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Louvain Studies 24 (1999) 40-56 Proportionalism: A Right Relationship Among Values Bernard Hoose Although during the last thirty years or so the term ‘proportional- ism'1 has been associated almost exclusively with moral theologians who are often called revisionists, calls for proportionality and proportionate reason have a long history in Roman Catholic moral theology, and that seems hardly surprising. As Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger pointed out some years ago, “The attempt to assess the proportion of the good or bad likely to proceed from a proposed action is really a common-sense judgment we all make rather routinely. Even the principle of totality and the whole tra- dition of examining the circumstances of an act employs a notion of pro- portionality.”2 Another clear example is to be found in the principle of double effect, one of the conditions of which is that there be a propor- tionate reason for allowing the evil effect of the act to occur. Proportion is also called for in just war theory. More recently, but still within circles that are commonly described as traditionalist, the principle of propor- tionality has also appeared “in debates about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, where the language of ‘proportionate' and ‘disproportionate' means of medical treatment has to some extent replaced the earlier language of “ordinary” and ‘extraordinary' means.”3 1. ‘Proportionalism' is an umbrella term. In the writings of the various scholars so described are numerous differences of approach to certain aspects of the task of discern- ing moral rightness and wrongness. In this work I make no attempt to deal with most of these differences. I merely wish to argue that: it is possible to discern the rightness or wrongness of an action by taking account of the relationships among the various goods and evils involved; that the so-called incommensurability of values is a red herring; that ethical norms are inevitably provisional; and that proportionalism can be a useful tool in the hands of fallible human beings struggling for ethical wisdom. 2. Joseph Ratzinger, “Dissent and Proportionalism in Moral Theology,” Origins (March, 1984) 668. 3. James F. Childress, “Proportionality, Principle of,” A New Dictionary of Chris- tian Ethics, ed. J. Macquarrie and J. Childress (London: SCM Press, 1986) 512. PROPORTIONALISM 41 A list such as this (which could be extended) might lead one to assume that proportionalism is nothing other than traditional Catholic moral theology (or, at least, a part of it) with a new suffix-‘ism.' Although, however, many proportionalists might claim to be building on tradition, one would go far beyond the confines of such a claim if one assumed that present-day proportionalists and all those other moral theologians who would describe themselves as ‘traditionalists' approach the subject of proportionality in the same way. Such an assumption can only be made if one ignores three things: 1) the dispute about the meaning to be attributed to such terms as ‘proportional' and ‘propor- tionate'; 2) the fact that the principle of double effect (which has been central to much of the debate about proportionalism) demands more than just a proportionate reason; 3) claims of moral theologians who stick closely to the line of recent Vatican documents that certain acts are always wrong regardless of circumstances. In order to understand why the debate about proportionalism is taking place and in order to be able to analyse what is being said in that debate, it seems to me that we need to pay some attention to each of these three issues. The Meanings of the Terms Among the definitions of ‘proportion' in the Oxford Dictionary of Current English are “comparative part or share”; “comparative relation, ratio”; and “correct relation of one thing to another or between parts of a thing.” The meaning of ‘proportionate' is given as “in due propor- tion,” and ‘proportional' is defined as “in correct proportion, corre- sponding in degree or amount.” A mere glance at a dictionary, however, does not settle the matter because, in debate about the rightness or wrongness of actions, the terms under discussion are used (or so it is claimed) in accordance with the dictionary definitions, and yet in dif- ferent ways. At least two senses of proportionality are commonly encountered in moral theology. In one of these senses, means will be disproportionate if choosing them causes the end in view to be undermined. If, however, we adopt the other sense, we need to take into account all of the goods and evils involved to check that there is due proportion (or, perhaps we might say, correct relation) among them.4 This second sense would appear to be the one most commonly adopted by proportionalists. Interestingly, 4. Cf. Childress, “Proportionality.” 42 BERNARD HOOSE Peter Knauer, the person whose writings on proportionate reason are often described as the beginning of the debate on proportionalism does not adopt this second sense. In fact, Garth Hallett quotes Knauer as noting in correspondence that his reasoning “has nothing to do with what generally is called proportionalism.”5 When he speaks of the need for a commensurate or proportionate reason, Knauer is concerned that the act be not counterproductive in regard to the end in view.6 An example of such counterproductivity is that of a man who decides to earn his living by hunting a certain species of animal, but then goes on to hunt it to the point of extinction. Such a position as this gives the impression that an agent should concern herself with only one value in any one action. Now, other val- ues, it seems to me, must be taken into consideration. Surely, for instance, when pursuing the generally legitimate aims of his career, a man (lets us call him Richard) should bear in mind the fact that exces- sive dedication to such ends may result in damage to his relationship with his wife, children, and indeed, various other people. He may also need to bear in mind how the dissemination of knowledge (the pursuit of truth) is affected by the fact that he is not available to help his daugh- ter with her homework (if, for instance, his daughter is experiencing serious difficulties at school). In other words, values may be under- mined, but not, perhaps, the values Richard is aiming at. Hallett too expresses concern about Knauer's apparent one-sidedness where values are concerned. He also finds other difficulties in Knauer's approach. One such lies in the latter's apparent assumption that, in acting, an agent has only one end in view. “Both objectively and subjectively,” he says, “an action may have more than a single end, and often does.” For example, President Bush's statements suggest that he had varied aims when he launched the war against Iraq, and he may have had others he did not mention. Which of these multiple ends deter- mined the morality of his action? American prestige? Votes? Regional security? American access to oil? World access to oil? Kuwaiti independence? The rule of law in international affairs? A curb to nuclear proliferation? Freeing the Iraqi people from dictato- rial rule? Countering the President's reputation as a ‘wimp'? If many or most acts have multiple ends, how can a single end criterion serve as a general guide to right action?7 5. Garth Hallett, Greater Good: The Case for Proportionalism (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995) 100. 6. See Peter Knauer, “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. C. E. Curran and R. A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) 14. 7. Hallett, Greater Good, 103-104. PROPORTIONALISM 43 Hallett goes on, however, to note that, in a revised version of his book Der Glaube kommt vom hören and in private correspondence, Knauer has modified his approach. He has accepted the possibility of an agent seeking after several values. Moreover, he has modified his attitude to counterproductivity as the criterion for judgment. “The fundamental moral norm runs as follows: So act that you do not, overall and in the long run, destroy the very value you are then seeking, nor needlessly sacrifice other values.” Other values are needlessly sacrificed, he explains, if their surrender is not needed in order to save the value sought, overall and in the long run.8 Knauer's modified version, however, only partially rectifies matters, for it would seem that other values can be sacrificed merely if such sac- rifice is necessary to save the value that is being sought. It is not obvious how that would help in the example I gave above of the man pursuing his career. In other words, it seems to me that, if we are to maintain a principle of proportionality, there is a stronger case for maintaining the version that takes into account all values and disvalues than there is for maintaining either of Knauer's versions – in spite of the fact that some may claim his versions are more in keeping with traditional ways of thinking.9 The Principle of Double Effect A fair amount of what has been written about proportionalism has revolved around the principle of double effect, in part because the arti- cle which is usually described as the one that started the whole debate was a discussion of that principle by Knauer.10 In the form in which it is usually presented, the principle has long been used (principally per- haps, although not exclusively, within Roman Catholicism) as a tool to 8. Hallett, Greater Good, 107. See Peter Knauer, Der Glaube kommt vom hören: Ökumenische Fundamentaltheologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1991) 99.