Intuiting Moral Truth Bernard Hoose

Abstract. — In Veritatis splendor, John Paul II made reference to the participation of the practical reason in ethics. Working out the relationship between these two, notes Joseph Selling, is precisely the task of moral theology. This article asks what part, if any, is played in this relationship by intuition. Given the fact that there is a fair amount of confusion, however, it is important to clarify what precisely one means when one refers to intuition. Here the word is used to indicate immediate knowledge, or knowledge that is obtained without any process of reasoning from premises to a conclusion taking place. In the first half of the twentieth century, there was a good deal of debate about the role of intuition in ethics among philosophers who were members of the school of Intuitionism. Early in the second half of that century, however, Intuitionism went out of fashion. Since that time, little attention seems to have been given to the role of intuition in ethics by either philosophers or theologians, in spite of the fact that reasoned arguments about objective ethics always begin with some intuition or other, and some arguments against certain positions amount to nothing more than claims that they lead to conclusions which are counter intuitive. Reasoned argument and intuition, then, should not be seen as opponents. Both, it would seem, have essential roles to play. Access to both, however, can be impeded by ignorance, psychological and cultural conditioning, and structures of sin.

In everyday conversation the word “theory” is commonly used simply as an alternative to “hypothesis,” the former word probably being employed more often than the latter. “I have a theory that so and so is the case” often means little more than “I think there is a good chance that so and so is the case.” In the world of science, however, the word “theory” has a more restricted meaning. In the application of scientific method, only a tried and tested hypothesis that satisfactorily answers all the relevant questions (at this point in time) is to be called a theory. Nevertheless, the fact remains that individual scientists make use of everyday language as well as the language of science, and some of them occasionally use the everyday meaning of “theory” even in scientific contexts. Thus we find them resorting to expressions like “I have a theory that” when they are referring to a mere hypothesis. Obviously, the existence and use of two such meanings can lead to misunderstandings on occasions. The word “theory,” however, is by no means the only such cause of confusion in

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academic circles. Another is “intuition.” In everyday language the word is often used to denote a hunch or a feeling about something. The same word, however, is also utilized, perhaps mainly in academic circles, to indicate something much more substantial than a hunch or feeling. It is used to indicate immediate knowledge, or knowledge that is obtained without any process of reasoning from premises to a conclusion taking place. With this meaning in mind, and turning to the world of morality, we can say that: “A moral intuition is (…) one that apprehends some moral object immediately, without there being any reasoning about it.”1 A good deal of debate about moral intuition in this sense took place during the twentieth century, some of the best known contributions coming from the pens of G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross and H. A. Prichard, who are generally labelled as Intuitionists. In spite of this, in ethical debate, one comes across moral philosophers referring to intuitions not only as immediate knowledge about objective morality, but also, at times, as mere feel- ings or hunches. Thus, in one place, Peter Singer writes of intuition in the sphere of ethics as “an immediate intellectual grasp of a self-evident truth.”2 Elsewhere, however, we find him saying: “When we condemn the behavior of a politician, celebrity, or friend, we often end up appealing to our moral intuitions. ‘It just feels wrong!’ we say.”3 It is easy to see how this kind of thing can lead to confusion in ethical debate. The school of Intuitionism referred to above, for instance, can and does become errone- ously identified as a crude form of emotivism, while moral intuitions are placed alongside such notions as the “yuk factor” and “a vague feeling that such and such is the right thing to do.”4 It is important to state clearly, therefore, that, in this article, a moral intuition is as defined above.

Intuition in Theological and Philosophical Ethics

In Veritatis splendor, John Paul II warned against views of the autonomy of reason which imply “a denial of the participation of the

1. William Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics (London: Methuen, 1948) 131. 2. Peter Singer, “Introduction,” Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) 8. 3. Peter Singer, “Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions,” www.project-syndicate. org/commentary/singer21/English. Accessed 1/24/2011. 4. Elizabeth Tropman further notes that, “in its everyday usage, the term ‘intuition’ sometimes refers to a non-rational and generally unreliable reaction, one that is not subject to further critical evaluation. An intuition is also something that is thought to issue from some special faculty called ‘intuition’.” (“Renewing Moral Intuitionism,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 [2009] 440-463, here 444).

