DOCSLIB.ORG

ABSTRACT Moral Particularism, Aquinas, and the Problem Of

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
ABSTRACT Moral Particularism, Aquinas, and the Problem Of ABSTRACT Moral Particularism, Aquinas, and the Problem of Context-Dependence: A Formal Solution to a Material Puzzle David T. Echelbarger, Ph.D. Mentors: Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., and Darin H. Davis, Ph.D. This dissertation is a historically informed response to what I call the problem of context-dependence. The problem of context-dependence is a problem for moral philosophy that stems from the fact that the rightness or wrongness of an action seems to be dependent upon the context in which it occurs. Moral particularists, such as Jonathan Dancy, use the context-dependence of rightness and wrongness to cast doubt upon our ability to formulate universally true moral principles. I contend that this is troublesome because if it is true that moral principles might not apply to all cases, then worries arise about our ability to understand and rationally navigate the moral domain. In response to this concern, I argue that it is possible to solve the problem of context-dependence by retrieving a neglected understanding of the structure of morality from Thomas Aquinas—namely his view that each instance of right and wrong is a composite of formal and material elements. I maintain that this distinction allows Aquinas to embrace the variability of right and wrong acts at the material level, while maintaining that all right actions share the same general form. In turn, the notion that right and wrong actions are made right by intelligible universal forms restores confidence in our ability to articulate and defend moral principles. Copyright © 2014 by David T. Echelbarger All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. viii DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................x PART I. THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE CHAPTER ONE: Getting to the Heart of the Matter: The Problem of Context- Dependence and Particularist Criticisms of Moral Principles ....2 1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................2 2. Moral Generalism .....................................................................................................9 3. Particularist Critiques of Generalism ...................................................................14 4. Finding the Center of the Debate: Why Ethical Theorists Must Examine the Relationship between Principles and Moral Explanations ........................18 CHAPTER TWO: Explanations in Ethics: Assessing Non-Principled Approaches to Ethical Theory .............................................................................25 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................25 2. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice .......................................................................26 3. Non-Principled Approaches to Ethical Theory ..................................................30 3.1. Statistical Generalizations ...............................................................................31 3.2. Defeasible Generalizations .............................................................................34 3.3. Dancy’s Particularist Approach to Explanations ........................................42 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................44 CHAPTER THREE: How Deep a Problem? Evaluating Particularist Challenges to Moral Principles ......................................................................46 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................46 2. Holism: Establishing Context-Dependence ........................................................46 3. Resultance: From Holism to Particularism .........................................................51 v 4. ‘Right’ as Resultance: A Remaining Possibility ..................................................60 4.1. Shape and Narrative: The Intermediate Layer of Resultance....................62 4.2. The Possibility of Shape-Based Principles ....................................................64 4.3. The Viability of Shape-Based Principles .......................................................68 5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................74 PART II. OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: FORM AND MATTER IN ETHICAL THEORY CHAPTER FOUR: Form and Matter in Moral Explanations ....................................77 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................77 2. From Resultance to Form and Matter: A Terminological Shift ........................80 2.1. Hume’s Misplaced ‘Gap’: Kovesi’s Objection to the Division Between Fact and Value ..................................................................................................80 2.2. Dancy’s Parallel Argument ............................................................................85 2.3. Parallel Arguments, Corresponding Vocabularies: Linking Resultance with Form and Matter .....................................................................................87 3. Formal Elements as Holistic Shapes.....................................................................89 4. Formal Explanations Amidst Material Variability: The Open-Texturedness of Moral Concepts ...................................................................................................90 5. Form and Matter in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: Principles Rules, and Rules of Thumb ...............................................................................................94 6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................101 CHAPTER FIVE: Aquinas’s Formal Solution to a Material Puzzle .......................103 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................103 2. Encountering the Problem of Context-Dependence in Aquinas’s De malo ..105 3. Aquinas’s Solution: An Initial Sketch ................................................................108 3.1. Reply to Objection 13: Material Variability Amidst Formal Consistency .....................................................................................................109 3.2. Reply to Objection 2: Generic Acts Appear Morally Indifferent Because Their Formal Narratives Are