Quarter 2018 th Issue 91, 4 91, Issue
2018 Essay Winners Authorities Competition to Cyber Attack Attack Cyber to A Smarter Approach Approach A Smarter
Engagement Complementary
JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-ONE, 4TH QUARTER 2018 Joint Force Quarterly Founded in 1993 • Vol. 91, 4th Quarter 2018 http://ndupress.ndu.edu
Gen Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., USMC, Publisher VADM Frederick J. Roegge, USN, President, NDU
Editor in Chief Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D.
Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D.
Production Editor John J. Church, D.M.A.
Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich
Copyeditor Andrea L. Connell
Book Review Editor Frank G. Hoffman, Ph.D.
Associate Editors Patricia Strait, Ph.D., and Jack Godwin, Ph.D.
Art Director Marco Marchegiani, U.S. Government Publishing Office
Advisory Committee COL Michael S. Bell, USA (Ret.), Ph.D./College of International Security Affairs; Col James D. Dryjanski, USAF/Air Command and Staff College; Col David J. Eskelund, USMC/Marine Corps War College; RADM Janice M. Hamby, USN (Ret.)/College of Information and Cyberspace; RADM Jeffrey A. Harley, USN/U.S. Naval War College; MajGen John M. Jansen, USMC/Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; MG John S. Kem, USA/U.S. Army War College; LTG Michael D. Lundy, USA/U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Brig Gen Chad T. Manske, USAF/National War College; Col William McCollough, USMC/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; LtGen Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC/The Joint Staff; RDML Jeffrey Ruth, USN/Joint Forces Staff College; VADM Kevin D. Scott, USN/The Joint Staff; Brig Gen Jeremy T. Sloane, USAF/Air War College
Editorial Board Richard K. Betts/Columbia University; Stephen D. Chiabotti/School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Eliot A. Cohen/The Johns Hopkins University; COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.)/National War College; Richard L. DiNardo/Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Aaron L. Friedberg/Princeton University; Bryon Greenwald/ Joint Forces Staff College; Douglas N. Hime/Naval War College; Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.)/The Joint Staff; Kathleen Mahoney- Norris/Air Command and Staff College; Thomas L. McNaugher/ Georgetown University; Bert B. Tussing/U.S. Army War College
Cover 2 images (top to bottom): Naval Aircrewman embarked aboard USS Wasp prepares patient’s family for evacuation during relief efforts in wake of Hurricane Maria, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands, September 21, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Levingston Lewis); Sailor gets baptized in hangar bay aboard USS Harry S. Truman, Atlantic Ocean, July 8, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Rebekah A. Watkins); World War II veteran Claude Cawood, former section chief on M105 Howitzer who served 3 years in Philippines, gives high-five after firing M777 Howitzer, August 9, 2018, at Camp Grayling, Michigan (U.S. Army National Guard/Sara Robinson) About the Cover In This Issue Marine with 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division attached to Special Purpose Marine Forum Air-Ground Task Force, Crisis 2 Executive Summary Response–Central Command, prepares to board MV-22 Osprey at 4 Complementary Engagement: Fire Base Um Jorais, July 6, 2018 An American-Led Response (U.S. Marine Corps/Carlos Lopez) to Rising Regional Rivals By Stephan J. Pikner 14 Beyond the Third Offset: Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory By James Hasik 67 A Smarter Approach to 111 Joint Publication 4-0, Essay Competitions Cyber Attack Authorities Joint Logistics 22 Winners of the 2018 By Michael P. Carvelli By Andrew Keene Essay Competitions 74 Military Transformation: 112 Joint Doctrine Update 24 Coercive Gradualism Through Applying the Kotter Eight- Gray Zone Statecraft in Step Methodology for Change the South China Seas: in the U.S. Armed Services Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National China’s Strategy and Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Potential U.S. Options By Hassan M. Kamara Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal designed to By Kapil Bhatia inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and Recall other partners on joint and integrated operations; 34 Political Warfare with national security policy and strategy; efforts to combat 82 Air Force Strategic Bombing terrorism; homeland security; and developments in Other Means: 2017 Cyber and Its Counterpoints from training and joint professional military education to Attacks on Qatar transform America’s military and security apparatus World War I to Vietnam to meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting By Edwin Y. Chua By Michael M. Trimble freedom today. All published articles have been vetted through a peer-review process and cleared by the 37 Peacekeepers in the Donbas Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review. By Michael P. Wagner Book Reviews NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and academic 90 On Grand Strategy publishing house. Commentary Reviewed by Peter Dombrowski The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 40 Additive Manufacturing: 91 Directorate S contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views Shaping the Sustainment of the Department of Defense or any other agency of Reviewed by Thomas F. Lynch III the Federal Government. Battlespace Copyright Notice By Michael Kidd, Angela 93 Allies That Count This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition Quinn, and Andres Munera Reviewed by Kathleen J. McInnis of Joint Force Quarterly. Any copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission of the copyright proprietors. JFQ 47 The U.S. Air Force and Army 95 Staying the Course should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted in Korea: How Army Decisions Reviewed by Erik B. Villard from or based on its content. Limited Airpower Effectiveness Submissions and Communications By Price T. Bingham JFQ welcomes submission of scholarly, independent Joint Doctrine research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, 97 The U.S. Government’s Approach academic specialists, and civilians from the United Features States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to Civilian Security: Focus to ScholarOne, available at https://mc04. 60 Beyond the Gray Zone: on Campaign Activities manuscriptcentral.com/ndupress, or write to: Special Operations in By George E. Katsos Editor, Joint Force Quarterly Multidomain Battle NDU Press 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 2504) By James E. Hayes III 105 Building Joint Personnel Fort Lesley J. McNair Recovery Through Washington, DC 20319 Multinational Collaboration Telephone: (202) 685-4220/DSN 325 By David Gayvert Email: [email protected] JFQ online: ndupress.ndu.edu/jfq 4th Quarter, October 2018 ISSN 1070-0692 U.S. Air Force Academy Class of 2017 marches toward their seats during graduation in Colorado Springs, Colorado, May 24, 2017 (DOD/James K. McCann)