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practical reason in the wisdom of the divine Creator and Lawgiver.”5 Responding to this, Joseph Selling wrote: “No theologian is going to ‘deny the participation’ of practical reason in divine wisdom but working out the relationship between these two is precisely the task of moral theology.”6 If we take a look at the history of theological ethics to see how scholars have applied themselves to that task, we find that a good deal of what has been said and written about such participation has been in terms of natural law.7 Writing much more recently, numerous moral theologians, Selling included, have opted for a personalist approach according to which “human activity must be judged insofar as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered.”8 The utiliza- tion of neither approach, however, necessarily rules out the possibility that some of our ethical knowledge is intuitive. Indeed, in his discussion of natural law, Thomas Aquinas declares that some propositions are self evident to all of us9. With this in mind, he says that the first truth to be thus apprehended by the practical reason is good. The first principle of practical reasoning, founded on the notion of good, is thus “The good is what all things desire.” Good, then, is to be sought after and done, while evil is to be avoided.10 This first precept of law, as Aquinas calls it, is clear, it would seem, to all humans who are of sound mind. If you like, we simply know it. It is possible to claim much the same as Aquinas claims here without referring to God at all, and, indeed, a number of other philosophers have discussed the role of intuitive knowledge in ethics without making explicit reference to the divine. G. E. Moore, for instance, claimed that we simply know what good is. We intuit it. As far as he is concerned, however, this is as far as intuition takes us. From this point on, Moore’s ideal utilitarianism is in charge. In his scheme of things, the right action,

5. John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, 40. 6. Joseph A. Selling, “The Context and Arguments of Veritatis Splendor,” The Splen- dor of Accuracy: An Examination of the Assertions Made by Veritatis Splendor, ed. Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans) 11-70, here 38. 7. The best known example would seem to be that of Aquinas. See Summa theologiae, Ia IIae q. 94. art. 2. 8. Louis Janssens, “Artificial Insemination: Ethical Considerations,” Louvain Stud- ies 8 (1980) 4. The work of Janssens has been particularly influential in the sphere of personalist ethics. His ideas have been taken up and engaged with by a number of other scholars, including Selling, Richard Gula and Kevin Kelly. Regarding Selling’s approach to the subject, see, for example, “The Human Person,” Christian Ethics: An Introduction, ed. Bernard Hoose (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1998) 95-109, and “Is a Personalist Ethic Necessarily Anthropocentric?,” Ethical Perspectives 6 (1999) 60-66. 9. Summa theologiae, Ia IIae, 94, 2. 10. Ibid.

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in any set of circumstances, is the one that will produce the greatest amount of good on the whole, “no matter how bad the effects upon ourselves may be and no matter how much good we ourselves may lose by it.”11 W. D. Ross, on the other hand, adopts a rather different posi- tion. Taking “morally right,” to be indefinable, he says that the general truths of ethics are grasped through intuitive induction. We see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfilment of a particular promise, and of another which would be the fulfilment of another promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity to think in general terms, we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfilment of promise. What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty.12 At certain points in his writing, a reader might be led into thinking that Ross is not far removed from Moore. Although he does indeed talk about maximizing the good as a prima facie duty that we intuit, however, he also says that it is only one of a number of such duties. Among the others are the duty to do what is just and the duty to fulfil promises. Moreover, trying to find out what our actual duty is can be problematic when we are faced with conflicts among prima facie duties.13 If we try to balance a prima facie obligation to fulfil a certain promise against a prima facie obligation to bring about a certain good, for instance, we may find ourselves moving in what Ross calls “a region of uncertainty.” In such circumstances, reasonable people may differ, and each will choose what appears to him or her to be the right course of action.14 Although there are similarities between the stances of Aquinas and Moore, we should avoid exaggerations in that regard. There appear to

11. G. E. Moore, Ethics (London, 1958) 143. See also his better known Principia Ethica, which was first published in 1903. Commentators often refer to his assertion in this latter book that good is indefinable. In a later work, however, he conceded that his “supposed proofs” that this was the case “were certainly fallacious” (G. E. Moore, “Is Goodness a Quality?,” Aristotelian Society Proceedings, Supp. Vol. 11 [London, 1932] 127.) Years later, C. Lewy recounted some of the contents of a preface for a proposed second edition of Principia Ethica which never came to fruition. Therein Moore states that, although he thinks it probable that good is indefinable or unanalysable, he is not certain. It seems to Moore, writes Lewy, that “possibly ‘right’ is unanalysable, and ‘Good’ is to be analysed partly in terms of ‘right’.” (C. Lewy, “G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy,” G. E. Moore Essays in Retrospect, ed. A. Ambrose and M. Lazerowitz [London, 1970] 292-303.) The word “good” was capitalized by Moore. 12. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 1930) 32-33. 13. W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939) 319-320. 14. Ibid., 320-321.

