Louvain Studies 24 (1999) 40-56

Proportionalism: A Right Relationship Among Values Bernard Hoose

Although during the last thirty years or so the term ‘proportional- ism'1 has been associated almost exclusively with moral theologians who are often called revisionists, calls for proportionality and proportionate reason have a long history in Roman Catholic moral theology, and that seems hardly surprising. As Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger pointed out some years ago, “The attempt to assess the proportion of the good or bad likely to proceed from a proposed action is really a common-sense judgment we all make rather routinely. Even the principle of totality and the whole tra- dition of examining the circumstances of an act employs a notion of pro- portionality.”2 Another clear example is to be found in the principle of double effect, one of the conditions of which is that there be a propor- tionate reason for allowing the evil effect of the act to occur. Proportion is also called for in . More recently, but still within circles that are commonly described as traditionalist, the principle of propor- tionality has also appeared “in debates about withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment, where the language of ‘proportionate' and ‘disproportionate' means of medical treatment has to some extent replaced the earlier language of “ordinary” and ‘extraordinary' means.”3

1. ‘Proportionalism' is an umbrella term. In the writings of the various scholars so described are numerous differences of approach to certain aspects of the task of discern- ing moral rightness and wrongness. In this work I make no attempt to deal with most of these differences. I merely wish to argue that: it is possible to discern the rightness or wrongness of an action by taking account of the relationships among the various goods and evils involved; that the so-called incommensurability of values is a red herring; that ethical norms are inevitably provisional; and that proportionalism can be a useful tool in the hands of fallible human beings struggling for ethical wisdom. 2. Joseph Ratzinger, “Dissent and Proportionalism in Moral Theology,” Origins (March, 1984) 668. 3. James F. Childress, “Proportionality, Principle of,” A New Dictionary of Chris- tian , ed. J. Macquarrie and J. Childress (London: SCM Press, 1986) 512. PROPORTIONALISM 41

A list such as this (which could be extended) might lead one to assume that proportionalism is nothing other than traditional Catholic moral theology (or, at least, a part of it) with a new suffix-‘ism.' Although, however, many proportionalists might claim to be building on tradition, one would go far beyond the confines of such a claim if one assumed that present-day proportionalists and all those other moral theologians who would describe themselves as ‘traditionalists' approach the subject of proportionality in the same way. Such an assumption can only be made if one ignores three things: 1) the dispute about the meaning to be attributed to such terms as ‘proportional' and ‘propor- tionate'; 2) the fact that the principle of double effect (which has been central to much of the debate about proportionalism) demands more than just a proportionate reason; 3) claims of moral theologians who stick closely to the line of recent Vatican documents that certain acts are always wrong regardless of circumstances. In order to understand why the debate about proportionalism is taking place and in order to be able to analyse what is being said in that debate, it seems to me that we need to pay some attention to each of these three issues.

The Meanings of the Terms

Among the definitions of ‘proportion' in the Oxford Dictionary of Current English are “comparative part or share”; “comparative relation, ratio”; and “correct relation of one thing to another or between parts of a thing.” The meaning of ‘proportionate' is given as “in due propor- tion,” and ‘proportional' is defined as “in correct proportion, corre- sponding in degree or amount.” A mere glance at a dictionary, however, does not settle the matter because, in debate about the rightness or wrongness of actions, the terms under discussion are used (or so it is claimed) in accordance with the dictionary definitions, and yet in dif- ferent ways. At least two senses of proportionality are commonly encountered in moral theology. In one of these senses, means will be disproportionate if choosing them causes the end in view to be undermined. If, however, we adopt the other sense, we need to take into account all of the goods and evils involved to check that there is due proportion (or, perhaps we might say, correct relation) among them.4 This second sense would appear to be the one most commonly adopted by proportionalists. Interestingly,