Executive Summary
s a student of leadership in many effect on how I viewed leadership, and give commands in such a manner settings, I have long sought especially as a follower. It came back to and such a tone of voice as to inspire in A to see it from the position of me instantly when I read about a senior the soldier no feeling, but an intense desire those who are being led. They know officer who was being disciplined for to obey, while the opposite manner and best what good leadership looks like not following the letter of the law while tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong and how it feels, as they are the ones in command. resentment and a desire to disobey. The one who help leaders succeed. At the U.S. The passage is from West Point mode or other of dealing with subordinates Air Force Academy, first-year cadets graduate, Civil War hero of the Western springs from a corresponding spirit in the are given a small book that contains campaign and Sherman’s March to breast of the commander. He who feels quotations and other basic facts about the Sea, and Medal of Honor winner the respect which is due to others cannot the Service that they must memorize Major General John M. Schofield, as fail to inspire in them respect for himself. and recite on command by upper-class he gave the graduation address at West While he who feels, and hence manifests, cadets. As cadets, my classmates and I Point in 1879: disrespect toward others, especially his were taught that followership was the subordinates, cannot fail to inspire hatred basis of good leadership. The theory The discipline which makes the soldiers of against himself. was if we learn how to follow, then a free country reliable in battle is not to be it would be easier to see how to lead. gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. This set of ideas seemed quite at odds One of the longest quotations I had to On the contrary, such treatment is far with the treatment a “doolie” like myself memorize was not from an Airman, or more likely to destroy than to make an typically received in those days at the about airpower, but it had a profound army. It is possible to impart instruction Academy, but in the end, those words
2 Forum / Executive Summary JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 and their value to me stuck. I recently Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions, held adapt or transform have been constant, read of a senior officer who was relieved here at National Defense University in but an accepted approach has been allu- for what I gather was a leadership style May 2018. Twenty-nine senior faculty sive. Hassan Kamara suggests we look at that embodied the darker side of what members from 15 participating profes- Kotter’s Eight-Step Methodology as a Schofield warned against. sional military education institutions potential answer. General Joseph Dunford has stated, served as judges to determine the best In Recall, we find an interesting “As a leader of consequence, it’s never student entries among the three cat- discussion of strategic bombing and the about you.” He believes that our military egories. Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian application of airpower to war. While leaders should share the quality of moral Navy, winner of the Secretary of Defense no single article of the length we accept courage. Leadership is neither a right National Security Essay competition, could hope to fully cover the entire his- nor an entitlement but a privilege and an provides one of the best articles we have tory of this topic, Michael Trimble offers honor that must be carefully respected. seen in recent years about the impact of a successful run with his discussion of the In this day of constant social media bom- China’s expansion projects in the South evolution of Air Force strategic bombing bardment and constant surveillance via China Seas and what the United States from 1918 to 1974. cell phones, enlightened senior leaders can do about it. In a rare event, the Along with three excellent book are likely to thrive while those who “fail judges awarded a tie for first place in the reviews, our Joint Doctrine section is to inspire”—or simply cannot be the Chairman’s Strategy Article competi- fairly robust this issue with three valuable best steward of our son’s and daughter’s tion, so we are pleased to bring both of pieces on a range of joint force support futures—will become a costly burden we these papers to you. Major Edwin Chua, issues. In his continuing series of inter- can no longer afford. In an increasingly Singapore Army, offers the cautionary agency focused articles, George Katsos complex and threat-filled world, the tale of the misinformation cyber attack offers a summary of joint force campaign Nation expects the military to protect on Qatari state media in 2017, and activities to execute the U.S. approach them, and that means leaders at all levels Lieutenant Colonel Michael Wagner, to civilian security. Bringing in the mul- must lead with the highest principles in USA, discusses the Russian offer of a tinational partners that are essential to mind—always. peacekeeping force in Eastern Ukraine as many U.S. military operations around the In this issue’s Forum, we offer two not being something the United States globe, David Gayvert describes how U.S. interesting views on how to deal with the should completely dismiss. Joint Personnel Recovery missions lever- environment facing the joint force today, In Commentary, two interesting age international forces. In an important and for the foreseeable future. Clearly, articles take us from the cutting edge update article, Andrew Keene helps us the United States has moved to focus of technology in today’s environment understand the key details of the new on state competitors after nearly two to the Korean Peninsula of some 65+ Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics. And decades of dealing with violent extremism years ago. Michael Kidd, Angela Quinn, as always, you can keep track of the ongo- primarily in one region of the world. and Andres Munera bring us a compact ing changes to how the joint force fights Stephan Pikner helps us see the arc of primer on additive manufacturing and its with the Joint Doctrine Update. U.S. strategy from the Cold War to the potential game-changing impact on how What