Incomplete ....................................112 3.3. Reply to Objection 5: Viewed Formally, Circumstances Are Not Accidents .........................................................................................................114 vi 3.4. Two Remaining Questions ...........................................................................116 4. Aquinas on the Universal Forms of ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong ................................118 5. The Formal Specification of Individual Acts ....................................................128 5.1. Ends as the Source of Form and Species .....................................................131 5.1.1. Final Ends as the Primary Source of Moral Forms .............................134 5.1.2. Non-Consequentialist Ends ...................................................................136 5.2. The Role of Material Objects within an Act’s Formal Narrative .............143 5.3. Formal Specification through Material Circumstances ............................147 6. Implications for Moral Practice ...........................................................................152 7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................157 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................................160 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I first owe thanks to my parents, David and Christine Echelbarger, who taught me to care about life’s enduring questions. Their guidance led me to St. Norbert College, where I was formally introduced to the liberal arts. My experience at St. Norbert set me upon the path that culminated with this dissertation. I neither would have undertaken, nor completed this journey if it were not for their unwavering affirmation that a Ph.D. in philosophy is a worthy and noble goal. I dedicate this work to them. I began studying philosophy as an undergraduate with Darin Davis. He also taught the last class of my Ph.D. coursework here at Baylor University and co-directed this dissertation. It was in his class on moral particularism that the ideas for my project began to take shape. For nearly eleven years now, he has been my philosophical, spiritual, pedagogical, and personal mentor. He has also been a great friend. I would like to thank him for all that he has done on my behalf. I am especially grateful for his fraternal advice and for believing in me. His presence in my life is undeniably providential. I would like to thank Thomas Hibbs, also co-director of my dissertation, for his guidance and encouragement of my work. His direction was instrumental, especially during the final stages of writing. My committee members, Michael Beaty, Robert Kruschwitz, and David Jeffrey are equally viii worthy of acknowledgment. I am indebted to them for their suggestions, support, and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Understanding Human Sexuality in John Paul II's Theology of the Body
    Duquesne University Duquesne Scholarship Collection Electronic Theses and Dissertations Spring 5-6-2016 Understanding Human Sexuality in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: An Analysis of the Historical Development of Doctrine in the Catholic Tradition John Segun Odeyemi Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd Recommended Citation Odeyemi, J. (2016). Understanding Human Sexuality in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: An Analysis of the Historical Development of Doctrine in the Catholic Tradition (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1548 This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. UNDERSTANDING HUMAN SEXUALITY IN JOHN PAUL II’S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION. A Dissertation Submitted to Duquesne University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By John Segun Odeyemi May 2016 Copyright by John Segun Odeyemi 2016 UNDERSTANDING HUMAN SEXUALITY IN JOHN PAUL II’S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION. By John Segun Odeyemi Approved on March 31, 2016 _______________________________ __________________________ Prof. George S. Worgul Jr. S.T.D., Ph.D. Dr. Elizabeth Cochran Professor of Theology Associate Professor of Theology (Dissertation Director) (Committee Member) ________________________________ ________________________________ Rev. Dr. Gregory I. Olikenyen C.S.Sp. Dr. James Swindal Assistant Professor of Theology Dean, McAnulty College and Graduate (Committee Member) School of Liberal Arts iii DEDICATION In honor of my dearly beloved parents on the 50th anniversary of their marriage, (October 30th, 1965 – October 30th 2015) Richard Tunji and Agnes Morolayo Odeyemi.
    [Show full text]
  • Failings of Strong Moral Particularism
    University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections Critical Reflections 2015 Mar 28th, 10:30 AM - 11:00 AM Failings of Strong Moral Particularism Timothy Grainger Mr Carleton University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance Part of the Philosophy Commons Grainger, Timothy Mr, "Failings of Strong Moral Particularism" (2015). Critical Reflections. 3. https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance/2014/eos2014/3 This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Critical Reflections by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1 The Failings of Strong Particularism Timothy Grainger Jonathan Dancy has without a doubt raised important meta-ethical issues with traditional principle based ethical system, but he has also over stepped and taken up a position that he cannot defend. On one hand Dancy creates a strong argument for the need of context to play a role in ethical decision making and on the other hand he argues against the ability for principles to have any justified role in moral decision making. This paper will discuss the issues facing Dancy’s extreme rejection of principle, be it his utter rejection of moral principle or simply his rejection that any moral principle can ever be justified, and argue that such a stance is both unproductive and incoherent. Before attempting to dismantle Dancy’s position it is important to see why he should not be discounted altogether. Dancy’s particularism is motivated through two distinct paths; the idea that there is need for contextual sensitivity in ethical matters, and a belief that reasons are always holistic in nature.
