THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE POLICY 1997–2010: AN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS by MARTIN MONAHAN A thesis submitted to The University of Birmingham for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Political Science and International Studies College of Social Sciences The University of Birmingham 2013 University of Birmingham Research Archive e-theses repository This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or as modified by any successor legislation. Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged. Further distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission of the copyright holder. Abstract This thesis uses historical institutionalism (HI) to explain why social justice policy became an important focus for change in the 1997–2010 Conservative Party, how this policy changed, and why radical ideological change did not take place. Utilising interviews with mid- and elite-level Party actors, and analysis of policy publications, this thesis maps the restrictive and enabling effect of material and ideational institutional structures. It introduces new HI theoretical mechanisms of path tendency within path dependency, and confluence junctures, as key processes; neutral and mimicry invasion as key sources of new policy; and policy and institutional entrepreneurs as key types of actor. It couples these newly defined terms to present mechanisms in HI to offer an explanation that down-plays Cameron as a significant break from past ideological practice: rather there has been broad continuity throughout the opposition period, which, rather than being restrictive, has facilitated incremental policy change, largely emerging slowly from mid-level actors in the Party. The thesis contributes to debates in the study of British politics by offering a theoretical and institutionally focused explanation rather than prioritising descriptive and personality focused work. It also develops HI, improving its explanation of incremental change in a non-crisis institutional environment. Acknowledgments I am extremely grateful to the following for their respective pecuniary, interlocutory, advisory, domiciliary, amatory, and sartorial support: The Economic and Social Research Council for a +3 studentship; Dr Peter Kerr and Dr Stephen Bates; Mary Kaye and Tony Kaye; Kevin Monahan and Maggie Jennings; Pamela Welsby and John Welsby; Mark Kaye and Harry Kaye; Richard Monahan and Zoë Monahan; Susan Monahan; Simon Allsop; all those who generously agreed to be interviewed; the staff and students of POLSIS. And also thank you to Alison Welsby. Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 1.1. Rationale for research ............................................................................. 1 1.2. An overview of the argument and structure of the thesis ....................... 5 2. A Review of the Literature on the Post-1997 Conservative Party ............. 8 2.1. Campaigning, marketing, and elections ................................................ 13 2.2. Leadership elections and leaders........................................................... 21 2.3. Ideology, policy and factions ................................................................ 30 2.4. Party organization ................................................................................. 47 2.5. Political party adaptation ...................................................................... 57 3. Historical Institutionalism ........................................................................ 71 3.1. Introduction to theoretical framework .................................................. 71 3.2. The mechanisms of historical institutionalism (HI) .............................. 76 3.3. The limits of rational choice institutionalism (RCI) ........................... 105 3.4. Learning from sociological institutionalism (SI) ................................ 109 3.5. Generating an hypothesis .................................................................... 119 4. Methodology .......................................................................................... 123 5. Empirical Study...................................................................................... 131 5.1. The Conservative Party and Social Justice Policy .............................. 133 5.2. There is no critical-juncture here: uncertainty not crisis..................... 138 5.3. Radical change shut out: expunging ideological entrepreneurs .......... 153 5.4. Incremental change can take place: the role of path tendency ........... 165 5.5. The path tendency of small “c” Christianity ....................................... 171 5.6. The parallel rise of other mid-level policy entrepreneurs ................... 196 5.7. The incremental change of material structures ................................... 210 5.8. Le eminences grise—the action of elite policy entrepreneurs ............. 220 5.9. Path tendencies and an institutional entrepreneur ............................... 233 5.10. The role of environmental contingency in a confluence juncture ..... 255 6. Conclusion ............................................................................................. 269 Bibliography............................................................................................... 277 Abbreviations HI Historical Institutionalism RCI Rational Choice Institutionalism SI Sociological Institutionalism CCO Conservative Central Office CCHQ Conservative Campaign Head Quarters PPC Prospective Parliamentary Candidate PCP Parliamentary Conservative Party CCF Conservative Christian Fellowship LSE London School of Economics RSA Royal Society of Arts IEA Institute of Economic Affairs SMF Social Market Foundation CPS Centre for Policy Studies CSJ Centre for Social Justice 1. Introduction 1.1. Rationale for research When the Conservative Party returned to power in May 2010 it finally left behind thirteen years of unfamiliar opposition. It was by no means a triumphal return, and the visual of Cameron’s somewhat stoical entry into Downing Street was far removed from Blair’s new dawn breaking. Rather than enjoying a landslide, or even a healthy working majority, the Conservatives experienced a subdued stumble over the finish line aided by the supporting shoulder of the Liberal Democrats. Can it be said that the opposition period was one of reflection and renewal, and, as a consequence, that the UK voter was offered at the 2010 election a reinvigorated and changed party? If this were so—and indeed the Party itself was keen that this be projected—then it was a change that was not wholly embraced by the electorate, though, indeed, not wholly rejected, either. But it is possible that the ambivalent endorsement evidenced in the Party’s election performance was a result of a public impression that the Tories had not adequately changed. My aim in this thesis is to understand how, and to what extent, the Party had changed on the way back to government. To do this it is necessary that we examine the entire period of Conservative opposition since 1997. In doing so we can understand the nature of the Conservative Party; and what difficulties the Party’s successive leaderships experienced during opposition to direct the Party once again towards the power they had coveted for so long. In particular, I focus on social justice policy, as 1 emblematic of wider considerations of change, or resistance to change, within the Party. However, though this policy forms a guiding through line, it cannot be understood in isolation—therefore, it is linked to changes in economic policy, marketing, organisational structure, the electoral environment and the actions of elite and mid-level actors in the Party. The extent of the electoral challenge facing the Conservatives after the first Labour landslide was considerable. In 1997 the Party suffered its biggest defeat of the mass democratic era when they secured only 165 seats and 30.7 per cent of the vote (Crowson 2001: 52). Many experienced ministers lost their seats, such as Michael Portillo, David Mellor, and Malcolm Rifkind, and not a single MP was returned from either Scotland or Wales. In response to this unequivocal public rejection, John Major immediately resigned as leader leaving a dazed and injured Party behind him. It was the nadir of the Conservatives’ electoral history and the Party, as it launched quickly into a divisive leadership election, appeared in disarray as to the direction it wished now to take. It was believed by some that the moment held the possibility of rapid renewal and significant change in the image, policies, and even ideology of the Party. But many were also cautious that the heady days of post-defeat should not lead to change for change’s sake; even Michael Portillo (1997), who would go on to be a persistent voice of modernisation in the coming years, counselled in a Conference fringe speech following the Labour victory, that ‘there is much for the Conservative Party to learn and to put right. We shall do it. But that is not to say that everything that we did in the past was wrong. Very far from it...’ And yet what the Party presented to the electorate in 2001 and 2005 was largely similar,