do you think about the joint present and suggests that complementary the joint force is logistically supported. force? Where do we need to adapt to engagement with allies and partners Returning JFQ author Price Bingham of- meet the future as you see it? Where does backed by certain revitalization of U.S. fers his take on the evolving relationship leadership make a difference to you, and capabilities will position the United of the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army in what does good leadership look like? States to compete in this new strategic the Korean War. His unique perspective When you think you have some answers, world. With a change in administration, will surely stimulate an age-old debate JFQ is here to help you reach out to the some of the efforts that began under the on the relationship between the Army joint force and beyond. JFQ Obama administration with the concept and Air Force. of the “Third Offset Strategy” have Our Features section takes us into William T. Eliason either continued or have been shelved. the “hot” topics affecting the joint force, Editor in Chief Technology and strategy thinker and and all three relate to current operating JFQ alumni James Hasik gives an excel- environment and how the military might lent explanation of the Nation’s offset adapt to it. James Hayes III discusses the strategies and describes how current role of special operations forces in the innovations supporting the Third Offset multidomain battle concept. Addressing Strategy can help the U.S. military win the growing issue of how to deal with the the Nation’s wars. threat of cyber attack, Michael Carvelli JFQ next presents the winning essays next describes a better approach to from the 12th annual Secretary of Defense establishing the rules for our responses. and 37th annual Chairman of the Joint For many years, calls for the military to
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Eliason 3 Soldiers assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) conduct urban operations training near Stuttgart, Germany (U.S. Army/Jason Johnston)
by the West. While American allies and supporters of the rules-based inter- Complementary national order have—in many cases belatedly—woken up to the threat of systemic upheaval, the lack of a shared organizing principle has limited the free Engagement world’s response. Emerging rivals have historically focused minds and opened An American-Led Response wallets, but today America’s military is hamstrung by competing visions and priorities. to Rising Regional Rivals In this emerging global security environment, the United States should By Stephan J. Pikner modify its military structure and global posture to counter the full array of rising regional rivals and ensure the continued fter 17 years of the war on concentrated on Iraq, Afghanistan, and security, freedom, and prosperity of its terror, the United States and countering violent extremism across the allies and like-minded partners through- A its allies stand today at a grand globe, regional powers such as China, out the world. Through a process of strategic inflection point. As America Russia, and Iran dramatically expanded deliberate security partnership and ca- their ambitions and capabilities. Start- pacity-building—an approach this article ing with the 2008 Russian invasion of dubs “complementary engagement”— Major Stephan J. Pikner, USA, is the Army Georgia, and accelerated by the global the United States can maintain global Strategist Association Secretary for the 2017– financial crisis of 2008–2009, this leadership, adapt to today’s threats, and 2019 board term and is studying at Georgetown University as part of the Army’s Advanced resurgence of great power assertiveness rebalance the burden and risk of security Strategic Planning and Policy Program. has been met with a certain weariness to reflect modern economic realities.
4 Forum / Complementary Engagement JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 The departure point for this arti- The Evolution of Post–Cold Advocates for selective engagement cle is G. John Ikenberry’s view of the War Grand Strategy sought to focus American power solely post–Cold War era as an “American-led The collapse of the Soviet Union on geopolitically critical areas, rather than liberal hegemonic world order,” where prompted a broad reassessment of spreading it ineffectually across the globe. unrivaled U.S. strength underwrites eco- American grand strategy. Deep engage- By prioritizing strategic regions, selective nomic growth and political liberalization ment, the prevailing American strategy engagement “steers a middle course through a widely accepted, voluntary, during the Cold War, can be defined as between isolationism . . . and world rules-based, but increasingly atrophying the enduring diplomatic, informational, policeman.”9 The underlying security re- system. While the inherent stability of military, and economic partnerships lationship between the United States and unipolarity has been debated by interna- with a wide range of allies and partners its allies would remain similar to the Cold tional relations scholars, the failure of a across the globe that underwrote sus- War dynamic, but instead of seeking to cohesive counterbalancing coalition to tained economic growth and regional contain the Soviet threat, American forces emerge as a challenge to the American- stability in the face of communism. It would stabilize and secure key political led system supports Ikenberry’s benign enabled the West German and Austrian and economic allies. view of U.S. dominance.1 This does postwar Wirtschaftswunder and the phe- While selective engagement supports not mean that the United States and its nomenal growth of the “Asian Tigers” a relatively narrow and material definition allies do not face an array of increasingly in the shadow of Soviet and Chinese of American national interest, the option assertive and capable threats that seek communism, and nurtured liberal of collective security considered peace a to undermine this order—as the 2018 democracy in Europe and Asia.5 Deep public good that must be provided by National Defense Strategy clearly states, engagement’s critics, though, cited the the shared efforts of like-minded nations. we are facing “increased global disorder, high cost of maintaining this military Through collective action to uphold characterized by decline in the longstand- footprint, the trap of allies shirking their norms and punish rogue actors who un- ing rules-based international order.”2 defense responsibilities, and the risk of dermine peace and stability, states would Rather, it sees these rivals as probing being drawn into peripheral conflicts as act in concert to deter conflict and limit for weakness along