4. Cf. Childress, “Proportionality.” 42 BERNARD HOOSE

Peter Knauer, the person whose writings on proportionate reason are often described as the beginning of the debate on proportionalism does not adopt this second sense. In fact, Garth Hallett quotes Knauer as noting in correspondence that his reasoning “has nothing to do with what generally is called proportionalism.”5 When he speaks of the need for a commensurate or proportionate reason, Knauer is concerned that the act be not counterproductive in regard to the end in view.6 An example of such counterproductivity is that of a man who decides to earn his living by hunting a certain species of animal, but then goes on to hunt it to the point of extinction. Such a position as this gives the impression that an agent should concern herself with only one value in any one action. Now, other val- ues, it seems to me, must be taken into consideration. Surely, for instance, when pursuing the generally legitimate aims of his career, a man (lets us call him Richard) should bear in mind the fact that exces- sive dedication to such ends may result in damage to his relationship with his wife, children, and indeed, various other people. He may also need to bear in mind how the dissemination of knowledge (the pursuit of truth) is affected by the fact that he is not available to help his daugh- ter with her homework (if, for instance, his daughter is experiencing serious difficulties at school). In other words, values may be under- mined, but not, perhaps, the values Richard is aiming at. Hallett too expresses concern about Knauer's apparent one-sidedness where values are concerned. He also finds other difficulties in Knauer's approach. One such lies in the latter's apparent assumption that, in acting, an agent has only one end in view. “Both objectively and subjectively,” he says, “an action may have more than a single end, and often does.” For example, President Bush's statements suggest that he had varied aims when he launched the war against Iraq, and he may have had others he did not mention. Which of these multiple ends deter- mined the morality of his action? American prestige? Votes? Regional security? American access to oil? World access to oil? Kuwaiti independence? The rule of law in international affairs? A curb to nuclear proliferation? Freeing the Iraqi people from dictato- rial rule? Countering the President's reputation as a ‘wimp'? If many or most acts have multiple ends, how can a single end criterion serve as a general guide to right action?7

5. Garth Hallett, Greater Good: The Case for Proportionalism (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1995) 100. 6. See Peter Knauer, “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” Readings in Moral Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition, ed. C. E. Curran and R. A. McCormick (New York: Paulist Press, 1979) 14. 7. Hallett, Greater Good, 103-104. PROPORTIONALISM 43

Hallett goes on, however, to note that, in a revised version of his book Der Glaube kommt vom hören and in private correspondence, Knauer has modified his approach. He has accepted the possibility of an agent seeking after several values. Moreover, he has modified his attitude to counterproductivity as the criterion for judgment. “The fundamental moral norm runs as follows: So act that you do not, overall and in the long run, destroy the very value you are then seeking, nor needlessly sacrifice other values.” Other values are needlessly sacrificed, he explains, if their surrender is not needed in order to save the value sought, overall and in the long run.8 Knauer's modified version, however, only partially rectifies matters, for it would seem that other values can be sacrificed merely if such sac- rifice is necessary to save the value that is being sought. It is not obvious how that would help in the example I gave above of the man pursuing his career. In other words, it seems to me that, if we are to maintain a principle of proportionality, there is a stronger case for maintaining the version that takes into account all values and disvalues than there is for maintaining either of Knauer's versions – in spite of the fact that some may claim his versions are more in keeping with traditional ways of thinking.9

The Principle of Double Effect

A fair amount of what has been written about proportionalism has revolved around the principle of double effect, in part because the arti- cle which is usually described as the one that started the whole debate was a discussion of that principle by Knauer.10 In the form in which it is usually presented, the principle has long been used (principally per- haps, although not exclusively, within Roman Catholicism) as a tool to

8. Hallett, Greater Good, 107. See Peter Knauer, Der Glaube kommt vom hören: Ökumenische Fundamentaltheologie (Freiburg: Herder, 1991) 99. 9. Hallett opines that Knauer's revised version of his principle has a faulty foun- dation, is one-sided and has a basic ambiguity. “Faulty Foundation: One still wonders why the fate of a value should be decisive for an act's morality when that value need not be sought at all rather than some alternative, supposedly incommensurable, value. One- Sided: Other values are still slighted, being accorded weight only in relation to the val- ues that figure as motives. A Basic Ambiguity: The “good” an agent seeks may still be such merely in the sense that it is in fact desired (the person may, for instance, seek revenge) or in a more objective sense that narrows the norm's coverage.” He also lists other difficulties he has with the principle (Greater Good, 107-112). 10. “La détermination du bien et du mal moral par le principe du double effet,” Nouvelle Revue Théologique 87 (1965) 356-376. 44 BERNARD HOOSE help people judge whether a contemplated action which has both good and bad effects can be justified. In the form in which it has reached us, the principle states that such an act may be performed if, and only if, all four of the following conditions are fulfilled: 1. The act is good in itself or at least indifferent. 2. The good end does not depend upon the evil effect for its accom- plishment. 3. Only the good is intended by the agent. It is his or her reason for acting. 4. There is a proportionate reason for causing the harm (the bad effect).11 It seems to me that the examples of this principle's application most often encountered in literature produced by moral theologians in recent decades are those of therapeutic abortion and so-called ‘indirect euthanasia.' Time after time we are presented with the case of a preg- nant woman suffering from cancer of the uterus. The problem, we are told, is whether or not a surgeon can be justified in performing a hys- terectomy. Those explaining the principle to us say that the first condi- tion is met because the act in itself can be described as good or indiffer- ent. This may seem surprising, in view of the fact that removing somebody's womb is an act of mutilation. One can only assume that those who describe it as good or indifferent accept that, if the woman were not pregnant, the hysterectomy could be justified by another prin- cipal (e.g., the principle of totality – according to which this act of mutilation is the best that can be done for the organism as a whole). The second condition too is fulfilled because the good effect (saving the woman's life) does not depend upon the bad effect (killing the fetus). It is the hysterectomy that saves her. The killing of the fetus is just an unfortunate side-effect. As for the third condition, the surgeon's inten- tion (or reason for acting) is the good effect of saving the woman. It is certainly not that of killing the fetus. Finally, there is a proportionate

