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Home , Alexis de Tocqueville

CHAPTER THREE

PROSPECTS FOR : / AS SOURCES OF ASSOCIATION/

It is a pity that the Federalist Papers, George Washington’s last Address to the Nation, and Alexis de Tocqueville’s (Tocqueville 2000) are considered models of political analysis, while starting somewhere in the last half of the 19th century Americans got used to politicians and their advisors spoon-feeding us with pablum instead of analysis. Woodrow Wilson had some responsibility for the failures of democracy in the generation aft er World War I, the rstfi of our many Wars to End All Wars. By telling how easy it is to have a Democracy, he got the Germans to surrender easily enough, without us having to cross the Rhine, then for years aft erward they would elab- orate on “stab in the back” doctrines once they decided they had been tricked and maybe they shouldn’t have surrendered so easily, partly because they discovered that democracy doesn’t really come that easy. It was to a large extent the good sense of European leadership aft er World War II that got at least Western and now Eastern Europe to cooperate, fi nally. We were gracious with our Marshall Plan to rebuild the European economy, and created markets for ourselves at the same time, but our political advice was they thought excessively simple, as it has been throughout the last century. It is the kind which President George W. Bush exemplifi ed with his “Th ey hate us for our ” explanation of why so much of the rest of the world is not like us; if only it were so simple life would be a lot easier. Let’s start from the beginning. Even in the 18th and early 19th cen- turies in Europe and America it was understood that the ancient republics were more than debating , and relied on patriotism and communal feeling to articulate issues, even though without party politics demagoguery was exceedingly common. For a long time mon- archy, especially a limited monarchy in the British mode, was idealized because it reduced the need for politics. For example, , the 18th century British philosopher and , was a monarchist for whom politics was so diffi cult to run properly that inherited leadership 44 chapter three at the top of the executive branch was considered a viable substitute. He likewise believed in the necessity of political patronage to grease the wheels of in those areas where politics was unavoida- ble. He also believed that government should rely on the people’s self- interest, on the ambition of notables, on processes of social conformity, and when necessary the use of force. Th is is all found in Explaining America: Th e Federalist (Wills 1981). For a while anyway, aft er the America’s top political lead- ers were more idealistic than their British counterparts and thought politics could be run without resort to fi gurehead leaders or complex patronage schemes. Th is didn’t last long, and the same things we criti- cized about the British Political Establishment, especially their resort to patronage schemes to serve the interests of professional politicians who forever lived off the public trough instead of being amateur politi- cians who would serve their neighbors and then get out, returned with a vengeance. For this analysis I am heavily in debt to Presidents Above Party: Th e First American Presidency, 1789–1829 (Ketcham 1987). As for the diff erences between ancient and modern democracy, they refl ect the modern concept of . In eff ect it is believed, especially in America, that democratic government should not be stressed by expecting too much from it. Partly this refl ects the religious of our culture producing a sense of sin that doesn’t trust leader or led to be given too much power for fear it will be abused. Also, because we have representative democracy rather than direct democracy, this induces an aristocratic element in , producing rule by notables at least in terms of wealth and power. Th us the question remains “Who will guard the guardians?” How eff ective are the controls which the mass of people have over those who represent them? Is democracy really the functional equivalent of mon- archy? Th en people vote for candidates which they know little about, and this off ers legitimacy to their rule as they pretty much do whatever they want, like in an elected monarchy. Or is democracy where people also set the agendas which they then vote on and thus legitimate through the act of voting? In the 18th century it was easy for elites to lose honor, partly by appearing to be dishonorable in a society at large that monitored such things (at least in Anglo-American culture, if less so in Continental Europe), partly through the checks and balances of fellow elite members who monitored and competed with them. Th e American ideal of republican virtue was taken from its British source, that the notables of the community should be chosen by