the periphery, and reasons to reassess this grand strategy in its effects. Regional collective security seeking relative gains from the resultant the wake of the Soviet demise.6 Several focused on building such systems in dis- anarchy.3 While there are many elements alternatives to the Cold War approach crete areas of the world, while the global to the American-led, rules-based interna- of deep engagement were posited in version of the concept viewed security as tional order, this article argues the largest the 1990s. These ranged from a return a world-spanning ecosystem where no and most critical piece of the structure to pre–World War II reclusiveness to one region could be isolated. Liberal in- that undergirds it is U.S. military power.4 a continuation of the expansive (and stitutions would be central to overcoming Given a range of rising regional rivals expensive) Cold War posture. This the inherent collective action problems.10 who are engaging in interstate compe- debate considered several options, Primacy—the most ambitious op- tition, along with the continued war on broadly categorized as neo-isolationism, tion considered—is a global extension terror and increasingly independent and selective engagement, cooperative secu- of hegemonic stability theory: “Only a well-armed allies, how can the United rity, and primacy.7 preponderance of U.S. power ensures States best ensure continued security and Neo-isolationists advocated disen- peace.”11 Primacy sought to capitalize prosperity? tangling from the web of alliances and on America’s post–Cold War unipolarity To answer this question, this article commitments across the world that was through sustained investment in and begins by tracing the evolution of strat- woven during the Cold War. The geo- use of all elements—diplomatic, infor- egy from the end of the Cold War to graphic advantages of the United States, mational, military, and economic—of the recently published National Security coupled with its lack of historical rivals national power. This approach would Strategy (NSS). Examining proposed and overwhelming military and economic mitigate the collective action problems alternatives to America’s grand strategy power, could allow America to safely step inherent in collective security while ex- and the events that shaped its evolution back from the world. Even if a threat to tending the values of democracy and free frames the second section, which explores the United States did emerge, geography trade across the world in a way that the the current dilemma and helps differen- would provide a buffer to allow for rear- more limited strategy of selective engage- tiate today’s challenge from the previous mament, as it did in the opening years of ment could not. contexts that still form the foundation World War II. Left unanswered by propo- The debate over the fundamental for many current proposals. In the final nents of neo-isolationism, however, was nature of American foreign policy contin- section, this article proposes a compre- the threat of nuclear proliferation among ued through the 1990s and was reflected hensive military structure and posture states that could no longer rely on the in academic articles, policy documents, shift—complementary engagement—that American posture of extended deterrence and foreign policy decisions. The final better addresses the dilemma of rising for their own security.8 Clinton administration NSS integrated regional rivals. the ideas of primacy and cooperative
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pikner 5 security into initiatives that expanded During this inwardly focused period, regional powers and their neighboring the North Atlantic Treaty Organization though, rivals of the U.S.-led order American allies, coupled with the pattern (NATO), promoted free trade, and began asserting power more openly of expansion common to Iran, China, strengthened international cooperation in their respective regions. Chinese and Russia, it follows that leaders in against terror and weapons of mass de- economic growth generated a sense of nearby states would see them as a threat struction. Cooperative security’s focus on national confidence that was matched and seek to counter them by strengthen- controlling illicit arms and rogue states with sustained investment in its military. ing their ties with Washington, regardless was evident in nonproliferation cooper- Developments in antiaccess/area-denial of the raw balance of global power. ation with Russia, and in a nod to global (A2/AD) weapons systems designed Balance of threat is increasingly sup- collective security’s requirement for to preclude an unimpeded, low-risk ported empirically. In recent years, many resolving and containing conflict across American deployment into theater pro- American allies have “hard balanced” the world, a variety of peace-building ceeded rapidly. An incremental program against their more assertive neighbors by successes in five continents were cited in of land reclamation and island-building building their military capacities. Persian the 1998 NSS as evidence of the value of in the South China Sea sought to create Gulf states, which have long lavished sustained engagement.12 the (newly minted) ground that would petrodollars on military hardware, have The shock of September 11, 2001, extend Chinese military and economic continued their investments despite lower reframed the debate over American power and de facto sovereignty into oil revenues. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, foreign policy as the defense of the international waters shared by an array of and the United Arab Emirates have all homeland clearly took priority. Threads nations.17 Iran, capitalizing on the power increased their spending on sophisticated of cooperative security remained in the vacuum created by Iraq’s continued American-built antimissile systems to 2002 NSS, though now woven into the instability, involved itself more openly defend against Iran, a trend highlighted global counterterrorism effort: “Today, and assertively in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, by the $110 billion weapons deal struck the world’s greatest powers find [them- and Iraq. Russia flexed its muscles as during President Donald Trump’s 2017 selves] on the same side—united by well by creating and then capitalizing on visit to Riyadh.22 Asian states such as common dangers of terrorist violence and a series of “frozen conflicts” in regions Vietnam and Singapore have dramatically chaos.”13 The 2006 NSS continued this along its periphery. Some of these man- increased their spending on naval and theme by starkly opening with the dec- ufactured conflicts erupted into open air weapons to balance against China. laration that “this is a wartime national