11. I have tried to make the wording of the conditions clear. Somewhat different wording is used by others. Some years ago, for instance, Joseph Selling listed the condi- tions as: “1. The act (directly) performed is in itself good, or at least indifferent. 2. The good accomplished is at least as immediate as the evil. 3. The intention of the agent is good. 4. There is a proportionate reason for causing the harm” (“The Problem of Rein- terpreting the Principle of Double Effect,” Louvain Studies 8 [1980] 48). Richard McCormick has: “(1) The action from which evil results is good or indifferent in itself; it is not morally evil. (2) The intention of the agent is upright – i.e., the evil effect is sin- cerely not intended. (3) The evil effect must be equally immediate causally with the good effect, for otherwise it would be a means to the good effect and would be intended. (4) There must be a proportionately grave reason for allowing the evil to occur” (”Double Effect, Principle of,” A New Dictionary of Christian Ethics, 162). PROPORTIONALISM 45 reason for causing the harm. If the surgeon did not perform the opera- tion, both the woman and the fetus would die. This way the woman lives. There is nothing that can be done to save the fetus. The same sort of reasoning has been applied to cases of ectopic preg- nancy where the embryo is forming in the fallopian tube. Most propo- nents of the principle of double effect, it seems, invoke it, in such cases to justify excising the tube (with the embryo inside it). What, then, if it were possible to remove the embryo without cutting the tube. Surely that would be preferable, in spite of the fact that such an act would be what most people would describe as a direct abortion. Few, if any, moral the- ologians, one imagines, would argue with that assertion. One or two, however, have persisted in trying to apply the principle of double effect to such cases, claiming that saving the woman's life does not depend upon killing the embryo. It depends upon removing it. It just so happens that medical science is not so far advanced as to prevent death resulting from such removal. Many, however, feel that such mental and verbal gymnas- tics are unnecessary. They see no need to insist that the good effect should not depend upon the evil effect for its accomplishment. All that matters, they say, is the existence or absence of a proportionate reason. It could be argued that those opposed to this concentration on the need for a proportionate reason are on unsafe ground, and are perhaps not traditional enough. When, as an undergraduate, I was first intro- duced to the principle of double effect, I told my tutor that I saw no sense in the first condition (that the act be good or at least indifferent). If I already know that the act is good, it seemed to me, I have no need of the principle of double effect. I was assuming, of course, that the word ‘good' in this context meant ‘morally right.' In fact, a certain amount of controversy has arisen over the meaning of that first condi- tion. Some have suggested that behind it lies an assumption that there are certain acts which are intrinsically evil (in the sense of always being morally wrong) and which, therefore, can never be justified, even by the principle of double effect. That, however, seems unconvincing when one reflects on the fact that this very principle is used to justify giving medication which results in sterilisation, medication which has a less permanent contraceptive effect and, as we have seen, surgery that results in abortion. It would seem, then, that it is precisely the principle of double effect, with its stipulations concerning intention and causality, that is supposed to help us decide whether or not the act in question is or is not of the intrinsically evil kind. Some years ago, Joseph Selling wrote an article in which he expressed the view that the person or persons who formulated the prin- 46 BERNARD HOOSE ciple did not wish to indicate by means of that first condition that the act not be morally wrong. He thought it much more likely that they intended that the act should not contain any evil (even nonmoral evil). He pointed out, of course, that this would not necessarily mean that the act was unjustifiable. It merely meant that the act could not be justified by the principle of double effect. What another principle made of it was another matter. Selling wrote: What I propose is that the principle of double effect applies, and is meant to apply, only to those cases where the doing of a good may result in a foreseeable evil. It must not be confused with cases where evil is done directly. One must consider why double effect is not applied to cases of capital punishment, imprisonment, disciplining children or civil or ecclesiastical censures, etc., and why it encoun- ters so much difficulty when forced upon cases outside its compe- tence, such as that of mutilation.12 When dealing with actions that involve doing an evil directly, he adds, one needs another principle to deal with them morally, “and the removal of a uterus regardless of the presence of a fetus is still an act of mutilation no matter how you slice it.”13 If Selling is right, as I sus- pect he is, some of the ‘classic illustrations' of the principle of double effect are beyond its scope. The principle of totality cannot be substi- tuted, moreover, to deal with the abortion cases because more than one organism is involved, and one of those organisms (the embryo/fetus) clearly gains no benefit at all from the surgical inter- vention. The most obvious candidate would seem to be the principle of the lesser evil, but surely that is just the principle of proportional- ity in one of its guises. Indeed, many might say: “Surely this is just a form of proportionalism.”

