DOCSLIB.ORG

The Abolition of Emerson: the Secularization of America’S Poet-Priest and the New Social Tyranny It Signals

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Abolition of Emerson: the Secularization of America’S Poet-Priest and the New Social Tyranny It Signals THE ABOLITION OF EMERSON: THE SECULARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POET-PRIEST AND THE NEW SOCIAL TYRANNY IT SIGNALS A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Justin James Pinkerman, M.A. Washington, DC February 1, 2019 Copyright 2019 by Justin James Pinkerman All Rights Reserved ii THE ABOLITION OF EMERSON: THE SECULARIZATION OF AMERICA’S POET-PRIEST AND THE NEW SOCIAL TYRANNY IT SIGNALS Justin James Pinkerman, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Dr. Richard Boyd, Ph.D. ABSTRACT Motivated by the present climate of polarization in US public life, this project examines factional discord as a threat to the health of a democratic-republic. Specifically, it addresses the problem of social tyranny, whereby prevailing cultural-political groups seek to establish their opinions/sentiments as sacrosanct and to immunize them from criticism by inflicting non-legal penalties on dissenters. Having theorized the complexion of factionalism in American democracy, I then recommend the political thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson as containing intellectual and moral insights beneficial to the counteraction of social tyranny. In doing so, I directly challenge two leading interpretations of Emerson, by Richard Rorty and George Kateb, both of which filter his thought through Friedrich Nietzsche and Walt Whitman and assimilate him to a secular-progressive outlook. I argue that Rorty and Kateb’s political theories undercut Emerson’s theory of self-reliance by rejecting his ethic of humility and betraying his classically liberal disposition, thereby squandering a valuable resource to equip individuals both to refrain from and resist social tyranny. Indeed, the democratic cultures Rorty and Kateb envision foster a socially tyrannical disposition, giving rise to an inhospitable atmosphere in which someone espousing Emerson’s religious sensibility and transcendental moral realism would be persona non grata. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful to Dr. Richard Boyd, Dr. Bruce Douglass, and Dr. Joshua Cherniss for their service on my doctoral committee. Their feedback, guidance, and support have aided this project immeasurably. I wish to thank Dr. O. Bradley Bassler whose timely advice and encouragement nourished the incipient ideas from which this dissertation eventually emerged. Dr. Joshua Mitchell’s insights have spurred my thought and benefited my research. Dr. Marc Howard’s excellent teaching was a boon in the formative stages of this project. I am thankful to the Department of Government at Georgetown University for providing the resources enabling me to conduct this research. My wife, Rosie, has been wonderfully supportive throughout my graduate work. I am blessed to have her in my life. Also, I could never have carried this project to completion without the love, generosity, and steadfast encouragement of my parents, brother, sister, and in-laws. Lastly, I dedicate this dissertation to Olivia and Torrance, in the earnest hope that they will live as free persons in service of God. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ......................................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1: Informal Authority in a Democratic Regime and Social Tyranny as Informal Authoritarianism ............................................................................................................................22 Chapter 2: Legitimating Informal Authority in a Democratic Regime ..........................................61 Chapter 3: Richard Rorty and the Tyranny of Sentimental Authorities ........................................99 Chapter 4: An Emersonian Critique of Rorty’s Strong Poet ........................................................125 Chapter 5: An Emersonian Critique of Kateb’s Clear-Eyed, Sympathetically Receptive Poet ...153 Chapter 6: George Kateb and the Cultural Authoritarianism of Constitutional Democracy .......190 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................238 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................272 v Introduction I have the same objection to dogmatism in Reform as to dogmatism in Conservatism. —Ralph Waldo Emerson One of the earliest efforts to pressure Ralph Waldo Emerson into joining a movement for social reform was initiated by his brilliant, eccentric, and ardent aunt—Mary Moody Emerson. Displaying the evangelizing zeal of a recent convert to Garrisonian abolitionism, Aunt Mary took it upon herself to invite abolitionists George Thompson