sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ahmad Hindi, Asceticism, Ashik, Barakah, Burka ban in Australia, Chhatri

ISLAMIC REVIVALISM: A STUDY OF THE IN

Jan Ashik

BA(UWS),MA(UNSW),MPP(MACQ)

Thesis submitted to the University of in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

March 2006

ABSTRACT

Since the great of 1978-79, there has been a significant increase in Islamic and activity in Muslim communities across the globe. As a phenomenon it has become known as “Islamic revivalism”. Its hallmark is a return to Islamic origins, the fundamentals of the embodied in the Qur’an and the (sayings and practices of ). Contemporary Islamic revivalism has its roots in Muslim responses to European colonialism and imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century, when the darker sides of modernity began to reveal themselves in what was perceived as less than desirable social, cultural, economic, and political conditions of many Muslim communities and societies.

Islamic revivalism has constantly featured in Islamic and is by no means a new phenomenon. What distinguishes contemporary Islamic revivalism from earlier revivalisms is its complex multifacetedness as a defensive reaction to a new epoch of modernity described in revivalist circles as jahiliyah (ignorance). This thesis argues there is a central relationship between modernity and Islamic revivalism. Using in-depth interviews and participant observation techniques this study is an ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat (Preaching Party), a transnational Islamic revivalist movement active in Sydney. It also seeks to locate the Tablighi Jamaat in the spectrum of Australian .

The principal argument of the thesis is that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to modernity. Contrary to popular it neither constitutes an anti- modernity nor does it seek to destroy modernity. Rather, it highlights that as adherents to a revealed tradition - Islam - are in a serious of crisis. They are confronted with both material crisis and the threat of losing their faith and identity in modernity. Through a study of the Tablighi Jamaat the thesis argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is, therefore, an attempt to rescue Muslims from their modern malaise through selective use of modern ideological and technical means.

I ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people that I would like to offer my sincere gratitude for helping bring this study to fruition. First and foremost I wish to thank Professor Humphrey for his unceasing , support, and encouraging advice all along the life of this study. Also a sincere thank you to Professor Clive Kessler for his insightful comments on issues pertinent to this study and constant encouragement. I also would like to thank Lester Adorjany for proofreading the draft and Frances Lovejoy for her encouraging words of wisdom.

My heartfelt gratitude to all my Tablighi interviewees who provided me with clear and great insight into the Tablighi Jamaat and other members of the Tablighi Jamaat who provided assistance and support during my thirteen-month participant observation.

Last, but certainly not least, I wish to offer a special thank you to my beloved wife for her support, perseverance, encouragement, and insightful comments during my study and my three precious children who have been very patient in letting me complete this study.

II TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Abstract i Acknowledgement ii Table of Contents iii List of Tables viii

Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 1

INTRODUCTION 1

1.1. THESIS OUTLINE 18

Chapter Two: A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 22

INTRODUCTION 22

2.1. ISLAM AND THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 23

2.2. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 27

2.2.1. Islamic Revivalism Defined 27 2.2.2. Theoretical Underdevelopment 29 2.2.3. The Literature on Contemporary Islamic Revivalism 30 2.2.4. The Concepts of Tajdid and 32 2.2.5. The Concept of 33 2.2.6. The Concept of Jahiliyah 33 2.2.7. The Concept of 34

2.3. THREE KEY PERSPECTIVES 36

2.3.1. Socio-economic and Political or Crisis Perspective 40 2.3.2. Success Perspective 41 2.3.3. Defensive Reaction to Modernity Perspective 43

2.4. THE OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 46

2.5. THE OBJECTIVES OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 48

CONCLUSION 51

III Chapter Three: THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGIOUS RESPONSE 53

INTRODUCTION 53

3.1. - THEORY 54

3.2. DEPRIVATION THEORY 63

3.2.1. Economic Deprivation 64 3.2.2. Social Deprivation 66

3.3. MAUDUDIAN ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 67

3.3.1. Modern Civilization 72 3.3.2. 73 3.3.3. 74 3.3.4. Democracy 76

CONCLUSION 77

Chapter Four: METHODOLOGY 78

INTRODUCTION 78

4.1. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 79

4.1.1. Complete Participant 83 4.1.2. Participant-As-Observer 86

4.2. ETHICS 88

4.3. PARTICIPATING WITH THE TABLIGHIS IN SYDNEY 90

4.4. FIELDNOTES 95

4.5. INTERVIEWING 96

4.5.1. Informal Interviews 97

4.6. CASE STUDY 99

4.6.1. Types of Case Studies 100

CONCLUSION 103

IV Chapter Five: ISLAM IN THE WEST 105

INTRODUCTION 105

5.1. MUSLIMS IN THE WEST 105

5.2. EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM 109

5.3. INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 112

5.4. 115

5.5. THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR OVER THE SATANIC VERSES 117

5.6. THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT IN THE WEST 120

5.7. EUROISLAM 123

CONCLUSION 126

Chapter Six: THE ORIGINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT 128

INTRODUCTION 128

6.1. AND THE MEOS 128

6.1.1. Islamic History of Meos 131

6.2. THE CRISIS OF EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 134

6.2.1. The Socio-economic Crisis 134 6.2.2. The Peasant Uprisings of the 1930s 135

6.3. MAULANA MUHAMMAD ILYAS 136

6.4. THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT 140

6.4.1. Six Principles of Tablighi Jamaat 141 6.4.2. Tablighi Participants 143

6.5. TABLIGHI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 143

V 6.6. TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT 146

CONCLUSION 148

Chapter Seven: ISLAM IN 150

INTRODUCTION 150

7.1. MUSLIMS IN AUSTRALIA 150

7.1.1. Post- War II Muslim Immigration 152 7.1.2. Muslim Ethnic Diversity 155

7.2. IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 157

7.3. ISLAM AND MULTICULTURALISM 158

7.3.1. Muslim Marginality 161

7.4. MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 162

7.5. ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS 166

7.5.1. The Tablighi Jamaat 169

7.6. FIRST GENERATION MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS 172

7.7. SECOND GENERATION MUSLIMS 174

7.8. ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 177

7.8.1. Reflexive Muslim Identity 178

CONCLUSION 181

Chapter Eight: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT 182

INTRODUCTION 182

SECTION ONE: TABLIGHI PRACTICES IN SYDNEY 183

8.1. AT THE ALI IN SYDNEY 183

VI 8.1.1. Bayaan 186 8.1.2. Taleem 190 8.1.3. Jolah 192 8.1.4. Bayaan 194

8.2. EXPERIENCING KHURUJ 197

8.3. MUSHAWARA 202

8.4. THE ONGOING IMPORTANCE OF SELF-FASHIONING: THE THREE CASE STUDIES 205

8.4.1. Case Study One 205 8.4.2. Case Study Two 209 8.4.3. Case Study Three 213

SECTION TWO: DISCUSSION AND ANAYSIS 217

8.5. THE TABLIGHI IDEOLOGY 217

8.6. TABLIGH 225

8.7. KHURUJ 230

8.8. THE TABLIGHI WORLDVIEW AND ISLAMIC REVIVALISM 234

8.9. INNER-WORLDLY ATTENTION 241

8.9.1. 249 8.9.2. Piety 250

8.10. SELF 253

8.11. POLTICAL ALOOFNESS 257

8.12. IDENTITY 259

CONCLUSION 261

Chapter Nine: CONCLUSION 263

GLOSSARY 268 APPENDIX: DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWEES 279 REFERENCES 280

VII LIST OF TABLES Page No.

Table 1: Muslims in Europe 108 Table 2: Australian Muslim Population by State/ Territory 153 Table 3: Australian Muslims – Country/Region of Origin 154

VIII CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism through an analysis of the transnational Islamic revivalist movement of the Tablighi Jamaat1. In the last few decades there has been a significant surge in Islamic consciousness in Muslim communities across the globe. This has become known as “Islamic revivalism”. Islamic revivalism as a phenomenon is not new to Islamic history. In fact, Islamic history is constantly punctuated by Islamic revivalism. The hallmark of Islamic revivalism throughout Islamic history has always been, even today, a desire for the return to Islamic origins – the basics of the faith as enshrined in the Qur’an and the sunnah (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad).

Since the early fifteenth Islamic century (A.D. 1980s) to the present, what distinguishes the contemporary Islamic revivalism from earlier expressions is its complex multifacetedness (Dessouki, 1982) and new defensive reactionary ideological character (Arjomand, 1995). In other words, contemporary Islamic revivalism manifests itself in multiplicity of forms as a defensive reaction to an epoch characterized by modernity.

It needs to be noted at the outset that there is little agreement on the conceptualization and meaning of the term “revivalism”. Dessouki (1982), Voll (1982), Dekmejian (1995), and Burgat and Dowell (1997), for instance, have all drawn attention to this fact pointing out the heterogeneity of this phenomenon which has been studied under the umbrella of Islamic revivalism. Forms of Islamic consciousness as diverse as “”, “reassertion”, “awakening”, “renewal”, “resurgence”, and “reformation” have all been, at one time or another, referred to as Islamic revivalism. These writers emphasize the difficulties in properly understanding contemporary Islamic revivalism that arise from the lack of definitional and conceptual agreement. Also, they point out that this leads to

1 Tablighi Jamaat means a Preaching Party. It is an Islamic revivalist movement founded in 1927 in by a trained Muhammad Ilyas (1885- 1944).

1 theoretical vagueness and the loss of specificity in the articulation of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. However despite the difficulties of establishing a sound definition of Islamic revivalism, it is still necessary, in any study, to clarify what is meant by it. Thus, as a working definition, Islamic revivalism in this thesis refers to movements concerned with the removal of accretion in normative and ritualistic Muslim practices with the aim of replacing them with pristine Islamic cultural and spiritual values leading to the reaffirmation of principles of the shariah (Islamic law) and the effort to remake society based on the blending of and . In other words, the conceptualization and practice of Islam based exclusively and totally on the Qur’an and the sunnah (sayings and practices of prophet Muhammad) as was the practice of the pristine Islamic community.

While constituted by a wide diversity of revivalist movements, the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism has almost always had a localized nature as a defensive reaction to uncertainties or crisis situations prevailing in numerous Muslim societies (Dekmejian, 1995). Yet, in many ways these uncertainties or crisis situations in different national milieus are strikingly similar, giving the Islamic revivalist movements a transnational character and the phenomenon a global leverage.

These uncertainties or crisis situations, from an Islamic revivalist perspective, are attributed to the negative impact of the modern world order or modernity2. Modernity is seen by the revivalists largely in a negative light. It is being described by revivalists as jahiliyah (ignorance or a state of un-Islam) with its roots in Muslim responses to European colonialism and imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century. However, modernity is not completely fruitless or a total state of jahiliyah just certain aspects of it,

2 By modernity I mean a shift in the conceptualization of society from an agricultural to an industrial foundation and from a feudal to a capitalist economic framework. In this form of society the nation-state becomes key form of political organization, an increasing adherence to the principles of rationality, belief in progress, focus on individualism, and development of bureaucracy and the growing intrusion of the state into the daily lives of its citizens.

2 namely secularization and westernization. Hence contemporary Islamic revivalism is not so much a rejection but a defensive3 reaction to modernity or to a state of jahiliyah.

Islamic revivalism’s defensive reaction to modernity finds resonance in other world such as , , and . Therefore, Islamic revivalism in the modern era shares the concerns of other regarding the perceived failures of modernity. This is because the development of modernity in the form of secularization and the expansion of the application of rational thought to the problems of human societies has not brought an end to “human ”. , unemployment, inequality, homelessness, racial and sexual discrimination, crime, corruption, human exploitation, underdevelopment, environmental degradation, and numerous other social ills, plague even the most wealthiest and technologically advanced societies such as the USA and Australia.

The manifestation of Islamic revivalism is no different from the manifestation of religious revivalism in other world religions and can be understood as a response to the failures of secular modernity. Marty and Appleby explain:

It manifests itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk in the contemporary era, these believers fortify it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved “fundamentals” are refined, modified, and sanctioned in a spirit of pragmatism: they are to serve as a bulwark against the encroachment of outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic, areligious, or irreligious cultural milieu. Moreover, [revivalists] present the retrieved fundamentals alongside unprecedented claims and doctrinal innovations. These innovations and supporting doctrines lend the retrieved and updated fundamentals an urgency and charismatic intensity reminiscent of the religious experiences that originally forged communal identity (1993: 3).

Islamic revivalists, like religious revivalists in most world religions, are not in search of the basics or fundamentals of religion. They claim to possess the Truth. For Islamic revivalists the shariah is the Truth. Access to the Truth for them means a break with jahiliyah. What they then seek is a society founded concretely and totally on the shariah.

3 Defensive in that accepting changes without sacrificing any principles or precepts of Islam or accepting changes in total light of the shariah. In other words, accepting aspects of modernity such as certain technological innovations and scientific developments that do not negatively affect life pursued under the guidance of the Qur’an and the sunnah.

3 With the advent of modernity, Islamic revivalists claim that society has been transformed - what Ferdinand Tonnies calls from gemeinschaft (community) to gesellschaft (society) and Emile Durkheim calls from mechanical solidarity (traditional or premodern society) to organic solidarity (modern society). The American and French Revolutions on the one hand and the Agrarian and Industrial Revolutions on the other, have transformed the ways in which society was organized, first in the West then subsequently in other parts of the world. No longer organized under traditional or religious authority, the society, therefore under modernity, came to be organized around reason (reason and rationality as ways of organizing knowledge strengthened by experience and experiment), empiricism (the belief that knowledge about natural and social world is founded upon empirical facts that are understandable through our senses), (the idea that scientific understanding is the key to expanding all human knowledge), (the notion that reason and science can be applied to any and every situation), progress (the belief that the natural and social condition can be improved through the application of science and reason), individualism (the idea that knowledge and action begins with the individual and that individual reason is the highest form of authority), freedom (free from all constraints imposed by tradition and religion), and secularism (an opposition to traditional and religious authority) (Hamilton, 1992: 21-22).

Consequently, society manifests itself in anti-clericalism, the pre-eminence of empirical and materialist knowledge, technological and medical innovations, and legal and constitutional reform. The Islamic revivalists this as wicked because these are factors responsible for undermining and then abolishing traditional and religious sources of authority. Furthermore, modern values and ways have promoted the idea of happiness and success in the possession of material wealth and ultimately led to questioning the very value of religious fundamentals. Modern society has essentially departed from a religiously authorised blueprint of how individuals should behave and what values society should uphold. Hence, in modernity, many individuals have come to experience the ideals of the modern self and its emphasis on self-actualization and consumption as spiritually empty. For some the re-establishment of tradition offers a way to regain a sense of purpose, meaning, and spiritual fulfilment. Islamic revivalists believe that

4 through the re-establishment of the authority of religion, social institutions will once again have clear and high moral standards, politics will have a sacred expression, and the “true believers” will have a full membership in the (community of believers). All aspects of life will then be influenced and governed by the comprehensive implementation of the fundamentals of the religion.

In this sense contemporary Islamic revivalists share much in common with their predecessors. The newly forged Islamic identity forms the exclusive and separate basis for a re-established socio-political order that is directed not to the sacred past but to a more rewarding and bright future. Combining selected aspects such as doctrines, beliefs, and practices of pristine Islam4 with modernity’s benefits of technological innovation and pure science5, contemporary Islamic revivalists seek to place above all things as a way to recover cultural and political authority over the lives of Muslims.

Thus, Islamic revivalists make themselves “border-markers”. They strive to distinguish themselves from others through religious diligence such as wearing Islamic dress, offering , observing gender rules, and engaging in (preaching). But at the same time, they are often ambitious to extend their sphere of influence through proselytizing. They do this by encouraging ordinary Muslims to be more observant of the Islamic religious essentials such as the . The Tablighi Jamaat is a good example of a revivalist movement focused on the recovery of Islam by encouraging stricter religious observance.

An account of why the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism has emerged at this time can be formulated within a variety of theoretical and scientific perspectives. However, from a sociological perspective, according to Hunter (1990) it can be argued that all religious cultures, not just Islam, encountering the modern world order,

4An unaltered orthodoxy whose rules, precepts, authority, and legitimacy are derived from an unchanging continuity with the truth as originally revealed. 5 According to Islamic revivalists, technology is inherently not a bad thing but only becomes bad when it is misused resulting in undesirable and negative consequences. Pure science is value neutral, thus, acceptable for use.

5 particularly its science, intellectual reasoning, pluralism, , and secularity are confronted with possibly three choices – retreat, accommodation or resistance.

First, the ummah embodying the revealed truth can retreat from the larger material world – the modern world order – into a purpose built closed and total religious world. Second, the ummah can be flexible, accommodating, and adjusting its values and norms to the continuously changing modern world. Third, the ummah can develop a defensive reaction to the modern world order and resist its encroachment on the revealed truth.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism can be better understood in the context of the third choice. It is neither about the reintroduction of traditions nor the return to the golden age nor about changing Islam6 to adapt to the modern world order. It is not even about the call to reinterpret the Qur’an. It is about Islamic social and political movements whose aim is the acquisition of political power and the reorganization of the society based on the shariah. In this sense it is primarily an ideological response involving the reformulation and development of certain elements of Islamic social teachings to enable them to deal with the new challenges of modern society or this particular epoch – modernity. Contemporary Islamic revivalism is an attempt to confront those aspects of modernity considered to be promoting jahiliyah - in particular secularization and westernization and replacing them with Islamic values. When referring to contemporary Islamic revivalism, what is stressed is the increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic symbols, principles, and institutions in Muslim societies and in the public life of Muslim people. It reflects an indigenous response - a return to pristine Islam - in contemporary Muslim societies in crisis.

This defensive reaction to modernity makes particular sense in the context of recent Islamic history and the decline, disintegration, and decimation of the ummah. In theory, the teachings of Islam have consistently stressed the unity of the ummah and its message has fixed universal diction. The emergence of Islam in the seventh century replaced tribal ties with religious solidarity of the ummah and jahiliyah with Islam. The ummah serves

6 Modernization of Islam.

6 as a means for the revitalization of the divine decree in society, as an example of all the peoples of the world (Qur’an, 2: 143). Thus, Islam is a world religion with a definite universal outlook. Religion is seen as integral to every aspect of life – , , , economics, law, politics, and society. The Islamic view of is one of unity and totality, in which God is one and sovereign. He is the Creator of all things. Creation belongs to Him including human beings. All God’s creations are subservient to Him and His rule. According to Islamic revivalists, Muslim society, therefore, must submit to His will and rule if it is to continue and flourish in the contemporary period. In the real world, doing so is not easy but a constant battle because the distinction between dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war) has been eroded by the disappearance of the , the development of large-scale migration of Muslims to non- Muslim countries, and the development of the separation between Muslims and nominal Muslims/secularist Muslims in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. This ceaseless tension is crucial to Muslims’ everyday existence and constitutes the commitment to God which the Qur’an constantly emphasizes. Islamic revivalism or keeping Islam alive is part of this battle. The greatest of all battles for Muslims as God’s vicegerents is to implement God’s law on earth.

This is where the Islamic revivalists or Islamic revivalism gets the reactionary character from. This is the religious perspective they have and want to fulfil. Hence, Islamic revivalists argue that human beings are God’s greatest creation and therefore are given special responsibility of vicegerency – to implement His rule on earth. This belief is mirrored both in the doctrine of divine unity and in development of the and the shariah. The belief in the divinely created world and Muslims’ role as God’s vicegerents on earth found validity through their success and power throughout Islamic history. Early Islamic history, in particular, was marked by great success because jahiliyah was replaced with Islam and dar al-Islam was perceived as an ideal world order. In this ideal world order, the Muslim population quickly increased, the ummah extended from Arabia, west to North and , and east to , and Muslims thrived in their cultural and religious developments (Hunter, 1990). With these great social, economic, cultural, and political successes, “Islam gave birth to a great civilisation” (Esposito, 1983:

7 5). Muslims attributed their success to unwavering adherence to the shariah and the implementation of God’s rule on earth.

However, then a major crisis besieged the ummah in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the expansion of Western capitalism into the dar al-Islam and the start of colonialism. “European colonialism and imperialism in and the Near East created an acute intellectual and spiritual problem for [Islam and] Muslims” (Turner, 1974: 144-145). Muslim intellectuals and the (Islamic scholars) attributed the crisis to Muslim leaders and the populace becoming lax and derelict in their religious obligations and failing to abide by the shariah in totality.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the dar al-Islam surrendered to a number of Western powers who had established direct economic, political, and military control over their domains. The European colonial powers became so strong that they created an almost unified economic system on a global scale (Turner, 1974). Western supremacy principally meant the introduction of new political and administrative systems and the imposition of the Western traditions of dualism, capitalism, secularism, and on the Islamic way of life (Held, 1992). This saw the ultimate disintegration of the traditional Islamic political order, first the and then the Ottoman Empire and the suppression of . Under Western supremacy and colonial control, many aspects of modernity penetrated dar al-Islam thereby initiating the spread and progress of modernity.

One response to modernity by Muslim societies was that by embracing Western models in their developmental endeavours would eventually lead dar al-Islam to its former successful socio-cultural and political prominence (Tibi, 1988; Rajaee, 1993). Thus, the modernity of the dar al-Islam was pursued but with great haste and rigidity and not with much prudence. Esposito explains:

Western models of development had been abruptly transplanted; they were adopted, not adapted, to their new environments. Institutions and codes that were the product of the West’s historical/cultural

8 experience, spanning several centuries of development, were often uncritically and suddenly applied to people with a different historical tradition, experience, and values (1983: 7).

Consequently, old religious traditions and institutions were either reformed or replaced with modern Western ones. For example, under colonial tutelage the caliph and sultans (Muslim royals) were eliminated, much of the shariah, which regulates prayer and alms- giving as well as family, commercial, criminal, and international law, was replaced with Western legal codes, and modern secular social, cultural, economic, and political systems were instituted (Esposito, 1983).

Modernity, in many Muslim countries, essentially followed a trail of westernization and secularization as the modern Muslim elites adopted Western models in the key areas of social life (Voll, 1982). It brought about sweeping changes (secularization, westernization, capitalism, nationalism, and ) in the dar al-Islam. However, according to the Islamic revivalist perspective, despite some material success under the sweeping changes of modernity, Muslim countries’ problems have largely remained unresolved to this day. Islamic revivalists claim that the paradigm of modernity and the modern Muslim elites connected with it did not succeed in halting the decline of the dar al-Islam and put a stop to its economic and political dependency on the West. Esposito succinctly summarises this situation:

Although parliamentary forms of government, democratic elections, and systems were adopted in many countries, the reality of Muslim politics was often one of dictatorship and authoritarian rule. In addition, corruption and the concentration of wealth persisted as twin pillars of Muslim society while poverty, illiteracy, and overpopulation galloped along unchecked. … The positive benefits of modernisation seemed to benefit the few, while the of the masses remained relatively unchanged (Esposito, 1983: 12).

The consequence of modernity in the dar al-Islam, for these reasons, was generally negative for the majority Muslims. Modernity, it was generally viewed, has been largely carried out in an uneven and unjust way, with the economic and social benefits of it distributed disproportionately among Muslims. The real benefits of modernity were simply too thinly distributed for the vast majority to be convinced of its long term

9 rewards. Fazlur Rahman summarizes the situation in many Muslim countries after their political independence from colonial powers:

socialisation trends occurred after a few decades, in response to a pattern of economic development that tended to concentrate great economic wealth and power in the hands of a relatively small number of capitalists. Although one cannot deny that a goodly measure of prosperity and material well-being did percolate to the middle classes, the vastly increased economic gap between the upper and lower strata of these societies threatened to destroy them (1982: 88).

Muslims in their new experience encountered nothing but “the diverse traumas of modernity” (Kaplan, 1992: 13). Some of these traumas were increased unemployment, homelessness, crime, corruption, poverty, racial and sexual discrimination, inequality, starvation, exploitation, and environmental degradation.

Thus, those who have remained deprived of the of modernity, whose lives have been dislocated by it while having been denied a say in shaping its character and pace, have responded to the vision of the Islamic revivalists, that is, the re-establishment of an Islamic order.

In this thesis, I will argue that the contemporary Islamic revivalism is characterized not by a rejectionist posture but by a defensive reaction towards modernity characterized by secularisation and westernization. For Islamic revivalists, Islamic revivalism is an attempt to carve a space for themselves in modernity. Theirs is a goal to live in modernity under shar’iyyat al-hukm - the Islamic authority not under the idea that knowledge and action starts with the individual and that human reason is the chief form of authority.

The kind of modernity and the rigid way in which it was implemented in the dar al-Islam has contributed to an extensive sense of dissatisfaction. The stress in all developing societies, including Muslim countries, on material modernity while ignoring the need for new social, cultural, and political understanding and the establishment of new and broad based institutions capable of dealing with the complexities of modernity has been most unhelpful, even destructive (Hunter, 1988). Whilst material modernity has generally tended to split up old social and political institutions and the structures of relationships, it

10 has not replaced them with new ones capable of connecting and channelling newly formed social and political forces, or of responding to new needs. Consequently, for the majority of ordinary Muslims there has been a growing feeling of personal, social, and political marginalization and uncertainty. These feelings in turn have forced them to find some solace, sense of stability, and by reverting to their traditional way of life. In Muslim countries, this has meant a return to Islam, in which Muslims find a real anchorage, a sense of familiarity and confidence, and an identity.

The speed with which the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism has traversed the globe since the 1980s, and the growing number of Muslim countries including , Mauritania, and , re-examining their legal structures in light of the Qur’an and the sunnah, has taken many Muslims and non-Muslims by surprise and called into question the universality of modernity - putting the claims of secularization in doubt. It was generally thought that the centrepiece of modernity - secularization - would gradually overcome the foundations of traditional reasoning and religion. Modernity with its roots embedded in the intellectual and cultural tradition of the Enlightenment7 project, was claimed to be the alternative to the religious source of authority. Modernity, defined by its capitalist economic production, urbanization, the modern bureaucratic state, scientific and rational knowledge, and secularization was to pave the way for human freedom, progress, and fulfilment (Berger, 1967). Religion was viewed by Enlightenment thinkers such as Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Hume (1711-76) as a liability and was expected to die out and be replaced by science and technology in organizing and managing society.

Therefore, the general expectation was that the increasing dissemination and adequacy of scientific knowledge, would eventually overcome all social ills and put a stop to human suffering. Ismael (1974) suggests that through the application of rationally and empirically based knowledge, social institutions could be established that would make humankind happier and free them from ruthlessness, injustice, and despotism. In science there was the promise to make agriculture more efficient and productive and thus

7 The questioning of traditional beliefs and prejudices, especially religious ones, and emphasizing the importance of reason, strict scientific method and the possibility of progress to a new and better society.

11 eliminate famine; it could pave the way for the invention of processes and machines which would turn raw materials into commodities that would be of benefit to entire humankind; and to ensure the reduction of illness and infirmity.

However, the process of Western colonialism and imperialism, the two world wars of the twentieth century, the Great Depression, the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, African , the Bhopal and Chernobyl disasters, the famines in Africa, the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, the oil crisis, the collapse of communist , Rwandan crisis, Bosnian genocide, armed conflicts in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republic, and many more called into question the ethical and moral values as well as the efficacy of modernity. Even the forging of an American-led coalition to force out of in the Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 and the subsequent American policy of not respecting Iraqi borders, despite ethnic (Kurdish) and religious (Shi‘ite) calls for independence, seen as a failure rather than the success of modernity. Most importantly, the emergence of the powerful phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, in the 1980s, manifesting itself in the Iranian revolution of 1978-79 and in the emergence of a plethora of Islamic revivalist movements put the claim of secular modernity in doubt.

In light of this, the implementation of the shariah in a number of Muslim countries, therefore, cannot be taken as an anachronistic act whose utility and authority are being gradually diminished in favour of science and technology as the road to human emancipation (Ismael, 1974). Hence it is no longer accurate to suggest that religion, in the last few decades, has ceased to play a significant part in all people’s lives. Consequently, a statement like “in recent years Islam has so declined in authority and vitality that it has become a mere instrument for state policy, although it is still active as a ” (Ismael, 1974: 204) is no longer valid. Tradition and religion are still very much alive and form the basis of many people’s lives in the contemporary period. This is happening at a time when modernity is globally pervasive and when “not only Marxist politics and are being questioned from without and within [but] [t]he West also finds its programs and conceptual schemes in disarray” (Marty and Appleby, 1991: xiii).

12

A number of Western theorists, including classical sociological thinkers like Weber (1946/1920-21) and Durkheim (1951/1897) and contemporary scholars like Davidson (1977) and Stark and Bainbridge (1980), have cogently argued in reference to all major world religions that social and economic deprivation8 leads to increased religiosity or contributes to religious revivalism. Be as it may, other causes such as the failure or the lack of early socialization9 and the alienation10 from appropriate reference groups are important variables (Wimberley, 1984) that need to be considered in the analysis of religious revivalism.

In the context of contemporary Islamic revivalism more specifically, the literature points to three principal perspectives - a socio-economic and political or crisis approach (Dekmejian, 1980; Zubaida, 1993; Tessler, 1997), a historical-cultural or Muslim success approach (Pipes, 1980; Voll, 1982; Esposito, 1983), and a defensive reaction to modernity approach (Marty and Appleby, 1991). These perspectives in conjunction with variables discussed above help explain contemporary Islamic revivalism in the literature as a significant sociological phenomenon.

This thesis is premised on the assumption that there is a correlation or relationship between the experience of modernity and Islamic revivalism. Islamic revivalism is not necessarily anti-modernity but a defensive reaction to modernity, particularly secularization and westernization. Secular modernity has not only undermined the traditional and religious sources of authority, but its benefits of planned economic and social development based on scientific management have not reached all people in a

8 Religiosity based on deprivation seems to be rooted in the argument that individuals are subjected to some form of deprivation, for example, socioeconomic deprivation. Individuals sense that deprivation and therefore desire to overcome it (Glock, 1964). Reverting to religion or religiosity provides compensation for deprivation and makes circumstances or conditions of deprivation more tolerable. Individuals subjected to deprivation consequently tend to immerse themselves in religion and find that it relieves their (Bainbridge, 1997). 9 This could be the outcome of the absence or lack of religious centres or institutions in which children could learn about religion and their parents’ own anti-religious perspectives or disinterestedness or apathy or ignorance. 10 Experience of alienation can have its basis in a religious , different religious perspectives, or even a clash of personalities.

13 direct and fair way, and, therefore its promises in many instances remain unfulfilled. Secular modernity promised a bright and better future but for many the present is so problematic that the better future is a far distant prospect. For solace, survival, and anchorage the revivalists have reverted to tradition or religion. In the case of Islamic revivalists, they have turned to God through Islam for all that modernity promised but failed to deliver. After all, Islam is the most vital element of the majority of a Muslim’s self-identity.

Hence, the problem explored in the principal argument of this thesis is not so much that Islam is in crisis, although this is partly correct, but that contemporary Muslim communities are in trouble and require rescuing from modernity through Islam. The trouble faced by the contemporary Muslims is a combination of socio-economic and political crisis threatening their faith and identity. If they lose their identity, from a religious perspective, they feel they also effectively lose their faith, and as a result they lose everything.

Contemporary Muslims confront the prospect of losing their identity in the face of increasing modernity. The key issue they have to resolve, therefore, is not so much how to resist or reject modernity but, how to resurrect the original force of Islam in modern society.

Another argument of this thesis is that despite the rise of modernity in, or secularization of Islamic societies, Muslims in general continue to look to Islam to seek answers to fundamental existential questions, in particular the ultimate meaning of human existence. This is because science leaves such metaphysical issues to the individual to resolve privately and consequently, the progress of rationalization can cause a lot of inner unrest.

For Islamic revivalists science is what Ian Barbour (1960) says a system of knowledge concerned with means rather than ends. Science is not concerned with why events happen but with how they take place. It essentially provides human beings with a limited type of knowledge, such as ideas about what we can technically do but not about what we should

14 do. They have met the challenge of what they see as the erosion of religious authority, loss of Muslim identity and meaning in life by proposing a revitalized Islam as the answer.

To put the Islamic revivalists’ position in perspective and make sociological sense of the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, this thesis seeks to provide an analysis of contemporary Islamic revivalism through a synthesis of theories of Church-Sect, Deprivation, and Maududian Islamic Revivalism. The Church-Sect theory differentiates between the church as a form of religious institution and sect as a religious movement. Whilst church is a religious group that accepts the prevailing social environment, a sect as a religious group plainly rejects it. Church and sect sit on opposite ends of a spectrum. Sect, which involves itself in reviving the original character of religion, emerges in society as a religious movement. Its objective is to cause religious change where necessary or prevent religion from changing where its not warranted. The sect makes the claim that the parent religious body has drifted away from the original character of religion and its engagement is merely in authenticating, purifying, and revitalizing the prevailing faith.

Deprivation theory claims that individuals subjected to some kind of deprivation, particularly social and economic, often opt to overcome it not through material means but through spiritual means. Although religion does not change the deprivational conditions, it offers “reprieve” or “compensation” and, therefore, makes these conditions palatable. As a corollary, religious conviction influences the perception and causes of deprivation and although not necessarily removing one’s state of deprivation, it is seen to alleviate the suffering.

Maududian Islamic Revivalism provides an Islamic account of the phenomenon of religious revivalism. For Maududi Islamic revivalism emerged in response to the issue of sovereignty of God. He argued that an Islamic society accepts the sovereignty of God and no one and nothing else. Importantly, a nominally Islamic society which failed to acknowledge, and whose government was not based on the sovereignty of God, was one

15 which was not truly Islamic, but, on the contrary, was degenerating or had already degenerated into jahiliyah. The idea of a nation-state produced by the West and exported through colonization and imperialism was, according to Maududi, taking Muslim societies back to pre-Islamic times and into a state of jahiliyah. Jahiliyah, for Maududi, is the ignorance (absence of belief in or understanding of force – God) and (produced by the modern dogmas) and political philosophies of Western societies.

The principal claim of the Maududian Islamic Revivalism is that the modern world order has failed humanity because it is founded upon faulty principles - nationalism, democracy, and secularism. These principles are not divinely created but are products of human creativity which, unlike divine creativity, is not perfect and can cause its own destruction as human history has shown time and again. The most powerful manifestation of the strength of un-godly civilization is the secular nation-state which is based on the sovereignty of the people and not the God. For Maududi all human calamities, problems, and distress originate from here. Maududian Islamic Revivalism seeks to replace the secular nation-state with an dedicated to the creation of the Kingdom of God on earth from where will flow justice, tolerance, equality, and success and ultimately making the world a peaceful haven for all.

These frameworks articulate contemporary religious revivalism as a religious process of adjustment and readjustment of life under changing conditions. In other words, a response to a shift in the conceiving of society from one based on human solidarity and intimacy to one founded on a complex impersonal nexus of loose human relationships.

This study is about the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism based on the experience of the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia. It has attempted to investigate why religion - in particular Islam - is re-emerging in the era of modernity when in fact modernity (which has been characterized by secularization and westernization) has diminished the significance of religion and ultimately brought about its demise substantially. Furthermore, a central concern of this study is - why is it that Islam in

16 particular has featured so prominently in religious revivalism? Why is Islam on the rise again, not only in the dar al-Islam but even in the cradle of modernity – in the Western world?

Thus, this thesis is an empirical study based on participant-observation, interviewing, and case studies. Because there is so little empirical research on contemporary Islamic revivalism, especially from a detailed ethnographic perspective, this study also makes an original contribution by building the data and knowledge base through a study of the Tablighi Jamaat.

At an empirical level this thesis aims to provide an analysis of the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat in Sydney as a sociologically important phenomenon in its own right. By doing so, this thesis extends the literature on Muslim communities in Australia and provides a specific context in which to explore Islamic revivalist practices in a Western non-Muslim society where Muslims represent a minority. By focusing on the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat in Sydney the thesis seeks to explore how faith is maintained in a largely secular and non-religious cultural environment and how religious identity and practice is used to define communities.

Because the history of Australian Islam is overwhelmingly a history of Muslim immigration and settlement, the study of has emphasized its immigrant, plural, and ethnic character. However, Islam in Australia today is more than just an imported culture. Second generation Muslims are now involved in the development of an “Australian Islam” which is not rooted in a parochial and ethnic heritage but based on scriptural Islam11. Given that the Tablighi Jamaat favours this conceptualization of Islam, it has struck a special chord among second generation Muslims and many mainstream Muslim bodies such as different mosques, charities, and welfare organizations. Does this mean Islam in Australia is undergoing refinement12 and

11 An Islam based purely on the Qur’an and the sunnah. 12 Removal of foreign accretions from and practices.

17 deheterogenization13 as part of the global process of Islamic revivalism or is this just a natural evolution and development of Islam in Australia? In this thesis an attempt will be made to answer this using the Tablighi Jamaat as a case study.

There is no implicit or explicit assertion that the thesis offers a comprehensive analysis of Islam as a way of life. Primarily the research focuses on the nature of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism and its relationship to modernity. Modernity has turned the world into an enormously complex and fast changing place. The societies in it have themselves become enormously complicated and vast. Modernity has brought about tremendous social disruption through economic and technological development in many countries of the world. In the global socio-cultural environment where the West plays a dominant role, the Muslims states experience tension born of especially social and economic deprivations. In Islamic societies, the social, economic, and technological transformations have challenged traditional cultural values and put Muslims under significant stress, both of which, in turn, have inspired a fundamentalist response.

1.1. THESIS OUTLINE This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter Two selectively reviews the wide- ranging literature on Islamic revivalism. Particular attention is focused on three key perspectives - the socio-economic and political or crisis approach, the Muslim success approach, the reaction to modernity approach - regarding origins, manifestations, and responses of Islamic revivalism as both a complex and multidimensional phenomenon. The insights gained from this review will then be used to articulate the ideology and objective of Islamic revivalism and its relationship with modernity.

Chapter Three looks at three specific theories that have contributed, in this thesis, to the explanation of the emergence of Islamic revivalism as a significant sociological phenomenon in the contemporary period. Whilst the Church-Sect and Deprivation

13 Deheterogenization refers to a process whereby the focus of attention is taken away from ethnic and parochial practices of Muslim culture to the practise of Islam in the full light of the principles and precepts of Islam. It is a process that seeks to break the Muslim ethnic and parochial barriers and lead Muslims towards a practise of more scripturally based Islam.

18 theories help locate contemporary Islamic revivalism in the context of religious revivalism as a response to modernity, Maududian Islamic Revivalism provides an indigenous account of Islamic revivalism. The blending of these three theories offers a unique opportunity to diagnose a tense and crisis milieu that surrounds Muslim communities across the globe.

Chapter Four addresses the methodological issues of the thesis. Three key methods were employed to gather empirical data. They were participant observation, informal interviews, and case studies. Participant observation was undertaken with Tablighis (members of the Tablighi Jamaat) in Sydney for a total of eighteen months. Out of these eighteen months, six weeks were spent in India at the Tablighi Jamaat’s headquarters in the New suburb of Nizam-u’d-. Participant observation in Sydney was not taken on a daily basis throughout the eighteen month period but rather on weekends starting on Friday around dusk and finishing on Sunday in the evening after the end of the last (prayer) of the day.

There were twelve informal interviews conducted with Tablighis. The interviews were approximately two hours in length. The respondents were selected randomly and the interviews were conducted over a period of six months during my participant observation in Sydney with the Tablighis who came from different social and economic backgrounds and ethnic communities.

The case studies were based on open-ended questions or interviews. There were three cases built around the experiences and insights of three senior Tablighis whom I came to know during the period of participant observation.

Chapter Five focuses on European colonialism and Muslim immigration to the West as the basis for the exploration of the relationship between Islam and the West. In this chapter the argument advanced is that although Muslims have been living in the West, particularly in Europe, for centuries, they have always had to live in the shadows of the dominant West living as ethnic and cultural “Other”. Islamic revivalism in the West is a

19 response to this “Othering” or marginalization largely attributed to the second-and third- generation Muslims.

Chapter Six looks at the origins and the development of the Tablighi Jamaat. It locates the Tablighi Jamaat in the context of the Meos in the Mewat region of India as people of interpolative religious beliefs and practices. The chapter highlights the emergence of the Tablighi Jamaat amid the Meos of Mewat as a means to purge Muslim society of “un- Islamic” beliefs and practices and how this interacted with the transformation brought about by the establishment of British colonial rule which created the context for the moral reform of Muslims and their remaking. It then moves on to briefly discuss the organizational structure and transnationalization of the Tablighi Jamaat.

Chapter Seven explores the evolution of Islam in Australia and seeks to understand its current nature. It looks at the current transition of Islam in Australia from a largely ethnically based culture to one grounded in the Qur’an and the sunnah. This helps locate Islam in Australia in a broader framework of Islamic revivalism and foster the argument of this chapter that Islam in Australia is developing a distinct character and a unique identity.

Chapter Eight is the longest chapter in the thesis. This chapter studies the ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section I explore the Tablighi rituals and study the ongoing importance of self-fashioning based on three case studies and in the second section I discuss the Tablighi ideology and worldview and how these constitute a response to modernity.

Chapter Nine presents the conclusions. It summarizes the key arguments and provide the sociological links between the empirical data and the theoretical perspectives in the thesis. The chapter shows that this thesis contributes to the sociological knowledge of

20 contemporary Islamic revivalism by investigating contemporary Islamic revivalism as a sociologically significant phenomenon resulting from complex social, economic, and political changes in and exchanges between societies in modernity.

21 CHAPTER TWO

A REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION Islamic revivalism is a sociologically significant phenomenon in the contemporary period. Constituted by a large diversity of revivalist movements, Islamic revivalism is a complex and heterogeneous reality. As Dekmejian observes, the movement to return to pristine Islam or the development of Islamic revivalism “is at once spiritual, social, economic, and political in nature” (Dekmejian, 1985: 7). Though it is by no means a monolithic phenomenon, there is a common thread between these disparate movements that binds them together. This thread is the ideology of a defensive reaction to modernity.

There is more than one explanation or one set of explanations for the emergence of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. To maintain a simple approach to the literature review in this chapter, attention, therefore, will be focused on just three key perspectives. Briefly, these are: socio-economic and political (Zubaida, 1993; Tessler, 1997) or what R. Hrair Dekmejian (1980) prefers to collectively call a “crisis perspective”; historical-cultural (Voll, 1982; Esposito, 1983) or what (1980) describes as a “success perspective”; and a “defensive reaction to modernity perspective” (Tibi, 1988; Marty and Appleby, 1993, 1991; Lechner, 1995; Sivan, 1995; Lawrence, 1998). From the crisis perspective, Islamic revivalism is the result of poverty and discontent or crisis in society (Dekmejian, 1980; Zubaida, 1993; Tessler, 1997) and from the success perspective, historically there is a positive relationship between historical success of Islamic societies and government, for example, economic development, territorial expansion, Muslim population growth, and cultural richness all due to the right observance of Islamic teachings leading to Muslim success (Pipes, 1980; Voll, 1982; Esposito, 1983).

From a “defensive reaction to modernity perspective” the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is more accurately a response to the consequences of modernity. The

22 key contentions of this perspective are that by Muslims subjecting Islam to a process of “de-traditionalization”14 a more purified Islam is created and this Islam then forms the basis for the creation of the caliphate. In this respect, Islamic revivalism means purification from foreign accretions and the securing of a political power in an attempt to form an ummah – an imagined Muslim community, so that a clear distinction is maintained between the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) and dar al-harb (abode of war).

Among these perspectives, there is one common theme present that the world today is a place of great “disenchantment”. In this disenchanted world, Muslims find their societies in crisis and are reverting to Islam with the intention of creating an “enchanted” dar al- Islam. However, there are some Muslims who have attributed some Muslim successes (such as the initial victories by Egypt and in the Arab-Israeli war in 1973 and oil- related increase in Arab-Muslim influence) that kept their hopes for the future alive to the strong faith in Islam and consequently contributed to .

This chapter, through a brief review of the literature, therefore, seeks to understand the key features of contemporary Islamic revivalism particularly in terms of its main concepts, objectives, and ideology. Furthermore, it seeks to understand why Islam as a religious tradition re-emerged in an epoch characterized by modernity. The principal aim of this chapter is to identify contemporary Islamic revivalism as a significant sociological phenomenon and locate Islam in modernity.

2.1. ISLAM AND THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE In order to better survey the literature and gain a clear insight into contemporary Islamic revivalism, a brief look at the colonial experience of the people of the dar al-Islam in the last 150 years is essential. This is because the encounter of the West with the people of the dar al-Islam is precisely what brought down the (Esposito, 1983; Hunter, 1988) and consequently instigated a Muslim response of Islamic re-assertion to the situation.

14Cultural purification through the removal of ethnic and traditional values.

23 Thus, in the last 150 years or so revivalist ideas and motivations have surfaced essentially in direct response to the challenges and experiences generated by Western influence and intrusion, particularly European expansion on Islamic life. The European conquests of Muslim territories which began in the sixteenth century overwhelmed Muslim societies with new Western technologies, methods of economic management, political systems, and ideology (Bagader, 1994). Muslims who reigned supreme for many centuries quite quickly came under Western domination by the nineteenth century and their societies were confronted with a multiplicity of challenges (Bagader, 1994). The advent of colonialism broke up the traditional Islamic political order, especially the Mughal Islamic dynasties and the Ottoman Empire, and challenged the traditional beliefs and norms causing a major crisis in Islamic authority and Muslim identity (Bagader, 1994). Under Western influence and colonial rule modernity “found its way” into the dar al-Islam bringing sweeping changes in the Muslim world (Rahman, 1982; Esposito, 1983; Hunter, 1988). The processes of secularization, urbanization, and modernization, for example, undermined and challenged old myths, doctrines, institutions, social structures, and social relationships. Muslims went through a radical socio-economic, cultural, and political changes (Rahman, 1982).

To counter the domination of European colonial powers and secure its independence, the Islamic religion took on a political dimension in the twentieth century in the dar al Islam inspiring anti-colonial and nationalist movements. Notable Muslim figures like Jamal al- Din al-Afghani (1838-97) of , Khan (1817-98) of India, and (1849-1905) of Egypt emerged to meet the modern challenges and embarked on a quest of forging a truly Islamic identity and establishing an Islamically- oriented order. They asked to what extent Muslims’ lack of competitiveness in the modern world contributed to their failures? Why Muslims have failed to take initiatives that have been taken by the West in developing their societies? Consequently, old ideas were redefined or polished and new concepts proposed. Although alien to Islamic heritage, they have encouraged the implementation of concepts such as nationalism, secularism, capitalism, and Marxist social radicalism. All these in their attempt to “modernize” Islam and subsequently restore independence of Muslim societies.

24

Collectively these outstanding Muslims were referred to as a movement of which called for (reform), taking a stance opposite to those who advocated (imitation) of the prophetic time (Al-Alwani, 1979). They argued that the “best” in European philosophy and science can be accommodated by Islam (Voll, 1982). Islam, they contended, is both din wa-dunya (religion and the world). The separation of din (religion) and dunya (world), particularly in the context of Sufi (mystic) teachings that give priority to the spiritual over the material dimensions of life, they argued, was the contributing factor towards the underdevelopment of Muslim societies. They saw an urgent need for Muslim societies to become competitive in the modern world and accommodate social change. Muslims, they suggested, must develop systems that are suitable to their historical and social milieu. They argued that the changes brought about under European colonialism have caused crisis in Muslim societies and, therefore, a fresh interpretation of Islam was warranted.

This accommodationist outlook saw many Muslim states adopt the political, economic, and educational institutions of the Western states that had colonized them. They embraced Western models of nationalism, parliamentary government, and economic and educational systems to achieve independence. However, as Esposito explains:

Neither liberal nationalism nor the radical /socialism of or the Baath party had succeeded. Problems of authoritarianism, legitimacy, and political participation continued to plague most Muslim countries. … corruption and the concentration of wealth persisted as twin pillars of Muslim society while poverty, illiteracy, and overpopulation galloped along unchecked. … The positive benefits of modernization seemed to benefit the few, while the lot of the masses remained relatively unchanged (1983:12).

Similarly, Hunter (1988) notes that despite the embrace of modernization and national development by the majority of Muslim states after independence in general social and economic conditions did not improve for ordinary Muslims with many continuing to experience poverty, social inequality, and injustice. The living standards of most ordinary Muslims barely changed. She argues that this was the result of incomplete modernization either because post-colonial Muslim states remained politically dependent or because the

25 benefits of modernization were monopolized by traditional elites (Hunter, 1988). A general feeling of decline and stagnation continued and the vast majority of Muslims finally realized that “the paradigm of modernisation and the political elites associated with it have failed to avert the Islamic world’s decline and end its state of political and economic dependency” (Hunter, 1988: xii). Hunter (1988) also suggests that because of the specific nature of the process of modernization and the imposing way in which it was applied proved counter productive and produced a widespread sense of despair and malaise. Instead of taking equal care of new cultural, social, and political attitudes and developing new and broad-based institutions with the ability to cater for the requirements of modernity, the focus centred exclusively on material modernization. By uprooting old social and political institutions and patterns of relationships, whether based on tradition or religion material modernity, created a void because the newly created social and political forces and other new demands were not properly catered for or offered proper channels of expression. “The result for the majority of people has been a growing feeling of psychological, social, and political alienation and disorientation” (Hunter, 1988: xiii).

The development of contemporary Islamic revivalism as a significant political phenomenon, according to Sidahmed and Ehteshami (1996) grows out of the experience of decolonization and continued underdevelopment in much of the Muslim world. Islamic revivalism emerged in response to the perceived failure of secular models of development on the one hand and strong antagonism towards the religion of Islam and its adherents on the other.

Social dislocation resulting from or accompanying economic “development,” rapid urbanization, destruction of traditional institutions, expansion of education, and social mobility had resulted in the growth of deep social tensions and discontent. This environment was compounded by the growing inability of the states to provide necessary services for their subjects as a result of mounting economic crises (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996 :7).

Importantly:

the process of modernization has generally been carried out in an unbalanced and unfair manner, with the economic and social benefits of modernization distributed unevenly among the Muslim populations. In addition, many Islamic leaders have used the paradigm of modernization to justify and legitimate their arbitrary rule (Hunter, 1988: xiii).

26

Muslims felt a strong sense of being socially, economically, and politically eclipsed and deprived of the benefits of modernization.

Contemporary Islamic revivalism is, therefore, a struggle against the forces “hostile” to religion and aspects of traditional and religious life. The Islamic revivalists who subscribe to this ideological approach see Islamic revivalism as the last hope for bringing about Islamically prudent and acceptable changes in their societies. For these revivalists, the return to pristine Islam is the solution to current existing problems. Through personal and social reform and Muslim unity, they seek to strengthen Islam and present it as the alternative to Western order. They see in Islamic revolution a real potential for the implementation of God’s will in the world which they have been commanded to do in their scripture, leading to positive changes in Muslim societies and consequently world peace and harmony. Muslims, as believers in the unity of God, see themselves as the chosen people bestowed with the responsibility to form the ummah, which is guided by the shariah, and be an exemplar for other people to follow and emulate.

2.2. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM Before proceeding to discuss (in some detail) various perspectives that seek to explain the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism, it would be helpful to briefly look at the key defining issues surrounding contemporary Islamic revivalism. Then briefly make some preliminary observations about the literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism and briefly discuss principal concepts surrounding contemporary Islamic revivalism.

2.2.1. Islamic Revivalism Defined As a concept and a phenomenon, contemporary Islamic revivalism is variously referred to as “activism”, “awakening”, “fundamentalism”, “neo-fundamentalism”, “integrism”, “”, “Khomeinism”, “messianism”, “militancy”, “millenarianism”, “puritanism”, “reassertion”, “reawakening”, “”, “reconstruction”, “re-emergence”, “reform”, “regeneration”, “”, “renewal”, “return to Islam”, “resurgence”, “resurrection”,

27 “revitalization”, “revival”, “revivification”, “revolution”, “traditionalism”, and “upsurge” (Dessouki, 1982: 4; Voll, 1982: 283; Dekmejian, 1985: 4; Haddad, 1986: 145; Burgat and Dowell, 1997: 2,8). Collectively these concepts describe the complex and diverse nature of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism revealing that Islamic revivalism is not a monolithic and unified phenomenon but rather a heterogeneous reality. As suggested by Dessouki, the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is “not a monolithic phenomenon but, rather, socially and historically conditioned” (1982: 14).

In general scholarly literature and in journalistic writing these concepts are used interchangeably rendering the terminology obscure and even problematic (Dekmejian, 1988). The use of so many terms to refer to contemporary Islamic revivalism does not help clarify the phenomenon. Furthermore, it is worth noting that within the language, Islamic revivalism finds many expressions too. Islamic revivalists in their writings have adopted expressions such as al-’th al-Islami (Islamic renaissance), al- shwa al-Islamiyah (Islamic awakening), ihyah ad-din (religious revival), al-taya’r al- Islami (Islamic current), al-itijah al-Islami (Islamic tendency), and al-usuliyah al- Islamiyah () (Dekmejian, 1985).

Suffice it to say though that all these concepts and terms in some direct or indirect way delineate the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Thus, it is difficult to find a common or universal definition of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. However, Dessouki provides a sociologically plausible definition when he says that the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism “refers to the increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic ideologies and symbols in Muslim societies and in the public life of Muslim individuals” (1982: 4). Daniel Pipes also offers an interesting definition - asserting that the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism “is understood to mean an increase in Islamic activism” which is concerned with “working for the goals of the shari’a, the sacred law of Islam” (1982: 35-36).

Given the problem of assigning a universal definition to this multidimensional and multifaceted phenomenon, this thesis draws on various definitions of contemporary

28 Islamic revivalism and concepts associated with it to provide a working definition: a process of purifying Islam from accretions and promoting its activism in pristine form both in public and privates affairs of Muslim individuals as a worldview and world order.

2.2.2. Theoretical Underdevelopment In recent years there has been a wide-ranging literature produced on Islamic revivalism. To mention a few in academic journals (Mutalib, 1990; Babeair, 1991, 1990; Marr, 1992; Momayezi, 1997; Said and Funk, 2001; Ali, 2003), edited books (Ahmad, 1983; Haddad, 1983; Voll, 1983; Arjomand, 1986; Esposito, 1991, 1989; Sivan, 1992; Metcalf, 1994), and in books (Commins, 1990; Esposito, 1992; , 1996; Haykel, 2003). Despite these (and other works) further studies about Islamic revivalist movements are necessary - particularly based on empirical research (Dessouki, 1982). Although there has been a sudden surge in written material on revivalist movements in recent years (Yassine, 2000; Attanassoff, 2005), sociology of Islam has a long way to go because there seems to be a significant lack of detailed research into particular aspects of Islamic revivalist movements, which in turn precludes the establishment of a theory to sufficiently explicate the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism.

The literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism needs to address the absence of sociological theory. In the context of Christianity, for instance, a Church-Sect theory exists which is widely utilised to explain the emergence of as social movements. However, in relation to Islam, despite a few attempts (Dessouki, 1982; Dekmejian, 1985, 1980; Tamadonfar, 1989), the field of contemporary Islamic revivalism remains “un- theorized or under-theorized”. As Salem remarks:

There exists a need to find new approaches to the study of the relationship between religion and politics, in general, and between Islam and Middle Eastern politics, in particular…social scientists are ill equipped… An intellectual block seems to hinder them, as they are not trained to consider the social reality of such a religious phenomenon as the return to the sacred in Islamic areas (1984: 6).

More generally, in relation to Middle Eastern studies, Brynen remarks:

29 Perhaps the most important issues that can be raised, however, relate to the theoretical underdevelopment of the field and the structural and ideological characteristics of the field which give rise to it … . This theoretical underdevelopment is evident not only in absolute terms, but also in comparison with African studies in particular (1986: 412).

Brynen arrives at this conclusion from his own research of quantitative, comparative, and longitudinal content analysis of a few key journals of Middle Eastern studies. He goes on to say:

existing theories (especially “grand theories”) of development, society, and politics have been found to be generally unuseful or inappropriate in explaining social processes in the (Brynen, 1986: 413).

Although, both Salem and Brynen made their observations in the 1980s, a decade later Abu-Rabi notes that the situation essentially remained unchanged and there continues to exist “the theoretical inadequacy of the writings on Islamic revivalism” (Abu-Rabi, 1994: 417).

Jennifer Chandler (2005) alludes to the fact that the there exists an absence of a theory of Islamic revivalism even in the current period because many contemporary writers on Islamic revivalist movements such as Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001) and Mona Younis (2000) opt for the Social Movement Theory for its basic explanatory value in exploring movements of Islamic revivalism. Chandler says that:

SMT [Social Movement Theory] draws upon processes and mechanism from rational-choice, structural, and cultural comparative political theories which enable a stronger explanatory value of understanding [Islamic revivalism and] actions and outcomes (Chandler, 2005: 1).

2.2.3. The Literature on Contemporary Islamic Revivalism In the literature revival is perceived by its proponents as an essential means of re- introducing and inculcating an Islamic way of life, which is governed exclusively by the shariah, into the ummah. Islamic revival involves a return to the fundamental puritanical foundation of Islam. Islam is not only a religion but a comprehensive way of life. All its rules are embodied in the shariah, which itself is founded upon the Qur’an and the

30 sunnah. The proponents of Islamic revivalism seek to re-establish the ethos of the pristine model and to apply it to contemporary circumstances in order to demonstrate Islam’s dynamism and its relevance to modernity. Thus, the contemporary revivalist literature, whilst not renouncing the prophetic era as an ideal, moves to advocate Islam as a broad and dynamic religion inherently capable of meeting the demands of the changing time and space (Haddad, 1982; Imara, 1985; Boulares, 1990; Nasr, 1990; Akhavi, 1992; Smith, 1992; Ahmad, 1994). For Islam to play its complete and vibrant role, the proponents of contemporary Islamic revivalism rally support from all Muslims encouraging them to form a and an ummah leading to the construction of a just and better future for all. As a result, the literature concentrates on the nature of the future being conceived and the likelihood of its acceptance and success (Tibi, 1990; Moussalli, 1992, 1993; Engineer, 2005). In this ideology Muslims are made to assume a new and prominent role as ’s vicegerents to restore His sovereignty on earth founded upon the Qur’anic injunctions (Rahman, 1967; Safi, 1991).

In a sense then, the written works on contemporary Islamic revivalism reveal a tension between two great civilizations - Islam and the West - and the recognition by Muslims of their own internal malaise (Ayubi, 1991; Haddad, 1991; Pelletreau et al., 1994; Gellner, 1995; Pasha and Samatar, 1996; Said and Funk, 2001). This is a highly complex tension which prevails in an epoch which itself is enormously complex and fast changing. This epoch is modernity.

As already mentioned the contemporary Islamic revivalism, therefore, is a response to the consequences of modernity. Voll expresses this response by saying that those who seek to revive Islam construct:

the Islamic discourse in a way that does not attempt to start with western forms of modern ideas. … western ideological formulations, whether liberal or radical, capitalist or communist, are seen by many Muslims as having failed. The emphasis therefore has shifted from “modernizing” Islam to the of the modern experience (1991: 24).

Islamization of modern experience entails the reintroduction of Islamic symbols, rituals, and institutions in the public sphere rendering religion both a private and public affair. By

31 lifting the ban on Islamic symbols in public spaces and making Islam part and parcel of both private and public life, modern experience can be one in which Muslims can display and enjoy their Islamic identity and heritage.

Those Muslims who have taken a leading role in revitalizing Islamic faith in recent years reveal this changing context in their thinking. Of course local conditions are never the same from which the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism find expression, however, certain broad themes common among the Muslim revivalists have emerged.

Two prominent themes can be identified that are consistent with the revivalist thought in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. The first theme highlights the key concepts that have been pivotal to Islamic revivalism of the pre-modern era and have continued to be part of it in present times. The second theme involves the transformation or recontextualization of old concepts to suit modern times.

The following is only a brief review of key concepts under the two separate themes that appear and play a part in the discourses of Islamic revivalism both in the pre-modern and current periods.

2.2.4. The Concepts of Tajdid and Mujaddid Under the first theme, one key concept in Islamic revivalist discourse is the notion of revival itself. The concept of revival has two constituent components. One component is tajdid denoting “regeneration” and the other component is mujaddid denoting a “renewer of the faith”. Efforts at revitalizing the Muslim community have been made periodically throughout Islamic history. Calls for tajdid in line with Qur’anic teachings and the ways of have been made regularly, particularly in recognition of the need for a centennial regeneration, revival, and reform of the faith. This is based on the popular perspective of Mahdism (messianism). The perspective asserts that Allah will send a mujaddid to the ummah at the beginning of every century to restore the “proper” teachings and practices of Islam. While there are disagreements over who were the in the past and who are the mujaddids now (and will be in the future), there is,

32 however, almost total agreement among Muslims regarding the idea of mujaddids as important figures in Muslim societies. Revival is pivotal to Islamic ethos and many Muslims take the concept literally, putting all their energies in this cause.

2.2.5. The Concept of Jihad Another vital concept, under this theme, is jihad. It is a complex concept but in recent years it has come to simply mean, particularly in the West, a “holy war”. The concept of jihad is not restricted to a single meaning or its meaning is this narrow. In fact, in its broadest sense jihad means “striving in the path of Allah”. The striving can be internally oriented as practiced by Sufis seeking spiritual renewal of the self or externally focused as often advocated by militants calling Muslims to “holy war” or arms. The concept of jihad encompasses a variety of important efforts and they have been part of Islamic heritage since the very early days of Islam. Contemporary revivalists stress that this complex heritage is important and draw upon it in their efforts to revive Islam in present times.

2.2.6. The Concept of Jahiliyah Under the second theme is the concept of jahiliyah. It is an Arabic term open to some controversy in the literature over its meaning and its referents. There are some who argue that jahiliyah is the antithesis of (knowledge) (Maududi, 1986, 1980b, 1979, 1972, 1961) and some argue that it is the antithesis of hilm (gentleness) (Goldziher, 1966).

Sayyid Abu’l A’la Maududi was an early pioneer in contemporary revivalist thought who dealt with the concept of jahiliyah in great depth. His work has some resonance in the thinking of Sayyid . Qutb (n.d.) sees jahiliyah as becoming manifest in the modern period. In fact, he refers to the modern period as jahili (pre-Islamic or the non-Islamic epoch). He argues that the state of jahiliyah is a particular period in time or a condition or set of conditions that can come into being at any time (n.d.). He asserts:

If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in , and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s

33 sovereignty on earth … . It is now in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed (Qutb, n.d.:10-11).

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, jahiliyah has come to represent the opposite condition of Islam and an important part of revivalist rhetoric (Voll, 1991). Jahiliyah as an antithesis of Islam in the contemporary period, is a far worse than any which preceded the advent of Islamic revelation. This is because Muslims who believe that Islam had dispelled ignorance and darkness fourteen centuries ago and replaced it with the Truth still succumb to secularised existence in the West. For the revivalists, to not know and commit jahili acts can be excused but to know and yet not refrain from it is inexcusable.

In his study of Qutb’s articulation of historical and modern jahiliyah, Choueiri (1990) argues that, to the advent of Islam, jahiliyah denoted ignorance due to a lack of understanding of the world. However, in the present time, science and rationality have transported humanity into a new realm of knowledgeability and therefore human beings can no longer plead ignorance about the world. Thus, jahiliyah in the current period cannot be described as lack of knowledge, but, rather “aggression against God’s governance on the earth” (Choueiri, 1990: 95). It is the latter which concerns the revivalists the most.

2.2.7. The Concept of Tawhid Broadly speaking then, the underlying themes and objectives of the historic traditions of Islamic revivalism have remained constant. That is, there is an ongoing emphasis on the comprehensiveness and universality of Islam and a strict interpretation of the unity of God which permits no human sovereignty other than God. At least in the ideal, religion and politics are not distinct spheres. This idea of tawhid (oneness of God), according to the revivalists, needs to be understood not by blindly accepting interpretations put forward by theologians and scholars but by directly drawing on the primary sources – the Qur’an and the sunnah – for explanations by exercising (independent interpretation of the Qur’an and the sunnah). Hence one needs to learn and understand the Qur’an and the sunnah as part of religious obligation. The role of the ulama (Islamic

34 scholars) in all this is merely to facilitate this process. The dependence on ijtihad ensures that the contemporary Islamic revivalism embodies the continuing dynamism of the Islamic tradition and manifest it in social, economic, and political planning and developments.

In their efforts to re-energize and reassert the Islamic message in the present time, the revivalists, therefore, focus on tawhid. In Islamic it is the most pivotal concept. Prior to the emergence of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism, the concept of tawhid was straight-forward in meaning. As Abd al-Rahman Azzam simply puts it, tawhid “means the act of belief in the oneness of God” (1964: 53).

The concept of tawhid has appeared almost constantly in Muslim intellectual discourse for a very long time. Therefore, it has received adequate attention. For instance, Muhammad Abduh, a Muslim modernist writer from Egypt, deals with the concept of tawhid in great depth in his work. Despite being a modernist Muslim, his understanding of the concept of tawhid reveals a remarkable concordance with the perennial descriptions in Islamic theological thought. He contends that the:

theology of unity (tawhid) is the science that studies the being and attributes of god, the essential and the possible affirmations about Him … . The original meaning of tawhid is the belief that God is one in inalienable divinity. Thus the whole science of theology is named from the most important of its parts, … the unity of God in Himself and in the action of creation (Abduh, 1966: 29).