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be considerable differences in their world views and there are certainly differences in the ways in which they proceed beyond the most basic intuition of good. What we can say, however, is that they and, indeed, most ethicists take some sort of intuition of good (and/or right) for granted, even though many ethicists may not explicitly state that fact. How far can we proceed further than an apprehension of good while remaining within the sphere of intuition? Ross clearly makes some claims in this respect in his deliberations about right, but what can we say about Aquinas? In the section of the Summa referred to above, Aqui- nas seems to have been influenced by what Boethius had said about being and good. A rather different approach to things would be needed to reach the somewhat different conclusion that all human persons of sound mind intuit the notion of “morally right,” (and, indeed, in keeping with Aquinas own pattern, the conclusion that all human persons simply know they should always do what is morally right and avoid what is morally wrong). That said, would such a claim be outrageous? Of course, we may not always be sure which acts are right and which are wrong, but it does appear to be the case that we simply know we should seek after and do only what we believe to be right, and that we should avoid what we believe to be wrong. This, we might say, is self evident. It would seem odd to try to deny that this is the case. The mere fact that humans tend, in practice, to do what is wrong a lot of the time is not, in itself, a sufficient indication that this claim is incorrect. It merely indicates our ability to make mistakes about which acts are wrong (or right) and to sin. Ross, of course, goes beyond a basic intuition of right. He claims, for instance, that we intuit a prima facie duty to fulfil promises. Many others, moreover, would claim that all human persons of sound mind simply know that they should not harm children merely for entertain- ment, and they would also claim, one imagines, that this is not merely a prima facie duty. Nevertheless, there is a good deal of opposition to such claims.

Objections and Other Problems

Although the school of Intuitionism gained a fair amount of attention from philosophers early in the twentieth century, it eventually became unfashionable. This, says Elizabeth Tropman, was largely because, by the 1950s, it “became unpopular to hold, as intuitionists did, that there are objective moral facts of which we can have genuine moral

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knowledge.”15 That, of course, was not, and is not the case in the world of theological ethics, the very mission of which depends upon the existence of objective moral facts to which we have some access.16 Even within the ranks of theological ethics, however, some have argued against those who attribute a significant role to intuition on the grounds that these latter provide no reasons for their conclusions which could aid others to see what is right. Thus we find Robert P. George claiming that: A major problem with act intuitionism (though by no means the only one) is that on this theory moral judgments can neither be sup- ported by nor criticized by reasons, and so no common rational discussion of what we should do leading to co-operative action is possible. Thus the theory utterly undermines community.17 The idea that we should be able to prove (or at least try to prove) every one of our arguments seems to be common. The fact is, however, that our deliberations on just about anything build on some intuition or other. Aristotle noted the demands of some people for a demonstration of every axiom, but stated that: it is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely every thing (there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration); but if there are things of which one should not demand demonstration, these persons could not say what principle they maintain to be more self-evident than the present one.18 It could be countered, of course, that there is an enormous differ- ence between, on the one hand, claims about apprehending good and knowing that we should seek after and do what is right, while avoiding what is wrong, and, on the other hand, claims that we can intuit the rightness or wrongness of particular kinds of acts. In view of the fact that he refers to act intuitionism, it would seem that this latter route is the one that concerns George. There are probably very few people who would claim that intuition alone will tell us, in all cases, which, among those available to us, is the right act to perform. Nevertheless, as we have

15. Tropman, “Renewing Moral Intuitionism,” 441. 16. Tropman notes that, even within moral philosophy, “enthusiasm for objec- tivistic moral theories rebounded two decades later and remains strong today, whereas interest in intuitionism did not immediately increase in tandem” (ibid.). 17. Robert P. George, “Liberty Under the Moral Law: B. Hoose’s Critique of the Grisez-Finnis Theory of Human Good,” The Heythrop Journal 34 (1993) 175-182, here at 179. 18. Metaphysics, IV, 4. Translation by W. D. Ross, The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941) 737.