and Samuel J. May to dine at her nephew’s house for breakfast. Though irritated at Aunt Mary’s presumption, Emerson and his wife nonetheless accommodated the guests.1 To his aunt’s dismay, however, Emerson not only resisted their urgings to play a more active role in abolitionism, he positively disdained the inflexible manner in which Thompson discussed slavery. Or rather, Emerson was vexed that he could not properly discuss the topic, could not really be said to converse, with someone so single-minded in purpose and so tightly tethered to his opinion. Reflecting on the breakfast meeting, Emerson recorded an unflattering assessment of Thompson in his journal: [He] is inconvertible: what you say, or what might be said, would make no impress on him. He belongs, I fear, to that great class of the Vanity-stricken. An inordinate thirst for notice cannot be gratified until it has found in its gropings what is called a cause that men will bow to; tying himself fast to that, the small man is then at liberty to consider all objections made to him as proofs of folly and the devil in the objector….2 Though Emerson agreed with Thompson on the evils of slavery, he warily withstood enlistment into a movement that he felt both simplistically construed the issue and refused to tolerate difference of opinion as to the best means to end slavery. To be sure, Emerson respected radical abolitionists like Thompson, William Lloyd Garrison, and Wendell Phillips for their unswerving commitment to moral principle and for the 1 On the arrangement of Emerson’s meeting with Thompson and May, see Sandra Harbert Petrulionis, To Set This World Right: The Antislavery Movement in Thoreau’s Concord, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 15. 2 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson: 1820-1872, vol. 3, eds. Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910), 548. 1 eloquent arguments they advanced against slavery, even when threatened by mob violence. However, he strenuously opposed their reliance on direct, collective action along with their harsh, wrathful tone. Eighteen years after first meeting George Thompson, Emerson recorded thoughts on abolitionists of a similar ilk. Of Phillips, Garrison, and others I have always the feeling that they may wake up some morning and find that they have made a capital mistake, and are not the persons they took themselves for. Very dangerous is this thoroughly social and related life, whether antagonistic or cooperative. In a lonely world, or a world with half a dozen inhabitants, these would find nothing to do. The first discovery I made of Phillips was, that while I admired his eloquence, I had not the faintest wish to meet the man. He had only a platform-existence, and no personality. Mere mouthpieces of a party; take away the party and they shrivel and vanish. They are inestimable for workers on audiences; but for a private conversation, one to one, I much prefer to take my chance with that boy in the corner. “The Liberator” [Garrison’s abolitionist periodical] is a scold. A sibyl is quite another thing.3 Assessing the radical abolitionists, then, he acknowledges the rightness of their overriding moral principles and concedes their success in gaining adherents to the antislavery cause. Still, he neither fully adopts their perspective, which he deems prepossessed by one truth—the evil of slavery—to the exclusion of a host of others, nor their measures, which he thinks harsh and preclusive of both conversation and individuality.4 Emerson first spoke out against slavery publicly in November of 1837. His family and many members of his immediate social circle held abolitionist sentiments. In Massachusetts, however, a substantial portion of the population was averse to “agitation” of the slave question. Above all, many New Englanders wished to avoid provoking political conflict with the South 3 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson: 1820-1872, vol. 8, eds. Edward Waldo Emerson and Waldo Emerson Forbes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1912), 433-434. 4 In 1840, William Ellery Channing authored a tract, “Emancipation,” from which Emerson drew inspiration for an 1844 address on slavery. In the tract, Channing celebrates emancipation in the West Indies and sharply criticizes slavery. However, he refrains from villainizing Southerners in general, and he warns against forsaking truth for the sake of furthering a moral cause. “I know that there are those who consider all acknowledgment of the virtues of slave-holders, as treachery to the cause of freedom. But truth is truth and must always be spoken and trusted. To be just is a greater work than to free slaves, or propagate religion, or save souls. I have faith in no policy but that of simplicity
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Human Values Annual Review