In recent times, what Abduh describes above as tawhid, has been transformed, however. Tawhid in contemporary context is more than merely a belief in the unity of Allah. It is a belief as well as an action-laden process. In other words, tawhid is believing in the unity of Allah and at the same time implementing that belief in practical reality: doing all that is prescribed in the Qur’an and the sunnah.

Maududi redefined and transformed tawhid from being merely a concept into a process. He conceived of tawhid as belief in Allah as well as a practical process in which Allah is revered, obeyed, and worshipped. For Maududi, the proclamation that “there is no

35 divinity but God” is a “summons that man respond to Him with his whole being in exclusive service and obedience and devotion and ” (Ahmad and , 1979: 365).

2.3. THREE KEY PERSPECTIVES The explanations for the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism are manifold. Some explanations focus on single variable or factor, whilst others focus on a combination of variables. However, generally speaking, the explanations for the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism can be organised into two separate categories. In the first category, the explanations primarily centre on social, economic, and political variables and in the second category, they mainly centre on historical, cultural, and religious variables. A number of writers like Tessler (1997), Sidahmed and Ehteshami (1996), Zubaida (1993), and Dekmejian (1985) fit into the first category. Take Dekmejian, for example. He argues that the multidimensional social crisis caused by social and economic factors provide the catalyst for contemporary Islamic revivalism (1985). He remarks that “ebb and flow of Islamic [revivalism] throughout history reveals an ongoing dialectic between Islam and its social-economic-political environment” (Dekmejian, 1985: 19).

Like Dekmejian, Zubaida contends that the “root of the ‘Islamic phenomenon’ are the well known economic and demographic problems and the policy dilemmas they pose for government” (1993: xvi). Further, he argues that the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is a modern ideological construct and not the “product of a historical continuity with an essential Islam preserved in the hearts and of people” (1993: 137).

Another writer, Tessler (1997), argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is the result of poor political and economic circumstances in many Muslim countries and not the outcome of religious and cultural traditions. In the face of rising unemployment, the increasing divide between rich and poor, and lack of opportunities for young men and

36 women in terms of employment and education, Tessler purports that people in the dar al- Islam:

regard their problems as grounded in existing patterns of political economy, and they accordingly attribute much of the responsibility for their plight to the political regimes by which they are governed (1997: 93).

The failure of their own governments and precarious local conditions, Tessler (1997) maintains, turn Muslims towards Islam in which they find sanctuary.

Furthermore, Sidahmed and Ehteshami argue that:

social dislocation resulting from or accompanying economic “development,” rapid urbanization, destruction of traditional institutions, expansion of education, and social mobility had resulted in the growth of deep social tensions and discontent (1996: 7).

Adding to this malaise, they (1996) further argue, is the constant failure of the states to meet people’s social needs in the face of rising economic problems. Consequently, they assert, “The combination of these factors created fertile ground for the growth of forces and [Islamic revivalism]” (1996: 7).

The criticism levelled against the social, economic, and political explanation is that it offers a purely secular interpretation of the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism. It fails to appreciate the inclusivity of religion and politics in Islam. Scholars like Shahin argues that such an explanation de-emphasizes the “role and relevance of religion in social and political development” (Shahin, 1997: 2). The essence of the criticism of the social, economic, and political explanation is captured in Ayubi’s analysis of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism which he asserts is the embodiment of diverse revivalist movements. He says that:

The point to be emphasised, however, is that although Islamic movements may emerge out of social conditions … they do not represent doctrinally a mere mechanical reflection of social and economic concerns… . As such we would be making a serious mistake if we applied a vulgar type of reductionism to the discourse of the Islamic movements and assumed that they did not really mean what they were talking about,… . Economic, social and political factors may give rise to specific movements at specific times, but such movements soon have a logic and a life of their own… . It would also be naïve to assume that man has no spiritual and moral needs (1991:125).

37

Hunter (1988) argues that although social, economic, and political explanation is important in accounting for the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism, it is nevertheless an inadequate explanation. There are various other variables such as cultural, religious, moral, juridical, and psychological that play crucial roles. They have to be taken into consideration in combination with social, economic, and political factors to better understand contemporary Islamic revivalism.

In the second category are writers like Babeair (1991), Donohue (1983), and Jansen (1986). Babeair, for example, suggests that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a religious and cultural response to life at the conclusion of the twentieth century (1991).

Babeair (1991) that contemporary Islamic revivalism is religiously and culturally a backward looking process which is founded on three basic premises:

(i) the unchangingness of the world, (ii) the finality and supremacy of Islam, and (iii) of Prophet Muhammad as the perfect model that Muslims must imitate. He argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is an attempt to re- establish Islam as an idealized world religion or culture.

Donohue (1983), similarly, suggests that there are indeed other economic and political factors involved in raising Islamic consciousness, however, contemporary Islamic revivalism is a reassertion of Islamic identity which is a reaction to a deep-seated, on- going clash of cultures which is yet to be reconciled. Through his content analysis research into the literature on Islam, Donohue shows the increasing importance of Islam as an aspect of Muslim identity. In other words, culturally inspired return to the fundamentals of Islam.

38 Jansen (1986) echoes Donohue’s assertion. Jensen believes that contemporary Islamic revivalism is the result of cultural irreconcilability of Islam with the modern world. This is a long on-going experience of Muslims perhaps since the Renaissance when the West produced a variety of innovations.

Abu-Rabi (1994) is another writer whose analysis of the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism focuses on historical analysis of Islam. His key assertion is that Islamic revivalism is a “historical phenomenon” and that any understanding of contemporary Islamic revivalism has to particularly “integrate the historical reality of Western exploitation of the Muslim world into coherent system of analysis” (1994: 419).

Dessouki (1982) criticizes the historical, cultural, and religious approach to understanding the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Whilst he agrees that historical, cultural, and religious variables or factors are useful for the understanding of contemporary Islamic revivalism, they are essentially inadequate. He asserts that any studies of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism first and foremost needs “to be interdisciplinary, comparative, and integrative” (1982: 8). He goes on to say that contemporary Islamic revivalism:

have to be seen in relation to the specific process of social change taking place in [specific Muslim] societies, in particular to issues of the changing position of classes and groups, political participation, identity crisis, the stability of regimes, and distributive justice (1982: 8).

Raymond Hinnebusch (1982) makes similar observations emphasizing the interchange between sectarian, regional, and class factors in directly contributing to the return to the fundamentals of Islam.

From the two abovementioned explanatory categories emerge three key perspectives on the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. These are:

(i) socio-economic and political or what is collective called crisis perspective, (ii) success perspective, and

39 (iii) defensive reaction to modernity perspective.

They will be adopted in this thesis in conjunction with three other approaches - Church- Sect theory, Deprivation theory, and Maududian Islamic Revivalism, that are discussed in the next chapter, to analyse the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. The three key perspectives that are discussed in detail below are adopted in this thesis because they collective offer a multidimensional view on the emergence of contemporary Islamic revivalism which is critical to the sociological understanding of Islam in the modern period.

2.3.1. Socio-economic and Political or Crisis Perspective The socio-economic and political or crisis perspective sees contemporary Islamic revivalism as a manifestation of a society in crisis and the solution to the crisis is a return to pristine Islam. Acknowledging that at the current stage of the development of Islamic revivalism it is not possible to identify an exact cluster of catalysts, this perspective identifies numerous causal factors responsible for the degeneration of Muslim societies and returning to the fundamentals of Islam is the solution.

R. Hrair Dekmejian asserts that:

At the most general level of analysis, the recent quest for a return to the Islamic ethos appears to be a natural response to the successive pathological experiences which have buffeted Islamic societies in contemporary times. This protracted crisis milieu included the disorienting political, economic and social impact of Western and Soviet imperialism … the emergence of Western and Marxist secularist ideological movements… . Consequently, the catalysts of the crisis environment which appear to have triggered a return to Islamic roots are multi-dimensional (1980: 3).

He (1980) then identifies these catalysts as identity conflict, class conflict, political conflict, cultural crisis, legitimacy crisis, and military impotence. What he makes of this is that “to an increasing number of alienated Muslims, Islam does appear to provide a practical political alternative as well as a secure spiritual niche and psychological anchor in a turbulent world” (Dekmejian, 1980: 9).

40 The socio-economic and political or crisis perspective stresses the significance of the underlying continuities within Islamic traditions and Islam is construed as a haven catering for everyone but more advantageously for those who have found themselves pushed to the margins of the modern world. Given the tremendous changes brought about by modernization and development, many aspects of Islamic faith remained constant that are found to be familiar to the Muslims and to which they can relate. For instance, the festivals of Eid al-Fitr (festival celebrated at the end of the Holy month of ) and Eid al-Adha (festival of ).

Esposito, another proponent of this perspective, locates Muslim crisis in the context of European colonialism, arguing that the advent of colonialism produced a major crisis of Muslim identity:

The disintegration of the traditional Islamic political order and the struggle against European colonialist intervention and rule provided both an identity crisis and a political purpose for Muslims in the twentieth century (1983: 5).

He identifies two key factors responsible for the revival of Islam in recent history:

an identity crisis precipitated by a sense of utter impotence, disillusionment, and loss of self- esteem [and] disillusionment with the West and the failure of many governments to respond adequately to the political and socio-economic needs of their societies (1983: 11).

2.3.2. Success Perspective In contrast to the previous perspective, the success perspective lays emphasis on the changes implemented by Muslims in their societies. They are seen as significant contributing factors in rejuvenating Islam since the 1970s. The success perspective uses as its point of departure a particular crucial aspect of Islamic experience. Within Islam there has been a positive relationship between historical success and the right observance of Islamic teachings.

Muslim success was the proper and full implementation of God’s Will. The failure of Muslims was, according to Wilfred Smith (1957), the broken link between proper

41 adherence to Islamic faith and mundane affairs. And this broken link needed to be fixed by Muslims returning to the straight path of Islam.

The social ills that plagued the dar al-Islam according to Pipes were because “Muslims abandoned Islamic political customs and goals during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the West enjoyed predominant power” (1982: 44). The solution to this malaise was simply in returning to Islamic sources – the Qur’an and the practices of Prophet Muhammad (Pipes 1982).

Hence, according to Voll (1982) the 1970s saw Muslims, particularly the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) countries, gain some international political influence as a result of oil wealth, and active participation by prominent Muslims in global issues started to emerge. This led to the recognition of Muslim societies as important partners in the global community (Voll, 1982). Casting their vision on Islamic success in history, Muslims realized the link between success and proper observance of their faith.

Certain significant events says Pipes (1980) - such as the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil embargo, and the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 - provided Muslims a much needed boost in confidence. All of a sudden emboldened Muslims and revivalists came to realise the potency of Islam and how they could change their predicament by strictly adhering to Islamic precepts. They interpreted this political and military success as evidence of the power of Islam. However, Muslim success and enhanced self-image according to Daniel Pipes (1980) was due to one single important factor and that was oil revenues. Pipes claims that:

In the 1970s came the oil boom, and suddenly Muslims could stand up to their Christian nemesis. The long slide downward was stopped, as some Muslims again enjoyed the wealth and power that was their due as God’s community. The oil boom marked a turning point in Muslim consciousness: more than anything else, it prepared the way for widespread Islamic political activity (1980: 20).

Thus, success and wealth produced power and power led to Islamic revivalism.

42

2.3.3. Defensive Reaction to Modernity Perspective The last perspective, which is the defensive reaction15 to modernity perspective, acknowledges the multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism and asserts that this sociologically significant phenomenon cannot be explained adequately by a single factor or by a set of factors to the exclusion of the other. There is no rational basis to treat the two in a mutually exclusive way. Given that they overlap, the explanation of contemporary Islamic revivalism, according to this perspective, will be better served by synthesising all the key factors into an integrative analysis.

Thus, according to this perspective, Islamic revivalism is a defensive reaction to the prevailing conditions in the modern epoch. In other words, it is a defensive reaction to modernity. This doesn’t mean it is against modernization per se, but rather it is anti- westernization and anti-secularization. This perspective argues that the catalysts for contemporary Islamic revivalism are the negative consequences of the processes of modernization. The modernization model and the political elites linked to it have been unsuccessful in preventing the Muslim world’s decline and stop its political and economic dependency on the West. A number of scholars have taken this stance namely Rahman (1982), Keyder (1986), Hunter (1988), Ayubi (1991), Kaplan (1992), Tibi (1993, 1988), Marty and Appleby (1993), Mendelsohn (1993), Lechner (1995), Sivan (1995), Choueiri (1996), Roy (2001).

Hunter argues in favour of this perspective:

Thus, while material modernity has tended to disintegrate old sociopolitical institutions and patterns of relationships, it has not replaced them with new ones… . The result for the majority of people … psychological, social, and political alienation… . These feelings … propelled, … to seek some sense of stability and continuity by reverting to their traditional way of life. In the context of Islamic countries, that has meant a return to Islam (1988: xiii).

15 Defensive reaction entails a cautionary participation by Muslims in the process of modernization with pristine Islam acting as a frame of reference for Muslim collective identity and a symbol of self-assertion in order to protect Muslim peoples’ traditional sources of solidarity, history, and integrity of their value system.

43

From defensive reaction to modernity perspective, modernization has been largely unsuccessful in creating a just foundation for world societies and overcoming the social ills that have plagued humanity for a long while now. As Ayubi argues:

When modernisation stumbled, failing to achieve the promised economic development and instead deepening the alienation and dependency of society, groups that were previously excluded or were promised what was never given, came forward with their alternative ideational system: ‘Islam’ (1991: 216).

Similarly Keyder argues that when Muslims failed to benefit from capitalism and modernization, they turned their backs on them and accepted revivalism as “a community-building movement, seeking to keep the noxious effects of the market, which is identified with secularist immorality, out of the community of believers” (1986: 13). The failure in these world views have meant returning to Islam for resolution, solace, and refuge.

Sivan (1995) is another scholar who maintains that the return to the fundamentals of Islam is the result of the community of believers formulating, from the symbols rooted in tradition, its own world view which stands in stark contrast to modern world view. He suggests that revivalists see modernity as “humanity’s revolt against God” (1995: 21). He says that revivalists see modernity as a state of jahiliyah which “consists of rejecting the sovereignty (hakimiyya) of Allah by replacing his laws with ones made by man …. [and] a reminiscent of the first century as Darwinism, materialism, and other human- centred paradigms loom as idols” (1995: 21).

Sivan’s thesis is that modernity is perceived by revivalists “as geared to serve human self-realization, even if by transgressing (or adapting and subverting) God- prescribed (shari‘a) rules of conduct” (1995: 20). Wedged between Islam and jahiliyah, the revivalists embark on the mission to revive Islam and secure anchorage by retreating “into the enclave community, shoring up their social and physical boundaries, and from there branching out, as circumstances permit, into educational and welfare extensions and local political work” (Sivan, 1995: 45).

44

Everett Mendelsohn agues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity but a defensive reaction to it, that revivalists “seek in their educational and political programs to construct a viable synthesis between tradition and modernity” he maintains (1993: 23). He suggests that the commonly held belief that science and technology which are the manifestations of modernization and whose ownership rests with the West are challenged by the revivalists. According to Mendelsohn revivalists claim that science has its origins in Abrahamic and religious revivalism is not an attempt to reconcile religion with science but to regain “ownership and control of things inspired and nurtured in their traditions before the secularizing Enlightenment separated scientia from its ties to revealed religion” (1993: 24).

Mendelsohn (1993) argues that revivalists believe that the “disjoining” of religion and science or the process of secularization have effectively removed all the restraints against what may be described in revivalist language as harmful forces of modern science and technology. Created by God to operate in perfect harmony to control nature, the Enlightenment project accompanied by the secularization process at the advent of modernity have inappropriately introduced rivalry between science and religion adversely impacting on nature and now revivalists have emerged as “the restorers of the lost harmony” (Mendelsohn, 1993: 24).

Similarly, Dessouki (1982) finds contemporary Islamic revivalism as a defensive reaction to modernity, in particular to Western secularism. Agreeing with Dessouki and the abovementioned authors, Tibi argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is “a religious response to modernity” (1993: 73). Modernity is reflected in science and technology, which is closely associated with the West. But science, Tibi (1993) maintains, is a “cultural product” and the modern world, apart from its coalescing qualities, is a culturally plural reality. Hence, the reactionary attitude towards the West by non-Western peoples - including the Muslims - is not necessarily against science and technology, but, rather against the superiority complex of the West and its cultural impositions (Tibi, 1993). Tibi asserts that although the revivalists demand “the de-westernization of

45 knowledge” they, nevertheless, look favourably towards science and technology and therefore are not anti-modernity but anti-westernization and anti-secularization (Tibi, 1993). He argues that in essence contemporary Islamic revivalism means “that the protest against Western cultural hegemony does not necessarily include a wholesale rejection of the scientific and technological achievements of the West” (Tibi, 1993: 74) but complete condemnation of Western secularism.

Furthermore, Fazlur Rahman (1982) maintains that contemporary Islamic revivalism which he calls “neorevivalism” or “neofundamentalism” is a reaction against modernity or in his words against “classical modernism”. He argues that:

in an important way, [contemporary Islamic revivalism] is novel because its basic élan is anti- Western (and, by implication of course, anti-Westernism). Hence its condemnation of classical modernism as a purely Westernizing force (1982: 136).

Rahman also claims that:

The neorevivalist has undoubtedly served as a correction not only for several types of excesses in classical modernism but, above all, for secularist trends that would otherwise have spread much faster in Muslim societies. That is to say, neorevivalism has reoriented the modern-educated lay Muslim emotionally toward Islam (1982: 137).

Rajaee argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a response:

to the consequences of modernity – to its political (i.e., colonialism), educational (i.e., new school systems and modern institutions of learning), and ideological (i.e., the ideologies of nationalism, democracy, and socialism) by-products (1993: 103).

Like Rajaee, Roy argues that contemporary Islamic revivalism is a modern phenomenon and a response – a response “of anti-colonialism, of anti-imperialism, which today has simply become anti-Westernism” (Roy, 2001: 4).

2.4. THE IDEOLOGY OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM The quintessential role of theory and philosophy is to explain and provide an understanding of the complexities and the nature of any phenomena. However, ideology seeks to fulfil an objective. It is, in fact, an idea-system that seeks to interpret anew the world and at the same time transform it. Thus, “Ideology is an ingredient of society

46 which cannot be subdivided into a base-superstructure scheme: ideology and social structure are in a dialectical not a schematic causal relationship” (Tibi, 1988: 37).

Islamic revivalists have an articulated ideology and definitive plan. They generally:

operate out of an acute sense of the rational need for change on the individual and community levels: the individual, through a comprehensive process of socialization and mobilization; and the community, through the integration of Islamic values into the political, economic, and administrative structure of society (Shahin, 1997: 202).

Islam reinforces group norms and provides for the institution of moral sanctions for individual behaviour. Family, juma (Friday congregational prayer) gathering, and (consultative committee) are three good examples of this. Further, it provides universal goals and values, which in turn offer a sense of stability and unity to the ummah and contribute to its security and equilibrium.

This makes revivalism an attempt to re-establish an Islamic order modelled on pristine Islam, free from accretions and foreign influences. As James Piscatori observes, “[the] common approach among Muslims themselves stresses the imperative of returning to an unadulterated version of Islam in order to overcome the debased politics of our age” (1983: 3).

With the commitment and puritan existence of Muslims governed by the shariah, a society in which justice, moral purity, peace, and prosperity prevail can be achieved through a pure Islamic polity (Guazzone, 1995). Moral purity, therefore, is the key aspect of revivalist ideology. To be a complete and true Muslim one has to live in an Islamic state governed by the shariah pursuing a divinely commissioned purpose (Esposito, 1983). In revivalist circles this is an important issue and to achieve this one has to properly adhere to Islamic teachings made possible in a properly established Islamic state. Untainted morality is achievable, for the revivalist movements, not through rationality but through serious observance of the shariah (Moussalli, 1999). Islam is din wa-dawlah (religion and state) precisely because morality is absolute. Thus, revivalist ideology conceives of Islam as all-encompassing system embodying social, economic,

47 political, and spiritual aspects of life into one complete and holistic order (Moussalli, 1999).

2.5. THE OBJECTIVES OF CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REVIVALISM Contemporary Islamic revivalism is an attempt to bring about personal and social change. The world is in crisis and change, therefore, is necessary. Change denotes making necessary adjustments in the material world and pursue life in full light of the shariah (Jansen, 1986; Abdelnasser, 1994). Spiritually oriented revivalists - such as the members of the Tablighi Jamaat - seek indirect transformation of society. They emphasize self- reformation arguing that social change depends on individual change. They take a “bottom-up” approach to change in society. The politically oriented revivalists such as the Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Organization) seek change beyond the individual level. They insist on regaining political power. They strive for the removal of authoritarian, repressive, and unrepresentative regimes and the creation of Islamic institutions as a priority. The achievements of the ummah under a pious caliph is to restore justice, equity, and and promote public and private piety. In this light, Moussalli remarks:

Islam’s main goal, from the [revivalist] perspective, is the unity of races, peoples, and societies; its necessary concomitant principle is eliminating the multiplicity of systems, institutions, and sources of conflict and confrontations, such as nationalism, patriotism, racism, ideologies, and economic interests (Moussalli, 1999: 64).

Revivalists hope to turn the direction of life from secularism to . In their view political stability, social equilibrium, and economic prosperity in society all depend on not on materialism. Thus, as Shahin puts it, the goal of revivalists is:

not based on accelerating the process of development, nor on a desire to block ongoing changes taking place in society. On the contrary, they aim at redirecting the political orientation of their respective countries from secularism to Islamism (1997: 241).

In order to understand the objectives of revivalist movements it is critical to examine the relationship between religion, politics, and society in Islam. Of course one of the primary objectives is the establishment of an Islamic state but how could a revivalist movement of religio-political orientation be understood? There is obviously a diversity of explications

48 attempted by various modern Sunni theorists (Taji-Farouki, 1996). One way to understand this is to take the Islamic state to mean what Esposito describes as “a community of believers” (1983: 4). The legitimacy of the Islamic state hinges on social philosophy of life and specific political and moral philosophy (Moussalli, 1999). This, however, does not address the question of what an Islamic state should be in its nature, its function, and its foundational basis. Therefore, there are some (the liberal modernists) which claim that a state that employs Islamic values, symbols, and institutions such as that proposed and implemented in Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser is minimally sufficient for Muslims to live under (Salem, 1980). A state that roots its ideology in Islamic heritage and accepts science and technology but rejects foreign ideology such as Western capitalism, communism, and socialism is tolerable. Then there are others who argue that complete implementation of the shariah by the state is what gives it an Islamic character, credibility, and legitimacy.

The contemporary concept of an Islamic state is elusive. After the abolition of the Ottoman Empire by the Grand National Assembly of in 1924, numerous thinkers emerged to offer new explanations of the relationship between religion and politics, and what entails an Islamic state. Maulana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Maududi was prominent amongst these thinkers. At the outset his conception of the Islamic state and his ideas about the relationship between religion and politics seem to be a modernization of the classical theory of the caliphate. However, upon revisiting his work it seems that his primary concern was the application of the shariah in the affairs of the state. His challenge was to give birth to a state that embodied his idea of the ummah. Maududi believed that religion - din - and politics were intertwined together (1986). He also asserted that “The chief characteristic of Islam is that it makes no distinction between the spiritual and the secular life” (1986: 9).

Maududi (1980b) contended that in order to be a Muslim, as articulated by the din, individual Muslims had to struggle for a caliphate, for only within the structural boundary of the caliphate could Muslims live a truly Islamic lives and have a truly Islamic identity. The caliphate was required because Islam as a way of life would not find full and proper

49 expression in everyday Muslim living unless Islam itself controlled the power structures (Maududi, 1980b). Therefore from Maududi’s perspective Islamic revivalism depends on its control of political power.

Maududi argued that the shariah had to be given prominence over “man-made” laws and then implemented both in public and private affairs of Muslim experience. For the shariah to gain clear prominence, it would have to pervade all aspects of social conduct and re-assert the inclusivity of religion and politics (Maududi, 1979). This would be an unequivocal manifestation of the faith and to ignore or even deny it would be to reject the need to be a “true” Muslim. Maududi saw no hope for progress and salvation for Muslims outside Islamic structure and a secular political order was an impediment to the full implementation of Islamic faith. Thus, he rendered politics sacred, asserting:

If you believe in God and His Prophet and accept the Qur’an as the Book of God, then inevitably you have to use moral principles which Islam teaches and will have to accept the political principles which it has given (Maududi, 1980b: 21).

The ummah could only really come into being with the establishment of the caliphate. The Muslim identity that corresponded with Maududi’s notion of Islamic existence could only become a reality with it’s clear endorsement by an . Therefore the caliphate was not just a means for bringing into being the ummah but at the same time it was a model for ideal government with universal relevance (Maududi, 1980b).

From a secular or Western perspective of state-theories, the proposed Islamic model has some fundamental problems. The problem is in the fact that whilst the modern state model and international system of states are founded upon a secular principle (Tripp, 1996), the Islamic model of the state is an embodiment of religion and politics as an inclusive unitary system. Conceptually and pragmatically they are mutually exclusive. Thus, an Islamic state cannot be modern, as George explains:

Modern states exist only as parts of this international order and by virtue of its secular law… . As components of the international system of states, then, Muslim states, qua states, are no less secular than their non-Muslim counterparts. By the same token, an Islamic state is a contingent impossibility, a sheer contradiction in terms; Islam and the secular are mutually exclusive (1996: 73).

50

From Maududi’s perspective, for the Islamic state to have any credibility and legitimacy there has to be a total removal of the current world order, and the void thus created, then, has to be filled by an Islamic system.

CONCLUSION The literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism demonstrates that it is a multifaceted and complex phenomenon. This phenomenon has its roots in European colonialism and it is a defensive reaction to the consequences of modernity. It is by no means a new phenomenon, however. What distinguishes it from past revivalisms, particularly in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, is that whilst in the past revivalism of Islam was bent on reconstructing Islamic spirituality and morality based on pristine Islam, contemporary Islamic revivalism goes a step further to mount a defensive reaction against the status quo, that is, defensive reaction against modernity, in particular against westernization and secularization.

The bulk of the literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism provides a look into the attempt by revivalists to rebuild Islamic order as an alternative to Western modernity which, Islamic revivalists claim, has failed humanity dismally. Islam has to re-emerge as a universal system to save the world from sliding into irreversible jahiliyah. For Islam to reassert itself as a global power, Muslims have to remove all the accretions and innovations from every day life and return to the fundamentals of Islam. The re- emergence of pristine Islam, on which are based Muslim identity and cultural values, will only occur when Muslims will accept and implement internal jihad (on the self) and external jihad (on foreign forces and influences – modernity).

Most importantly, however, the literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism reveals the absence of a theory of contemporary Islamic revivalism, therefore, the problem with the comprehensive sociological understanding of the phenomenon. Although the three key perspectives on contemporary Islamic revivalism come a long way in providing an insight into contemporary Islamic revivalism, the sociological understanding of it

51 remains inadequate and this thesis goes to some degree to address that epistemological void.

52 CHAPTER THREE

THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND RELIGIOUS RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION There are a number of theories that attempt to explain the emergence of contemporary religious revivalism. Some of these are exclusively in the context of Christianity and others are generalist in nature - with the exception of Maududian Islamic Revivalism which is a model designed exclusively for Muslims to revive their religion in light of the Qur’an and the sunnah. Some of these theories are: Church-Sect theory (Niebuhr, 1929; Troeltsch, 1931; Johnson, 1963; Stark and Bainbridge, 1979); Counter-Culture theory (Rozak, 1969; Slater, 1970; Prince, 1975); Cultural Crisis theory (Needleman, 1970; Eister, 1975;); Anti-Cultural theory (Lasch, 1975; Rosen, 1976); Deprivation theory (Glock, 1964); and Maududian Islamic Revivalism (Maududi, 1991, 1986, 1980a, 1980b, 1979, 1976a, 1976b, 1945).

As mentioned above, there are a number of theoretical frameworks that can be employed to understand contemporary religious revivalism, however, in this chapter the Church- Sect theory, Deprivation theory, and Maududian Islamic Revivalism will be relied on. The reason for this is because by blending these theories a multidimensional basis is created for the understanding of a multidimensional phenomenon of contemporary religious revivalism.

In this chapter I will show contemporary Islamic revivalism is in essence a response to modernity where religion inevitably undergoes change or is subjected to the process of secularization and the fear of the decline of religion is aroused. The emergence of religious revivalism is an attempt to demonstrate and understand this fear. As well, it offers a clear insight into the process of reversal of the decline of religion.

Importantly, I will argue in this chapter that in the absence of a comprehensive and coherent theory of Islamic revivalism, a central concern of this dissertation, a synthesis of

53 the Church-Sect, Deprivation, and Maududi’s Islamic Revivalism theories are a very useful way of conceptualizing the contemporary phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. This is one of the most appropriate ways to empirically explore the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism based on the analysis of the Tablighi Jamaat.

3.1. CHURCH-SECT THEORY The Church-Sect theory differentiates between the church as a form of religious institution and a sect as a religious movement. The central focus of this theory is on a particular sort of church, the denomination that is officially established by a society as the ideal and the only legitimate religion. It may be, therefore, referred to as an “established church” or what is more eruditely referred to as ecclesia (a word of Greek origin).

The dichotomy between church and sect was initially made by Weber (1930) in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and by his contemporary Troeltsch (1931) in The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber described church as “a sort of trust foundation for supernatural ends, an institution, necessarily including both the just and the unjust” (1930: 144) and sect as the “believer’s church … solely as a community of personal believers of the reborn, and only these. In other words, not as a Church but as a sect” (Weber, 1930: 145). For Troeltsch, the Church is a religious institution:

which is overwhelmingly conservative, which to a certain extent accepts the secular order, and dominates the masses; in principle, therefore, it is universal, i.e. it desires to cover the whole of humanity (1931: 331).

Furthermore, the Church cooperates with the state and the ruling classes and incorporates them into itself and hence, “becomes an integral part of the existing social order … [it] stabilizes and determines the social order; in so doing … becomes dependent upon the upper classes, and upon their development” (Troeltsch, 1931: 331).

However for Troeltsch sects “are comparatively small groups; they aspire after personal inward , and they aim at a direct personal fellowship between the members of

54 each group” (1931: 331). Troeltsch (1931) posits that from the time they are conceived, sects are compelled to structure themselves in small groups. They reject the notion of ruling the world. They display a mixture of indifferent, tolerant, and even hostile attitude towards the material world, the state, and the surrounding society. They wish for a simple existence and usually either tolerate the parallel existence of mainstream complex forms of social life with their own unique ways or “replace these social institutions by their own society” (Troeltsch, 1931: 331). Troeltsch (1931) postulates that unlike churches, the sects are linked with the lower classes and the disaffected and they work in an ascending not descending order – bottom-up not top-down. This would be seen to be equivalent of Niebuhr’s (1929) argument that sects are connected with the “disinherited” classes of society. Their emergence is a result not just of religious dissent but of social crisis as well (Niebuhr, 1929).

Having distinguished between Church and sect, Troeltsch (1931) posits that both Church and sects exhibit a different attitudes towards the divine and transcendent feature in religion, and, therefore, in their conceptualization of its method of . He claims that the Church views the entire social system as a vehicle and a preparation for the divine objective of life, and it adopts pure asceticism into its structure as a particular feature in this preparation, all under the mandate of the Church. Sects, however, link their members to the divine objective of life directly through inward struggle, self-purification, and individualistic ascetic trance as a means of finding God. This direct religious character of asceticism is developed, in sects, more strongly and completely than in the Church. The attitude of , by the sects, towards the world and its material powers, with which the secularised Church has direct and intimate association, tend to help generate imaginary and broad asceticism. Therefore, what constitutes asceticism in the context of the Church and ecclesiastical is not the same in the context of world renouncing individualistic asceticism of the sects. There are, then, obviously two types of asceticism.

The asceticism of the Church is a process of earning good deeds - virtues - and a distinctive measurement of religious achievement linked primarily to the repression of

55 the senses (Troeltsch, 1931). However, the asceticism of the sects is just a straightforward rule of disconnection from the world and manifests itself in rejecting the secular institutions such as legal codes and the courts, and declining to govern the world. The sects receive their instructions from their charismatic leaders as their ideal and choose “the kingdom of God to all secular interests and institutions” (Troeltsch, 1931: 332). The ascetic ideal of the sects comprised of renouncing the world and the complex and material forms of social life in it. Troeltsch (1931: 332) argues that:

In all things the ideal of the sects is essentially not one which aims at the destruction of the sense-life and of natural self-feeling, but a union in love which is not affected by the social inequalities and struggles of the world .

So what sustains the Church and the sects? Troeltsch, (1931) asserts that the Church is sustained by its objective institutional character. Membership in the Church is by birth. and officials who are the principal custodians of the tradition of the Church represent what Troeltsch (1931: 332) calls “the objective treasury of grace”, although some of them may feel or seen to be “weak”.

As long as this supernatural treasury is given the highest recognition reinforced through the sacraments, the institution will operate just fine by the virtue of the extraordinary power vested in the Church. Troeltsch says that:

The Church means the external existence of the God-Man; it is the extension of the Incarnation, the objective organization of miraculous power, from which, by means of the Divine Providential government of the world, subjective results will appear quite naturally (1931: 332).

Despite the individual weakness, the institution stays pure and supernatural and still possesses the promise of its ability to resist the world by virtue of its extraordinary power. It is, therefore, one’s connection with the Church that makes it possible to compromise with the world and acquire virtues and a higher level of achievement.

The compromise with the world means suppression of personal desires and making God’s desire one’s own desire and defining the purpose of life as a complete service to God including the implementation of His Will on earth. This is the basis on which rests

56 universalism – a universal, all-encompassing control over civilization. Troeltsch argues that personal acts of good deeds no matter how extensive and pure they may be, after all have only a secondary status; “the main thing is the objective possession of grace and its universally recognized domination” (Troeltsch, 1931: 332). Thus, the critical point is to attempt to bring all individuals under the influence of the Church. However, the Church remains entirely intact even if there are many individuals outside the range of its influence.

In contrast to the Church as an objective institutional entity, the sect is a voluntary organization whose members enter it of their own accord and not by virtue of birth. The survival and of the sect hinges on the personal services and collaboration between the sect members. Each member has a part to play within the fellowship. Unlike the Church where the relationship between its members are based on common sharing of Divine grace, the relationship of sect members are based on personal bonds and social exchange.

In this regard, Weber (1930) notes that the need for sect members to practise brotherly love and brotherhood in their dealings with each other is similarly a plausible expansion of the understanding that every sect is based on the predominance of a local community of devoted believers. Weber (1930) asserts that the rule of sovereignty of the local community of believers is one of the most crucial feature of sects.

In the sect, the stress is laid on individual personal effort and service for spiritual growth not like in Church on the objective distribution of sacramental grace. In fact, sacramental grace is frowned upon. This does not denote that the bond of union is undermined by individualism. On the contrary, it is reinforced because each individual expects a membership due to his or her direct and personal contribution to the sect community. This fellowship, however, is limited in form. The personal effort and service towards maintaining the fellowship results in the creation of:

57 a certain indifference towards other forms of fellowship which are based upon secular interests; on the other hand, all secular interests are drawn into the narrow framework of the sect and tested by its standards, in so far as the sect is able to assimilate these interests at all (Troeltsch, 1931: 333).

Whatever fails to meet the standards of the sect and the scriptural ideal is denounced and shunned. This then means that the sect does not engage in imparting religious teachings to the general public. Instead, it concerns itself with recruiting members and developing the fellowship in preparation for placing it in sharp contrast to the world. This separation from the world in sectarian groups is also noted by Weber (1930) and likewise reflected in a more wide analysis of Bryan Wilson’s (1961) work.

Finally Troeltsch (1931) suggests that sects exhibit a strict and solely religious attitude towards the pursuit of living, which consequently prohibited the accommodation of any foreign values and cultural traditions. Weber (1930) made a similar observation suggesting that within each self-ruling worshippers of a sect, a remarkably austere moral discipline is being practised so that the purity of the whole community is preserved. He stressed that the discipline of an asceticist sect is extremely rigorous compared to the Church. Similarly, Niebuhr (1929) argues that sects adopt a strict and literalistic theology and built into their ideology is a puritanical ethic which emphasizes self-discipline.

Implicit in this is the different nature of asceticism in the sect-type in comparison to Church-type as discussed earlier. The practical severity of a purely religious attitude towards life has nothing to do with privilege classes or special circumstances but is about “ from the world, the reduction of worldly to a minimum, and the highest possible development of fellowship in love” (Toeltsch, 1931: 333).

The focus on personal effort and service and the sociological relationship with practical ideal, makes a very precise demand on individual effort or individualism and evasion of variety of forms of human or social association (Toeltsch, 1931). The asceticism of the sect is not an effort to make an ideal universal and commonly acceptable within the society which the Church had approved to special classes and in particular instances.

58

The Church ideal of asceticism can never be conceived as a universal ethic … the ascetic ideal of the sect, on the contrary, is, as a matter of course, an ideal which is possible to all, and appointed for all, which, according to its conception, united the fellowship instead of dividing it (Troeltsch, 1931: 333).

Drawing on Troeltsch’s (1931) definitions of the concepts of Church and sect, O’Dea (1966) posits that an ecclesia claims to be the proper Church, particularly for those who are born within the Church’s socio-ethnic boundaries. Within the ecclesia, then, priests and other religious personnel are organized into a formal structure that distributes heavenly grace or helps the faithful in achieving it by holding on to the society’s official religious .

In the contemporary period, the point that needs to be made in the context of modern Church-Sect theory is that the ecclesia has undergone radical change so that it can cater for the existing secular powers and link itself with secular institutions and accept their ideals.

In contrast, a sect O’Dea (1966) argues retreats from the secular world. It can even challenge the principal institutions of society. The sect not only sees secular institutions as its opponent but because they support the ecclesia and vice a versa, the ecclesia is also seen as an opponent. O’Dea (1966) sees the sect as an exclusive body. Membership to it is not by birth as is in the case of the ecclesia. In the context of the sect, membership is voluntary, typically gained through proselytization in which an individual undergoes renewal and reformation. The sect is strictly self-disciplined and ascetic body based on the fact that its members turn out to be materially poor yet spiritually affluent, whereas the membership of the ecclesia is made up by people from the upper echelon of the society (O’Dea, 1966).

The use of Church-Sect typology based on Troeltsch’s (1931) formulation ran into difficulty later on because empirical cases simply would not appropriately fit. This was because, for instance, the modern industrial capitalist countries have a multiplicity of rival religious movements of different forms and sizes but have no ecclesia. Furthermore,

59 describing religious movements as sects, as Niebuhr (1929) did, caused frustration among scholars (Welch, 1977; Knudsen et al., 1978) because the so-called features of the ideal sect were often absent. For example, numerous groups which were commonly described as sects did not stress proselytization.

Benton Johnson proposed a solution to these problems in important articles he published in 1963 and 1971. He argued that there were too many correlates in the variety of definitions of Church and sect and these were to be reduced so that a clear dimension of variation could be used to examine various types of religious movements. In his words:

A church is a religious group that accepts the social environment in which it exists. A sect is a religious group that rejects the social environment in which it exists (Johnson, 1963: 542).

By discarding many correlates from a variety of definitions of Church and sect and choosing to keep only a single feature to classify religious groups, Johnson (1963) was able to design a continuum upon which religious groups could be placed to indicate their level of tension with their socio-cultural environment. The ideal sect sits on one end of the continuum where the tension with the surrounding socio-cultural environment is so high that sect members are reviled as deserters. On the other end of the continuum sits the ideal Church which is so deeply embedded in the surrounding socio-cultural environment that it becomes the socio-cultural environment itself and any possibility for tension consequently disappears.

Johnson’s (1963) Church-Sect typology has proven to be important and useful. For instance, in the past it was difficult, even problematic, to identify, say, the Church in the as a type of sect, in comparison to say the in . With Johnson’s reconceptualization of Church and sect, this problem has been removed and now such distinction or differentiation can be easily made. Importantly, given that it is now clear that Church and sect sit on opposite ends of Johnsonian continuum, explanations about them are made easy. The important variables long assumed to affect the development of sects or their metamorphosis into Churches, with

60 Johnson’s paring down of Church-Sect distinction to its essentials, can now be readily scrutinized.

Johnson’s ideal types of Church and sect are so refined that “They identify a clear axis of variation and its end points” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1979: 123). His simplification of Church-Sect typology paves the way for definitional refinement of two other important sociological concepts namely religious institution and religious movement. At the low or non-tension end of his continuum not only sits the Churches but the religious institutions as well. This means that at this low or non-tension end of the Johnsonian continuum a stable socio-cultural sphere exists in which various social and cultural structures operate in harmony. At the tension or high tension end sit religious movements. Religious movements are like social movements. Stark and Bainbridge (1979) says social movements are organized groups who seek or obstruct social change. Unlike institutions in general who easily become accustomed to change, social movements basically strive to cause change or seek to turn into institutions themselves. Hence, on the Johnsonian continuum, religious institutions sit on the low or non-tension end and on the greater tension end sits the religious movements. In light of this, Stark and Bainbridge describe religious movements as “social movements that wish to cause or prevent change in a system of beliefs, values, symbols, and practices concerned with providing supernaturally-based general compensators” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1979: 124). They go on to say that on the Johnsonian continuum, when religious movements move along in the direction of low tension, they become what they call “church movements” and when they move along in the direction of high tension, they become “sect movements” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1979).

They elaborate on what they call “sect movements”. They posit that these are religious movements founded by individuals “who left another religious body for the purpose of founding the sect” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1979: 125). This is one of the reasons why Niebuhr (1929) identifies sects as schematic religious movements because their emergence is the result of internal faction within the religion. Stark and Bainbridge (1979) however, clarify that sect is not a new religion or, as Niebuhr (1929) argues,

61 severs ties with the Church. Sect is a religious group which presents itself to the world as a pristine entity. It left the parent body not to establish a new religion but to reclaim the pristine religion. The sect claims that the parent body has wafted away from the pristine religion and all it is doing is authenticating, purifying, and revitalizing the current faith. Consequently, “As the sect members become accommodated to the larger society, their religious movement proceeds to accommodate itself too. In so doing, it makes the transition from sect to church” (Glock and Stark, 1965: 244).

As an explanatory framework, the Church-Sect theory is applicable to numerous cases. However, it has certain inherent inadequacies to become a grand theory for the emergence and development of religious movements. Here, only three specific inadequacies are focused on because they are particularly sociologically important. Firstly, the problem with Church-Sect theory is that it does not account for the fact that not all religious movements arise as sects. There are many churches preserved in their original form. Take, for example, the Reform Judaism in Europe or many Protestant groups which were, since their inception, more church-like than sect-like (Glock and Stark, 1965).

Secondly, many religious movements emerge without having the characteristics of a sect and “they need not, contrary to the theory, draw their membership primarily from the lower class” (Glock and Stark, 1965: 245). For instance, the in the United States (Glock and Stark, 1965) or Maududi’s Jamaat-i Islami in the Indian sub- continent (Nasr, 1990) from their very beginnings, were middle-class movements.

Thirdly, in reference to other religions where there is no Church and sectarian cleavages are based on politics, the theory falls short of providing a comprehensive explanation for the origin and development of religious movements. For instance, within Islam the division between sects such as Isma’ilis and Jafaris is premised on politics. Furthermore, many Islamic movements such as the Tablighi Jamaat do not seek to progress toward the “Church” form. And in the Tablighi Jamaat’s seventy-five year history it has always

62 worked, as a distinct religious movement, within the broader framework of Sunni orthodoxy.

Despite these limitations of the Church-Sect theory, it is still a useful framework and if supported by Deprivation theory, the development of religious revivalism in contemporary modernity becomes much easier to understand.

3.2. DEPRIVATION THEORY Deprivation theory claims that individuals sometimes find themselves subjected to some kind of deprivation, often socio-economic, and when they realise this they seek to overcome it not through material means but spiritual means. Of course religion does not alter the deprivational conditions, however, it offers reprieve or what Stark and Bainbridge (1980) calls “compensation” and, therefore, makes these conditions endurable. As a result, religious conviction influence the perception and causes of deprivation but not the actual deprivation itself. Religion does not necessarily remove one’s state of deprivation, it merely provides or seen to provide reprieve from the suffering. To use Karl Marx’s expression, religion acts as an “opiate”.

The means through which religion offers reprieve from suffering is “”16 (Weber, 1966; Berger, 1969) or “compensation” (Stark and Bainbridge, 1980). Thus religion can provide meaning, self-satisfaction and status to many individuals who may have been disillusioned with or alienated from a materialist values and .

Based on this premise, the Deprivation theory seeks to explain the origins and evolution of religious movements. Glock and Stark (1965) define deprivation as “any and all of the ways that an individual or group may be, or feel disadvantaged in comparison either to other individuals or groups or to an internalised set of standards” (Glock and Stark, 1965: 246). They say that individuals or groups subjected to some type of suffering usually sense the deprivation and may even know its causes. Deprivation can also be felt or

16 Religious explanation of human suffering.

63 experienced indirectly or from unrecognized causes. Whether deprivation is experienced directly or indirectly Glock and Stark (1965) argue that the individual’s or group’s tendency will be to eliminate it. The objective to eliminate deprivation drives individuals or groups (1965) towards religion and it is from this background that religious movements emerge.

According to Glock and Stark (1965) there are five types of deprivation to which individuals or groups may find themselves subjected to: economic, social, organismic, ethical, and psychic. Individuals or groups may experience more than one type of deprivation however ordinarily one type of deprivation is dominant (Glock and Stark, 1965).

I will not go through all five types of deprivation, here, mentioned by Glock and Stark (1965) but will only focus on two types – economic deprivation and social deprivation – because as Wimberley, (1984), Finney, (1978), and Davidson, (1977), note these are two most common types of deprivation individuals or groups may experience or find themselves subjected to.

3.2.1. Economic Deprivation Glock and Stark (1965) argue that economic deprivation is the result of the uneven distribution of income and inequality in society. They state that economic deprivation may be determined either by objective or subjective criteria. Hence, a person who may be relatively economically advantaged, as determined by objective criteria, may still feel himself or herself to be economically disadvantaged. This occurs because:

Social class and income are notoriously anxiety-provoking questions, and even people who generally tell the truth may feel great pressure to claim a higher income than they actually receive, simply to appear respectable in the eyes of [others] (Bainbridge, 1997: 51).

Furthermore, Glock and Stark (1965) argue that economic conditions, especially if they perpetuate or exacerbate deprivation can lead to the development of religious movements.

64 To put it another way, economic deprivation is perceptually and symbolically, not literally, revolutionary:

The latent resentment against society tends to be expressed in an ideology which rejects and radically devalues the society. Thus, for those in the movement, the society is symbolically transformed while actually, of course, it is left relatively untouched (Glock and Stark, 1965: 250).

Glock and Stark (1965) identify sects as an example of religious movements that emerge as a result of economic deprivation. They clarify, however, that not all religious movements that emerge from economic deprivation are theologically grounded in traditional religion. They offer Black Muslim movement in the USA as a specific example which, they say, emerged from economic deprivation. Borrowing extensively from non-Islamic heritage, this movement rejects America’s treatment of Black people and displays a strong sense of doctrine of Negro Superiority (Glock and Stark, 1965).

Bainbridge (1997) extends the thesis of economic deprivation and argues that religious movements are the result of people being divided into classes in society. Class is based on economic organization and structure of the society and when economic conditions are or become unpropitious, people look for alternatives or what Stark and Bainbridge (1979) call “compensators” which people find in religion.

Class society usually creates spatial separation with the poor tending to live in poor suburbs removed from the concerns and attention of the state or the larger society. The local church, however, shows sympathy and concern and attempts to fulfil their distinctive needs. Where the usual social and economic institutions fail, the local church or religion (in general) succeed. Religion provides assistance which can be material but can be in the form of “compensators”. These are promises made by a religious movement or sect to its recruits. Whilst the secular or mundane world promises rewards in the form of wealth and power for one’s hard work, religion offers “compensators” in the form of Heaven and everlasting “trouble-free” and satisfactory life in the Hereafter for one’s loyalty to religion and constant acts of piety.

65 3.2.2. Social Deprivation According to Glock and Stark (1965), social deprivation has its source in society’s tendency for selectively valuing certain characteristics of individuals and groups to bestow social rewards such as prestige and power to only those who possess these valued characteristics. Hence social deprivation is the corollary of the inequitable distribution of highly valued attributes of individuals and groups. The bases for such inequity are almost infinite. Take, for instance, in Australia there is a tendency to value men who tend to receive greater rewards than women (Graetz and McAllister, 1994) or whites receive more privileges than Aboriginals (Cowlishaw, 1988).

Social deprivation is elastic in that the greater the number of sought-after characteristics the individuals and groups have the higher their relative position is going to be and the reverse is equally applicable. In Australia, for example, having an education is a valued attribute. Importantly, if the person is white Australian in comparison to an Aboriginal Australian, his or her status is further enhanced through having an education.

Glock and Stark (1965) argue that in the context in which social deprivation exists next to a weak economic component, the situation does not demand a radical transformation of society (neither literally nor symbolically) to bring about relief. This is so because it is not the whole of society which is seen as dysfunctional, just a few constituent elements. Therefore, the central focus is on those specific dysfunctional elements, not on the society as a whole. These dysfunctional elements are particularly responsible for social deprivation - especially lack of status.

The emergence of religious movements can provide an alternative status system in which individuals who lack the rewarded social attributes can attempt to compensate for lack of status. A Tablighi example is illustrative. A Tablighi in Australia who is “no one” (just a working class migrant) during the week, come the weekend, can become the most respected and powerful da‘i (a Muslim ) dressed in a distinct attire delivering a prophetic message to his fellow Tablighis. Hence he receives a status never accorded to him in the wider Australian society.

66

In this sense, Glock and Stark assert that religious movements emerge:

because the existing religious structure [is] incapable of meeting the status needs of the groups involved. While overtly a means to overcome religious disadvantages, these [movements] also [help] to overcome sources of social deprivation (1965: 251).

Deprivation theory has been criticized by a number of scholars (Roberts and Davidson, 1984; Wallis and Bruce, 1986; Flynn and Kunkel, 1987). Their main objection is that many individuals in society are deprived, according to the typology formulated by Glock and Stark (1965) but they do not necessarily all resort to religion to compensate for lack of social status. Deprivation theory gives no explanation for this discrepancy. Another significant objection raised is that deprivation measured “objectively” is frequently incompatible with the “subjective” mental states of religious revivalists (Bibby and Brinkherhoff, 1974). An example is a wealthy person feeling a sense of “hollowness” or lack of meaning in life. Westley (1983) calls this “cultural crisis”. He argues that religious movements emerge not only in response to social and economic deprivations but “cultural crisis” which reflects the “breakdown of meaning systems” (Westley, 1983: 14). The religious movements offer their members - who may be perceived as experiencing meaning deprivation – alternative meaning systems (Westley, 1983).

The thrust of the argument against Deprivation theory is that “deprivation need not necessarily be social and economic” (Wimberley, 1984: 236) or that exclusive emphasis should not be placed on social and economic deprivations. Hence, if deprivation is to form the basis for the explanation of the emergence of religious revivalism, all or a combination of forms of deprivation need to be employed.

3.3. MAUDUDIAN ISLAMIC REVIVALISM Maududi was one of the original contemporary Muslim intellectuals to construct a groundbreaking and intellectually illuminating framework of Islamic revivalism. His framework of Islamic revivalism was a part of his broader formulation of a or sociology of Islam. Maududi emphasized the need for observation and

67 rigorous analysis of social facts as the bases of concrete understanding of the social environment and processes in society. He also stressed the use of human intellect or rationalization to explain and understand society and social processes rather than blind acceptance of traditions and cultural values.

Maududi studied human society as constantly evolving and saw civilizations as superseding each other in time and space. He stressed the interdependence of cultural, economic, military, and political spheres of life and, therefore, the necessity of effective social control of human activity.

In his sociology of religion Maududi saw Islam as a complete and an ideal system applicable and relevant to all peoples of the world and to all periods in time. He stressed the dynamism and malleability of Islam and saw Islam as the ultimate solution to all problems facing all societies in the world.

Maududi believed that the caliphate was the ultimate expression of Islam and his thoughts centred on its social solidarity. He explained the rise and fall of Islam in conjunction with the rise and decline of the caliphate which in turn was the outcome of the diminishing social solidarity of the ummah.

Maududi (1979) posited that the teleology of Islamic success starts with the objectives of revealed religious law, that is, the objectives of God as expressed concretely in legal form. It is the acknowledgment of this linkage between success and revelation that lies behind the resolute demand for the institution of the shariah – there can be no human or more specifically Muslim success until religious objectives are institutionalized.

Islamic or Muslim success is also connected with the theological imperative of tawhid (unity). The term denotes a belief in the oneness of God as well as the oneness of existence with God, which implies the organic solidarity or corporatism of Islamic society. The recognition of God and society denotes that the social needs or the needs of society must take priority over those of the individual, the collectivity of men and women

68 is represented by the ummah. Individuals are connected to the organic whole through the concept of vicegerency of the individual as the expression of God on earth, forming the brotherhood of man in the sharing of this vicegerency.

Maududi went on to posit that family and neighbourhood are the fundamental foundation of the social solidarity of Islamic society. Here, he emphasized the concept of shura (consultative committee) as related to Islamic view of political development or what may be described as Islamic democracy. Political authority, Maududi suggested, is to be exercised through a consultative process with all members of the society. Both theoretically and practically, consultation is achieved by representatives of constituent groups such as the ulama, professionals, landowners, and business people (Muadudi, 1979). Consultation may be extended more popularly through an elected parliament, however, consideration and consultation must form the hallmark of its proceedings, not divisiveness and contestation.

Maududi’s ideas were formulated against the backdrop of British colonial rule of India in which Muslims were disadvantaged. However Muslim experience of colonial rule in India was similar to the experience of colonial rule in other parts of dar al-Islam. Maududi’s aim, therefore, was not only to improve the material and spiritual conditions of Muslims in India but the entire ummah.

Maududi linked the historical predicament of Muslims to the decline of Islam as an institutionalized mode of existence and a world order. In other words, the prevailing Muslim conditions were the direct outcome of fragmentary implementation of Islamic teachings and a weak appreciation of Islam as a comprehensive mode of existence. He attributed the decline of Islam to endogenous as well as exogenous factors. Endogenously, Maududi (1986) argued Muslims had veered away from the straight path. He saw the decline of Islam as a result of individual and collective factors. Ahmad and Ansari (1979: 16), following Maududi, attribute the decline of Islam to “the failings of different sections of Muslim society – rulers, scholars, spiritual leaders, and so on”. Maududi argued that the ulama had largely failed in their religious duties to promote

69 pristine Islam and at the same time protect Islam from foreign influence (Maududi, 1999) and Muslim leaders took an apologetic instead of defensive stance towards Islam due to their incorrect understanding of Islam (Maududi, 1986). Furthermore, he argued that institutions such as the family, universities, and courts in the dar al-Islam changed from Islamic in character to Western and secular in nature (Maududi, 1976a). Maududi saw this turning away from the religious path as a result of Muslim contact with modern Western civilization. He described this as a “defeatist” response to an encounter with a new civilization (Maududi, 1976a). What Maududi meant by this is succinctly explained by Khurshid Ahmad and Zafar Ansari who say that the defeatist response was:

an indiscriminate welcome to all that was labelled as “modern” – the Western outlook on life, Western legal codes, Western style of life, Western customs of social behaviour, Western political doctrines and institutions, Western economic ideologies, and so on (1979:16).

What was astounding about this defeatist response, in Maududi’s view, was the fact that Western values and ideologies were welcomed by Muslims, implying that Islam, in the era of modernity, had become redundant and, therefore, succeeded by Western modernity. Maududi interpreted the defeatist response as Muslim weakness and suggested that an Islamic way of life as laid down in the Qur’an and the sunnah is to any human-made systems of life and is as relevant and necessary today as it was in former times (Maududi, 1976a).

At an individual level, Muslims had permitted impiety and religious adulteration to besiege their everyday living. Maududi argued that Muslims “have been, and still are, neglecting to do [their] duty” (1986: 40). Thus, he warned Muslims:

The future of the world of Islam will depend upon the attitude that the Muslims ultimately adopt towards Islam. If, unfortunately, the present hypocritical attitudes … persist, … newly liberated Muslim nations will not be able to preserve their freedom for a long time (1985: 7).

It was weak or a loss of faith at an individual level which made Maududi argue that Islamic revivalism was first and foremost about purifying and intensifying individual faith in Islam, which led him to concentrate on the work of dawah (preaching) which

70 eventually became a movement – Jamaat-i Islami. Referring to Muslims, he further commented:

You claim to be the servants of the One God, but in fact you are serving every , every , and every power in rebellion against God. You have friends and enemies, but it is always your personal, selfish interests that determine your friendship and enmity. In both cases you use Islam as a party to your cause. Thus, your conduct has, on the one hand, deprived your lives of the blessings that Islam has to offer you, and, on the other, you are alienating mankind rather than attracting it to Islam (Maududi, 1986: 42-3).

Maududi (1976b) went on to argue that Muslims, by tenaciously holding onto an adulterated Islam, did not do them any good or to Islam. The adulterated Islam was embedded in the conservative perspective expressed in defence of Muslim heritage, argued Maududi (1976b). This response was manifested in Muslims feeling that unless their entire Muslim heritage, which was transmitted from generation-to-generation, was preserved, Islam would disappear. These conservative Muslims not only failed to distinguish between religion and custom from a purely Islamic view point but also did not examine the factors which had led to the decline of Islam and the ascendancy of Western culture (Maududi, 1976b). These Muslims had defensively embraced tradition and blindly opposed every change proposed either in the name of progress or reform of Islam. Maududi regarded the predicament of Muslims as a sorry state of affairs for Muslims. He placed great stress on the fact that what constituted Muslim heritage was not the values, customs, and traditions handed down from parents to the children or from one generation to another but the principles of the Qur’an and the sunnah (Maududi, 1999, 1979, 1976a, 1976b). He argued that the Qur’an and the sunnah were all Muslims needed to draw upon to instruct them on all issues in life as it had in the past and should do now and in the future. No other source or sources either can emulate the Qur’an and the sunnah or replace them.

Exogenously Western imperialism forced sweeping changes on India and most parts of the dar al-Islam. These changes included the fragmentation of tribal or communal systems, re-organization of traditional relationships through new forms of socialization and division of labour, the development of secular educational system, and the emergence of capitalism, urbanization, bureaucracy, and the nation-states. Western imperialism

71 came as a “civilising” project of non-Western peoples (Parenti, 1995). Reiterating Maududi’s position, Khurshid Ahmad (1967: 5) states in the case of the dar al-Islam that “The pioneers of the West came to the world of Islam on a “civilizing mission”. … they wielded the arms and conquered these lands as the “ambassadors of a higher civilization””.

Maududi saw the process of imperialism as a systematic attempt to undermine Islam and ensure its demise (Maududi, 1979, 1976a). This view was reinforced, for example, when first the Mughal Empire and then the Ottoman Empire succumbed to Western imperial power.

Maududi believed that Western imperialism was not about “civilizing” people but about systematic exploitation of indigenous people in different parts of the world. Civilizing was a code word for a process of exploitation, encroachment, and destruction. He did not doubt the hideousness of the process of Western imperialism and directly questioned the civility, rationality, equity, and humanity of the structure from which it emerged. Western imperialism, Maududi argued, was a product of a “hollow” system (1979). The system was modern Western civilization or modernity.

3.3.1. Modern Civilization Maududi (1979) conceived of modern civilization as a social order and a way of life. In modern civilization, Maududi believed that the individual is his or her own Master who sits at its helm and with the benefits of science, rationality, and technology freely shapes its . The individual has no obligation or responsibility to anything or anyone but himself or herself. The purpose of his or her life is simply self-service and self-fulfilment and the objective is to achieve it through the material means. God or the idea of God, if such a being or concept actually exists, is confined to the private sphere.

This being the essence of Maududi’s thoughts (1979), he described modern civilization as a jahili (un-Godly) order. An order which is based on corrupt and evil principles with “a completely materialistic conception of morals and culture … and the reins of power … in

72 the hands of leaders and rulers who are devoid of the fear of God” (Maududi, 1979: 13). What Maududi meant by a jahili order is a system in which God’s sovereignty has been replaced with that of human and religious principles and values, particularly in the public domain, play no role. Maududi, therefore, claims that the root cause of all evil and mischief in the world is the domination of what he calls “man over man” (1979). This is the real jahiliyah and since the modern civilization as an order and a way of life has pervaded the entire world, jahiliyah has crept into every corner of the world including the dar al-Islam. In light of this, Maududi (1979) says that Islam has lost its commanding position in the dar al-Islam. Hence, he became concerned, not with changing the leadership of the system or making certain structural changes to the system or to reforming the principles on which the system rested but with uprooting and replacing the system with an alternative Islamic system.

Maududi (1979) identified three key principles upon which modern civilization rested - which he wanted to first uproot and replace with Islamic principles. These principles, that will be elaborated on later, were secularism, nationalism and democracy. All modern nation-states, which he saw as the central expression of modernity, were founded on these three key principles. The applications of these principles in the practical affairs of the modern nation-state is how jahiliyah crept into every corner of the world. In Maududi’s (1979) view, these principles were the root cause of jahiliyah in the world.

3.3.2. Secularism Maududi (1979) asserted that secularism demanded that religion be confined to the personal life of human beings and, with some minor exceptions, of a person’s private life; the remaining affairs of personal life should be administered in light of a mundane perspective - not a spiritual or religious viewpoint on life. In other words, religion is a private matter between the faithful and God. This means that the believer in God is free to believe and worship God in private life but in public or collective affairs God has no jurisdiction or legitimacy. Modern civilization as a system is based on this creed, which “seeks to free from the influence of God and religion all the relations between man and man and between man and this world” (Maududi, 1979: 17).

73

Maududi (1979) suggested that secularism or the secularization theory which asserts that God and religion are personal matters is flawed. It is flawed because God is either the Creator of the world and everything in it including human beings or He is not, plain and simple (Maududi, 1979). If God is not the Creator then it is only logical to not have any relationship with Him let alone a private one. However, if God is indeed the Creator, “then it is equally meaningless that His jurisdiction should be limited to the private life of an individual” (Maududi, 1979: 22). As the Creator, God has jurisdiction over both private and public spheres. On this point, Maududi (1979) goes on to argue that life itself is not just a private affair or just a public affair but both and human beings need their Creator in both the spheres. Maududi argues that the principle of secularism which constitutes one aspect of the corner-stone of the modern civilization can not be defended and should be removed because “Truly speaking, the private life of an individual is nothing but a mere name. Man is a social being and his whole life is in fact collective and social” (1979: 24).

3.3.3. Nationalism Maududi (1979) holds that nationalism denotes more than just an allegiance and a commitment to the nation. It is a phenomenon based on the idea that the nation is the ultimate source of meaning, protection, and livelihood. The nation-state can provide for and care for its citizens through its vast resources, bureaucratic organization and technological know-how and manage the problems of modern life.

In modernity nationalism emerged as a thereby displacing what God and religion represented in the pre-modern era. Nationalism is the “alternative benefactor” to God in modernity. Hence, in modernity what is good and what is bad, meaningful and un- meaningful, and right and wrong are determined by national-standards not by the theological criteria. In Maududi’s words:

For every nation the highest moral standards and values have now become synonymous with its own national interests and aspirations. Virtues consists in what is advantageous to the nation, be it falsehood, faithlessness or disbelief, oppression or any other act which may have been looked

74 upon as the worst sin in the eyes of the old type of religion; and evil is said to be what is injurious to the national interests, be they truth, justice, rights and obligations or anything else which may hitherto have been considered a moral virtue (1979: 19).

Maududi (1979) suggests that nationalism has assumed a religious character. Nationalism, according to Maududi, has the power to shape people and mobilize them into action in the same way as a normative religion. Nationalism demands that individuals:

should not fall short of any sacrifice in the interests of their nation and should give up their lives, wealth, time, and even their morality, humanity, virtue and nobility of spirit. They are not expected to desist from these “” and should devote themselves whole-heartedly (Maududi, 1979: 18).

Nationalism for Maududi is a new (polytheism) because it links a modern idol, the nation, to Allah, whom the nationalists claim they do not reject. Shirk, of course, is on the same level as apostasy. To add perplexity to , Maududi argues, the nationalists use for national community the same description, ummah, reserved only for the “community of believers” (1979).

