Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006)
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This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. RAND COUNTERINSURGENCY STUDY • VOLUME 2 Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006) Bruce R. Pirnie, Edward O’Connell Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted in the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN 978-0-8330-4297-2 Cover Image Courtesy of 4th PSYOP Group, Ft. Bragg, NC The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. Cover Design by Stephen Bloodsworth © Copyright 2008 RAND Corporation All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2008 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface This monograph is one of a series produced as part of the RAND Cor- poration’s research project for the U.S. Department of Defense on how to improve U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities. It should be of interest to persons in the government who are concerned with COIN issues and to scholars working in this field. The project will culminate in a report that builds on these earlier efforts. As of spring 2007, when field research for this monograph was completed, Iraq appeared to have slid from insurgency into civil war. The U.S. failure to focus on the protection of the Iraqi population in the preceding four years had contributed significantly to the subse- quent increase in insurgency and sectarian violence. In the security vacuum that ensued, Iraqi citizens were forced to engage in a Faus- tian bargain—often looking to bad actors for protection—in order to survive. The failure of the United States and the Iraqi government to subdue the Sunni insurgency and prevent terrorist acts—punctuated by the 2006 destruction of the Golden Dome—produced an escala- tion of Shi’a militancy and sectarian killing by both militia and police death squads. However, by early 2008, when this monograph was published, the security situation in Iraq had started to stabilize due to a number of factors: a Sunni reaction to al Qaeda excesses, a pullback of Shi’a mili- tias from anti-Sunni violence and confrontation with coalition forces, a decrease in externally supplied armaments, and strides made by U.S. and Iraqi forces in gaining control of important areas in the country, including western provinces such as Anbar and parts of Baghdad. It iii iv Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006) should be noted that as of this publication date, it is still not clear how the political-security situation in Iraq will eventually turn out. In par- ticular, the authors maintain considerable doubt as to whether Iraq can reconcile the divisions between the Sunni, Shi’a, and Kurdish elements of the population. Nevertheless, the reduced level of violence as of early 2008 was an encouraging development. That said, the authors’ view is that our examination of U.S. politi- cal and military challenges in Iraq from 2003–2006 has important implications for improving future counterinsurgency strategy and capabilities. Iraq presents an example of a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihad- ists and persistent criminal opportunists—some combination of forces likely to be replicated in insurgencies in other troubled states in the future. In that sense, this monograph highlights national capability gaps which persist despite the adoption and improved execution of counterinsurgency methods in Iraq. This analysis was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Com- mands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on RAND’s International Security and Defense Policy Center, contact the director, James Dobbins. He can be reached by email at [email protected]; by phone at 703- 413-1100, extension 5134; or by mail at the RAND Corporation, 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, Virginia 22202-5050. More informa- tion about RAND is available at www.rand.org. Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv CHAPTER ONE Overview of the Conflict in Iraq............................................... 1 The Ba’athist Regime .............................................................. 2 The Invasion of Iraq................................................................ 5 The Occupation of Iraq............................................................ 9 The First Priority: Setting Up a Constitutional Government................10 The Spiral Downward Begins (Spring 2004) ..................................11 Benchmark One: Holding Iraqi Elections .....................................13 Islamic Extremist and Sectarian Violence Begin ..............................15 A U.S. Approach Hesitantly Unfolds ...........................................17 CHAPTER TWO Armed Groups in Iraq ..........................................................21 Overview .......................................................................... 22 Kurdish Separatists .............................................................. 24 Sunni Arab Insurgents............................................................25 Violent Extremists................................................................ 28 Shi’ite Arab Militias ..............................................................31 v vi Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003–2006) Criminal Gangs ...................................................................32 Insurgent Use of Terrorism ......................................................32 CHAPTER THREE Counterinsurgency in Iraq.....................................................35 Organization and Recognition of the U.S. COIN Effort Is Slow to Unfold ......................................................................35 Traditional U.S. Military Forces May Need to Be Adjusted................ 36 Fallujah.......................................................................... 38 Tal Afar ..........................................................................39