilitary forces as included a large number of fighters policy of drawing a clear racial and mujahidin. The confusion is increased considered to be reserves who were religious boundary across Sudan divid- by the fact that early mujahidin included only mobilized on an ad hoc basis.11 ing Southern Sudan from the North. students, and that students were forcibly It should be noted that the militias Religion had become more important conscripted during the latest conflicts in Darfur and elsewhere were not in Sudanese politics in the 1980s, in the Two Areas. Yet in recent years formed by a monolithic central gov- largely as a reaction by successive there seems to have been little appetite ernment, but by various power bases governments to the rise of the Muslim for jihad, and the militias have clearly within the government. Some key Brotherhood. This played a role in mobi- been motivated by a desire for secular figures may have had an interest in lizing militias for what was labelled a booty.8 In addition, the original muja- pushing for the recruitment of militias jihad. The murahilin were at times also hidin have become increasingly critical in general, or in arming particular called mujahidin (holy warriors).5 of the government, in particular through tribes. Historically, the militia strategy This religious dimension became the group called saehoun (wanderers) has always been a way to counter SAF even more important after the Muslim composed of former mujahidin.9 influence, including by the Islamic Brotherhood’s National Islamic Front The recruitment of the PDF and movement and more recently by the (NIF) took power in 1989. One of the other militias took place on an ethnic NISS and the presidency. It has resulted main early acts of the regime was the basis, particularly in Sudan’s periph- from rivalries between strongmen in creation of the Popular Defence Forces eries, based on tribal structures. Tribal Khartoum, for instance between secu- (PDF). This ‘officialized’ the murahilin chiefs—who were de facto government rity chiefs Salah ‘Gosh’ (who reputedly and expanded the recruitment of para- employees as members of the ‘native has links with Musa Hilal) and Nafie military forces to both Arab and non- administration’ and often National Ali Nafie. Local power brokers such as Arab Muslims, notably from Darfur.6 Congress Party (NCP) members—were former North Darfur governor Osman Typical of the Muslim Brotherhood’s tasked with mobilizing their youths.10 Kibir (who was dismissed in 2015) also approach, the mobilization of militias Some recruited from among existing recruited tribal militias to strengthen mixed a populist ideology (that is, a traditional structures, organized armed their power locally.12 people’s army that could protect the youths, pastoralists’ livestock guards Furthermore, since the early years new regime from the regular armed led by traditional agid or war chiefs, of the first decade of the 21st century forces) and a religious one. Khartoum or even their own bodyguards. Local the regime has increasingly viewed also initially enlisted mujahidin as tribal and war chiefs and PDF coordi- itself as being besieged by enemies, PDF.