However, although nationalism may assume a powerful role and religious character, it is not a religion in the sense of Abrahamic monotheism and is just a secular formulation (Maududi, 1979). Maududi (1979) suggests that a religion (like Islam) ordinarily seeks to unite people and encourage cooperation between different peoples and nations but nationalism inherently seeks to fuel competition and create divisions between nations. Take, for instance, ethnocentrism, ethnic cleansing, national prejudice, and racism. He (1979) also argues that the principle of nationalism in modern civilization is regional and non-universal and rejects it as jahiliyah. Nationalism has involved all the nations in fierce competition with each other “and responsible for converting the whole world into national wrestling arenas and battlefields” (Maududi 1979: 28). World War I and World War II are good examples of this. Hence, Maududi (1979) believed that modern civilization is not an ideal order and it is leading the world towards World War III. For Maududi (1979) the ideal order is Islam which he saw as the only possible and practical alternative to stop the world from slipping into self-destruction.

75

3.3.4. Democracy Democracy refers to the sovereignty of the people. The will and power of a people to determine their own collective destiny. Maududi (1979) claims that the principle of democracy was originally proposed in response to monarchical and feudal landlordship, and oppression of the masses. It was promoted to popularise the idea and practice “that no individual, family, or class, has any right to force its will on millions of other peoples and use them for their own selfish ends” (Maududi, 1979: 20). Democracy means individual nations possessing independent power and the will to determine their own - based on the will of their people. According to Maududi (1979), under democracy, a nation has no restrictions to pursue its collective desire, whether it be in terms of moral duties, economic development, social relations, or political decisions. Any principle or set of values agreed upon by the majority of the people is held to be valid and legitimate, while those principles and values rejected by the majority are no longer valid.

The problem with democracy, argued Maududi (1979), is that any principle or set of values can be passed on, under collective consensus, as valid and correct. Another problem with democracy, argued Maududi (1979), that although democracy may be largely about the national sovereignty of the people (not the democracy of nation-states or democratic international relations) individual powerful democratic countries are imposing their will on other people, that is, that democracy does not guarantee autonomy in a world where countries are not equal and there is no effective international institution which democratically determines the behaviour of nations.

Maududi’s concept of Islamic revivalism is developed in the context of the decline of Islam in the contemporary period and its application is limited to the explication and exploration of just the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism. In other words, Maududian Islamic Revivalism is an indigenous explication of contemporary Islamic revivalism. It is an attempt to explain contemporary Islamic revivalism from the viewpoint of those who have been living out this phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism and although

76 the explanation may be loaded with theological overtones it is nonetheless important to take it into account in the sociological analysis of contemporary Islamic revivalism.

CONCLUSION The three theories discussed above provide a clear insight into the emergence of religious revivalism in the contemporary period. While Church-Sect theory developed in the context of Christianity and already religiously conscious populations Deprivation theory is a more secular explanation for the emergence of religious revivalism. Maududi’s Islamic Revivalism is specific to Islam and offers an account of return to the religious fundamentals from a perspective of the Muslim faithful. Combined these theories provide a basis for understanding the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism as a response to the contemporary world, to modernity. In this thesis these theories will be used to explain and explore contemporary Islamic revivalism. Contemporary Islamic revivalism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and a multi-dimensional framework is most appropriate approach to analyse contemporary Islamic revivalism.

Most importantly, it provides a framework for my study of the Tablighi Jamaat in Sydney. As a religious organization focused on learning and proselytizing in small groups Tablighi Jamaat can be understood as a sect in the context of small groups setting themselves apart from religious orthodoxy. By adopting separate religious interpretations and practices the Tablighi Jamaat sets itself apart from the orthodox mosque congregation which is reinforced by the Tablighis’ perception of themselves as part of a minority immigrant community which is treated as culturally and socially outside the dominant Australian society. Added to the sense of sect identity and discrimination is a South Asian ethnic identity dimension to their religious practice with which the Tablighis are still culturally associated.

The Tablighis religious outlook then adopts Maududi’s perception that Islam had to be recovered in full. Their adaptation of Maududi is to recover Islam as an individual rather than institutional project especially in Western multicultural societies like Australia. The Tablighis provide a specific example for this study of Islamic revivalism.

77 CHAPTER FOUR

METHODODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents a methodology which emerged from the insights gained from reviewing the literature in chapter two. The literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism confirms that despite modernization of the domain of dar al-Islam in the last one hundred years, Islam as a source of identity, a cultural tradition, and a value system, has not diminished. In fact, there has been a significant surge in Islamic consciousness and activities in Muslim countries around the world in the last three and a half decades. Consequently, the fundamental tenet of the secularization theory, that in the face of modernization, the influence of religion diminishes, “does not apply to Islam” (Gellner, 1994: xi).

Contemporary Islamic revivalism as a significant global phenomenon highlights the ongoing importance of religion in the modern epoch. It raises the broad sociological issue of the compatibility of religion with modernity. In fact, it raises the sociological question of why religion continues to play a vital role in the modern epoch. One hypothesis is that people hold on to their religious beliefs and values because they address existential needs. Whilst science and rationality provides explanations of life it does not tell people how to live life. Religion provides the ultimate framework and . Another hypothesis is that people hold on to religion, or more accurately revert to religion, in the modern epoch because modernization as a multidimensional process with its urbanization and state formation, rationalization of the economy, differentiation of social structure, individualization, and disenchantment of the worldview has weakened if not destroyed peoples’ anchorage and sense of community. People are fragmented and lost and reverting to religion is a way of establishing roots, finding the ultimate meaning of life, and securing salvation.

78 Hence, the purpose and the objective of this study are to attempt to explain why religion, in particular Islam, continues to play an important role or more precisely why Muslim return to the fundamentals of Islam in the modern epoch. In so doing the study will contribute to the sociology of religion, in particular the sociology of religious revivalism in the context of Islam.

In this chapter, following the methodological tradition of interpretivism, in particular ethnomethodology, I seek to describe how I went about the task of exploring and explaining the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism, particularly through an empirical study of the transnational Islamic revivalist movement of the Tablighi Jamaat in Sydney. The empirical data gathered was based on interviews conducted with the Tablighis in Sydney and participant observation made about their routines of everyday life and their engagement with reality construction. Focusing on rituals of everyday life and the production and its acceptance of the everyday world as a phenomenon in its own right worked well as a methodological approach to understanding the subjective meanings the Tablighis assign to their natural environment of daily life and the “real” social processes.

Given the “quietist” and apolitical nature of the Tablighi Jamaat, a qualitative approach was the only option to data collection on the movement in Australia, hence the importance of the method of participant observation in this study.

4.1. PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION On a day-to-day basis people make sense of their subjective world through interaction with each other and the meanings they assign to their actions and their environments (Blumer, 1969; Denzin, 1978). For people a situation is real, although they could be mistaken or hold an erroneous belief about it, because it has real consequences (Thomas and Thomas, 1928). The world of everyday life is a social construction (Berger and Luckman, 1966) and the conception of reality, by the insiders of this world, is not directly accessible to strangers (Schutz, 1967). The world of everyday life as perceived from the insider’s perspective is the quintessential reality to be delineated by participant

79 observation. In the final analysis, therefore, participant observation attempts to unearth, make accessible, and expose the meanings people assign to their daily lives. Participant observation permits an understanding of the people being studied and their behaviour in direct reference to their own constructs and meanings about their subjective world.

Participant observation is not a single method but a complex tactical blend of methods and techniques such as observation, informant interviewing, respondent interviewing, and document analysis employed in researching particular types of subject matter. Instead of limiting the research, participant observation through the application of multi-method studies, which in some instances can be not only desirable but necessary, helps fulfil the research objective and purpose. The method of participant observation, therefore, is particularly useful for studying relationships among people and events, patterns of behaviour, processes, the organization of people, and the activity of members of a particular social group or a culture.

Various scholars define participant observation in different ways. In Goffman’s understanding, participant observation as a research technique is about:

getting data by subjecting yourself, your own body and your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies that play upon a set of individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically penetrate their circle of response to their social situation (Goffman, 1989: 125).

For Denzin (1989: 158) participant observation is “a field strategy that simultaneously combines document analysis, interviewing of respondents and informants, direct participation and observation, and introspection”. This dissertation draws on these two definitions and posits that participant observation is a method of data collection that takes the researcher into the actual social setting or field enabling him or her to gain first hand experience and understanding of its complex and inner .

Why participant observation? According to Mason (2002), participant observation can be undertaken for a number of reasons but for our purposes here two key reasons are worth discussing briefly - the ontological and epistemological. Firstly, participant observation

80 can serve to foster a particular ontological view that recognizes actions, interactions, and habits and conduct and the way participants’ interpret them as pivotal. It helps promote the understanding about the existence of a variety of dimensions of the social milieu including daily rituals, conversations, and types of verbal and non-verbal communications which the written responses to questionnaire, interviews, or written material may otherwise fail to adequately convey.

Secondly, participant observation is helpful in the promotion of an epistemological position that meaningful knowledge about the existence of a specific social world can be produced through experiencing “real” social milieus. In other words, a view implying that substantial knowledge is a product of experience and observation because some knowledge is beyond verbal expression, narration, or can be captured in a lengthy conversation.

Such a position is based on the premise that these kinds of settings, situations and interactions ‘reveal data’ in multidimensional ways, and also that it is possible for a researcher to be an interpreter or ‘knower’ of such data as well as an experiencer, observer, or a participant observer (Mason, 2002: 85).

Anthropology and sociology have a long established history of utilising participant observation as a methodological approach to study society. However its use has attracted some criticisms. Critics of participant observation are over two key issues. Firstly, that the people being studied or specific social setting in one way or another are inevitably affected by the presence of the researcher and secondly, that the researcher has to rely almost entirely on impressionistic interpretation of the information to reach generalizations (Van Krieken et al., 2000). They claim that the data gathered under such a method is highly likely to be unreliable, invalid, and over-generalized because of “observer bias”, “going native”, and “hearsay” (McCall and Simmons, 1969: 2). Consequently:

Because of the obvious difficulties of generalizing from field notes collected under disparate conditions, observation and interviewing frequently end with masses of undigested data, the meanings of which are not clear (Dean et al., 1969: 21).

81 Whilst some critics denounce participant observation as a quixotic approach to coming to grips with the data, the proponents of participant observation celebrate its utility arguing that in comparison to other research methods, participant observation is less likely to be unreliable, biased, or invalid. The fact that the social world of the people being studied has its own internal system of checks and balance naturally authenticates the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) and any concerns for data contamination and researcher bias is dispelled (Van Krieken et al., 2000). In general then:

The nuts and bolts of research techniques are often aimed at increasing reliability,… . Researchers doing fieldwork go to considerable lengths to cross-check data. Occasionally a piece of fieldwork can be replicated, sometimes by the same fieldworker, more often by another, as when a different researcher returns to the same locale or informants (Bechhofer, 1987: 109).

In any case, participant observation remains an important technique in studying society because:

Through participant observation, it is possible to describe what goes on, who or what is involved, when and where things happen, how they occur, and why - at least from the standpoint of participants - things happen as they do in particular situations (Jorgensen, 1989: 12).

Furthermore, “Participant observation enables the research worker to secure his data within the mediums, symbols, and experiential which have meaning to his respondents” (Vidich, 1969: 79).

Within participant observation a range of participant roles exist. Buford Junker (1960) identifies four participant roles. On a continuum, these range from the complete participant at one end and the complete observer at the other end. Between these two ends, the role, say, closer to the left end is the participant-as-observer (more participant than observer) and the role, say, closer to the right end is the observer-as-participant (more observer than participant). Making a firm choice from the four roles for a researcher is not an easy task. However, choice should not be an issue because multiple roles in any one research project is an acceptable practice and even can be desirable for both intellectual and practical reasons.

82

As mentioned earlier, multiple roles do not endanger but enhance the research project. Jorgensen suggests that:

The performance of multiple roles offers the distinct advantage of providing access to different standpoints and perspectives. The researcher gains a more comprehensive and accurate picture of what is happening simply by observing, but also by developing relationships with different people. These relationships, typically based on mutual interests, open up the setting for further participant observation (1989: 61).

Similarly, Coffey suggests that an actively spontaneous approach to ethnographic selves should be taken:

One of the strengths of ethnographic enquiry is the real involvement of the fieldworker in the setting under study. A weakness is not the possibility of total immersion, but a failure to acknowledge and critically (though not necessarily negatively) engage with the range of possibilities of position, place and identity (1999: 36).

Consequently, in this dissertation complete participant and participant-as-observer roles were employed. They are briefly discussed below.

4.1.1. Complete Participant A complete participant usually withholds his or her true identity and purpose as a researcher in the field. The researcher participates in the aspect or aspects of daily living of the people being studied by learning to play the vital everyday roles successfully and interacting with them with natural ease. This is done, on the one hand, to avoid detection as a researcher and, on the other hand, to facilitate and secure acceptance into the participants’ setting so that the knowledge and understanding of the inner workings of their subjective world can be achieved: in short, research objectives can be achieved.

In this sense, the basic tenet of complete participation is a role-pretence17. In role- pretence nothing matters as much as for the researcher to realize that he or she is

17 There is an opinion that sees role-pretence as unethical. However, in my research, the role-pretence operated strictly within the practices of social scientific research and no deception or falsity was used to gain access to the Tablighi Jamaat.

83 pretending to be someone which he or she normally is not. In my case, complete participant, indeed was a role-pretence motivated by my sociological research into the Tablighi Jamaat, however, no form of deception was employed. In fact, I unequivocally informed key members of the Tablighi Jamaat in Sydney that I was pursuing a PhD, with a central focus on the Tablighi Jamaat, in Sociology of Religion at the University of New South Wales. Although the Tablighis usually refuse to cooperate with any type of survey or research, on this occasion, they openly welcomed me because they were not required to fill any questionnaires or forms or take special time out to participate in any experiment and, most importantly, for them this was their opportunity to proselytize me.

Joining the movement was essentially to conduct empirical research about the Tablighi Jamaat. This was the focus. However, as I was collecting the data on the Tablighis and their movement as a Tablighi apprentice I also inevitably learnt more about Islam as my own religion.

On a personal level I had only theological interests in Islam and therefore my sociological interests and endeavours were not compromised. Thus, in the final analysis, my complete participant role entailed a Muslim researching other Muslims – an insider’s perspective of a sociological phenomenon. In this way, role-pretence does not undermine the principles of morality because its essential core or intent is not to inflict harm but to merely gain understanding.

This is one level of the role of complete participant. Another level is when the researcher attempts to reconcile the role of complete participant (pretended role) with the self demands (actual or own self) in the field. Here, the researcher assumes that after the initial period of introduction to and learning about the participants’ subjective world, he or she can revert to being actual or own self. In my case this was not an issue because my position from the outset was clear; I made the Tablighis aware from the beginning that it was first and foremost my PhD study that brought me to participate in the movement.

84 The role-pretence is for the duration of the research project. Therefore, in my case, for example, I had to be consistent with my complete participant role throughout the course of the research. I attended the movement’s meetings and went on tour as both an apprentice Tablighi and a sociological researcher. To maintain my role as a complete participant part of my everyday self as an ordinary person had to be opened up for minor changes, for instance, wearing kameez (long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers), in light of accentuating my Tablighi self. Although I was able to balance up, with relative ease, my roles as a Tablighi (complete participant self), an ordinary individual (actual self), and a researcher (professional self) in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat, for a non- Muslim researcher in particular this role reconciliation would have no doubt proven to be problematic.

It is worth pointing out, therefore, that the complete participant self was not totally an alien phenomenon for me given that this role had some common features consistent with my everyday self by the virtue of me being a Muslim. Accentuating my complete participant self or the Tablighi self, in this context, did not mean becoming alienated from my everyday self but indirectly giving my everyday self, particularly the embodiment of my Muslim identity, a clarity and expression. This was through learning more about the different social and cultural expressions of my own religion. As a Tablighi apprentice I managed to fulfil the dual role of an ordinary Muslim seeking to know more about his own religion and a complete participant undertaking an empirical research to understand a sociological phenomenon. Becoming a Tablighi apprentice meant that I had to wear kameez and shalwar all the time when in fact I usually only wear them on special religious occasions, not shave when I am used to shaving everyday, and sleep on the floor when I am used to sleeping on a bed with an inner-sprung mattress. I did not have an issue with moving in and out of this assumed role, however, in a more complex situation this would pose a major problem and would potentially make the participants suspicious of the researcher’s interest in their subjective world and the membership leading them to becoming aloof in terms of interacting with the researcher and consequently precluding the flow of information.

85 A role-pretence is not an easy task. A researcher has to make some ephemeral changes18 to his or her life to facilitate the research, as I have indicated above. He or she has to become sensitive to the demands of self, of the observer role, and the pretended role. This means becoming aware of the set of demands embodying role-pretence resonates with being receptive to various open and hidden behaviours and other social symbols signifying the observer’s manufactured self. Instead of being one’s self in the pretended role, the researcher needs to be a “new self” in which actions are still meaningful.

Two potential common problems plague all complete participant roles. A complete participant ultimately has to come to terms with them. Firstly, a complete participant may become overwhelmed with divulging his or her true identity that fulfilling the pretended role satisfactorily becomes problematic. Secondly, the complete participant may “go native”. In other words becoming totally engrossed in the field removing the barrier between the pretended role and the actual or own self and, consequently, breaching the rules of complete participant role. The real or potential possibility of securing objective data then is jeopardized or even lost. To overcome this the researcher needs to break off for a short time during when he or she can revert to being the researcher and view the experience from a more neutral and sociological standpoint.

4.1.2. Participant-As-Observer The participant-as-observer role leans more towards the “complete observer” end of the continuum than towards “complete participant” end and, therefore, is quite similar to the complete observer role. In this role the researcher basically observes the activities of the informants and the meanings behind their actions. Both the researcher and the informants know that their relationship is only provisional and that the pretended role is founded upon it eliminating any potential for role jeopardy. There can be reactions of one kind or another from the informants concerning the presence of the researcher but these do not last (Bechhofer, 1987).

18 It is worth mentioning here that I made some changes to my life to facilitate my research but also I participated as a Muslim who wanted to explore the Tablighi Jamaat path for greater religious awareness and devotion.

86 A participant-as-observer sometimes observes formally, such as during a structured interview and some times observes informally, such as during the performance of a ritual. This could prove a little uncomfortable for the informants but when the rapport is quickly established and the informants’ trust is secured, such an issue is promptly quashed.

Participation can potentially bring about problems of identification and commitment. For instance, is it prudent for the researcher and informants to maintain close friendly relationships where informants in particular place too much trust in the researcher because this can potentially jeopardize their roles. Firstly, the informants may become too close to the researcher that he or she may no longer be able to fulfil the informant’s role effectively and rationally. Closeness may put the informants’ independent thinking into peril. Secondly, the researcher may find difficulty distancing himself or herself from the informants’ subjective world, goals, and values that he or she may lose research objective and purpose and “go native”.

Thus, even though it is totally acceptable for the participant-as-observer to establish a sound and intimate relationship with the informants, there is always a pressing need to be vigilant of one’s pretended role and its purpose. In other words, the need to recognize and deal appropriately with the tension that naturally exists between the insider and the outsider. In my case, this was the approach I took to avoid becoming too close to my informants and exposing my research project to danger. If a participant-as-observer is able to maintain the requisite distance from informants’ subjective world and at the same time does not confuse the pretended role with the actual role or break the barrier that separate the researcher and the informants, as I successfully did, then he or she will not find fulfilling the objectives and purpose of the research project problematic.

Like other scientific methods, conducting research through participant observation can raise some ethical questions. The data collected by social researchers in general and sociologists in particular and the social setting in which the research takes place, ethical and political aspects are necessary considerations in the research process. Ethical discord exists in all social research as much as discord could exist between the values of science

87 and the values of the people being studied. Whilst some researchers argue that the imposition of limitations upon scientific investigation impacts negatively on the integrity of scientific knowledge, others argue that limitations are necessary in guarding against the scientific encroachment on the autonomy of individuals and the sacredness of the institutions involved. In this dissertation, the stance taken leans towards the former rather than the latter and the discussion below delves into it in more detail.

4.2. ETHICS The task of conducting sociological research without being influenced in some way by the sociologist’s own personal and political values is impossible (Denzin, 1989). Therefore, Denzin (1989) says that the values held and ethical positions taken, either willingly or unwillingly, by sociologists bear directly on the sociological activity. He asserts, these being given, what is of more significant concern then and where lies the key disagreement among sociologists, is the exact integrity of these values and the precise function they should have in their sociological pursuits.

Like scientific findings, ethics, norms, and values are not affirmations that have a single source nor do they exist in a static and perfect world. Rather, ethics are a composite of emblematic meanings that are open to intricate political arguments (Denzin, 1989). These meanings are constantly negotiated and redefined because what may be “ethical” in one context may not be so in another.

There is no to which the scientist can appeal. Like others, he bases his decisions on personal predilections and particular values. But one person’s predilections - be he scientist or - are not perforce more natural than another’s. The proclivity among scientists to minimize, if not ignore, competing social ethics, and to define science in some independent sense is quite widespread. In short, the scientist typically subscribes to the notion that the end of knowledge justifies the scientific means (Vaughan, 1967: 71).

“Ethics, then, is an especially interpersonal concept” (Goldner, 1967: 264). The ethics and values constantly remain with sociologists. This is not a problem because the sociological investigation of one kind or another poses no real threat to the integrity of the natural setting of the group or people being studied due to the fact that the

88 sociologist’s main interest is not in the action of individual members but rather in the behavioural patterns. The data gathered are treated as classes in an open and objective manner and not perceived as individual attributes. Furthermore, sociologists being professional scientists are already governed by a perennial set of regulations that prohibit the revelation of the identity of the informant or informants and thereby potential for harassment or any form of harm or damage (Vaughan, 1967). As long as sociologists recognise the function of ethics and values in their everyday living, scientific research and the establishment of the links between theory, methods, and data are possible.

The ethical and value stances taken in this dissertation concerning sociological investigation and sociological activity correlates with that of Denzin’s (1989). He suggests that as professional scientists, sociologists have the right to conduct research on people in their setting provided that it is for scientific purposes. The objective of both natural and social are not to embarrass, harass, or otherwise inflict harm or injury to the individual or members of the group being studied but to promote understanding and knowledge. Therefore, any method, because it is inherently rational and objective, and allows the fulfilling of that objective, is justifiable. The proper application of the method cannot in any way destroy the reputation or integrity of the people being studied and if the sociologists observe the protocols of their profession and meticulously guard the confidentiality of the subjects, the objective of science will be preserved and the research will be successful.

The thrust of Denzin’s argument in this regard is “that no area of observation should be closed a priori to the sociologist, nor should any research methods be designed a priori as unethical” (Denzin, 1989: 257). In other words, sociologists should have the freedom to investigate, using any method whether it be participant observation or survey, on-going activities of a group or people without pressure, restrictions, or control by non-scientific factors or agencies. The rationale for this is based on the broader norm which is that there should not be any constraint on freedom of scientific investigation which in turn is the value founded upon the idea of inherent right of human beings to acquire knowledge and to know. Knowledge is above and beyond ignorance and nothing outside the object of

89 investigation itself should impact on procuring knowledge. Since knowledge is a value, any factor or circumstance hindering its acquisition is undesirable to say the least. Science in general and scientific research in particular cannot make a substantial contribution to knowledge, which is its most fundamental role, if the freedom of scientific investigation is restricted and externally controlled. Thus, scientists are themselves the best custodians of science because ethics and values constantly remain with them.

Like values and norms directed toward social object, ethics are fluid and emblematic assertions embedded in a particular political circumstance. Integrity, values, and ethics are the products of interaction and therefore, sociologists determine their own ethics. There is no natural or set of standards to which the sociologist can appeal and therefore each situation will dictate a different ethical stance. This means that the sociological endeavour undertaken by sociologists centres on “telling it as it is” and under the cover of science have the freedom to make such assertions.

4.3. PARTICIPATING WITH THE TABLIGHIS IN SYDNEY The fact that the members of the Tablighi Jamaat cast a disinterested eye towards Western science and do not regard social science perspectives as appropriate and adequate means of understanding social and natural phenomena makes the task of researching the movement very difficult. Without employing participant observation as the key method of data-collection in this research, it would have been almost a practical impossibility to research the Tablighi Jamaat.

For the Tablighi Jamaat modernity is seen quintessentially as a product of Western imagination and therefore anything or anyone linked to it are viewed with a sense of apprehension. Modern Western thinking, the academy, and pedagogy are no exception and are perceived as anti-theology in general and anti-Islam in particular. As a consequence, the Tablighis see social research as a mode of investigation by the West or by Muslims sympathetic to the West and its values to ascertain information for the purpose of monitoring and undermining the movement. They denounce social research as

90 counter productive because its focus is on investigating the “social”, not the “divine”. Social research is therefore devalued. As many Tablighis informed me during my research the time, money, and energy invested in research can be better spent in the path of Allah. Their claim is that the Islamic way of life itself is a research: a research into the might and omnipotence of Allah. It is a way of life that seeks to find Allah. Thus, the Tablighis eschew giving interviews, filling questionnaires or participating in surveys. These are seen as worldly pursuits devoid of any genuine and pure fulfilments.

The Tablighis see their movement as an instrument for teaching and learning and not an object of study. They claim there is no better way of understanding their movement than to join it and participate in its activities, hence their invitation to me to join.

Joining the Tablighi Jamaat in the case of a non-Muslim would be contingent upon converting to Islam. In the case of a Muslim it would mean proselytization, which involves increased religious consciousness and piety. For me the latter was applicable because I am a born Muslim. Proselytization in my case involved simply learning the etiquette and rituals of the Tablighi Jamaat whilst the Islamic rituals such as daily prayer were already part of my daily life. Thus, in the words of Fox:

while ethnography, of the sort I was engaged in, is by its nature limited to the study of one case, it had the benefit of allowing the researcher access to a level of interactional minutiae … which other methods cannot attain (1990: 436).

I originally came to learn about the Tablighi Jamaat in 1970s as a young boy growing up in . As part of religious socialization, I would accompany my father to the local mosque where sometimes Tablighis were present giving a bayaan (religious talk). My father, though was a practicing Muslim, never took a particular fancy towards the Tablighi Jamaat but if a Tablighi happened to be giving a bayaan then my father would participate merely as part of religious socialization rather than sympathizing with and advocating the Tablighi path.

91 In late 1990s, when I briefly returned to Fiji after living in Australia for fourteen years, I was very surprised at the strong influence the Tablighis had in the village where I grew up as a child and on a few of my family members. Tablighi influence manifested itself in the observation of ritual prayers, wearing of Arabic-Islamic attire, emergence of markazes (prayer halls), and observance of various Tablighi rituals and etiquettes. Witnessing such a social and religious transformation was an interesting experience and aroused my sociological curiosity in wanting to learn about the rationale behind it and to procure a concrete understanding about the Tablighi Jamaat, its internal dynamics and functions, its ideological undercurrents, and its purpose.

After returning to Australia in 1998, I began visiting the Imam Ali Mosque in the Sydney suburb of Lakemba on Friday evenings. Even though I had intermittently visited this Mosque since 1984 when I first arrived in Australia to remain in touch with my Islamic belief and practice and the Muslim community in Australia, after 1998 my visits were more frequent, motivated in part by my greater interest in my religion and in part by the desire to understand more about the growing influence of the Tablighi Jamaat. Hence I began attending the bayaan delivered by a Tablighi after the (evening prayer) every Friday evening.

I gradually gained a better understanding of the movement and a few years later I resolved to undertake sociological research on the movement hence a sociological investigation into the Tablighi Jamaat at a doctoral level.

My first participant observation into the Tablighi Jamaat began in earnest at the Imam Ali Mosque in August, 2001. Because the Tablighi Jamaat does not have an office in Sydney or a clear organizational structure or a person or persons of defined authority, my participation began as a Muslim who chose to flow in the direction the Tablighis were flowing – imitating them. Tablighis from surrounding suburbs of Sydney congregate at the Imam Ali Mosque on every Friday evening for what is acknowledged in the Tablighi parlance as itikaf (devotional seclusion in a mosque for a fixed time). From the time of the (sunset prayer) on Friday evening to (dawn prayer) the

92 next morning, the Tablighis engage, on a regular basis, in various religious activities and rituals such as reading Faza’il-e-Ama’l (Tablighi text), giving a bayaan, conducting taleem (teaching), and offering optional prayer. I participated in these, as a complete participant, regularly for eighteen months.

I was already a Muslim, therefore, putting a Tablighi garb over my Muslim identity did not in any way discount but only reinforced my “Muslimness”. Coffey comments regarding this kind of approach:

The choices between involvement and immersion, rapport and over-rapport, familiarity and loss of self are often too starkly drawn to accurately reflect the full range of chosen and imposed identities, assumed during and beyond the field. The issue is not necessarily one of conversion, immersion or not, but a recognition that the ethnographic self is the outcome of complex negotiations. Moreover the definition and location of the self is implicitly a part of, rather than tangential to, the ethnographic research endeavour (1999: 36).

In so doing I was accepted as a member - as an insider - and my ethnographic self found an easy fit into the movement.

The first six months of participant observation were undertaken independently of the khuruj (preaching tour) and the remaining twelve months were undertaken in conjunction with the khuruj. Furthermore, the leaders or senior members of mosques and musallahs (prayer houses) around Sydney gather at Rydalmere Mosque for mushawara (discussion) on a regular basis for a couple of hours on Wednesday evening to discuss current issues and matters of interest and concern, discuss issues raised at, and relay directives from, the headquarters in Nizam-u’d-din in India, review the events and khuruj outcomes of the previous week, allocate the speaker for the Friday evening bayaan at the Imam Ali Mosque, and general discussion regarding the movement’s work. I participated in these discussions as a participant-as-observer intermittently over a twelve month period.

The first six months of my participant observation, both in terms of participating in the Tablighi activities and rituals at the Imam Ali Mosque and in terms of participating in the mushawara at the Rydalmere Mosque, were to concentrate on learning the rituals and

93 etiquettes, rapport building, and securing membership. Prior experience can have a positive impact on the research project as it did in my case. Many see prior experience in a positive light. Certainly Jorgensen does:

If previous experience and knowledge is confirmed by direct observation, you will have more powerful, empirical evidence of these facts … . Aside from collecting information, the basic goal of these largely unfocused initial observations is to become increasingly familiar with the insiders’ world so as to refine and focus subsequent observation and data collection (1989: 82).

By the end of six months I gained considerable insight into the group dynamics, understood the objectives, purpose, and ideology of the movement, and developed a sound relationship with a lot of ordinary Tablighis and some leaders and senior members of suburban mosques and musallahs. Consequently, I started going out on a three-day khuruj19 (from late Friday afternoon to late Sunday evening), first on the second weekend of each month for three consecutive months with the Tablighis from the Ashfield Musallah,20 and then, on the last weekend of each month for ten consecutive months with the Tablighis from the Surry Hills21 Mosque. Initially the Tablighi organizers at the Imam Ali Mosque allocated me the Ashfield group. However later I was invited by the Tablighis from the Surry Hills Mosque to join them as a result of my interaction with them at the ijtima22 (annual Tablighi gathering) and consequently decided to accept and started going on khuruj with them.

My first khuruj was in February 2002 when I was still with the Ashfield group. It took us to Belmore Mosque where we worked for a few days with the local Tablighis. My second khuruj in March 2002 took us to Redfern Mosque and the third khuruj in April 2002 took

19 All my khurujs were confined to mosques and musallahs in Sydney with the exception of an ijtima participation in 2002 at Mangrove Mountains near Gosford (New South Wales) and another ijtima participation in 2003 at in . 20 An outer Sydney suburb. 21 An inner Sydney suburb. 22 Ijtima is an annual gathering of Tablighis from around Australia and on alternate years Sydney and Melbourne host the ijtima. In 2002, Sydney hosted the ijtima at Mangrove Mountains in a large makeshift tent but due to heavy rain the venue was moved the next morning on Saturday to the Rooty Hill Mosque. Ijtima entails the usual Tablighi activities and rituals and is accentuated by a couple of bayaans by keynote speakers and Muslim scholars during the day. It starts on the long weekend after the Juma prayer on Friday and finishes on Monday morning after the Fajr prayer. I participated in the ijtima in 2002 in Sydney and 2003 in Melbourne.

94 us to Wentworthville Musallah. Each time we worked with the local Tablighis in their respective locales.

In May 2002 I joined the Surry Hills Mosque group and my first khuruj with them took us to Artarmon Mosque. I then went on a series of khurujs: in June 2002 we went to Mosque, in July 2002 we went to Artarmon Mosque again, in August 2002 we went to Ashfield Musallah, in September 2002 to Sefton Mosque, in October 2002 to Gladesville Musallah, in November 2002 to Green Valley Mosque, in December 2002 we went to Campsie Musallah, in January 2003 to Tempe Mosque, and in February 2003 we went to Lakemba Musallah.

The end of February 2003 brought my participant observation to a close. However, in May 2003 I renewed it and went on a six-week khuruj to Nizam-u’d-din Markaz, the Tabligh Jamaat’s headquarters in in India. The end of the six-week khuruj to Nizam-u’d-din Markaz concluded my participant observation altogether.

The data collected during my eighteen month of participant observation resulted in over twenty thousand words of fieldnotes. In these fieldnotes, I recorded, in unstructured and some times semi-structured ways, the activities of the Tablighis and what I learned through my roles as a complete participant and participant-as-observer. Generally, numerous approaches to collect information exists such as tape recording and video recording, however, in my case fieldnotes as an approach proved effective, practical, and indeed invaluable - especially given the quietist nature of the Tablighi Jamaat. Unlike audiovisual materials in general, fieldnotes are un-intrusive, non-disruptive, and hardly affect responses and this was indeed appropriate for the interaction with the Tablighi Jamaat. Below is a brief discussion about fieldnotes and a detailed account of what happened during the empirical research into the Tablighi Jamaat.

4.4. FIELDNOTES There are many different forms of participant observational fieldnotes but it is not possible to discuss them in any fine detail here. Therefore, I will only discuss a particular

95 form of fieldnotes – the field journal – because it was used in this dissertation. Before I embark on discussing field journals, let me refer to at what Emerson et al., say about fieldnotes in general. They posit that “Fieldnotes are accounts describing experiences and observations the researcher has made while participating in an intense and involved manner” (Emerson et al., 1995: 4-5).

If this is what fieldnotes should be, then, a field journal is a good means to capture these elements of research. The field journal commonly is a mixture of appointment diary and daily log of events and may also include interview outcomes and personal observations and experiences (Jorgensen, 1989). This was the approach I took for the field journal in this dissertation. A daily log of events and casual, informal continuous interview entries were kept in the field journal. The Tablighis who invariably became informants continuously advised on practices, rituals, and rules which were written in the field journal. Detailed descriptions of what took place during khuruj and other events such as ijtima, discussions about my own impressions, understandings, and analytical ideas, and any other general observations were all entered on a daily basis into the field journal. As the notes in the field journal accumulated, they were sorted, sifted, and organized with the plan to refining and focusing issues and problems of the study. Hence, the field notes became “raw data” which was gradually built upon into a data set and subsequently analysed and the excerpts used in the analytical chapter in the dissertation.

4.5. INTERVIEWING Participant observation quite often is used in conjunction with a number of other data gathering techniques, particularly interviews - both formal and informal. As the key problem and issue for the research gradually becomes clearer and defined, participant observers find it suitable to utilize interviews. A vast majority of solid ethnographic data collected comes from the informal interview or casual conversation between researcher and informants (Agar, 1996).

96 4.5.1. Informal Interviews Similar to casual conversations, informal interviews are open, flexible, and two-way verbal and non-verbal communication between researcher and informants. They are unstructured and built around a couple of broad issues which the researcher intends to examine. Therefore, in informal interviews, the researchers do not have a pre-organized and elaborately thought-out written set of questions. Instead, a question-answer approach is taken whenever opportunity presents itself or is deemed appropriate. In an informal interview, the researcher puts the questions to the insiders about matters of interest. Like in an ordinary conversation, the questioning can take place in a variety of contexts such as during driving with the informants from one point to another or while undertaking a shared task such as cooking with the informants in a casual and relaxed manner without the expectation of the discussion taking a particular direction. Generally there would be a set of issues to be discussed and unlike formal interviews, these may be pursued in a free- flowing way without necessarily asking informants the same questions each time.

This certainly was my experience in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat. Randomly selecting my respondents either during meals, whilst travelling on preaching tours, before sleep, and during rest breaks and washing, I would put a non-leading question to the respondent and then build on what was said.

The interviews covered a number of issues and included the following questions:

• When and how were you introduced to the Tablighi Jamaat?

• What was your initial response or reaction?

• How did you initially fit in with the Tablighi Jamaat?

• How regularly do you go on khuruj?

• How would you describe your experience?

97

• How would you describe the Tablighi Jamaat?

• What is the significance of the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia?

• How have the Tablighi Jamaat impacted on you personally?

• What is so appealing about the Tablighi Jamaat?

As the respondent was talking, whenever possible, I would jot down points, which I would later elaborate. Sometimes I would simply listen to my respondent and as soon as the opportunity presented itself I would write out notes resembling as closely as possible the content of the discussion. Each evening before retiring for the night I would then review and rewrite my notes. Upon awakening in the morning, before starting the day, I would review my notes again to look for errors and to ensure that I had captured, if not all the details, then at least the essential aspects of what the respondent or respondents had to say during the informal interview.

One key factor that helped me conduct the interviews with relative ease was that by the time I began interviewing my Tablighi informants, they were well aware of my academic interests, educational background, and seemed to assume that it was their perfect opportunity to proselytize me through answering my interview questions with cues in them for me and telling me as much as possible what they perceived as important Tablighi knowledge. On some occasions my targeted informants deferred talking for reasons such as lethargy and busyness. Overall, however, they were forthcoming and cooperative.

This was the approach throughout the period of my participant observation. In the end, twelve informal interviews of approximately two hours in length were conducted. The respondents addressed the issues in some instances differently and in some instances similar to one another. This, however, did not matter because the objective was to get the

98 “experience-near” as practically possible (Geertz, 1973), permitting the informants to control the discussion in which “everything is negotiable. The informant can criticize a question, correct it, point out that it is sensitive, or answer in any way they want to” (Agar, 1996: 140).

The informal interviews in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat meetings did not hinder but actually fostered the systematic collection of the data. Raising similar if not the same set of issues with my Tablighi informants yielded systematic collection of data about these issues. The formal interviewing proved to be a particularly useful way of discerning varying positions held by insiders, that is, the Tablighis themselves.

4.6. CASE STUDY Despite the often hostile treatment of case studies due to doubts raised about their reliability and representativeness in the literature on research methods, they continue to be employed as a useful method of data collection by social scientists in general and sociologists in particular. One of the many appeals of case studies is that they take a variety of forms involving the detailed exploration of one or more cases which might be an individual, group, organization, community, society, or phenomenon such as beliefs (Yin, 1989). Case studies emphasize the holistic and naturalistic analysis of a phenomenon and they attempt to avoid isolating various elements from the broader context to which these may be connected.

The method of case study is suitable for defining topics broadly rather than narrowly, focusing on the context rather than on a specific phenomenon, and relying on more than one source of evidence. Some case studies are quantitative and some qualitative in nature. Those case studies that use a qualitative approach, as has been the case in this dissertation, study the case in great depth and detail. Case studies are a research enterprise of their own, however, depending on the circumstance, they can be used in combination with other methods such as surveys and historiography. A definition of case study is useful for coming to grips with its function and purpose. Yin gives a particularly useful definition articulating:

99

A case study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real- life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989: 23).

A case study, as a research enterprise, contributes effectively to our knowledge of individual, group, social, and cultural phenomena. The need for case studies arises when attempts are made to comprehend both simple and complex social phenomena. Here, the case study permits an inquiry to maintain the holistic and meaningful features of actual or real events.

4.6.1. Types of Case Studies Different scholars (Yin, 1989; Platt, 1992) provide different typologies of case study. However in this dissertation we will focus on Stake’s typologies of case study. Stake (1994) identifies three types of case studies:

(i) intrinsic case study, (ii) instrumental case study, and (iii) collective case study.

The intrinsic case study is undertaken by the researcher to enhance his or her understanding about a particular case itself. It is undertaken essentially because the case itself is of importance and interest such as a rape victim. All focus of the researcher or investigator, temporarily, is centred on the case in order to allow the case to reveal its reality or to tell its own tale. The purpose of the study is to understand the full possible breadth and depth of the case because of its intrinsic value and interest.

The instrumental case study is undertaken so that a clear insight into an issue or a subject matter can be gained. The case, in an instrumental case study, facilitates the researcher or investigator to understand the interest or issue other than the case itself. The case is an instrument not the source of understanding. Of course the case is analysed, its contexts examined, and its functions closely scrutinized but only to help enhance the understanding of the pertinent issues or to refine theory. Whether the case is typical or

100 not is not a major concern or of importance because it is chosen to advance the understanding of the external interest or interest which is associated with the case but not about the case itself. In a research project where there are a number of interests that need to be met all at once, the border that divides intrinsic case study and the instrumental case study is not always that sharp and clear and some permeability is possible.

The collective case study is not about the study of a collective per se but is similar to an instrumental case study involving multiple cases. A category of cases is chosen because it is understood that by gaining insight into it, understanding will be advanced about much larger collections of cases. In other words, by studying multiple cases in the same category, the whole totality of the context can be comprehended.

In this thesis, the collective case study was employed. Unlike in the intrinsic case study where the case is given such as a cancer patient, in the instrumental case study and the collective case study, cases are chosen (Stake, 1994). Regarding choice of cases, Patton (1990) and Yin (1989) suggest that understanding a phenomenon can very much depend upon how well one chooses his or her cases. Thus, choosing a case or cases is an important enterprise and further light on this point will soon be shed.

In the context of the Tablighi Jamaat, the three lengthy case studies undertaken, were chosen. Three senior Tablighis were chosen. What was intended was to generalize about the attitudes, behaviours, and revivalist understanding of the Tablighis through each of the cases representing, no matter how strongly or weakly, the attitudes, behaviours, and revivalist understanding of the more general membership of the Tablighi Jamaat. As Campbell (1975) notes that a case study or case studies can be effectively employed as a preliminary or minor step toward generalization.

Instead of randomly selecting from the general Tablighi population in Sydney where the empirical research was conducted, a decision was taken to choose from the senior membership on the account of their experience, insightfulness, and functional and ideological understanding of the movement. Although these cases were of some

101 typicality, they were chosen particularly because they seemed to offer the best opportunity for learning. Moreover, they were chosen in anticipation that by understanding them, a better understanding would be procured about other cases leading to deeper insight into the Tablighi Jamaat and even the general phenomenon of Islamic revivalism.

These cases were chosen to represent, at least, some population of the Tablighi Jamaat. What the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism meant and represented for these cases were also what it held for the more general Tablighi population. Given that the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism preceded the Tablighi cases, these case studies, thus, were opportunities to study the phenomenon itself.

The case studies of three senior Tablighis were intended to supplement and even complement the two other parts of the empirical research, namely participant observation and informal interviews, previously discussed. They provided intellectual richness and another dimension to the empirical research.

The interview is one of the most widely used sources of case study information (Yin, 1989). For this purpose, each Tablighi case was approached during a three-day khuruj who were reasonably familiar with me and with my research purpose and endeavour as a doctoral student. I had to only ask my three informants once to do a case study on them and they agreed almost without hesitation or reservation. Their familiarity with me and their understanding that I was a doctoral candidate pursuing studies in the Sociology of Religion, particularly Islam, perhaps was one factor in giving me consent to do the case studies on them and another factor perhaps was the fact that no filling of forms or questionnaires or participating in any experiment was involved. Once the consent was given, we would agree to a time and place to meet. In two instances we met after lunch in the musallah for almost one and a half hours. In the third instance we met for a little over an hour before lunch in the basement of a mosque.

102 The type of interviews used were open-ended in nature, in which the informants were asked a series of open-ended questions in a conversational manner. Sarantakos says that:

In this form, interviews are mainly unstructured and unstandardised and allow the interviewer a high degree of freedom to manipulate the structure and conditions of the method. Openness refers to the degree to which the interviews are open to change and manipulation by the interviewer (1998: 250).

The aim was to allow the informants to provide their own insights into the inner workings of the Tablighi Jamaat and what the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism meant for them. Through them discussing their individual experiences and attitudes towards and understanding about the Tablighi Jamaat, they provided valuable insight into the movement.

In the first two instances I took extensive notes which I reviewed almost immediately after the end of the meeting and in the last instance I tape-recorded the conversation, with permission, and a few days later transcribed it. In the end, each case study proved to be several thousand words long.

CONCLUSION Qualitative research, in particular participant observation, has proven, in this dissertation, to be a powerful means of discovering the complex inner workings of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism. Furthermore, qualitative research, which is about people being studied in their subjective world and understood in terms of the meanings generated by them about themselves and their own social setting, has helped refine and expand the understanding of the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism through the empirical study of the Tablighi Jamaat.

By participating in the rituals and routines of the Tablighi Jamaat and exploring the way the Tablighis create their own social world and make sense of everyday life within it, a “real” glimpse into the broader phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism has been made possible. As Mason notes:

103 Through qualitative research we can explore a wide array of dimensions of the social world, including the texture and weave of everyday life, the understandings, experiences and imaginings of our research participants, the ways that social processes, institutions, discourses or relationships work, and the significance of the meanings that they generate (2002: 1).

Whilst normally the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is viewed from “outside” in, the empirical study of the Tablighi Jamaat has made it possible in this dissertation to view contemporary Islamic revivalism from “inside out”. This has not only helped provide a better understanding, from a local and individual existential level, of contemporary Islamic revivalism as a significant global phenomenon and helped address why and how Islam continues to play a significant role in the lives of Muslims in modern epoch but, shed some light on the relationship between religion and modernity in general.

104 CHAPTER FIVE

ISLAM IN THE WEST

INTRODUCTION This chapter locates the Muslim experience and their religious culture in a broader framework of Islam in the West23. Islam in the West has been formed through immigrant plural cultures from Muslim communities of diverse cultural and linguistic backgrounds. In Europe most of these Muslim communities were emigrants from former colonies. The settlement of these Muslim communities began in earnest after the end of the Second World War when many Western societies embarked on reconstruction and national development projects that needed additional labour. Hence, as with most of the postwar migrants, the Muslims were seen as a source of labour. The colonies and former colonies were the most obvious recruiting grounds for this labour.

Islam in the West is undergoing transformation transgenerationally through a process of de-ethnicization and the recovery of Islam as a “pristine” religion. This de-ethnicization or re- of Islam based on the shariah (Islamic law) is closely linked to the global phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism.

5.1. MUSLIMS IN THE WEST Although Muslims have been linked with Europe since the early days of Islam as a religion and culture, the twentieth century, particularly since decolonization, witnessed a unique type of Islamic movement westward. The Islamic movement westward involved two specific factors: a push factor and a pull factor. The push factor was that the dar al-Islam, once self-sufficient, self-ruling, and a powerful world gradually declined in the face of European imperialism and colonialism causing large-scale disruptions, dislocation, and malaise. The pull factor was that the European civilization in the second half of the twentieth century made enormous social and economic strides. The catastrophes in Europe between 1914 and 1945, for instance, the First World War, the

23 West primarily refers, despite their political diversity and some social and cultural differences, to Western European, North American, and Australasian nation-states as a compact political and military coalition that functions under the stewardship of the United States particularly since the Second World War.

105 communist revolutions in and certain parts of Europe, the Great Depression, the Nazi and fascist dictatorships, the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the class conflict were over. Finally there were major advancements being made and workers were needed.

The places European nations could find workers were in their former colonies or dependent territories. According to Ballard (1996), the former colonies were targets because their subjects already had the experience of working under European rule. In fact they were eager immigrants. This is why, for example, Britain has received large numbers of immigrants particularly from India, , and ; particularly from Algeria, , , and the former French West Africa; and particularly from Turkey.

Muslims left their homes in increasing numbers searching for employment, refuge, and in some instances, religious freedom. Muslim immigration to the West, therefore, on the one hand, is a manifestation of the lands of Islam in crisis and on the other hand, the West, particularly Europe, in need of workers (Ballard, 1996).

Ballard suggests that the history of Muslim immigrant communities in the West varies according to their population size, their social and economic composition and colonial connection to the host society, they share similar experiences. One important similarity according to Smith, is their “shared … understanding that their reasons for entry into a new country were primarily if not exclusively economic and that soon they would be returning to their home countries” (2002: 4). This is what immigrants in general would say and end up staying.

Since decolonization, the immigration of millions of Muslims has gradually changed the demography of the Western societies and their social and economic landscape. Today, after Christianity, Islam, although still a small percentage compared to the mainstream Christian population, is the next largest religion in almost every Western country (Smith, 2002). Smith (2002) argues that in light of this reality, Islam, which was seen as a foreign

106 religion, and some times even not a religion at all in the West, was lumped with Buddhism and Hinduism. In contrast to the Judeo-, Islam presents a unique set of tests to the Muslims who have opted for the West to be their new home, as well as to the Western host societies that are facing mounting pressure to accommodate their new recruits (Smith, 2002).

A precise figure of how many Muslims living in the West today is difficult to ascertain. There are a number of difficulties associated with this task. First, there is the United States and certain countries in Europe, for instance, , , France, , Hungry, Italy, Luxemburg, and Spain who do not include questions on religion in censuses and other official questionnaires. Second, there are a significant number of countries in Europe who still do not officially recognize Islam as a religion (Savage, 2004). Third, a large discrepancy that exists in figures cited by the media or some scholars makes any estimation open to question. For example, Shadid and Van Koningsveld in 1996 estimated a figure between seven and ten million Muslims living in the countries of the entire European community (1996: 1). In the same year Tibi estimated a figure of fifteen million Muslims living just in Western Europe (1996: 139).

For a more reliable figure, according to the United States Department of State’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2003, twenty three million Muslims live in Europe - constituting almost five percent of the entire European population. Even though the figure is just for Europe, given the fact the most of the countries of the West are in Europe and its historical significance, particularly regarding the relationship between Islam and the West, the focus on Europe, here, is justified. The table below, reproduced from Savage (2004: 27), depicts a demographic picture of Muslims in Europe in greater detail.

107 Table 1: Muslims in Europe Country Grouping Number of Muslims¹ Percent of Total Population¹ 1982 2003 1982 2003

EU-15 6.8 mil. 15.2 mil. 1.9 4.0

New EU Members 208,000 290,000 0.4 0.4 EU-15 plus New EU Members 7.0 mil. 15.5 mil. 1.6 3.4 Other European States (incl. Turkey) 56.0 mil. 74.8 mil. 50.0 56.0 Other European States (not Turkey) 8.8 mil. 7.7 mil. 14.0 10.0 All European States (incl. Turkey) 62.9 mil. 90.3 mil. 11.6 15.0 All European States 15.6 mil. 23.2 mil. 3.2 4.5 (not incl. Turkey) Note: 1. Current numbers from U.S. Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2003; 1982 estimates in brackets for comparison, from Kettani, M. (1986) Muslim Minorities in the World Today, : Mansell Publishing Ltd.

Furthermore, by looking at the Muslim populations in some Western countries, particularly in key regions in the World, more closely, we will be able to make a much deeper sense of how important Muslim immigrants are as social groups in these countries in particular, and in the West in general. For instance, the Muslim population in Britain is 1, 552, 000; in France is 3, 240, 000; in Germany is 1, 973, 000; and in the United States is 5, 232, 000 (Britannica Book of the Year, 2001). In Australia there are 281, 578 Muslims (ABS Census, 2002) and in New Zealand there are 23 631 Muslims (NZ Census, 2002). From these figures, it is evident that Muslims are significant minority groups in the West raising many challenges and issues for themselves and the host countries - particularly in terms of identity, religious freedom, equality, and citizenship.

At present, approximately fifty percent of Muslims in Western Europe were born locally (Malik, 2001). Muslim birth rate in Europe at present is more than three times that of the rest of the population, making Muslims the fastest growing population in Europe (Caldwell, 2000). Consequently, Muslim communities in Europe are comparatively younger than the rest of the population on the continent (Mandaville, 2002). A third of

108 France’s Muslim population is under of twenty compared to twenty one percent of the total French population. A third of Germany’s Muslim population is under the age of eighteen compared to eighteen percent of the total German population. A third of United Kingdom’s Muslim population is under the age of fifteen compared to twenty percent of the total British population; and a third of Belgium’s Muslim population is under the age of fifteen compared to eighteen percent of the total Belgian population (Roy, 2003).

Apart from birth, conversion to Islam is another contributing factor toward the increase in Muslim population in Europe. Although a small factor - less than one percent - this could become an important source later on. This demographic reality, Halliday observes, will soon transform into Muslims becoming “a significant [political] force in many Western countries” (1996: 120).

5.2. EMERGENCE OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM The emergence of Muslim communities and the establishment of Islam in the West developed from the growth in numbers of Muslim settlement which began with the development projects undertaken in many countries of the West after the end of the Second World War. The “good” jobs for this were largely taken up by the indigenous people but the menial and laborious tasks which required only unskilled and semiskilled labour called for an infusion of workers from abroad (Vertovec, 2002). In this connection some Muslims immigrated individually, some with their families, and yet some through what is called “chain” immigration – when individuals immigrate and later take relatives and friends, who, in turn, take their own relatives and friends. These first immigrants took residency in the surrounding areas or suburbs of main cities where accommodation was affordable and work was in close proximity, with subsequent immigrants called over to join them (Joly, 1988).

In this way, settlements of Muslim immigrants from the same family, village, or region became established in a single neighbourhood or suburb of major European cities.

109 Concentrations of Muslim immigrants from specific parts of the sender countries thus grew in specific parts of the cities in the West. For instance, in Australia in the capital city of Sydney in the suburb of Lakemba there is a high concentration of Lebanese Muslims (Humphrey, 2001) and in Britain in East London there is a high concentration of Bangladeshis (Werbner, 2002).

Thus, as will be discussed in chapter seven in the context of Islam in Australia, the family and small community was the original basis for rebuilding community and renewing religious life in the West (Joly, 1988; Waardenburg, 1988; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1996; Mahnig, 2002; Roald, 2002). Islamic practice among early recruits was limited to the basics of Islam (Vertovec, 2002) and, therefore, their focus remained confined to Islamic life-cycle rituals (Humphrey, 2001). Small Muslim communities were the central focus for organizational life and played a significant role in settlement (Waardenburg, 1988).

Community meeting places such as a lock-up garage, an empty building in the backyard, or a spare room in the house of a Muslim family or even dilapidated buildings were first used as temporary prayer halls and then subsequently became official mosques (Wilpert, 1988). This was the original social and cultural development of Muslim institutions by local ethnic communities in many countries of the West. However, mosque developments have not always occurred without the challenge being mounted at the courts by non- Muslim residents from the area or suburb where the mosque building was proposed (Wilpert, 1988).

The discourse of Muslim groups during their initial settlement in the countries of the West was a defensive one. This was because for many Muslim immigrants religious identity and national identity were the same (Cesari, 2002). Because religious identity is intimately connected to national identity for many Muslim immigrants, ethnic differences set Muslim communities apart from each other. This defensive attitude was characteristic of the mosques run by Muslim immigrants. The Muslim immigrant groups established themselves independently along ethnic lines, with next to no interaction between different

110 ethnic groups. No practical steps were ever taken by any group to attenuate the ethnic division for better communication and mutual benefit. This was the case because the “home” country served as the point of reference. When the Muslim immigrants came to the realization that they were not returning “home”, they retreated more into their ethnic enclaves to sustain their ethnicity. There relationship with other Muslim and non-Muslim groups was restricted to the basic essentials of communication and they hardly had any social interaction or exchange (Simonsen, 2002). As a result, they emphasized the need to maintain close relationship with the “home” country which they did by telephone, mail, sending remittance to parents and family members, and frequently visiting the home country (Simonsen, 2002).

Thus, the local community source of many mosques reflects the strong ethnic character many still hang on to. Ethnic Muslim community members gathered funds to purchase land for the mosques and (leaders) were imported from the “home” countries to lead the prayers and provide spiritual guidance and religious teaching (Cesari, 2002). This separate development of mosques has been largely independent. However, some larger mosques have received financial assistance from the “home” country and/or international Muslim charitable organizations (Ramadan, 2002).

The independent and local community character of religious life, however, is not just a reflection of the ethnic diversity of Muslim immigrants. In fact, it is also a reflection of an absence of a Muslim leadership not only in certain individual countries but globally. Although Muslim confederations and councils exist in many countries such as Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) in Australia and Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in Britain, they are not seen by many Muslim communities as a source of religious authority (Simonsen, 2002).

The first-generation of Muslim immigrants who arrived in the countries of the West faced the threat of losing their identity through assimilation and secularization. For example, the Muslim response to Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses in Britain (I discuss Muslim response to Rushdie affair in detail later on) was very much an expression of their fear of

111 losing their faith and identity, especially their youth. Despite this fear immigration has actually been found to encourage the accentuation and rejuvenation of faith and identity. As Humphrey argues:

Far from being culturally assimilating, the experience of migration and settlement in the multicultural industrial cities of the West made Muslims more aware of their ethnic and religious differences. Moreover, for most, their social marginality as unskilled workers made them particularly vulnerable to unemployment, welfare dependence and racism as other sources of differentiation (2005: 137).

This pattern of enhanced Muslim consciousness and identity as a minority was common within the context of forced (indentured) and voluntary (immigration) international labour migration practices. For example, Muslim community development and the emergence of is a direct outcome of the indentured labour arrangements initiated by the British colonial authority during late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. My own research (Ali, 2004) on Islam in Fiji found that under the indenture system Islam was strictly a private affair. Islamic practices of varying degrees were rooted in the personal rituals of Muslims. Islam was basically transplanted24 from India and had no public appearance in the religious communal life early in the indenture period. The introduction of Islam in Fiji, therefore, was not the result of missionary preaching exercises or proselytizing initiatives but a consequence of broader processes of geographical and social mobility created by the international labour market and social and economic development sought by individuals through personal initiatives in pursuit of a better life.

5.3. INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION Muslims in the countries of the West are minority communities and therefore, as some scholars (Sander, 1996; Cesari, 2000) argue are expected by the host society or dominant culture to conform to the essential values and institutions. The recent calls for “schools for imams” in Europe, and also Australia, to educate them in the values and traditions of the host society is an expression of this expectation. However, conformity is neither a

24 Similar experience of Islamic transplantation is quite common among first-generation Muslims in the immigration context.

112 simple process nor is necessarily desired by immigrants. Nielsen (1992) suggests that Muslims have opted for one of three choices when it comes to the question of integration and assimilation. He says Muslims either opt for integration/assimilation or reject it outright or take a middle position (Nielsen, 1992). He claims that those who opt for integration/assimilation are mainly the second-generation children of immigrant families (Nielsen, 1992). Nielsen says that these children tend to adopt Western social norms in family and social behaviour, business practices, language, and dress and in a sense are westernized in their way of life and attitude.

At the other end of the scale are those who reject integration/assimilation outright and prefer to maintain their traditional life styles, says Nielsen (1992). Settled in communities that keep consistent links with home countries, they maintain clear ethnic identity and customs and social practices of their home countries. Nielsen (1992) argues that for them, practicing Islam as understood in their homelands and drawing clear similarities between Islam and ethnic traditions are closely tied with their identity and thus may perceive themselves in terms of ethnic or national origin. They continue to have religious and political loyalties to families, friends, communities, and political parties in their homelands (Nielsen, 1992).

In the middle are those who have integrated/assimilated into both the public and the private spaces of the host society and use ijtihad (independent reasoning) to interpret Islam (Nielsen, 1992). Nielsen (1992) argues that they blend Islam with Western values leading to a creation of new hybrid Western-Islamic identity. This new identity has its basis on a liberal and innovative form of Islam accommodating Western material, and individualistic, secular, and social values. Nielsen claims that these Muslims with a secular and individualistic outlook on life make religious compromises so that life can fit in with expectations and rationalities of the host societies and thus pave the way for a more syncretic and diasporic version of Islam. For such Muslim immigrants, Islam is a changeable system which can be modified and reshaped to suit one’s life-style, mode of existence, and demands of the epoch rendering it a secular, individualistic, and private religion with no necessary link with a religious movement or caliphate or the ummah.

113 Nielsen claims that those who fall in the middle category are in majority. To adopt a “middle ground” is not necessarily a conscious choice but rather taking part in “a process of continual negotiation between individual personality and circumstances” (Nielsen, 1992: 153).

Apart from Nielsen, other scholars such as Haddad and Smith (2002) and David and Ayouby (2002) have argued that those Muslims in the West who adopt a middle position towards integration/assimilation are in the majority. David and Ayouby (2002) show this to be true through their work with Muslims in Detroit in the United States. They claim that certain Muslims, especially locally born second or third generation or both from Arab background, find themselves in the “middle ground” as they seek to identify with their cultural heritage and try to conceal it (David and Ayouby, 2002).

For Muslim immigrants, integration into the culture of Western societies is clearly problematic. Van Den Berghe suggests that immigrants in general are “Subordinate minorities, … are under constant pressure to acculturate, because becoming like the dominant group almost invariably confers social advantages” (1981: 215). Sander (1996), whose work focuses on Muslims in Sweden and has relevance to Muslim situation in general in the West, sees the integration of Muslim immigrants as a big problem. He claims that it is not that Muslims resist integration but that, like in many Western countries, the Swedish structures are largely unfavourable to them. Sander notes that as part of Western monolith, Sweden sees itself being built on the idea of “One nation, One people, One religion” (1996: 272). He connects the separation of Muslims in Sweden to this notion of “a common culture and religion, including common manners, norms and value system, as well as a common way of thinking in general” (Sander, 1996: 273). Sander further argues that the state’s official declared “multiculturalism”, where equality, freedom of choice, and partnership are important features, is understood in a different way by Swedish non-Muslim population and by Swedish Muslim population. Swedes in general understand multiculturalism basically through the principle of equality, denoting “equality between universal individuals regardless of culture, ethnicity, race, religion and gender” (1996: 274). Muslims, however, are likely to see multiculturalism in terms of

114 equal right to freedom of choice. Sander (1996) argues that for Swedish authorities the idyllic “multiculturalism” is one in which the public life is characterized by equality, denoting similarity, while religious and cultural expressions should be restricted to the private sphere. Hence, while officially an integrationist model is promoted, in reality the expectation is for an elevated degree of assimilation (Sander, 1996). Muhammad Anwar (1987), a sociologist from Great Britain, similarly argues in the context of Muslims in Britain. His argument is that integration in Britain means one thing to majority Brits and another to immigrant Muslims. Anwar claims that immigrant Muslims conceive of “integration” as “acceptance by the majority of their separate ethnic and cultural identity” (1985: 110). However, from the majority perspective, “integration” echoes the “ideology of the dominant group” which implies that “any group unabsorbed, or not assimilated, is considered to upset the equalization of social relations in the society” (Anwar, 1985: 9).

5.4. ISLAMOPHOBIA Immigrants have always faced different forms of discrimination based on factors such as race and ethnicity, inability to speak the national language of the country, dress, mores, and religion. For Muslims, this discrimination has been made worse as a result of increasing opposition towards Islam in the West, sometimes referred to as “Islamophobia” (Haddad and Smith, 2002; Vertovec, 2002; Werbner, 2002). Werbner asserts that “Islamophobia targets the Muslim community as fanatical and violent, a legitimizing veneer which at its most virulent covers over deep-seated racialisms” (Werbner, 2002: 258). Importantly, it “results from the religion being depicted as violent, and the attribute of then stigmatizes minority Muslims” (Haddad and Smith, 2002: xii).

In recent times, the religion factor has been particularly vital. The stereotyping that has emerged from media coverage of international events such as the Iranian Revolution, the Rushdie Affair, the Gulf crisis, and the events of September 11th “have had a deep impact in shaping perceptions of Islam on the part of European citizens” (Ramadan, 2002: 158). They have become the focus of attention in a highly negative way. In Ramadan’s words:

115 It is difficult to estimate the degree to which these events have helped foster a negative perception of Islam among Europeans, but what we do know is that such a negative perspective is currently a widespread phenomenon that transcends particular national European borders. We also know that the scandals and events in the Middle East have fed the tensions stemming from the social crisis that has gripped much of Europe, manifested in its high levels of unemployment, exclusionary reactions, and recurring violence (2002: 159).

Echoing Ramadan’s sentiments, Vertovec (2002) asserts that in Britain in the last decade or so Muslims have come under intense public scrutiny. He says that such widespread attention has generated a highly negative attitude towards Muslims. The source of this, Vertovec argues, is the media which have portrayed Muslims “in very derogatory and vilifying way” (2002: 19). He, further adds, that such media portrayal of Muslims have affected Muslims in very real ways and “Among the effects of such depiction, which has contributed to what is now widely referred to as “Islamophobia,” Muslims in Britain have been subject to considerable discrimination and even violence” (Vertovec, 2002: 19).