    [Show full text]
  • Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17, No. 2
    Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy Volume XVII · Number 2 April 2020 Articles 103 Social Reform in a Complex World Jacob Barrett 133 Freedom and Actual Interference Jonah Goldwater 159 Do We Have Reasons to Obey the Law? Edmund Tweedy Flanigan 198 The Ambitions of Consequentialism Brian McElwee Discussions 219 Error Theory, Unbelievability, and the Normative Objection Daniele Bruno 228 Does Initial Appropriation Create New Obligations? Jesse Spafford Journal of Ethics Social Philosophy http://www.jesp.org & TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (issn 1559-3061) is a peer-reviewed online journal in moral, social, political, and legal philosophy. The journal is founded on the principle of publisher-funded open access. There are no publication fees for authors, and public access to articles is free of charge and is available to all readers under the Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 license. Funding for the journal has been made possible through the generous commitment of the Gould School of Law and the Dornsife College of Letters, Arts, and Sciences at the University of Southern California. TheJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy aspires to be the leading venue for the best new work in the fields that it covers, and it is governed by a correspondingly high editorial standard. The journal welcomes submissions of articles in any of these and related fields of research. The journal is interested in work in the history of ethics that bears directly on topics of contemporary interest, but does not consider articles of purely historical interest. It is the view of the associate editors that the journal’s high standard does not preclude publishing work that is critical in nature, provided that it is constructive, well- argued, current, and of sufficiently general interest.
    [Show full text]
  • Reasons and Moral Principles
    This is a repository copy of Reasons and Moral Principles. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/76787/ Version: Accepted Version Book Section: Väyrynen, P orcid.org/0000-0003-4066-8577 (2018) Reasons and Moral Principles. In: Star, D, (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford Handbooks . Oxford University Press , Oxford, UK , pp. 839-864. ISBN 9780199657889 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.37 © 2018, the several contributors. This material was originally published in The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity, edited by Star, D., and has been reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.37. For permission to reuse this material, please visit http://global.oup.com/academic/rights. Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reasons and Moral Principles∗ Pekka V¨ayrynen University of Leeds 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory
    University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1998 The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory Richard A. Posner Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Richard A. Posner, "The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory," 111 Harvard Law Review 1637 (1998). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VOLUME 111 MAY 1998 NUMBER 7 1HARVARD LAW REVIEW1 '997 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY Richard A. Posner TABLE OF CONTENTS I. THE Lminrs OF MORAL THEORIZING ........................................................................... 638 A. The Thesis of PartI Summarized............................................................................. 638 B. My Moral Stance ......................................................................................................... 1642 x. Moral Relativism ................................................................................................ 1642 2. Moral Subjectivism ............................................................................................ 1643 3. Moral Skepticism ............................................................................................... 1643 4. Emotivism ..........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Curriculum Vitae Judith Jarvis Thomson February 2016 Education
    1 Curriculum Vitae Judith Jarvis Thomson February 2016 Education: B.A. Barnard College, 1950 B.A. Cambridge University, 1952 M.A. Cambridge University, 1956 Ph.D. Columbia University, 1959 Awards: Phi Beta Kappa Fulbright Scholarship, 1950-51 Frances Dibblee Scholar (Columbia University), 1955-56 AAUW New York State Fellowship, 1962-63 NEH Fellowship, 1978-79 NEH Fellowship, 1986-87 Guggenheim Fellowship, 1986-87 (held in 1987-88) Member, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 1989- Fellow, Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo, Norway, spring 1996 Quinn Prize, APA, 2012 Honorary President, American Committee of the Philosophy Summer School in China, 2013 Honorary degree: Doctor of Letters, University of Cambridge, June 2015 Teaching Positions: Barnard College, 1956-62 Lecturer, 1956-59 Instructor, 1959-60 Assistant Professor, 1960-62 Boston University, 1963-64 Assistant Professor, 1963-64 MIT, 1964- Associate Professor, 1964-69 Professor, 1969-1991 Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Philosophy, 1991-96 Professor, 1996- (Professor Emerita, 2004-) Visiting Fellow, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, summer 1968 Visiting Professor, University of Pittsburgh, fall 1976 Visiting Professor, University of California, Berkeley, Law School, spring 1983 Visiting Professor, Yale Law School, fall 1982, fall 1984, fall 1985 Visiting Professor, UCLA, winter quarter 2003 Visiting Professor, Princeton, fall 2010 Professional Activities: American Philosophical Association: Chair, Board of Officers, 2002-2004 Eastern Division:
    [Show full text]
  • MORAL PARTICULARISM and TRANSDUCTION Gilbert Harman
    Philosophical Issues, 15, Normativity, 2005 MORAL PARTICULARISM AND TRANSDUCTION Gilbert Harman Princeton University Introduction There has been considerable recent discussion of one or another version of ‘‘moral particularism’’ as opposed to ‘‘moral generalism’’ (e.g., Dancy 1993, Sinnott-Armstrong 1999, Hooker and Little 2000, Kihlbom 2002, Va¨yrynen 2004). Moral generalism holds, either that specific moral truths have their source in general moral principles, or that reasonable or justified moral decisions and beliefs are based on the acceptance of general moral principles. Moral particularism rejects moral generalism. There are stronger and weaker versions of moral generalism and corre- spondingly weaker and stronger versions of moral particularism. Strong moral generalism holds, either that all specific moral truths have their source in general moral principles, or that all reasonable or justified moral deci- sions and beliefs are based on the acceptance of general principles. Weak moral generalism holds, either that at least some moral truths have their source in general moral principles, or that at least some reasonable or justified moral decisions and beliefs are based on the acceptance of general moral principles. Since the denial of a strong claim is weak and the denial of a weak claim is strong, strong moral particularism denies weak moral generalism and weak moral particularism denies strong moral generalism. I will be concerned with one of the issues between strong moral general- ism and weak moral particularism. The issues between particularism and generalism are metaphysical, to the extent that they concern the source of moral truths, and epistemic (or psychological), to the extent that they concern the source of reasonable or justified moral decisions and beliefs.
    [Show full text]
  • Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism, and Just War Theory a Critique
    pal-patterson-003 10/24/07 10:23 AM Page 53 CHAPTER 3 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism, and Just War Theory A Critique Keith Pavlischek his chapter examines how Reinhold Niebuhr’s Christian realism departs in fundamental and profound ways from the classical just war Ttradition and explains why this matters. In short, Niebuhrian realism proceeds from a liberal theology that rejects much of the theological and philosophical orthodoxy associated with the broad natural law tradition and its progeny just war theory, resulting in a worldview far different from that of early “Christian realists” like Augustine and Aquinas. For brevity’s sake, this paper defines “classical” or “traditional” just war theory as a theological-philosophical trajectory that runs from Ambrose and Augustine through medieval developments summarized by Aquinas, then reaffirmed by Calvin and the early modern just war theorists, such as Grotius, Vitoria, and Suarez. Contemporary proponents of classical just war theory include Paul Ramsey (who revived the tradition among Protestants following World War II), James Turner Johnson (Ramsey’s student), Oliver O’Donovan, George Weigel, and more recently Darrell Cole. An obvious question is whether this classical just war tradition, contrasted here against Niebuhr’s Christian realism, is not also a form of Christian realism. The answer is “yes.” Few would object to classifying two millennia of reflection as broadly “Christian realist” if what is meant is “not pacifist,” if it takes seri- ously the Christian doctrine of original sin, and if it declares the inevitable influence of human fallenness in political life and international affairs. Indeed, pal-patterson-003 10/24/07 10:23 AM Page 54 54 Keith Pavlischek Niebuhrian realism shares with older Christian realisms—notably the just war tradition—concerns about power, justice, and the law of love in this world.
    [Show full text]
  • A Defense of a Particularist Research Program*
    A Defense of a Particularist Research Program* Uri D. Leibowitz Abstract: What makes some acts morally right and others morally wrong? Traditionally, philosophers have tried to answer this question by identifying exceptionless moral principles—principles that capture all and only morally right actions. Utilitarianism and Kantianism are paradigmatic examples of such attempts. In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in a novel approach—Particularism—although its precise content is still a matter of controversy. In this paper I argue that some of the most common objections to particularism result from a misconception of the nature of particularism, and I offer a new formulation of the view. I argue that particularism is best understood as a research program characterized by the core hypothesis that morality can be explained without appeal to exceptionless moral principles, and I explicate some of the advantages of this formulation. Finally, I argue that particularism shows enough promise to warrant further exploration. I. Introduction Particularism is a controversial new movement in moral philosophy. It is not uncommon to hear philosophers say that particularism is a “crazy view” or that it amounts to giving up on moral theorizing. The most prevalent objections to particularism are that particularism is demonstrably false and that particularism is unmotivated.1 I believe that these negative assessments of particularism result from a misconception of the nature of particularism. I hope to show that particularism, properly understood, is a well-motivated project that should not be dismissed out of hand. I will proceed as follows: first, I will outline a recent version of the standard argument against particularism and explain why it is based on a misconception of particularism (section II).