war, such as in 2008 against Georgia and Even Japan, constrained by its pacifist security strategy.” Moving beyond the 2014 against Ukraine. Others, namely postwar constitution, is investing heavily immediate demands of counterterrorism Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno- in expeditionary weapons platforms such and missile defense, though, the 2006 Karabakh in Azerbaijan continue to linger as helicopter carriers.23 While Europe has strategy sought to address the causes of unresolved.18 been wracked by economic and political worldwide instability by “promoting free- Viewed in the global power balance, instability, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine dom, justice, and human dignity” while the growth of regional rivals could inspired action. Sweden, though not also “leading a growing community of prompt several possible actions by a NATO member, has reintroduced democracies.”14 American allies. Some scholars consider conscription and is remilitarizing islands By the middle of the 2000s, however, a unipolar system inherently unstable, in the Baltic Sea to counter Russian the post-Soviet “third wave” of democ- and that once a credible alternative to the probing.24 Poland is also investing in ratization was cresting. Increasingly, United States rises, states will align with territorial defenses and now fields the states that were previously categorized it to balance out overweening American largest tank force in Europe, apart from as “democratizing” began backsliding power.19 Others argue that unipolarity Russia. NATO members in the Baltics, toward a mix of illiberal institutions and is more stable and durable, especially the likeliest targets of Russian aggression, fragmented politics.15 The 2008–2009 given the shared gains from economic are developing their forces to counter the financial crisis, compounded by a series interdependence and the common threat subversive gray zone tactics of unmarked of bailouts of spendthrift members of the of nonstate actors and rogue states that soldiers and ethnonationalistic instigation Euro currency zone, exposed economic seek to undermine a rules-based inter- employed earlier against Georgia and weaknesses and political divisions among national order that is more democratic, the Ukraine.25 the members of the European Union. liberal, and prosperous than previous While these allied military invest- In the United States, economic distress ones. These shared benefits drive states ments, particularly from NATO members compounded existing war-weariness. to bandwagon with the American liberal whose forces have atrophied dramat- This mood was reflected in the 2010 leviathan, rather than counter it.20 Finally, ically since the end of the Cold War, NSS, which emphasized that America’s balance-of-threat theory claims that a are welcomed in Washington, reckless “strength and influence abroad begins power’s intent, more than strength, drive driving—the inverse problem to free with the steps we take at home.”16 in state alliance calculations.21 Given the riding—can also emerge.26 Reinvigorated historical animosities between the rising American allies facing regional rivals
6 Forum / Complementary Engagement JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Mentored by Army’s 45th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Ukrainian soldier calls out to fellow soldier during training at Yavoriv Combat Training Center, International Peacekeeping and Security Center, near Yavoriv, Ukraine, May 15, 2017 (U.S. Army/Anthony Jones)
may be overly emboldened by their pledge of spending 2 percent of gross In short, a new security dynamic has ties to Washington and rashly launch domestic product on defense. The emerged among the United States, its ambitious military strikes in the belief German military, for example, has seen its allies, and their common rivals who seek that the United States will back them once-vaunted tank force that numbered to upend the American-led, rules-based up. Georgia’s actions in the summer of over 7,000 in 1991 dwindle to just 237, international order in their respective 2008, prior to the brief and calamitous of which only 100 are combat-ready.29 corners of the world. Accordingly, the war with Russia, were explained in part Given the large economies of many debate about the breadth and inten- by overconfidence in its growing ties with NATO Allies, these levels are less dra- sity of American foreign engagement, NATO.27 Israel’s plans for strikes against matic in absolute terms, but redundant which paused following September 11, Iran’s nuclear sites were widely judged structures, parochial procurement, has also reemerged. The 2015 NSS as contingent on American leadership and competing priorities make NATO recognized the rising threat of regional support, which was, in turn, not keen on less than a sum of its parts.30 Some of powers, most notably from Russia and being drawn hastily into war. The French America’s more peripheral allies in the China, countries that had previously and British–led air campaign against Gulf such as Oman and Qatar have been described largely as partners against Muamar Qaddafi’s regime in Libya also hedged their diplomatic alignment with terror. The Trump administration’s hinged on American support, and when Washington with outreach to Tehran. recently published NSS solidifies this the European military efforts stalled, The Philippines, a longstanding U.S. prioritization of revisionist states as the the United States was obliged to take ally, has pursued engagement with China primary threat to American security and the lead.28 under President Rodrigo Duterte’s re- prosperity: “China and Russia want to Not all states have pursued hard gime. These strategies of accommodation shape a world antithetical to U.S. values balancing against the rising threats in echo the Cold War alignment of Finland and interests.”32 While the challenges to their neighborhoods, though. Most and grant legitimacy and momentum to a the American-led international order are NATO countries still fall short of their rising rival.31 increasingly clear, the answer is less so,