Discrimination and violence against Muslims vary in nature and from place to place in the West. However, some common forms of discrimination against which Muslims have complained and even have gone to the courts are men not permitted to wear beards in the police force, Muslims not allowed to offer prayer at work, refusal to grant Muslims time off to attend Friday congregational prayer, refused employment, women stopped from wearing (veil) at work and in public schools, and the lack of alternative food items when pork is offered in school lunches (Nimer, 2002). In regards to violence, Vertovec (2002) notes Muslims in the West have been subjected to verbal abuse and spat upon, and mosques being burnt. This has been echoed by Haddad and Smith who claim that there have been “violent attacks on the Muslim community (such as mosque burning, bombing, and trashing)” (2002: xii). Generally speaking then, Muslims have experienced discrimination in essentially every facet of life and in some instances even violence across the West.

The point Islamophobia underscores is that Muslim presence in the West (despite Muslims being there, in some cases, for three generations and the West’s claim of a tolerant culture) continues to be a problem for both Muslims and the dominant cultures in

116 the countries of the Western world. It raises the issues of “the prevailing position of deprivation of Muslim minorities in Europe” (Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 1996: 2-3), “race relations … throughout Europe” (Van der Veer, 1997: 102), and “Muslim attempts to achieve full religious equality. … [Muslims] sense of alienation” (Werbner, 2002: 258).

However, it would be grossly misleading to suggest that the Muslim presence in the West has received no official support and recognition. Steven Vertovec notes the official support and recognition of Muslim presence in Britain (which summarizes the situation across the West in general) when he says:

Over the years and in different cities, public accommodation of Muslim needs and concern has included permission to establish facilities for ritual slaughtering of animals for food; to set aside areas of local cemeteries for Muslim use; to provide (permitted) meat in the public institutions such as schools, hospitals, and prisons; to designate prayer facilities or time for prayer in the workplace and to allow time off for religious festivals; and to broadcast public azan or call to prayer from mosques over loud speakers (2002: 28).

5.5. THE RUSHDIE AFFAIR OVER THE SATANIC VERSES The Rushdie affair was a moment of truth, firstly, in the overall development of the status of Muslims both in Britain and in larger Muslim diasporas and, secondly, Muslim realities in general regarding faith and practice. It highlighted the shift in the West from an imported to a universal Islam. The publication of Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses in 1988, in which he allegedly commits blasphemy against Islam by portraying Prophet Muhammad in an offensive way and fictionalizes pristine Islam, made many Muslims (after it was politicized by Khomeini) from all walks of life from all over the world, very angry.

In Britain particularly, the publication of the book generated a massive outcry by Muslims calling for the ban of the book under the British blasphemy laws and led them to stage a colossal book-burning exercises. Muslims from all over the world did the same in protest against the book in their own localities and countries. Local Muslim leaders joined leaders of the Muslim world, including the prominent Khomeini of Iran

117 in condemning the book. Ayatollah Khomeini not only rejected Rushdie’s portrayal of Prophet Muhammad and Islam in a blasphemous way but he initiated and politicised The Satanic Verses through his fatwa (a religious edict) of death of Rushdie as an apostate.

According to many Muslims Rushdie’s “insult” of Prophet Muhammad was particularly hurtful. As Patel notes, “Rushdie’s representation of Prophet [Muhammad] … and his family, were the main factors that caused real offence and anger in the Muslim community world-wide” (1998: 8). Apart from this, what caused even greater anger was the harshness of the language with which Rushdie deals with the characters representing the Prophet and his Companions in his book.

Some defenders of Rushdie argued that what Rushdie did in The Satanic Verses was, in democratic Britain, expressed his rightful freedom of literary genius (Brennan, 1995; Cundy, 1996). According to Patel (1998), Westerners, on this account, have confused the terms “” and “democracy”. He says that both are sacred ideals. He posits that “Muslims argue that the issue is not about the defence of these ideals, but the perversion of them; their protest is not against democracy and freedom of expression, but the freedom to abuse and offend without restraint” (Patel, 1998: 15).

Beyond this, Steven Vertovec (2002) argues that The Satanic Verses arouse great concerns among Muslims over Islamic threat, the fear of loss of social control, and potential loss of identity through increased secularization, westernization, and in the context of immigration more specifically, assimilation. Oliver Roy (2003) agrees - arguing that the fact that Rushdie who once was a Muslim turned an agnostic reveals for Muslims that they themselves and Islam are under siege in the West. In a sense then this means that Muslim identity is becoming vulnerable to the forces of modernity and if Muslims do not act now, many locally born Muslims are likely to take the path Rushdie took in his life and become agnostics. This will consequently undermine Muslim community and Islam leading ultimately to their demise.

118 For many Muslims, I would therefore argue, the content of The Satanic Verses was indeed blasphemous and furthermore that its production demonstrated a process underway of westernization - that was gradually taking away from Muslim communities in the West and elsewhere, their future - the youth. The anti-Rushdie campaign was merely a manifestation of a much larger campaign against westernization. Rushdie was seen as symptom of the problem not the cause of it; westernization was the actual root cause.

Rushdie’s personal biography which revealed him as a non-believer, therefore, was sufficient for Muslim leaders not only in the West but elsewhere, to become concerned with the status of Islam in modernity. This is why Rushdie’s admittance as a non-believer shocked many Muslims and rang alarm bells among them, particularly in Britain, in the respect that what was under threat, “was the definition of a new Islamic community in a European context” (Roy, 2003: 66). In other words, Islam throughout the West was under threat. What this amounted to was a threat to “universal” Islam with no ethno- linguistic and territorial base.

Olivier Roy (2003) adds credence to this argument with his claim that although Muslims were angry with Rushdie for portraying Prophet Muhammad in a blasphemous way, the real essence of anti-Rushdie sentiment was the fear and threat to Muslim identity. He remarks, “The demand for communal recognition ran parallel to the attempt to define the borders of a community that, as its leaders saw it, was in danger of disintegrating through assimilation” (Roy, 2003: 67).

This, above all, suggest that Muslims in the West felt under threat. Despite their aggressive (and aggrieved) behaviour, the anti-Rushdie campaign, I would argue was a call for an Islamic defence in response to this fear about the loss of religion. Underlying the reaction to Rushdie’s “blasphemy” is then the real fear of erosion of faith, the disappearance of Islam from “within” and the actual foundation of Muslim identity.

119 It is important to note here, that Rushdie’s book, is not necessarily and entirely about demeaning Prophet Muhammad and degrading Islam. It is, in fact, a salient and crucial statement about Islamic threat from within. Rushdie touched the fear of many Muslims in the West about the consequences of migrating to the West and becoming a minority. The expression of such strong sentiment and of a fatwa can only be understood through reference to the contemporary socio-cultural and political concerns of the Muslims. The political concern was that Islam has been endangered from without and within. From without, endangerment originates from colonialism, imperialism, secularization, westernization, and globalisation. From within, Muslims have been abandoning Islam in every epoch. In modernity, Muslims have increasingly adopted secular lifestyles which poses a danger to the ummah and Islam. What Muslim fear is that this may gradually lead to rendering Islam unimportant and irrelevant in every-day Muslim life.

These threats are the basis of Islamic revivalism. Fearing the loss of faith, Muslims are returning to Islam. They are seeking ways to incorporate Islam in their everyday living. The issue surrounding The Satanic Verses highlights the importance and urgency of adapting to Islamic way of life. To use Islamic revivalism as a means to inspire and inculcate Islamic zeal in Muslims and lay a new and more solid foundation for Muslim identity. Reviving Islam in the Muslim communities in the West, therefore, is part of the broader narrative of the restoration of Islamic identity because it is about a sense of belonging and having anchorage in a non-fluid and non-hostile milieu.

5.6. THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT IN THE WEST For those Muslim immigrants who have chosen to remain separated or to reject assimilation, there are a number of pragmatic options for pursuing life in the West. Without canvassing everyone of these to assess its relative merits or lack of them (which lies beyond the scope of this study), this thesis will focus on a key option - spiritualism25 which is a path rigorously promoted by Tablighi Jamaat. The Tablighi spiritualism

25 By spiritualism I mean avoiding political engagement and material pursuit of happiness, and directing life towards the discovery of God through religious rituals such as performing regular prayer.

120 demands Muslims or its members to eschew or deemphasize politics in life and in Islam, and concentrate essentially on fundamental principles of Islam such as (faith), salaat (prayer), (alms), saum (fasting), and (), attend mosque for congregational prayer and remembrance, and practice Islamic rituals such as the life- cycle rituals, optional charity, and generally doing good and preventing the forbidden. Tablighis, like many orthodox Muslims, believe that Islam is for all peoples and for all times. It is, therefore, a universal system above and beyond all other systems in the world, including the (modern) Western order. The Tablighi Jamaat does not only avoid materialism and consumer culture but politics as well and whenever deemed appropriate, carefully exercise ijtihad (individual interpretation).

The aim of the Tablighi Jamaat is to turn ethnic Muslim identities towards a global Muslim identity founded on the universally accepted (common) Muslim belief and practices. It is a shariah (Islamic law) focused movement which deemphasizes ethnic and parochial distinctions and leans towards a unified Muslim identity. It strives towards the preservation of separate identity in multicultural societies of the West - not by forming separate enclaves within Western societies or by withdrawing from the civil order with separate facilities such as schools and religious centres - but by attracting Muslims to the worldwide commonalities in Islamic belief and the invocation of the principles and practices of pristine Islam.

In my study of the Tablighi Jamaat, second-and third-generation Muslims offered the following reasons for their attraction to the Tablighi Jamaat. They indicated that they often found ethnic or parochial Muslim customs of their parents “undigestible” and “heterogenizing”. In response to this, taking solace in the Tablighi Jamaat offered a cultural alternative. Through downplaying of the significance and pertinence of ethnic and parochial cultures and accentuating Islamic values and culture, the Tablighi Jamaat attracted them. They found themselves pinning hope in the movement and in its founder for guidance and inspiration. Through doing this, the doctrine of the Tablighi Jamaat gained prominence in their lives in the West. Insofar as the Tablighi Jamaat remained apolitical, the second-and third-generation Muslims indicated the movement’s potential

121 for providing an ongoing positive force for social change and cultural integration. Unlike in other forms of mosque or communal rituals and activities, the Tablighi Jamaat in the West fulfilled an existential need in providing a greater familiarity with Islam. If nothing else, the second-and third-generation Muslims found an increase in their spirituality by joining the Tablighi Jamaat. As a result, through their personal effort they were offered a way to resolve the compatibility of and locate themselves more comfortably as practicing Muslims in a secular Western society. In an increasingly globalized world in which the dynamics of modernity have made the world become “smaller” and ever more closely interconnected, Muslims from different ethnic, socio- economic, and cultural backgrounds are able to interact with much ease and speed, both locally and internationally through internet, telecommunications, video communication links, and mobile phones and thus rediscover the worldwide commonalities in Islamic norms. The Tablighi Jamaat helps these second-and third-generation Muslims and their families break ties from the home countries and parochial cultures of their parents and espouse a more universalistic Islamic identity, facilitated through globalizing technologies.

Furthermore, despite its transnational character, the Tablighi Jamaat helps to facilitate Muslims integrate into multicultural societies of the West overriding ethnic and national boundaries and permitting a slow transition into the Tablighi norms. Those who opt for this approach to living in the multicultural societies of the West with a Tablighi ethos are generally marginalized Muslim immigrants, or their locally born children, who face prejudice, discrimination, unemployment, and various other social problems including the lack or “inappropriateness” of public services. Some students and intellectuals also opt for this approach.

Through this alternative, a new process emerges in which the opportunity to participate in the building of an alternative Islam helps these Muslims in the West gain a concrete “anchorage” and a deeper appreciation of Islam to define collective identity. But as an alternative form of Islam, the Tablighi Jamaat offers only one way of being a “good’ Muslim. Alternative forms of Islam abound not only in the West but even in the Muslim

122 world. Looking at one of these, EuroIslam, provides an assessment of the nature of .

5.7. EUROISLAM EuroIslam has a clear relationship with the form of Islam promoted by the Tablighi Jamaat. Both emphasize the removal of accretion from Islam, that is, the de-ethnicization of Islam, and stress the guidance of life derived directly from the shariah. EuroIslam and the Islam of the Tablighi Jamaat are universal borderless cultures. In this light, Olivier Roy (2003) argues that the EuroIslam is a form of Islam that has emerged in recent years in Western Europe as an alternative to traditional and “ethnicized” Islam. An Islam, which is transnational, divorced from its place of origin, and traverses the globe. It has been promoted as a “de-parochialized” and “de-ethnicized” Islam that transcends cultural and ethnic boundaries and cuts across class barriers to construct a conscious supranational community of the faithful - the ummah.

Furthermore, Roy (2003) argues that Islam in Western Europe is undergoing a transition from a transplanted religion to a “universal” Islam. He asserts that the principal difference between the two forms of Islam26 is that whilst the transplanted Islam is adhered to largely by Muslim immigrants in Western Europe - who maintain a constant link with their countries of origin - the universal Islam is followed by mainly locally born Muslims who never established such ties and, therefore, don’t have the ancestoral country “as a reference point and a storehouse of activists and clerics” (Roy, 2003: 63). Instead, guidance is made directly from the Qur’an and the sunnah (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad) or the shariah. How much this transition has really occurred, Roy speculates, differs from society to society though it is visible and detectable in second- and third-generations (Roy, 2003). Once this transition is completed, however, Roy (2003) predicts that it is possible that Islam could take numerous different forms. One form could be integration; a process through which a distinct European, or German, or French Muslim community could evolve. Another form is re-communalization with a

26 The Western or “universal” Islam is theologically the same as Islam in general. The difference refers to the distinction in living and experiencing the faith by Muslims in the West and the dar al-Islam.

123 supranational character, “which is defined in essence by European Muslims’ identification with a universal umma, or community of the faithful” (Roy, 2003: 63). In other words, the creation of a “deculturalized” Islam which has no particular link to any specific culture and thus able to accommodate all cultures or be devoid of a sense of culture altogether.

Roy suggests that the re-communalization form of Islam is closely associated with “fundamentalism” (Roy, 2003). The condition for fundamentalization or revitalization is re-Islamization which entails the inculcation of Islamic beliefs, or what are perceived as Islamic beliefs, and practices in European-born Muslims. In other words, an Islamic socialization for second-and third-generation Muslims.

However, there is a problem with the need for this condition. Simply put, it is insufficient. Re-Islamization can be conventional and conformist and, therefore, oriented towards the preservation of individual dignity and self-respect rather than to act as a mechanism for the removal of accretion and purification of Islam (Roy, 2003). It can also be oriented towards revitalization, or what Roy calls “radicalization” (Roy, 2003: 64). Theoretically, this can be achieved in two ways. First, there is “diasporic revitalization” which involves the maintenance of the “links to and focused on the country of origin”, (Roy, 2003: 64), not the European receiver country. All the guidance and energy flows from the home country and gets re-directed from the host country rendering the host country a mere platform for the advancement of parochial and ethnic interests and values. “Revitalization Muslim” groups in the Europe who continue to have ties with their home countries, however, are generally nationalist not fundamentalist or revivalist (Roy, 2003). As a result, they do not contribute directly and in any meaningful way towards the creation of EuroIslam.

The second type of revitalization is “ideological and takes the form of a transnational Islam divorced from its country of origin” (Roy, 2003: 63). Ideological revitalization usually emerges from an environment in which second-and third-generation young Muslims feel a strong sense of alienation (Roy, 2003). Akyol observes that unfamiliarity

124 with, and even deliberate detachment from, the Islam believed in and practiced by their parents and grand parents, the second-and third-generation unemployed Muslim men drift towards pristine scriptural Islam for solace and anchorage (Akyol, 2004).

Islamic revitalization or revivalism in Europe in the last decade or so has primarily taken this second path with the emergence of a tendency towards a supranational community of the faithful (Roy, 2003). It is in a sense a Maududian imagined community brought into existence with the help of modern advancement in transportation technologies such as supersonic jets, fast cars, and express trains and communication technologies such as mobile phones, facsimiles, and the internet.

The association with a supranational community of the faithful can be a genuine experience of religious identity formation asserts Roy (2003). This is particularly true for middle-class Muslims especially “among disenchanted alienated youth”, (Roy, 2003: 68). Such identification has the potential to lead the youths to the process of political extremism. Of course this is not a universal process. The process differs from one country to another and within each country from one immigrant community to another. However, there is indeed a general trend and a rationale for political extremism.

Europe is an open, liberal, and multi-ethnic world which offers economic dynamism and social mobility. In European countries, argues Roy (2003), when diasporic seniors make attempts to control their people and restrict their blending into the mainstream community, their attempts largely fails. Therefore, when diasporic culture gradually becomes weak, new values and norms emerge and permeate the life. In some instances this is deep and wide-ranging manifesting in assimilation and in some instances it is superfluous and haphazard characterizing integration (Roy, 2003).

Thus, without a diasporic anchorage, the second-and third-generation youths, argues Roy (2003), turn to the imagined community for support and purpose in life. In the case of Muslims in Europe, this community is normally erected upon supranational Islamic identity. The rejection of ancestral culture and the refusal to assimilate with the

125 mainstream Western culture, therefore, finds expression in Islamic revivalism. Revivalism is specially attractive to disenfranchized youth because it helps transform them from uprooted or cultureless individuals to soldiers and minders of universal Islam (Roy, 2003).

Islamic revivalism, in this sense, can be said to be centred not on family and communal custom but on individuals who encounter identity crisis in face of severed ties with family and ethnic community. It conforms with , gives priority to ijtihad and self- instruction, and emphasizes emotional faith instead of committing to traditional rituals. It is a by-product of westernization of Western-born Muslims. It intensifies anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments in immigrant communities and is attributed to a generation gap and Western political and cultural encroachments (Roy, 2003) and widespread Muslim poverty and desolation (Akyol, 2004).

CONCLUSION Islam in the West, today, is projected from not an immigrant perspective but locally born Muslim citizens of Western countries. Increasingly immigrant Islam is becoming the Islam of the second-and third-generation Muslims. Theirs is an Islam that is increasingly detached from the ethnic traditions and values of origin and one based on the shariah. These Muslims are being socialized in the same world as their non-Muslim counterparts but with different outcomes. For these Muslims the socialization and participation in the mainstream society has not necessarily helped them overcome their social and economic problems and many still suffer from them such as unemployment, ghettoization, and racism. Seeing themselves as nationals and citizens they have come to realize their marginal status and demand recognition and equality. For them a re-examination and recovery of their religion has become a major source of self-worth and well-being.

Thus the fundamental problem of Islam in the West is to a degree rooted in the relationship between Islam and the West – the so-called “clash of cultures” – and specific colonial and imperial legacies, partly in assimilation and integration policies, and partly in social, economic, and political marginalization and consequent alienation of Muslims.

126 Although Muslims have been living in the West, particularly in Europe, for centuries, they have always had to live in the shadows of the dominant West living as ethnic and cultural “Other”.

As we will see in greater detail in chapters seven and eight, in the last few decades, Muslims in the West have been at the forefront of remolding the relationship between Islam and the West in their efforts to carve out a space for themselves in the social, economic, cultural, and political landscapes of the West. Muslims in the West and elsewhere, while embracing modernity, are at the same time showing their increased loyalty to Islam. Instead of their experience of modernity being westernization and secularization many are opting for an accentuated Islamic identity and deeper and broader appreciation of Islamic values. They are returning to Islam for guidance and pursuit of more fulfilling and rewarding life.

127 CHAPTER SIX

THE ORIGINS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT

INTRODUCTION As a non-hierarchical and apolitical transnational Islamic revivalist movement, the Tablighi Jamaat emerged in India in 1927 amid the Meos of Mewat to purge Muslim society of “un-Islamic” beliefs and practices. At the time the social and economic conditions of the Meos in the Mewat region of India were very poor and Muslims there were people of interpolative religious beliefs and practices. Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, saw this as a great Muslim tragedy and attributed the prevailing conditions of Meos to the disappearance of Islam from their lives. To counteract this great Muslim tragedy, he devised a simple yet effective plan – the return to the basics of Islam which has ever since characterized the Tablighi Jamaat.

This chapter sketches the origins and the development of the Tablighi Jamaat in India. It discusses how the specific situation of Meos in the Mewat region of India had direct links with the broader context of Muslim’s sense of crisis about their faith and society in larger India. Furthermore, it discusses how the emergence of the Tablighi Jamaat interacted with the transformation brought about by the establishment of British colonial rule which created the context for the moral reform of Muslims and their remaking.

6.1. MEWAT AND THE MEOS Mewat is where the Meo people live. Its geographical boundary is constituted by , Bharatpur, and districts. The district of Gurgaon makes up part of , and the Bharatpur and Alwar districts constitute part of . Mewat lies south-west of the Indian capital and is not remote from central Delhi. Whilst people with different ethnic backgrounds live in Mewat, Mewat is largely occupied by its own people commonly known as Meos, who speak the Mewati dialect. Essentially:

128 the Meos are all Musalmans, and are mainly agriculturalists, being greatly helped in the fields by their women, who do not observe parda, and generally do better work than their husbands (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908: 430).

However, animal husbandry and sheep, goat, and dairy farming form the secondary sources of livelihood.

Taking shelter near the foothills of undulating terrains of the Aravalli ranges called Kala Pahard (black mountain), early history reveals Meos as pillagers and plunderers causing the Delhi rulers terrible grief and costly resolutions (Mujeeb, 1976). Mujeeb says:

in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Meos who lived in the hilly areas west and south of Delhi not only plundered people on the highways around Delhi but even stole into the town. They came up to the Hand-I-Shamsi, molested water-carriers and maid servants, who came to draw water, stripping them and walking away with their clothes (1976:218-19).

Furthermore:

the Meos and Mewatis, however, retained their character for turbulence; and towards the end of the eighteenth century traveling in the upper and central was unsafe owing to armed bands of Mewati horsemen. They gave much trouble to Lord Lake’s forces in the war of 1803, while in the Mutiny they and the Gujars were conspicuous for their readiness to take advantage of any disorder (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908: 105).

The broader Meo society is a complex of social groups and sub-groups. Meos are essentially divided into two primary exogamous clans known as pals (a pal is territorial unit consisting of a set of Meo ) and sub-clans called gotras (a is a Meo lineage). These are hereditary clans, determined by patrilineal descent. There are thirteen pals, five are Jadon pals – Chhirkilat, Dalat, Demrot, Nai, and Pundelot; five Tomar pals – Balot, Darwar, Kalesa, Lundavat, and Rattavat; one Kachhwaha pal – Dingal; one Bargujar pal – Singal; and one miscellaneous half-blood pal - Palakra and fifty-two gotras (Crooke, 1975). The pals have their individual links to a particular territory. The thirteen pals reflect the thirteen individual tracts of the Mewat region. A pal owns a tract and each tract has a corresponding pal name. Over time, the territorial boundaries of individual pal have become less pronounced and the pal chief commonly known as

129 Chaudhary who once represented his own pal and wielded political power no longer has a significant role in the broader political structure of the Meo society (Marwah, 1979).

The individual pals are further divided into small groups or sub-groups known as thamas. A thama is a sub-group whose members are patrilineal descendants of a common ancestor. A thama acquires its name either directly from the ancestor or from the village where the ancestor was born. Like pals, the thamas have their own representative chiefs. The chieftain is a hereditary office (Marwah, 1979).

What distinguishes gotras from pals is that the gotras are smaller in size and lack territorial connection. However, “the function of the gotras and pals is almost identical” (Aggarwal, 1973: 27). Gotras are descendants of a common male ancestor. The gotras are exogamous groups whose members do not live together in one village but in a series of neighbouring hamlets whose occupants are called seghotians (people from same gotra). It is not unusual for Meos and non-Meos such as Minas to share same gotra names between them because:

the similarity of names and the legend of Sasibadani, as well as the fact that the sections of both tribes closely agree, has led to the general belief that the Minas and Meos, who are classed as distinct in their native home Rajputana, are really of common origin (Crooke, 1975: 485).

The Meo family comprises of a complex of blood relations who live collectively under one roof and share a common chulha (hearth). This is called a ghar (household). The household can be divided into two primary groups. There is a simple household comprising of the primary family, one-member family, and a partial primary family and a complex household is made up of two or more complete or incomplete non-extended families who live under the same roof and share the same chulhas (Marwah, 1979). The complex household can be further divided into two subgroups: lineal joint families consisting of a man and his wife living with their sons and their families and collateral joint families entailing several brothers and their families all living together (Aggarwal, 1973).

130 Meos also practice and, therefore, have polygynous families. A polygynous family consists of a man, more than one wife, and their children. The practice of polygyny in Meo society arises from a social custom in which a man takes his ’s widow in marriage and becomes her source of support. Also, a man may take a second wife if the first one proves to be infertile or “sometimes, although very rarely, rich Meos take two or more wives for reasons of prestige” (Aggarwal, 1973: 34).

Under the patrilocal extended family system women in Meo society move in with their husbands upon marriage. Women rarely own any property in the Meo society because their inheritance rule, which is not based on the shariah (Islamic law) preclude them from sharing in ancestoral property (Marwah, 1979). However, a woman, whether as a daughter or a sister, may inherit land or property should there be no male heir or the heir had passed away.

6.1.1. Islamic History of Meos The Islamic history of Meos is a little obscure and the historical accounts paint a rather contradictory and conflicting picture. Meo belief holds that the proselytization of Meos to Islam occurred as early as the initial period of when Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sind in 711 and established Islam in India. It is claimed that at that time Meos were spread up to Sind and therefore came under the influence of Islam (Shakur, 1974). But then, “according to tradition, the Meos first crossed the Jumana in the period of anarchy, which succeeded the invasion by Mahmud of Ghazni in 1018-9” (Imperial Gazetteer, 1908: 104). Another account suggests that in 1194 when Qutb-u’d-din Aibek was in power, Hiraj who was Prithviraj’s brother, made an attempt to invade Mewat but was defeated and killed (Haq, 1972). Sayyid Wajih-u’d-din was given the task to invade Mewat by the sultan but he was killed during the battle and his nephew, Miran Husayn Jang, took charge and ultimately subjugated the Meos. Some of them converted to Islam and some opted to maintain their Hinduism by paying jizyah (a land tax) (Haq, 1972).

These historical accounts of the conversion of Meos to Islam, in which Meo Muslims kept many Hindu customs and traditions and continued to worship Hindu while

131 others reverted to Hinduism reveal considerable . The Meos were nominal Muslims because “they observed most Hindu rituals and continued to use the services of all Hindu castes, including the Brahmins, long after embracing Islam” (Aggarwal, 1978: 151). Meo Muslims celebrated festival of Holi (festival of colour), Dussehra (festival celebrating the triumph of Lord Rama over the king – Ravana), and Diwali (festival of lights) as well as their own festivals of Eid al-Fitr (the feast at the completion of the fasting month of Ramadan), Eid al-Adha (the feast of sacrifice), and Shab e-Barat (the night of forgiveness which some Muslims celebrate as festival on thirteen or fourteenth of of Shaban). They traced their geneology to Lord Krishna and observed his birthday - janam-ashtami. Sufi such as Hazrat Khwaja Mohiuddin Chisti and Nizam-u’d-din Auliya were held in high regard and worshipped. The graves of these Sufi saints became and the site of pilgrimage. Hazrat Madar Shah (1315-1436) was another well respected Sufi saint whose tomb is in Makanpur and considered by Meos as sacred. In order to honour Hazrat Madar Shah, a procession of Meos would carry a flag as a symbol of respect to his tomb while singing and chanting praise to him. Other well-known Sufi saints who were religious preachers such as Hazrat Shaikh Musa and Shah Chokha, were also held in great esteem and their tombs were worshipped and (an annual celebration to mark the death of a saint) were observed. As a Meo scholar attests:

at the local village level, certain deities such as Panchpir, Khera Devta, Chabunda, Bhomiya and Bhairon were also worshipped. These deities were represented either by platforms or by stone slabs. People used to light earthen lamps on them and offer sweets. These offerings were given to the (Marwah, 1979: 86).

Furthermore:

the local saints and deities are regularly worshipped, the officiates at all family ceremonials side by side with the Musalman , and if in matters of creed they are Muhammadans in matter of form they are (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908: 37).

It is fair to suggest that Meos, upon converting to Islam, did not pay much specific attention to what constituted a pristine Islamic practice and allowed themselves to be enveloped in a syncretic lifestyle in which Hinduism and Islam contributed proportionately. As a consequence, the institution of family remained almost untouched

132 by Islam and Meo family structure continued on the base of the pal and gotra dichotomy and marriage exogamy.

The rule governing the selection of a spouse are complex and involve various degrees of prohibition such as the avoidance of cross cousins, those from one’s own village, or from one’s mother’s brother’s village, etc. (Marwah, 1979: 86).

These rules of exogamy were artificial and in direct contrast to the shariah which permits believers to marry blood relations as close as the first cousin. Customary Hindu laws of inheritance continued to be applied because “those of indigenous origin still retain their ancient Hindu customs and ideas” (Imperial Gazetteer of India, 1908: 37). Therefore, among the Meos, Hindu customary laws often took precedence over the shariah and thus what may be perceived by Meos as harmless religious syncretism became very problematic and undermined orthodox religious practices. Other practices of cultural syncretism included the naming of children - a Hindu prefix would follow a Muslim suffix, for example, Raja Khan, Darya Khan, and Sunjay Khan, clothing customs, for instance, Meo women adopted Muslim dress such as gunghat (dress worn by Muslim women in some parts of India) but not pardah (veil). As Aggarwal observes:

unlike both the Muslim and Hindu high castes, Meo women do not observe parda (seclusion). … Meo women, however, do avoid certain relatives in their families, especially the male affinels who are older than their husbands. In the presence of these relatives Meo women cover their faces and avoid any kind of contact (Aggarwal, 1973: 33).

However, instead of kameez (a long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers) men continued to wear dhoti (the loin), kamari (waist cloth), and paejama (drawers) (Crooke, 1975).

Meo adopted Islamic life-cycle rituals such as khatna (circumcision), nikah (marriage ceremony), and janazah (funeral) but with Hindu features. For example, khatna (circumcision) was made a grand social occasion and celebrated with great pomp and ceremony. The nikah was performed by a maulvi or a kazi (Muslim cleric) but included Hindu marriage rituals such as the rubbing of tumeric on the bodies of a bride and groom, getting Brahmin priests to write the note called pili chitthi to fix the date of a marriage

133 and playing the dhol (drum). In the case of the janazah, Meos adopted burial instead of cremation but maintained the Hindu funeral feast known as chehallum, observed on the fortieth day after the burial. However these rituals and ceremonies never included the recitation of the Qur’an, a crucial Islamic element.

The syncretic Meo religious traditions and practices served to reinforce their local social and political position in Mewat. As the dominant land owners and the leading caste their maintenance of Hindu traditions defined their social interaction with other castes, for example, the gotra/pal system described above and the attitude of untouchability towards the “lower” castes such as the bhangis (sweepers) and chamars (leather workers). It allowed them to maintain their dominant position in the caste system despite converting to Islam. As Shams observes, there was “no pressing need to bend in either direction [towards Hinduism or Islam] because their position in Mewat was secure” (1983: 17).

6.2. THE CRISIS OF EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY At the turn of the twentieth century, with British colonial power firmly established in India, the Meos were forced to confront their ambivalent position on the issue of religious identity. A series of socio-economic and political crisis produced the circumstances in which the Tablighi Jamaat found fertile soil.

6.2.1. The Socio-economic Crisis Despite the fact that Meos were the owners of almost the entire productive land in Mewat they were overwhelmingly poor small land holders with few local leaders or large landlords amongst them (Ali, 1970; Shams, 1983). Moreover as the economic situation deteriorated the Meos became poorer. According to Wahiduddin Khan one reason for their deepening poverty was their growing indebtedness to the local Hindu traders, the Banias, who charged impoverished Meos an interest rate of five percent per month on their loans which amounted to 60% annually (Khan, 1988: 4). The consequence was many Meos became so indebted to the Banias that they were forced to forfeit their land to them because they could not continue to pay their debts. Shams (1983) notes many Meos saw themselves as victims of the exploitation of Bania money lenders who they blamed

134 for their poverty. In turn they became disillusioned with Hinduism to which Banias were directly linked as Brahmanic Hindus.

The Meos increasingly saw the colonial regime and the upper Hindu castes as their enemies. Their response was to emphasize their Islamic identity and thereby reinforce their communal identity.

6.2.2. The Meo Peasant Uprisings of the 1930s The global economic depression of the 1930s hit Indian peasants particularly hard. In several areas of northern India, including Mewat, peasants rioted demanding relief from the economic hardships. From 1932 to 1934, in response to depressed economic conditions, the Meos revolted against authorities so fiercely that the period still features in Meo legends (Ali, 1970). The severity of the Meos oppressive conditions can be grasped from the following assertions made by Haye:

The Meo tracts in Alwar and Bharatpur were victims of the extreme authoritarianism and ruthlessness of their rulers. Government servants would do nothing without extorting bribes. Peasants were being grossly overburdened with increased taxation. … The rights of the people were being thrown to the winds. The Mewatis were now treated as goats and sheep, as nothing better than dumb animals (Haye, n.d.: 8).

In addition the Meos were still required to render forced labour to the state, pay numerous high taxes such as servant’s tax, tail tax on different kinds of domestic animals, grazing tax, and a tax for religious ceremonies (Haye, n.d.). In addition to this great economic burden, in 1933, the raja sanctioned a quadruple rise in revenue levy (Shakur, 1974).

Meo peasants united in protest and resolved to boycott the levy rise. The Meo demonstrations became widespread covering the entire and subsequently spread into the British territory (Haye, n.d.).

After the rebellion had broken out in 1933 the Tablighi Jamaat started its dawah work in full force in the Mewat area.

135 At this critical moment the movement of Ilyas (d.1944) infused new hope and confidence in the Muslims living in the riot-infested areas. Some felt that the calamities that had come upon them were a visitation from God for their negligence of religious duties. Many were drawn to the work of Ilyas which thus received great impetus (Haq, 1972: 44).

Initially the dawah work of the Tablighi Jamaat centred on British Mewat, particularly around , and only began to focus on Alwar and Bharatpur after the rebellion had broken out (Haye, n.d.). Although not a direct outcome of the revolt, Islamic revival in Mewat was a religious response to social oppression.

6.3. MAULANA MUHAMMAD ILYAS The founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, was born Akhtar Ilyas in 1885 and was the youngest of three sons. His father was Maulana Muhammad Ismail, a learned and pious man who was an esteemed religious teacher. He taught the Qur’an to the children of Mirza Ilahi Bakhsh who was related by marriage to Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal ruler of Delhi. His home was a small building over the red gate near the tomb of Hazrat Nizam-u’d-din Auliya in the south of Delhi. Ismail was also the imam (leader) of the Banglawali Masjid which stood in the Nizam-u’d-din complex and practiced . He had three sons, Muhammad from his first marriage and after the death of his first wife, Yahya and Ilyas from his second wife. Ismail took great delight in helping people. Often he would assist the passing labourers with their loads and offered water which he would draw himself from the well. He was renowned for being charitable and was responsible for minding water pots during large congregations. All these deeds he did purely for the pleasure of Allah (Haq, 1972).

Maulana Muhammad Ismail came from a very respected and pious family and he extensively used to fashion his life. He devoted a vast portion of his daily time in (remembrance) and salaat (praying) and recited the Qur’an regularly which he committed to his memory at a very young age. He displayed strong interest in Islamic education and preaching and was renowned for paying the labourers their days earning just to entice them to learn about Allah and His din (religion) and invoke Islamic zeal in Muslims. Once the labourers learnt their prayers and began to offer their regular salaat, the payments or wages were withdrawn with mutual consent. This gave birth to the new

136 madrasah at the Banglawali Masjid where the labourers were its original students. As such, the foundation was laid by his father for Ilyas to base his revivalist work among the Meos of Mewat (Haq, 1972).

Ilyas grew up in Kandhela where his mother was born, however, he also spent some portion of his childhood in Nizam-u’d-din. His mother, Bi Safiyah, was a pious woman with a remarkable memory who was renowned for reciting, with great ease, the entire Qur’an several times over during Ramadan (Muslim month of fasting) .

Like his two elder brothers, Ilyas got his education from the maktab (grade school) which entailed Qur’anic studies and religious instructions. He committed the entire Qur’an to his memory at a very young age and was very particular in offering his five daily salaats. His family surroundings were not only friendly but charged with spirituality and godliness. His pious mother and grandmother often narrated stories of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions to him and “the atmosphere of piety in which he lived illuminated by the events and incidents in the lives of remarkable men and women he had known or heard about fanned this spark” (Haq, 1972: 82).

Ilyas’s first real Islamic education began during his ten developmental years under Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gungohi. However because of serious illness he unfortunately had to suspend his studies (Hasni, n.d.). Ilyas resumed his studies after recovering and, when Gungohi passed away, Ilyas found a new teacher Maulana Khalil Ahmad under whose guidance he completed the levels of suluk (Sufi mystic journey to God) (Azzam, 1964) and became a follower of the Naqshbandiyah Sufi order. Subsequently, he went to Deoband where he studied Tirmidhi and Sahih al-Bukhari (books of Hadith) under Maulanas Mahmud-u’l-Hasan , Ali Thanawi, and Shah Abd-u’r-Rahim Raipuri. These were Gungohi successors. Ilyas received bay’at (oath of allegiance) from Maulana Mahmud-u’l-Hasan Deobandi.

Deoband madrasah played a significant role in shaping Ilyas’s intellect, particularly in Islamic theology. Deoband is a madrasah - seminary - founded in 1867 as a reformist

137 Islamic institute at a time when the British were at the zenith of their rule in India. The Deoband madrasah was a direct Islamic response to the approach taken by the British government in employing Christian missionary books which instructed students in the principles of Christianity.

Many of the alims (Islamic scholars) at Deoband adopted a simple ascetic lifestyle and this attracted a lot of students to seek initiation into losing themselves to the Divine Love. However, as reformists, these understood the mundane problems well and thus embarked on the path to imitate the practice of the earlier period of Islam and enjoined Muslims in their mission of transmitting Allah’s word to both the impious and the ignorant. They were well versed in the Qur’anic scripture and used their power of knowledge to denounce syncretic customary practices, celebrations, and life-cycle rituals, saint worship, and Shi’a (a Muslim sect) traditions such as the taziyah (a Shi’a re- enactment of the passion and death of Hussein) as unauthentic Islamic practices. Ilyas was an integral part of this intellectual phenomenon and later in his life annexed knowledge with practice to launch what became the Tablighi Jamaat of spiritual renewal.

It was in 1918 after the death of his eldest brother, Muhammad, Ilyas was made the imam at the Nizam-u’d-din mosque and started teaching at the madrasah (Haq, 1972). Although he had held teaching positions in the past, such as at Mazahirul Uloom seminary in in , this appointment took him to new heights in his career. The madrasah was physically and financially in a very poor shape and there were only a few poor Meo and non-Meo students enrolled (Haq, 1972). The task of running the madrasah with limited resources was difficult and Ilyas on many occasions used his own money to facilitate the continuous running of the madrasah and remained positive and never complained (Haq, 1972). He continued his efforts in Islamic teaching and preaching and the establishment of a number of small scale madrasahs.

He thought that by opening centers of religious instruction, the young generation could be reformed. Moulana Ilyas started establishing maktabs and madrassas in Mewat. He even spent his personal income for this. Thanks to his missionary zeal, a large number of maktabs and madrassas were opened in a short span of time (Marwah, 1979: 94).

138 “However, he soon became disillusioned with the approach to Islamisation” (Ahmad, 1991: 512), and being aware of the slow spread of the fundamental principles of Islam in Mewat and the presence of syncretic elements in Meo living, Ilyas embarked on the quest for a better way of reforming the Meos who had abandoned the basic Islamic principles. So during the course of his second hajj in 1926, Ilyas’s intuition was directing him to a greater divine course and upon returning to India this manifested in the form of the Tablighi Jamaat.

Within a month, a jamaat of eight persons had been formed. The jamaat moved out of its village of origin, Ferozepur Nanak, and moved to other villages reaching a town called next Friday. The Friday congregation prayers were offered at Sohna and again the movement began. The next two Friday prayers were held at (in Rajasthan) and Nagina (district Gurgaon) towns. This was the first tablighi jamaat (Marwah, 1979: 95).

Marwah (1979) notes that after having finished performing his hajj the third time, Ilyas returned to India and immersed himself in his missionary preaching work. In Mewat, he proselytized by sending small groups of Tablighis to preach in various neighbouring villages and subsequently to villages outside Mewat.

Moulana Ilyas was very systematic in his work of Tabligh in Mewat. He had a map of Mewat prepared in which information regarding roads, names of villages, population figures of each village, and names of the prominent Meos was given. A number of jamaats were set up, which included non-Meo Muslims, and started touring the villages in Mewat. In this way the Moulana brought the Muslims of different communities together, hoping to bring them closer culturally (Marwah, 1979: 96).

Ilyas’ aim was not only to spread Islamic scriptural doctrine to the Meos but also to eliminate the non-Islamic customs and practices of the Mewatis. The Tablighi Jamaat began proselytizing in isolated villages inside and outside Mewat and:

after many such tours within and outside Mewat, the Mewatis started … [wearing] Islamic dress, the bangles of hands and the earrings vanished. Men started sporting beard, anti-Shariat customs of marriage became less. Drinking liquor, to which the Meos were addicted, was given up. Crimes, riots and immoral behaviour began to show decrease in incidence (Hasni, n.d: 96).

In 1938, after Ilyas performed his fourth hajj he made attempts to extend his work to , however, the monarchical protocols and bureaucratic processes presented obstacles to his call for missionary preaching and he returned to India to concentrate on

139 his work locally and nationally. He died in July 1944, but his work survived to this day and is guided by his six principles.

6.4. THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT

The Tablighi Jamaat emerged in Mewat in a direct response to the rise of Hindu sect. From this sect emerged two proselytizing movements of Shuddhi (Purification) and Sangathan (Consolidation). They were engaged in large-scale efforts to “win” back “strayed” Hindus who accepted Islam during Muslim political hegemony in India. The Arya Samajis who claimed to be the new defenders of Hinduism which was alleged to have become a forgotten faith and slipped into decadence at the hands of the concentrated primarily on marginal Muslims who even though accepted Islam while back and adopted many Islamic ritual practices never completely gave up the quintessential practices of Hinduism and, therefore, remained Muslims in name only.

In order to counter Arya Samaj proselytizing amongst the Meos, the Tablighi Jamaat embarked on the mission of Islamic faith renewal and awakening among the Meos of Mewat and the broader Muslim population of India. The Tablighi Jamaat realized that the true teachings of Islam had been grossly neglected by the Muslims, particularly those living in India. The Muslim bourgeoisie was too comfortable in the lap of luxurious living and had generally given up their obligation to Allah in totality. Also, the ulama had focused excessively on knowledge construction within the confines of educational institutions and mosques and had neglected preaching to the majority lay Muslims. The ulama’s neglect created a gap between the learned and the lay Muslims which led to many Muslims “questioning the validity of Quranic injunctions” (Marwah, 1979: 88). This trend only threatened further decline of Islam in India.

To counter this division between learned and lay Muslims Ilyas invoked the fundamental principles of Islam in these communities. Ilyas argued that the responsibility of spreading Islam was not confined to the ulama but was incumbent on every Muslim. He reiterated what numerous other alims had asserted that after the death of Prophet Muhammad, who

140 was the last in the chain of , no other prophet will descend on earth to spread the word of Allah. Therefore, the discharging of the “prophetic responsibilities” is the obligation of every Muslim who should encourage the praising of Allah and invite Muslims to do good and refrain from doing bad. In this sense, the aim of the Tablighi Jamaat centered on purifying the Muslims from religious syncretism and not on converting non Muslims.

6.4.1. Six Principles of Tablighi Jamaat The six principles of the Tablighi Jamaat of which the first two are five pillars of Islam are: shahadah; salaat; ilm and dhikr; ikram i-Muslim; ikhlas i-niyat; and tafriq i-waqt.

First is the shahadah, or Article of faith, which is an assertion that there is no deity but Allah and that the Prophet Muhammad is His messenger. The Article of faith has two aspects: first is the acceptance of the existence of Allah and His greatness and oneness and second is to testify to the Prophethood of Muhammad and obedience to Him.

The second is the five ritual salaats. These are most crucial to a practical life and they open the door to spiritual elevation and piety in actions.

The third is ilm and dhikr (knowledge and remembrance of God) are the third principle. A short time in the morning after the ritual salaat and a little time in the evening after the salaat are to be spent for these purposes. In these sessions, apart from listening to the preaching by the amir (leader), the congregation perform nafl (supererogatory) prayers, recite the Qur’an, and read hadith. They also have their breakfast and dinner together and throughout this session, one can easily notice Islamic brotherhood, solidarity, and humility expressed openly among the congregation. All of this seems to encourage most regular attenders to remain in the movement (Sikand, 2002).

The fourth is ikram i-Muslim (respect every Muslim). Honour and deference need to be demonstrated toward fellow Muslims. In the case of young Muslims they should be

141 treated with kindness and affection by the elder Muslims and in respect to elder Muslims, they should be shown reverence and deference by young Muslims.

The fifth is ikhlas i-niyat (emendation of intention and sincerity). A Muslim must perform every single human action for the sake of Allah. This is linked with the purpose of life as being a permanent servitude to Allah.

The sixth is tafriq i-waqt (to spare time). As Maulana Ilyas explains:

to a Muslim faith and life based on faith means holding firmly to kalimah and prayer, regularly observing dhikr, learning its virtues or excellences, fulfilling duties and obligations, respecting the rights of fellow-Muslims, seeking the pleasure of God, following in the footsteps of the Prophet and going from door to door, city to city and country to country for the sake of faith. This was the essence of the life of all Prophets and the distinguishing feature of the community brought into being by Muhammad (Haq, 1972: 145).

The sparing of time is connected with the notion of khuruj (tour). Participating in khuruj is central to the tabligh or dawah (preaching) efforts where jamaats (groups) of ten men (some time more or less depending on the size of the original jamaat) journey from house-to-house and place-to-place preaching and inviting Muslims towards righteousness and Islamic practices. The Tabligh Jamaat ideology advocates that a new member should initially spare time for three chillahs27 (forty days make one chillah) to learn about Islam, the Tablighi work, and reform oneself for personal benefit as well as for collective benefit. Once one has accomplished this, then one should at least spare time for a chillah every year and go out on a three day khuruj each month in order to sustain the knowledge and practice thus acquired. However, the normal practice of the Tablighis transcend these times and many spend prolonged periods whilst some commit their entire life to Tablighi work.

27 The first chillah is an initiation into the movement. It proves that one has acquired the necessary knowledge and understanding to go out on khuruj and invite people to din. Without a chillah one remains a junior during khuruj.

142 6.4.2. Tablighi Participants One doesn’t need to be an alim to participate in the Tablighi work. In this sense the spreading of Islam is not a realm exclusive to the ulama or the pious but a religious obligation of every Muslim. This is because the Tablighi Jamaat emphasizes egalitarian status of believers. The membership to Tablighi Jamaat is on a voluntary basis and those who join the work cover for their own expenses. The participants are from varying socio- economic and ethnic backgrounds.

Tabligh includes many levels of participation, from those who have virtually no other activity, to people engaged in household or paid employment who yet manage to meet the movement’s standards for participation in gathering and travel to those who join on occasional mission, to those who may occasionally or regularly pray where Tablighis congregate and listen to their discussions (Metcalf, 1996b:111).

The Muslims who join the Tablighi Jamaat may start with a short period of commitment and gradually build on their experiences and ultimately become fully fledged Tablighis. Membership to the Tablighi Jamaat is free and open to any Muslim and it means members leaving their families in small groups, for varying periods of time, to educate fellow Muslims in the fundamentals of Islam and the study the sunnah.

6.5. TABLIGHI ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE Approximately twenty minutes drive south of New Delhi is the suburb of Nizam-u’d-din where the headquarters of the Tablighi Jamaat is situated. The headquarters was once a small mosque known as the Bangalawali Masjid, but today, after structural renovation and extension, it has become a large seven storey building which can house approximately ten thousand28 Tablighis at a time. The structural changes have taken place around and on the top of the old Bangalawali Masjid leaving most of the old structures intact.

In this large seven storey building is the movement’s Madrasah -ul ‘Ulum, a number of rooms for important quests and visitors, a few conference rooms, and little rooms for resident scholars and senior preachers. Also, situated in the building on the

28 I was given this figure by a senior Tablighi during my visit to Nizam-u’d-din in May, 2003.

143 ground level next to the old Bangalawali Masjid are two fenced graves belonging to Maulana Ilyas and Maulana Zakariya.

The headquarters was always headed by a single amir, but since 1995, it has been headed by two amirs – Maulanas Saad and Zubair. At one stage the amir received the assistance of twenty senior Tablighis and fifty volunteers who had different responsibilities (Durrany, 1993: 24) but at the present the information is sketchy with figures suggesting as high as a couple of hundred workers. The Nizam-u’d-din headquarters is an all-year round centre of activity with jamaats coming in and going out all the time. They come to learn the Tablighi work from the senior Tablighis and scholars, discuss with officials the Tablighi activities in their own areas or countries, and receive directives from the leaders.

Apart from worshipping such as ritual prayers, supererogatory prayers, recitation of the Qur’an, remembrance of Allah, and reading the hadith, Nizam-u’d-din headquarters provides accommodation to at least two thousand Tablighis at any given time, three daily meals, organizes visa requirements for both local and foreign Tablighis, and organizes transportation requirements, particularly for the foreign members.

At the headquarters, all decisions, no matter how small or big, are made by the shura (consultative committee) during mushawara (consultation) which takes place daily. For instance, a small matter such as a Tablighi member wanting to break his khuruj for half a day to attend to a personal matter such as a visit to a friend requires the approval of the shura. The reason why mushawara is held daily is because given the large number of members present, many different issues arise requiring resolution. Ordinarily, mushawara is convened by any shura member unless either amir is present who then assumes the role. Shura members are still required to do tours and for this reason the daily mushawara is not always graced by the presence of all the members.

Within India, the Tablighi Jamaat has regional headquarters in the capital cities of almost all states. Unlike the elaborate Nizam-u’d-din headquarters, these are simple arrangements usually in the small back rooms of those mosques whose members have

144 cordial relationship with the Tablighis or are tolerant of Tablighi work. Each Indian state has its own amir who operates under the direct instructions from Nizam-u’d-din headquarters. At district, suburb, and town levels the same organizational structure exists. This model is reproduced in overseas countries where the Tablighi Jamaat is an established organization. For example, in Australia, the Tablighi organizational structure resembles the Nizam-u’d-din headquarters at state and territory levels, at regional levels, and at small city levels such as and Parramatta in New South Wales.

The Tablighi Jamaat has always focused on the expansion of its organizational network rather than on consolidation. In order to maintain its expansionary pursuits, the movement has not diverted, for over seventy years now, from its original recruitment strategy of Tablighi workers who go out on khuruj and the fluidity of the leadership grounded in the notion of shura and localism has helped the Tablighi Jamaat survive without any association with political or social institutions.

Though the Tablighi Jamaat is reasonably large organization, it doesn’t have paid staff or a bureaucratic hierarchy. The administrative or organizing work is essentially performed by any Tablighis some of whom offer their free service on a full-time basis.

With the transnationalization of the movement, the need for a coordinated organizational approach is fast growing. Therefore, an international directory is now available containing details and addresses of Tablighi Jamaat centers in the world which can be downloaded from the internet address: http://tabligh.tripod.com/markaz.html. At the local level within individual countries, the need for planning and a structured organizational approach has been emerging where centers are now keeping journal entries29 of the Tablighi work in general and khuruj activities in particular. This facilitates not only a coordinated coverage of the targeted local Muslims for recruitment and preaching but helps in the organization of the Tablighi work with effectiveness and efficiency.

29 I experienced this in my many khurujs during the participant observation.

145 Due to an increased emphasis on organization and coordination of Tablighi efforts, particularly in overseas countries where Muslims are in a minority, distinct Tablighi institutions have emerged. For instance, in Sydney, the Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba has assumed the role of the center of Tablighi Jamaat where Muslims from greater Sydney area congregate on Friday evenings for their weekly meetings. Even though Tablighi organizers hold their small weekly mushawara on Wednesday evenings at the Rydalmere Musallah and Green Valley and Rooty Hill mosques form other Tablighi Jamaat centers, the Imam Ali Mosque, which has predominantly Lebanese members remains the main center where large numbers of Muslims, both the Tablighis and non- Tablighis, congregate and where recruitment for members and the organization of Tablighi effort takes place.

6.6. TRANSNATIONALIZATION OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT Although the Tablighi Jamaat emerged in the context of Imperial India and Muslim and Hindu political struggle for power, religion was problematic as an identity because of syncretism. Purging Meo ritual of syncretic practices developed the community along religious and political lines. Tablighi Jamaat’s expansion and growth then took place in the context of Muslim minority communities.

The Tablighi Jamaat has always had a transnational focus ever since its inception. This is evident in the fact that the Tablighi Jamaat did not only see Meos or Imperial India in crisis but the entire ummah was steeped in jahiliyah (ignorance). The Tablighi Jamaat’s aim was to save the whole ummah, therefore, it steered away from social and political ideologies generated by nationalism and remained committed to purging Muslim practices at an international level. It was not only concerned with the religious conditions and welfare of Muslims in Mewat or larger India but Muslims living in other regions and countries. It was even concerned with Muslims living as minority communities in Western countries such as Australia and Great Britain. I will show this global concern of the Tablighi Jamaat through my example of its presence in Australia later in chapters seven and eight.

146 The international expansion of the Tablighi Jamaat is attributed to Mualana Muhammad (1917-65), the son of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, who took the reign of the movement in 1944 after his father’s death.

Like his father, Muhammad Yusuf conceived of Muslims as an ummah. The Muslim ummah was not only in India or in Middle East but in the entire world. Hence Muhammad Yusuf embarked on a more ambitious mission than his father, upon taking the reign, to spread the Tablighi message to wherever Muslims lived and in this pursuit deployed many overseas preaching missions and thus internationalized the Tablighi Jamaat. In this endeavour, the movement’s members first arrived, for instance, in Britain in 1946, in United States in 1952, and in France in 1962 (Metcalf, 1996b).

Today, the Tablighi Jamaat members are spread across the globe in some 165 countries (Faruqi, 1992) and in the alone, one annual gathering “today can attract a million people” (Metcalf, 1994: 707). This is a very large gathering of Muslims second only to the hajj congregation. Its major impact has been felt in Muslim communities, for instance, in larger Asia including South East Asia, Middle East, North America, South Pacific including Australia and more specifically in Belgium (Dassetto, 1988), France (Kepel, 1985), and Britain (Vertovec, 2002).

Whilst it is true that the Tablighi Jamaat became a transnational Islamic revivalist movement in the 1940s:

it was, however, with the substantial labor, student, and professional migrations to Europe and North America, beginning in the 1960s, that a network of support and a core audience for preaching appeared and substantial Tablighi activity began (Metcalf, 1996b: 111-112).

In countries, especially in the West, where Muslims make up only a minority in the form of diaspora communities without established Islamic institutions and sufficient resources, the influence and popularity of the Tablighi Jamaat is enviable. It proves a vitally important venue for Islamic learning and practices. It also fills in the many social and cultural vacuums created by migration. This has benefited the Muslims in acquiring the

147 understanding of the fundamental principles of Islam and at the same time helped the movement establish and intensify its preaching networks in these countries. Though other networks for the purpose of dawah are regularly utilized, the diaspora network happens to be employed more widely because of its broad and significant effect.

In the diaspora network the Tablighi Jamaat finds a special position because in the absence of all major Islamic institutions, the face-to-face and house-to-house itinerant preaching becomes for ever more necessary and thus allows the movement to exercise greater influence on Muslims. Therefore utilizing itinerant preaching method:

The Tablighi Jamaat has thus become an important religious training ground for aspiring [Muslims] among the small-town shopkeepers, school teachers, government clerks, artisans, and para-professionals in the private sector (Ahmad, 1991: 515-516).

In this way the movement believes that “the people will become good Muslims not by reading books but by receiving the message through personal contacts and by active participation in da‘wah work” (Ahmad, 1991: 515-516). This kind of missionary- preaching approach has placed the Tablighi Jamaat in stark contrast to its counterparts such as Al- al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Association), whose Islamic revival activities are based primarily on written communication and speech-based congregational preaching. A direct approach with a simple message and seeking a slow yet permanent transformation of “self” based on reformist ideology, makes the movement a pleasant and non-threatening organization for all Muslims and particularly for nominal Muslims.

CONCLUSION The last almost one hundred years has witnessed the growth in movements of Islamic revivalism and reformation among Muslims all around the world. Among them the Tablighi Jamaat has emerged as the most popular transnational Islamic revivalist movement in the world today with a membership spread to approximately 165 countries. Unlike many other Islamic revivalist movements the Tablighi Jamaat’s growth and

148 success lies in its aloofness from politics and a focus on tabligh, that is, a face-to-face missionary preaching.

Although the political decline of Muslim power in India and the establishment of British colonial rule provided the broader context for the emergence of the Tablighi Jamaat, it was in fact in light of the Hindu proselytizing efforts of the Shuddhi and Sangathan movements in the 1920s that the Tablighi Jamaat found a more specific context to launch its Tablighi work. The Tablighi Jamaat through Maulana Muhammad Ilyas finally realized that a rigorous community-wide Tablighi efforts were immediately needed to protect Muslims from falling prey to the two Hindu proselytizing movements. It also quickly realized that in light of the political decline of Muslim power in India and the resourcefulness and might of the British colonial authority, the face-to-face Islamic revitalization efforts was the most practical means to protect Muslims from the increasing threat of apostasy. Hence, the Tablighi Jamaat claimed that Muslim proselytizing and Islamic propagation were not only the religious duty of the ulama but all Muslims. The Tablighi Jamaat brought in focus the fact that every Muslim had a role to play in the preservation of an Islam that was continuously seen as under serious threat. This, subsequently reflected the growing shift in the nature of religious authority which until then was seen to be very much based on the idea that the ulama and the sultans were the guardians of Islam to based on the notion of the Muslims making religious decisions by drawing on the scriptural source or the shariah.

Tabligh (preaching) as the central focus of the movement emerged as a vital issue around which Muslim communal support could be secured to help reinforce the enduring project of the construction of a Muslim community and identity. The Tablighi Jamaat emerged in India as a champion of this cause and subsequently took the cause overseas and in the process became a truly transnational Islamic revivalist movement.

149 CHAPTER SEVEN

ISLAM IN AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION Islam in Australia has a pluralistic foundation. This foundation is built on distinct theological dogmas and different cultural, sectarian, linguistic, and ethnic values. The religious and cultural diversity of Australian Islam has its origins in the post-World War II national mass immigration program initiated by the Australian government to recruit immigrants for national development.

The notion of “Islam in Australia” suggests a unitary, monolithic socio-cultural and religious phenomenon but in reality Islam in Australia is “pluralistic”30 - a heterogenous reality. This means that “Islam in Australia” is conceptualized and practiced according to the cultural traditions of various individual Muslim countries and in some cases according to different ethnic traditions within these national cultural traditions.

I will examine the plural character of Islamic practice through an exploration of the evolution of Islam in Australia. I will argue that the ethnically based Islam which characterises “Islam in Australia” has been undergoing a transformation in recent years. It is part of a new process underway known as Islamic revivalism which is evident both in Australia and internationally. As demonstrated in chapter five, Islamic revivalism is about Muslims carving out a space for themselves in modernity. In Australia, the second- generation Australian born Muslims are intimately involved in Islamic revivalism as an attempt to reconstruct Islam with a distinctively Australian character.

7.1. MUSLIMS IN AUSTRALIA The presence of Muslims is a relatively recent phenomenon in Australia. However, Muslims have been linked with Australia as early as the sixteenth century, in the west and

30 By pluralistic I mean the co-existence of different forms of Islam such as , Shi’a Islam, and Sufi Islam.

150 north regions, through the Macassar fishermen from the eastern islands of Indonesia (Ahmad, 1994) and then through Malay and Filipino pearl divers recruited by the Dutch colonial authorities (Jones, 1993). Due to their small numbers and the absence of a community base, these Muslims played a marginal, if any, role in Australian social and cultural life (Cleland, 2001). Subsequently cameleers, commonly known as “Ghans” were brought from the Indian subcontinent during nineteenth century to help explore the Australian deserts and establish trade and communication routes (Mograby, 1985) and established small Muslim communities called “Ghantowns” (Akbarzadeh, 2001). The first “Ghantown” mosque was built in 1889 in in outback New South Wales and the building survives today as a museum occupied by the Broken Hill Historic Society. The Afghans also built mosques in in in 1890, in in in 1904, and in 1907 in , all of which continue to function as mosques to this day (Ahmad, 1994). These early mosques symbolized the initial establishment of Islam in Australia

However, the introduction of the railway in the remote interior and the utility truck, in particular the T Ford model in the 1920s, made cartage redundant and hastened the demise of the camel-carrying industry (Ahmad, 1994). As a result, the “Ghan” communities slowly began to disappear. Furthermore, in 1901, when all the former colonies were federated, Australia’s early commitment to the White Australia Policy barred most non-Europeans from gaining citizenship and this further marginalized the Afghans. Without citizenship and no prospect for employment many old camelmen returned to their homelands but some remained to see life through in Australia (Jones, 1993). With their numbers dwindling through repatriation and natural causes, it made forever “more difficult for those who remained to retain their Islamic identity”, (Johns and Saeed, 2002: 198). Separated both religiously and culturally from the main white Anglo-Celtic society, a vast majority of this generation of Muslims abandoned their Islamic conviction (John and Saeed, 2002) resulting in the public disappearance of Islam.

151 7.1.1. Post-World War II Muslim Immigration After the Second World War, the Muslim population began to increase again in Australia and so did Islam. By now Australian governments and businesses realised that in order for Australia to be part of post-war world development it had to grow demographically and economically. The sourcing of large numbers of migrants as workers, therefore, was related to the dynamics of the global economic position of developed capitalist societies like Australia (Castles and Miller, 1993). The need for large numbers of migrant workers for Australia was not just a national issue but was directly related to the nature of Australia’s economy and its positioning in the global capitalist world. At the end of the Second World War, Australia was a developing capitalist society that had the necessary preconditions, financial structure, and political and natural resources to develop industrially, however, it did not have the adequate labour resources and capital to achieve this development (Field, 2000).

While the mass migration programme initiated in 1947 sought immigrants from British origins, the ambitious immigration targets soon saw the immigration net expand and gradually become more global and culturally diverse. As a result Australia started receiving immigrants from overseas and Muslim immigration was part of this process.

Although , former citizens of the Ottoman Empire, arrived in Australia in 1920s and 1930s, their numbers were too minute to make much difference to the Australian landscape (John and Saeed, 2002). Turkish Cypriots, therefore, were the first Muslim immigrants who started arriving in significant numbers in the 1950s and 1960s followed by Turkish immigrants between 1968 and 1972 (Humphrey, 2001). Lebanese Muslims followed, constituting the largest Muslim community in Australia by early 1970 and they continued to grow, particularly after the outbreak of civil war in 1975 in (Armstrong, 2000). The period 1950 to 1975 not only saw an increase in Muslim population in Australia but also saw a significant increase in the number of arrival of professional and skilled personnel, “such as teachers and engineers from Egypt, doctors from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and tertiary students from ,

152 Indonesia, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan” (Ahmad, 1994: 318). Between 1947 and 1971 the Muslim population grew from 2704 to 22 311 ( and Allen, 1997).

Then the last quarter of the twentieth century saw a steep increase in the growth of Australia’s Muslim population. For instance, in 1991 there were 148 096 Muslims which constituted 0.9% of the total Australian population (ABS Census, 1991); in 1996 there were 200 902 Muslims constituting 1.1% of the total Australian population (ABS Census, 1996); and in 2001 there were 281 578 Muslims constituting 1.5% of the total Australian population (ABS Census, 2002). Though Muslims live across the Australian continent they are mainly concentrated in New South Wales and (as the table below shows). In all states and territories, Muslims mainly live in the capital cities (Omar and Allen, 1997: 23).

Table 2: Australian Muslim population by State/Territory

New South Wales 140 907 Victoria 92 742 Western Australia 19 456 14 990 South Australia 7 478 Australian Capital Territory 3 488 Northern Territory 945 Tasmania 865 Other territories 707 Total 281 578

Source: Census 2001.

In New South Wales, where the largest Muslim population lives, Muslims constituted 2.2% of the total state population (ABS Census, 2002). Within New South Wales, over 50% of the Muslim population lived almost entirely within a radius of fifty kilometers of

153 Sydney, making Sydney the city with the most concentrated Muslim population in Australia (ABS Census, 2002).

This steady increase has been mainly attributed to immigration, however, high birth rates have also contributed to the rapid increase in the Muslim population. The table below, prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2004 using 2001 Census data shows that the Muslim birth rate in Australia is a significant factor towards Muslim population growth. Also, it shows that Muslims in Australia are increasing at an unprecedented rate from within. If this trend in Muslim population growth continues, it is possible that second-and third-generation Muslims could gradually expand over the years and then become an important factor in Australia’s social, economic, and political reality.