Intrinsically Wrong Acts

Several documents emanating from the Vatican in recent years have made reference to acts which are intrinsically wrong, the sense of this terminology being that such acts are wrong in all circumstances. The fact that we cannot hope to imagine all the possible circumstances in which such acts could be performed is apparently regarded as being of no importance. The acts concerned have, for the most part, been of a

12. Joseph A Selling, “The Problem of Reinterpreting the Principle of Double Effect,” Louvain Studies 8 (1980) 59-60. 13. Ibid. PROPORTIONALISM 47 sexual nature or have in some way involved direct killing of nonaggres- sors.14 A major catalyst to the development of proportionalism, other than difficulties concerning the application of the principle of dou- ble effect to cases of therapeutic abortion, was, of course, the label ‘intrinsically evil' attached to artificial contraception in Paul VI's encyclical Humanae vitae.15 It seemed to many moral theologians that circumstances could cause major variations in the relationship (or, if you like, balance) between the various values and disvalues involved in any case in which artificial contraception is contem- plated. Indeed, different circumstances could usher in different val- ues and disvalues. A judgment of rightness or wrongness could only be made after taking into account all the values and disvalues involved in any particular case. Not for the first time, moral theolo- gians who would later come to be included among those known as proportionalists differed in a significant way from those who clung to the pope's line of thinking. In his encyclical Veritatis splendor John Paul II echoed the teachings of Paul VI. He declared: There are acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed “intrinsically evil (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circum- stances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that “there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by rea- son of their object.”16 He also states that we should reject the thesis which, he says, is characteristic of proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species – its “object” – the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behaviour or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.17

14. Exceptions to this are found in Veritatis splendor, where John Paul II lists deportation, mutilation and homicide as acts which are always wrong regardless of cir- cumstances. This, however, would seem to be a departure from tradition. See B. Hoose, “Circumstances, Intentions and Intrinsically Evil Acts,” The Splendor of Accuracy, ed. Joseph A. Selling and Jan Jans (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1995) 136-152. 15. Paul VI, ”Humanae vitae,” AAS 60 (1968) 491. 16. John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, 80. Emphasis his. 17. Ibid., 79. Emphasis his. 48 BERNARD HOOSE