    University Center for Human Values 304 Marx Hall Princeton, New Jersey 08544 The University Center for Human Values supports teaching, research, and discussion of ethics and human values throughout the curriculum and across the disciplines at Princeton University. Additional information about the University Center for Human Values can be found at http://uchv.princeton.edu or by calling (609) 258-4798. Human Values Annual Review 2011 “As someone with interests in both meta-level philosophy debates and more applied issues in normative ethics and political theory, the values and public life (VPL) program was a way for me to integrate these areas. The VPL program also afforded wonderful opportunities to attend lectures on the applied and academic areas of values—something that doesn’t often come together in certificate programs.” Shivani Radhakrishnan ’11, Philosophy Introducing a new Undergraduate Certifi cate Program in SOCIETY INDIVIDUALITY PLURALITY COMMUNITY CITIZEN NATION IDENTITY ETHICS MODERNITY RESPONSIBILITY CASUISTRY OBLIGATION CONSEQUENTIALISM LAW EQUALITY RIGHT WRONG DUTY SUPEREROGATORY RULES FAIRNESS UTILITY RECIPROCITY RULES EQUALITY JUSTICE COMPASSION CASUISTRY NATURAL LAW IMPERATIVE OBLIGATION SENTIMENTS FREEDOM DEMOCRACY SOCIETY INDIVIDUALITY COMMUNITY CITIZE NATION IDENTITY ETHICS MODERNITY RESPONSIBILITY CASUISTRY OBLIGATION CONSEQUENTIALISM LAW EQUALITY RIGHT WRONG DUTY SUPEREROGATORY RULES FAIRNESS UTILITY RECIPROCITY RULES FAIRNES EQUALITY JUSTICE COMPASSION CASUISTRY IMPERATIVE OBLIGATION SENTIMENTS FREEDOM DEMOCRACY
    [Show full text]
  • Seven Atheisms
    SEVEN ATHEISMS Andrew Walker SEVEN ATHEISMS Exploring the varieties of atheism in John Gray’s book Seven Types of Atheism Andrew Walker Emeritus Professor of Theology, Culture and Education, King’s College London Christian Evidence Society christianevidence.org Text copyright © Andrew Walker 2019 Published by the Christian Evidence Society, London, 2019 christianevidence.com All rights reserved Editing and design: Simon Jenkins Cover photograph by PhotoDu.de / CreativeDomainPhotography.com. Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0) license Contents Introduction 5 The seven atheisms 19th century atheism 6 Secular humanism 8 Science as religion 12 Modern politicial religion 15 God-haters 18 Atheism without progress 22 The atheism of silence 25 Conclusion 27 Index 30 Introduction John Gray’s Seven Types of Atheism (Allen Lane, 2018) is an important book for both religious and non-religious readers. John Gray, who describes himself as an atheist, is nevertheless critical of most versions of atheism. His attitude to atheism is the same as his attitude to certain types of religion. This attitude is predicated upon Gray’s conviction that human beings are intrinsically dissatisfied and unpredictable creatures who can never get along with each other for any length of time. His view is based on a reading of human nature that sails close to the wind of the Christian concept of original sin, and is out of step with most modern forms of atheism. In particular, Gray is allergic to any forms of cultural progress in human behaviour especially if they are couched in positivistic or evolutionary terms. 5 ATHEISM 1 19th century atheism Gray sets out his stall in his first chapter, ‘The New Atheism: A Nineteenth- century Orthodoxy’.
    [Show full text]
  • A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly
    Southern Illinois University Carbondale OpenSIUC Honors Theses University Honors Program 5-2002 The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses Recommended Citation Daly, Chris, "The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill" (2002). Honors Theses. Paper 131. This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact [email protected]. r The Boundaries of Liberalism in a Global Era: A Critique of John Stuart Mill Chris Daly May 8, 2002 r ABSTRACT The following study exanunes three works of John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Utilitarianism, and Three Essays on Religion, and their subsequent effects on liberalism. Comparing the notion on individual freedom espoused in On Liberty to the notion of the social welfare in Utilitarianism, this analysis posits that it is impossible for a political philosophy to have two ultimate ends. Thus, Mill's liberalism is inherently flawed. As this philosophy was the foundation of Mill's progressive vision for humanity that he discusses in his Three Essays on Religion, this vision becomes paradoxical as well. Contending that the neo-liberalist global economic order is the contemporary parallel for Mill's religion of humanity, this work further demonstrates how these philosophical flaws have spread to infect the core of globalization in the 21 st century as well as their implications for future international relations.