Table 3: Australian Muslims – country/region of origin

Australia 102 566 Lebanon 29 321 South Asia 26 757 Turkey 23 479 Bosnia & Herzegovina 9 892 Indonesia 8 087 7 749 Iran 6 353 Other 67 374

Source: Census 2001.

Muslims, in most parts of the world, are not a homogenous people and are divided essentially on sectarian and ethnic grounds. Australia’s Muslim population is also very diverse and the table above provides a glimpse of this diversity. According to Saeed (2003), Sunnis make up the majority Muslims in Australia followed by the various Shi’a sects such as Zaydiyah, Isma’iliyah, , Jafariyah, and Alawiyah. There are traces of Ahmadism and , in Australia, as well as various other minor sects. Between

154 1975 and 2000, Muslims have come from over seventy different nations and make Muslims ethnically the most diverse religious groups in Australia (Saeed, 2003).

7.1.2. Muslim Ethnic Diversity Muslims migrated to Australia, like migrants in general, for various reasons, however, economic advantages and educational opportunities, family reunion, and escaping political oppression in their homelands are some of the more prominent rationales for making Australia their permanent home (Jones, 1993). Whilst some migrants came from Islamic monocultures such as , Pakistan, and Syria, a lot of them arrived from countries like Albania, Lebanon, and Nigeria, that are themselves culturally and religiously diverse (Jones, 1993). As a result, Muslim migrants have different experiences of Australian society, and cannot be homogenized. The plurality of Muslims and their experience as migrants contrasts with the popular media representations of Islam and Muslims being uniform and homogeneous.

The majority of these migrants settled in large capital cities, in particular Sydney and Melbourne (Humphrey, 1998). These large urban centres provided relatively cheap accommodation, particularly in their outer suburbs, and offered employment in the manufacturing and service industries, and were also homes to other groups from the same ethnic backgrounds, which provided the socio-cultural and emotional needs of new Muslim immigrants (Cleland, 2001). Thus, Muslim immigrants settled close to each other. Following the dominant pattern of immigrant settlement in Australia, Muslims gravitated towards their own ethnic circles and concentrated in the working class suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne (Humphrey, 1998). In Sydney, for instance, Muslim communities are concentrated in four Local Government Areas namely Auburn, Bankstown, Canterbury, and Marrickville (Humphrey, 1989a). The overwhelming concentration of Muslim immigrants in these two capital cities corresponded to the settlement patterns of Mediterranean migrants. In the case of Muslim immigrants, 50% settled in Sydney and 23% in Melbourne (Bouma, 1994). Humphrey (1984) observes that chain migration - by which individuals immigrated and later brought over families, relatives, and friends - and close settlement were pivotal in creating the geographical

155 concentration of Muslim immigrants, emphasizing the significance of social relations based on parochial and family ties and ethnicity (Humphrey, 1984). Humphrey (1998: 21) claims that “Muslim immigrants have entered Australian society through the cultural mediums of family, community and religion which have located them in social spaces shaping their status, employment and residence patterns”.

According to Humphrey (1998) this has meant that the established social relations of the family and village community have become even more firm and indispensable resources of social in themselves. Consequently, this has helped create social microcosms. These social microcosms have been meticulously built through the application of personal efforts in home making, family creation, ethnic language maintenance, and selective shopping based on culture. These social microcosms are also maintained and further perpetuated transnationally by recognizing the importance of maintaining links with the past. This is done, for instance, by going “home” for a visit, sponsoring family members to immigrate, and sending money to extended family back home.

Family and community bonds have been of paramount importance for Muslim immigrants to immigrate, to receive support during settlement, to re-establish their traditional social worlds, and, ultimately, to obtain Australian citizenship. Family in particular has been the principal resource in reproducing social and religious culture. Chain migration made immigration possible and acted as the vehicle for penetrating the broader society. Family and community bonds facilitated residential grouping from which emerged Muslim community and Islamic life. As Humphrey (2005: 136) notes, “The family and village community was used as the basis for recreating community and re-establishing religious life”.

However, the emergence of Muslim communities and Islamic life is not so autonomous and has involved a complex web of institutional interaction and coming to terms with certain ideological realities namely integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism. The nature of Muslim communities and Islamic life in Australia (which I will come back to later on) therefore needs to be understood in this context.

156

7.2. IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION

In Australian immigration history, the question of who should be permitted to settle in Australia has been directly associated with the idea of which people will assimilate with the least resistance. Immigration during most of the last century was essentially an issue about the maintenance of the white monocultural national identity through the practice of selective immigration.31 It was a way to develop Australia and assist its participation in the post-World War II global order based on ethnic and cultural purity.

In Australian colonial society culture and race were key issues in the creation of the nation-state. The birth of the Australian nation-state, the transition from colony to a constitutional monarchy in 1901, clearly acknowledged memberships in terms of race. The “Immigration Restriction Act” of 1901 denied entry to “coloured” people. Its legacy was the “White Australia Policy” which survived beyond the post-World War II period of Australian mass migration.

The “White Australia Policy” continued to shape the post-World War II immigration initiative. Assimilation was the approach adopted towards difference to ensure cultural uniformity expressed as Australian national identity. The key aim of the assimilation policy was the preservation of imagined homogenous national community founded on British culture and institutions (Jakubowicz, 1989). Assimilation was a racist model that expressed the supremacy of the Australian host society in cultural rather than racial terms.

Eventually, it was the immigration program, the large influx of immigrants from different parts of the world, which weakened the openly racist construction of the Australian nation-state. The on-going arrival of non-British immigrants fractured the formal ties between Britishness and citizenship and nationalism. The official stance on Australian nationalism and citizenship began to change as early as 1958.

31 Selective immigration means permitting only those immigrants to settle in Australia who were deemed white and easily assimilable.

157 It was for the first time, then, in 1958 “Immigration Restricted Act” or the official “White Australia Policy” was subjected to reform. Thus, the openly racist dictation test was abolished in 1958 (DILGEA, 1988: 42). Then in 1959 further changes were made allowing Australian citizens from an immigrant background to sponsor their non- European spouses and single young children to immigrate to Australia (DILGEA, 1988: 43). Importantly, in 1964, the rules governing the entry of people described as “of mixed descent” were relaxed further (DILGEA, 1988: 48).

In 1972, race and culture were removed from official discourse on the recruitment of immigrants with official abolition of the “White Australia Policy” and its replacement with multiculturalism as the dominant theme in immigration and settlement policy. By this time mass immigration changed the character of Australian society and it became literally multicultural. This meant that multiculturalism as the official national policy prohibited discrimination on the basis of culture or race in the recruitment process of immigrants and their treatment in Australian society. In this regard by the late 1980s the multicultural policy identified and emphasized three critical points:

(i) cultural identity – the right of all Australians to express and share their cultural heritage, (ii) social justice – the rights of all Australians to equal treatment and opportunity, (iii) economic efficiency – the requirement to maintain and develop the skills of all Australians, regardless of their background.

7.3. ISLAM AND MULTICULTURALISM Multiculturalism meant the recognition of the diversity of Australian population. The policy supported the promotion of tolerance and acceptance of large diverse cultures of Australian people and encouraged and assisted individuals, groups, organisations, and institutions to reflect the multicultural character of Australia in their local and overseas dealings. It meant that all members of Australian society had the right to equal access to services, regardless of their ethnic background.

158

Immigrants were granted fundamental rights to live according to their own cultural values, yet, nevertheless were expected to integrate into Australian society. Ethnic and cultural diversity are encouraged, however, only to the extent that it does not undermine the values, customs, and institutions of the dominant Anglo-Celtic society and conformity is practiced. It was basically assumed that immigrants arriving into Australia would automatically adapt to the dominant Anglo-Celtic way as they worked here, and they would simply abandon their customs and habits (Graetz and McAllister, 1994). This became the distinctive Australian trajectory to full citizenship. Integration in essence then entailed participation in the key areas of society - namely labour, education, and housing; a pathway to fruitful existence for immigrants. Failure to integrate would result in deprivation. In other words, cut off from the many benefits and privileges available and offered to ordinary citizens. Equality32 did not mean similarity but a “plain field” for all. The idea of a monocultural society was abandoned and difference was celebrated and made the basis of integration.

However, if Australia is a multicultural society in which cultural diversity is celebrated then why is it that cultures are valued differently? As Humphrey asserts “The lexicon of multiculturalism differentiates and values cultures differently according to undeclared criteria” (2001: 37). Why, for example, the Islamic presence produced through immigration represents or is perceived to present a threat to the Australian national mosaic, or why Islamic beliefs and practices are considered to be in discord with the patterns of public life in Australian cities, or why are Muslim practices of prayer and fasting, for instance, seen to challenge the conformity of modern public sphere and its ideals?

The attitude towards Islam in Australia shows that, despite the formulation of multiculturalism as a public policy, the views of the dominant group predominates.

32 The term equality means “of equal value”. For instance, while a Chinese Australian and a white Anglo- Saxon Australian are not thought, by some people, equal, they are “of equal value”. Equality, at least theoretically, denotes that difference in religious or cultural background can not become a handicap for a person or community when it comes to exercising legal, political, or social rights in society.

159 Their’s is a modernist view that expects immigrants, particularly from more traditional societies such as from the third world to assimilate through the processes of secularization and individualism. The modernist view is founded on the premise of secularism – the diminishing significance of religion – forcing religion from the public sphere into the private domain, thus, the expectation that immigrants, perhaps the second- and third-generations, will eventually assimilate as individuals who become divorced from their ethnic roots.

In regards to Islam, Humphrey (2001) says that the attitude is that Islam is a homogenous culture that is resistant to modernity. In the discourse of multiculturalism, a discussion on Islam, to some extent, is usually about the concerns regarding cultural resistance.

In Australia, Islamic organizations and culture have emerged from a settlement and immigration processes connected in a complex way to working-class immigrants’ experience of social marginalization and economic deprivation (Humphrey, 2001). For Muslims, this immigration experience has forced them to negotiate their Islamic identity with the Australian state and society. In relation to this, Michael Humphrey argues that Islam in Australia is a reflection of the politics of multiculturalism that limits both pluralizing and homogenizing tendencies:

It is pluralising through the migration process that has generated local, ethnic community-based Islamic religious institutions which, in turn, helped decentre and localise the religious authority of tradition. It is homogenising through a multicultural politics of ‘re-traditionalisation’ – the essentialisation of culture as a defensive, as well as representational, strategy that tends to place ethnic culture in compartmentalised social space (2001: 35).

The negotiation by Muslims of their Islamic identity in the context of Australian multiculturalism has left them relegated to the “Other” in the national imagination, which is both defined by, and predominantly represents the culture of, the hegemonic group. It incorporates Muslims in Australian society only insofar as they contribute to the “cosmopolitanism” of the dominant group, and, therefore, merely as the “Other”. This aspect of multiculturalism is thus essentially a policy for the management of ethnic minorities. According to Hage (1998) it involves strategies of exclusion alongside the

160 rhetoric of inclusion. In a sense, then, this form of multiculturalism maintains the marginality and liminality of immigrants and their descendants.

7.3.1. Muslim Marginality In the Australian multicultural panorama, Muslim means being “immigrant working class” and religiously “conservative”.33 This class description of Muslims has developed from the origins of Muslim immigrants and their real experience with the Australian labour force. A vast majority of Muslim immigrants have arrived in Australia from poor rural and urban backgrounds from mostly underdeveloped countries. After arriving, these Muslim immigrants have largely being engaged in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs within the manufacturing and service industries (Humphrey, 2000). Muslim immigrants who had academic qualifications and professional experience were even forced by the immigration processes to take up non-professional menial jobs because Australia considers qualifications from underdeveloped countries comparatively sub-standard, thus refuses to recognize them (Graetz and McAllister, 1994).

Furthermore, Lowenstein and Loh assert that “Often Australia does not recognize the overseas trade and professional qualifications of migrants, so skilled people are forced to work either at unskilled jobs or to carry out skilled work at unskilled rates of pay” (1977: 10). As in the context of immigrants in general, the demand by Australian society for cultural accommodation of Muslim immigrants entails a slow transition. They are required to initiate social and cultural adjustments to their daily social and vocational rituals by accepting the routine of manufacturing industry where they work and take more than one to maintain a family or depend on limited welfare benefits with some income derived from working in the black economy. The whole process of cultural accommodation imposes upon Muslim immigrants to modify the ritual of their daily life in accordance with the practices of the broader Australian society and in so doing it impacts on the entire basis of their social existence. For example, the impact is felt on all aspects of social life such as marriage, social networks, residency, gender relations,

33Conservative signifies traditional or customary.

161 housing, and consumption patterns. This makes the reconciliation between ethnic culture and customs and new social and work rituals problematic.

These are the demands of the class culture (Humphrey, 2001) and when Muslim immigrants fail to fulfil them, they also fail to meet, as a group, their expected economic contribution and consequently are censured for not making a fair contribution to the national economic growth and development of the whole society. Their statistical over- representation in the records of welfare benefits, workers compensation claims, and unemployment give them a negative image and push them to the lowest strata of the social hierarchy. This highlights their peripherality in urban structures and their status in Australia.

Given their marginality to the labour force, many Muslim immigrants have been pushed into a situation of mutual dependency. The requirements of social and community reciprocity due to their social marginalization and the fear of loss of family and cultural identity often force family and community to guard the environment in which tradition is nurtured (Humphrey, 1984). However, whilst on the one hand family and community are strengthened as principal cultural capital through immigration policy and social and economic marginalization, on the other hand, they are rendered tenuous by fearing the loss of cultural heritage and the sense of loss of identity through the process of immigration.

Thus, Islamic organization and Muslim culture need to be put in the context of the language of multiculturalism. Muslim cultural differences do have their origins in specific places and customary traditions but these are only further reinforced and perpetuated through the policies of settlement and windows of opportunity (Humphrey, 2001).

7.4. MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MOSQUES It was the family and village communities that formed the original basis for Muslim community and re-establishing Islamic life in Australia. Islamic organizations, in many

162 cases, emerged from the activities of village community organizations. Humphrey (1989b) asserts that these Muslim community organizations have been the product of family and community ties. He argues that Muslim immigrant community religious life emerged as one aspect of village community activities and that as the community grew so did the community needs and this situation made it necessary for the establishment of a separate institution which could cater for multiple aspects of Muslim community life (Humphrey, 1989b). For example, village social centres or community meeting places frequently developed into provisional prayer halls and subsequently, as the population grew and demands increased, turned into mosques. Islamic immigrant cultures and practices emerged from these localized set of contacts in multicultural Australia. These contacts selectively fostered the recreation of religious culture in immigration where Muslim immigrants found their status transformed from a majority to a minority group.

The key religious interests of the first generation Muslims were with the arranging of what may be collectively described as Muslim life-cycle rituals - birth, marriage, and death - within the local Muslim community framework. Muslim village associations were important institutions for community life and played a key role in the process of settlement (Bouma, 1994).

Mosques have assumed a significant role in Muslim settlement process. They have emerged in direct response to growth in Muslim population and Muslim community needs. According to Humphrey (1989b), in the context of Muslim immigration, mosques have been significant but, not the first Islamic institution in Australia. He asserts that mosque associations came into being alongside various other voluntary Muslim immigrant organizations during the early period of Muslim settlement.

Like in many parts of the world where Muslims are in minority, in Australia mosques cater for Muslim community needs and have become more than just places for worship. They have at once become the spiritual centres for symbolizing the existence of Islam, collectivizing Muslims, and teaching and training Muslims about their

163 and practices. Mosques also act as the centres of religious, educational, cultural, and social activities.

Apart from facilitating the coming together of the community through regular ritual prayers and other aspects of ritual worship, the mosques serve as centres for religious and social activities. They further serve as venues for the celebration of Eid al-Fitr (festival celebrated at the end of Ramadan) and Eid al-Adha (feast of sacrifice) and act as centres for accommodation for Muslims engaged in the dawah (preaching) work. For example, the Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba, the Rooty Hill Mosque in Rooty Hill, and the Surry Hills Mosque in Surry Hill are regularly used by the Tablighi Jamaat for dawah work. Thus:

in the evolution of immigrant cultural institutions the mosque has often functioned as a pan-village organization, in which the culture of Muslim family and village relations become incorporated into a wider Muslim immigrant community through religion (Humphrey, 1989a: 13).

According to Humphrey (1989a) mosques as symbols of collective Muslim presence in Australia either emerged from purchased sites which were developed into mosques or from existing community or village social venues. In either case, even though the way mosques are established is distinct, for instance, one comes into existence through communal life and the other based on broader community support both in terms of finance and lobbying the local council, the purpose for establishing the mosque remains the same - to fulfil the social and religious needs of the Muslim immigrant community.

Muslims do not necessarily have to have a mosque to pursue a religious life. Islam permits the offering of prayer anywhere - such as in an office, at home, or even on the lawn in a park as long as the place is clean. However, mosques always have played a role beyond being merely places of ritual prayer. For instance, classic mosques such as Masjid al-Aqsa (grand mosque in ) and Masjid al-Nabawi (Prophet Muhammad’s mosque in ) have always played spiritual, educational, social, cultural, and political roles in Muslim community life. Prayer is only one aspect of Islamic life and given that Islam is a complete way of life, Muslims require, particularly in the context of immigration, mosques for other religious and social needs. In this sense, mosques as local

164 community institutions that fulfil religious, welfare, educational, and social functions assumes a role beyond a place for worship. As Humphrey (1991: 185-6) remarks:

As the pre-eminent community institution, the mosque becomes the domain for the assertion of separate identity and status within a pluralist political environment in which ethnicity has legitimacy. It is a centre from which demands are made on Australian political, legal and bureaucratic structures about the needs and rights of the ‘community’ vis-à-vis other groups.

Thus, through the mosque, Muslims make demands regarding those aspects of life considered essential to uphold religious and moral values. For example, demands for Muslim girls to be allowed to wear hijab (veil) to public schools, legal recognition of the right of imams (leaders) to consummate marriages and perform burial services according to Muslim traditions, and acknowledgement of the right to pray at work. These demands symbolize the restoration of Muslim cultural practice in the context of immigration.

The question of religious leadership at the mosque has highlighted its intimate connection with the evolution of community and religious organizations in Muslim immigrant communities in Australia. The absence of an Islamic shura (consultative committee) or body of clerics has, in many instances, seen mosque leadership remain in the hands of individual mosque committees instead of separate autonomous religious organizations detached from social connections which have produced immigrant mosque communities. The course taken in the establishment of mosques reflects distinctive ethnic, linguistic, and regional backgrounds of Muslim communities in Australia. For the vast majority of Muslims, religion continues to be deeply rooted in class structure and ethnic sources. As a corollary, local community politics based on former family and sectarian rivalry in “home” communities continue to play out in the mosque politics (Humphrey, 1987). The claim of Muslim as identity and the stipulations for acknowledgment of Muslim religious and legal practices, in this political milieu, are effectively competitive and drawn into the politics of a community reputation and protection of cultural autonomy.

However, the organizational focus on community association is not fixed and could be moved on to the mosque. The quintessential character of cultural capital and political resources undergoes transformation as demands originally made based on parochial

165 attachment to kinship, friendship, and community networks are located in totally distinct political and institutional frameworks. The mosque, which is established in light of a legal framework that demands a formal organizational structure and the establishment of proper management processes, becomes a central focus and serves as a base for the mobilization of Muslim immigrants within a political arena.

7.5. ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS To look after the affairs of Muslims in Australia, various organizations or “Islamic societies” came into being. As a consequence, there are many small associations from numerous different countries such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, Fiji, , Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Albania, and numerous Middle East states but the two largest Muslim associations are founded by the Turkish and Lebanese Muslims. Ordinarily, individual associations have opted for the maintenance of separate identities rather than coming under one national body. Muslim associations and mosques have emerged from specific communities and ethnic pride has always played a divisive role rendering Muslims in Australia a heterogeneous community (Humphrey, 1989a).

Muslim immigrants started establishing Islamic societies as early as the 1950s. The Islamic Society of New South Wales in Sydney was established in 1957, for instance. Then, in 1960, emerged the Lebanese Muslim Association of Sydney. The Islamic Society of Victoria in Melbourne and similar societies in Adelaide, Perth, and Brisbane were all established in 1962. In 1973, the Islamic Council of New South Wales was formed, in spite of the existence of a national Islamic body, the Australian Federation of Islamic Societies (AFIS) which was established in 1964. The Australian Federation of Islamic Societies was re-structured in 1976 into a three-tier system comprising of local societies, state councils, and a national federation (Jones, 1993). During this re- structuring, the organization went through a name change to the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC) and the headquarters was moved from Melbourne to Zetland, an inner-city suburb of Sydney where it has remained since.

166 In the beginning, the interests and activities of AFIC were not firmly linked to broader Islamic practices and arrangements within the local societies. It was, in fact, at the time more firmly focused on the certification of halal (permissible) meat, particularly for export to Muslim countries in the Middle East. Subsequently, with the financial backing from the Saudi Arabian Government, AFIC grew steadily both in its structure and activities (Cleland, 2001). A new Muslim school was established in the western suburb of in Sydney, and closer links were forged with local societies and Islamic councils and more societies and Islamic Councils were established in suburbs and in states where the Muslim population demanded them. A rapport was established with Australian Government officials who were regularly invited as honoured guests to Muslim social and religious functions. Contacts were also established with overseas Muslim countries and Islamic organizations who were later lobbied for material and financial support to reinvigorate and increase religious activities in Australia. As well, the publication of a multi-lingual quarterly journal, , was started, which remains in circulation to this day.

Currently the three-tier organizational structure of AFIC continues to exist and remains firmly established. Even though its national and international profile has grown over the years as has its influence over the Muslim community, there is still room for improvement. It can attempt to exercise even greater and stronger influence than it is exercising now over Muslims in Australia - particularly in terms of overcoming the many barriers that divide Muslim ethnic communities.

Given this, Islamic cultural and organizational structures, particularly the role of the family and community in the process of enculturation, need to be understood in the context of immigrant culture. In this context, the relationship between the maintenance of male authority and the establishment of community organizations and religious institutions is significant. It is because it reflects the intimate connections between secular and Islamic organization in ethnic politics and shows how the discourse of ethnic struggle and depravity are reflected in the political and religious orientation of individual and independent mosque communities. In the arena of ethnic politics the maintenance of

167 autonomy of Muslim communities is an important issue because autonomy is directly related to ethnic identity. Therefore, issues relating to leadership and the maintenance of ethnic and sectarian character in mosque associations gain greater importance in ethnic politics and reinforce the need for autonomy and separate identity of Muslim communities.

This poses problems in the process of immigrant enculturation for the Australian governments which becomes involved with Islamic organizations to exercise control and facilitate the process of enculturation within the area of the ethnic working class. Islam as a broad identity base becomes an important area for assisting in the process of enculturation. The Australian governments perceive the diversity and autonomy of Islamic organizations as problematic in dealing with them directly because economically it adds a further cost burden on the nation. It, therefore, prefers to deal with large well established Islamic organizational and authority structures.

Having said this, it is important to note, at another level, that a number of Muslim organizations, mosques communities, and groups influence intercommunity discourses in Australia. These include sympathisers with international Islamic movements such as the Al-ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood), who have immigrated to Australia. One such group in Australia is the Ahl al-Sunnah wa’al-Jamaat Association based in the outer Sydney suburb of Lakemba, describes itself as part of the “global Islamic movement”. Other movements that were established outside of Australia but have Australian sympathisers include the Tablighi Jamaat (the focus of this thesis), Jamaat-i Islami (Islamic Association), and Hizb al-Tahrir (Liberation Party). Although differences exist in their articulation of Islamic doctrine among these movements, they developed as part of Islamic revivalism during the European colonial period of the Muslim world. But what these movements stress is the need to preserve the individual Muslim character and the unity of the ummah (Muslim community). Hence, they naturally find a place in the functions of mosques, schools, youth groups, and other community activities.

168 The numerous Sufi orders in Australia emphasize and usually eschew issues linked to politics. Generally speaking, Sufi orders or groups are engaged in issues of theology and sources of Islamic knowledge. The Tablighi Jamaat organizes preaching tours and stays away from issues that involve politics.

Other small groups in Australia, for example, the Hizb al-Tahrir, entertain the idea that Australia is dar al-kufr (an abode of disbelief) and that Muslims should reject secular nationalism and redirect their efforts towards establishing or helping establish the caliphate with the shariah (Islamic law) as its constitution. Campaigning for the detachment from state institutions, leaders and members of Hizb al-Tahrir in Australia regard their presence in Australia as merely a temporary experience that will halt once the caliphate has been established.

Furthermore, other groups such as the Islamic Society of Liverpool - Sydney, based in a western Sydney suburb of Green Valley, take a more practical approach, advocating that Australian Muslims are as much a part of the global ummah as they are part of Australian multiculturalism. The members of this mosque community believe that Muslims are in Australia to stay and Australia has to find a truly fair way to address Muslim concerns and accommodate them.

7.5.1. The Tablighi Jamaat The Tablighi Jamaat reached the Australian continent when Muhammad Yusuf, the son of the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, swiftly and successfully expanded the movement to over two dozen countries in numerous continents including Australia. In this wave of transnational expansion of the Tablighi Jamaat, the movement with another Islamic revivalist movement – the Jamaat Daawah Islamiah (Party for Preaching Islam) – arrived in Australia in 1972 (Ahmad, 1994). This was an important period for the Muslim community in Australia because at the same time as it was experiencing significant growth the Tablighi Jamaat was successfully expanding itself internationally.

169 It is not clear who were the original local and overseas Muslims involved in the establishment of the Tablighi work and where exactly in Australia it began. Unlike the situation in Britain where some literature exist that traces the evolution and contemporary reality of the Tablighi Jamaat in Britain, the literature on the Australian situation is silent, making any historical survey and contemporary assessment of the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia difficult and problematic. It is likely, however, that the Tablighi work in Australia began from the Surry Hills Mosque because of its Indian subcontinent and language connections. The current imam (leader) of the Surry Hills Mosque supports the view34 that the Surry Hills Mosque would have been the natural choice for overseas proponents of the Tablighi Jamaat to launch Tablighi work into the broader Muslim community in Australia.

Even though the dawah movements started their activity in Australia as early as the 1970s, the work particularly that of the Tablighi Jamaat, did not gain momentum until the late 1980s. There are several factors responsible for the slow progress of the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia but the first and foremost was the small and poorly resourced Muslim community from the Indian subcontinent. Muslims from the Indian subcontinent only began to arrive in substantial numbers in the 1980s. The great diversity of the Muslim population and the style of the Tablighi method of itinerant preaching which was unfamiliar to them was another contributing factor. Apart from these the time naturally needed for networks to develop in a new society was also an important contributing factor.

Once the foundation of the Tablighi Jamaat was firmly established and the Tablighi activity started to gain acceptance, the movement began to make slow but steady progress and expanded within Sydney and its outer suburbs, regional New South Wales, particularly in the industrial city of Newcastle in the Hunter region and in the industrial city of Wollongong in the South Coast, as well as inter-state. In all these areas the Tablighi Jamaat has been able to gain influence over the Muslim population from the

34 This was established during my conversation with the imam on 20th February, 2003 at the Surry Hills Mosque.

170 Indian subcontinent (because of their familiarity with the Tablighi Jamaat and the teachings of the Deoband Madrasah and Sufism) but also other Australian Muslims from South East Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East. One of the reasons for this seems to be that where the community leaders, mosque imams, and Muslim scholars in general failed due to lack of sense of vision or project, the Tablighi Jamaat succeeded with its simple itinerant preaching approach. A second reason lay in the very nature of Tablighi piety as universal and scripturalist and therefore very mobile. The Tablighis could work, for example, in a network without the need for an infrastructure and buildings. The third reason lay in the fact that given the enormous Australian Muslim diversity and the absence of a single church-like structure, the Tablighi Jamaat provided a forum for all Muslims from all walks of life in Australia to share a common spiritual bond and universal piety embodied in the and universality of Islam.

In the Australian context, this inherent universalism of Tablighi teaching struck a special chord among Muslims who earlier found the ritual and conduits of expression of piety in the experience of their ethnicity not in religion per se. Many Muslims who joined the Tablighi Jamaat continued their ethnic path which the Tablighi Jamaat considered shirk (polytheism).Yet, the Tablighi Jamaat accommodated them because it believed that once they were adequately reformed and inculcated with true Islamic fervour and their lives were enriched with iman (faith), salaat (prayer), and faza’il (reward), the shirk or aspect of non-Islam would automatically disappear from their lives.

It is worthwhile to note, however, that despite its universal outlook, the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia has continued to remain to some extent culturally “subcontinental”. has always been a common language of communication among Muslims from the Indian subcontinent and only gets substituted with the English language if a gathering or group is ethnically diverse. The Tablighis from the Indian subcontinent also reveal their distinct character in what they wear - which is the traditional Muslim subcontinental attire - with occasional instances of Arab dress.

171 By the turn of the 21st century, the Tablighi Jamaat had firmly established itself in Australia and had achieved impressive success in its itinerant preaching missions. Its success is apparent in an increase in the number of musallahs (prayer halls), the adoption of strictly Islamic attire – kameez (long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers) and jubbah (a flowing Arab robe), and the popularity of its annual ijtima (congregation), which in 2002 drew together in access of 300035 Muslims at the Rooty Hill Mosque from all over Australia.

7.6. FIRST GENERATION MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS The experience of first-generation Muslim immigrants both in Australia and other Western countries was generally characterized by the fear of losing their culture and faith. This was abundantly and clearly evident in what, in the 1980s, became the “Rushdie Affair”. The Rushdie Affair over the Satanic Verses was essentially a special phenomenon which drove home for many Muslim immigrants in Britain that living in the West poses a danger to their culture and faith. Whilst, on the one hand, living in the West may represent the fear of losing cultural and religious values, making hijrah36 or the act of travelling to the West, on the other hand, can produce a “heightened sense of being Muslim” (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1990: 16), and make “Those Muslims who may not have been active in the mosque in their country of origin, … be drawn into a deeper level of participation as they make their place in the new community” (Bouma et al., 2001: 58). In Islamic tradition “travelling”37 has played an important role in gaining greater religiosity. Hijrah is one example. Sufis moving from place to place to preach and promote Islam is another example of travelling being used as a means for gaining greater religiosity.

As discussed earlier, Muslim immigration and settlement experience in Australia has been one not of cultural assimilation but greater awareness of their ethnic and religious

35This figure was given to me by a senior Tablighi when I participated in the ijtima in 2002. 36 The hijrah or withdrawal, is the emigration of Prophet Muhammad and his followers to the city of Medina in 622. The Prophet Muhammad undertook the hijrah to Medina and made the new place for Islam – the dar al-Islam. Hence, the Muslims who emigrate to the West are in a sense undertaking hijrah and will both find and help produce in the new environment a suitable place in which to engage in the practice of Islam. 37By travelling I do not mean just physical movement but spiritual as well.

172 identity. Furthermore, for a vast majority of Muslim immigrants, their social marginality as semi-skilled and unskilled workers rendered them particularly susceptible to unemployment, welfare reliance, and racism as another basis for emphasizing their separate identity (Humphrey, 1986b). Those with professional qualifications and overseas university degrees were even forced to join the ranks of unskilled workers because their qualifications were devalued.

First-generation Muslim immigrants not only in Australia but in the West in general share a common social background which is that they are overwhelmingly from rural and poor urban backgrounds who took residence in large cities (Cleland, 2001). This is true of, for example, the Turkish and Lebanese Muslim immigrants in Australia (Humphrey, 2005), the Maghrebians in France (Cesari, 2002), the Bangladeshis, Indians, and in Britain (Vertovec, 2002), and the Turks in Germany (Stowasser, 2002).

This process of identifying urban ethnic groups has had a diverse impact on Muslim immigrants. Humphrey notes that some Turkish first-generation immigrants in Australia who “put greater emphasis on their ethnic consciousness than on their religious one. Travel in their case permitted greater political and religious freedom than had existed in Turkey” (2005: 138). Furthermore, Humphrey (2005) notes that the identified themselves differently (based on their ethnicity from Turks) in an attempt to strengthen their separate sectarian awareness and identity by establishing distinct community associations. The Turkish government’s direct role in establishing mosques in Australia and recruiting imams from Turkey has also helped intensify internal ethnic and amongst Muslim immigrants from Turkey (Humphrey, 2005).

Gary Bouma et al., (2001) explains similar development of ethnic segregation and religious awareness among first-generation Pakistani immigrants in Australia. They observe that “their practice in the homeland was ‘automatic’ or ‘unreflective’, whereas migration brought a new depth to their faith and religious practice became more regular” (Bouma et al., 2001: 69).

173 Pakistani immigrants living in Australia commented that it was in Australia that they became more conscious of Islamic values and practice. As one respondent said “I was not a religious person when I arrived in Australia. As the children grew up and the Pakistani community increased I also experienced an awakening of religious fervour” (Bouma et al., 2001: 70).

The urban multicultural experience permitted Muslim immigrants to cement their collective Islamic identity and stress their cultural difference by incorporating their social and ritual needs into the daily living within the broader structure of the state system. Common key concerns with organizing Muslim life-cycle rituals – birth, marriage, and death – became important foundations for interacting with state institutions and which then paved way to the establishment of national organizations to look after the interests of the whole Muslim population in Australia, thus, the development of the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils (AFIC). Importantly, Muslims also gained from official multiculturalism which established legislation against discrimination and racism.

However, the degree to which multiculturalism promoted equality and “unity in diversity” was never unlimited. Limits of multiculturalism, for instance, can be seen in the opposition expressed towards the establishment of places of worship in the suburbs of major cities. The propensity to alienate and marginalize underscores the inbuilt uncertainty in acknowledging cultural diversity within Australian multicultural society (Humphrey, 2000). The Muslim immigrant identity becomes essentialized and racialized through viewing Muslims as a homogenous group. This involves rendering, through the involvement of the state institutions in the so-called interest of multicultural principles, the Muslim identity under the process of immigration and settlement, traditional, conservative, and even problematic.

7.7. SECOND GENERATION MUSLIMS (2002) has argued in his Islam and Muslims in Europe: A Silent Revolution Toward Rediscovery that second-and third-generation European born Muslims

174 have helped re-orient the political debate from the temporariness of the Muslim presence in Europe to their permanency. He claims that many Muslims at the moment do not:

have a genuine feeling of belonging within the European society. The -set that prevails among some second-and third-generation Muslims that one should live isolated, ignoring the societal context without even having mastered the language, makes no sense. The community is the place for enlightenment of the spirit and should provide serenity and an intellectual vigor that permit the blossoming of the Muslim individual as a European citizen (Ramadan, 2002: 162).

Thus, Ramadan argues, Muslims have been living in Europe for a substantial while and raising the issue of permanent Muslim presence in Europe by second-and third- generation Muslims is a serious attempt on their part “to carve a place for themselves within European intellectual and social spheres” (2002: 159). For second-and third- generation Muslims Europe is not a dar al-harb once seen as such by their immigrant parents but “home”; a dar al-Islam “where Muslims … [should be permitted] to live in security and according to [Islamic] law” (Ramadan, 2002: 160). Thus, unlike first- generation immigrants, these younger Muslims demand (with the strength of their European citizenship the right to express their faith visibly and develop a truly European Islamic culture.

In comparison to the European situation, in Australia Muslim immigrants used their citizenship rights to demand the recognition of their Islamic identity within Australian multiculturalism from the very beginning when the first-generation Muslims arrived in the 1970s (Humphrey, 2005). In a sense then, Australian multiculturalism was already a dar al-Islam because it permitted the pursuit of a good Muslim life and offered a genuine feeling of belonging. One measure of Muslims feeling a sense of belonging within Australia is the fact that they take out Australian citizenship in very high proportions (Yasmeen, 2002).

The second-generation Muslim experience of living in Australia is not homogenous as Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds experience life in Australia in different ways. However, in reference to Turkish and Lebanese Australian Muslims (who constitute the two largest Muslim communities in Australia) they have faced racism and

175 marginalization similar to those minority Muslim groups in other countries of the West. Examples include the Turks in Germany, and Bangladeshis, Indians, and Pakistanis in Britain. This is not to suggest, however, that Muslims from other ethnic groups do not experience racism and marginalization in Australia. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that most Muslims one time or another have experienced prejudices based upon the socio-economic position of their ethnicity and have faced classification as foreigners, despite possessing Australian citizenship or being born here.

As seen earlier, such discrimination and marginalization promote a sympathetic identification between Muslims in the context of Muslim immigration and with Islam. For second-generation Muslims, then Islam is a source of bona fide identity which is held and expressed with a sense of heightened pride.

As is the case in Europe, in Australia second-generation Muslims are becoming increasingly involved with Islam through participating in what Lars Pedersen (1999) refers to as “newer Islamic Movements”. These are movements of non-ethnic tendencies with a focus on making Muslims better Muslims, based on the Islamic scripture. Non- ethnic or universalistic revivalist movements such as the Jamaat Daawah Islamiah and the Tablighi Jamaat in Australia fall in the category of “newer Islamic movements”. These two movements are non-political, ascetic, and de-ethnicized movements engaged in proselytization. In Australia they appeal to Sunni Muslims38 from all walks of life including a large section of Muslim youth. Muslim youths who are second-generation Australians are particularly attracted to the Tablighi Jamaat have to increasingly deal with a series of challenges on a number of fronts such as racial discrimination, high unemployment, rising “Islamophobia”, and inter-generational tension.

The slow de-ethnicization of Islam in second-generation Muslims and the development of non-ethnic revivalist movements does not necessarily mean that Muslims in Australia (or internationally) have achieved homogeneity. Although globalisation has broken almost all communication barriers and the world has become a borderless and interconnected

38 They are Sunni based movements.

176 sphere, Muslim homogeneity or Islamic re-centering is far from being achieved. However, one aim of Islamic revivalism is exactly this – the achievement of Muslim homogeneity and the centralization of Islamic authority.

7.8. ISLAMIC REVIVALISM Gary Bouma et al. (2001) argue that, as elsewhere, there is a phenomenon of Islamic revivalism emerging in Australia in which Muslim immigrants are showing signs of increased religiosity. They say that:

The experience of migration and rearing children in [an Australian] socio-religious environment, as well as being in a minority group, has enhanced the religiosity of some [Muslims]. Believing and practising a , [Muslims] are forced to rediscover who they are and how they are to live (Bouma et al., 2001: 69).

They believe a number of factors are responsible for the increase in religiosity in Muslims in Australia. They explain that for some Muslim immigrants, conformity to Islam provides a sense of security and protects them from “alien intrusions” – the penetration of foreign values and practices. For others, holding tenaciously to Islamic values and practices offer a feeling of satisfaction and tranquillity during a period of personal or social crisis and transition:

Some Muslim migrants intensified their religious practice in their new society for fear of losing their own religiosity and to socialize their children in the family’s religion. [Further still, some] … did this to present good role models for their children (Bouma et al., 2001: 70).

What Bouma et al., observed about Islamic revivalism in Australia resonates with what I found among the Tablighis here. For example, Ayub Razak39, a Tablighi for eighteen years said:

When you are in a new country which is not a Muslim country, you become more conscious of your own self. You are alone because others are different. You can see the difference between yourself and the main population. This difference stops you from becoming part of mainstream Australian society. You hesitate to integrate because you fear this might change you. So what you do is hold onto your identity as a Muslim more strongly to ensure that the outside factor doesn’t destroy you. You start praying, wear Muslim clothes more, and take special care of what you eat –

39 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I have referred to him above.

177 halal. You take refuge in Islam. At home everyone is the same so you have no worries. But here, you have no family or friends and you realize that Allah is the only friend and protector you have. This should be the case all the time even in our own country – Pakistan – but immigrating to a non-Muslim country like Australia makes you realize this even more.

Faiz Deen40, another Tablighi said:

Before coming to Australia from Bangladesh I was very slack religiously. I never used to pray. I always used to wear trousers and shirt, miss Ramadan, and was not regular with charity. I was actually not what you call a practicing Muslim. I came to Australia and I changed. I joined the Tablighi Jamaat. Now, after living in Australia for thirteen years, I do dawah, pray regularly, give my zakat, fast, and have encouraged my wife and my ten-year old daughter to pray regularly.

This increase in conformity to Islam has become quite a common experience among many Australian Muslims today. Even among Muslim youth there is evidence of Islamic revivalism. Evidence of Islamic revivalism can also be seen, for instance, in Muslim women wearing hijab (veil) or burqah (ladies outer garment covering the whole body worn by some Muslim women) to work and universities, Muslim men wearing Muslim kameez (long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers) or Arab-style gown known as jubbah in public places and sporting beards, and provisions for prayer being sought in workplaces and at universities.

In the next chapter I will demonstrate, through the activities of the Tablighi Jamaat, how Islamic revivalism is emerging as a sociologically important phenomenon in Australia. It argues that Islamic revivalism is taking place in Australia in response to Muslims wanting to carve a space for themselves in Australian society.

7.8.1. Reflexive Muslim Identity Human beings today live in a rapidly changing world. Identities that provide individuals with a sense of who they are, are fluid and porous. Processes of globalization and the international movement of people – immigration – have been factors contributing to people having heterogenous sense of who they are and to which groups they pledge their loyalty to. In this regard, Stuart Hall says:

40 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I have referred to him above.

178 Modern people of all sorts and conditions, it seems to me, have had, as a condition of survival, to be members, simultaneously, of several overlapping ‘imagined communities’ and the negotiations across and between these complex borderlines are characteristics of modernity itself (1992: 7).

Hall (1992) argues that it is critical to view ethnicity, nationalism, and “race” as just some of many potential sources of identity constituting the “self”. In our attempts to understand the social world in the contemporary period we have to also consider, he suggests, other possible sources of identity such as class, political affiliation, and religion. With these features in mind, the explanation and understanding of multiple identities becomes even more complicated. Thus, Stuart Hall says that identity firmly located in a social milieu is a “moveable feast: formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems that surround us” (1992: 279). The nature of one’s being, the self, is subjected to manipulation and modification during the interaction with “outer” cultural worlds where identities are constructed and assigned. Therefore, identities are constantly being negotiated between the individual and society.

In light of this, it is critical to realize that the “self” is never static. Identity is rooted in the social world, therefore, constantly changing and adapting to new social settings. People generally carry with them multiple identities which they employ in varying ways in different social environments. Muslims are no exception. They carry multiple identities such as familial, national, and Islamic.

Second-and third-generation Muslims raised simultaneously in two cultures have a good opportunity to be “reflexive”, that is, “pick and choose” between both cultures. In Australia, these two generations of Muslims are constructing multiple identities as they seek to understand or display who they really are.

They are developing a certain bond with Australia, which, in most cases, is not at the expense of their Islamic and ethnic heritage. Their Australianness complements and puts into perspective their Muslim identity and their ethnic traditions. The result may be a hybrid Islamic identity based on commitment to the secular norms of Australian society and Islamic/ethnic traditions (Saeed and Akbarzadeh, 2001: 5).

179 However, Australian Muslim identity is still in the process of development. Apart from the ethnic diversity of Muslims being a factor in slowing the emergence of a homogenous Muslim community both in Australia and elsewhere, variances in the social background of Muslims is another contributing factor to this process. For instance, Muslim immigrants from rural areas of the third world countries who were expected to maintain their village culture or ethnic Islam in immigration are now living in suburbs of major Australian cities, visiting mosques and interacting with fellow Muslims from different social settings.

Islamic revivalism in Australia needs to be placed in this context. Among other things, it is about the negotiation and reconstruction of separate Muslim identity in the broader structure of Australian multiculturalism. Given the fact that the Australian Muslim population is divided on cultural and ethnic grounds, I would argue that Islamic revivalism seeks to nullify ethnic diversity through the promotion of scriptural Islam and guide Muslims in the direction of unity and uniformity. The strategy used here is to achieve Muslim unity in Australia through the reconstruction of social boundaries. Old boundaries based on language, region, social class, and socio-economic status are diluted in favour of new fixed social boundaries relating to almost every aspect of everyday life.

Marriage is a good example of the dilution of ethnic and linguistic boundaries amongst Muslims. Islamic revivalists argue that ethnicity and language is no barrier to marriage as long as the spouse is a Muslim. Ethnic languages have considerably lost their importance and pertinence in new boundary construction among the many Australian Muslims. As Johns and Saeed (2002: 213) note, “There is increasing intermarriage between Muslim ethnic groups, partly attributable to the spontaneous encounters between these subcommunities”. Through social interaction across Australian Muslim ethnicities a new identity is emerging based on fundamentalist beliefs and identities. The definition of what constitutes a Muslim ummah in Australia has broadened with the reconstruction of boundaries beyond linguistic, cultural, and ethnic affiliations. This is not to suggest, however, that the attempt to construct a new alternate Australian Muslim identity has

180 been realized. Deep ethnic and cultural differences continue to exist amongst Australian Muslims.

CONCLUSION The presence of Islam in Australia is a product of the process of modern capitalist development and the mass immigration it has set in motion. Muslims from different national and ethnic backgrounds brought their own versions of Islam to Australia, making it a pluralistic socio-cultural and religious reality. Based on this fact Islam in Australia has essentially been a pluralistic religion.

In recent years, however, Islam in Australia has been undergoing transformation. This transformation has involved the re-development of Islam based on more fundamentalist and, what Olivier Roy (2004) refers to as de-culturalized traditions of so-called “pristine” Islam. Australian born Muslims have become active participants in Islamic revivalism in Australia in an attempt to forge a separate Muslim identity shaped by their new Muslim consciousness as immigrants and as a minority in Australian society.

One way Islamic revivalism manifests itself in Australia is in “scripturalism” or the Tablighi path. This path is adopted by many Muslims in Australia who find themselves socially and economically marginalized from broader Australian society. Affected by a multiplicity of poor social and economic conditions these Muslims find in the Tablighi path a sense of belonging and self-worth. The Tablighi Jamaat emerges from this context as a sect. Muslims increasingly see themselves as a disadvantaged and discriminated against minority group and the path to new identity then, provided by the Tablighi Jamaat, for them is in individual, spiritual, and moral reform.

181 CHAPTER EIGHT

THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF THE TABLIGHI JAMAAT

INTRODUCTION The modern world, according to the Tablighi Jamaat, is in a state of jahiliyah (ignorance). Over the years the world has gradually moved into this state because Muslims as vicegerents of God on earth have been derelict in their religious and social duties. The Tablighi Jamaat aims to change this jahili (anti-Islamic) state of the modern world by infusing Islamic values and practices in it. It seeks to do this through the revival of Islam41.

The aim to change the jahili state of the world is shared by all Islamic revivalist movements. These movements also share the ultimate objective to restructure Muslim society in line with the shariah (Islamic law). What distinguishes these movements is their methodology not their goals. Hence what sets the Tablighi Jamaat apart from the rest of the Islamic revivalist movements is its methodology of preaching and missionary work.

This chapter studies the ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat. The ethnography of the Tablighi Jamaat is based on Tablighi activities in Sydney and provides an insight into Islamic revivalism as a response to modernity and a Muslim response to their loss of faith in an immigrant context. The chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section I explore the Tablighi rituals and study the ongoing importance of self-fashioning based on three case studies and in the second section I discuss the Tablighi ideology and worldview and how these constitute a response to modernity.

41 In the context of the Tablighi Jamaat, reviving Islam essentially means proselytization. A process whereby nominal Muslims are encouraged to at least learn and practice the basics of Islam – article of faith, ritual prayer, fasting, giving alms, and undertake pilgrimage.

182 SECTION ONE: TBLIGHI PRACTICES IN SYDNEY

8.1. RETREAT AT THE IMAM ALI MOSQUE IN SYDNEY On every Friday evening, around 300 Tablighis42 from surrounding suburbs of Sydney converge on the Imam Ali Mosque43 to experience collective spirituality and religiosity and, importantly, plan for future khuruj (preaching tour). What I am attempting to describe in the ensuing pages are the Tablighi practices and rituals based on my experience with the movement in Sydney. The practices and rituals may slightly vary in form but not in principle in the context of another city or place within or without Australia. Although people start arriving at the Mosque shortly before the Maghrib (sunset) prayer, the majority arrive after the Maghrib prayer, and some even later during the bayaan (religious talk). Those who arrive early engage in taleem (education) which is not always in one particular language but depending on the number of people and their language diversity, a number of groups may be formed.44 It is important to note, however, that not everyone always spends this occasion to engage in taleem or dhikr (remembrance of Allah) and instead may engage in socializing. The taleem usually entails the reading of Faza’il-e-Ama’l (Tablighi text), however, some times other Islamic books may be read including the Qur’an or someone may deliver a short impromptu bayaan.

Shortly before the Isha (night or after sunset) prayer the taleem is stopped and people get to prepare for the Isha prayer. The Isha prayer is always led by the local imam (a leader in prayer) and upon the completion of the prayer the bayaan begins. Every week the bayaan is delivered by a different speaker who has spent three chillahs (forty days makes

42 When I am talking about the Tablighi in the thesis I am generally referring to male members because although females also participate in the Tablighi work they are relatively few in numbers and they also work separately. 43 Imam Ali Mosque is in Lakemba. Lakemba is a suburb in Sydney. Sydney itself is the capital city of the state of New South Wales and the largest city in Australia. It has a population of over four million people of diverse culture and ethnicity. Sydney is home to over fifty percent of all Muslims in Australia. They live in numerous metropolitan and outer suburbs. In the context of Tablighi work, Sydney is divided in seven zones. Within these zones there are numerous mosques and musallahs. 44 This reflects not only the ethnic and cultural diversity of Muslims in Australia but also of the Tablighi membership.

183 a chillah) in the Tablighi work and is nominated45 by the shura (consultative committee). The bayaan almost without exception revolves around the six points and lasts for approximately an hour. At the end of the bayaan, the tashkeel (recruitment) for three chillahs, one chillah, ten days, and three days takes place. Names are taken and tour dates are nominated and depending on the size of the gathering, around fifty people are enlisted every week - some of whom are new recruits,46 the rest are a mixture of junior and senior Tablighis.

During the tashkeel, the enlisters encourage recruitment, citing the experience of Prophet Muhammad and His Companions and narrating fascinating anecdotal stories about senior Tablighis. The whole recruitment process takes between thirty to sixty minutes and concludes with a short du’a (supplication) performed by the speaker.

Some people leave after the du’a but dedicated Tablighis stay back and spend the entire night at the Mosque. Staying back is a form of retreat called itikaf (devotional seclusion). The nature of itikaf varies according to the school of thought and thus, there are three separate forms of itikaf. The first form is wajib (essential), which becomes incumbent on a person when he makes a du’a to Allah with the promise to Him that upon the fulfilment of his du’a, itikaf for certain days will be offered to express gratitude and show appreciation. The second form is sunnah and is performed for the final ten days of Ramadan (the Muslim month of fasting) when Laylat al-Qadr (night of power) is sought. The third form is nafl (supererogatory) and performed for no specific time or day but as a general practice to remain in a state of seclusion. Whilst Tablighis subscribe to all three forms of itikaf, the nafl itikaf, however, is most commonly performed, particularly on Friday evening. Itikaf usually revolves around a series readings and expositions from the Qur’an, performance of optional prayers, and long supplications. For instance, I have witnessed on a number of occasions at the Imam Ali Mosque, Tablighis offering optional prayers at 1:00A.M., some I have seen doing () in the dark in the middle of

45 This process is part of the mushawara that takes place on Wednesday evening at the Rydalmere Musallah. 46 These are men who have never been on a khuruj and happened to be in the gathering by choice or by invitation by a Tablighi friend or acquaintance.

184 the night, some I have seen remain prostrate for a prolonged time during their optional prayer in the middle of the night, and some I have seen crying during their prayers. This is all part of itikaf, part of seeking guidance, forgiveness, and material and spiritual success.

The Tablighis always come prepared with food47, clothing48, and sleeping bags and they sleep49 on the floor in the back of the mosque. They sleep for a while and then get up in the early hours of the morning and remain awake. During this time, they offer (supererogatory prayer offered at night) prayer, recite the Qur’an, read the hadith (accounts of Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds), and spend long time offering supplications. There are some Tablighis, however, who sleep through the night and wake up at the time of Fajr (dawn) prayer.

On a normal Friday evening (outside of any special occasion such as Ramadan, Eid al- Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and ijtima), approximately 150 Tablighis stay back for itikaf. Some of these are accompanied by their children as young as ten years old. Children accompany their fathers in this gathering to be introduced to the Tablighi work and socialized into the way of the Tablighi Jamaat as a sect.

In the morning (Saturday) after the Fajr prayer there is again a bayaan but a short one delivered by a new speaker followed by a comparatively small-scale tashkeel and finally the main program concludes with a du’a. The members generally then leave for work or return home, however, those going on khuruj separate into their respective jamaats (groups) and attend the hidayah bayaan (guidance speech). These jamaats are from a specific locale or suburb where a small group of Tablighis regularly gather. They could be described as “grass-roots groups”. Whilst the hidayah bayaan is in progress, the shura

47 Individuals bring their own food, however, it is shared and eaten in the so-called Arab-style which involves placing the food in a few large plates and around each plate a few members sit and eat out of it. This eating manner is not exclusive to the Tablighi Jamaat and is practiced in many different Muslim contexts. 48 A majority of Tablighis wear either a jubbah (a flowing Arab robe) or kameez (long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers). 49 Tablighis during itikaf and khuruj sleep in a dormitory fashion. Some die hard Tablighis even practice dormitory sleeping at their homes.

185 meets in the mosque to review the proposed composition and plans for individual jamaats and by the time the hidayah bayaan concludes the jamaats would have received their instructions. The review is done about the jamaat and the Tablighi work, based on the information ascertained from the leaders of each grass-roots group or suburban group. These leaders either are present themselves at the mosque or have a representative who conveys the necessary information to them later. Often what is required for the determination is information on the urgency of Tablighi work in a particular area or suburb and how the work might help the local Muslim community. Jamaat is always headed by an amir (leader) and either the shura nominates him or the jamaat itself. To avoid burdening a new member with leadership responsibilities, usually the amir of a jamaat is a member who has working knowledge of the movement and khuruj. By this criterion, the bulk of the Tablighis are potential amirs and one time or another one receives or will receive his nomination.

Once jamaats are formed they are dispatched on khuruj either to the neighbouring suburbs or farther out in different regions such as Wollongong, Nowra, Newcastle, Young, and Burke.

8.1.1. Hidayah Bayaan The hidayah bayaan centers on the essential etiquette of khuruj. Even though it is a simple and short talk, the hidayah bayaan is an important part of the overall Tablighi work which seeks to inform the members, particularly the new recruits, about the elaborate rituals of khuruj and the actual objective and purpose of undertaking such an endeavour. For any khuruj to succeed, the members need to be mindful of its essential rituals and their correct implementation. Hidayah bayaan, therefore, delivered by an experienced Tablighi, prepares members for the task, at least psychologically, before they are dispatched to the field.

In the hidayah bayaan a great deal of emphasis is placed on self-discipline and members are familiarized with the eight primary rituals of khuruj. Four of these rituals have

186 positive functions and they assist in the self-purification and spiritual elevation processes and they are to be done with greater frequency. Thus:

• forever more dawah (preaching), essentially directly after the ritual prayer when a lot of people are present. There are three types of dawah: (i) khususi dawah is to the senior Tablighis, people with status, and the ulama (Islamic scholars), (ii) infiradi dawah is to an individual, and (iii) ijtimai dawah is to a group.

Also:

• forever more taleem. Two types of taleem exists: (i) infiradi taleem where one should memorize the saying of the Prophet, and (ii) ijtimai taleem which is done in a group in the mosque and another one at home.

Moreover:

• forever more dhikr involving the performance of supererogatory prayer, reciting the Qur’an, and supplication, and • forever more khidmah (service) which involves serving the amir, the group, people of the local area, and yourself.

The other four rituals have negative functions and potentially can lead one straying from the purpose and objectives of the khuruj and, therefore, are to be avoided. Thus:

• less sleeping, • less eating or not over-eating, • less mundane conversations or its avoidance altogether, and

187 • less unnecessary exiting the mosque.

For these rituals to be effectively implemented, five general rules are to be observed. They are: (i) upon reaching the prescribed destination such as a mosque or musallah, the members should perform two rakah (a unit of prayer) , (ii) then they should have a mushawara to plan the khuruj. Once the plan is made, it need not be modified or broken unless warranted by an unforeseen situation or an extenuating circumstance, (iii) the role of the amir is important and the members are encouraged to revere him and provide necessary support. The amir himself should earn this by consulting the group on all essential matters, show respect in return, deal with the members of the group in fair and just manner, be quick in resolving problems, and be active in all the rituals of the movement, (iv) the members should concentrate on the work at hand and not become complacent or deviate from the goal or the purpose, and (v) the members should avoid excessive use of the mosque facilities such as water and electricity which are deemed to be provided free of charge by the local mosque committee from donated funds.

Once the hidayah bayaan is finished, the jamaats leave for their prescribed destination for khuruj. Ordinarily, jamaats move some thirty or forty kilometers (radius) of central Sydney. They travel in cars. Once a jamaat reaches it destination, the members offer two rakah nafl prayer. This precedes with an hour long taleem and then the jamaat disperses for the Ishraaq (superrogatory prayer between sunrise and mid-day) prayer. Subsequently, the jamaat holds a mushawara in which any concerns or issues are discussed, money for food is collected, and a plan is agreed upon for the khuruj. There are four key points about khuruj upon which the members have to agree. These are allocating members for:

188 (i) khidmah, primarily involves cooking, serving meals and tea or water, and cleaning up,

(ii) bayaan, giving a talk revolving around the six principles of the movement,

(iii) taleem, reading from the Faza’il-e-Ama’l, and

(iv) jolah (preaching mission), paying preaching visits to local Muslims.

After the mushawara members have their breakfast, they offer supererogatory prayer, and take a short rest. Then they wake up to offer their Dhuhr (noon) prayer in the company of the local Muslims. Subsequently, a short bayaan is delivered preceded by a taleem and then finally lunch is served. Then there is a short taleem after which the members take a rest until the time for Asr (afternoon) prayer. Once is performed, taleem follows but this time the taleem centres on tajweed (reciting the Qur’an with proper intonation). In other words, the members get in pairs and recite ten suras (chapters of the Qur’an) for the purpose of authenticating the pronunciation. When this has finished, the members get together and send a few jolah groups with three members in each group to the local Muslim community or homes to inform them of the purpose of their visit and how they can contribute towards reviving Islam as well as bettering themselves.

The jolah group or groups return to the base by the Maghrib prayer. Between the Maghrib and Isha prayers either a short bayaan or a short taleem session takes place. Then, after the Isha salaat the main bayaan of the day starts and depending on the speaker it can last between an hour to hour and a half. After the bayaan, a short taleem50 follows and then finally dinner is served. Once dinner is eaten, a short mushawara takes place in which the day’s events are recapitulated and assessed. The mushawara concludes with a du’a. Members then disperse to offer nafl prayers and then sporadically they retire for a few hours only to get up in the middle of the night or early morning to offer

50 This taleem is slightly different in content compared to other taleems discussed earlier because in this taleem, an opportunity is created to discuss or learn new du’as, the way to perform the janazah (funeral) prayer, the rituals of aqiqah (naming ceremony) and wedding, etiquette of eating, sleeping, and visiting the toilet, and so on. For those members who are already familiar with these the session provides them with the opportunity to refine what they already know and practise.

189 tahajjud prayer. This marks the end of the full cycle of khuruj and the following day or days are just the repeat of the rituals of the first day.

8.1.2. Taleem

The objective of taleem is to arouse a desire for righteousness and good deeds. Therefore, at taleem members are encouraged to sit next to each other in a state of (ablution) and give their undivided attention to what is being read. Generally speaking, taleem has three parts:

(i) reading Faza’il-e-Ama’l,

(ii) talk revolving around the six points, and

(iii) tajweed.

It is not unusual during khuruj to have the focus on only one part of taleem. However, when the complete taleem is done, first short passages are read from five separate sections of the Faza’il-e-Ama’l. This is done to allow members to better understand the nature and depth of engagement of Prophet Muhammad and his Companions in spreading Islam, and draw inspiration from their efforts and sacrifices. The first section centers on the virtues of Qur’an, the second on virtues of salaat (prayer), the third on virtues of dhikr, the fourth on virtues of tabligh, and the fifth on virtues of Ramadan. Each section deals with selected inspirational hadith and they are read to the members in the context of a taleem or by the members themselves for inspiration51. Take, for instance, excerpts from the first section on virtues of Qur’an, “people who believe in the Holy Book and act upon it are given by Allah the position of honour and respect, both in this life as well as in the Hereafter, while those who do not act upon it are disgraced by Allah” (Kandhalvi, 1990: 297).

51 The hadith in the Faza’il-e-Ama’l seem to be selected for a specific purpose, that is, to motivate Muslims for religious zeal and inspire them for religious course. At least this is what was suggested by many Tablighis during the fieldwork.

190 Furthermore, “Allah orders you to read His Book, and if you do so, you will be like the people protected in a fort, so that on whichever side the enemy wants to attack you, he will find the Word of Allah as a guard to repulse him” (Kandhalvi, 1990: 353).

Take another set of excerpts from the second section on virtues of salaat, “indeed salaat is a tremendous asset. Besides pleasing Allah it often gets us deliverance from the calamities of this life and provides us with tranquility and peace of mind” (Kandhalvi, 1990: 413). Moreover:

salaat is the cause of Allah’s pleasure,… is a weapon against the enemy, shall intercede for its adherent, is a light in the darkness and a companion in the loneliness of the grave,… is a shade against the Sun on the Day of Judgment, is a protection against the fire of (Kandhalvi, 1990: 438).

For neglecting salaat, the punishments are grave:

Those in this world are: he is not blessed in life; … he receives no rewards for his good practices; his prayers are not answered;… he dies disgracefully; he dies hungry; he dies in thirst which the water in the oceans of the world cannot quench (Kandhalvi, 1990: 433).

In the contemporary context, a message like this can prove to be very potent. It does so among the Tablighis who find truth and relevance of these assertions particularly in light of the plight of Muslims in the world and the decline of a once pervasive and powerful Islamic civilization. Because Muslims have abandoned the call towards righteousness and to Allah and opted, instead, for secular and modern existence, Allah has taken away from Muslims their honour and their protected fort has come undone with enemies now reigning in it. The selected hadith in the Faza’il-e-Ama’l generate a sense of concern and even fear and motivate the participants towards their implementation. Going out on khuruj to learn din (religion) and then implementing its teachings in life and encouraging their fellow Muslims to follow suit, Tablighis believe that they are constantly fulfilling the commands of Allah. The stories and messages in the Faza’il-e-Ama’l gives the Tablighis an opportunity to ponder on their own lives and allows them to measure their own situations against those in the stories.

191 The second part of taleem revolves around the six points. These are the six pillars of the Tablighi Jamaat and each point is to motivate and prepare the participants to implement the din in their lives. If they are fully and seriously fulfilled according to the Tablighi prescription, then the full din will enter into the lives of the participants who will find success and pleasure in this world as well as in the Hereafter.

The third point is tajweed. This point emphasizes the need to recite the Qur’an properly so that the reading and reciting of the Qur’an can have the full benefit for the reader as well as to the listener if there is an audience. Because the Qur’an contains Allah’s own words and holds essential messages, reading and understanding it properly is absolutely critical. Reciting the Qur’an or pronouncing Qur’anic verses properly is also important because one slip of the tongue or mispronunciation can change the whole meaning. This is important because the change in the meaning can lead to misinterpretation of the word or verse and lead to all sorts of polemics and debate among the people, not only about a particular word or a verse but a particular message and even the whole text.

8.1.3. Jolah Jolah or gasht (preaching visit) means a group of three Tablighis visit Muslims in the local area where the jamaat is based. It is a quick visit designed to inform the targeted Muslims that the jamaat is staying for a few days in their local centre and they are welcome and even encouraged to sit with the jamaat and discuss and talk about the din. There are two types of jolah. One type is known as khususi jolah where one or more men make a special visit to a particular individual to make special effort on the targeted52 individual so that he is encouraged or inspired to enter into the din in totality. Another type is called mukami jolah which involves a small group of Tablighis propagating to a targeted group of Muslims again to encourage taking din more literally and seriously.

52 Targeted connotes Muslims who do not practise Islam and fall in the so-called category of nominal Muslims.

192 Mukami jolah is the common form requiring a minimum of three men and these members are chosen by the jamaat during mushawara. The jolah members consist of an amir who keeps the group together and provides the technical and religious expertise when it is necessary, a mutakallim who speaks or dispenses the message and gives the invitation, and a dalil who does the navigation work and knocks on the door and introduces the jolah to the household .

The jolah start its tour with a short du’a offered usually just outside the mosque or musallah through which they seek Allah’s blessing and the success for their jolah efforts. Depending on the size of the actual jamaat, there are often a couple of jolahs dispatched in the field. Whilst most of the members are out in the field, those left53 behind either collectively or individually engage in some sort of dhikr.

Once on their way the jolah keeps its gaze down and walks on the right hand side of the road either reciting the shahadah (article of faith) or some sura or doing the tasbih (rosary). If they are travelling in a car, they avoid unnecessary conversation and concentrate on some form of dhikr.