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pikner 7 Marine with 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, attached to Task Force Koa Moana 17, assesses area during raid for culminating event of Exercise Crocodilo in Metinaro, Timor Leste, September 13, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Juan C. Bustos) especially with the Trump administra- of nuclear proliferation among U.S. there is no great project, such as building tion’s frustration with parsimonious allies allies who seek to ensure their security liberal democracy, to focus U.S. allies. who look to Washington for continued as American power recedes, while those Probes by an adversary in one theater are support. In policy debates, advocates with a more pessimistic view of prolifer- not part of a coordinated, global scheme for neo-isolationism or retrenchment, ation argue that extended deterrence is to test U.S. resolve, as was often the case rebranded as “offshore balancing” and credible only with the continued forward in the Cold War. This lack of broader billed as a way to reduce free-riding presence of U.S. forces, and therefore cohesion on both sides of the divide re- among allies and ease the pressure on an continued engagement is critical to con- sults in a fractured array of independent, overextend American military, squared taining the spread of nuclear weapons.35 regional rivalries that are often colored off against defenders of continued global These re-warmed arguments, more by historical animosity than by a engagement.33 however, do not capture the fractured global struggle between Washington and The difference between these schools threats around the world or consider the a single foreign capital. largely hinges on two distinct issues: the significant changes in both American and Caught between the domestic expected cost savings from retrenchment allied military structure and capabilities. pressure to contain military spending, and whether nuclear proliferation, even The rival powers that are building their restraining some rearmed allies from among allies, is tolerable. Supporters military strength and probing American reckless driving while nudging others of a neo-isolationist policy of offshore power and resolve are regional, not global to bear their fair share of the security balancing or retrenchment often cite the ones. Often their tactics involve quickly burden, and countering a diverse array of cost savings of a reduced force structure, manufacturing a small-scale fait accompli, regional rivals, a new American approach while their opponents counter that rather than a large-scale invasion through to building and deploying its military in previous withdrawals have ended up the Fulda Gap or across the Taiwan concert with its allies across the world costing America more, in both blood Strait. Furthermore, there is no universal is in order. and treasure.34 Similarly, advocates of ideology, such as Soviet communism, that neo-isolationism largely accept a degree binds America’s rivals together. Similarly,
8 Forum / Complementary Engagement JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Complementary Engagement the forward-deployed American combat In South Korea, the American footprint Buttressing America’s network of formations needed to slow an enemy is transitioning from frontline warfighter allies and securing its national interests invasion of allied soil. In this sense, to guarantor for the South’s army, with require acknowledging this new security complementary engagement builds on, the unique capabilities and capacity of the dynamic and reshaping the military but moves beyond, hybrid strategies U.S. military deterring large-scale aggres- accordingly. While grand strategy can proposed in 2012, such as “forward sion by Pyongyang. In the Middle East, include a broad set of elements, ranging partnership,” as a more cost-effective the United States provides intelligence, from financial prowess to scientific way for the United States to retain its logistics, precision fires, and special progress to cultural programs, the rebal- worldwide footprint than the traditional operations support to the international ancing of America’s global security role notion of deep engagement.36 Similarly, coalition fighting the so-called Islamic presented here centers on military struc- without the focused investment in and State (IS). This support allows for the ture and posture. The U.S. military’s deployment of high-end strike capabili- coordinated application of allied assets outsize importance in American foreign ties and logistics infrastructure detailed while enabling regional partners to lead policy is a function of its unmatched later, complementary engagement would the close fight, a critical element for the size, flexibility, and reach. Changes in essentially be offshore balancing. The ideological defeat of IS. structure and posture are expensive, unique advantage of complementary In summary, complementary en- lengthy, and are subject to path-depen- engagement, lacking in previous propos- gagement is an organizing principle that dent forces and sunk costs. These qual- als, is the meshing together of American brings coherence to much of what the ities also make shifts in the American and allied capabilities, a balance that at military has been doing since the end of military an unambiguous signal to both once dissuades reckless driving and limits the Surge in Iraq. In a sense, it proposes a allies and adversaries across the world: free riding. force that matches both current demands talk is cheap, but aircraft carriers are Complementary engagement hinges and can better frame allied investments. expensive. on the United States and its partners What is lagging the operational require- The unifying logic of this new military each bringing critical forces to a conflict, ments and shifting international context strategy is complementary engagement. thereby binding their security interests are the force posture and structure of the Complementary engagement hinges together closely and allowing the political American military, the concept to which on allied investments in their territorial and economic benefits of partnership to this article turns to next. defense, matched with forward-deployed flow in both directions. Unlike the deep American forces that can be quickly engagement of the Cold War, where Force Structure under reinforced by globally projected U.S. the United States exported security to Complementary Engagement military power. Forward-deployed U.S. regions on the Soviet periphery, allowing This article does not propose any inher- troops would serve three purposes: them to grow economically and develop ently political foreign policy shift by the integrate host-nation defensive forces into liberal democracies, complementary United States—such a recommendation and American military power, defend engagement rests on a more equita- is beyond the scope of the military. infrastructure from A2/AD threats while ble set of relationships. While Cold Neither is it a budget-driven scaling of receiving U.S.-based forces deployed War security engagements were often the existing military, with the expected from the homeland during a crisis, and regional manifestations of the global capabilities and reach of a smaller serve as a signal of American commit- U.S.