In practice few, if any, proportionalists, it would seem, have entirely dismissed the notion of intrinsic evil. They have, however, dis- agreed with the attitude of the magisterium to circumstances. The point of disagreement would appear to concern the meaning of the word ‘object.' It seems that, in the pope's scheme of things (at least where the acts he describes as intrinsically evil are concerned), the object is the action devoid of all circumstances and intentions. In taking such a stance, the pope is not, of course, at all unusual. In his manual, Thomas Slater, for instance, describes the object as “that to which the will pri- marily and directly tends; that which it determines to do looked at in itself, apart from the circumstances with which the action when done will be clothed; or it is the action considered in the abstract.” He goes on to say that human actions “derive their specific morality from the object, whenever that object is of itself conformable to rational human nature or, on the contrary, not conformable to it. If the object is indif- ferent, without any objective moral quality, as walking, the action will derive its morality from the circumstances in which the action is per- formed.”18 Nor is the pope unusual in claiming that there are acts which can be described as always wrong without any need for consideration of cir- cumstances and intentions. All this, however, raises obvious difficulties, even in regard to some of the acts listed by him as always seriously wrong by reason of their object. One such is deportation. Some years ago, the British authorities resorted to deportation when it became apparent that a Libyan diplomat had been involved in the mortal wounding of a police woman. It might be objected that the pope is clearly referring to other kinds of deportation. It should immediately be pointed out, however, that what makes instances of deportation differ- ent are circumstances and intentions. The well-known proportionalist Richard McCormick was thus able to say, in response to the above asser- tions of Veritatis splendor, that he believed all proportionalists would be prepared to admit that there are acts which are intrinsically evil from their object “if the object is broadly understood as including all the morally relevant circumstances.”19 Some years earlier in a book published for his students in Rome, Josef Fuchs had differentiated between the total object of an act and the object in a narrower sense. In a section on the three sources of morality he says that the total object contains the object in the narrow sense, the circumstances and the end. He takes up the

18. Thomas Slater, A Manual of Moral Theology for English Speaking Countries (London: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, 1925) 22. 19. Richard A. McCormick, “Killing the Patient,” The Tablet 247 (1993) 1411. PROPORTIONALISM 49 example of a kidney transplant. The total object consists in removing a kidney (the object in the narrow sense), from a healthy person (the cir- cumstances), in order to transplant it into the body of another person who needs it (the end). All three elements together determine the moral rightness of the act. If a doctor were to remove somebody's kidney for an unnecessary experiment, he or she would be acting in a morally wrong way. Referring to the maxim that a good end does not justify evil means, he points out that the means (acts) spoken of are morally evil ones. But how, he asks, can we know that an act is morally bad (wrong) unless we have taken into consideration the end and the circum- stances?20 Clearly, there is a major disagreement here between the stance of proportionalists such as Fuchs and McCormick and that adopted by John Paul II. It is difficult, however, to see how the pope can supply a truly convincing defence of his position on this matter. He also lists mutilation as an act that is wrong per se and in itself, independently of circumstances.21 In view of what we discussed earlier about surgery (and in view of what some of John Paul II's predecessors had to say by way of justification of the mutilation involved in surgery), it would seem that the application of the term ‘intrinsically evil' here is particularly problematical. A proportionalist, of course, might go on to suggest that application of the same term in regard to artificial contraception is equally problematical. At one point the pope cites as saying that, often, people act with good intention, but without any spiritual gain, because they lack a good will. “Let us say that someone robs in order to feed the poor: in this case, even though the intention is good, the uprightness of the will is lacking. Consequently, no evil done with a good intention can be excused.”22 In response, it could be pointed out that there is a very long tradition, supported by Aquinas himself,23 that, in cases of emergency, one may take what one needs from another person who has more than he or she needs of that commodity, if that person refuses to give what he or she should, in fact, have given. Now, let us suppose that the person in a state of emergency is too weak to perform the act of tak- ing what is needed. Surely it would be permissible for another person (who, needless to say, cannot supply the required commodity from his or her own stocks) to perform the act on behalf of the one in need. We

20. Josef Fuchs, Essere del Signore (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1981) 196-197. 21. Veritatis splendor, 80. 22. Ibid., 78. 23. See Summa theologiae II-II, q. 66. 7. 50 BERNARD HOOSE need to know the circumstances if we are to be able to discern whether or not a particular ‘Robin Hood type act' (performed without unneces- sary violence) is justifiable.

But How, if at All, Can Proportionalism Function?