Upon reaching their targeted destination54 the dalil will knock on the door of the house and offer salaam (salutation). If there is no response to the first knock then he will knock again, follow with salaam and this will be repeated for the third time. After the third knock if there wasn’t a response then the jolah would proceed to visit the next household and the next until the visiting list is completed. When there is a response, however, the mutakallim makes a brief introduction and explains the purpose of the visit in which he make a short few-minute bayaan on din and extends the invitation to male to attend the mosque. Should a child answer the door a request will be made to talk to an adult and if a lady answers the door, the dalil will turn his face away to avoid visual contact and ask to talk to an adult male. If there isn’t one then he will leave a message in

53 There is always at least one person from the jamaat who stays back and keeps the Tablighi work continuing inside the mosque or the musalllah. 54 There can be more than one target destinations depending on the number of households to be visited. Usually the jolah focuses on those households whose members do not frequent the mosque or the musallah. This information is usually provided by the local amir.

193 which requesting for the male household member to pay a visit to the centre. Once the list is completed the jolah will return to the mosque or musallah and engage in dhikr and if it is close to prayer time then they will prepare for it.

8.1.4. Bayaan The bayaan, whether long or short, usually revolves around the six fundamental principles of the Tablighi Jamaat: shahadah (article of faith); salaat (prayer); ilm and dhikr (knowledge and remembrance of Allah); ikram i-Muslim (respect for every Muslim); ikhlas i-niyat (emendation of intention and sincerity); and tafriq i-waqt (sacrifice or spare time). The speaker starts his bayaan with an exaltation of Allah and describes His attributes and greatness. This forms the backdrop to his exposition and explication of the concept of shahadah. Faith in something needs to be based on the understanding of that something, thus the description of Allah’s attributes and greatness. By describing Allah’s attributes and greatness, the speaker is able to help the listener understand what shahadah entails, how faith should be formed and acted upon, and how a bond with Allah can be forged. He describes how building one’s faith in Allah is a life- long process. His emphasis is on entering into din in absolute entirety and implement the commands of Allah in all aspects of everyday living. The success in this world and in the Hereafter, he reveals, is in accepting and implementing din in its entirety. He defines din as La ilaha illa Allah wa- Allah (there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His last messenger). In a sense, believe in the unity of the unseen God and His universe and follow the teachings of Muhammad who is a Prophet.

Given that the shahadah captures the essence of din and is, therefore, the first pillar of Islam and by extension first pillar of the Tablighi Jamaat, it makes listening to the bayaan worthwhile not only to the Tablighis or Muslims from a particular social and economic background, but to Muslims in general.

Then the speaker moves on to talk about salaat. He describes its virtues first and then reveals the nature of punishment prescribed in the shariah (Islamic law) for neglecting obligatory ritual salaat. The speaker also discusses the virtues of supererogatory salaat,

194 especially the tahajjud salaat, and how salaat is a direct and the best means of reaching Allah. By talking about salaat in this manner, the audience is expected to take notice of the message and implement it.

Salaat is the second pillar of Islam and is also second pillar of the Tablighi Jamaat. Having a bayaan centre on first and second pillars of Islam, the Tablighi Jamaat makes the speaker keep his audience focused on Islam and its teachings. In this way, Muslims from all sorts of socio-economic, political, and ethnic backgrounds can be appealed to who in turn can relate to the speakers bayaan and a sense of ideological universalism, under the rubric of Islam, is generated. In this way, any possibility of giving the audience the impression of the Tablighi Jamaat as a movement of some form is easily suppressed and the audience’s disposition is won. So, when the speaker moves on to the third point and subsequently other points of his bayaan, which he perspicaciously ties to Islamic spiritualism, the audience is already won in favour of the Tablighi work.

The third point is ilm and dhikr. This is a first point in the bayaan that is not a pillar of Islam but still is a pillar of the movement - in fact the third pillar. Ilm and dhikr, explains the speaker, are two important features in understanding and implementing din. Acquiring the knowledge of din in an attempt to properly implement din in everyday living is absolutely critical. For instance, if a Muslims does not know the rules of salaat yet performs it, the salaat is rendered invalid. Thus, the performance of an invalid salaat is equivalent to salaat being not performed at all and not performing salaat is an important breach of the shariah. Hence, knowledge of din is necessary. Once the knowledge of din is gained, its implementation becomes obligatory. Knowledge of din with no implementation is like a train full of passengers going nowhere. Thus, it becomes a sin to possess knowledge of din and not implement it. Dhikr, is a very potent way of implementing the knowledge of din. Dhikr, can be in any form or size. What is important, however, is that one needs to do dhikr all the time. Even if one says Allah is great over and over again is dhikr and Allah loves those who do dhikr.

195 The speaker provides this information to arouse awareness of the duties of Muslims. It is assumed that the prevailing crisis in the ummah (Muslim community) is the direct result of ignorance about religion and an absence of serious and perpetual dhikr. The speaker puts the crisis of the ummah in contemporary context and allows the listener to ponder over it. All these, he hopes, will lead the listener to implement din in life.

The fourth point is ikram i-Muslim. The speaker discusses this topic in light of human rights – right to respect, right to voice an opinion, and right to help and seek help. He alerts the listener that human beings have rights that have to be honoured, particularly the rights of Muslims. Because Muslims are Allah’s beloved creation, showing respect to fellow Muslims is in a way showing respect to the creator – Allah. Doing this is a good deed and Allah will reward those who do good deeds. The speaker’s aim here is to show the listener that doing little things like this has many benefits but importantly many rewards and opportunity should not be wasted.

The fifth point is ikhlas i-niyat. This point is discussed by the speaker to demonstrate to the listener that all the points mentioned earlier have to be observed in life with good intention and with sincerity. In other words, they have to be carried out in an unselfish manner for the sole sake of Allah. If the approach is sincere, then the Muslims will taste the of their labour here and there will be much left for the Hereafter.

The sixth point is tafriq i-waqt. This is the last point which wraps up the discussion. The speaker impresses on the audience that what he has discussed cannot be realized by simply pondering about it but that everyone present in the gathering have to invest time in the path of Allah to learn the din and then implement it. Learning din is about getting out of the home for a few days or more and sitting with the fellow brothers in an environment that is conducive to learning. It requires commitment and effort through which an individual embarks on the new journey of self-fashioning.

196 8.2. EXPERIENCING KHURUJ The alarm went off at 4:30A.M. The amir got up first. In his soft voice and with a gentle touch he woke us up individually. We all then got up in a matter of minutes, attended the call of nature, brushed our teeth (some members used (a twig of certain trees used as a ), performed our wudu, and offered our Fajr salaat in the company of local Muslims.

After the salaat the amir got up and delivered a bayaan. Whilst almost half the local Muslims left after the salaat, the other half remained to listen to the bayaan. The bayaan was simple but delivered in a typical Tablighi fashion revolving around the “six points”.

An abridged version of his bayaan is as follows:

My dear brothers,

Allah is an entity, who if we praised for hundred lifetimes over, will still be not enough. Allah is the Creator of all creations. He neither begets nor is begotten… Allah, my dear brothers, is the Mightiest and the Exalted. Allah is our Lord. Allah created , our first prophet, without a father and a mother. He created our prophet Isa without a father… .

As Muslims, we believe in Allah. We also believe in His , in the prophethood of all His messengers, in heaven and hell, in the Day of Judgment, and in the life after death. All this is part of our religious belief - our imaan… .

My dear brothers, Allah has given us Islam - a way of life… . You know Islam is standing on five pillars. After imaan, the second most important pillar of Islam is salaat. What is salaat? Salaat is the key to heaven…. It has been mentioned in hadith that the first thing that will be asked on the Day of Judgment will be about salaat… . If a Muslim has performed salaat regularly, he will be saved, if not, he will be deprived of Allah’s favour... . Salaat is absolutely essential. One must know the , the sunnah, and all the right ways of performing the salaat so that the salaat is accepted and doesn’t get wasted. The hadith says that Allah forgives one’s sins that have been committed between salaats, when one offers his salaat … .

What is also important in Islam, my brothers, is knowledge and remembrance - ilm and dhikr. Ilm and dhikr are very important… . Every one should try to achieve high level of knowledge and remembrance. Knowledge of what and remembrance of whom? Knowledge of Islam and remembrance of Allah… . Knowledge about Islam takes you near to Allah. Remembering Allah all the time also takes you near to Allah… . Every Muslim should have at least the basic knowledge of Islam. Knowledge about the five pillars of Islam, about how to offer your salaat, about the difference between halal and , what is good and bad, and so on… . If you have the Islamic knowledge then you can conduct yourself in the proper manner. You can remember Allah in the proper manner too. What is important about this is that you will know what you are doing and whom you are remembering… . There is a lot of reward in doing so… .

Respecting your fellow Muslim is also very important in Islam. Islam demands that every Muslim show his fellow Muslim respect… . Each single Muslim, for Allah, is worth more than the entire

197 gold on earth because he has the faith - La ilaha illa Allah - in him… . Showing respect to your fellow Muslims is acknowledging and giving them their rights… . Muslims should realize the rights of Allah’s creatures and should be nice and humble to them… . A Muslim should like for others what he likes for himself. He should not be jealous of his fellow Muslims or wish them harm… . He should be courteous and loving to all Muslims whether they are young or old, rich or poor, knowledgeable or ignorant, and healthy or sick… .

Every good deed performed should be done to please Allah and it has to be done with sincerity of intention… . This is very important point. If a deed is done in a machine sort of way then it doesn’t have much power in it… . Take salaat, for example, it is not just a physical action of standing up, , and sitting down. No. This is ignorance… . Salaat is about total concentration in your communication with Allah… . So, any act that is permissible in our religion, if done with sincerity of intention, will be rewarded by Allah… . Our Holy Prophet said that the reward for ones deed very much depends on his intention and everyone is rewarded in accordance with the character of his intention. So someone who offers his salaat quickly as a routine doesn’t benefit the same as someone who takes time, shows passion and commitment, pronounces the suras properly, and understands what he recites in his salaat… .

The last point I want to make is that to understand din and to bring din into our everyday living, time is needed. Time is needed to learn the din and to convey it to those who have drifted away from din… .

My dear brothers, the fact of the matter is that the success of this life and the life in the Hereafter is in the following of din not in man-made ideas and systems… . If din enters completely in our lives, we will be successful both in here and in the Hereafter. But, if complete din is not in our lives, as the case is today, we will be unsuccessful in this life and in the Hereafter… . You see brothers, din in this world is like the heart in the body. You damage your heart, the body ceases to operate properly and when you remove the heart, the body ceases to operate altogether. Similarly, when the complete din is practised in this world, everything will operate properly as it once did during the time of our Prophet and then during of the four pious caliphs… situation today … everything is in chaos because complete din is not in our lives.

So, how complete din can enter our lives, our children’s, our families’, our neighbour’s, and our country men’s and women’s is what our concern should be… . To bring complete din in our lives, we have to become good and true Muslims. We have to change, lift our moral standards, increase our religious commitments, and become serious about how we practise our religion. We, the Muslims, have to return to our true Islamic roots and abandon the life of unIslam. This is called self- redirection and revival of our din. For this, we need to engage in tabligh… . We need to make a serious commitment to al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar. We have to improve ourselves and help our fellow Muslims… . We have to do tabligh the purpose of which is to spread Islam and remove ignorance… (Bayaan by Rafan Amin55 at Belmore Mosque: 16th February, 2002).

After the bayaan, the “tashkeel brother” (recruitment brother), as he is called, got up to take the names56 of potential recruits. The event is referred to as tashkeel. The tashkeel took approximately ten minutes. This was a small group so it did not take long, however, in large gatherings because people take time to make up their mind to go on khuruj, it

55 This name is fictitious to maintain confidentiality. 56 Name taking or enlisting happens after every bayaan and the targets are the new people in the gathering.

198 could take an hour, even more before the tashkeel is finished. Once the tashkeel was over, the amir offered a short du’a.

Then we began the taleem. As we sat on the floor in a circle, the “taleem brother” (education brother) read extracts from the Faza’il-e-Ama’l for an hour. He chose to read from the following books in the Faza’il-e-Ama’l:

(i) Virtues of the Holy Qur’an, (ii) Virtues of Salaat, (iii) Virtues of Dhikr, and (iv) Virtues of Tabligh.

After the taleem was over, we all went to offer nafl salaat. Then some of us rested for approximately twenty minutes whilst the “khidma brothers” (service brothers) prepared the breakfast. Shortly after 8:00 A.M., breakfast was served. We all sat down on the floor and had Arab style meal. It consisted of what is commonly called Arab pizza, Lebanese bread with butter and , beef mince, and tea. The meal was placed on four large plates which were strategically placed on the dastarkhan (tablecloth) on the floor. Next to each plate was a stainless steel bowl of tea. In pairs we ate out of one plate and drank tea from the same bowl.

When we had finished eating breakfast and the “khidmah brothers” had cleaned up, some members who needed to have a shower or do their washing attended to their needs and the rest of us went to our sleeping spots for a lay-down.

At 10:30A.M. the amir gathered us for Ishraq salaat (supererogatory prayer offered between sunrise and mid-day) after which we got into pairs and engaged in tajweed57. In the tajweed session, we took turn in reciting ten suras and repeated the process a couple of times over. There were a few minor pronunciation errors in some of our suras so we

57 Tajweed is an Arabic word meaning to improve. In the context of the Qur’an, it means reciting the Qur’an correctly, in manner so done by the Prophet Muhammad.

199 corrected each others mistakes. Then some of us went to read the Qur’an, some went to read Faza’il-e-Ama’l, and some offered more nafl salaat. Once we finished our Tablighi ama’ls, we took a break for approximately an hour.

At 1:15P.M., the call for Dhuhr salaat was made and we all gathered for the prayer. After the salaat a bayaan followed. This time the bayaan was delivered by a different member who was allocated the task the previous night during the mushawara. Again the bayaan revolved around “six points.” There were a few new faces during the bayaan. At the end of the bayaan, there was a short tashkeel. It did not attract any new members, however, old members expressed their intention to spend more time in khuruj in due time. This is quite common because in the Tablighi ethos making an intention to go in the path of Allah is as good as literally doing so. Then with a du’a the session ended.

We waited for approximately ten minutes and the lunch was ready. In the manner breakfast was served and eaten, the lunch was served. Its content, however, was different. Lunch was lam curry, , and Lebanese bread. For drinking water was served in the bowl. Lunch was prepared by the “khidmah brothers” in the kitchen on the lower ground level of the mosque.

A short talk on “six points” followed lunch after which we had a mushawara. In the mushawara members were allocated tasks for the remainder of the day, three groups for afternoon jolah were formed (each group had three members – an amir, a guide, and a speaker), and virtues of mushawara, etiquette of jolah, and rules of ghusul (religious bath), wudu, and salaat were discussed. Mushawara concluded with a short du’a.

By now it was nearly 4:00P.M. and everyone went to their bedding to take a rest. At 5:30 the amir woke everyone up to prepare for Asr salaat. We performed our prayer at 6:30P.M. The person who delivered the noon bayaan gave a brief bayaan again after the Asr salaat, a brief tashkeel followed, and then a du’a concluded the session.

200 One member stayed back at the mosque engaged in tasbih and the rest of us went on jolah in our respective groups. I was the guide of my jolah. Before leaving the mosque the amir offered a brief du’a outside the mosque and then walking on the right hand side of the road, our gaze down, we went to invite some local Muslims to the bayaan scheduled to commence after the Maghrib salaat.

The mosque had a list of names and addresses of some local Muslims and we chose four names from it. The addresses are usually not to far from the mosque, perhaps half an hour walk at the most. Our first stop was at a factory worker’s home but after knocking on the door of his house we realized no one was at home. We proceeded to the next stop which was two streets away at an accountant’s home. The male member was out so we left the message with his wife for him to join us for the evening bayaan. The next stop was about ten minutes walk to another accountant’s home. He was at home. He invited us in and offered us a cup of tea. The speaker mentioned the purpose of our visit and politely raised the issue of religion with him. We spent about ten minutes there. The accountant was receptive to the speaker’s message and he promised to visit us at the mosque in the evening. From there we proceeded to a natural therapist’s home which was ten minutes away. The natural therapist was home but was in a process of preparing to leave for the airport as he was flying out on an overseas trip to Malaysia that night. Without taking too much of his time, the speaker stated the purpose of our visit which he appreciated and assured us that he would be obliging the next time. We then left straight for the mosque from there and by the time we arrived at the mosque it was almost time for Maghrib salaat. This concluded the jolah.

Maghrib salaat was shortly after 8:00P.M. After the salaat, the bayaan began. It was delivered by a different khuruj member. Again, the bayaan revolved on the “six points” but only this time it was long, full of details and examples. The gathering was relatively large. After the bayaan, there was half an hour of tashkeel during when approximately sixteen new faces volunteered to go on khuruj in the next four weeks. With a brief du’a this session concluded.

201 It was dinner time now and we all gathered at the kitchen for dinner. It was served and eaten in same previous two occasions. The content was beef mince, vegetable salad, Lebanese bread, and bowls of water. There were also some fruits for desert.

After finishing eating our dinner and the “khidmah brothers” finished cleaning up, everyone took a short rest. Then it was time for Isha salaat which was at 10:00P.M. After the salaat, there was a short bayaan delivered by the amir. Then there was a tashkeel and three local Muslims offered to go on khuruj. This session finished with a du’a.

The above is a description of events for one whole day. These events rarely if ever change making each khuruj day a replica of the previous day.

On Sunday, after the du’a at the end of Isha salaat, everyone collected their belongings and bags and gathered at the main entrance of the mosque ready to go home. Saying goodbye to each other, one-by-one we left for home.

8.3. MUSHAWARA Organizing any type of social activity or group work always requires the coordination of various elements and khuruj is no exception. As illustrated earlier, khuruj is not only an important Tablighi concept but a practical activity that constitutes the Tablighi Jamaat’s life-line. Organizing and ensuring the proper operation of khuruj can be a daunting task let alone organizing the activities of the entire movement which has in access one million members and is present in over one hundred and sixty five countries. According to Muhammad Ilyas and the Tablighi teaching, the best way to make the task of organizing the khuruj manageable and easy is for the relevant members to hold a mushawara. In fact, the Tablighi teaching encourages mushawara in any human affair because it permits the parties involved to interact and communicate directly and in a consultative manner.

202 Here I want to look at the process of mushawara58 that takes place on every Wednesday evening in a musallah at Rydalmere, a suburb North West of Sydney, after the Isha salaat during winter and after Maghrib salaat in summer. Although this mushawara is set in a specific context, what we can learn from it are its rules, etiquette and method of application which are universal.

At the Rydalmere musallah, the Sydney amir of the Tablighi Jamaat convenes the meeting accompanied by his seven deputies of seven Tablighi zones59 and some ordinary Tablighi members. There are approximately thirty men present in the mushawara on a given day.

The mushawara begins with someone, usually nominated by the amir, delivering a bayaan on the importance and etiquette of mushawara. In this connection, an example of a bayaan on the concept of mushawara, which I participated in, will suffice. Thus:

Respected elders and dear brothers,

It is because of the will and mercy of Allah that we are gathered here for the purpose of mushawara. Mushawara is a very great thing and is loved by Allah. It’s purpose is to arouse concern in ourselves about din and this work. We should make all our decisions either in the context of tabligh or in personal and family affairs with a mushawara because decisions taken in mushawara have Allah’s blessing in them. Mushawara is the way of our Prophet and His Companions. Mushawara has many shifa’at - remedy - for the and for the ummah. It brings us together, makes us humble and respectful, and helps us appreciate each others opinions.

Mushawara is like a honeycomb. The bees gather nectar from different flowers to make honey. They work together towards a common goal of producing honey. The honey, that is so sweet and has so many medicinal benefits, is the result of a cooperative effort. Such a thing like honey comes after great effort and cooperation.

Mushawara, like a honeycomb, requires the cooperation of everyone. Everyone should put effort to make the mushawara successful. It should be done with every body’s full cooperation. Everyone is entitled to his opinion. Opinion should be sought from the right hand side of the circle starting with the amir or the person next to him. Opinions should be put forward in a polite and humble manner and if your opinion is not accepted, you should not get upset. You should accept this with dignity as Allah’s will. If your opinion is accepted, you should not consider it as a superior opinion but one approved by Allah and so you should thank Allah. If we show each other respect and discuss matters

58 Mushawara is a common practise among Tablighis because it has inherent positive qualities and can be done any time or at any place as long as its operating rules are observed. 59 For the sake of convenient coordination of the members and Tablighi work in Sydney, Sydney’s geography is divided into seven zones.

203 in the way our Prophet used to do, then, Inshah Allah, the decisions we will make in mushawara will have good outcome (Attended the mushawara at Rydalmere Musallah on 10th April, 2002).

Ordinarily, after the bayaan on mushawara, the amir puts numerous sets of issues before the forum for consideration. All the issues are discussed and resolved in the same manner. The amir asks the members for their opinion on each issue by going around the room and based on the opinion of the majority, resolves the issue. There are, however, occasions when members are divided on certain issues and then it just takes longer and involves negotiation and compromise before decisions are reached.

The first set of issues are routine matters relating to the Friday evening gathering at the Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba and they are as follows:

(i) nominations for the speakers60 for the bayaan on Friday evening and Saturday morning, and another speaker for the hidayah bayaan61,

(ii) the nominations for the Aylaan makers62,

(iii) the nominations for the enlisters or team of recruiters,

(iv) the nominations for taleem conductors, particularly in Arabic and English languages after the Maghrib salaat on Friday , and

(v) a report by the amir of the tashkeel team regarding the dispatching of three day jamaats on the previous week and any arrivals or departures of inter-state and overseas jamaats.

Once the routine issues are resolved, the amir then gives the amirs of the seven zones or their representatives the opportunity to report on Tablighi work in their local areas.

60 Speakers for the bayaan are Tablighis who have been on khuruj to Tablighi headquarters in New Delhi for four months. This is the common criterion used to determine the speaker for the bayaan. So any Tablighi who has been on a four month khuruj to New Delhi can be the speaker. 61 Speaker for hidayah bayaan can be a senior Tablighi who knows the rituals of khuruj and has spent a lot of time on khuruj but may have never been to the Tablighi headquarters for a four month khuruj. 62 These are Tablighis who make an announcement to the gathering to stay back after the ritual prayer and participate in the bayaan. It is essentially an announcement to inform the people in the gathering that Tablighi work will take place at the masjid (mosque).

204 Subsequently, the person responsible63 for karguzari64 gives a report on the returning of forty-day and four-month jamaats to Sydney.

After these items have been addressed, the members then get the opportunity to raise and discuss more general yet relevant issues. Once all issues are addressed, the mushawara concludes with a du’a. There is no time limit for the mushawara, however, usually it goes for an hour and hour or hour and a half. During the mushawara the members are patient and courteous towards each other and despite occasional differences of opinions on issues, the mushawara on the whole is an inspirational and rewarding process. Due to this, everyone departs with good will and good wishes and meet again on the weekly gathering on Friday evening at the Imam Ali Mosque in Lakemba.

8.4. THE ONGOING IMPORTANCE OF SELF-FASHIONING: THE THREE CASE STUDIES

8.4.1. Case Study One Aref Ali65 is a thirty-six-year old Kuwaiti born Muslim. He migrated to Australia nine years ago and is currently living in Bankstown. Aref Ali works as a Customer Service Officer in the service industry. He is married for the second time and has a young son from his current marriage. His normal attire consists of a long sleeve shirt and a pair of trousers. However, during khuruj he wears either kameez (long baggy shirt) and shalwar (baggy trousers) or a jubbah (a flowing Arab robe). He speaks softly and has a polite manner.

Aref Ali recounted his joining the Tablighi Jamaat:

63 Usually it is a senior Tablighi. The task mainly contains the recording of which jamaats went where and when they are returning so that their experiences can be shared which is often revealed by the amir of the area where the jamaat originated from. 64 Prior to dispatching a forty-day and four-month jamaats, an experienced member deliver’s a special bayaan which entails the basic instructions of the Tablighi work. Also when a jamaat returns, again an experienced member gives a yapasi bayaan which entails encouraging the members to remain steadfast to Islamic rituals and implement in their daily lives what they learnt during the khuruj. Basically it is done to stop the members from backsliding. 65 This name is fictitious to maintain confidentiality.

205

A Muslim brother originally from invited me to join a Muslim gathering in Melbourne for three days. Well … he came to my house one day and said that we are gonna die some day. What preparations have I made for the life in the Hereafter. We will take with us nothing except our deeds. The things we work so hard for, the good and bad things in life, all will remain here. Our family will bury us and come back home. We gonna stay in the kabr with our deeds. So our deeds in general will stay in the kabr. For the good deeds, our kabr is gonna be like a garden of but if our work is not good in this world and we have a lot of bad deeds, then our kabr is gonna be one of hell fire. So that’s why I was ready to go. I said Al-Hamdulillah, I am ready. So we went there. There I said I will go on khuruj.

This is a good illustration of the simple face-to-face approach of recruiting members to the Tablighi Jamaat. It reveals that Tablighis not only engage in proselytization during khuruj but whenever the opportunity presents itself. It also demonstrates that an appeal to emotion is used to arouse religious consciousness. By positing this world as ephemeral and a testing ground which everyone one day will abandon, the Tablighis makes direct appeal to the “heart.” Life is portrayed as a series of bad fortune, struggles, and counter- productive (bound for hell) when religion is placed after material values but blissful in both worlds - here and in the Hereafter - when Islam is embraced in its entirety as a mode of existence. Naturally, then, wisdom is in seeking bliss in this world and Hereafter by embarking on a preaching tour to first reform oneself and then invite people towards righteousness and preventing them from doing evil. To gain bliss in both worlds, it becomes essential to do tabligh (preach) as Aref Ali explains:

It’s the duty of every Muslim to remind each other about din and Tablighi Jamaat is doing exactly this. So, everyone should do tabligh, remind each other one way or another about this world which will disappear one day. Remind about Allah’s . Remind that by doing tabligh that life here and in the Hereafter will be great. At the moment this world is in chaos. So tabligh, which is preaching to do good things and avoiding bad things, is very important.

Thus, to glorify Allah and His religion, khuruj becomes the vehicle, a means to an end - a blissful end. Khuruj requires conviction and commitment and these are not achieved overnight. It is a long and arduous process. Aref Ali says:

It was actually December 1992. I didn’t go on khuruj straight away. I was working and brothers used to come to my house and say please come with us for khuruj, for staying overnight on Friday at the mosque. So I started going to the mosque. One brother from used to come and pick me up and he was making a lot of effort on me and giving me advice to go to the mosque on Friday and

206 stay overnight. Consequently I started to go on khuruj for a couple of days – Saturday and Sunday, on and off. Not consistently. I didn’t go on khuruj for probably four months or six months and then I started again. I wasn’t 100% in the beginning. It took some time for me.

Embarking on khuruj starts with basic human interaction and communication and the application of fundamental Islamic values in the pattern of everyday living. It starts with the familiarization with and implementation of basic human activities – conversing, interacting, and socializing. This soon becomes the foundation upon which one’s future Tablighi activities and inter-relationship rests.

The application of Islamic principles and values facilitate the change process but the changes are initially psychological and social and not necessarily spiritual. Individuals learn ways of socializing and behaving which are consistent with the broader social norms of the movement and religious values. These are important and necessary changes which are required to create an environment in which self-reformation is made possible and easy to sustain. These changes essentially make in-roads for self-reformation and for gaining higher spiritual conviction.

“Self”, therefore, is an important entity. There is a mutual dependency between “self” and social environment. Individuals are not separate from or independent of the social environment and vice-a-versa. The Tablighi Jamaat, therefore, seeks to create a social environment in which the Tablighis can nurture the “self”. In other words, the Tablighi Jamaat creates a haven in which Muslims can retreat. A social world constituted for sustaining a particular self.

Thus, instead of targeting society for change or social reform, the Tablighi Jamaat, focuses on the individual as the agent of change. The individual, therefore, is imbued with deep faith in Allah and is made aware that change and only occur with the invocation of Allah. Thus, by applying these values and practices, Aref Ali says:

207 I have changed. Before, for example, I used to ignore my salaat, watch movies and do usual stuff people do in Australia. My father tells me that I have changed. My religious life has increased. My mother wants to wear the veil – hijab. Even she wants to change. My ex-wife said, “you know, every time you come from khuruj, your face is full of noor and you are very patient and forgiving”. So khuruj is great. I love khuruj … go on khuruj as much as I can.

Generally, my life is a happier one. The Tablighi Jamaat through khuruj has made me appreciate life not material things. I mean I need material things for sure but not as much as I thought I did before. What I really need is a good relationship with my family and friends and the people and happiness in my heart. This can not be bought. I get all these by being a humble servant to Allah, by working for His din. The purpose of my life is not to have money, to have Allah’s blessing. Being good to Allah means good life in this world and good life when we die.

By the way, not only me but khuruj has made other people change too. In Australia I have seen, for example, a lot of drug addicts and gangsters becoming involved in the religion because of the Tablighi Jamaat. They left the bad things and they don’t do bad things … they pray. The Tablighi Jamaat has provided the environment for the people to have more self-respect, something that’s not found in wider Australia. There are a lot of misbehaving teenagers and dysfunctional and dismantled families. A lot of broken families in Australia. Tablighi Jamaat has a lot of good affect on them. Of course Tablighi Jamaat is not enough. There is more needed. Tablighi Jamaat is only the call for sacrifice and learning the basics. It is just a starting point. In this way the Tablighi Jamaat is very important.

Why Tablighi Jamaat is very important because anybody who wants to fix themselves can do so. Like one of the elders said, don’t say you are Tablighi, say you are people who fix themselves. We fix ourselves. If you want to fix yourself, you go on khuruj, you go with the Tablighi Jamaat. It means fixing yourself in terms of, say, if you are arrogant, become less arrogant … overcome your pride. If you are not patient, become more patient. If you are materialist and live materialistic way, you become less materialistic or probably become not materialistic at all. Of course everybody needs these qualities plus we can learn communication skills, skills, goal setting, discipline … discipline is the fountain of greatness. We learn discipline, we learn order, we learn consultation, we learn everything that life needs. We need each other. Everyone needs each other. So we learn discipline and communication. We learn to live in harmony.

Those who join the Tablighi Jamaat sooner or later change and adopt a more spiritual outlook on life. This spiritual awakening plays a pivotal role in the change process of “self” particularly in one’s quest for becoming a Tablighi – which has a distinct identity. The transition sought here is a departure from the profane to the sacred. In this pursuit one re-makes “self” and at the same time facilitates the making of a Muslim brotherhood which embodies a patterned religious rituals and an identity. But is there any social benefit of khuruj? According to Aref Ali:

Going on khuruj creates unity … love among the brothers. We get to do things together … prayer, dhikr, eating, sleeping, and talking. Khuruj gives you the chance to be with your brothers, with your own people who understand you and your religion, and it creates a very friendly environment. You learn the virtues and the values of having certain good qualities. You learn to be good Muslim. You learn to practice your religion. You learn to understand your role in this world. You learn the true meaning of life. You learn how to live a happy life. You learn who you are. …tabligh is working

208 for God. It is the work of believers. With this work … Allah is going to put blessing in your life … in your neighbourhood. There will be less crime, the relationship between your wife and children will improve and if already good then it will become better. Everyone will love each other. We will become a group of loving people. If some body is in hardship, everybody will help. This is the aim of the Tablighi Jamaat and the spirit of khuruj.

In terms of on-going importance of self-reformation, the Tablighi Jamaat employs khuruj as a means to an end. The end is to produce good practicing Muslims for their salvation from terrestrial jahiliyah and ultimately their place in heaven could be secured. In the process of re-making Muslims if some social benefits are produced then it is applauded but this is never intended. The focus is always on the individual and in the process of self-reformation the individual self becomes the single most important entity.

8.4.2. Case Study Two Abdul Kareem66 is a thirty-three-year old Somalian who migrated to Australia twelve years ago. He resides in a rental apartment in the Sydney suburb of Rooty Hill with his wife and four children. Abdul Kareem works as a Pharmacy Assistant on a part-time basis and also holds a second job as a cleaner which is also on a part-time basis. He is a born Muslim who has a beard and always wears either kameez and shalwar or a jubbah. He is well spoken and courteous.

Abdul Kareem recalls his first encounter with the Tablighi Jamaat saying:

I used to do my salaat and I was committed to Islam in a way but not in the Tablighi way. One day, the brothers approached me in the mosque where I used to occasionally go for prayer and started talking to me about akhirah and Allah … this encouraged me. Then the brothers approached me at home and reminded me to come to the mosque regularly. I started going to the mosque … after my salaat used to listen to the bayaan. The talks … about the relationship with Allah and about the day of judgment. The talks were never about worldly things or materialism or politics. Yet, all this time I thought I needed to make lot of money. I was working twelve-hour shifts. I thought making money had advantages but there were only disadvantages such as tiredness, lethargy … I was nervous … worried about everything. There was no regular and serious practice of din … no time for my family and kids. There was no practice of din but just the salaat. I was busy with the material world and that was the biggest disadvantage. Doing nothing with friends and family. I thought I was doing something really good but this wasn't true because there was a lot of stress.

66 This name is fictitious to maintain confidentiality.

209 Abdul Kareem’s encouragement and inspiration to rise above the threshold of material living are the manifestations of the common approach Tablighis take in their attempts to recruit new members. What we saw in the previous case study is repeated here. Life is essentially sacralised to evoke spiritual elevation and the temporary bliss of this life is weighed against the eternal bliss in the life Hereafter. The complex and dynamic nature of mundane life which is symptomatic of contemporary modern secular living is compressed into a simple dichotomy between ephemeral here (dunya) and eternal Hereafter (akhirah).

Dunya is conceptualized as an embodiment of material things which can be literally consumed and enjoyed but apparently material things are only limited in their contents and temporary in their existence. Pursuit for dunya, therefore, is fine as long as it is merely for basic existence and not perceived as an end in itself but rather a means to an end.

The Tablighi Jamaat doesn’t denounce this world. It admits this world as real but not eternal. Like religious movements in other such as Christianity, the Tablighi Jamaat conceives of the world as temporary where life is in transit only awaiting eternal life and eternal world in the Hereafter. From the Tablighi perspective, endeavours towards worldly pursuits should be less, much less, than that towards the cause of Islam, for Islam teaches the values of both worlds but emphasizes akhirah because it is eternal.

Therefore, dunya is merely the trajectory for the akhirah where life will be eternally harsh and painful or eternally blissful depending on how one behaved in this world. Inculcation of this understanding, which distinguishes Islamic spiritualism from materialism, is integral to the face-to-face recruiting approach as well as in the Tablighi lifestyle. In terms of recruitment of new members and imparting Islamic message, the distinction made between Islamic spiritualism and capitalist materialism plays an important role. It permits the members or potential members to realize the nature of the

210 lifestyle and the changes needed to improve oneself and ones immediate environment. Abdul Kareem sheds some light on this:

Once I understood the talk, my whole life changed. The Maghrib and Isha salaats became my regular prayers at the mosque and I also regularly began to listen to the bayaan. After about six months, I started going for the itikaf on Friday evenings at the Imam Ali Mosque. After one year, I went on khuruj for three days for the first time. The first time I went on khuruj it was a new experience. Khuruj for me was something new. I never had any experience like that before. Something I haven't done before. It was a good thing though. You get to sleep in the mosque, which is worship. You are not engaged in worldly things. It makes you want to come the next time for itikaf. The initial feeling was that … didn't fit in with my life but I knew deep inside it was something I had to do. Therefore, I welcomed it… . See, when the person is busy with worldly things, shaytan wants you to keep being busy because it keeps you away from din. That is his job. But you can do both. A lot of Tablighi Jamaat members have business and they still have the time to do Tablighi work. The business goes on and very well too. I wasn't aware of the Tablighi Jamaat before, so I was open to listening. I was really happy. It straightaway came to my mind that these people are really good people. They wanted us to be good. So I finished my forty-day khuruj in February this year just locally in Australia and I have been on a number of ten day khuruj already. I do my three days a month khuruj regularly. I do my two jolahs and will keep doing my forty day khuruj.

However, even though for Abdul this is the right path to a fulfilling existence, embarking on preaching tours has been a slow and gradual process. His experience resonates with that of Anwar’s and many other Tablighis where the initial commitment to tabligh is sporadic and haphazard but only intensifies over time.

This is not surprising because it is a widely known sociological fact that personal or social transformation is not an event but a process (Giddens, 1991a). Transformation takes time. There are multiple factors involved in the transformation process and it takes time for a proper and full coordination of these factors to occur.

In this way going on khuruj is about embarking on a journey of transformation – transformation of the “self”. But khuruj is not only about self-transformation, it is also about influencing the family and friend. Abdul Kareem describes how the Tablighi Jamaat through khuruj makes the change in the individual self and the immediate environment possible:

211 Before my life was not much focused on din … now I can feel the benefits of change. Before I didn't know much about the Qur’an. Now I do. I do my two jolahs. I plan my work. I always accumulate my holidays or do extra hours so that I can go on khuruj. Whatever I do for din now, l can see the benefits. I feel that I am a proper Muslim now. My life is based on Islam. I can fit din with my work and worldly things at the same time. I have two part-time jobs and I earn less than before, but this gives me so much confidence and I can manage a lot of things. I can manage my family, work, and din too. Before, I was on one direction … spending twelve hours per day working. Tablighi work takes your worries of this world away and gives you so much pleasure and happiness. My family is so happy now. This work makes my family so happy. Al-Hamdulillah, this work gives satisfaction in life. It’s something you have to do - do the Tablighi work. Tablighi work is to rectify yourself. You don't have to worry about anything else but to make yourself a right person. Tabligh is the you can get self-confidence and the content of heart today especially in Australia. Australia is not a Muslim country so we have to create a Muslim environment ourselves. Tablighi work gives us that atmosphere.

This work has also given a lot of benefits to my family. For example, whatever I used to do before, when I compare it to now, present is better. I feel happier and good inside. The whole family is praying more, reading Qur'an and hadith more and learning more. We practice more now. Now when I go out of my house for khuruj, I feel I am doing good for everyone and I come back home safely. We are properly shaped in life now.

Also, there are a lot of benefits from this work for everyone … especially this work … you become close to Allah … important benefit is that it corrects the self and it leads you to your creator - Allah. Another thing is that it leads you to base your life on the lives of the Prophet Mohammad and His companions. You realize whatever happens in your life comes from Allah and you accept that. This work allows you to live the life Allah has asked you to live.

Today Muslims have a bad name because Muslims lack Islamic understanding themselves. Tablighi way or the din will save a lot of Muslims and non-Muslims because Islam teaches to live peacefully together and not harm anyone. The religion doesn't allow anyone to harm others. Tablighi Jamaat is to revive all the good Islamic things. To show … good things, to show non- Muslims … Islam is the best way.

Khuruj plays an important role in identity construction and bringing Muslims together into a brotherhood. Muslims from different ethnic, cultural, and employment backgrounds come together as one to serve the religion of Islam and thus they create a sense of belonging through shared values and mutual respect and find practical guidance according to Islamic precepts. By focusing on the fundamentals of Islam and on self- reformation, individuals find that the Tablighi work has direct impact on them. Instead of going through the mainstream channels, which can prove expensive and cumbersome, for self-improvement and , Tablighi Jamaat provides a free and easy alternative through khuruj. In Australia, for example, accessing self-development programs, Islamic education, and culturally appropriate socializing venues in mainstream society for Muslims can prove both an expensive and a daunting experience. Importantly,

212 Muslim community services are often based on ethnicity and membership which raises obstacles for Muslims to access them. These resources can be found in the Tablighi Jamaat as Abdul Kareem observes:

This work plays an important role everywhere. They, the Tablighi brothers, unite the people and make everyone become good and one. There is a lot of respect … sharing and caring going on all the time. In Australia, a lot of people are in a lot of trouble - human problems - and this work helps solve them. If the Muslim people practice their full din there will be actually benefit for all Muslims and every human being. We are one … all Muslims are one … no difference. We have one Qur’an and one Prophet Muhammad, so one religion for all Muslim … so all Muslims are one. That is why we need tabligh … Tablighi Jamaat helps us find a common ground … of course this is through khuruj.

The khuruj completely changes your life - the way you live. It helps you to live according to din. The work teaches you to live a simple life. The work tells you not to be greedy. It tells you to be a generous person and have faith in your Allah. Be a good character person. Your well-being, both in this world and Hereafter depends on the practice of your din. The din is … living together as Muslims … it is … upholding Allah’s revelation and the teaching of Prophet Muhammad.

8.4.3. Case Study Three Muhammad Aadil67 is sixty six years old and lives in the Sydney suburb of Marrickville with his wife and two sons. He was born in Sicily in Italy and over thirty years ago migrated to Australia. His wife is a Fiji-Indian Muslim who is also an immigrant. Muhammad Aadil converted to Islam before he married his wife. He was a carpenter by profession but now is retired and only does occasional odd jobs here and there. Muhammad Aadil owns his house in Marrickville and has performed hajj twice. He wears a beard and a jubbah. Muhammad Aadil is politely spoken with a gentle demeanour.

Muhammad Aadil recounts his first encounter with the Tablighi Jamaat by saying:

Over ten years ago when I was going to the mosque … so some brothers reminded me that this world will finish one day … we need to prepare for life after death. It was actually when brothers began talking in this way and raised the issue of inviting others to the mosque … I started to pay attention. I was already in the environment … praying and so on. I was already going to the mosque. So, they made sense and I started taking part slowly. I felt it was a necessity to call people towards the din. People who are our Muslim brothers … fifteen odd years ago … not many of them were practicing din. There wasn’t much response from the Muslim people for tabligh work. Therefore, it is our responsibility to talk to people about din and about the tabligh work. The Prophet Muhammad

67 This name is fictitious to maintain confidentiality.

213 and his companions did this work. We forget things and neglect things … so we need to be reminded. So I said to myself that we should do this sort of work. We all should go to the mosque and talk about din and iman. Strange thing is that you do this … spontaneously. This is what happened to me. The love I have for the brothers was what pushed me to do this work. I felt good working with the brothers. It was like a social work. So I was happy. Actually I found tabligh work very easy because I was, though new, already familiar with the mosque environment and some of the brothers … and everyone helped too. We were very united … we had a very good sense of communication … were well amalgamated.

Muhammad Aadil’s experience regarding his introduction to the Tablighi Jamaat is similar to the experiences of the gentlemen of the previous two case studies and seem to follow the general trend of recruitment into the Tablighi Jamaat. His situation is a testimony to the fact that the face-to-face approach for new recruits has a common emotive tendency and the potential recruits are drawn to the ideology of the Tablighi Jamaat through the arousal of individual conscience and spirituality. The potential recruits are presented with the realities of the two worlds and this world is weighed against the akhirah through the assertions of the Qur’an and hadith.

This world in which we live is construed as materialistic and limiting both in its contents and existence and life in it is perceived as under constant threat from the (Satan). To give life a true sense of purpose and acquire Allah’s blessing for a blissful life in the Hereafter, Muslims are reminded to stand alert and guard themselves against the attacks of Iblis. Seeking Allah’s constant guidance and blessing through spiritual commitment and total submission to His will are seen as ways of gaining guarantee of His protection, here and in the Hereafter. For this purpose one is encouraged to embark on khuruj to learn and implement Islamic precepts and at the same time do good and prevent the forbidden. Thus, Muhammad Aadil explains that:

For me khuruj is always a great experience. I feel by doing this work I will … learn and benefit. I feel I need to do this work for myself to set example for others. You go on the path of Allah talking and discussing about things that are important … You learn …. It makes you want to learn more. Encourages you to want to learn more. Personally, I feel jealous when I hear people recite Qur’an so nicely and I can’t. I wish I was like them or better. It challenges you to learn more by going on khuruj.

In terms of personal change and self-reformation, Muhammad Aadil remarks that:

214 In my personal experience, it has encouraged and pushed me to pray regularly, take part in bayaans, and do taleem regularly. It has affected me personally by encouraging me to spend time in the path of Allah in general. I am spending time in learning din. It has made me a better Muslim. It has helped me in every which way. I have been on four months khuruj twice and forty day khuruj twice as well. I go on my three day khuruj regularly. I do my khuruj regularly, especially the three days a month one.

The Tablighi Jamaat brings Tablighis together into a distinct social group. As a mobile Islamic educational institution, the Tablighi Jamaat doesn’t discriminate against Muslims weather they be a Hanafi, a Shafii, a , a or even an Ahl e-hadith. With the accentuation of Islamic norms as patterning Muslim’s behaviour through institutionalization of Islamic values which the individual Tablighis internalize, the socio- economic and ethnic boundaries, which separate Muslims in the broader structure of the global setting, are diminished. This, we have been made aware of in these three case studies, particular in the Australian context. By eating together, tolerating personal differences, and collectively feeling the experience of khuruj, creates a sense of togetherness, a sense of belonging and oneness. All this is to inspire change. Muslims are encouraged to join the movement for self-reformation and spiritual elevation. In pursuit of this, the Tablighis discover the movement to be more than a training ground for acquiring and implementing basic Islamic rituals. As a social group, the movement helps the Tablighis establish new bonds or reinforce old ones through regular meeting and sharing of a sense of identity and belonging. Muhammad Aadil explains:

Tablighi Jamaat as a religious movement, particularly in Australian, has great importance ... it is important because we are living in a non-Muslim country. Therefore, if we are not going to work … din will not be here. We all will astray. It is essential to do this work … set good example … lay the foundation where it’s needed the most – in a non-Muslim country. It is also essential for those who are invited to this work … they can learn about din which otherwise is not always possible for them.

This work creates the opportunity to talk to people … . In doing this, there is reward in this world and in Hereafter. So the more I talk to others about din the more I need to learn and I learn from the Tablighi work in order to do more tabligh work. There are social benefits … people improve and change in a positive way. It is also beneficial for your ownself … people who know you doing this work … respect you including the neighbours … particularly the non-Muslims. We are able to get together … share things and ideas… We create a bond between each other … we become a team. Amongst us we are very friendly so we invite each other to our social functions and help each other, for example, repairing a friend’s house or whatever help one needs and one can give. This is from Tablighi work where you have a social network going on all the time. We are all brothers … all Muslims.

215 The three case studies highlight the significance of face-to-face preaching tours for the revival of Islam. They show people often join the Tablighi Jamaat for self-reformation based on their dissatisfaction with what they often refer to as “material life or material world”. A dissatisfaction of this nature is sociologically interesting. It is interesting because it occurs in the context of migration and immigrant culture which themselves are materialistic68 – a product of modernity. To put it another way, here are people who migrated to Australia in pursuit of better material life but ended up pursuing a more religious life because of what modernity promised them – happiness and – they found its antithesis in Islam.

Another important point to make is that the case studies show that through the pursuit of self-reformation, spiritual awakening, and ultimately good life here and in the Hereafter, a sense of Muslim brotherhood is achieved. In the context of migration this is important because mainstream Australian culture often marginalises migrants from meaningful social, economic, and political participation. A brotherhood characterized by collective ritual practices, shared values, mutual understanding and tolerance, and collective identity, then provides an alternative.

On another level, the brotherhood is an important part of seeking nearness to Allah in that not only good and the best are desired for individual self but, in fact, for everyone who constitute the brotherhood. In other words, “self” transcends the individual ego into the “conscience collective.” The entire membership of the Tablighi Jamaat then becomes the focus of concern for every Tablighi. This concern provides the basis of their solidarity and holds the Tablighis together, particularly in an environment like Australia where social, economic, and political currents are not always flowing in favour of immigrants but quite often against them. This solidarity is not demonstrated anywhere else as saliently as during khuruj.

68 What I mean by materialistic is that migrants largely move to another country not necessarily in pursuit of spirituality or increased religiosity but to acquire a better material existence.

216 SECTION TWO: DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

8.5. THE TABLIGHI IDEOLOGY The Tablighi ideology centres on the relationship between the faithful and Allah. Its central claim is that nothing is as important and worthwhile as establishing and then cherishing this relationship. Bryan Turner (1974), focusing on this type of unique relationship, presents an analysis in which he contends that the actor’s claim about the relationship with the supernatural is a really serious enterprise. The sociological description of the actor’s personal world need to embody the actor’s understanding of his or her social world – the external environment. Taking the actor’s own interpretation of reality as a vital step in the explanation of action, a sociologist may want to seek an understanding as to how social actors communicate with beings who are invisible or who, according to ordinary logic, do not exist. This will, hence, lead sociologists to take God as a social actor culturally constituted and transformed into something that may be described as a supernatural being.

All of life, according to the Tablighi ideology, rests on this relationship without which life is hollow, void of purpose and meaning, and is ultimately self-destructive. In making that claim, the faithful tenaciously embrace the notion that life can be oriented towards and made to conform with Allah’s commands. The faithful then, seeks Allah’s praise, approval, and guidance based on the fulfilment of a prescribed composite of routines and rituals. Thus, the communion between a Tablighi and Allah is like that of the “self” and the environment that exists in any social relationship in the material world. George Mead (1934: 138-140) offers an analysis which describes self as reflexive and which can be subject as well as object. The self enters into the experience of the self through the process of social conduct or activity when the individual mobilizes himself or herself into the same experiential field as that of the other individual selves in relation to whom he or she acts in a particular social setting. An individual enters his or her own experience as a self or organism, not by becoming a subject to himself or herself but he or she initially becomes an object to oneself very much like other individuals who are objects to one’s experience. The individual becomes an object to oneself by the virtue of accepting the attitudes of other individuals towards oneself within a social environment in which both

217 the parties are participants. When an individual responses to that which he or she addresses to another and that response in turn becomes embodied in his or her conduct that behaviour emerges in which the individuals or organisms become objects to themselves. Therefore, the self, an object to itself, is primarily a social structure which emerges in social experience.

In this sense, the connection between the faithful and Allah is socially relational. In other words, the interrelationship and interaction between the Tablighi and Allah have a social dimension. This means, what George Mead (1934) describes in general terms, as individuals becoming self-conscious about their relations to the whole social process of experience and behaviour. This is a modern view of the self – a return to the Qur’an but based on a modern self. The Tablighi Jamaat or the Tablighis may not see it in this way, however, this is not an illogical way of describing what may be called the “Tablighi self”. Experiencing Allah is as much part of this process as experiencing another individual or other individuals. In other words:

It is by means of reflexiveness – the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself – that the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it; it is by such means, which enable the individual to take the attitude of the other toward himself, that the individual is able consciously to adjust himself to that process (Mead, 1934: 134).

Thus, the relation between the Tablighi and Allah is embedded in a certain common socio-physiological basis, which in itself is social.

How a Tablighi achieves this is through his or her initiation into the movement and subsequently into the Tablighi routines and rituals through which he or she learns about Allah, gets to know about His omniscience and omnipotence, and ultimately through pure concentration and conviction feels Allah’s presence. The summons for tabligh could be explained as an invitation to join the Tablighi Jamaat and participate in its routines and rituals to practice the faith in the omnipresence of Allah who is always with the faithful. Furthermore, the claim orders the faithful to comply with the commands of Allah in

218 practice so that he or she can get a real sense of Allah’s being and might, understand His attributes manifested in nature and in human beings, and come to truly appreciate Him.

Let me offer an example of an empirical experience of an ordinary Tablighi here to gain an insight into this point.

Ayub Razak69 from Sydney explains how he received Allah’s mercy and help when his wife of over twenty years asked for a divorce and demanded that he abandon their home. He had nowhere to go:

I found myself in a terrible situation. I was homeless and lonely. I was lost. I could not seek the help of my relatives or friends because I was embarrassed as well as concerned about being rejected. I was depressed. I became desperate. I finally turned to Almighty Allah. I bowed before Him in my prayer and just cried. I wept. I begged for His mercy and help. I prayed and prayed. In my prayers I would tell Allah that I was in a state of total desperation and despair and He had to do something for me. I would tell Him that besides Him I have no one to turn to. Each time when I would conclude my prayer, I would find myself very calm and content. My desperation and despair would disappear. Finally, Allah made me come to terms with my situation and I was alright.

In the past Ayub Razak did not seek Allah’s help in the manner he did during his personal tragedy. This was because he often assumed that Allah only answers the prayers of those who are pious. This did not mean that Ayub Razak never prayed. In fact he offered his prayers regularly as a minimum fulfilment of his religious obligation. The only difference this time was that he saw prayer in a more intense light. This time the prayer, for Ayub Razak, was seen more than merely a ritual. He saw it as a real means to an end and started using it in this way. Suddenly, for Ayub Razak, the prayer had a whole new meaning. For him, prayer entailed not just a ritual but a means of communication with Allah through which he established a special bond with Him – a bond of friendship. Thus, a prayer came to hold a very distinct meaning. As a means of communication with the supernatural, prayer became, in Meads words:

not communication in the sense of the cluck of the hen to the chickens, or the bark of a wolf to the pack, or the lowing of a cow, but communication in the sense of significant symbols, communication which is directed not only to others but also to the individual himself (1934: 139).

69 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Ayub Razak on 25th May, 2002 at Artamon Mosque.

219

In this way, Ayub Razak befriended Allah and as I once heard a senior Tablighi saying “When the Creator of all creations is your friend then you obviously have no worries in the world. He will always look after you”.

However, Ayub Razak admits that despite this bond with Allah, any kind of tragedy can still strike him. His faith informs him that tragedy occurs for two possible reasons. One reason is that tragedy is a punishment from Allah for any wrong-doing and he quotes from the Qur’an “Whatever misfortune happens to you, is because of the things your hands have wrought, and for many (of them) He grants forgiveness” (Qur’an, 42: 30), to reinforce his faith. Another reason is that it is a test of faith. In either case, according to Ayub Razak, Allah is never unjust or unfair and whatever hardship or tragedy befalls human beings has purpose and reason whether we understand about it or not. In an ordinary religious context this may be considered as fate. Ayub Razak sees Allah in a very distinct light and describes his experience of Allah as a “lived” experience70 beyond verbal expression or explication. In other words, it is an experience, from Troeltsch’s (1931) Church-Sect perspective, of an individualistic asceticism as a means of discovering God. Ayub Razak’s assertion of Allah as a “lived” experience, therefore, from this perspective denotes that Allah is discovered through what Troeltsch describes as inward struggle and self-purification. The experience of Allah can wither away, however, if one becomes neglectful of his or her religious obligations. To experience Allah or divinity, Muslims have to constantly fulfil their religious obligations and remain connected with Allah through their regular practice of religion.71 Going out in khuruj, therefore, re-ignites their fading faith and brings them back into the company of Allah or godliness. It is a way of remaining connected with Allah and in a state of Islam divorced from what Maududi calls jahiliyah.

70 “Lived” experience in a religious sense means that Allah acts in the lives of human beings.

71What Ayub Razak is referring to is the behavioural pattern of the Tablighis, which is quintessentially social because as human organisms or individuals, they seek for the stimuli in the attitudes and characters of other forms, in this case Allah, for the fulfilment of their own responses, and by their behaviour tends to maintain the other – Allah – as a part of their own environment.

220

For the Tablighi Jamaat, what constitutes a Muslim first and foremost and therefore the focus of attention is the individual’s entire being. The actual material being or material “self” of the Muslim is the real site where faith is constituted and cultivated.72 This is why the movement remains disengaged from activities that under the rubric of Islam striving towards constituting a Muslim through remolding the external environment based on power. A Tablighi, therefore, doesn’t consider the engagement in state-building or the struggle for state power a worthwhile project. Why? Muhammad Ilyas addresses this question very early in the development of the Tablighi Jamaat. What he said during his living years also resonates with Tablighis today:

when you (Muslims) are not able to defend and maintain Allah’s commands in your own individual being and in your life (for which you are sovereign and face no barriers), then how could the task of governing the affairs of the world be entrusted to you? Allah’s purpose to hand over the affairs of state to the community of the faithful is to implement in the world the will and commands of Allah. When you are not practising it within your limited prerogative, then with what hope could the guardianship of the world be delegated to you? (Naumani, n.d.: 20).

There are three potential problems with Ilyas’s assertion here. First is that not all Muslims are in the same boat. There are many Muslims who are pious and physically, intellectually, and emotionally committed to the teachings of Islam and fulfilling the commands of Allah. Second is that if the Muslim focus is turned inwardly onto the self then the external environment will be largely ignored threatening the collapse of the social, economic, and political structures upon which the society rests. Third is that Islam is a complete way of life and the turning of Muslims inwardly undermines the social principles of the ummah and at the same time ignores many key aspects of religion namely the economy and politics.

72 According to the behavioural science (Mahoney, 1974), the material being or material “self” is an environment in its own right with which we become familiar at very early age in life. The familiarity with our material being lasts until we die. Whilst it is possible that we may have less or no control over the environment external to us - the broad socio-economic and political environment - we definitely have direct and enormous control over our own material being which we can train and discipline in a particular way, should we choose to, to meet specific needs or desires. Thus, Tablighis find it logical and feasible to reform individual self – the material “self” – because as an environment individuals have jurisdiction or in Foucaultdian terms, governance over the material “me” to the extent that he or she doesn’t have over the broader external environment.

221 The sociological implications of turning Muslims inwardly into the “self” as a process of reviving Islam renders, in the Tablighi context, Islamic revivalism as an individual project. This is in stark contrast, for example, to Maududi’s (1991, 1986) sociology of Islam as a comprehensive way of life and a holistic system where Islamic revivalism is conceptualized as a social or collective project leading to the establishment of the caliphate and the eradication of jahiliyah.

The basic response of the Tablighis to Maududi’s sociology is that the fulfilment of the commands of Allah is not dependent on whether Muslims are a minority or a majority community or socio-economic and political conditions are propitious or not or whether there exists an Islamic state or not. The way the community can be rejuvenated and society can be Islamically reformed, therefore, is through tabligh and not necessarily through the enhancement of power.73 This explains why the Tablighi Jamaat does not consider the distinction between dar al-harb and dar al-Islam important and asserts that all circumstantial barriers to tabligh are passable. In other words, Muslims can have a perfect relationship with Allah and pursue a life based on Islamic precepts anywhere and at any time. The issue of the distinction between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb is a political one and according to Tablighi ethos Islamic way of life does not necessarily have to be dependent on politics. Politics may be useful and even important but not necessary. What is necessary is the awareness of the existence of God at all times and in all places. This is precisely what Niebuhr (1929) means when he attributes this kind of religious attitude to sects and argues that sects take on a firm and literalistic theology and built into their ideology is a puritanical ethic which underscores self-discipline. Similarly, being aware of God’s omnipotence and omnipresence, for Weber (1930), is also a strict discipline of an asceticist sect which in comparison to the Church as an institution, therefore, is extremely religious.

This is why the main objective of the Tablighi Jamaat is not to aspire to remake or utopianize the world by rearranging the prevailing socio-economic and political institutions or even the society at large but to recreate individuals into faithful Muslims so

73 This point will be explored in detail later on under the sub-heading Tabligh.

222 that they can directly render prescribed services to Allah in this world and thus secure ultimate reward in the Hereafter. The individual reformation is not considered as a means of societal change leading to the ultimate creation of a utopian Islamic society. On the contrary, given the movement’s aim is to reform the individuals by making them better Muslims or more observant of their faith, the focus of the Tablighi Jamaat is on directing Muslims towards embracing a thorough going practice of Islam into everyday life, a sphere as individuals they have greatest control over. The larger external world over which individuals have much less control is left in the hands of Allah. Dawud Hassan74 provides the following advice to Tablighis:

We are interested in making ourselves better Muslims, which is the main focus. The world is too big and complicated. We have no control over it. But we have control over ourselves. By performing our regular prayers and doing all the good deeds we can make ourselves better Muslims. We want Allah to forgive our sins. We want to do tabligh because it has rewards for us. There is no desire for worldly things. The focus is on how we can secure, by doing good deeds and pleasing Allah, a good akhirah. Money, status, and power will not accompany us in the grave so why strive for them? Ama’l, the good deeds, will accompany us and if you have a lot of them than you are rich here in this world but most importantly in the Hereafter. Little things that we can do for ourselves are more important than doing big things like trying to change the world. Allah is the creator of the world and He knows best how to look after it. What will we do by changing the world any way when we are committing sins left, right, and centre.

Hence, by only focusing on the dimension of life over which individuals have direct and greater control and leaving other dimensions of life such as social, economic, and political to be administered by Allah directly through His own power and might, the Tablighi Jamaat is able to protect itself from the failings experienced by the larger world.

Thus, according to the Tablighi teaching, life has a single purpose which is to propagate the message of Allah to humanity, not politicking. This is precisely why the Tablighi Jamaat rejects political activism and opts for individual preaching and moral reform. It rejects politics for the sake of moral values and principles – to the Tablighis, the essence of Islam found during the life time of the Prophet Muhammad – thereby insisting on the separation of religion and the state. The Tablighi Jamaat accepts the political

74 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Dawud Hassan at Sefton Mosque on 29th September, 2002.

223 manifestation of secularism as a necessary evil to be tolerated in an attempt to achieve immediate personal religious goal and in the long run a broader social objective.

In contrast to Maududi’s Jamaat-i Islami which insist on the union of religion and state with the purpose of creating a modern form of Islamic government, the Tablighi Jamaat strive for the recreation of Islamic social order and the refashioning of modernity from within the modern milieu albeit passively and indirectly. In other words, Tablighis seek to change the world through setting “good” examples for the entire humanity so that the world is transformed from what Weber (1966: 167) calls “a natural vessel of sin” to a vessel of spiritualism.

This, however, is not done in an organized and strategic fashion but as the result or consequence of tabligh and the Tablighis’ socialization within the broader socio- economic, cultural, and political processes of the society in which they live as ordinary citizens. Tablighis do not seek to live as Islamic revivalists set apart from the realm of the modernity but very much within it. For instance, Tablighis do own cars, have refrigerators at home, carry mobile phones, attend universities, and even practice what may be called Western medicine and law. Moreover, Tablighis vote in national elections of their countries, they interact with the bureaucracy and key socio-economic, cultural, and political institutions in their societies, they work for a living whilst some as ordinary workers others either as professionals or experts, and still some as business operators. Like other members of the society, Tablighis also participate in the broader process of socialization as normal part of pursing life. They participate in and experience modern living in much the same way as the general population of the society in which they live.

Tablighi Jamaat thrives on itinerancy, and like , views politics as a “dirty game” or corrupting. Thus, it only seeks a revival of personal morality through adherence to the fundamental principles of Islam and the promotion of communal links and services to maintain an Islamic society among its members.

224 The Tablighi Jamaat tolerates a secular government or state so that it can create an Islamic social order independent of state support, thus allowing it to maintain a focus on personal salvation. This pragmatic response enhances their survival as practising Muslims in avowedly secular societies such as Australia, Britain, France, Germany, India, and the USA. Broadly speaking, the Tablighi practices depoliticize religious activists and serve to weaken institutional or politically inspired religious efforts (Ahmad, 1991). The Tablighi Jamaat is an authentic transnational Islamic revivalist movement, postulating the authority of the preacher - the Tablighi - over that of the ulama but not unlike the evangelical Protestant response to secularism.

Many Tablighis believe that because Muslims still live in the state of jahiliyah and do not have the necessary character or religious awareness or insight political engagement is a fruitless enterprise. They argue that perhaps if Muslims build their good character, align their conduct with a prophetic pattern of behaviour, and pursue din not dunya, political engagement will be rendered unimportant and thus undesirable. The spreading of the message of Allah or engaging in tabligh is a life-changing experience according to Tablighis and if life can be changed through tabligh or political disengagement, then tabligh, in this way, is obviously rendered powerful. The tabligh itself becomes power or the source of power, thus its indispensability and Muslim engagement in it. It governs and guides the propagatory processes and leads to the transformation of the “self”.

8.6. TABLIGH Tabligh is an Arabic word which means to convey, to make known or to reach out. In the context of Islam, tabligh denotes the spreading of the message of Allah or a call towards Him. The Qur’an declares, “You are the best of peoples evolved for mankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong and believing in Allah” (Qur’an, 3: 110). Hence, tabligh is an obligatory duty and an act of virtue. Muslims, by virtue of their declaration of the oneness of Allah, are naturally obliged not only to submit themselves to the Will of Allah but invite others to submit to the Will of Allah. As one of the tenets of Islam, tabligh is a form of proselytizing encouraged by the Prophet Muhammad.

225 A point needs to be made before proceeding any further. The fact of the matter is that according to Muslim practice and Islamic history, there have been many paths to greater religiosity and spirituality. For instance, some Muslims seek spirituality and religiosity by offering regular prayers, fasting in the month of Ramadan, giving alms, performing hajj. Some Muslims take an ascetic path such as Sufism and seek greater spirituality and religiosity by renouncing the world. Some seek the same by attending the congregation prayer on Friday and observing the Islamic dietary rules. In each case a Muslim considers himself or herself as a “good Muslim” and that is what matters to them.