    [Show full text]
  • Christianity, Natural Law and the So-Called Liberal State
    Christianity, Natural Law and the So-called Liberal State James Gordley According to the Book of Genesis, “God said, ‘Let us make man in our image, after our likeness.’ So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.” (Gen. 1:26–7) Here, my former colleague Jeremy Waldron has said, is “a doctrine [that]is enormously attractive for those of us who are open to the idea of religious foundations for human rights.”1 What is special about man is that he is created in the image of God. Waldron noted that “[m]any object to the political use of any deep doctrine of this kind. For some, this is a special case of a Rawlsian commitment to standards of public reason generally.”2 He quotes Rawls: “In discussing constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines” but only to “plain truths now widely accepted, and available, to citizens generally.”3 I will come back to this objection later. Rawls’ claim is particularly important for present purposes since he has said the most about what other people can and cannot say in the public forum. Waldron’s own difficulty is with “the further question of what work [this doctrine] can do.”4 Why does it matter? He quoted Anthony Appiah who said, “[w]e do not have to agree that we are created in the image of God ... to agree that we do not want to be tortured by government officials.”5 Towards the end of his article Waldon noted that “[c]onsistently, for almost the whole of the Christian era imago Dei [the image of God] has been associated with man’s capacity for practical reason...”6 He quoted Thomas Aquinas: “man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God’s image.”7 I think if he had pursued this point further he could have answered his question.
    [Show full text]
  • From Liberalisms to Enlightenment's Wake
    JOURNAL OF IBERTARIAN TUDIES S L S JL VOLUME 21, NO. 3 (FALL 2007): 79–114 GRAY’S PROGRESS: FROM LIBERALISMS TO ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE JEREMY SHEARMUR The progress of that darkness . from its first approach to the period of greatest obscuration. William Robertson, History of the Reign of Charles the Fifth I HAVE KNOWN JOHN Gray for quite a few years, and have long admired his work. We were among the (very few) political theorists in the U.K. who, in the early 1970s, had an interest in the work of Hayek, and more generally in issues relating to classical liberalism. During the 1980s, he emerged as the most powerful and effective theorist of classical liberalism in the U.K., notably through his re- interpretations of John Stuart Mill in Mill on Liberty (1983a), his Hayek and Liberty (1984), and his overview and critical assessment of the lib- eral tradition, Liberalism (1986). We had, over the years, various dis- cussions about Hayek and liberalism—as Gray mentions in his Hayek on Liberty—and in that connection we shared many intellectual con- cerns; notably, with problems about how classical liberalism related to particular traditional cultures, and about the value of lives that did not involve autonomy in any significant sense. Our discussions about these and related matters were occasional, and typically by telephone or at Liberty Fund conferences. In the course of one of these conversations, I suggested to Gray that he might consider col- lecting some of his essays on liberalism into a volume, as he kindly JEREMY SHEARMUR is Reader in Philosophy at the Australian National University.
    [Show full text]
  • The Restless Liberalism of Alexis De Tocqueville
    FILOZOFIA ___________________________________________________________________________Roč. 72, 2017, č. 9 THE RESTLESS LIBERALISM OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE JAKUB TLOLKA, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK TLOLKA, J.: The Restless Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville FILOZOFIA, 72, No. 9, 2017, pp. 736-747 This essay attempts to contextualise the purported novelty of Alexis de Tocqueville’s particular brand of liberalism. It regards the author not as an heir or precursor to any given political tradition, but rather as a compelled syncretist whose primary philosophical concern was the moral significance of the democratic age. It suggests that Tocqueville devised his ‘new political science’ with a keen view to the existential implications of modernity. In order to support that suggestion, the essay explores the genealogy of Tocqueville’s moral and political thought and draws a relation between his analysis of democracy and his personal experience of modernity. Keywords: A. de Tocqueville – Modernity – Liberalism – Inquiétude – Religion Introduction. Relatively few authors in the history of political thought have produced an intellectual legacy of such overarching resonance as Alexis de Tocqueville. Even fewer, perhaps, have so persistently eluded ordinary analytical and exegetical frameworks, presenting to each astute observer a face so nuanced as to preclude serious interpretive consensus. As writes Lakoff (Lakoff 1998), ‘disagreement over textual interpretation in the study of political thought is not uncommon’. However, ‘it usually arises around those who left writings of a patently divergent character’ (p. 437). When we thus consider the ‘extraordinarily coherent and consistent nature’ of Alexis de Tocqueville’s political philosophy, it appears somewhat odd that the academic consensus surrounding that author relates almost exclusively to the grandeur of his intellectual achievement (Lukacs 1959, 6).