In attempting to answer this question, one first needs to find the answer to another: How do proportionalists arrive at knowledge or awareness of the values and disvalues (goods and evils) that need to be taken into account in any particular case? The answer lies in the fact that, for the most part at least, they are thinkers who are affected by recent scholarship in the sphere of personalism. In other words, they arrive at knowledge of values by reflecting upon what it is to be a human person and upon what makes human persons flourish. Some such reflection has, of course, been going on for centuries. Knowledge of what it is to be human, however, changes (dare I say increases?) as time goes by. What we are reflecting upon today, therefore, is not in all respects the same as that which was reflected upon by peo- ple of previous generations. Our conclusions about values and about general moral norms based on those values must therefore be open to revision. Most, if not all, of the moral norms of behaviour referred to in the writings of proportionalists, like the values that ground them, are derived from natural law thinking, and, for the most part, are norms inherited from previous generations. Again, for the most part, these norms are regarded by them as guidelines. Generally speaking, one should not kill, should not tell untruths, should not take the property of another person without that person's permission and should not break promises. There will, however, be exceptions. These exceptions arrive because of special circumstances which bring extra values and/or disvalues into play. It is here we see revealed what many regard as the Achilles' heel of proportionalism. In order to deal with such exceptional cases, they say, proportionalists resort to weighing, or at least to some way of compar- ing, values. Such comparison, say the opponents of proportionalism, is impossible.24 This was the view expressed by Knauer right at the begin- ning of the debate. His way of attempting to overcome this problem was, as we have seen, to insist that the whole act must correspond to its

24. See, for instance, Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol. I: Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983) 152. PROPORTIONALISM 51 end. Another way of putting this is to say that the reason for the act (the end aimed at) must be commensurate (or, presumably, if one prefers, proportionate) to the act itself. Or again, the act must not contradict the fullest achievement of the end “in relation to the whole of reality.” That is the case, in Knauer's words, when “A short run ‘more' of the value is paid by a ‘lesser' achievement of the same value in the long run.”25 We have noted problems with Knauer's approach, but proportion- alism can fair better only if its proponents can overcome the problem of incommensurability. Can they do so? Knauer is by no means the only scholar to raise the spectre of this supposed incommensurability of val- ues. Germain Grisez and numerous other opponents of the proportion- alist approach have pointed out that values such as justice and truth cannot be compared. If we treat them as mere abstractions (rather like Platonic Ideas), I am sure that is the case, but what possible purpose could there be in doing such a thing when trying to judge rightness and/or wrongness in a particular concrete case. Hallett presents the example of a hypothetical situation in which he is trying to decide on the best recipient for some extra cash. Esthetic values suggest the local art museum, truth values suggest my alma mater, and justice values suggest a social-justice lobby. All are worthy causes. But how effective is the lobby? How well run is the uni- versity? How badly strapped for funds is the museum? These and many other details are pertinent to my choice; yet on none of them can I receive any light from a rating on esthetic values, truth values, or justice values in general.26 In the practical work of ethics we are not concerned with total abstractions such as, for instance, the Idea of Truth. If we stay with the example of truth, we can say that we are concerned with communicat- ing what is due to a person or to a number of persons in a certain set of circumstances. Some decades ago, Dietrich Bonhoeffer observed that ‘telling the truth' can mean different things in different circumstances. In attempting to discover what is required in this domain in any partic- ular case, we need, he said, to take into account the relationships involved. Thus he finds that the truthfulness of parents towards their child is essentially different from the truthfulness of their child towards them. “The life of the small child lies open before the parents, and what the child says should reveal to them everything that is hidden and secret, but in the converse relationship this cannot possibly be the 25. Knauer, “The Hermeneutic Function of the Principle of Double Effect,” 14. 26. Hallett, Greater Good, 24-25. 52 BERNARD HOOSE case.”27 It could, of course, be said that the reason for the difference arises from conflicts of values. In dealing with such conflicts, however, we do not merely compare abstract ideas. We take into account, for instance that communication of certain facts to this child at this stage of development would be traumatic. Communication of certain other facts would be downright dangerous for the child and perhaps for other peo- ple likely to be affected by the child's putting the newfound informa- tion to use. We are not paralysed by the apparent incommensurability of truth on the one hand and life, health and safety on the other. A key to why we are not so paralysed is provided by a former student of mine, John Kearns. Faced with the objection that basic human goods such as truth, life and friendship have no common denominator and cannot therefore be compared, he observed that they do, in fact, have a com- mon denominator. They are all human goods. It would seem, therefore, that, in any situation of conflict, we need to take into account values as they exist in that situation and as they are related to each other in the situation and in the people concerned. It does not seem to me that this necessarily leads to a need for completely new thinking every time we are faced with a conflict of val- ues. Wisdom accumulates over time and becomes common property. Gerard J. Hughes holds that ethics is at root an empirical study.28 Bear- ing this in mind, I wrote, in a soon to be published piece that we need to learn from human experience which kinds of choices best promote human flourishing in various types of situations. If we wish to talk in terms of human goods, it seems we must say that, inevitably, in differ- ent situations, right choosing will involve different mixtures or cocktails of goods. On rare occasions, as new knowledge about what it is to be human becomes available and/or as new insights result from the ongo- ing reflection upon human experience of what it is to be human, we may have to revise our ideas about which cocktails are the best in par- ticular situations.29 There will be cases, however, in which the individual agent will have to do more than merely appeal to accumulated wisdom for a