This then makes sense when the Tablighis talk about the concept of tabligh as having a dual dimension. According to the Tablighis, there are two sides to tabligh. On the one hand, tabligh denotes doing good deeds yourself by observing all the obligatory religious rituals such as salaat and fasting and avoiding what is described and declared by Islam as wicked. In this sense, tabligh – the call towards Allah – is focused on the self. On the other hand, tabligh denotes inviting others towards righteousness and preventing them from what is forbidden by Islam such as indulging in manifestly false worship, transgressing religious boundaries, and neglecting obligatory duties. Therefore, for example, it is as much an act of tabligh to respond to the call of ritual prayer or remind oneself the unity of Allah by reciting the shahadah over and over again or refusing a bribe as is to call a Muslim to a congregational prayer or prevent a Muslim from dealing in usury or settling a dispute between two Muslim brothers or inviting a non-Muslim towards Allah. This is what’s meant by al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar (enjoining the good and preventing the forbidden). Thus, tabligh is a dichotomy of internalization and externalization of fundamental and obligatory rituals of Islam. It is an act in which good is internalized and then exhibited externally in the preaching of the teachings of Islam for the benefit of oneself as well as others.

Furthermore, tabligh can be categorized into two distinct types. The first type of tabligh is fard ‘ayn75 and the second type is fard al-kifayah76. Fard ‘ayn tabligh is when the

75 Fard ‘ayn means “an individual responsibility” which is incumbent on every believer.

226 believers are not taking on the responsibilities for al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al-nahy an al- munkar. If a believer happens to be in a particular locale, for example, and al-amr bi-al- maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar is neglected there, then tabligh becomes fard ‘ayn for that particular believer in that particular locale. However, if al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al- nahy an al-munkar is a norm in a particular locale, then tabligh becomes fard al-kifayah and if a believer resolves to engage in tabligh alone then he or she may do so with a reward for such engagement being equivalent to the fulfilment of only a sunnah not a fard77. Hence, tabligh, to be either fard ‘ayn or fard al-kifayah depends on the circumstances and conditions of a particular place in a given time and therefore is a relative issue.

Given that the entire world is currently steeped in jahiliyah and da‘is (preachers) are in short supply, from the Tablighi Jamaat perspective, tabligh has become fard ‘ayn in time and space. Individualism, secularism, capitalism, socialism, and communism are some of the symptoms of jahiliyah. Jahiliyah is the root cause of uprootedness, disenchantment, and disintegration in the world, particularly in the Muslim world. The Tablighi Jamaat maintains that given the state of both the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds today, tabligh has become a responsibility incumbent upon every Muslim. The Tablighi Jamaat claims that whoever has attested to the shahadah need to engage in the spreading of the message of Allah according to their own ability and strength. They must not deter from convey Allah’s message or become dependent on others to do it.

The Tabligh Jamaat claim that the enemies78 of Allah are united together in solidarity and are cooperating with one another to undermine Islam. Certain manifestations of this cooperation are the popularization and implementation of the ideologies of secularism, modernism, and scientism. Therefore, it is necessary for Muslims to fight back. However, Muslims today are weak in almost every aspect of life because they have split into many

76Fard al-kifayah means “a collective duty” which if fulfilled by enough believers than the rest are freed from the obligation. 77 In Islam performing an act of fard has more reward than the performance of an act of sunnah by the virtue of the fact that fard is an obligation and sunnah is important but not obligatory. 78 Enemies are the non-Muslims.

227 sects and groups, lost their power and wealth, and succumbed to the enemy’s worldly charms79and slipped into the darkness.80

According to the Tablighis, the state of jahiliyah cannot be allowed to continue because Muslims as well as non-Muslims who are caught in it will be destroyed. People have to be brought out of this darkness and the true din has to be established. Through tabligh, those in the darkness have to be brought out into the light, those immersed in ignorance have to be given knowledge, and those being disobedient have to be taught obedience. Din has to be revived. This is the purpose of tabligh.

Hafeez Ahmad81 sheds some light on what is meant by tabligh, what is its purpose in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat and therefore how the concept of tabligh can be understood in the broader context of Islamic revivalism:

Tabligh is a very important religious duty and is very easy to do. Tabligh is not a rocket science. Tabligh is conveying the Truth straight with no involvement of philosophy or politics. Just revealing what is in the scripture. For example, the scripture says that we have to fast in the month of Ramadan so we say this. Tabligh is nothing but al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar. For example, to say As-salamu Alaykum to your Muslim brother is tabligh. So, see how easy it is. We need to be engaged in continuous and serious tabligh. We have put din below dunya and as a result brought about ignorance. We have allowed ourselves to be charmed by ideologies such as socialism, nationalism, and secularism and processes such as modernisation and urbanisation and not by the Truth. Allah is the Truth. Islam is the Truth. Muhammad is the Truth. Tabligh is conveying this Truth to the fellow Muslims first and foremost then to the rest of the world.

There is another dimension to tabligh which Rafan Amin82 explains:

For me, tabligh brings peace and calmness to my heart because in my heart I feel I am doing a great work. I feel there is - blessing - in my life and I know, Insha Allah, my sins will be pardoned by Allah. Allah will forgive all our sins by doing tabligh. This is His promise. This is the work of the nabis. I will have to do this until my last breath. This is my work and responsibility as a Muslim.

Tabligh is a great thing. It’s about working to overcome ignorance. The true teachings of Islam comes out through tabligh in which you will find the benefit for dunya and akhirah. Doing tabligh

79 Worldly charms refers to secular and materialistic pursuit of life. 80 State of jahiliyah. 81 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Hafeez Ahmad at Ashfield Musallah on 25th August, 2002. 82 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Rafan Amin at Redfern Mosque on 17th February, 2002.

228 keeps you on the right path. It is good for you and for others. Inviting people towards Allah is the purpose of life. Allah created nabis for this work and because there will be no more messengers coming this ummah is responsible for tabligh. If you don't do this work then you will be lost. You will not know who you are. You will be lost and din will disappear.

Doing tabligh gives me enormous satisfaction and thus removes my desire for worldly things. The peace and satisfaction I get from doing tabligh, I cannot get a fraction of it from chasing after the dunya. Let me put it to you this way: I believe that, it is mentioned in the hadith by Abu Dawud, for every dollar we spend in the path of Allah, He increases it to seven hundred thousand dollars. Of course we don’t see the reward straight away. Part of it we get in this world but the rest we will get in the Hereafter. Same applies when we make physical sacrifice in the path of Allah, we are and we will be heavily rewarded. Each physical sacrifice is worth seven hundred thousand points. You do the sum your self. Tabligh has affected my family. Allah has given hidayah, you know guidance, to my wife and daughters. Insha Allah He will give hidayah to my descendents too. Tabligh has benefits to the future generations you know. I see it not only as a great thing to do but see it as my obligation as a responsible Muslim to encourage human being towards righteousness.

I see tabligh as a tool for promoting Islam. Everyone is running after dunya today as if it is going to last forever or come handy in the akhirah. This is ignorance. Tabligh is necessary through which we as da‘is are able to show the greatness of din to others and teach them what will matter the most in the end. Tabligh is the only way of removing ignorance in this world and by saving others we will save ourselves and vice a versa.

Tabligh is a key tool in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat in particular and in the context of Islamic revivalism in terms of returning to the basics of Islam, in general. As revealed in the interviews, the world is seen to be sunk deep in what Maududi famously calls jahiliyah and it has to be replaced with din by individual effort83. Individual Muslims have to take their religious obligations seriously especially at a time like this because the state of global jahiliyah has rendered tabligh what I discussed earlier as fard ‘ayn. In this precarious global climate tabligh is no longer merely a concept but a concept with practical applicability. It has become a means to an end.

From the perspective of Maududian Islamic Revivalism tabligh stands out to be a very useful concept as well as practical tool in confronting and then eradicating jahiliyah. Maududi (1986) argues that jahiliyah has come to pervade the world through increase in Muslim impiety, religious adulteration, and neglect of religious duties. Of course outside factors are also responsible but Maududi says that if Muslims held their Islamic position firmly all along, jahiliyah would have not found an easy and clear trajectory. However, now that jahiliyah is here it needs to be eradicated.

83 Why by individual effort because Muslims lack both unity and resources. The situation is such that the only way to approach it, at least for time being, is at an individual level.

229

In his Islamic Revivalism, therefore, Maududi finds a special role for tabligh - as a means to an end. In this framework, the Tablighis are the means and the end is Islam – peace. Tabligh or what Maududi calls dawah (preaching) finds a practical role in the eradication of jahiliyah (1986). Its role becomes one from being merely a concept to one as an instrument for delivering message against jahiliyah. Consequently, in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat, tabligh finds a practical expression in the khuruj.

8.7. KHURUJ Khuruj is a dynamic process and is the “engine” that drives the Tablighi Jamaat. Khuruj has three key rituals – taleem, jolah, and bayaan. In essence, khuruj can be described as an institutionalized form of worship in which efforts are harnessed to move closer to Allah through spiritual enlightenment and abandoning material pursuit of peace and happiness. khuruj is about reforming oneself as well as others. The aim of khuruj is to form a group and embark on a preaching tour, for a set time – three days or forty days or four months – to learn din in order to reform oneself and then help others embrace din in their lives. At a time when human living is globally dictated by the imperatives of material capitalism, it is therefore particularly important to exit84 from this form of living for a short while and engage in pure spirituralism85. The purpose of khuruj is simple and straightforward. It is to invite, towards the Right Path, those who have become engrossed in the world of materialism and consequently given no thought to or made preparation for the life in the Hereafter. The principal purpose of khuruj is to remind the wrong-doing and negligent Muslims that preparation should be made for a life awaiting in the Hereafter. The best preparation is not in the security of material existence but in the accumulation of good deeds. These are any engagement in the service of Allah and the best way they can be earned and multiplied is by leaving the loved ones and the familiar pattern of everyday living behind and making sacrifice and spending ones hard earnings in the path of Allah.

84 Suspend worldly engagements. 85 Time devoted to the service of Allah and His true religion.

230 In this regards the Qur’an says:

My prayers and my sacrifices, and my living and my dying are for God alone, the Lord of all the worlds. No partner has He. Thus I have been commanded, and I am foremost among those who surrender [themselves unto Him] (Qur’an, 6:163-4).

In terms of the contemporary conditions and state of Muslims, khuruj provides a kind of spiritual retreat during when one finds not only peace and serenity but a sense of closeness to Allah. As Barbara Metcalf (1994: 709) notes, “the tour [khuruj] is meant to represent a radical break with all enmeshments, including the intense face-to-face hierarchies of family and work typical for most people”. In the everyday hustle and bustle of material life spiritual connection with Allah is made problematic and khuruj permits an outlet. Instead of seeking serenity and relaxation in mainstream activities such as sports, weekend away, and entertainment which often proves to be expensive ventures, khuruj for the Tablighis acts as a substitute or alternative. It is equivalent to what O’Dea (1966) describes as a retreat from the secular world by the members of a sect. Faiz Deen86 offers his view as a Tablighi on khuruj:

One of the biggest realizations for me was that these days we more often talk about tension and stress in our lives than about Allah and din because our focus is on material things. This can be fixed only by adopting this simple lifestyle taught by the Tablighi Jamaat. The tension is experienced because we are trying to achieve more and more material things and they are in limited supply. We are fighting over it, cheating over it, and doing corruption over it. These are all bad and evil things. Concerning ourselves with material things instead of Allah and the sunnah causes anxiety and tension. If we concern ourselves with Allah the tension will reduce or even disappear. Allah will fulfill all our needs from gayb – from invisibility. I came to learn all these by going on khuruj. Khuruj makes me non-materialistic and happy. People go on holiday to find peace but for me I find it in going on khuruj.

Bassam Mahmoud87 reiterates:

I get a lot of pleasure going out in the path of Allah. Definitely. It gives me a good feeling - positive feeling. I have become a practicing Muslim. I am now praying in the masjid. I am passing the message to my family … encourage them to practice Islam more … direct them towards the way of

86 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Faiz Deen at Gladesville Musallah on 25th October, 2002. 87 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Bassam Mahmoud at Capsie Musallah on 28th December, 2002.

231 our Prophet. In doing this I feel happy. Khuruj is very important … I find . I feel happy when I am just involved in the path of Allah.

Importantly, khuruj is a mobile means of training and learning through which one seeks the withdrawal from matters of controversy and mundane activities and devoting time and effort in the exaltation of Allah and His sovereignty. Thus, learning and expressing respect, showing tolerance, communicating in gentle and persuasive way, using simple and polite language, behaving like a true Muslim - as a faithful slave to Allah - and persistently observing the shariah are some of the achievements of going out on khuruj. In the guise of the composure, disposition, and objectives of pristine Islamic community, the khuruj transports the participants from the everyday rhythm of contemporary life into what Bassam Mahmoud, a Tablighi, described as “the realm of Allah and His din”.

The concept of khuruj transcends its ordinary conceptualization as a missionary tour into a unique phenomenon which unites ethnically and parochially separate individuals into a large jamaat of worshippers of Allah and brings Muslims from different socio-economic, cultural, and political backgrounds, who eat, sleep, and pray for the sheer pleasure of Allah, together. Breaking down the human barriers ordinarily based on ethnicity, culture, possession of material wealth, and prestige, khuruj allows the making of an ideal Muslim through the re-construction of basic human relations as Bassam Mahmoud exlpains:

You learn from each other. You get benefit from meeting other people during khuruj, people from different cultural backgrounds. You learn one hadith from someone and that is great. Meeting or mingling helps gain knowledge. Like you go for hajj where people from every where come together. Its multicultural, its brotherhood, its unity. You feel like a community. Everyone comes with same fikr - concerns, with same niyah - intention, and with same aim to do the same thing together, that is, to become good God-fearing Muslims.

With a practical and a grass-roots approach to reform, khuruj stands as a unique feature of Tablighi Jamaat. This approach takes Muslims away from what may be described as their familiar environment, or simply home to a more pristine and spiritual life experience. Overpowering Muslim inter-dependence and Muslim reliance on material possession, khuruj helps Muslims achieve a unique bond with their Creator on a more spiritual and intimate level. This unique bond, which requires concentration and devotion,

232 is not readily achieved in an ordinary environment in which circumstances and conditions are essentially driven towards material pursuit of happiness. Khuruj, therefore, provides an environment in which doing good deeds are made easier and potentially habitualized and ultimately helps the participants achieve the bond with their Creator. Barbara Metcalf explains by saying, “At the simplest and most explicit level, travel, [khuruj] like a retreat, allow for focused worship and attention to spiritual life and obligations” (1994: 709). This bond is important because in it is a promise and a way to secure entry into heaven – the ultimate place to be. This is the ultimate purpose of life and if Muslims can properly and fully understand the meaning and purpose of life in this world and consequently fulfill them, heaven becomes not only achievable but easily achievable. Like anything in life, initiative, effort, and commitment are required and if Muslims can do these and take up the challenge by going out in the path of Allah, they will succeed.

Apart from this, khuruj is quite popular among some sections of unmarried urban men and teenagers and seems to be a religious substitute for a variety of forms of youth culture. Talking about an Australian experience, Rahat Ayubi88 who is a single man himself and have been involved with the Tablighi work for five years says:

I have noticed that quite a lot of unmarried guys and teenagers come to listen to the bayaan at the on Friday nights. Some of them go on khuruj the next day. Six months ago my uncle took a sixteen year old kid from next door on khuruj with him. The kid loved it. Last month a first year university student went on khuruj for the third time with my father. Likewise, there are many cases. What I am trying to say is that young people are coming towards din. A lot of them are avoiding night out on the weekends and instead going to the mosque or on khuruj.

Hence, in the context of the Tablighi work, the mosque becomes more than just a place for worship and transforms into a meeting place functioning like a coffee shop, a bar, a club, or a cinema, Tablighi attire becomes an attractive substitute for Nike T-shirt and Jag jeans and discussions on topics like Traditions of the Prophet, the conduct of four pious caliphs, and the valor of early Muslims replace the popular discourse on computer games, movies, cars, and music. The common meals and conversation sittings are alternatives, and sometimes even the solutions for, chasing after girls, loitering, drug-taking, drinking,

88 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Rahat Ayubi at Artamon Mosque on 27th July, 2002.

233 and other group activities in which a number of bored and purposeless urban teenagers participate. Senior Tablighis see the positive change this produces in youths and encourage them to remain firmly attached to the mosque even after the khuruj. Some of the senior Tablighis even believe that the Tablighi Jamaat (through khuruj) provides a means for diminishing delinquency among lively young men and boys, particularly those who have completed school or graduated from university, or have no job. For some in this category of youth, participating in tabligh work may result in early marriage and could be seen as stopping such youths from committing sinful acts associated with open and promiscuous processes of Western secular youth socialization, by bestowing on Muslim youths marriage and family responsibilities.

Early socialization into the rhythms of Islamic way of living is seen by many Tablighis as a process whereby Muslim youths are directed away from participating in mainstream youth culture or socialization because it is perceived as generating social and moral conduct in youths that are in direct contrast to the teachings of Islam. Before the peer pressure or influence of the broader popular culture or socialization take strong hold on Muslim youths, the Tablighi Jamaat sees khuruj as a mechanism for early intervention, thus stopping that from happening. By inculcating Islamic values and practices and generating a strong sense of Muslimness very early in their lives, the Muslim youths are thus prepared to interact, later on, with the broader structures of Australian society through work or otherwise without fearing their loss of identity.

The effects of khuruj are enormous and brings about tremendous changes in its participants. It generates social processes and serves social functions. Khuruj serves social functions by bringing Tablighis together and providing a common ground on which the group solidarity rests. Islamic rituals such as salaat, taleem, and dhikr are the ways through which group solidarity is maintained and enhanced.

8.8. THE TABLIGHI WORLDVIEW AND ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

The Tablighi Jamaat holds a common orthodox view of the world which from the advent, success, and dominance of Islam up till now, has changed in a radical way. To put it in

234 Toenniesian language, the world has become transformed in which society has changed from gemeinschaft form of communities (a close-knit group of people with the same or similar values and cultural traditions who identify closely with each other) to gesellschaft form of society or from feudalism to capitalism (more materialistic, individualistic, dissimilar, and artificially formed industrial societies).

Emile Durkheim (1974) also talks about such a shift in the formation of societies, particularly in the last few hundred years. Durkheim describes gemeinschaft as a mechanical solidarity form of society and gesellschaft as an organic solidarity form of society. For Durkheim (1974), mechanical solidarity form of society is based on resemblances and the organic solidarity form of society is based on division of labour. As a form of society, mechanical solidarity is segmented, small in population, behaviour and conducts are governed by religion, and individualism is absent and the individual is subordinate to the collective whole with a collective conscience (conscience collective).

By contrast, organic solidarity is differential, has a high population, people are specialists who are dependent on each other, and are increasingly secular. Durkheim (1974) distinguished traditional society from modern society by portraying the latter as vast and complex. This shift is not just a shift from small to large forms of societies. In fact, it is more than that. It is a change involving different mode of thinking and relating to each other, new type of institutions and social organizations, and new way of understanding the relation between human beings and the nature. This shift towards large mass society is what is often called the process of rationalization of human relations, social institutions, and ways of thinking. In other words, a mass society based on non-religious principles and laws. In comparison to traditional society, modern one is described as complex, large, impersonal, and bureaucratic. Unlike traditional society whose basis rests on feelings of trust, obligation, and belonging, the modern society is held together by artificial rules, laws, and regulations that govern human behaviour and social relations.

235 In some definite ways, traditional societies were essentially religious. Tradition, myth, and religious beliefs were all part of the structure of day to day life in these societies. The way they explained reality, conceptualized their cosmology, and build their social systems were very much based on religion (De Vaus, 2002). As societies changed from small scale group to large mass group, accompanying this transformation has been the marginalization of religion. Religious modes of thinking are no longer pervasive and religion has been relegated away from the central position to the margins of social life. Religion has been rendered a personal affair and an individual’s public relationship with God has been de-legitimated.

The process by which this shift from a society is founded upon essentially religion and morality to a rational, modern, and secular mass society is known as secularization. Secularization, according to Bryan Wilson is “the process by which religious institutions, actions and consciousness, lose their social significance” (1982: 149). This, however, does not mean that people stop believing in their religion or cease to participate in religious rituals and activities, or that religion no longer plays an important role in one’s personal life. What it means is that religion ceases to play a significant if any part in structuring and organizing society. Instead of being a key player in the organization of society, as it once was in pre-industrial and pre-modern eras, religion in modern society plays no significant or active part (Wilson, 1982).

Hence, when religion no longer forms the basis of social order, when it is pushed towards the margins of social life, a secular society is produced. In this respect, modern society is secular. In modern secular society neither morality nor religion are the source of authority and instrumental decision-making89 reigns. Wilson explains this by saying that, “The large scale social system [capitalism] does not rely, or seek to rely, on a moral order, but rather wherever possible on a technical order … societal system relies less on people being good … and more on them being calculable” (1982: 161).

89 Instrumental decision-making is a process in which decisions and behaviour are premised on the calculation of cost-benefit analysis. In other words, what is beneficial is good and what is costly is not.

236 In other words, people in modern secular society are governed and motivated by material benefits or material inadequacies. It can be assumed, therefore, that people’s decisions and behaviour are instrumental and amoral.

Modern mass society is secular because religion is not the source of moral order or the basis for the social, economic, and political order. The “will of the gods” is no longer applied to legitimize power and personal gain is the norm requiring no further legitimation. The aim and purpose of life is not spiritual enlightenment or meeting the demands of a supernatural being for good life but the material pursuit of present happiness. Modern mass society functions through the efforts and initiatives of human individuals both individually and collectively. Through rational purposive actions and the utilisation of science and technology, the efforts and activities find meaning and efficacy permitting human beings to be in control of and shape their own lives. This naturally mitigates the need to be dependent on any outside force or power and thus human beings become masters of their own world. Wilson puts all this neatly together saying:

All one time functions of religion have declined in significance as human involvements have ceased to be primarily local, and as human associations have ceased to be communal. Industrial society needs no local gods, or local saints; no local nostrums, remedies or points of reference. … Personal gain is the common sense of modern life, needing no further legitimation, whilst material provision, not spiritual solace, is what society now offers the poor (1982: 159-60).

For the Tablighi Jamaat all this is problematic. First and foremost, it sees the world as being not in a state of peace and prosperity but in a state of self-service, bitter rivalry, and ungodliness – state of jahiliyah. What Toennies describes as a positive transformation of the society from gemeinschaft to gesellschaft or in Durkheimian formulation from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity, Tablighi Jamaat describes exclusively in negative terms. Tablighis suggests that such a transformation has produced a modern civilization upon which is based the entire current organization of the world which no longer has the uniting representation of people within society. The development and the spread of nation-states across the globe is a good example.

237

Tablighis, like Maududi, see the development of nation-states as the epitome of the modern civilization. However, Maududi (1979) is more critical, even ruthless, in his assessment of modern civilization describing it as morally bankrupt and devoid of virtue, humility, and nobility of spirit. The modern civilization, Tablighis suggest, is not like Islam in which sovereignty rests with God acting as the central unifying force. This political sovereignty unified under belief in God although existed only for a brief period in Islamic history it can be achieved again because Islamic history has shown that it is possible.

The modern world is ideologically as well as politically fragmentary and divided into many nation-states. These nation-states are based on different “man-made” sets of rules and regulations and have their own separate socio-cultural, economic, and political structures and separate geographical boundaries with the right to self-determination. Tablighis claim that given the fact that human beings are created by Allah and are not creators themselves, it is then only prudent and logical to base life on an already prescribed legal framework - shariah - rather than invent it which only leads humanity into inventing more rules and regulations which in turn constantly sets people against each other and draws them into disputes and conflicts.

Tablighis argue that while the notion of development is of central concern in the nation- state its focus is material improvement not spiritual development. It is the absence of connection between spiritual development and material improvement, argue Tablighis, that is the key source of all prevailing problems facing humanity today. Tablighis find support for their view in the sura: “Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves” (Qur’an, 13: 11). Thus, Tablighis suggest that social and material development is God’s work and His reward for spiritual improvement. Tablighis argue that the spiritual cultivation of good side of a person helps to create self-discipline against evil which has the benefit of contributing to a person’s wellbeing and social and material development of the community of believers - ummah - within which good is pursued and evil is forbidden.

238

Tablighis argue that when “peoples” or societies and states do not fit as one community guided by and governed under a single source of rules and regulations like the shariah, development is hampered and there emerges a potential crisis and challenge to the “unity” of the nation-state. The Tablighis argue that the boundaries of the nation-state and the “monopoly of force” within it, have been challenged over the years by sub-nationalist movements seeking self-determination. They oppose nationalism which they see as “evil” and a cause of division amongst people.

The Tablighi interpretation of nationalism resonates with Maududi’s description of nationalism, discussed earlier in chapter three, as a new shirk (polytheism) because nationalism substitutes the modern idol of the nation for Allah (Maududi 1979). Like Maududi, Tablighis argue that nationalism is used by many Muslim nationalists as the equivalent to ummah which should be reserved exclusively for the “community of believers”.

According to the Tablighis the social solidarity of the ummah, not of the nation-state, is their central focus. The ummah is analogous to internationalism, not nationalism, where the sense of identity is an important aspect but equally important for the preservation of the ummah are aspiration, loyalty, and devotion. Thus, for Tablighis as in Maududian sociology, nationalism is also perceived as a “man-made” and parasitic ideology because it is often difficult, even impossible, to identify a single characteristic common to all members of national society.

All this implies that the idea of religion has changed and people can make their own religion, which instead of reflecting the community spirit, reflects the individual’s own private quest for reality and what role should it play in his or her life. The things that have replaced traditional living or religion are now focused on the individual, on the self and the modern mass society has become a self-absorbed entity.

239 To change the situation and save the world from drifting further into the state of jahiliyah, the Tablighi Jamaat suggest that Islam has to be revived and re-established as a dominant global belief system. For the Tablighi Jamaat this is a desirable yet practically distant prospect and what is immediately achievable is the Islamic awakening among the Muslims themselves. With a return to the basics of Islam approach, the Tablighi Jamaat sees an immediate impact made on the process of reviving Islam. The philosophy that resonates with the Tablighi Jamaat here is that save yourself before saving others. Salvation can only reach to others if one is saved himself or herself. Therefore, Muslims themselves need to first and foremost enter totally into the fold of Islam and base their entire life on the Qur’an and the sunnah.

But what does the Tablighi Jamaat exactly mean by this? Does this mean an abandonment of the material world in what has been described as “world-rejecting new religion” (Wallis, 1984) or does it mean what I would like to call “inner-worldly attention”? “Inner-worldly attention” refers to the notion of “inward concerns” for the purpose of improving, reforming, and developing oneself in terms of Islamic practices and rituals. It draws on Weberian “inner-worldly asceticism” (1966) and Wallisian “world-accommodating new religion” (1984). The Tablighi Jamaat as a movement is neither inner-worldly asceticism nor world-accommodating new religion but an inner- worldly attention because it encourages living as part of the general community not outside of it but with an increased cautionary approach to terrestrial and materialistic affairs.

Total entry into the fold of Islam in the Tablighi Jamaat parlance doesn’t denote “world- rejecting new religion” but inner-worldly attention. Allah created the world and the Tablighi Jamaat, therefore, sees it as always deserving of human attention and respect despite its current jahili state brought about by none other than human beings themselves. Allah created the world for human living and use and by the virtue of this fact the material world remains essential for the pursuit of human living. The inner-worldly attention in terms of total entry into the fold of Islam in the context of the Tablighi

240 Jamaat denotes a cultivation and re-infusion of Islamic values and cultures in individual living and in one’s immediate – domestic and familial – environment. The broader outside world is not rejected but a cautionary approach to it is taken because it still remains part of the total embodiment of life.

8.9. INNER-WORLDLY ATTENTION The inner-worldly attention doesn’t mean the renunciation of life or activities or the world but renunciation of worldly desires and attachment to worldly actions. The approach to the broader outside world in inner-worldly attention is cautionary because the Tablighi Jamaat see the contemporary world as one which has departed remarkably from God’s directions. Human beings have abandoned God and spiritual living and in search for material satisfaction, have successfully polluted the world. The world has become a site for human conflict in which greed, exploitation, mistrust, and despair abound. Vice- ridden societies have emerged in which individuals treat one another with deep sense of use and as means rather than as ends. Importantly, the urban modern secular societies and their values, particularly the idea of individual success which is measured by material possessions, wealth, and the ability to actively participate in the consumer culture, are viewed as overly materialistic and essentially devoid of meaningful humanism and spirituality and in a serious need for a reorientation of secular life to God.

As much as all these are problematic at the level of social order, it is at the same time both a challenge and an opportunity for accumulating and securing virtuous deeds. The world, therefore, is presented to or confronted by the Tablighi as his or her responsibility. The Tablighi has the obligation to transform the world in Maududian sense which is in accordance with the Islamic ideals, in which case the Tablighi will become a rational reformer or a Maududian mujaddid (Maududi, 1999).

But social transformation is never actively and consciously sought but merely expected. After all, a typical Tablighi is never someone of conspicuous social engagement or driven towards the accomplishment of a rational rearrangement of the world order based on a systematic pattern of life for any external success. Wherever Tablighi work has produced

241 communal action, it has come about not by conscious design but largely as a consequence of the inspirational tabligh work or brotherly love or brotherhood. The idea of members of a religious group participating in rituals together and from which emerges, rather naturally, some form of communal action or solidarity can be seen happening in other religions and not unique to Islam. However, albeit unintended, the social consequences produced by group rituals and practices are inevitable. Weber makes this point in his analysis of the mystical notion of the Eastern Christian church:

[the] Christian brotherly love, when sufficiently strong and pure, must necessarily lead to unity in all things, even in dogmatic beliefs. … men who sufficiently love one another … will also think alike and, because of the very irrationality of their common feeling, act in a solidarity fashion which is pleasing to God (1966: 176).

The goal of the Tablighi Jamaat is personal reform and spiritual elevation not the rational transformation of the mundane order. Here then we can see the parallel between the Tablighi Jamaat and Troeltsch’s conceptualization of sect. The parallel is expressed in what the members of both the Tablighi Jamaat and the sect seek as the ultimate purpose of life. In both cases the members seek self-purification, inner struggle, and individualistic ascetic trance as a way of discovering God. Pursuit of reordering the social system is neither a desire nor objective in either of the group. The attitude of rejection in both cases, therefore, towards the mundane world and its material attractions, seem to create a sense of deep asceticism. This is fittingly summed up Tariq Talal90 who has been involved in the Tablighi work for twelve years:

Individuals are the foundation of society. So to fix the broken society, individuals need to be fixed first. Our work is not to change the society – this will automatically happen from our work – but to change our Muslim brothers who have strayed from the din. The society is in trouble because din has disappeared. For this, tabligh is needed … bring Muslims close to each other but most importantly close to Allah.

Hence, it follows that transforming society is dependent on reproducing reformed or better Muslims. The source of personal and social problems and sufferings, the Tablighi Jamaat claims, lies within oneself not in the social structure. Therefore, the individual

90 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Tariq Talal at Lakemba Musallah on 22nd February, 2003.

242 should take responsibility for social ills that pervade society and for transforming it. The Tablighi philosophy does teach that the responsibility lies with the individual. Instead of complaining about and despairing over the prevailing unfavourble conditions, individuals are encouraged to ponder over them and do their best in solving the problem. Hence, adopting the Tablighi lifestyle, which is simple and non-materialistic, is the best way of making a direct contribution towards social and environmental improvements. For instance, Tablighis use resources very scrupulously such as food, shelter, and clothing and during khuruj live on meagre provisions so that a disciplined consumption pattern can be achieved and subsequently incorporated into everyday living. In this regard Metcalf (1994: 715) comments:

Most important, the impact of self-financing shapes relations by eliminating the bonds of patron and dependent, minimizing the reciprocity and exchange true of so many dimensions of everyday social interaction. If Tablighis stay in a mosque, they are scrupulous about not using resources that are not theirs…. They implicitly stand apart from all the elaborate transactional arrangements that organize so much of [contemporary] societies. This scrupulosity in material goods is a central theme of one pattern of guidance given those leaving on a tour.

The underlying assumption, here, seems to be that once a large number of Muslims adopt the Tablighi lifestyle or when the Tablighis are a majority or when their guidance are widely sought or when they become consultants to institutional authorities or when they start to lead the populace by example, that a more simple, humane, and spiritual social order will emerge. The basis of this assumption is in the Tablighi belief that the world is ameliorable and the evidence of this is in the expectation of the arrival of the (). Ills and problems can be overcome and therefore the Tablighis do not cut themselves off from the world, which is in contrast with the Sufis who do. The Tablighis response to the world is one of inner-worldly attention, that is, that society can be transformed from within not through social and institutional reforms but through individual self-improvement and moral and spiritual renewal.

The movement’s primary conviction is that an Islamic society can only be produced when Muslims have entered fully into the fold of Islam. However, it would be wrong to suggest that this is an individualistic and self-centred attitude because, whilst it is true that the movement’s beliefs and the benefits of practice and ritual are inwardly oriented,

243 the form of Tablighi practices in worship and many rituals are inevitably collective in nature. Therefore, coming together as people of religion, the Tablighis form an exclusive group outside the world of the mainstream Muslims to meet this objective. They operate as part of Sunni Islam but as an exclusive group. In other words, their operation is outside the world of the mainstream Muslims. The Tablighi Jamaat can not raise the religious commitment of the average Muslim to its own level of religiosity unless they join the group.

The Tablighi Jamaat claims that it possesses the means of unlocking one’s physical, psychological, and spiritual potential without necessarily withdrawing from the world. The means that it does not require one to make any arduous advance preparation or observe an ascetic system or put the body through any rigorous test or even a methodical and extensive process of . All that is required is a brief break from the everyday rhythm of life to learn the basics of Islam and to unlearn those aspects of religious practice that have roots in ethnic tradition and parochial values and in Islamic culture. Tariq Talal explains:

We invite Muslims to learn the simple basics of our din. A few days, may be on the weekend, is all we ask as a starting point. This is to learn how to perform ghusul, how to do ablution, and how to pray properly. Also, learn how to interact with each other and learn what is halal and what is haram. If all these are in order, your foundation is set. Later on, slowing there will be a lot of opportunity to learn other stuff.

From the Tablighi perspective, whether the world as a whole constitutes a material milieu or a spiritual milieu in the context of the whole of life does not alter the fact that it constantly remains as an examination hall and during its jahili state what Weber calls “a natural vessel of sin” (1966: 167). Therefore, if life is still to be pursued in accordance with Islamic ideals, then the world, because it constitutes a vessel of sin, becomes a contest for the expression of the Islamic disposition and for the most rigorous jihad (struggle or holy war) against satanic acts or sins.

The world is a creation not a creator, therefore, any capitulation to its material virtues and temptations may disrupt, even undermine the concentration for and possession of the

244 ultimate virtue of salvation, and may be an indication of weak faith. However, the world as Allah’s creation, provides the only channel through which the Tablighi’s own religiosity or commitment to Allah may manifest itself by means of pious moral conduct, so that he or she may be able to understand the nature and content of his or her own state of grace.

Thus, delivering Allah’s command to fellow Muslims and earning a halal (permissible) livelihood from the world becomes the Tablighi’s vocation. As a result, it becomes a Tablighi’s vocation to be involved in halal economic activity91 which is possible even in a secular state like Australia where a Tablighi has numerous halal options to derive a livelihood from economic activity. If a Tablighi succeeds in deriving benefits from this economic engagement, he or she attributes the success to Allah. The success is construed as Allah’s blessing and mercy to His humble and faithful servant.

There are many aspects to inner-worldly attention which are important but three are worth mentioning here. Firstly, the prohibition by the Tablighi Jamaat on harbouring excessive emotional feeling towards family and friends in particular and fellow Muslims in general because it deifies the creation not the creator – Allah. Subsequently the deification of the creation pollutes the unique value Tablighis believe to be held in the divine gift of grace. This is why Tablighis avoid, for example, attending a wedding, a funeral, or the hospitalization of family or friends during khuruj. Fahim Khan92, a devout Tablighi, once said:

I have told my wife and my extended family that if I am in khuruj and our elderly mother passes away, do not recall me from my khuruj. I have even mentioned this to my mother. I have told everyone that mother’s burial should still take place without unnecessary delay and without me being there.

91 Halal economic activity would entail any activity within the economic system which does not breach the shariah. For example, driving taxi for a livelihood will be considered a halal economic activity but working within a banking system such as the Australian reserve bank would be considered haram economic activity because of the bank’s dealing in interest. In the context of the bank, the interest pollutes its entire activity. 92 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Fahim Khan at Green Valley Mosque on 24th November, 2002.

245 This same Tablighi revealed that in another instance he did not visit his younger brother in the hospital, who was at the time suffering from a life threatening illness, because he was on khuruj. This demonstrates that in relation to inner-worldly attention, emotions are shaped and channelled inwardly, that is, towards Allah. All human emotions are concentrated and directed towards Allah as a matter of priority. This, however, does not signify that Tablighis are emotionless towards their loved ones or fellow Muslims. On the contrary, they are very emotional towards their loved ones and towards fellow Muslims. However, the emotions here are controlled and only the most intense and pure emotions are channelled towards Allah for Allah as the creator of all things including human beings, deserves more than the mother, the father, the children, brothers and sisters, and the wife.

Secondly, the exercise of force. The Tablighi Jamaat prohibits the exercise of force towards an individual or people if it is based on revenge and emotion and is motivated by personal and egoistic satisfaction. Jihad in terms of defensive confrontation against an individual or people, however, is justified because defending oneself physically and psychologically is a virtuous deed. It is for this reason, it is always found that at mushawara, in the hidayah bayaan, and during jolah, emphasis is always being placed on tolerance and forgiveness and Tablighis are encouraged to interact and approach each other and people in general with an increased level of politeness, empathy, and placidity. The khuruj itself encourages and inculcates this. Fahim Khan again explains:

When I first went on khuruj, I really liked it because the brothers were humble and everybody treated everybody else with ikhlas and . If somebody made a mistake he would, like beg, please, please forgive me and he would be forgiven quickly. So this kind of attitude attracted me. They treat me nicely. The khuruj provided the environment in which we learned to become humble and patient. So, that’s what the whole world needs now. Muslims, , , everybody needs to be humble, needs to keep the arrogance, pressure, intimidation, bullying, and the pride out of our hearts, and to be more patient, forgiving, and loving.

Thirdly, the personal secular enjoyment of power. The Tablighi Jamaat prohibits it because it deifies the creation not Allah. However, a society whose legal system is fair and just and in Weberian terms “rational” is according to Tablighi ideology, religiously

246 acceptable since conforming to principles becomes a virtuous deed. As Bilal Galib93 who has been a Tablighi for six years explains:

Abiding by the codes of a legal system like that in Australia does not mean that this is a breach of the shariah. Australia is a liberal democracy. Its legal system allows us to exercise our rights – human rights which is universal. So there is justice, there is fairness … at least in principle. As Muslims, of course we don’t hold political power in Australia and our lives are not ruled by the shariah but we are free to practice our religion. Allah is not cross with that.

The Tablighi who lives an inner-worldly life is not an idealist but a rational realist not only in terms of a balanced patterning of his or her personal life but also in terms of his or her condemnation of material aestheticity, consumer culture, and everything Islamically considered irrational. The objective of the Tablighi always remains the consciousness of Allah’s omnipotent existence and a firm control over his or her pattern of life and behaviour, thus, for instance, offering five ritual prayers on time, doing regular taleem at home and at the mosque, and going on khuruj regularly – three days in a month; forty days in a year; and four months in once lifetime. This type of inner-worldly attention teaches the Tablighi the principle of sincere completion of religious obligations and the only way of proving righteousness within the larger structure of the world.

However, what may constitute salvation for an ordinary Muslim by fulfilling Allah’s command through the engagement in earning a halal living such as driving a truck, for a Tablighi this may not enter his or her consciousness as such because for him or her salvation is a subjective condition in which Allah is sought and found directly during salaat and dhikr not in the performance of what may be generally considered as “good work”. Thus, for the worship to succeed in achieving its purpose and goal, everyday mundane activity becomes a necessary prerequisite. In fact it becomes spiritual itself if carried out according to Qur’anic injunction or the sunnah. For example, doing tasbih travelling in the bus to work renders the travelling a religious exercise or sleeping, eating, even having with ones married partner in the manner of the sunnah deserves divine grace, therefore, becomes a virtuous religious deed. Hence, while performing actions a Tablighi thinks that he or she is doing everything for the sake of

93 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Bilal Galib at Green Valley Mosque on 24th November, 2002.

247 Allah alone, whether in praying, preaching, working, or sleeping. In fact when a Tablighi is performing bodily functions, they are purely for the satisfaction of the divine will.

The Tablighi derives the certitude of his or her state of grace from the understanding that his or her possession of salvation affords him or her power to function and his or her understanding that by acting in a righteous manner, Allah’s will is fulfilled. The Tablighi feels close to Allah and assumes the role of His viceroy or a jihadi (one who struggles in the path of Allah) acting on His behalf without worrying too much about who or what the nemesis is and how it can be overwhelmed. The Tablighi is divine oriented. His or her thoughts and actions revolve around Allah. The Tablighi makes his or her life an offering to Allah and surrenders completely before Him. The Tablighi does not strive for wealth and fame and suppresses emotions of pride and the attachment to children, family, and friends but devotes himself or herself wholly to God-realization. The Tablighi remains untouched by impurities of life because of the detachment, self-discipline, and absence of egoism and thus remains untouched by sin. Inner-worldliness is the highest form of spiritual discipline, for peace immediately follows inner-worldly attention.

Importantly, the Tablighi’s condemnation of the world or the mundane is not literal but psychological in that unlike the mystics or the Sufis or the Hindu Sanyasis who totally cut themselves from almost all worldly and sensual of life, he or she downplays the importance almost to the point of unnecessity whilst being, at the same time, engaged in it. Hence, the Tablighi continuously triumphs over material greed and actively defeats, time and again, mundane and sensual temptations.

The distinctive path to becoming Allah’s humble servant or true Muslim is a total concentration on certain Islamic truths, namely the five pillars of Islam. The decisive aspect of this process is not what these truths mean or hold, which is already known even by the non-practicing Muslim, but the kind and degree of emphasis placed on the truths. By placing specific emphasis on the truths, they become known to and understood by

248 only the inner-worldly “attentionists” – the Tablighis. Tablighi truths come to take a key position within, and to make an integrating effect on the complete view of the world. Hence, in Tablighi ideology, Muslims can not become true to their religion and become deserving of divine grace by what Maududi (1991) calls the mere utterance of the shahadah or by achieving a penetrating understanding of the shahadah or the shariah in particular and the Islamic teachings in general. The Tablighis asserts that the only way to becoming a true Muslim is through concentration on the essential truths and their perpetual and comprehensive application in structured pattern of everyday life for security and salvation.

8.9.1. Salvation

The concept of salvation is multidimensional and the ultimate goal of the Tablighi Jamaat. It denotes, on the one hand, freedom from jahiliyah and, on the other hand, freedom to Islam. Freedom from jahiliyah involves the freeing of oneself from the intricacies of vice-ridden modern society and the process of secularization which, from the Tablighi perspective, allows individuals to behave in a jahili way. For example, practicing sexual promiscuity, dealing in interest, drinking alcohol, and generally doing what is considered haram (forbidden) in Islam. Importantly, the movement believes that secularization also undermines and even corrupts Muslims preventing them from practicing Islam as a comprehensive way of life.

The freedom from the Islamic perspective involves the re-structuring of everyday patterns of life in line with Islamic teachings. In other words, opening oneself up to moral reform, spiritual awakening, self-improvement, and re-Islamization. Furthermore, it means meeting at least all the key religious obligations such as regular offering of ritual prayer, giving alms, fasting, and performing hajj.

Freedom from jahiliyah and freedom to Islam, in the context of the Tablighi Jamaat, constitutes salvation. However, the Tablighi conceptualization of salvation is egocentric.

249 Salvation is about saving oneself from sins, infidelity towards Allah, and an impious condemnation of Allah’s promises. According to the Tablighi Jamaat the move away from the way of life based on religion to life based on human rationality and the philosophy of individualism has made this world a Weberian vessel of sin. People in general and Muslims in particular are lost today and their personal lives are full of despair, distress, and destitution. They are crying out loud for salvation. They essentially are seeking salvation from physical, psychological, and social sufferings of earthly life. The Tablighi Jamaat claims that the prevailing world problems require a systematic rescuing effort not at the social but individual level. First and foremost criterion for individual salvation is the conscious infusion of Islamic spirit into ones own life. This will basically have practical behavioural consequences in this world. These practical behavioural consequences will produce a positive orientation to worldly activities because of a way of life which is distinctively determined by Islamic precepts. Salvation will follow after the systematization of practical behaviour resulting from an espousal of Islamic values or Islamic orientation to life. It is anticipated that salvation will have a strong impact on how life is conducted when salvation itself is turned into a process, particularly a subjective process, and favourable conditions and sanctity are sought for good life here and in the Hereafter.

For salvation to have the most far-reaching consequences on life and for it to succeed Muslims have to literally implement Islam in their lives. Salvation of oneself very much rests on the quality of devotion a Muslim makes to his or her religious life. This quality of devotion is piety which the Muslim must acquire and make manifest in his or her everyday pattern of life. Without piety there is no salvation and the Tablighi Jamaat claims to offer, through khuruj, the opportunity to save oneself from everyday sufferings and malaise of this world.

8.9.2. Piety

Piety is the manifestation of ones commitment to Islam and devotion to Allah. It embodies all actions that are sanctioned by the shariah and are part of Islamic culture.

250 Hence, performing five daily salaats is an act of piety as well as removing an obstacle from the path of an elderly. All acts of piety have personal benefits or rewards some of which can be felt and enjoyed in this world and some or most of it is reserved for the life in the Hereafter. Take the benefits of performing ritual salaat, for example, that purportedly makes livelihood easy here and secures a place in heaven in the Hereafter. However, some acts of piety have both personal and social benefits, for instance, dhikr. The dhikr94 doer gets the benefit or reward as well as those listening to it, albeit the dhikr doer is entitled to greater portion of the benefit or reward because of his or her literal effort. In this case, doing dhikr and listening to it both become acts of piety. Hence, dhikr as an act of piety has both personal as well as social benefit.

Although the Tablighi Jamaat places strong emphasis and focuses on the individual rather than society, in relation to piety, most of its activities (which it considered to be acts of piety) are socially oriented. These Tablighi activities involve more than one individual. For example, salaat, bayaan, dhikr, jolah, mushawara, and taleem are all group activities. The rationale for focusing on social piety is that it attracts greater reward than personal piety. Hence the Tablighis argue that performing ritual salaat in a group attracts far greater reward from Allah than performing salaat on one’s own. This is one reason why Tablighis always perform their ritual salaat in a group even if they have to wait for a short while for their colleagues to get organized.

According to Tablighi teaching, piety is a genuine moral virtue and the real way for understanding Allah’s Commandments. The aim behind understanding Allah’s commandments is actually to encourage Muslims to acquire piety by performing those particular acts of which are obligatory. Piety is been seen as a genuine moral virtue and the best insurance for the Hereafter. Piety is as much about refraining from sins and other transgressions as is about doing virtuous deeds such as salaat and dhikr.

94 According to the Tablighi Jamaat, dhikr is an act of piety and the benefits or rewards may not be seen or felt, like many other acts of piety, either by the doer or the receiver of the dhikr but both the parties are entitled to a reward or rewards if not here than definitely in the Hereafter.

251 Piety, not only means renunciation of sins, rather it consists of possessing an internal energy and power of self-restraint, which are achieved by undertaking continuous rigorous self-discipline, and making one obedient to Allah's Commandments. The self acquires such strength that it shows resistance and steadfastness against unlawful whims and passions. Every act of abstaining from sinning is pious as well as an act of doing a virtuous deed.

Hence, the Tablighi push is always towards adopting piety because it is seen as the safest way to salvation and the best support for Islam. Being pious is a position of honour and pious pursuits bring peace and contentment.

Tablighis consider piety to be one of the best and most effective factors of insight, enlightenment, and conscientiousness. It is responsible for enhancing the sense of insight - the practical aspects of reason and ability to diagnose duties. The most important effect of piety, considered by Tablighis, is that it dominates over the difficulties of day to day life. Piety empowers the Tablighi to solve his or her problems and overcoming the obstacles in day-to-day life.

A pious person, according to Tablighis, is familiar with and confident about God- Almighty and Hereafter. Therefore, the calamities and hardships of day-to-day life do not disturb his or her state of ease and tranquillity. These hardships, calamities, and tragedies in essence are not painful, rather are the anxiety and intolerance of self which makes the Muslim uncomfortable.

Most of the severe problems and catastrophes in life are the result of moral indecencies, self-whims and passions, and domination of satanic desires. For example, Tablighis believe that family problems are created because of a failure on the part of the husband, wife, or both, in controlling their passions. Moral vices such as jealously, revengefulness, stubbornness, prejudice, egotism, greed, lust, extravagance, and arrogance are responsible for causing problems and hardships for human beings, creating pains and anxiety, and turning the sweetness of life into bitterness. The best and most effective thing which

252 could prevent such catastrophes is piety. Tablighis claim that in the life of a pious such painful and horrible catastrophes do not exist at all. With tranquillity of heart and enlightenment, a pious Muslim lives a peaceful life as well as manages to collect sufficient provisions for the Hereafter. Love of the world is the root of all evils and whilst ordinary Muslims easily succumbs to earthly temptations, the pious Muslim resists becoming infatuated with such allurements and charms.

Piety is the key solution for all human problems and the rescuer from disasters and destruction. It is the most formidable shelter for human beings. Therefore, piety does not deprive and create limitations, rather it revives human personality and frees a human being from the imprisonment of carnal desires, revengefulness, selfishness, self-conceit, prejudices, stubbornness, greed, egotism, ambitiousness, , and desire for fame and publicity which epitomizes the contemporary secular world. The moral abjectness such as jealousy, hatred, revenge, fault-finding, prejudice, greed, egotism, arrogance, fear, and temptation, are all overpowered by piety. Bashir Hussein95, a Tablighi, sums up all this very succinctly:

Piety will act as your shield and defense in life and in the Hereafter… your guide to Heaven. Its ways are clear and simple. Those of you who accept it will be benefited by it and the one who has imposed it upon you will guard it and will guard you. Certainly, piety is the medicine for your physical illness, the purifier of your polluted mind, the light of the darkness of your eyes, and the light for your ignorance.

8.10. SELF REFORMATION For the Tablighi Jamaat, the present world is neither eternal nor self-generating but a creation of Allah who exercises absolute control over it. The ephemeral nature of this world needs to be noted and Muslims need to be reminded of their mortality. However, death is not conceived of as the end of life, rather, a start to an eternal world in which the good will take delight in the bliss of (heaven) and the bad will burn in the raging (hell). To distinguish good from the bad, Allah, through His angels keep account of every human action and as His servants, demand of human beings their total

95 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I interviewed Bashir Hussein at Wentworthville Musallah on 13th April, 2002.

253 submission to Him. To become worthy of jannah, the Tablighi Jamaat preaches self- abnegation in the path of Allah. Undergoing hardship and making sacrifices for the sake of Allah, on the one hand is faith enhancing and character building and on the other hand is a “down payment” for a place in jannah.

Therefore, the Tablighi Jamaat engages in a total self-reformation, seeking the elimination of individual problems through the change in personal character and individual improvement. It demands personal renewal and individual reform for the betterment of self. Motivated by the Qur’anic promises of a blissful existence in the next life and the idea of salvation in inviting people towards good and stopping them from doing evil, the movement makes in-roads to conquering the “hearts” of the people. Seeking to penetrate the core of Muslim consciousness and making Muslims seek Allah’s forgiveness, a faith in Allah is evoked again. By calling others towards righteousness, one learns about “self” first, because “calling”, with its inherent positive qualities, is not only for the benefit of others but “self” as well. In consumer culture, “good life” and “successful life” are measured by the possession of the material wealth. The Tablighi Jamaat sees “good life” in purely a spiritual sense devoid of materialism. Halal earning, peace of mind, contentment, pleasure in worship, love for Allah and worldly success procured by lawful means constitute “authentic success.” Therefore, “authentic success” is both the success in this world and in life after death. The former precedes the latter and the focus always remains on the success in life after death. Personal crisis and problems are attributed to the weakness of personal character which leads one stray into all sorts of social evil manifesting in corruption, sexual promiscuity, and moral decay and away from “goodness” embodied in the pristine revelation. By doing away with the material pursuit of happiness and worldliness, the Tablighi doctrine helps members forge a new unity with Muslims and ultimately with Allah. This transformation seeks to then nullify the dominant modes of modern every-day existence which stands in the way of piety, spiritual elevation, and the creation of a Muslim ummah in the guise of a pristine Islam. Therefore, the Tablighi Jamaat activity functions as a means to success in this life and salvation in the life Hereafter. Thus, in the Tablighi doctrine, there is a new symbolic

254 definition of collective Muslim identity and new models of legitimizing ama’l (deed) and piety.

Tablighi Jamaat perceives human beings as the seekers of support of some sort to secure their stability, courage and the confidence imperative to pursue life. In this quest people usually turn to certain reified visual material things under the umbrella of consumer culture which then, with their appeals of mundane glory and power, changes people from spiritual, God-fearing, and mortal beings into believers of worldly . Those who do not prescribe to or possess such worldly certainties are, generally, censured and ill- treated. The Tabligh Jamaat de-emphasizes the material pursuit of happiness and material progress is perceived as a constant distraction from spiritual living in which the Muslim seeks to make necessary preparations for the akhirah. Through the unification of this contemporary materialistic world with the world of akhirah, a new moral order is achieved. It prescribes to earn a livelihood only enough to satisfy the basic requirements of the family and denounces excessive wealth, comfort, and pleasure. In this regard, the movement de-emphasizes the need for aesthetic pleasures and encourages a strict adherence to Islamic etiquette. Some of the ama’l encouraged by the Tablighi Jamaat includes having proper Muslim attire (which is linked to the notion of ) for both men and women, and becomes manifested in men wearing a toppy (head cap), beard, kameez and shalwar or jubbah and in women wearing hijab (veil). Moreover, the extends to procuring halal food and drink and avoiding haram food items such as alcohol and acts such as social interaction between men and women and sexual promiscuity. Politeness, courtesy, and good demeanour are inculcated and mosque building and opening Islamic centers and Islamic educational institutions are encouraged. The major social mechanism for the realisation of this is in the sunnah which is a pretext for a comprehensive Islamic life.

Thus, Muslim salvation lies in the idealization of the past which the movement venerable and attempts to re-construct the contemporary self in terms of this idealization. In this respect, therefore, the Tablighi Jamaat looks up to the past Islamic glory, particularly the period of Khulafa al- (first four caliphs of Islam) as a model for contemporary

255 life. In this sense, the movement is responding to contemporary social conditions that are charged with feelings of frustration, uneasiness, and tension because of the contemporary social order in which situations are no longer conducive to a desired future has become incompatible with an ideal past. For the totality of the order or system to change, the individual has to change first. Even though the intention or focus may not be on the remaking of the world, (which is true for the Tablighi Jamaat) the effects of self- reformation inevitably will help remake the world. The world Tablighi Jamaat seeks to accomplish is the world of past Islamic glory and to achieve it in the contemporary period, the Tablighi Jamaat first looks at the individual ego, the inner-self for reform and re-construction.

With the attention focused on the individual who, only with the help of Allah, can gain the power to change his or her environment, the Tablighi Jamaat seek the shaping of “self” in the comprehensive guise of Prophet Muhammad. The “self” - not knowing the boundaries of corruption, sexual promiscuity, moral decadence, and material greed can only produce a social milieu in which the life-world is devoid of all Islamic values. How then can such a life-world contribute to the eradication of social ills and universal evils? Human beings, individually and collectively, are today searching for peace and tranquillity and solutions to these problems everywhere including all sorts of political endeavours, social and physical scientific experimentations, and spiritual activities to no avail. The “self” has been mobilized into the depth of the material world which is conceptualized as an eternal and self-perpetuating entity and, thus, empowered with material energies.

The Tablighi Jamaat sees the world order from a different non-materialistic perspective in which “self” as an individual and as a collectivity plays a significant non-materialistic role. This role is not to engage in the re-construction of the world but the “self” based on the shariah and examples set by Prophet Muhammad. The change, therefore, is not directly sought in the social order but indirectly in individual “self” for the re-making of the self and procuring pristine Islam.

256 8.11. POLITICAL ALOOFNESS Tablighis believe that a genuine Islamic faith can only be practiced by shunning politics. Politics are corrupting and leading people astray. They are divisive as well. Summing up the typical Tablighi attitude towards politics, Hafeez Ahmad96, a long time Tablighi, once said that:

Politics is a game and a dirty one at that. No matter how clean you play, inevitably principles, values, and morals get compromised. The fact of the matter is that politics corrupt your mind and your soul. Those in politics only strive towards power and not for Islam. Power is bad politics because people in politics are even prepared to sell Islam to achieve it. Look at, all the political leaders in Muslim countries, how much they reflect or Umar or or Ali?

The movement’s attitude towards politics is that political power in itself does not guarantee a successful and just organization of an Islamic order. It maintains that before individuals embark upon a grand mission of state-building, it is critical that they first remake themselves in the total image of the Muslims of the prophetic era. It argues that in light of the Qur’an and the sunnah - Muslims have been instructed to organize themselves for religious, not political purposes. An Islamic social order is thus primarily premised on religious conviction and not necessarily on politics. The mission of organizing Muslims for religious purposes, for example, regular performance of salaat, collection of zakat (almsgiving), and dawah work does not necessarily have to be dependent on the founding of an Islamic state. These are the responsibilities that have to be carried out by individual Muslims themselves regardless of whether the Islamic state exists or not.

To those “fundamentalist” groups who claim that the establishment of an Islamic state is a religious undertaking and duty, the Tablighi Jamaat’s response is that it is not as simple and straightforward as that. The movement claims that the Islamic principles expressed in the Qur’an have two dimensions. The first dimension refers to objectives and the second one refers to responsibilities. Objectives are Islamic absolutes – the fards. These Islamic objectives are not negotiable and have to be adhered to regardless of whether the conditions are favourable or not. In other words, objectives such as the regular performance of salaat and fasting in the month of Ramadan can not be subjected to

96 This is a fictitious name to maintain confidentiality. I have referred to him above.

257 negotiation or abandoned due to circumstantial contingencies. Objectives have to be performed – period.

Responsibilities, however, denotes the discharging of religious obligations but the rules governing them are not as rigid as those governing objectives. Circumstantial contingencies, in this context, can be used as a basis for abandoning responsibilities. Take charity, for instance, which is obligatory only when one can reasonably afford otherwise one is excused from giving it. In Islam there is no undue pressure. There is no demand made by Islam on its adherents to give charity if the circumstances are unfavourable. If one’s earning, for example, is just enough to get him or her by, then there is no religious obligation to give charity.

Hence, whilst circumstantial contingencies can be the basis for excusing oneself from not fulfilling religious responsibilities, they, however, cannot be used to abandon or neglect religious objectives. As Ahmad observed:

Being grateful to God, for example, is an objective to be followed irrespective of circumstantial contingencies. It is a requirement inherent in an Islamic scheme and spirit of life. Charity, on the other hand, is a duty which must be discharged only when a person has sufficient wealth (1991: 520).

In the Tablighi lexicon political power and state constitute religious responsibilities not Islamic objectives. That is, if Muslims are in power, such as in the case of Saudi Arabia, then it becomes their responsibility to exercise that power according to the Qur’anic injunctions and the sunnah. However, if Muslims are without political power, such as in India, then religious responsibilities can be put on hold until power is gained.

The Tablighi Jamaat’s choice for remaining distant from social and political issues and restricting itself to individual spiritual reform and moral elevation is sociologically problematic. It reveals the movement’s conception of individuals as single entities detached or detachable from society. This is apparently an unorthodox position because it disregards the idea of an ummah. In a sociological sense, as Ahmad (1991) suggests, the

258 Tablighi Jamaat totally ignores the link between individual choices and social consequences. It also ignores what Durkheim describes as the correct relation between individuals and society, that the individual is subordinate to society.

The individual submits to society and this submission is the condition of his liberation. For man freedom consists in the deliverance from blind, unthinking physical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them the great and intelligent force which is society, under whose protection he shelters (Durkheim, 1974: 72).

Individual choices become social choices and therefore have serious political consequences (Ahmad 1991). Neither social reality nor religion can be free from politics. For religion and for politics, whether the original choice is neutrality or activism, the outcome is equally political (Ahmad, 1991). From this view point, as Frances Westley (1983) asserts, even if the spiritual aims of religious people were profoundly and genuinely spiritual, they cannot escape politics.

8.12. IDENTITY The Tablighi Jamaat, with its focus on Islamic revivalism is, among other things, about the negotiation and reconstruction of a separate Muslim identity in the broader structure of Australian society. In this era of post-modernity, identities which provide individuals with a sense of who they have become fluid and porous. Identity firmly located in a social milieu is a moveable feast which is formed and is always transformed in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems that around us (Engineer, 2005). So for the Tablighi Jamaat, a new collective identity is an important issue. To achieve a new collective identity, this strategy Tablighis adopt is to unite Muslims in Australia through the reconstruction of “boundaries”. Old boundaries based on language, ethnicity, social class, and socio-economic status are exposed to dilution, in favour of new fixed social boundaries relating to every aspect of everyday life. The new boundaries are based on Islamic tradition which the Tablighis invoke because they are considered older than the customary cultural traditions of most Muslim communities. The most common strategy adopted by Australian Muslims is to maintain ethnic identities to secure resources as “ethnic communities”. “In this logic, according to a tablighi, one is

259 using asbab (instrumentalities) as both means and ends” (Talib, 1998: 338-339). The common Muslim focus is on the present world, the here and how not the next world in the Hereafter. For many Tablighis then, moving away from existing associations and routines of mundane life to spiritual activities or the quest for Allah (God) is participating in the process of forming a new identity. The transformation brought about by the Tablighi Jamaat in the lives of the Muslims is actually a transformation of identity. “This transformation seeks to then nullify the dominant modes of material existence and modern practices that stand in the way of piety, spiritual elevation, and the creation of a Muslim ummah” (Ali, 2003: 179). The world in which life is pursued becomes a constantly changing signifier of identity. “The tablighi identity while grounded itself in commands of Allah and the recognition of akhirat as the beginning of an eternal life, transform the identities forged for and through this world” (Talib, 1998: 339).

In regards to negotiating and reconstructing Muslim identity, Tablighis withdraw their focus from the social values and cultural traditions of the Muslim community and even the larger Australian society. Instead, this attention becomes fixed on the “self” as the centre of the world, as the epicenter for producing meanings. Thus, the ritual prayers, wearing traditional Islamic attire, men sporting beards, increased vigilance in distinguishing halal from haram, (to mention but a few), are important aspects of the Tablighi image or identity.

The Tablighis reject a self-centred life and the pursuit of happiness through consumerism. Tablighis stop competing for material pursuit of happiness to which others aspire. They embark on a new quest for happiness and meaning. The happiness and meaning offered by the material world are rejected because they are perceived as temporary and devoid of value. What surpasses these is the immeasurable and eternal value hidden in spiritualism and the worship of Allah within the intersubjective confinement of the Tablighi Jamaat. Therefore, the six principles of the movement combine to become the means of forging a bond between the Tablighi and Allah.

260 The movement itself, then is the place where the constitutive parts of the Muslim identity come together. Therefore, in Australia we see a rise in avoidance of inter-faith friendships. Both adults and children favour interaction and socialization with co- religionists from a range of language, ethnic, and cultural backgrounds. Tablighis also encourage inter-ethnic interaction amongst Australian Muslims thereby emphasizing the religious over ethnic boundaries.

In this way a new identity is being shaped amongst Tablighis in Australia. The loyalties are moving away from their basis in ethnicity to a basis in a de-ethnicized pristine Islam which emphasizes commitment and belonging to the ummah and structures of meaning. The definition of what constitutes a Muslim ummah in Australia has broadened with a reconstruction of boundaries beyond linguistic, cultural, and ethnic affiliations. This is not to suggest, however, that the attempt to construct a new Muslim identity is complete. In fact, deep ethnic and cultural differences continue to exist amongst Australian Muslims and the Tablighi Jamaat largely remains South Asian in origin, however, the process of de-ethnicization of Muslim practices and Islamic rituals seems to be gradually working for the movement.

CONCLUSION As a transnational Islamic revivalist movement the Tablighi Jamaat has emerged as a sect in Australia. For the Tablighis Australia, like the rest of the Western world, is in a state of jahiliyah because Muslims as vicegerents of God have failed to carry out their responsibilities both at the individual as well as social level. In light of this the Tablighi Jamaat has set itself the project to make Muslims “better Muslims”. It offers Muslims, particularly those from the immigrant working class in Australian society, who find themselves socially and economically marginalized and discriminated against hope and a sense of belonging.

By presenting the Tablighi work to Muslims in Australia as a means to achieving a better life here in this world and in the Hereafter, the Tablighi Jamaat functions as a caring and

261 supporting institution unlike the impersonal and hierarchical bureaucratic and state structures of Australian society.