    [Show full text]
  • American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: an Appraisal of Alexis De Tocqueville’S Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D
    City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 2-2017 American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal and the Post-World War II Welfare State John P. Varacalli The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1828 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] AMERICAN CIVIL ASSOCIATIONS AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: AN APPRAISAL OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835- 1840) APPLIED TO FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S NEW DEAL AND THE POST-WORLD WAR II WELFARE STATE by JOHN P. VARACALLI A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Program in Liberal Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York 2017 © 2017 JOHN P. VARACALLI All Rights Reserved ii American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal and the Post World War II Welfare State by John P. Varacalli The manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Liberal Studies in satisfaction of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts ______________________ __________________________________________ Date David Gordon Thesis Advisor ______________________ __________________________________________ Date Elizabeth Macaulay-Lewis Acting Executive Officer THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii ABSTRACT American Civil Associations and the Growth of American Government: An Appraisal of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835-1840) Applied to Franklin D.
    [Show full text]
  • Alexis De Tocqueville Chronicler of the American Democratic Experiment
    Economic Insights FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS VOLUME 5, NUMBER 1 Alexis de Tocqueville Chronicler of the American Democratic Experiment The Early Years bring Tocqueville fame and honors. In Born in Paris in 1805, Alexis- 1833, about a year after Tocqueville We are pleased to add this piece on Charles-Henri Clérel de Tocqueville returned to France, the report on Alexis de Tocqueville to our series of profiles entered the world in the early and most American prisons, The U.S. Penitentiary powerful days of Napoleon’s empire. System and Its Application in France, that began with Frédéric Bastiat and Friedrich His parents were of the nobility and was published. von Hayek. Both Bastiat and Hayek were had taken the historical family name of Things in France changed for Beau- strong and influential proponents of indi- Tocqueville, which dated from the mont and Tocqueville upon their return early 17th century and was a region after 10 months in America. Both men vidual liberty and free enterprise. While they of France known previously as the left the judiciary. Beaumont was offi- approached those topics from a theoretical Leverrier fief. cially let go, and Tocqueville resigned perspective, Tocqueville’s views on early Tocqueville’s father supported the in sympathetic protest. Tocqueville then French monarchy and played no seri- had ample time to work on his master- American and French democracy were based ous role in public affairs until after piece, Democracy in America. Volume 1 on his keen personal observations and his- Napoleon’s final defeat at Waterloo, was published in 1835.
    [Show full text]
  • John Stuart Mill's Evaluations of Poetry
    JOHN STUART MILL'S EVALUATIONS OF POETRY AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON HIS INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT by MILLO RUNDLE THOMPSON SHAW B.A., University of British Columbia, 1949 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of English We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1971 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. Department of ENGLISH The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada Date October 1970 i JOHN STUART MILL'S EVALUATIONS OF POETRY AND THEIR INFLUENCE UPON HIS INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT ABSTRACT The education of John Stuart Mill was one of the most unusual ever planned or experienced. Beginning with his learning Greek at the age of three and con• tinuing without a break of any kind to the age of four• teen, it constituted an almost total control of Mill's every waking activity, with the important exception of his visit to France at fourteen, until his appoint• ment to the East India Company in 1823. It emphasized the "tabula rasa" theory, the effect of external cir• cumstances on the developing mind, Hartley's Associa- tionist theory, and the judicious use of the Utilitarian theories of the "pleasure-pain" principle.