-Soviet dichotomy, current tensions version of Armed Forces driving how ment. Rather than mirror the structure are more local and historical, such as ambitious a strategy is possible. Rather, and capacity of allies, the U.S. military Germany-Russia, Saudi Arabia–Iran, and the following proposal outlines a future would complement their defenses with its Japan-China. These renewed regional force structure and posture better unique capabilities and reach. threats have stimulated allied military suited to fight and win the conflicts that While complementary engagement spending, particularly in East Asia and the America has recently been engaged in builds on post–Cold War debates Persian Gulf, which complementary en- while deterring escalation driven by the among cooperative security, selective gagement uses both for burden-sharing more bellicose designs of regional rivals engagement, and primacy, it would not and as a hedge against unilateral action by in the context of the existing U.S. alli- have been possible to implement two an ally against a regional adversary. ance structure. decades ago. Without reinvigorated U.S. military operations are already First, the U.S. military must re- allies, some of whom have only recently taking on some characteristics of comple- tain and modernize its nuclear forces. realized that they must pursue a greater mentary engagement. The American role Continued extended nuclear deterrence measure of military self-help rather than in Operation Odyssey Dawn, where intel- over technologically advanced allies such merely free-ride on the United States for ligence, aerial refueling, and munitions as Germany, South Korea, and Japan security, a complementary engagement were provided to European air forces not only protects those states but also force posture would merely be an over- flying strike missions over Libya, is a tem- dissuades them from developing nuclear extended version of primacy, shorn of plate for complementary engagement. weapons themselves in response to a
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pikner 9 regional threat and possible American ballistic missiles. The success of Israel’s situation following the surprise attack neo-isolationism. The sharing of Trident Iron Dome system in countering Hamas by Egypt and Syria. During the 2011 air submarine-launched ballistic missile tech- rockets during the 2014 war shows how campaign over Libya, British and French nology with the United Kingdom and the effective missile defense systems can be air forces quickly depleted their stocks forward-basing of B61 tactical nuclear against conventionally armed rockets. and were forced to rely on American bombs, deliverable by allied dual-capa- Beyond the benefits of protecting Israeli resupply to sustain the operations ble fighter aircraft in NATO countries, civilians and property, Iron Dome’s against Qaddafi. supports complementary engagement success relieved the political pressure on In today’s domestic fiscal environ- and should be continued.37 While several Israel’s leadership to launch a premature ment, complementary engagement must widely proposed strategic alternatives dis- ground offensive into Gaza, pressure that be cost neutral. The tradeoffs that allow count the threat of nuclear proliferation led to mistakes in the 2006 war against for increased investment in the four cate- among established allies, complementary Hizballah.38 BMD systems can defend gories listed earlier will affect all Services engagement is rooted in nuclear pessi- not only allied cities but also the ports but will increase the overall efficiency and mism: a greater number of nuclear armed where reinforcements would disembark. effectiveness of the military to deter and states, even American allies, is inherently Terminal defense systems are a reliable defeat rising regional rivals. U.S. military destabilizing. way to defend against an enemy’s dead- force structure changes traditionally Second, the United States should liest weapons while not undermining the focuses on tradeoffs among key force enhance its long-range strike capabilities. balance of nuclear deterrence that exists elements such as Navy aircraft carrier These include the Air Force’s long-range among the legitimate nuclear powers. strike groups (CSGs), Air Force tactical strike bomber (LRSB), long-range The fourth element of U.S. military air wings, Marine divisions, or Army bri- standoff (LRSO) cruise missile, ground- force structure to be strengthened under gade combat teams. Many recent studies based rockets such as the Army Tactical complementary engagement is the back- of possible future forces structure revolve Missile System replacement, and sub- bone of the joint force: expeditionary around these same key force elements marine-launched, conventionally armed enablers such as logistics, intelligence, and recommend scaled versions of to- missile platforms such as the Virginia and communications. Air Force tanker, day’s military, which in turn reflects the Payload Module (VPM). Outsize in- transport, and electronic warfare aircraft; Cold War structure that formed the basis vestment by the United States in these Navy support and auxiliary vessels; and for the drawdown debates of the 1990s.39 systems has several benefits for both Army logistics distribution, network While there are marginal changes to America and its allies. First, these weap- systems, and prepositioned stocks are special operations and cyberwarfare capa- ons can be quickly deployed across the the unglamorous connective tissue of bilities, the mix of key force elements that globe, allowing for efficient centralized America’s military capability. Space drive the lion’s share of American military management of limited, expensive plat- platforms that provide secure communi- structure are taken for granted. forms. Second, their ability to strike deep cations and reconnaissance capabilities are With complementary engagement’s into enemy territory with conventional similarly critical. These capabilities can in- additional emphasis on nuclear recapi- munitions holds an adversary’s forces at tegrate and sustain smaller allied combat talization, ballistic missile defense, and risk, much like Chinese A2/AD capabil- elements in an expeditionary campaign, theater enablers, some of the traditional ities threaten American warships in the while acting as a brake on overeager reck- key force elements will face downward western Pacific. Third, these platforms less driving by an aggrieved ally that is budgetary pressures. Emerging capa- are less threatened by A2/AD systems acting beyond America’s interests. They bilities such as the LRSB, LRSO, and than aircraft carriers or forward tactical can also enable the rapid deployment VPM duplicate the strike capabilities air bases. Finally, and most critically, of American combat forces based in the of