    [Show full text]
  • Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy's Attack
    THEORIA, 2017, 83, 185–205 doi:10.1111/theo.12117 Can Reasons Be Propositions? Against Dancy’s Attack on Propositionalism by MATTEO MORGANTI University of Rome ‘RomaTRE’ and ATTILA TANYI University of Liverpool Abstract: The topic of this article is the ontology of practical reasons. We draw a critical compari- son between two views. According to the first, practical reasons are states of affairs; according to the second, they are propositions. We first isolate and spell out in detail certain objections to the second view that can be found only in embryonic form in the literature – in particular, in the work of Jonathan Dancy. Next, we sketch possible ways in which one might respond to each one of these objections. A careful evaluation of these complaints and responses, we argue, shows that the first view is not as obviously compelling as it is thought by Dancy. Indeed, it turns out that the view that practical reasons are propositions is by no means unworkable and in fact, at least under certain assumptions, explicit considerations can be made in favour of a propositional construal of reasons. Keywords: reasons, propositions, states of affairs, unity of reasons, Jonathan Dancy 1. Introduction REASONS ARE NO DOUBT IMPORTANT. They are important in our everyday life: we customarily refer to reasons when we explain our actions as well as when we try to justify what we plan to do, or what we did. Reasons are also important in con- temporary analytic philosophy. In a recent book, Thomas Scanlon (2014, pp. 1–2) points out that reasons have become the focus of philosophical research in at least two ways.
    [Show full text]
  • Prudential Personalism" > Why Does It Matter?
    HONORING FR. O'ROURKE What Is "Prudential Personalism" > Why Does It Matter? Fr. O'Rourke Helped Retrieve a Vital Ethical Method in Catholic Theology I n one sense, there is nothing new about will suggest several practical implications of this I the theory called "prudential personal- theory for medicine and health care ethics. _^^ism" developed by Fr. Kevin D. WHERE DOES PRUDENTIAL PERSONALISM FIT IN THE O'Rourke, OP, JCD, STM, and his BROADER CONTEXT OF ETHICS?* Dominican confrere, Fr. Benedict M. Ethics is a kind of knowledge, but it differs from BY CHARLES E. Ashley, OP, PhD, through successive edi­ scientific or technical knowledge because it has to BOUCHARD, OP, do with "oughtness." Ethics, whether based in STD tions of their book Health Care Ethics religious faith or not, always tries to answer two Fr. Bouchard is (HCE)} It is the retrieval of an ethical questions: "What ought I to do?" and "What president and method developed, at least in part, by kind of person ought I to be?" These "doing" associate professor Aristotle, refined and adapted to Christian and "being" questions are at the heart of nearly of moral theology, every ethical system. Aquinas Institute life by St. Thomas Aquinas, and neglected There are two basic ways of answering these of Theology, and distorted by philosophers, reformers, questions, each of which has a variety of subsets St. Louis. and even the church itself. It was reappro- or subcategories. The first basic system is called deontological or "duty-based," because the priated in the 20th century by theologians answer to the "ought" question always refers to and philosophers alike.
    Why Does It Matter?" class="panel-rg color-a">[Show full text]
  • Jurisprudence, Halakhah, and Moral Particularism
    Volume 64 Issue 5 Article 11 1-30-2020 Jurisprudence, Halakhah, and Moral Particularism Amy J. Sepinwall Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Amy J. Sepinwall, Jurisprudence, Halakhah, and Moral Particularism, 64 Vill. L. Rev. 757 (2020). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol64/iss5/11 This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. Sepinwall: Jurisprudence, Halakhah, and Moral Particularism 2019] JURISPRUDENCE, HALAKHAH, AND MORAL PARTICULARISM AMY J. SEPINWALL* ALAKHAH is, perhaps maddeningly, about the particular. Examples Habound: Jewish law forbids wearing clothing that mixes wool and linen. Except if one is a kohen (Temple priest), in which case one must wear wool and linen. But only when in the Temple compound; or, accord- ing to a different school, even then only when performing Temple duties.1 Or again: On the Sabbath, a day of rest, one is prohibited from writing by hand. But not by foot or mouth. Old-school Scrabble does not count as writing, but playing on a more modern board with grooves that hold the letters in place does. The contortions and distinctions in these examples find counterparts all over the original codification of the oral tradition and the centuries of commentary that followed. Halakhah is alive, byzan- tine, and seemingly wild.2 Given halakhah’s complexity, one might have thought that it would defy theorization, envisioning it as recalcitrant to the scholar’s aim to disci- pline, unify, generalize.
    [Show full text]