ABSTRACT Moral Particularism, Aquinas, and the Problem of Context-Dependence: A Formal Solution to a Material Puzzle David T. Echelbarger, Ph.D. Mentors: Thomas S. Hibbs, Ph.D., and Darin H. Davis, Ph.D. This dissertation is a historically informed response to what I call the problem of context-dependence. The problem of context-dependence is a problem for moral philosophy that stems from the fact that the rightness or wrongness of an action seems to be dependent upon the context in which it occurs. Moral particularists, such as Jonathan Dancy, use the context-dependence of rightness and wrongness to cast doubt upon our ability to formulate universally true moral principles. I contend that this is troublesome because if it is true that moral principles might not apply to all cases, then worries arise about our ability to understand and rationally navigate the moral domain. In response to this concern, I argue that it is possible to solve the problem of context-dependence by retrieving a neglected understanding of the structure of morality from Thomas Aquinas—namely his view that each instance of right and wrong is a composite of formal and material elements. I maintain that this distinction allows Aquinas to embrace the variability of right and wrong acts at the material level, while maintaining that all right actions share the same general form. In turn, the notion that right and wrong actions are made right by intelligible universal forms restores confidence in our ability to articulate and defend moral principles. Copyright © 2014 by David T. Echelbarger All rights reserved TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................. viii DEDICATION ...................................................................................................................x PART I. THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE CHAPTER ONE: Getting to the Heart of the Matter: The Problem of Context- Dependence and Particularist Criticisms of Moral Principles ....2 1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................2 2. Moral Generalism .....................................................................................................9 3. Particularist Critiques of Generalism ...................................................................14 4. Finding the Center of the Debate: Why Ethical Theorists Must Examine the Relationship between Principles and Moral Explanations ........................18 CHAPTER TWO: Explanations in Ethics: Assessing Non-Principled Approaches to Ethical Theory .............................................................................25 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................25 2. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice .......................................................................26 3. Non-Principled Approaches to Ethical Theory ..................................................30 3.1. Statistical Generalizations ...............................................................................31 3.2. Defeasible Generalizations .............................................................................34 3.3. Dancy’s Particularist Approach to Explanations ........................................42 4. Conclusion ...............................................................................................................44 CHAPTER THREE: How Deep a Problem? Evaluating Particularist Challenges to Moral Principles ......................................................................46 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................46 2. Holism: Establishing Context-Dependence ........................................................46 3. Resultance: From Holism to Particularism .........................................................51 v 4. ‘Right’ as Resultance: A Remaining Possibility ..................................................60 4.1. Shape and Narrative: The Intermediate Layer of Resultance....................62 4.2. The Possibility of Shape-Based Principles ....................................................64 4.3. The Viability of Shape-Based Principles .......................................................68 5. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................74 PART II. OVERCOMING THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE: FORM AND MATTER IN ETHICAL THEORY CHAPTER FOUR: Form and Matter in Moral Explanations ....................................77 1. Introduction .............................................................................................................77 2. From Resultance to Form and Matter: A Terminological Shift ........................80 2.1. Hume’s Misplaced ‘Gap’: Kovesi’s Objection to the Division Between Fact and Value ..................................................................................................80 2.2. Dancy’s Parallel Argument ............................................................................85 2.3. Parallel Arguments, Corresponding Vocabularies: Linking Resultance with Form and Matter .....................................................................................87 3. Formal Elements as Holistic Shapes.....................................................................89 4. Formal Explanations Amidst Material Variability: The Open-Texturedness of Moral Concepts ...................................................................................................90 5. Form and Matter in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice: Principles Rules, and Rules of Thumb ...............................................................................................94 6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................101 CHAPTER FIVE: Aquinas’s Formal Solution to a Material Puzzle .......................103 1. Introduction ...........................................................................................................103 2. Encountering the Problem of Context-Dependence in Aquinas’s De malo ..105 3. Aquinas’s Solution: An Initial Sketch ................................................................108 3.1. Reply to Objection 13: Material Variability Amidst Formal Consistency .....................................................................................................109 3.2. Reply to Objection 2: Generic Acts Appear Morally Indifferent Because Their Formal Narratives Are Incomplete ....................................112 3.3. Reply to Objection 5: Viewed Formally, Circumstances Are Not Accidents .........................................................................................................114 vi 3.4. Two Remaining Questions ...........................................................................116 4. Aquinas on the Universal Forms of ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong ................................118 5. The Formal Specification of Individual Acts ....................................................128 5.1. Ends as the Source of Form and Species .....................................................131 5.1.1. Final Ends as the Primary Source of Moral Forms .............................134 5.1.2. Non-Consequentialist Ends ...................................................................136 5.2. The Role of Material Objects within an Act’s Formal Narrative .............143 5.3. Formal Specification through Material Circumstances ............................147 6. Implications for Moral Practice ...........................................................................152 7. Conclusion .............................................................................................................157 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................................160 vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I first owe thanks to my parents, David and Christine Echelbarger, who taught me to care about life’s enduring questions. Their guidance led me to St. Norbert College, where I was formally introduced to the liberal arts. My experience at St. Norbert set me upon the path that culminated with this dissertation. I neither would have undertaken, nor completed this journey if it were not for their unwavering affirmation that a Ph.D. in philosophy is a worthy and noble goal. I dedicate this work to them. I began studying philosophy as an undergraduate with Darin Davis. He also taught the last class of my Ph.D. coursework here at Baylor University and co-directed this dissertation. It was in his class on moral particularism that the ideas for my project began to take shape. For nearly eleven years now, he has been my philosophical, spiritual, pedagogical, and personal mentor. He has also been a great friend. I would like to thank him for all that he has done on my behalf. I am especially grateful for his fraternal advice and for believing in me. His presence in my life is undeniably providential. I would like to thank Thomas Hibbs, also co-director of my dissertation, for his guidance and encouragement of my work. His direction was instrumental, especially during the final stages of writing. My committee members, Michael Beaty, Robert Kruschwitz, and David Jeffrey are equally viii worthy of acknowledgment. I am indebted to them for their suggestions, support, and