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noted, some claim that intuition can supply all that is needed in regard to the rightness or wrongness of certain kinds of acts. At this more particular level (as opposed to the overarching, more general levels of right and good), it may well be the case that what is available to our intuitive capacities could also be demonstrated through the use of our reasoning powers. This said, however, it seems likely that, where this is the case, another basic intuition, beyond the knowledge that we should always seek to do what is right, would be needed, at least in regard to some matters. Take slavery as an example. It could be claimed that one could simply intuit the wrongness of slavery, that is, have immediate knowledge of the objective wrongness of such activity. At the same time, it would be possible to reason to the wrongness of slavery, basing one’s reasoning on the more basic intuition of the equal dignity of human persons. One could reason from such an intuition that one should never treat another human person merely as a means to an end, and could then go on to reason from this that slavery is wrong. George’s concerns about the undermining of community, moreover, would surely be allayed if the intuition – about human dignity, in this case – were available to all of us. Another argument against claims that we can know ethical truth intuitively comes from the pen of Peter Singer. If it were the case, he says, that “knowing what is right did not carry with it a tendency to motivate us to do what is right, ethics would seem to have lost its point.” Given this, it seems to him that those who hold ethical judgments to be a special kind of intuition “must show how the knowledge that we gain through intuition provides us with a reason that can motivate us to do what we see to be right.” He adds: “There is something obscure, however, about how any kind of knowledge can, by itself, necessarily motivate us to act.”19 At this point, he reminds us of a well known question: Are there any imperatives that are, as Kant put it, “categorical” – that is, imperatives that apply to every rational being, irrespective of what desires he or she has? Kant thought that if ethics is to be anything more than a delusion, there must be categorical imperatives – for does not morality tell us that we ought to do what is right, irrespective of our desires? If the intuitionists are to succeed in showing that we gain knowledge of objective ethical truth through intuition, they must show that this knowledge gives rise to a categorical imperative.20 The motivation for which Singer asks can be identified by simply pointing to our intuited knowledge that we should do only what is right

19. Emphases his. 20. Ethics, 8-9.

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and avoid what is wrong. If we intuit the rightness of certain kinds of actions, does not the more basic knowledge that we ought to do what is right provide us with our imperative?21 One occasionally hears it said that intuitions do not give us the certainty that comes from reasoning about things. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that so many of our predecessors appear to have used their reasoning powers to defend slavery, the torture of heretics, and the burning of so-called witches (as well as numerous other practices that no present day moral theologian would dream of condoning), this seems to be a strange observation. In practice, numerous difficulties in regard to the making of ethical choices can and do present themselves to people who base their ethics on natural law, personalism, utilitarianism, kantianism, or any other theory that involves reasoning. Among the causes of such difficulties are: the limitations of time and space; ignorance (much of which seems not to be our fault); the fallibility of our reasoning processes; psychological conditioning; the limiting effects of culture; and situations of sin.22 If moral intuitions did exist, some might argue, we would not have to face such difficulties. We would simply know. This claim would seem to be correct, not just in theory, but also in practice in regard to the most basic intuitions about good and right. There appears also to be a case for making similar claims about some other general intuitions, like, for instance, the abovementioned intuition concerning human dignity. When we come to consider intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of particular kinds of acts, however, a different picture presents itself. Surely some of the difficulties listed above could block intuitions at that level. It might seem strange to list ignorance as a possible problem where intuitions are concerned. That is because, thus far in our deliberations, we have considered only intuitions that can be accessed by all human persons of sound mind. There may well be other intuitions about certain things which will become evident only after people have acquired knowledge in other ways about what those things are, or after they have had certain experiences. In this regard, Aquinas refers to propositions which are self-evident only to wise people. The wise here are those who

21. In another piece of work to which reference has already been made, Singer makes use of the research of Joshua Greene into what happens in the brain when moral judgments are being made. In this case, however, he appears to consider intuitions as emotion based. See “Should We Trust Our Moral Intuitions?” 22. Given the nature of this discussion, I have not included here any mention of the well known difficulties faced by those who base their ethics only on the Bible: difficulties of translation and interpretation; the culture bound nature of the books; the fact that not all moral problems are discussed therein, etc.