    [Show full text]
  • Sovereignty of the Living Individual: Emerson and James on Politics and Religion
    religions Article Sovereignty of the Living Individual: Emerson and James on Politics and Religion Stephen S. Bush Department of Religious Studies, Brown University, 59 George Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA; [email protected] Received: 20 July 2017; Accepted: 20 August 2017; Published: 25 August 2017 Abstract: William James and Ralph Waldo Emerson are both committed individualists. However, in what do their individualisms consist and to what degree do they resemble each other? This essay demonstrates that James’s individualism is strikingly similar to Emerson’s. By taking James’s own understanding of Emerson’s philosophy as a touchstone, I argue that both see individualism to consist principally in self-reliance, receptivity, and vocation. Putting these two figures’ understandings of individualism in comparison illuminates under-appreciated aspects of each figure, for example, the political implications of their individualism, the way that their religious individuality is politically engaged, and the importance of exemplarity to the politics and ethics of both of them. Keywords: Ralph Waldo Emerson; William James; transcendentalism; individualism; religious experience 1. Emersonian Individuality, According to James William James had Ralph Waldo Emerson in his bones.1 He consumed the words of the Concord sage, practically from birth. Emerson was a family friend who visited the infant James to bless him. James’s father read Emerson’s essays out loud to him and the rest of the family, and James himself worked carefully through Emerson’s corpus in the 1870’s and then again around 1903, when he gave a speech on Emerson (Carpenter 1939, p. 41; James 1982, p. 241).
    [Show full text]
  • The Contradiction of Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism
    The contradiction of classical liberalism and libertarianism blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2017/02/01/the-contradiction-of-classical-liberalism-and-libertarianism/ 2/1/2017 A standard assumption in policy analyses and political debates is that classical liberal or libertarian views represent a radical alternative to a progressive or egalitarian agenda. In the political arena, classical liberalism and libertarianism often inform the policy agenda of centre-right and far- right parties. They underpin laissez-faire policies and reject any redistributive action, including welfare state provisions and progressive taxation. This is motivated by a fundamental belief in the value of personal autonomy and protection from (unjustified) external interference, including from the state. It is difficult to overestimate the philosophical and political relevance of classical liberalism and libertarianism. President Trump’s proposal to repeal the “Affordable Care Act (Obamacare)”, for example, is clearly inspired by a libertarian philosophical outlook whereby “No person should be required to buy insurance unless he or she wants to” (Healthcare Reform to Make America Great Again ). More generally, in the last four decades the political consensus, and the spectrum of policy proposals and outcomes, has significantly moved in a less interventionist, more laissez faire direction. The centrality of classical liberal and libertarian views has been such that the historical period after the end of the 1970s – following the election of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Reagan in the US – has come to be known as the “Neoliberal era”. Yet the very coherence of the classical liberal and libertarian view of society, and its consistency with the fundamental tenets of modern democracies, have been questioned.
    [Show full text]
  • Habits Matter
    LivingstonCPSA2008.doc (may 12/2008) On the Micropolitical Alex Livingston Department of Political Science University of Toronto [email protected] DRAFT. Do not cite or circulate without the author’s permission. I. Introduction A turn to micropolitics appears to be going on in contemporary American political theory. Defined in its broadest terms, micropolitics is a politics of the ordinary that politicises habits, dispositions, feelings, the body, emotions, and thinking as potential sites of domination and resistance below the hallowed heights of liberal principles of justice. The claim of micropolitics is that justice talk, whether liberal, communitarian or otherwise, is insufficient if it remains narrowly confined to the ordering of basic institutions or of the idea of a political community as such. More everyday and ubiquitous practices and attitudes work to realize or hinder the potential of principles and institutions. And at this lower register, new conceptions of action, judgment, and responsibility are needed. In a recent edited volume Jane Bennett and Michael J. Shapiro define the substance of this turn as follows, “In sum, to engage in micropolitics is to pay attention to the connections between affective registers of experience and collective identities and practices. The aim is to encourage a more intentional project of reforming, refining, intensifying, or disciplining the emotions, aesthetic impulses, urges, and moods that enter into one’s political programs, party affiliations, ideological commitments, and policy preferences.”1 Defined as such, this could include a Foucaultian micropolitics of capillary power and arts of resistance, a Benjaminian micropolitics of capitalist phantasmagoria and redemptive critique, or even an Aristotelian micropolitics of the prior associations of the polis and virtuous self-cultivation.
    [Show full text]