27. He goes on to point out that: “Speech between parents and children is, in the nature of the case, different from speech between man and wife, between friends, between teacher and pupil, government and subject, friend and foe, and in each case the truth which this speech conveys is also different.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, ed. Eber- hard Bethge (London: Collins, 1966) 363-372. 28. Gerard J. Hughes, “Natural Law Ethics and Moral Theology,” The Month, March 1987, 100. 29. Bernard Hoose, “Natural Law, Acts and Persons,” Festschrift in honour of Nor- bert Rigali (exact title and pagination not yet available). PROPORTIONALISM 53 ready made solution. Some of the difficulties encountered arise from the fact that humans differ, a fact brought to the fore in recent times by the work of personalist scholars. We have already referred to differ- ences between adults and children. That single category of differences is complex and subject to continuing change. The ways in which we exhibit respect for a child's autonomy, for instance, change as the years pass, as the child develops. There are no clear guidelines here, for dif- ferent children develop at different paces. Moreover, the differences between children and adults are not the only morally significant ones found among humans. In certain situations the differences between the sexes may, for example, be a factor to be taken into consideration. Again, a counsellor may have to give different advice to extraverts, to introverts, and to those at varying points on the spectrum between the two extremes. This point about the differences between persons highlights the fact that working out what is the right thing to do in any set of cir- cumstances can be fraught with difficulties. We can easily make mis- takes. Moreover, the difficulties encountered will, at times, be more than those so far indicated in this paper. Although, for instance, I have argued against those who hold that proportionalism is impossible because of a supposed incommensurability of values, I do not wish to downplay the problems sometimes involved in deciding which value takes precedence in a particular situation – if we wish to use such ter- minology. There may be times too when, perhaps because of our limited knowledge, we will not be sure what the right solution is, as well as times when we will feel certain and yet disagree with others who feel equally certain that their solution is the right one. This, I believe, is inevitable. There will even be a certain amount of disagreement about the basic values, and that would probably be the case even if we all agreed that those values are to be derived from natural law. It was, I think, W. D. Ross who pointed out that reasonable people can reason- ably differ. Proportionalism, if we adopt it, is merely a tool in weak and fallible hands. It is not itself the solution.

But Will It Go Too Far?