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understand the terms in those propositions.23 I am not aware of Aquinas providing an example of such an intuition about a moral issue anywhere in his writings. We could say, however, that, in order to be able to access an intuition about gene therapy, for instance (if there is one), one would need to have some knowledge about what a gene is. Clearly, however, those who face difficulties in accessing intuitions because of their ignorance about something or other can gradually overcome their problems by increasing their knowledge in the same way as people who do not rely on intuitions. In practice, however, it may often be extremely difficult to distinguish a moral intuition as defined above from a conviction instilled in one’s psyche by other people during the emotional turmoil of a person’s formative years. Could it not be the case, then, that all so-called moral intuitions about particular kinds of actions are simply contents of the superego?24 Unaware that some of her convictions about ethics origi- nated in this way, an adult could conceivably believe that they are either intuitions or products of sound reasoning. Moreover, even academics who are well used to debating such matters are in no way immune from the same kind of mistake. Most moral theologians are well accustomed to discussing the difficulties involved in trying to distinguish between convictions of conscience and the tyrannical dictates of the superego. In spite of this awareness, however, it is still possible (and some would say probable) that certain differences of opinion among such scholars concerning the rightness or wrongness of certain types of act result only from the psychological conditioning of participants on one or even both sides of the debate. In the unresolved debates between so-called traditionalists and revisionists that have taken place in recent decades, it has not been unusual for scholars to defend their positions by making appeal to some sort of reasoning about natural law. Such appeals, we know, have not always persuaded opponents. Given this state of affairs, moral theologians who are convinced about the intrinsic moral wrongness of, say, intentionally telling an untruth with the intention of deceiving

23. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia IIae, 94, 2. 24. Taken up from the work of Sigmund Freud, the concept of the superego is explained in clear and simple terms by Richard Gula thus: “As we develop through childhood, the need to be loved and approved is the basic need and drive. We fear punishment as children not for its physical pain only, but more because it represents a withdrawal of love. So we regulate our behavior so as not to lose love and approval. We absorb the standards and regulations of our parents, or anyone who has authority over us, as a matter of self-protection. The authority figure takes up a place within us to become the source of commands and prohibitions” (Reason Informed by Faith: Founda- tions of Catholic Morality [Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1989] 125).

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could conceivably take a different tack, claiming that they simply have an intuition about this matter. They might say they simply know that such activity is wrong. If any such moral theologians were indeed to adopt this stance, however, their opponents, I am sure, would remain as unconvinced as they had been by the natural law arguments. It is much more likely, I suggest, that the latter would be inclined to think that the conviction of these particular “traditionalists” concerning the telling of untruths resulted from mere conditioning – perhaps about the impor- tance of St. Augustine, although not necessarily so.25 This example clearly illustrates the difficulties that might arise in distinguishing an intuition (understood as immediate knowledge about the objective rightness or wrongness of something) from a conviction about the same thing that simply results from conditioning. It could be argued, of course, that, while intuitions are not threatened by sound reasoning processes, what results from mere conditioning (when it is wrong) can usually be overcome eventually by an appeal to reasoning – provided only that the people concerned have not been so deeply dam- aged psychologically by the conditioning they have received that they are incapable of hearing or seeing what sound reasoning dictates. There may be some truth in this. Take, for example the case of a man whose superego dictates that he should never use swearwords. Even in the setting of a court of law, when being questioned as a witness of a serious crime, such a person might refuse to utter a particular word, even though told by the judge that the jury needs to know precisely what the defendant said (or shouted) on a particular occasion. At best, under pressure, he or she might spell the word.26 One imagines, however, that, although a fair amount of explanation and elucidation might be needed, it would be possible to enable such a person (if of sound mind)27 to come to understand that the problem with such expletives is not the mere pronuncia- tion of them. Other examples could easily be given, but it is not clear that this kind of process could be expected to succeed in all cases. Men- tion has already been made of the possibility that even seasoned academics could be unwitting victims of their own superegos, and the fact that opposing stances in some debates remain largely unchanged after decades

25. One usually learns of the existence of such opinions about other moral theologians only as a result of conversations with individual scholars. Most, it seems, would not be inclined to put such thoughts on paper. 26. A few years ago, a lawyer of my acquaintance informed me that, in his expe- rience, this sort of thing is not uncommon. 27. The expression “sound mind” could be misleading. Some people are classified as morally insane. I accept, however, that, in cases such as this, fairly commonly encoun- tered neuroses might suffice to make this process very difficult indeed.