Tablighi Jamaat teaches that Muslims need to articulate their true identity as God’s vicegerent on earth and restore Islam as a complete way of life. However, for all this Muslims only need to become faithful to Islam by going on khuruj. For a couple of days a month, forty days a year, and four months in once life time Muslims need to give time for learning the basics of Islam and undergoing self-reformation. Once Muslims have become “good Muslims” the world will follow them as model citizens of the world leading to the world becoming a better place.

262 CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

The principal proposition of this thesis is that the phenomenon of contemporary Islamic revivalism is a response to modernity. This response, while at the surface seems to be antagonistic to modernity, is in fact deeply rooted in it. The Islamic revivalist response however, by any measure, is not monolithic. Many responses ranging from “scripturalism” to “reformism” to “militant puritanism” characterizes contemporary Islamic revivalism. Across these responses, however, run the common themes of the fear of loss of faith and the search for Islamic authenticity. Islamic revivalists see Islam as being polluted by what they call foreign accretions namely modern political ideologies of liberalism, nationalism, and socialism and processes of modern social change such as secularization and westernization. These ideologies and processes have transported not only the dar al-Islam (abode of Islam) but the entire world into a state of jahiliyah (ignorance). Thus, rooted deeply in modernity, contemporary Islamic revivalism is simultaneously an expression of discontents of modernity and an attempt to create a space in the contemporary world for an Islamic way of life based on the shariah (Islamic law). It is the process by which this occurs in the contemporary world which is the central focus of this thesis.

The question why contemporary Islamic revivalism, which only dates back to the late 1970s, emerged in this particular epoch relates to specific Muslim experience. The causes for the emergence of Islamic revivalism varies by country and region, but there are several common threads. Among these is a widespread feeling of failure and loss of self- esteem in many Muslim societies which also plagued Muslim societies in the nineteenth century, especially during European colonial occupation. Most Middle Eastern and North African countries achieved independence from colonial rule by the middle of twentieth century, however, the expectations that accompanied independence were crushed by failed political systems and economies and the negative effects of modernization.

263 Overcrowded cities with insufficient social support systems, high unemployment rates, government corruption, and a growing gap between rich and poor characterized many of the newly independent Muslim nations. Modernization also led to a breakdown of traditional family structure and religious and social values.

The rural and urban poor attributed these failures to the importation and adoption of Western models of political and economic development and the material benefits they brought. They felt that they did not benefit from the changes brought about by modernity and, as a result, construed this as the cause of traditional and religious demise and the source of alienation. Once enthusiastically pursued as symbols of modernity, westernization increasingly came under criticism as a source of moral decline and spiritual malaise. Consequently, many countries became disillusioned with the West. Western political and economic support for authoritarian rulers of Muslim states who backed westernization and Western interests, for example, United State’s support for Iran's Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and it’s pro- policy only strengthened anti- Western feelings in the Muslim world.

Thus, contemporary Islamic revivalism throughout its short history has been a powerful instrument of rigorous Islamicization or penetration of Islam into the poorer sections of society. It is here that contemporary Islamic revivalism has found its greatest popularity and strongest acceptance. There is a good reason for this. The lower echelon of society, not only in the context of the dar al-Islam but also in the West, is where those who experience the discontents of modernity or the social and economic crises such as unemployment, poverty, family fragmentation, and poor education exist. Furthermore, it is here where the society is most vulnerable to foreign influence and encroachment and where Islamic identity is under greatest threat. This reality supports the premises of Deprivation theory which suggests that social and economic deprivation are the most common forms of deprivation among the members of the lower echelon of society that leads to them seeking what Stark and Bainbridge (1980) call “compensation” or in Karl Marx’ word “opiate” relief in religion. This does not mean, however, that Muslims from upper echelon of society where social and economic crises are minimal do not appeal to Islamicization. In fact they do but in relatively small numbers.

264

Contemporary Islamic revivalism in this sense is a struggle against the forces hostile to Islam. These forces manifest themselves, according to Islamic revivalists, in secularization and westernization or in jahiliyah. This causes a departure from the straight path and ultimately leads to the decline of Islam. The Islamic revivalists who subscribe to this ideology see Islamic revivalism as the last hope for bringing about Islamically prudent and acceptable changes in their societies. For these revivalists, the return to pristine Islam or a shariah based Islam is the solution or the cure for the existing problems. Through personal and social reform and Muslim unity, they seek to restore Islamic identity and strengthen Islam for its final presentation as the blueprint for an Islamically guided and socially just state and society.

The literature on contemporary Islamic revivalism shows that Islamic revivalists fear the loss of faith due to both endogenous factors such as impiety, laxity, and ignorance and a result of exogenous factors such as secularization and westernization of Muslim societies. This fear is emphasized by the revivalists linking its source to modernity or to the rhythms of modern living. Thus, it has been of vital importance for my investigation to endeavour to elucidate the nature of this fear and emphasize its links to modernity which I have done so in chapters five and seven.

The focus of my research has been at three distinct levels:

(i) to identify and describe contemporary Islamic revivalism, (ii) to identify its causes, and (iii) to identify and describe Muslim responses.

In regards to the last point here this thesis acknowledges the existence of numerous paths or channels to the expression of the fear of loss of faith and the quest for Islamic authenticity but opts for just a single path (“spiritualism”) in the empirical investigation of Muslim response to modernity. Spiritualism is a simple and apolitical path and is easily accessible to those seeking Islamic awakening. The movements associated with this path such as the Tablighi Jamaat (preaching party) seek to bring popular Islam into

265 line with orthodox Islam through a strict observance of the shariah and the removal of unorthodox popular practices or alien influences.

Spiritualists see the contemporary world or what Anthony Giddens (1991a) call “high modernity” besieged by consumerism and ethical and moral relativism, and the “real meaning of life” disappearing. The contemporary world or high modernity which offers multiplicity of choices to people and bestows responsibility to them for their own morality, can not provide the moral guidance most individuals seek. Hence, they are turning, for some guidance, to experts in morality – religious leaders – or the religion itself. The attraction to Islam therefore lies, for many nominal Muslims, in what Zygmunt Bauman refers to as the “increased attractiveness of agencies claiming expertise in moral values” (1992: 202-3). Anthony Giddens explains why this is so in detail:

In ‘high modernity’ certainty is undermined; doubt is institutionalized; everything, including science itself, seems open to revision. Consequently many individuals experience the world as bereft of the all-encompassing traditions and certainties that sustained earlier generations. We are increasingly thrown back on ourselves, on our own subjective choices to deal with doubt, uncertainty, stress, fragmentation and the threat of meaninglessness characteristic of high modernity. In many ways the religiosity of the postwar generation … can be understood as a response to these perils (1991a: 254).

Using ethnographic material on the Tablighi Jamaat, this thesis demonstrates that “spiritualism” or what I have referred to in chapter eight as “inner-worldly attention” is a distinct approach to a non-materialistic yet rewarding and fulfilling pursuit of life in modernity. The ethnographic material reveals that spiritualism in the Tablighi context is not what Wallis (1984) describes as world-rejecting New Religious Movements as sects or world-accommodating New Religious Movements but an approach to life that strikes a balance between din (religion) and dunya (world) with the balance always tipped in favour of din. This approach attributed to the Tablighi Jamaat forms the basis of appeal to its worldview from the lower echelon of society. This worldview helps those attracted to the movement to come to terms with their status of marginality and provides them a means and hope for defeating it, if not in this world than definitely in the Hereafter. The Tablighi spiritualism therefore provides a protection against the fast spread of alien

266 cultural values and norms – Hinduism in Mewat or godless secularism in Australia that are viewed as particularly hostile to a community’s sense of distinct identity.

Through their emphasis on maruf (good) rather than munkar (evil) and on faza’il (reward) rather than masa’il (point of Islamic law), the Tablighi Jamaat has produced an Islam that seeks to de-emphasize the prominence of inter-class and intra-community divisions, politicking and material pursuit of happiness which are so characteristic of modernity. In a remarkable similarity with the Protestant revolution, the Tablighi Jamaat can be potentially seen as contributing to the promotion of a more personalized form of Islam unconnected from the concern with the possession of political power, with its clear division, between the din and the dunya. In contrast to many contemporary Islamic revivalist movements such as Al-ikhwan al- Muslimun and the Jamaat-i Islami, the Tablighi Jamaat has moved on to shift the attention of Muslim piety to this world, with the individual Muslim now given the responsibility to create a replica of pristine Islam in modernity. The Tablighis are equipped with new sense of instrumentality in the world and a clearer consciousness of individual personal autonomy. In this way, as a product of modernity, the Tablighi Jamaat has developed a new path or way for the ummah (Muslim community) to operate within the broader framework of the modern global system of nation-states, hence, confirming my central argument in the thesis that Islamic revivalism is not anti-modernity or about its destruction but a response to it. Islamic revivalism is the demand by Muslims for their share in the world.

267 GLOSSARY

Adhan: call to prayer. Ahadith: plural of hadith. Ahl e-hadith: a Sunni sub-sect. Ahmadism: a Muslim sect founded by a Muslim scholar known as in 1901 in India.

Ahmadiyah: a member of Ahmadism sect. Akhirah: Hereafter.

Al-amr bi-al-maruf wa-al-nahy an al-munkar: enjoining the good and preventing the forbidden. Alawiyah: a Shi’a sect prominent in Syria, Turkey, and Iran.

Al-ba’th al-Islami: Islamic renaissance.

Al-Hamdulillah: praise be to Allah.

Aligarh: a large town in western Uttar Pradesh in India.

Al-ikhwan al-Muslimun: Muslim Brotherhood.

Alim (pl. Ulama): Islamic scholar.

Al-itijah al-Islami: Islamic tendency.

Al-shwa al-Islamiyah: Islamic awakening. Al-taya’r al-Islami: Islamic current. Al-usuliyah al-Islamiyah: Islamic fundamentalism. Ama’l: deed.

Amir (Ameer): leader.

Anbiyah: prophets.

Aqiqah: Islamic naming ceremony.

Asbab: instrumentalities.

Asr: the afternoon prayer. As-salamu alaykum: peace be upon you; greeting.

268 Ayah: a verse of the Qur’an. Aylaan: announcement.

Barakah: blessing. Bayaan: religious talk or speech. Bay’at: oath of allegiance. Bhangis: sweepers. Bismillah: in the name if Allah.

Bukhari: Sunni scholar of hadith. His collection of hadith is perceived as the most authentic collection by Sunni Muslims.

Burqah: ladies outer garment covering the whole body worn by some Muslim women. Chamars: leather workers. Chaudhry: of reverence, usually for leader of a caste or tribe in India. Chehallum: funeral feast observed on the fortieth day after the burial. Chillah: forty days. Chulha: hearth.

Da ‘i: preacher.

Dalil: guide; navigator.

Dar al-harb: abode or war or un-Islam.

Dar al-Islam: abode of Islam.

Dar al-kufr: house of or domain of disbelief.

Darul Uloom: the largest and most prestigious seminary in the Indian subcontinent.

Dastarkhan: tablecloth.

Dawah: preaching.

Dhikr: remembrance of Allah.

Dhol: drum.

Dhoti: a rectangular piece of cloth wrapped in a convoluted way about the waist and legs and is usually white in colour worn by Indian men; loin. Dhuhr: noon; noon prayer.

269 Din (Deen): religion of Islam.

Din wa-dawlah: religion and state.

Din wa-dunya: religion and the world.

Diwali: Hindu festival of lights.

Druze: an offshoot of Shiism. Du’a: supplication. Dunya: the world.

Dussehra: Hindu festival celebrating the triumph of Lord Rama over the demon king – Ravana; the victory of good over evil. Ecclesia: established church. Eid al-Adha: the feast of sacrifice, celebrated on the 10th of Dhu al-Hijja, the twelfth month of Islamic calendar.

Eid al-Fitr: the feast at the completion of the fasting month of Ramadan, celebrated on the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month of Islamic calendar.

Fajr: dawn; the dawn prayer. Fard: obligatory duty. Fard al-kifayah: collective obligation. Fard ‘ayn: personal religious obligation. Fatwa: a religious edict. Faza’il: reward. Faza’il-e-Ama’l: Tablighi text. Fikr: concern. : the jurisprudence of Islamic law. Gasht: preaching visit.

Gayb: invisibility.

Gemeinschaft: community.

Gesellschaft: society.

Ghar: household.

Ghusul: religious bath.

270 Gotra: Meo lineage.

Gunghat: dress worn by Muslim women in some parts of India.

Hadith: accounts of the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds.

Hadiyah: optional charity.

Hafiz: one who has memorized the entire Qur’an.

Hajj: pilgrimage to Makka, which all Muslims are obliged to make once in their life time, if they are able.

Hajja: a female Muslim who has performed the hajj. : a male Muslim who has performed the hajj. Hakimiyah: sovereignty. Halal: permissible practice under Islamic law. Hanafi: one of the Sunni legal schools in Islam. Hanbali: one of the Sunni legal schools in Islam. Haram: forbidden activity or object. Hasanat: blessing.

Hidayah: course of life changed by Allah; guidance.

Hijab: modest cover for Muslim women; veil.

Hijrah: migration of the Prophet Muhammad from Makkah to Medina in 622. Hilm: gentleness. Hizb al-Tahrir: Liberation Party. Holi: Hindu festival of colour. : heavenly damsel. : worship. Iblis: Satan. : breaking of fast at sunset. Ihyah ad-din: religious revival. Ijtihad: independent reasoning.

Ijtima: congregation; rally.

271 Ijtimai dawah: preaching to a group. Ijtimai taleem: preaching to a group in the masjid. Ikhlaq: morals.

Ikhlas: sincerity.

Ikhlas i-niyat: emendation of intention and devotion.

Ikram: respect. Ikram i-Muslim: respect for every Muslim. Ilm: knowledge.

Imam: a leader; a leader in prayer.

Iman: faith. Infiradi dawah: preaching to an individual. Infiradi taleem: to memorize the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Injil: . Insaan: human being.

Insha Allah: Allah willing.

Isa: . Isha: the night time prayer performed a little over an hour after the sunset. Ishraq: supererogatory prayer offered between sunrise and mid-day.

Islah: reform. Isma’ili (Isma’iliyah): a Shi’a sect. Itikaf: devotional seclusion in a mosque for a fixed time; retiring.

Jafari (Jafariyah): a Shi’a sect.

Jahannam: hell.

Jahil: ignorant; a tem often employed to refer to Muslims who adhere to “un-Islamic” practices and beliefs.

Jahili: pre-islamic or non-islamic epoch; anti-Islamic; un-Godly. Jahiliyah: ignorance; state of un-Islam. Jamaat: group; party.

272 Jamaat Daawah Islamiah: Party for Preaching Islam. Jamaat-i Islami: Islamic Association. Janam-ashtami: birthday. Janazah: funeral.

Jannah: heaven.

Jibril: . Jihad: struggle or Holy war, a term sometimes used generally, but also specifically, to designate either a war waged in accordance with the shariah in defense of the faith, or the personal struggle to overcome one’s imperfections in order to become a better Muslim.

Jihadi: one who struggles in the path of Allah. Jizyah: land tax. Jolah: preaching mission.

Jubbah: a flowing Arab role.

Juma: Friday congregational prayer.

Kabah: a square structure in the main courtyard of the Grand Mosque in Makkah and is the point toward which Muslims turn to pray.

Kabr: grave.

Kafir: non-believer; non-Muslim.

Kala Pahard: black mountain. Kalimah: declaring faith in Allah and in the prophethood of Muhammad. Kalimah Tayyibah: the assertion of the oneness of Allah.

Kamari: Indian waist cloth.

Kameez: long baggy shirt or top.

Karguzari: report of work.

Kazi: Muslim cleric.

Khatna: circumcision.

Khidmah: hospitality; service.

273 Khulafa al-Rashidun: first four caliphs of Islam.

Khuruj: preaching tour. Khususi: contact or visitation. Khususi dawah: preaching to the ulama. Khususi jolah: a special visit to a particular Muslim for the purpose of Islamic propagation. : sermon; sermon delivered on special Friday noon prayer. La ilaha illa Allah wa-Muhammad rasul Allah: there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is His last messenger.

Laylat al-Qadr: a Night of Power believed to be on an odd number of date in the last third of the month of Ramadan.

Madrasah: Islamic school, where a Muslim studies the Qur’an, shariah, and related subjects.

Maghrib: sunset; sunset prayer. Mahdi: an Arabic term meaning divinely guided one; saviour figure in Islam or a messiah.

Mahdism: messianism.

Mahr: dowry. Makkah: city in Saudi Arabia, Muhammad’s birthplace and the site of Kabah. Maktab: grade school. Maliki: one of the Sunni legal schools in Islam. Markaz: prayer hall. : passing of wet hand over any part of the body during ablution.

Masjid: place of worship; mosque.

Masjid al-Aqsa: grand mosque in Jerusalem. Masjid al-Haram: grand mosque in Makkah. Masjid al-Nabawi: Prophet Muhammad’s mosque in Medina. Maulana: a Muslim scholar. Maulvi: a Muslim cleric.

274 Mazahirul Uloom: an off-shoot seminary of in Saharanpur in Uttar Pradesh in India.

Mechanical Solidarity: traditional or pre-modern society. Mewati: a person living in Mewat in India; Minaret: of a mosque; Muslim multi-lingual quarterly journal. Miswak: a twig of certain trees used as a toothbrush. : a Muslim scholar of Islamic law who, therefore, has the authority to issue fatwa. Muhabbat: love.

Muharram: the first month of Islamic calendar.

Mujaddid: renewer of the faith. Mukami jolah: a common or usual visit to a Muslim for the purpose of Islamic propagation. : a religious teacher or preacher. Musallah: Islamic prayer hall. Mushawara: discussion or consultation. Mustahab: appreciable.

Mustirat: a jamaat for couples.

Mutakallim: speaker dispensing message of Islam during jolah.

Nabi: prophet.

Nafl: supererogatory.

Nafs: ego; desire.

Naqshbandiyah: a Sufi order.

Nikah: marriage ceremony.

Niyah: intention.

Noor: light.

Organic Solidarity: modern society.

Paejama: drawers; long baggy trousers with a draw-string to tie the waist.

275 Pal: territorial unit consisting of a set of Meo gotras.

Pardah: veil; seclusion.

Pili Chitthi: a letter with the symbol of Lord Ganesh written usually by Brahmin priest to fix the date for marriage. Rakah: a unit of prayer.

Ramadan: the month of fasting, the ninth month of Islamic lunar calendar. Rasulallah: messenger of Allah.

Riba: interest; usury. Rizq: provision.

Ruku: bowing in salaat.

Sabr: patience.

Sahabah: companion of Prophet Muhammad.

Sahih al-Bukhari: book of hadith.

Sajdah: prostration in salaat.

Salaam: salutation.

Salaat: Islamic prayer. Sangathan: lit. united group; movement for Hindu consolidation. Sawm: fasting for thirty consecutive days from sunrise to sunset in the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.

Seghotian: person from same gotra. Shab e-Barat: the night of forgiveness or a day of atonement which some Muslims celebrate as festival on thirteenth or fourteenth of Islamic calendar of Shaban.

Shafii: Sunni school of thought. Shahadah: Muslim article of faith. Shalwar: baggy trousers. Shariah: Islamic law. Shar’iyat al-hukm: the Islamic authority not under the idea that knowledge and action starts with the individual and that human reason is the chief form of authority.

276 Shaykh: religious teacher or respected leader. Shaytan: .

Shi’a (Shi’ite): an Islamic religio-political grouping whose adherents believe that Ali, the Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was Muhammad’s successor.

Shifa’at: remedy. Shirk: associationism; polytheism. Shuddhi: lit. purification; Hindu missionary movement. Shura: consultative committee. Sirat: way or path.

Sufi: mystic.

Sufism: a movement within Islam that emphasizes Islamic spirituality. : meal eaten before dawn in the month of Ramadan. Suluk: Sufi mystic journey to Allah. Sunnah: sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad. Sunni: a follow of the tradition (Sunnah), an “orthodox” Muslim; the branch of Islam whose adherents reject any claim to divinely guided heir to Prophet Muhammad’s spiritual authority; they accept the temporal authority of caliphs and elected leaders and now make up about eighty-five per cent of all Muslims

Sura: chapter of the Qur’an. Tabligh: to communicate; a call towards religion. Tablighi: a Muslim preacher who is a member of the Tablighi Jamaat. Tablighi Jamaat: Preaching Party or Group established in 1927 in India. Tafriq i-waqt: sacrifice or spare time. Tahajjud: supererogatory salaat offered between midnight and dawn.

Tajdid: religious reform or renewal.

Tajweed: reciting the Qur’an with proper intonation. Talaq: divorce. Taleem: education; teaching. Tanzim: organization; movement for Muslim consolidation. Taqlid: blind emulation in legal interpretation; imitation.

277 : an extra prayer incorporated with the Isha prayer during Ramadan. Tariqah: a Sufi path to discover the reality of Allah. Tasawwuf: Sufiism.

Tasbih: glorifying Allah; rosary.

Tashkeel: recruitment.

Tawhid: belief in the unity of Allah. Taziyah: a Shi’a re-enactment of the passion and death of Hussein, the beloved grandson of the Prophet Muhammad and the third imam of the Shi’as.

Thama: a sub-group of Meo clan whose members are patrilineal descendants of a common ancestor.

Tirmidhi: book of Hadith. Toppy: head cap. Ulama: Islamic scholars. : established by the fifth caliph, Muawiya from A.D. 661to 750. Ummah: Muslim community. Urs: an annual celebration to mark the death of a saint. Verstehen: to understand. Wahhabism: a Muslim revivalist movement founded by Abdul Wahhab in Saudi Arabia.

Wajib: essential.

Wudu: ablution.

Yapasi: returning.

Zaidiyah: a Shi’ite sect.

Zakat: obligatory charity in Islam; almsgiving. Zaydi: member of Zaidiyah sect.

278 APPENDIX

DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEWEES NAME* AGE YEARS WITH INTERVIEW TABLIGHI JAAMT DATES Anwar Ali 27 4 25.01.2002

Aref Ali◙ 36 6 26.06.2002

Abdul Kareem◙ 33 7 13.04.2002

Ayub Razak 65 18 25.05.2002

Bassam Mahmuod 22 4 28.12.2002

Basir Hussein 44 4 13.04.2002

Bilal Galib 36 6 24.11.2002

Dawud Hassan 35 6 29.09.2002

Faiz Deen 59 13 25.10.2002

Fahim Khan 42 9 24.11.2002

Hafeez Ahmad 43 14 25.08.2002

Muhammad Aadil◙ 66 14 28.12.2002

Rahat Ayubi 26 5 27.07.2002

Rafan Amin 23 7 17.02.2003

Tariq Talal 53 12 22.02.2003

*In the interest of confidentiality the names are fictitious.

◙Case Study Subjects.

279 REFERENCES

Abdelnasser, W. (1994) The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations, 1967-81, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Abduh, M. (1966) The Theology of Unity, Translated by Ishaq Musa’ad and Kenneth Cragg, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Abu-Rabi, I. (1994) ‘A Note on Some Recent Western Writings on Islamic Resurgence’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 11(3): 416-429.

Agar, M. (1996) The Professional Stranger, London: Academic Press.

Aggarwal, P. (1978) ‘Caste Hierarchy in a Meo Village of Rajasthan’, pp. 141-157 in I. Ahmad (ed) Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims in India, Delhi: Manohar.

______(1973) ‘The Meos of Rajasthan and Haryana’, pp. 21-44 in I. Ahmad (ed) Caste and Social Stratification Among the Muslims in India, Delhi: Manohar.

Ahmad, K. (1994) ‘Islamic Resurgence: Challenges, Directions, and Future Prospects’, pp. 49-65 in I. Abu-Rabi (ed) Islamic Resurgence: Challenges, Directions and Future Perspectives: A Round Table with Khurshid Ahmad, Tampa: The World and Islam Studies Enterprise.

______(1983) ‘The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence’, pp. 218-229 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: .

______(1967) Islam and the West, : Islamic Publications Limited.

280 Ahmad, K. and Ansari, Z. (1979) Mawdūdī: An Introduction to His Life and Thought, Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.

Ahmad, M. (1991) ‘Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-i Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat of South Asia’, pp. 457-530 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Observed: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume I), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Ahmad, Q. (1994) ‘Islam and Muslims in Australia’, pp. 317-338 in H. Mutalib and T. Hashmi (eds) Islam, Muslims and the Modern State: Case-Studies of Muslims in Thirteen Countries, : St. Martins Press.

Akbarzadeh, S. (2005) ‘Islam on the Global Stage’, pp. 1-12 in S. Akbarzadeh and S. Yasmeen (eds) Islam and the West, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

______(2001) ‘Unity or Fragmentation?’, pp. 228-234 in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (eds) Muslim Communities in Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Akhavi, S. (1992) ‘The ’s Concept of Rule in Egypt and Iran’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 524 (November): 92-102.

Akyol, M. (2004) ‘European Muslims and the Quest for the Soul of Islam’, New Europe Review, http://www.neweuropereview.com/English/english-akyol.cfm (accessed on 29th November, 2005).

Al-Alwani, T. (1979) Al-Ijtihad wa al Taqlid fi al Islam, : (n.p).

Ali, H. (1970) The Meos of Mewat: Old Neighbours of New Delhi, Delhi: Oxford and I.B.H. Publishing.

281 Ali, J. (2004) ‘Islam and Muslims in Fiji’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 24 (1): 141-154.

______(2003) ‘Islamic Revivalism: The Case of the Tablighi Jamaat’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 23 (1): 173-181.

Anwar, M. (1987) ‘Religious Identity in Plural Societies: The Case of Britain’, Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minorities Affairs, 2 (2-3): 23-32.

______(1985) Pakistanis in Britain: A Sociological Study, London: New Canterbury.

Arjomand, S. (1995) ‘Unity and Diversity in Islamic Fundamentalism’, pp. 179-198 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms Comprehended: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume V), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

______(1995) ‘The Search For Fundamentals and Islamic Fundamentalism’, pp. 27-39 in J. Lieteke Tijssen, and F. Lechner (eds) The Search For Fundamentals: The Process of Modernisation and the Quest For Meaning, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publications.

______(1986) ‘Social Change and Movements of Revitalization in Contemporary Islam’, pp. 87-112 in J. Beckford (ed) New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change, London: Sage Publications.

Armstrong, K. (2000) Islam: A Short History, New York: Modern Library.

Attanassoff, C. (2005) Bosnia and Herzogovina – Islamic Revival, International Advocacy Networks and , Stategic Insights, 4(5), http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/si/si_4_5/si_4_5_atv01.pdf (accessed on 6th December, 2005).

282

Ayubi, N. (1991) : Religion and Politics in the Arab World, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Azzam, A. (1964) The Eternal Message of Muhammad, New York: New American Library.

Babeair, A. (1991) ‘Intellectual Currents in Contemporary Islam’, Muslim World, 81 (3- 4): 231-44.

______(1990) ‘Contemporary Islamic Revivalism: A Movement or Moment?’, Journal of Arab Affairs, 9 (2): 122-46.

Bagader, A. (1994) ‘Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World’, pp. 114-126 in A. Ahmed and H. Donnan (eds) Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bainbridge, W. (1997) The Sociology of Religious Movements, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Ballard, R. (1996) ‘Islam and the Construction of Europe’, pp. 15-51 in W. Shadid and P. Van Koningsveld (eds) Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House.

Barbour, I. (1960) ‘The Methods of Science and Religion’, pp.196-215 in H. Shapley (ed) Science and Religion, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Bauman, Z. (1992) Intimations of Postmodernity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Bechhofer, F. (1987) ‘The Research Process’, pp. 84-124 in P. Worsley (ed) The New Introducing Sociology, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

283

Berger, P. (1969) A Rumor of Angels: Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural, New York: Doubleday.

______(1967) ‘Religious Institutions’, pp. 329-379 in N. Smelser (ed) Sociology: An Introduction, New York: John Wiley.

Berger, P. and Luckman, T. (1966) The Social Construction of Reality, New York: Doubleday.

Bibby, R. and Brinkerhoff, M. (1974) ‘Sources of Religious Involvment: Issues for Future Empirical Investigation’, Review of Religious Research, 15 (2): 71-79.

Blumer, H. (1969) Symbolic Interactionism, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Boulares, H. (1990) Islam: The Fear and the Hope, London: Zed Books.

Bouma, G. (1994) Mosques and Muslim Settlement in Australia, Canberra: Bureau of Immigration and Population Research.

Bouma, G., Daw, J. and Munawar, R. (2001) ‘Muslims Managing Religious Diversity’, pp. 53-72 in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (eds) Muslim Communities in Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Brennan, T. (1995) Salman Rushdie and the Third World, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Britannica Book of the Year (2001), London: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.

Brynen, R. (1986) ‘The State of the Art in Middle Eastern Studies: A Research Note on Inquiry and the American Empire’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 8 (4): 404-419.

284 Burgat, F. and Dowell, W. (1997) The Islamic Movement in North Africa, Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies - University of .

______(1993) The Islamic Movement in North Africa, Austin: Center for Middle Eastern Studies - University of Texas.

Caldwell, C. (2000) ‘The Crescent and the Tricolor’, The Atlantic Monthly, 34: 20-22, 30-32.

Campbell, D. (1975) ‘Degrees of Freedom and Case Study’, Comparative Political Studies, 8 (2): 178-193.

Castles, S. and Miller, M. (1993) The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World, New York: Guilford Books.

Cesari, J. (2002) ‘: The Shaping of a Religious Minority’, pp. 36-51 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chandler, J. (2005) ‘Explanatory Value of Social Movement Theory’, Strategic Insights, 4 (5), http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/May/chandlerMay05.asp (accessed on 7th December, 2005).

Chaudhry, L. (1998) Islamic Revivalism: A Primer, http://www.suite101.com/print_article.cfm/984/10348 (accessed on 2nd March, 2003).

Choueiri, Y.(1996) ‘The Political Discourse of Contemporary Islamist Movements’, pp. 19-33 in A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Oxford: Westview Press.

______(1990) Islamic Fundamentalism, London: Pinter Publisher.

285 Cleland, B. (2001) ‘The History of Muslims in Australia’, pp.12-32 in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (eds) Muslim Communities in Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Coffey, A. (1999) The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of Identity, London: Sage Publications.

Collins, J. (1991) Migrant Hands in a Distant Land – Australia’s Post-War Immigration (Second Edition), Sydney: Pluto Press.

______(1984) ‘Immigration and Class: The Australian Experience’, pp.1-27 in G. Bottomley and M. De Lepervanche (eds) Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Australia, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

Commins, D. (1990) Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria, New York: Oxford University Press.

Commonwealth of Australia, (2002) 2001 Census of Population and Housing (Catalogue No. 2015.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

______(1997) 1996 Census of Population and Housing (Catalogue No. 2901.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

______(1991) 1991 Census of Population and Housing (Catalogue No. 2722.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

______(1979) 1976 Census of Population and Housing (Catalogue No. 2417.0), Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics.

Cowlishaw, G. (1988) Black, White or Brindle, : Cambridge University Press.

286 Crooke, W. (1975) The Tribes and Castes of the North Western India (Volume III), Delhi: Cosmos Publishers.

Cundy, C. (1996) Salman Rushdie, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dassetto, F. (1988) ‘The Tabligh Organisation in Belgium’, pp.159-173 in T. Gerholm and Y. Georg Litthman (eds) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

David, G. and Ayouby, K. (2002) ‘Being Arab and Becoming Americanized: Forms of Mediated Assimilation in Metropolitan Detroit’, pp.125-142 in Y. Haddad and J. Smith (eds) Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

______(1998) Middle Eastern Community of Metropolitan Detroit Directory of Organizations, Detroit: United Way Community Services.

Davidson, J. (1977) ‘Socio-economic Status and Ten Dimensions of Religious Commitment’, Sociology and Social Research, 61 (4): 462-485.

Dean, J., Eichhorn, R. and Dean, L. (1969) ‘Limitations and Advantages of Unstructured Methods’, pp.19-24 in G. McCall and J. Simmons (eds) Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Dekmejian, R. (1995) Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Second Edition), Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

______(1988) ‘Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences’, pp. 3- 19 in S. Hunter (ed) The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

287 ______(1985) Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

______(1980) ‘The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives’, Middle East Journal, 34 (1): 1-12.

Denzin, N. (1989) The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Third Edition), Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

______(1978) The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (Second Edition), New York: McGraw-Hill.

Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds) (1994) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004) Annual Report, Canberra: Australian Government.

Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1988) Australia and Immigration 1788 to 1988, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

Dessouki, A. (1982) ‘The Islamic Resurgence: Sources, Dynamics, and Implications’, pp. 3-31 in A. Dessouki (ed) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, New York: Praeger Publishers.

De Vaus, D. (2002) ‘Religious Community’, pp.89-105 in P. Beilharz and T. Hogan (eds) Social Self, Global Culture: An Introduction to Sociological Ideas (Second Edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Donohue, J. (1983) ‘Islam and the Search for Identity in the Arab World’, pp. 48-61 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

288

Douglas, J. (1976) Investigative Social Research, Beverley Hills: Sage Publications.

Durkheim, E. (1974) Sociology and Philosophy, New York: Free Press.

______(1952/1897) Suicide: A Study in Sociology, Translated by John Spaulding and George Simpson, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

______(1933/1893) The Division of Labour in Society, New York: Free Press.

______(1915)The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Translated by Swain, New York: The Free Press.

Durrany, K. (1993) Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism, Bangalore: Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society.

Ehteshami, A. (1996) ‘Islamic Governance in Post-Khomeini Iran’, pp. 143-162 in A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder: Westview Press.

Eickelman, D. and Piscatori, J. (1996) Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______(1990) ‘Social Theory in the Study of Muslim Societies’, pp.3-28 in D. Eickelman and J. Piscatori (eds) Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination, Berkley: University of .

Eister, A. (1975) ‘Cultural Crisis and New Religious Movements’, pp.612-27 in I. Zaretsky and M. Leone (eds) In Religious Movements in Contemporary America, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

289 Emerson, R., Fretz, R. and Shaw, L. (1995) Writing Ethnographic Fieldnote, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Engineer, A. (2005) Religion in South Asia: A Liberative Perspective, Gurgaon: Hope India Publishers.

Esposito, J. (1992) The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New York: Oxford University Press.

______(1991) ‘Trailblazers of the Islamic Resurgence’, pp.37-56 in Y. Haddad, J. Voll, J. Esposito, K. Moore, and D. Sawan (eds) The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, New York: Greenwood Press.

______(1989) ‘Renewal and Reform in Contemporary Islam’, pp.31-46 in W. Shea (ed) Fundamentalism in the Modern World, Lanham: University Press of America.

______(1983) ‘Introduction: Islam and Muslim Politics’, pp.3-15 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______(1983) ‘Muslim Perspectives on A Resurgent Islam’, pp.215-217 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______(ed) (1983) Voices of Resurgent Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Faruqi, Z. (1992) Ulama-i-Deoband: Kaun Hai, Kya Hai?, Deoband: Dar-ul Kitab.

Field, H. (2000) Citizen or Resident?: Australian Social Security Provision to Immigrants, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Sydney: University of New South Wales.

Finney, J. (1978) ‘A Theory of Religious Commitment’, Sociological Analysis, 39 (1): 19-35.

290

Flynn, C. and Kunkel, S. (1987) ‘Deprivation, Compensation, and Conceptions of an ’, Sociological Analysis, 48 (1): 58-72.

Fox, S. (1990) ‘The Ethnography of Humour and the Problem of Social Reality’, Sociology, 24 (3): 431-46.

Friedrichs, J. and Ludtke, H. (1975) Participant Observation: Theory and Practice, Farnborough: Saxon House.

Fuller, G. and Lesser, I. (1995) A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West, Colorado: Westview Press.

Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures, London: Fontana Press.

Gellner, E. (1995) ‘Fundamentalism as a Comprehensive System: Soviet Marxism and Islamic Fundamentalism Compared’, pp. 277-287 in M. Marty and S. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms Comprehended: The Fundamentalisms Project (Volume V), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

______(1994) ‘Forward’, pp. xi-xiv in A. Ahmed and H. Donnan (eds) Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

George, D. (1996) ‘Pax Islamica: An Alternative New World Order?’, pp.71-90 in A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Colorado: Westview Press.

Giddens, A. (1991a) The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Glock, C. (1964) ‘The Role of Deprivation in the Origin and Evolution of Religious Groups’, pp. 24-36 in R. Lee and M. Marty (eds) Religious and Social Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press.

291

Glock, C. and Stark, R. (1965) Religion and Society in Tension, Chicago: Rand McNally & Company. Goffman, E. (1989) ‘On Fieldwork’, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 18 (2): 123- 132.

Gold, R. (1969) ‘Roles in Sociological Field Observations’, pp. 30-39 in G. McCall and J. Simmons (eds) Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Goldner, F. (1967) ‘Role Emergence and the Ethics of Ambiguity’, pp. 245-266 in G. Sjoberg (ed) Ethics, Politics, and Social Research, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Goldschmidt, W. (1944) ‘Class Denominationalism in Rural California Churches’, American Journal of Sociology, 49 (4): 348-355 .

Goldziher, I. (1966) Muslim Studies, New York: University of New York Press.

Graetz, B. and McAllister, I. (1994) Dimensions of Australian Society (Second Edition), Melbourne: Macmillan.

Guazzone, L. (ed) (1995) The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movement in the Contemporary Arab World, Reading: Ithaca Press.

Haddad, Y. (1991) ‘The Revivalist Literature and the Literature on Revival: An Introduction’, pp.3-22 in Y. Haddad, J. Voll, J. Esposito, K. Moore and D. Sawan (eds) The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, Westport: Greenwood Press.

292 ______(1986) ‘Muslim Revivalist Thought in the Arab World’, The Muslim World, 76 (3-4): 143-167.

______(1983) ‘: Ideologue of Islamic Revival’, pp. 67-98 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, New York: Oxford University Press.

______(1982) Contemporary Islam and the Challenges of History, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Haddad, Y. and Smith, J. (2002) ‘Introduction’, pp. v-xviii in Y. Haddad and J. Smith (eds) Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

Haddad, Y., Voll, J., Esposito, J., Moore, K. and Sawan, D. (eds) (1997) The Islamic Revival Since 1988: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, Westport: Greenwood Press.

______(1991) The Contemporary Islamic Revival: A Critical Survey and Bibliography, Westport: Greenwood Press.

Hage, G. (1998) White Nation: Fantasies of White Supremacy in a Multicultural Society, Sydney: Pluto Press.

Hall, S. (1992) ‘The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power’, in S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds) Formations of Modernity, Cambrideg: Polity Press.

Halliday, F. (1996) Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

Hamilton, P. (1992) ‘The Enlightenment and the Birth of Social Sciences’, pp. 17-69 in S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds) Formations of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers and The Open University.

293 Haq, M. (1972) The Faith Movement of Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Hasni, M. (n.d.) Savaneh Hazrat Maulana Mohammad Yusuf, Amir Tablighi Jamaat Pak- o-Hind, Lahore: Nasharan-e-Qur’an.

Haye, C. (n.d.) Chaudhri Muhammad Yasin Khan - Jeevan Parichay (Hindi), Nuh: Chaudhri Yasin Khan Yadgar Committee.

Haykel, B. (2003) Revival and Reform in Islam: The Legacy of Muhammad al-Shawk-an- I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Held, D. (1992) ‘The Development of the Modern State’, pp. 71-125 in S. Hall and B. Gieben (eds) Formations of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishers and The Open University.

Heron, J. (1996) Co-operative Inquiry: Research into the Human Condition, London: Sage Publications.

Hinnebusch, R. (1982) ‘The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime’, pp. 138-169 in A. Dessouki (ed) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, New York: Praeger Publishers.

Hourani, A. (1991) History of the Arab Peoples, New York: Warner Books.

______(1980) Europe and the Middle East, Berkley: University of California Press.

Humphrey, M. (2005) ‘Australian Islam, the New Global Terrorism and the Limits of Citizenship’, pp. 132-148 in S. Akbarzadeh and S. Yasmeen (ed) Islam and the West: Reflections from Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

294

______(2001) ‘Muslim Communities in Australia’, pp.33-52 in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (eds) Muslim Communities in Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

______(2000) ‘Globalisation and Arab Diasporic Identities: The Australian Arab Case’, Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, 2(1): 1-18.

______(1998) Islam, Multiculturalism and Transnationalism: From the , London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

______(1991) ‘Islam, Immigration and the State: Religion in Australia’, pp. 176- 193 in A. Black (ed) Religion in Australia: Sociological Perspectives, Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.

______(1989a) ‘Is This a Mosque Free-Zone? Islam and the State in Australia’, Migration Monitor, 12 (January): 12-17.

______(1989b) ‘Islam: A Test for Multiculturalism’, Asian Migrant, 2 (2): 48-56.

______(1987) ‘Community, Mosque, and Ethnic Politics’, Australia and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, 23(2): 233-45.

______(1986a) ‘Community, Mosque and Ethnic Politics’, Unpublished Paper Presented at the A.I.M.A. Conference from 14th -17th May at the .

______(1986b) ‘Racism and Unemployment Amongst Lebanese’, pp. 29-41 in Seminar Proceedings of The Arabic Community: Realities and Challenges, Sydney: The Arabic Welfare Inter-Agency.

295 ______(1984) Family, Work, and Unemployment: A Study of Lebanese Settlement in Sydney, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. Hunter, J. (1990) ‘Fundamentalism in its Global Contours’, pp. 56-72 in N. Cohen (ed) The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View From Within; A Response From Without, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Hunter, S. (1988) ‘Introduction’, pp. ix-xv in S. Hunter (ed) The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hunter, W. (2002) The Indian Musalmans, New Delhi: Rupa and Co.

Huntington, S. P. (1996) The Clashes of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Husain, M. (1997) ‘The Ideologization of Islam: Meaning, Manifestations and Causes’, pp. 91-127 in A. Jerichow and J. Simonsen (eds) Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East, Surrey: Curzon Press.

Imara, M. (1985) Al-Sahwa al-islamiyya wa al-tahaddi al-hadari (The Islamic Revival and the Civilizational Challenge), Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi.

Imperial Gazetteer of India (1908) Provincial Series: Rajputana, Calcutta: Superintendent of Government Printing.

Ismael, T. (1974) The Middle East in World Politics, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Jakubowicz, A. (1989) ‘Normalising Aliens: The Asutralian Welfare State and the Control of ImmigranT Settlement’, pp. 263-303 in R. Kennedy (ed) Australian Welfare - Historical Sociology, Sydney: Macmillan.

296 Jansen, G. (1985) ‘Militant Islam: The Historic Whirlwind’, New York Times Magazine, 27-35.

Jansen, J. (1986) The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, New York: Macmillan.

Jayasuriya, L. (1990) Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Welfare: New Directions for the 1990’s, A Paper Presented at the 50th Anniversary Lecture Series, Department of Social Work and Social Policy, Sydney: .

Johns, A. and Saeed, A. (2002) ‘Muslims in Australia: The Building of a Community’, pp. 195-216 in Y. Haddad and J. Smith (eds) Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Walnut Creek: Altamira Press.

Johnson, B. (1963) ‘On Church and Sect’, American Sociological Review, 28: 539-549.

Joly, D. (1988) ‘Making a Place for Islam in British Society: Muslims in Birmingham’, pp. 32-52 in T. Gerholm and Y. Georg Lithman (eds) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

Jones, M. (1993) ‘The Years of Decline, Australian Muslims 1900-40’, pp. 63-86 in M. Jones (ed) An Australian Pilgrimage: Muslims in Australia from the Seventeenth Century to the Present, Melbourne: Victoria Press.

______(1993) ‘To Rebuild What was Lost: The Post-War Years and Beyond’, pp. 87- 104 in M. Jones (ed) An Australian Pilgrimage: Muslims in Australia from the Seventeenth Century to the Present, Melbourne: Victoria Press.

Jorgensen, D. (1989) Participant Observation: A Methodology for Human Studies (Applied Social Research Methods Series Volume 15), London: Sage Publications.

297 Junker, B. (1960) Field Work: An Introduction to the Social Sciences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kandhalvi, M. (1990) The Teachings of Islam: Fazail-e-A’mal, Translated by Abdul Arshad, New Delhi: Idara Isha’at-E-Diniyat (P) Ltd.

Kaplan, L. (1992) ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-14 in L. Kaplan (ed) Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, Amherst: University of Press.

Keddie, N. (1968) An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani’, Berkley: University of California Press.

Kepel, G. (1985) The Prophet and Pharoah: Muslim Extremism in Contemporary Egypt, Translated by Jon Rothschild, London: Al-Saqi Books.

Kettani, M. (1986) Muslim Minorities in the World Today, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

Keyder, C. (1986) ‘The Rise and Decline of National Economies in the Periphery’, MEMEO.

Khan, W. (1988) Mewat Ka Safar, Delhi: Al-Risala.

______(n.d.) Maulana Mohammad Ilyas Aur Un Ki Deeni Tahreek, Lahore: Maktaba-e-Zakriya.

Knudsen, D., Earle, J. and Shriver, D. (1978) ‘The Conception of Sectarian Religion: An Effort at Clarification’, Review of Religious Research, 20: 44-60.

Kramer, M. (1996) Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival: The Politics of Ideals in the Middle East, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

298 Lapidus, I. (1990) A History of Islamic Societies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lasch, C. (1975) ‘The Emotions of Family Life’, New York Review of Books, 22 (19): 37- 42.

Lawrence, B. (1998) Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lechner, F. (1995) ‘Introduction’, pp. 25-26 in L. Tijssen, J. Berting and L.Lechner (eds) The Search for Fundamentalism: A Process of Modernisation and the Quest for Meaning, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

LeCompte, M., Millroy, W. and J. Preissle (eds) The Handbook of Qualitative Research in Education, New York: Academic Press.

Levtzion, N. and Voll, J. (1987) ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-20 in N. Levtzion and J. Voll (eds) Eighteenth-Century Renewal and Reform in Islam, New York: Syracuse University Press.

Lewis, B. (2003) The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror, New York: The Modern Library.

______(2002) What Went Wrong?: Western Impact and Middle East Response, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______(1993) Islam and the West, New York: Oxford University Press.

Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Lister, R. (1990) The Exclusion Society: Citizenship and the Poor, London: Child Poverty Action Group.

299

Lowenstein, W. and Loh, M. (1977) The Immigrants, Melbourne: Hyland House Publishing.

Mackie, F. (2002) ‘The Ethnic Self’, pp. 32-42 in P. Beilharz and T. Hogan (eds) Social Self, Global Culture: An Introduction to Sociological Ideas (Second Edition), South Melbourne, Oxford University Press.

Mahnig, H. (2002) ‘Islam in : Fragmented Accommodation in a Federal Country’, pp. 72-87 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mahoney, M. (1974) Cognition and Behaviour Modification, Cambridge: Ballinger.

Malik, M. (2001) ‘Islam in Europe: Quest for a Paradigm’, The Middle East Policy, 8 (2):100-115.

Mandaville, P. (2002) ‘Muslim Youth in Europe’, pp. 219-230 in S. Hunter (ed) Islam, Europe’s Second Religion, Westport: Praeger.

Marr, P. (1992) ‘The Islamic Revival: Security Issues’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 3 (4): 37-50.

Marshall, C. and Rossman, G. (1995) Designing Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Marshall, T. (1950) Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marty, M. and Appleby, R. (1993) ‘Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, Scandalous Code, Defiant Society’, pp. 1-19 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and

300 Society: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume II), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

______(1991) ‘Fundamentalism Project: A User’s Guide’, pp. vii-xiii in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms Observed: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume I), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Marwah, I. (1979) ‘Tabligh Movement Among the Meos of Mewat’, in M. Rao (ed) Social Movements in India (Volume II), New Delhi: Manohar.

Mason, J. (2002) Qualitative Researching (Second Edition), London: Sage Publications.

Maududi, S. (1999) A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam, Translated by Al-Ash‘ari, Petaling Jaya: The Other Press.

______(1991) Let Us Be Muslims, Edited by Khurram Murad, Kuala Lumpur: The Islamic Foundation.

______(1986) The Islamic Way of Life, Edited and Translated by K. Murad and K. Ahmad, Leicester: Islamic Foundation.

______(1985) Islam Today, : International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations.

______(1980a) Islamic Economic System: Principles and Objectives. Delhi: Markazi Maktabah Islami.

______(1980b) The process of Islamic Revolution (Eighth Edition), Lahore: Islamic Publication.

______(1979) Our Message, Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited.

301

______(1976a) The Moral Foundation of the Islamic Movement, Lahore: Islamic Publications Limited.

______(1976b) Islam and Ignorance, Lahore: n.p.

______(1972) Come Let Us Change the World, Edited and Translated by Kaukab , Washington: Islamic Party of North America.

______(1961) ‘Dear Jameelah’, pp. 56-60 in Correspondence Between Abi-L-A’La al- maudoodi and Maryam Jameelah (1993), Jeddah: Abul-Qasim Publishing House. ______(1945) Tahrik-i Islami ki Akhlaqi Bunyaden ( The Moral Foundations of the Islamic Movement), Lahore: n.p.

McCall, G. and Simmons, J. (eds) (1969) Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Mead, G. (1934) Mind, Self and Society, Edited by W. Morris, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mendelsohn, E. (1993) ‘Religious Fundamentalism and the Sciences’, pp. 23-41 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and Society: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume II), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Metcalf, B. (1996a) ‘Meandering : Knowledge and Short-Term Itinerancy in the Tablighi Jama‘at’, in N. Cook (ed) The Transmission of Knowledge in South Asia: Essays on Education, Religion, History and Politics, Delhi: Oxford University Press.

302 ______(1996b) ‘New : The Tablighi Jama‘at in America and Europe’, pp. 110-127 in B. Metcalf (ed) In Making Muslim Space in North America and Europe, Berkley: University of California Press.

______(1994) ‘“Remaking Ourselves”: Islamic Self-Fashioning in a Global Movement of Spiritual Renewal’, pp. 706-725 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume IV), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

______(1982) Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mograby, A. (1985) ‘Muslim Migration and Settlement: The Australian Experience’, pp. 25-35 Islam in Australia, Sydney: Middle East Research and Information Section – New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board.

Momayezi, N. (1997) ‘Islamic Revivalism and the Quest for Political Power’, The Journal of Conflict Studies, 17(2), http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get.cgi?directory=FALL97/articles/&filename= MAYEZI.html (accessed on 28th December, 2005).

Moussalli, A. (1999) Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism, Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

______(1993) ‘Two Tendencies in Modern Islamic Political Thought: Modernism and Fundamentalism’, Hamdard Islamicus, 16 (2): 51-79.

______(1992) Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb, Beirut: The American University of Beirut.

Mujeeb, H. (1976) Indian Muslims, London: George Allen and Unwin.

303

Mutalib, H. (1990) ‘Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States: Political Implications’, Asian Survey, 30 (9): 877-91.

Nadwi, A. (1986) Saviours of Islamic Spirit (Volume 1), Translated by Mohiuddin Ahmad, Lucknow: Academy of Islamic Research and Publications.

Nasr, S. (1996) Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______(1990) ‘Reflections on the Myth and Reality of Islamic Modernism’, Hamdard Islamicus, 13 (1): 67-82.

Naumani, M. (n.d.) Da’wat-e-Tabligh, Lahore: Maktaba-e-Zakriya.

Needleman, J. (1970) The New Religions, New York: Doubleday & Co.

Niebuhr, H. (1929) The Social Sources of Denominationalism, New York: Henry Holt & Company.

Nielsen, J. (1992) Muslims in Western Europe, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Nimer, M. (2002) ‘Muslims in American Public Life’, pp. 169-186 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

O’ Dea, T. (1966) The Sociology of Religion, Englewood Cliffs: Princeton-Hall.

Omar, W. and Allen, K. (1997) The Muslims in Australia, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service.

304 Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, (1995), New York: Oxford University Press.

Parenti, M. (1995) Against Empire: A Brilliant Expose of the Brutal Realities of U.S. Global Domination, San Francisco: City Lights Publishers.

Pasha, M. and Samatar, A. (1996) ‘The Resurgence of Islam’, pp. 187-201 in J. Mittelman (ed) Globalization: Critical Reflections, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Patel, I. (1998) Mis/Representations of Islam: A Study of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, and ‘The Rushdie Affair’, http:/victoria.fortunecity.com/coldwater/439/rushdie.htm (accessed on 31st January, 2005).

Patton, M. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods (Second Edition), Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Pedersen, L. (1999) Newer Islamic Movements in Western Europe, London: Ashgate.

Pelletreau, R., Pipes, D. and Esposito, J. (1994) ‘Symposium: Resurgent Islam in the Middle East’, Middle East Policy, 3 (2): 1-21.

Pipes, D. (1983) In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power, New York: Basic Books.

______(1982) ‘Oil Wealth and Islamic Resurgence’, pp. 35-53 in A. Dessouki (ed) Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World, New York: Paeger Publications.

______(1980) ‘This World is Political!!: The Islamic Revival of the Seventies’, Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, 24: 17-39.

305 Piscatori, J. (1986) Islam in a World of Nation-state, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

______(1983) ‘Introduction’, in J. Piscatori (ed) Islam in the Political Process, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Platt, J. (1992) ‘Cases of Cases … of Cases’, pp. 21-52 in C. Ragin and H. Becker (eds) What is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Prince, R. (1975) ‘Cocoon Work’, pp. 255-274 in I. Zaretsky and M. Leone (eds) In Religious Movements in Contemporary America, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Qadri, M. (1971) Tablighi Jamaat Ka Tarikhi Ja’iza, : Maktaba-e-Muaviya.

Qur’an, (1938) English Translation by Abdullah Ali, Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf.

Qutb, S. (n.d.) (Revised Edition), Cedar Rapids: Unity Publishing.

Rahman, F. (1982) Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

______(1968) Islam, New York: Doubleday.

______(1967) ‘Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu’, , (6): 205-224.

Rajaee, F. (1993) ‘Islam and Modernity: The Reconstruction of an Alternative Shiite Islamic Worldview in Iran’, pp.103-125 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and Society: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume II), Chicago: The Chicago University Press.

306

Ramadan, T. (2002) ‘Islam and Muslims in Europe: A Silent Revolution Toward Rediscovery’, pp. 158-166 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rex, J. (1988) ‘The Urban Sociology of Religion and Islam in Birmingham’, pp. 206-218 in T. Gerholm and Y. Georg Lithman, (eds) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

Roald, A. (2002) ‘From People’s Home to Multiculturalism: Muslims in Sweden’, pp.101-120 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Roberts, M. and Davidson, J. (1984) ‘The Nature and Sources of Religious Involvement’, Review of Religious Research, 25 (4): 334-350.

Rodinson, M. (1987) Europe and the Mystique of Islam, Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Rosen, P. (1976) ‘Psychobabble’, New Times, (November): 49-58.

Rosenthal, E. (1965) Islam in the Modern Nation State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roy, O. (2004) Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, London: Hurts & Co.

______(2003) ‘EuroIslam: The Jihad Within?’, The National Interest, 65 (2): 63-73.

______(2001) The Failure of Political Islam, Translated by Carol Volk, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

307 Rozak, T. (1969) Making of a Counterculture, New York: Doubleday.

Saeed, A. (2003) Islam in Australia, Crows Nest: George Allen and Unwin.

Saeed, A. and Akbarzadeh, S. (2001) ‘Searching for Identity: Muslims in Australia’, pp. 1-11 in A. Saeed and S. Akbarzadeh (eds) Muslim Communities in Australia, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

Said, A. and Funk, N. (2001) ‘Islamic Revivalism: A Global Perspective’, in P. Mische and M. Merkling (eds) Towards a Global Civilisation?: The Contribution of Religions, Washington: Peter Lang.

Salem, N. (1984) Habib Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation of Tunisia, London: Croom Helm.

______(1980) ‘Islam and the Status of Women in Tunisia’, pp. 141-148 in F. Hussain (ed) Muslim Women, London: Croom Helm.

Sander, A. (1996) ‘The Status of Muslim Communities in Sweden’, in G. Nonneman, T. Niblock and B. Szajkowski (eds) Muslim Communities in the New Europe, London: Ithaca.

Sarantakos, S. (1998) Social Research (Second Edition), South Yarra: Macmillan Publishers.

Savage, T. (2004) ‘Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing’, The Washington Quarterly, 27 (3): 25-50.

Schutz, A. (1967) The Phenomenology of the Social World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

308 Shadid, W. and Van Koningsveld, S. (1996) ‘Politics and Islam in Western Europe: An Introduction’, pp. 1-14 in W. Shadid and P. Van Koningsveld (eds) Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House.

______(1996) ‘Dutch Political Views on the Multicultural Society’, pp. 93-113 in W. Shadid and S. Van Koningsveld (eds) Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House.

Shahin, E. (1997) Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa, Colorado: Westview Press.

Shakur, A. (1974) Tarikh-i-Meo , Nuh: Chaudhri Yasin Khan Meo High School.

Shams, S. (1983) Meos of Mewat, New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications.

Shepard, W. (1996) ‘Muslims in New Zealand’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 16 (2): 211-232.

Sidahmed, A. and Ehteshami, A. (1996) ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-15 in A. Sidahmed, and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder: Westview Press.

Sikand, Y. (2002) The Origins and Development of the Tablighi Jamaat (1920-2000): A Cross-country Comparative Study, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Simonsen, J. (2002) ‘Globalisation in Reverse and the Challenge of Integration: Muslims in Denmark’, pp. 121- 130 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

309 Sivan, E. (1995) ‘The Enclave Culture’, pp.11-68 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms Comprehended: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume V), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

______(1992) ‘The Islamic Resurgence: Civil Society Strikes Back’, pp. 96- 108 in L. Kaplan (ed) Fundamentalism in Comparative Perspective, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Slater, P. (1970) The Pursuit of Loneliness, : Beacon Press.

Smith, C. (1992) ‘The Intellectual, Islam, and Modernisation: Haykal and Shari’ati’, pp. 163-192 in J. Cole (ed) Comparing Muslim Societies: Knowledge and the State in a World Civilisation, : The Press.

Smith, J. (2002) ‘Introduction’, pp.3-16 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, W. (1957) Islam in Modern History, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spivak, G. (1990) The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, Edited by S. Harasym, New York: Routledge.

Stake, R. (1994) ‘Case Studies’, pp. 236-247 in N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (eds) Handbook of Qualitative Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Stark, R. (1981) ‘Must All Religions Be Supernatural?’, in B. Wilson (ed) The Social Impact of New Religious Movements, New York: Rose of Sharon Press.

Stark, R. and Bainbridge, W. (1980) ‘Towards a Theory of Religion: Religious Commitment’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 19 (2): 114-128

310 ______(1980b) ‘Networks of Faith: Interpersonal Bonds and Recruitment to Cult and Sects’, American Journal of Sociology, 85 (6): 1376-1395.

______(1979) ‘Of Churches, Sects, and Cults: Preliminary Concepts for a Theory of Religious Movements’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 18 (2): 117-133.

Statistics New Zealand (2002) 2001 Census of Population and Dwellings (Catalogue No. 22.117), Wellington: New Zealand Government.

Stowasser, B. (2002) ‘The Turks in Germany: From Sojourners to Citizens’, pp. 52-71 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taji-Farouki, S. (1996) ‘Islamic State Theories and Contemporary Realities’, pp.35-50 in A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder: Westview Press

Talib, M. (1998) ‘The Tablighis in the Making of Muslim Identity’, pp. 207-340 in M. Hasan (ed) Islam, Communities and the Nation: Muslim Identities in South Asia and Beyond. New Delhi: Manohar.

Tamadonfar, M.(1989) The Islamic Polity and Political Leadership: Fundamentalism, and Pragmatism, Boulder: Westview Press.

Tessler, M. (1997) ‘The Origins of Popular Support for Islamist Movements: A Political Economy Analysis’, in J. Entelis (ed) Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Thomas, W. and Thomas, D. (1928) The Child in America, New York: Knopf.

311 Tibi, B. (1996) ‘Islam, Hinduism and the Limited Secularity in India: A Model for Muslim-European Relations in the age of Migration?’, pp. 130-144 in W. Shadid and P. Van Koningsveld (eds) Muslims in the Margin: Political Responses to the Presence of Islam in Western Europe, Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing House.

______(1993) ‘The Worldview of Sunni Arab Fundamentalists: Attitudes Towards Modern Science and Technology’, pp. 73-102 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms and Society: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume II), Chicago: The Chicago University Press.

______(1990) Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change, Boulder: Westview Press.

______(1988) The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age, Translated by Judith von Sivers, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.

Toennies, F. (1955/1889) Community and Association, Translated by C. Loomis, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Travers, M. (2001) Qualitative Research Through Case Studies, London: Sage Publications.

Tripp, C. (1996) ‘Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East’, pp. 51-69 in A. Sidahmed and A. Ehteshami (eds) Islamic Fundamentalism, Boulder: Westview Press.

Troeltsch, E. (1931) The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches (Volume I), Translated by Olive Wyon, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Turner, B. (1974) Weber and Islam: A Critical Study, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

312

United States Department of State, Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 2003.

Van Den Berghe, P. (1981) The Ethnic Phenomenon, Westport: Elsevier.

Van der Veer, P. (1997) ‘“The Enigma of Arrival”: Hybridity and Multiplicity in the Global Space’, pp. 90-105 in P. Werbner and T. Modood (eds) Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multi-Cultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism, London: Zed Books.

Van Krieken, R., Habibis, P., McDonald, D., Haralambos, K. and Holborn, M. (2000) Sociology: Themes and Perspectives, French’s Forest: Pearson Education Australia Pty Ltd.

Vaughan, T. (1967) ‘Governmental Intervention in Social Research: Political and Ethical Dimensions in the Wichita Jury Recordings’, pp. 50-77 in G. Sjoberg (ed) Ethics, Politics, and Social Research, Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company.

Vertovec, S. (2002) ‘Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain’, pp. 19-35 in Y. Haddad (ed) Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Vidich, A. (1969) ‘Participant Observation and the Collection and Interpretation of Data’, pp. 78-87 in G. McCall and J. Simmons (eds) Issues in Participant Observation: A Text and Reader, Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Voll, J. (1991) ‘Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the ’, pp. 349-402 in M. Marty and R. Appleby (eds) Fundamentalisms Observed: The Fundamentalism Project (Volume I), Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

313 ______(1983) ‘Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah’, pp. 32-47 in J. Esposito (ed) Voices of Resurgent Islam, New York: Oxford University Press.

______(1982) Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, Boulder: Westview Press.

Waardenburg, J. (1988) ‘The Institutionalization of Islam in the , 1961-86’, pp. 8-31 in T. Gerholm and Y. Georg Lithman (eds) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

Wallis R. (1984) The Elementary Forms of the New Religious Life, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Wallis, R. and Bruce, S. (1986) ‘Accounting for Acrion: Defending the Common Sense ’, pp. 11-46 in R. Wallis and S. Bruce (eds) Sociological Theory, Religion, and Collective Action, Belfast: The Queen’s University.

Weber, M. (1966) The Sociology of religion, Translated by Ephraim Fischoff, London: Methuen & Co Ltd.

______(1946/1920-21) ‘The Social Psychology of the World Religions’, pp. 267- 301 in H. Gerth and C. Mills (eds) and Translated from , New York: Oxford University Press.

______(1930) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Unwin University Books.

Welch, M. (1977) ‘Analyzing Religious Sects: An Empirical Examination of Wilson’s Sect Typology’, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 16: 125-139.

314 Werbner, P. (2002) Imagined Diasporas Among Manchester Muslims: The Public Performance of Pakistani Transnational Identity Politics, Oxford: James Currey.

Westley, F. (1983) The Complex Forms of the Religious Life: A Durkheimian View of New Religious Movements, Chico: Scholars Press.

Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001) The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan, Albany: State University of New York Press.

Wilpert, C. (1988) ‘Religion and Ethnicity: Orientations, Perceptions and Strategies Among Turkish Alevi and Sunni Migrants in Berlin’, pp. 88-106 in T. Gerholm and Y. Georg Lithman (eds) The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, London: Mansell Publishing Limited.

Wilson, B. (1982) Religion in Sociological Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

______(1961) Sects and Society, London: William Heinemann.

Wimberley, D. (1984) ‘Socioeconomic Deprivation and Religious Salience: A Cognitive Behavioural Approach’, The Sociological Quarterly, 25 (2): 223-238.

Wolff, K. (1950) The Sociology of Georg Simmel, New York: Free Press.

Yasmeen, S. (2002) ‘Muslim Women as Citizens in Australia: Perth as a Case Study’, pp. 217-232 in Y. Haddad and J. Smith (eds) Muslim Minorities in the West: Visible and Invisible, Walnut Creek: Altamir Press.

Yassine, A. (2000), Winning the Modern World for Islam, Translated by Martin Jenni, City: Justice and Spirituality Publishing.

315 Yin, R. (1989) Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Revised Edition), Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Young, I. (1994) ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship’, pp. 386-408 in B. Turner and P.Hamilton (eds) Citizenship: Critical Concepts, London: Routledeg.

Younis, M. (2002) Liberation and Democratisation: The South African and Palestinian National Movements, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

______(1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Zubaida, S. (1993) Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East, London: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd.

316