About ten years ago, in a review of my book Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its European Roots, James Keenan noted that, if you declare yourself to be a proportionalist, some at least will “see you as legitimating abortion, lynching, masturbation, adultery, theft, sui- 54 BERNARD HOOSE cide, lying, purse snatching, murder and a plethora of other activities.”30 Many might wish to believe that, in practice, proportionalism leads to none of these things. Others, however, might point to the attitude of proportionalists in regard to the case of ectopic pregnancy described ear- lier where the embryo could be removed without excising the fallopian tube. On the other hand, it seems to me that most moral theologians who are opposed to proportionalism would also permit such a proce- dure. They would differ from the proportionalists only in the way they would justify the action. The possibility remains, however, that, if they were consistent in their thinking, proportionalists might find themselves justifying other therapeutic abortions to which traditionalists would object. Traditionally, Roman Catholic moral theology has regarded all direct killing of the innocent (nonaggressors) as unjustifiable. There has been some disagreement over the years about the precise meaning to be attributed to the words ‘direct' and ‘indirect.' Generally speaking, how- ever, most commentators, it seems, would hold that an act of killing an innocent person is direct if it does not conform to the requirements of the principle of double effect, and, as we have seen, the principle of double effect, in its traditional formulation, requires more than just a proportionate reason (or, if one prefers, a balancing of the various goods and evils involved in the act). Another area in which there could conceivably be disagreement concerning the rightness or wrongness of acts traditionally prohibited is that of euthanasia. Again we encounter the teaching that one should not kill the innocent directly. Catholic moral theology has long accepted that it is acceptable to give painkillers to a dying person even though they will have the secondary effect of causing that person to die sooner than would otherwise be the case, provided that the person administer- ing the drug intends only to relieve pain. That may seem like a straight- forward application of the principle of double effect. Complications arise, however, when we come to consider the question of allowing a person to die by withholding or withdrawing what we judge to be dis- proportionate means of keeping him or her alive. Similar arguments about proportion and disproportion have traditionally been regarded as inadmissible when applied to the direct killing of the patient. This raises the question of whether or not proportionalism can contribute anything to the debate about whether or not the difference between killing and letting die is morally significant. One proportionalist who has con- tributed to that debate is Josef Fuchs. He noted some years ago that, as 30. James Keenan, Review of Proportionalism: The American Debate and Its Euro- pean Roots, in America, November 5, 1988, 352. PROPORTIONALISM 55 an expressive attitude, a justified act of letting someone die “stands nearer to an attitude expressing respect vis-à-vis human life than does an active intervention.”31 It might be objected that, as it stands, what Fuchs says is not a proportionalist argument. We need to bear in mind, however, that, when considering the goods and evils involved in an act, proportionalists tend not to confine their considerations to what we might refer to as the obvious consequences of an action. They also take into account such things as the meaning of the action, the significance of symbolism, the impact of gestures, and so on. The possibility remains, however, that, in a particular case, having attributed some importance to such matters, a person applying proportionalist reasoning might opt for helping a person to kill herself or, indeed, for killing her. A number of moral theologians have addressed the hypothetical case of a secret agent captured during wartime. He is sure that, using a combi- nation of various means (torture, sleep deprivation, truth drugs, etc.) his captors will gain enough information from him to inflict terrible evils on his people. In order to protect his people, he kills himself. Many have seen this as an exception to the ban on directly killing oneself. A few years ago, I extended the story: Now, let us suppose that the secret agent needs help, and that one of his side has infiltrated the enemy ranks. The infiltrator assists his suicide by secretly bringing a small pouch containing poison into his prison cell. The agent then puts this poison into his food or drink. If one accepts that the self-killing is justified, there seems to be no reason for condemning the assistance given by another party who, like the secret agent, is convinced that, unless the agent dies, the enemy will get and use the information which he is carrying in his head. To complete the scenario, let us assume that, even with the help of the infiltrator, escape is out of the question.32 Even if we accept that such assisted suicide is justifiable in this case, it does not necessarily follow that assisted suicide would be justifiable in any of the kinds of cases that we would more normally discuss within the debate on euthanasia. In view of the fact, however, that we cannot imagine all the possible circumstances that could arise, it would seem that any proportionalist who accepted that assisted suicide was accept- able in the case of the secret agent would have to be open to the possi- bility that it might be acceptable in other cases (albeit extremely rare ones). More directly on the subject of euthanasia, I considered the case

31. Josef Fuchs, Christian Morality: The Word Becomes Flesh (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987) 79. 32. Bernard Hoose, Received Wisdom?: Reviewing the Role of Tradition in Chris- tian Ethics (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994) 100. 56 BERNARD HOOSE of a soldier who has to abandon his horribly wounded friend on the bat- tlefield because his unit has been ordered to retreat. He knows, not only that his friend will suffer an excruciatingly painful death, but that enemy soldiers from whom his unit is retreating are sadistic and delight in tormenting wounded soldiers from the other side. His friend has asked him to kill him. As an expression of love and respect, he does so. This would be a case of voluntary euthanasia. Could it be justified? If not, why not?33 If proportionalism does not rule out doing nonmoral evil that good may come of it, the mere existence of a norm (guideline) that one should not directly kill the innocent will not be enough to decide the matter, although what Fuchs says about expressive attitudes, it would seem, should be taken into account. These examples suffice to show, not that proportionalism will nec- essarily go too far, but that, every now and then, areas of doubt appear. This, however, only serves to underline Hughes's observation that “Ethics is inevitably provisional, revisable, for the same kinds of reason that our beliefs about astronomy, physics or medicine are revisable.” Every now and then we will discover that, in some notable way we have had “an inadequate grasp on how we ought to live.”34 How proportion- alism can help us in this ongoing task is a matter for continuing inves- tigation. There are still many questions about how precisely proportion can be estimated in the varying circumstances of life. Perhaps one of the questions to which we need to give urgent attention is that of how one can acquire and nurture the virtue of practical wisdom.

Bernard Hoose is Professor of Moral Theology at Heythrop College, London. Address: Kensington Square, London W8 5HQ, England.

33. Hoose, Received Wisdom?, 104-105. 34. Hughes, “Natural Law Ethics and Moral Theology,” 101.