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of scholarly exchanges may well be witness to such victimhood on the part of people on at least one side of those debates, although it is worthy of mention that both sides could be suffering from the same affliction.28 In short, then, it appears that it will not always be easy to distinguish the products of mere psychological conditioning from either intuitions or conclusions that are reached by reasoning from premises. Situations of sin often arise, it seems, as a result of wrongdoing by many people over a period of time. Corrupt structures, systems, cultures and mentalities arise and come to be regarded as normal by many of the people affected by them – sometimes even by the vast majority. These people do not see what the problem is, although the wrongness of what is going on may be clear to other people who are situated outside the corrupt structures. Problems arising from such corrupt structures, systems, cultures and mentalities can be quite complex, and can also be extremely difficult to overcome.29 One complicating factor is a fairly common tendency, it seems to me, to confuse at least some such situations with what we might call plain, ordinary ignorance – ignorance that is not directly caused by sin. One hears it claimed from time to time, for instance, that we now know about the moral wrongness of torture, slavery, and executing people whose theology differs from our own, whereas our forebears knew no such thing. In discussion about such matters, reference is often made to “the mentality of the time.” It seems, however, that numerous mentalities are present in any society in any age (and that is very clearly the case in our own societies at this point in time). Thus we find Erasmus and numerous others expressing their dis-

28. Scholars on both sides of recent debates produced what they saw to be well reasoned arguments. Far from simply being unconvinced by some of these arguments, however, a number of their opponents came to regard their interlocutors’ stances as unreasonable. Thus, after more than twenty years of debate about proportionalism, I felt able to describe the debate as fiery and observed that “a certain number of trenches appear to have been dug, or, if I may be allowed to change the metaphor, it would seem that a situation of stalemate has been reached” (Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its European Roots [Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1987] ix-x). To the best of my knowledge, no participant in this fiery debate openly accused any members of the opposing side of being misled by their superegos. The vehemence of the language used at times, however, could well indicate a conviction, at least on the part of some on both sides, that their opponents’ claims were not reasonable. As a participant in the debate, the present writer was well aware that a number of scholars on the proportionalist side judged some of the claims made by certain members of the Grisez-Finnis school to be very strange indeed. For their part, some of the latter made it clear in their writings that they had similar convictions about the proportional- ists, and I myself recall being accused, on at least one occasion, of delving into absurdity. 29. In the strict sense, sin is, of course, personal. Terms such as “structural sin” and “situations of sin,” however, are sometimes used in debate about the kind of situation under discussion here.

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agreement with the dreadful manifestations of religious intolerance that abounded in large parts of Europe during their lifetimes. One of those others was the French Protestant Sebastian Castellio, who famously wrote: “To kill a man is not to defend a doctrine, but to kill a man.”30 In the following century the Jesuit Friedrich von Spee expressed his opposition to witch trials in his Cautio criminalis. In trawling through history, moreover, we find that, long before the abolition movements of the nineteenth century, there was widespread awareness that slavery was far from an ethical ideal.31 These problems concerning intolerance of others’ theological opinions, the burning of witches and slavery cannot be fully explained, then, merely by ignorance resulting from the “mentality of the time.” Nor, it seems, can such problems be explained by the gradual development of doctrine. The teaching of Pope Nicholas I on torture, for instance, was used by Pius XII to support his own twentieth century teaching on the subject. Pius, however, would have been unable to gain similar support from Innocent IV, who wrote about torture in approving terms some centuries after Nicholas.32 Bearing this kind of thing in mind, I considered in an earlier study the possibility that moral intuitions which are already available to us are somehow hidden from us by situations of sin.33 In such situations it seems that a kind of thick fog descends, as it were, and causes people to be morally blind, at least in regard to some matters. Clearly, however, as is indicated by the examples given, it is not always the case that everyone living within the confines of the area affected by the situation of sin is thus afflicted. In recent times a fair amount has been written about situations of sin and their ability to cause moral blindness. What evidence, however, is there to suggest that they can succeed in preventing large numbers of us, at times, from seeing what would otherwise be glaringly obvious? In other words, are there any indications that they hide the self-evident, that they impede our ability to access intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of specific kinds of activity? In response, we could surely say that the moral wrongness of burning people at the stake because their

30. “Hominem occidere, non est doctrinam tueri, sed est hominem occidere” (Sebastian Castellio, Contra libellum Calvini 77). 31. For a more in-depth discussion of intuitions about such matters as slavery, torture and burning people at the stake because of their theological beliefs, see Bernard Hoose, “Intuition and Moral Theology,” Theological Studies 67 (2006) 602-624. 32. In his address to the Sixth Congress of International Penal Law in 1953, Pius quoted from a letter to the Bulgars written by Nicholas in 866. In 1252, in his Bull Ad extirpanda, Innocent approved of torturing heretics to get them to admit to their own wrongdoing and that of others, as was already done with thieves and marauders. 33. “Intuition and Moral Theology.”

