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Base Structure Report DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BASEBASE STRUCTURESTRUCTURE REPORTREPORT (A Summary of DoD's Real Property Inventory) FISCAL YEAR 2002 BASELINE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS & ENVIRONMENT) Summary of Installations/Locations - FY2002 Baseline Data No. of Small No. of Large No. of Medium Location Summary Installations or Total Locations 4 Installations 1 Installations 2 Locations 3 United States 93 96 5,423 5,612 U.S. Territory 4 2 82 88 Foreign 17 18 690 725 Total 114 116 6,195 6,425 No. of Small No. of Large No. of Medium Service Summary Installations or Total Locations 4 Installations 1 Installations 2 Locations 3 United States Army 35 33 3,798 3,866 Navy 19 29 383 431 Air Force 33 29 1,204 1,266 USMC 6 5 38 49 United States Total 93 96 5,423 5,612 U.S. Territory Army 0 0 53 53 Navy 3 1 7 11 Air Force 1 1 21 23 USMC 0 0 1 1 U.S. Territory Total 4 2 82 88 Foreign Army 1 8 385 394 Navy 7 3 36 46 Air Force 7 7 269 283 USMC 2 0 0 2 Foreign Total 17 18 690 725 Grand Total 114 116 6,195 6,425 1 Total PRV greater than or equal to $1.5B 2 Total PRV less than $1.5B and greater than or equal to $800M 3 Total PRV less than $800M 4 Records with zero or null PRVs are not counted - primarily land records or state owned locations I. INTRODUCTION II. CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION III. DEFINITIONS IV. CONCLUSION V. POINTS OF CONTACT VI. TOTAL DOD INVENTORY BY STATE VII. INDIVIDUAL SERVICE INVENTORIES BY STATE 1. ARMY 2. NAVY 3. AIR FORCE 4. MARINE CORPS DoD-1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BASE STRUCTURE REPORT I. INTRODUCTION America’s security depends on defense installations and facilities being available (in the right place and at the right time) and capable (with the right qualities and capacities) to fully support the nation’s military requirements. This fact is perhaps more apparent today as America fights terrorists who would plan and carry out attacks on our facilities and our people. To ensure that our nation has the assets it needs, and to properly manage those assets, the Defense Department maintains a comprehensive inventory of installations and facilities and their attributes. The Department’s physical plant is huge by any standard, consisting of more than 600,000 individual structures, at more than 6,000 locations, on more than 30 million acres. Sites range from small, unoccupied sites supporting a single navigational aid on less than one-half acre, to the Navy’s complex of installations at Norfolk, Virginia with over 71,000 employees, to the Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico that contains over 3.6 million acres. This report summarizes the current structure of installations and provides basic information on the facilities at each location. Defense analysts, as well as other government agencies, private organizations, and individuals who have business to conduct with the Department of Defense have reiterated a continuing need for this report. II. CONTENT AND ORGANIZATION Please be aware of the following important parameters for the content of this report: – Timeliness. While the base structure is continuously changing, this Base Structure Report is a “snapshot” of the Defense physical plant, as it existed on October 1, 2001. The bases listed may be in various circumstances, including unused or awaiting disposal. Due to the legalities involved in transferring deeded property, individual Service inventories may contain a property record long after the decision to transfer the asset to another organization. Likewise, ongoing additions to the base structure, including in- transfers, are often not officially recorded until well after the decision. Any forecasts of requirements based on this listing must take these time lags into consideration. – Mode of View. For the purpose of this report, each entry is defined as a site at a specific location with a name and real property assets (see definition of a “site” in the next section). There are other ways to look at base structure. For example, a summary of bases by installation commander would be different and may include disparate interstate locations under one base name. However, DoD-2 one exception to this definition was made for this report. Rather than listing a multitude of individual sites with minimal assets, Air Force strategic missile sites were rolled up to the appropriate one of seven parent installations. In the case of F.E. Warren AFB, missile sites located in Nebraska and Colorado were counted as part of the parent installation total for the state of Wyoming. – Display Criteria. For practicality of use, this report includes specific information on sites meeting a predetermined size and value criteria. If located in the United States, a site must be larger than 10 acres AND have a Plant Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million to be listed. If located in a foreign country, a site must be larger than 10 acres OR have a Plant Replacement Value (PRV) greater than $10 million to be listed. To preserve the comprehensiveness of this report, sites that do not meet these criteria are aggregated as an “Other” location within each state or country. – Personnel Data. Personnel data at the level of detail shown in this report were not readily available from a single source, so information was collected from multiple sources to include the Defense Manpower Data Center and the individual Services manpower or personnel databases. Since personnel totals reflected in this report are shown as they relate to individual sites or locations and attempt to show all personnel regardless of Service affiliation, totals should not be confused as necessarily representing individual Service total strength. Detailed personnel questions should be addressed to the appropriate Service manpower or personnel offices. The report is organized by State within each Military Service. Each record includes the site name, the component (Active, Guard or Reserves), the name of the nearest city, zip code, primary phone number (where possible), the number of buildings owned and leased, total acres owned by the Services and the total acres used, the PRV (in $ millions) and the authorized number of military, civilian, and other personnel. The PRV represents the reported cost of replacing the facility and its supporting infrastructure using today’s construction cost (labor and material) and standards (methodologies and codes.) Other personnel include any non-appropriated employees, government contractors (if identified) or foreign nationals performing work on the base III. DATA SOURCES AND DEFINITIONS The facilities data included in this report were extracted directly from the native Services’ real property inventories; i.e., Army – HQ Army Integrated Facilities System (IFS), Navy – Navy Facilities Assets Database (NFADB), and the Air Force’s Real Property Asset (RPA) database. This report does not intend to replicate all of the details included the Services’ databases. Instead, this report provides a summary view of the Department’s installations using common elements that should answer most ordinary questions. An explanation of criteria used for each column is shown below: – SITE: Indicates the installation or site name as depicted in the Services’ databases. This is based on the Services’ Installation Number (Army and Air Force) or Unit Identification Code (Navy and Marine Corps). The notation “multi-sites” shown after a site name indicates the parent unit is located in another state, so the data shown only reflect those facilities in the listed state. DoD-3 – COMPONENT: Designates the primary component owner/reporter of a site or installation, either Active, Guard or Reserve. For the Navy, this column is also used to designate those sites in caretaker status pending some type of further action. This action may be a pending closure, realignment or remaining in a dormant state. – NAME NEAREST CITY: Identifies the name of the nearest city of reasonable size. – ZIP CODE: Identifies primary Postal Code associated with the site or installation. Many large installations may have multiple postal codes, though only one is shown for this report. – PHONE NUMBER: Identifies a local phone number when available. In some cases, a central locator number was used or, for others, the Public Affairs office number was listed instead. All munbers are commercial numbers, unless specifically designated as a “DSN” number. – BLDGS OWNED: Represents the number of facilities owned by the Service at that particular site or installation. This column only includes those facilities designated as “buildings” and does not count “structures” (which could be anything from tent pad sites to carports) or utilities (which also generate records in the facilities table.) It also does not include licensed or permitted facilities, State-owned National Guard facilities or facilities provided by other nations at foreign locations. – BLDGS OWNED SQFT: Reflects the building square footage for the facilities identified above as owned as stated in the Services’ databases. – BLDGS LEASED: Identifies the number of facilities leased by the Services. It does include only facilities designated as “buildings” and does not count “structures,” which could be anything from tent pad sites to carports. – BLDGS LEASED SQFT: Reflects the building square footage for the facilities identified above as leased as stated in the Services’ databases. – TOTAL ACRES: Identifies the total number of acres owned, used by, or leased to the DoD. It includes public land, state land, land owned by other federal agencies, and acreage of foreign soil used by DoD sites. – ACRES OWNED: Reflects only those acres actually owned by the government for use by DoD. – PRV ($M): Total Plant Replacement Value (PRV) for all facilities records (buildings, structures and utilities) used by the DoD, to include those facilities that are not owned by DoD, such as state, NATO or foreign owned, which show a PRV in the database.
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