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Object of Cognition in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti

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Object of Cognition in Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 Number 1–2 2007 (2009) The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (ISSN 0193-600XX) is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. As a peer-reviewed journal, it welcomes scholarly contributions pertaining to all facets of Buddhist EDITORIAL BOARD Studies. JIABS is published twice yearly. KELLNER Birgit Manuscripts should preferably be sub- KRASSER Helmut mitted as e-mail attachments to: [email protected] as one single fi le, Joint Editors complete with footnotes and references, in two diff erent formats: in PDF-format, BUSWELL Robert and in Rich-Text-Format (RTF) or Open- Document-Format (created e.g. by Open CHEN Jinhua Offi ce). COLLINS Steven Address books for review to: COX Collet JIABS Editors, Institut für Kultur- und GÓMEZ Luis O. Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen- HARRISON Paul Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Wien, AUSTRIA VON HINÜBER Oskar Address subscription orders and dues, changes of address, and business corre- JACKSON Roger spondence (including advertising orders) JAINI Padmanabh S. to: KATSURA Shōryū Dr Jérôme Ducor, IABS Treasurer Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures KUO Li-ying Anthropole LOPEZ, Jr. Donald S. University of Lausanne MACDONALD Alexander CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland email: [email protected] SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina Web: http://www.iabsinfo.net SEYFORT RUEGG David Fax: +41 21 692 29 35 SHARF Robert Subscriptions to JIABS are USD 40 per STEINKELLNER Ernst year for individuals and USD 70 per year for libraries and other institutions. For TILLEMANS Tom informations on membership in IABS, see back cover. Cover: Cristina Scherrer-Schaub Font: “Gandhari Unicode” designed by Andrew Glass (http://andrewglass.org/ fonts.php) © Copyright 2009 by the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. Print: Ferdinand Berger & Söhne GesmbH, A-3580 Horn JIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 30 Number 1–2 2007 (2009) Obituaries Georges-Jean PINAULT In memoriam, Colette Caillat (15 Jan. 1921 – 15 Jan. 2007) . 3 Hubert DURT In memoriam, Nino Forte (6 Aug. 1940 – 22 July 2006) . 13 Erika FORTE Antonino Forte – List of publications . 17 Articles Tao JIN The formulation of introductory topics and the writing of exegesis in Chinese Buddhism . 33 Ryan Bongseok JOO The ritual of arhat invitation during the Song Dynasty: Why did Mahāyānists venerate the arhat? . 81 Chen-Kuo LIN Object of cognition in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti: On the controversial passages in Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s translations . 117 Eviatar SHULMAN Creative ignorance: Nāgārjuna on the ontological signifi - cance of consciousness . 139 Sam VA N SCHAIK and Lewis DONEY The prayer, the priest and the Tsenpo: An early Buddhist narrative from Dunhuang . 175 2 CONTENTS Joseph WALSER The origin of the term ‘Mahāyāna’ (The Great Vehicle) and its relationship to the Āgamas . 219 Buddhist Studies in North America Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 23–28 June 2008 Guest editor: Charles S. Prebish Charles S. PREBISH North American Buddhist Studies: A current survey of the fi eld . 253 José Ignacio CABEZÓN The changing fi eld of Buddhist Studies in North America . 283 Oliver FREIBERGER The disciplines of Buddhist Studies – Notes on religious commitment as boundary-marker. 299 Luis O. GÓMEZ Studying Buddhism as if it were not one more among the religions . 319 • Notes on contributors. 345 OBJECT OF COGNITION IN DIGNĀGA’S ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀVṚTTI: ON THE CONTROVERSIAL PASSAGES IN PARAMĀRTHA’S AND XUANZANG’S TRANSLATIONS* CHEN-KUO LIN 1. Introduction There are four Chinese translations of Dignāga’s Ālamba na pa rī kṣā- vṛtti. The earliest translation, Wuxiang sichen lun, by Paramārtha, is dated between 557 and 569 C.E. The second one, Guan suoyu- anyuan lun, by Xuanzang, was done in 657. The third one, com- pleted in 710, was included in Yijing’s translation of Dharmapāla’s Commentary, Guan suoyuan lunshi. The last version, by Lü Cheng, was translated from the Tibetan in 1928.1 In Lü’s work, all four versions are arranged in parallel form for convenience of compari- son. Lü concluded that, as far as the original text was concerned, Para mārtha’s version and the Tibetan version were very similar, while Xuanzang’s version was rather close to Yijing’s.2 A similar comparison by Ui Hakuju was conducted in 1958 partially on the basis of Lü’s contribution.3 * Acknowledgements: This article is indebted to Professor Shoryu Kat- sura’s invaluable instruction in several occasions of discussion. It is also ben- efi ted from Professor Chien-hsing Ho’s comments and Carlo Harris’ edito- rial assistance. 1 Lü & Yincang 1928. 2 Lü 1928: 34. 3 Ui 1958: 13–14. Yamaguchi Susumu also acknowledged his indebted- ness to Lü’s exegetical reading of Dharmapāla’s text. See Yamaguchi & No- zawa 1965: 413–414. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 29 • Number 2 • 2006 (2008) pp. 117–138 118 CHEN-KUO LIN Regarding the content, however, it is quite obvious that Xuan- zang followed Dharmapāla’s Commentary, claiming that the object of cognition in Dignāga’s critique of realism referred to the fi ve kinds of sensory objects. By contrast, in Paramārtha’s translation the object of cognition is said to consist in the six kinds of objects, including the object of mental consciousness (manovijñāna).4 Al- though Dignāga’s original Sanskrit text was no longer extant, we are quite sure that, as agreed in both the Tibetan and Yijing’s trans- lations, Dignāga did not specify the scope of the cognitive objects in his critique of realism. Here arises the question: Is the textual discrepancy between the two translations a minor issue? Or is it rather a critical sign of an interpretative diff erence in Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s concep- tion of Dignāga’s epistemology? I shall argue in this article that the discrepancy cannot be overlooked, for both Paramārtha’s and Xuanzang’s translations are quite consistent in themselves with re- gard to whether fi ve kinds or six kinds of the object of cognition should be subject to investigation. It is obvious that these diff er- ences were deliberately maintained in both translations. Now, how do we explain this interpretative diff erence? The key to answer this question is to explain how the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness was conceived diff erently in Buddhist episte- mology during the fi fth and sixth centuries, especially in the debate between the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools. If the object of mental consciousness is regarded as externally real, it should be subject to the same criticism that Dignāga had launched against re- alists. On the other hand, if it is not externally real, there is no need to include it as the target of investigation. In other words, we should 4 In Paramārtha’s translation, the treatise is directed to “those who claim that the six kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness, etc., are caused by the external objects” (若有人執眼等六識緣外境起), while in Xu- anzang’s translation the treatise is rather directed to “those who would re- gard external matter (rūpa) as the known object (ālambana) and the cause (pratyaya) of the fi ve kinds of consciousness, such as visual consciousness, etc.” (若有諸欲令眼等五識以外色作所緣緣者). See T.31.1619.882c; 888b. OBJECT OF COGNITION 119 be more concerned with the epistemological arguments about the ontological status of the object of mental consciousness than with the diff erences between the various translations of Dignāga’s text. There are two approaches that may be employed to solve the foregoing problem. The fi rst is to look into Dignāga’s other works, especially Nyāyamukha and Pramāṇasamuccaya, with the hope that we may fi nd an explanation in some doctrinal clues. The sec- ond approach is to contextualize the whole issue within the Indian Buddhist scholastic debate, mainly between Sarvāstivāda and Sau- trāntika, about the ontological status of the cognitive object. Hypo- thetically, I believe that Dignāga, just like his Yogācāra predeces- sors, conducted his epistemological analysis by engaging with both contemporary Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers. That this approach is a better choice can be confi rmed through Dignāga’s Pra mā ṇasamuccaya, where he vigorously responded to the chal- lenges from Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, and Mīmāṃsā.5 In the Ālam banaparīkṣāvṛtti, however, Dignāga took Buddhist realists as the main antagonists, arguing that the Buddhist realist atomic the- ory fails to explain the object of cognition. This way of reading is also confi rmed in Chinese Yogācāra literature, especially in Kuiji’s Weishi ershilun shuji and Chengweishilun shujii, Taixian’s Cheng- weishilun xueji (and Huizhao’s Chengweishilun liaoyideng).6 The elaboration of these issues in the discussion that follows is divided into three parts: (1) Firstly, I provide a brief account of the main thesis in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti. (2) Then I use Dharmapāla’s Commentary to explain the rationale for Xu- anzang’s exclusion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness in Dignāga’s argument. (3) Thirdly, I explore the doctrinal debate about the ontological status of the cognitive object in Buddhist di- rect realism (Sarvāstivāda), indirect realism (Sautrāntika) and epis- temological idealism (Yogācāra). In the last section I look for some 5 For a comprehensive view of Dignāga’s philosophical enterprise within the Indian philosophical and religious context, see Dan Arnold, 2005. 6 See Lü 1928: 39. 120 CHEN-KUO LIN doctrinal clues to explain the raison d’être for Paramārtha’s inclu- sion of the cognitive object of mental consciousness. 2. Main theses in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti What is the object of cognition (ālambana)? This is the question addressed in Dignāga’s Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, a small treatise that contains 900 words in Xuanzang’s translation.
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