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theology does not accord with that of our own group, club, denomination or whatever is obvious to us. We could arrive at such a conclusion about the moral wrongness of such activity by means of a reasoning process, but the fact is that we do not have to do so. We simply know that it is wrong.34 Indeed, we might dare to suggest that it is self-evidently wrong. Given this state of affairs, it does indeed seem disturbingly odd that so many (though certainly not all) of our forebears were blind to this fact. The truth of the matter is, however, that a standard feature of situations of sin is the fact that some of their effects are indeed disturbingly odd. Those who are not immune to the blinding effect appear to be conditioned in a manner not unlike that of the young people we discussed above. Indeed, it is worth noting that the normal process of conditioning in the formative years can assist in the prolongation of situations of sin, as adults who are already conditioned by such situations pass on their conditioning to their children, assisted by the predominant culture of their place and time. Thus, corrupt structures, systems and mentalities become deeply entrenched, and can persist over very long periods.35

Freedom to Access Intuitions

As we have had reason to note, not everyone within a situation of sin is morally blinded by it. When the situation is removed, moreover, normal moral vision is much more easily obtained, even by those whose moral vision had previously been impaired. Then, of course, there are those people who have been removed from the situation or who have never been in it. Thus, not imprisoned within a particular situation of sin that afflicted many of our forebears, we see, without difficulty, the wrongness of burning at the stake those people who disagree with us about certain aspects of theology. Could something similar be said about

34. Given the strength of the reaction of Martin of Tours and others to the execution of Priscillian, it may be that the wrongness of execution for heresy was obvious to him, and indeed to others more than a thousand years before the Reformation got off the ground. See Sulpitius Severus, Historia sacra 12. 50. 35. The persistence of slavery over a very long period seems not to be sufficiently explained by mere ignorance, Indeed, the outlawing of slavery, serfdom excluded, was not unknown in parts of Western Europe long before the nineteenth century. See David A. E. Pelteret, Slavery in Early Medieval England: From the Reign of Alfred until the Twelfth Century (Woodbridge: Boydell, 1995) 78-79. Again, ignorance alone may not suffice to explain at least some of the institutionalized problems that have afflicted women over the centuries. If there has been moral progress in recent times in regard to such matters, it may perhaps be explained as an overcoming of longstanding situations of sin.

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the Founding Fathers of the United States?36 Somewhat removed from certain European situations of sin, it might be claimed, they were able to intuit certain truths about equality and human rights. Others might argue that their claims about rights were based on natural law thinking, which would seem to clash with the Fathers’ own claim: “we hold these truths to be self-evident.” We know, moreover, that different rights can and do clash, and that compromise is often needed. Even natural law thinking, however, builds upon basic intuitions (about human dignity, equality, or whatever). The question, then, has to be about where the intuited knowledge ends and natural law reasoning begins. Moreover, even though a problem arises about conflict between different rights, it is still possible to talk about intuition of prima facie claims on other people (rights) and corresponding prima facie duties.37 If it is indeed the case that intuitions are blocked by corrupt structures, systems, cultures and mentalities in our societies, religious group- ings, companies and other organisations, we have to ask where the solu- tion is to be found. I have suggested elsewhere that being able to access intuitions “has something to do with keeping in contact with one’s true humanity, and that means keeping in touch with the Spirit of love, life and truth.”38 It seems that the corrupt structures that surround us and in which we are immersed sometimes impede our ability to commune with the Spirit. Even within these situations, some people, it seems, remain open to the Spirit about the matters concerned, although other structures may succeed in bringing about moral blindness in other spheres (even at the same time) in those same people. In this scenario, then, we might say that, while the most basic intuitions about “good” and “right” are innate, other intuitions can only be accessed if some of the effects of human brokenness do not succeed in impeding them.

36. In view of the fact that some of the Founding Fathers appear not to have been opposed to slavery, one occasionally hears people casting doubt upon the self evidence of equality, and the rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is worth, noting, however, that, although these men were somewhat removed from certain European situations of sin, the land in which they lived had problems of its own. Slavery was well established, especially in certain areas. The long acceptance of it by many people may well have produced some moral blindness in regard to slavery. It is also worth mention- ing that, when we look at particular historical events, we need to bear in mind, even without wishing to judge anybody in particular, that humans are capable of doing what is wrong even when they know it is wrong. Some people may have done just that. We may not be able to understand the mystery of sin, but that is no reason to discount it. 37. There is some debate about whether or not the term “prima facie” is the most appropriate. However, in view of the fact that it has been in circulation for quite a long time, and the meaning attributed to it by Ross and others is well known, it seems sen- sible to retain it here. 38. “Intuition and Moral Theology,” 622.

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If we accept that the Spirit lives in our hearts (in the very core of our personalities) and that the Spirit will teach us all things, it could seem easy to say that there is nothing controversial in all of this. Taking into account, however, the similarity of the concepts of heart and conscience, we are instantly reminded of the notorious fallibility of conscience, in spite of the fact that conscience is where we are alone with God.39 A glance at the history of the Church, moreover, shows a good deal of division among Christians about numerous issues, including matters of morality, even when all involved in the disagreements claimed the guidance of the Holy Spirit.40 The problems of error in conscience, however, have already been covered in our discussion of ignorance, situations of sin, conditioning, etc. It is surely not outlandish to suggest, moreover, that at least some of those factors played a role in the divisions among Christians. A person could be conditioned (or brainwashed) to believe, for example, that his or her side in a debate was guided by the Holy Spirit when this was not the case. Where does this leave us? We may still accept that basic intuitions about “good” and “right” are innate. It would seem, however, that, if other intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of particular kinds of acts are available, many people of fairly sound mind simply may not succeed in accessing at least some of them. In response, of course, the observation could be made that reasoning from premises to conclusions about the rightness or wrongness of particular kinds of acts runs into similar difficulties. The question that arises, however, is: given this state of things, is there anything, in practice, that intuition can add to our debates about ethics that is not already supplied by reasoned argument? I think there is. A short reflection on how we react to certain forms of utilitarianism illustrates that fact. We dismiss them, we say, because they could be used to justify atrocious acts, or else we simply say that some of the conclusions they could be used to reach are counter intuitive. Justifying the infliction of physical harm on children (or, indeed, adults) merely to give pleasure to a large number of witnesses to the act, as well as those inflicting the harm, is an example. Moreover, it seems to be the case that examples of self-evident injustice are the surest stimulus and guide to debate (and, indeed, action) about justice. An obvious example is provided by the immense increase in interest in human rights as a

39. Gaudium et spes, 16. 40. Reference is often made in this regard to splits among Protestants when all involved claimed the guidance of the Holy Spirit in the interpretation of Scripture. The important matter here being the guidance of the Spirit, it matters little whether matters of morality were always involved in these splits.

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response to certain self-evidently wrong acts committed during a period of structural sin in the 1930s and 40s in certain parts of the world. More generally, intuitions, I suspect, are responsible for voices that nag at us (if only in the background) during periods of structural sin or when an authority is pressurizing us to do what is wrong. For example, although there have been major changes in attitude in recent decades, it seems that, in many countries in the not too distant past, the dominant culture demanded that, when war was declared, all men of suitable age should be willing to serve in the armed services. I am not suggesting at this point that the voice nagging in the background in such circumstances would necessarily be an intuition that going to war would always be wrong.41 There might well be an intuition, however, that one should not just blindly obey. Something similar could be said about an intuition not to go along with any attempt by authority figures to stifle healthy debate. In short, then, it does seem that some of our participation in divine wisdom comes about through intuition. Few, I think, would claim that, in this broken world of ours, intuition can entirely replace some sort of reasoning process from premises to a conclusion. It does seem, however, that, at various levels and in partnership with such reasoning processes, intuition has an important part to play in ethics.

Prof. Bernard Hoose retired last year from Heythrop College, University of London, where he taught Christian Ethics. He has written on various aspects of theological ethics, including proportionalism, truth and lies, the ethics of punishment, human gene therapy, science and theological ethics, the role of intuition in ethics, and authority. Recent publications include: “Religion Truth, Mystery and Morality,” Irish Theological Quarterly 75 (2010) 144-156, and Moral Theology for the Twenty-First Century (London: T.&T. Clark, 2008), which he edited with Julie Clague and Gerard Mannion. Address: The Willows, 13 Cherry Grove, Tonbridge, Kent TN10 4NA, United Kingdom. Email: [email protected].

41. However, there might well be an intuition that war is prima facie wrong.

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