the CSG at lower cost and higher American control of such weapons re- continental United States into a crisis survivability, reducing the requirement duces the risk of reckless driving by allies, theater, allowing for these formations for carriers and freeing their escorts to as Washington would have a clear veto to maintain a high level of readiness and fight as independent squadrons of surface over any escalation. modernization stateside. combatants. The capabilities of smaller, Third, complementary engagement A clear example of American use of less capable vessels such as the littoral should include air and missile defense. logistics in support of allied action is the combat ship (LCS) are easily duplicated Forward-stationed ballistic missile de- delivery of munitions during a crisis. by our allies, who routinely deploy simi- fenses (BMD) are critical to reassuring Many countries rely on the United States larly sized corvettes with greater combat allies and enabling the rapid deployment for military equipment, and munitions power and reliability than the LCS. of American reinforcements. Terminal de- stockpiles are often a lower priority than Increased A2/AD threats make large- fenses such as the Terminal High-Altitude weapons such as airplanes, tanks, and scale airborne or amphibious operations Air Defense, sea-based Aegis, and shorter ships. The emergency delivery of mu- unacceptably risky, and the units tailored range Patriot can reliably protect an ally’s nitions to Israel during the 1973 Yom for these missions should be reduced cities, bases, and key infrastructure from Kippur War helped turn around the dire in a future force structure to numbers
10 Forum / Complementary Engagement JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Blue crew of USS Nebraska transits Hood Canal following test launch of two unarmed Trident II D5 missiles off coast of California, April 2, 2018 (U.S. Navy/ Michael L. Smith) capable of large-scale raids, rather than complementary engagement gives them action. Sustained, large-scale, out-of- attempted invasions. Both the Army a framework to prioritize this spending. area missions, even with a coalition of and Marine Corps would retain much of A larger concern is that the states closest American allies, would be less viable as their current combat strength but would to the rising regional rivals—countries these forces focus on territorial defense. increasingly focus on interoperability with whose military expenditures are gen- While this trend away from large con- allies through rotational force deploy- erally growing—will opt to equip their tributions to nation-building missions is ments and exercises. Active component forces with a full range of offensive and already under way, complementary en- theater enablers, forward deployed and technically ambitious weapons systems, gagement will exacerbate it. While there continuously used, would replace some much like France did with its inde- is a risk that an emerging crisis will call for Reserve component units. Air Force tac- pendent nuclear force de frappe under such a deployment, policy guidance since tical fighter aircraft—platforms common Charles de Gaulle in the 1960s. This 2012 has already assumed this risk: as the among American allies—would decrease risks duplicating American capabilities 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance states, in number but increase in effectiveness at high costs, limiting more sensible “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to through improved tankers, networked investments in territorial defense, while conduct large-scale, prolonged stability sensors, and allied interoperability. also enabling reckless driving in a crisis. operations.”40 Complementary engagement Complementary engagement mitigates Geopolitically, a shift toward comple- does carry some risks. First, it assumes this risk by giving America’s allies a clear mentary engagement may be interpreted sustained military spending by allies, plan of military investment that maxi- as retrenchment without sustained, and a continuation of the current trend. mizes their national defense. public, rotations of American combat American allies, particularly in Europe, Second, although it retains the units to forward bases in concert with al- are being pressured to increase de- capacity for unilateral American action, lied forces. Clear, visible, on-the-ground fense spending by both Washington complementary engagement reduces demonstrations of continued American and a newly assertive Russia, and the quantity of forces available for such presence, will, and capability are critical
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pikner 11 Chaplain prepares wall of school for new paint during community relations event supporting Southern Partnership Station 17, Colón, Honduras, August 9, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Kristen Cheyenne Yarber) to ensuring that neither America’s ad- military burden-sharing while investing way to further a more peaceful, prosper- versaries nor wavering allies perceive the heavily in ballistic missile defense, long- ous, and free world. JFQ United States as attempting to balance range strike, logistics, communications, from a distance. While such exercises will and nuclear weapons capabilities, the be conducted by the U.S. military, nest- United States can continue to underwrite Notes ing them with the Department of State’s a rules-based international system that 1 public diplomacy capabilities multiplies creates the conditions for economic John G. Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the their effect. U.S. Army Europe’s syn- growth, liberal democracy, and regional American World Order (Princeton: Princeton chronization of Operation Dragoon Ride stability. Importantly, complementary University Press, 2011). with a range of NATO Allies and with the engagement lays the groundwork not 2 Summary of the 2018 National Defense U.S. State Department is an illustrative only to enable allied defense but also to Strategy of the United States of America: Sharp- example of this approach.41 restrain any reckless driving that could ening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Complementary engagement builds pull the United States into an unneces- 2018), available at
12 Forum / Complementary Engagement JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Defense Policy, Policy Paper No. 2 (Riga, Latvia: Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force National Defense Academy of Latvia, Center (Boulder, CO: Basic Books, 2017). for Security and Strategic Research, 2014). New 5 Joseph S. Nye, “The Case for Deep En- 26 Barry R. Posen, “Pull Back: The Case of gagement,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (1995), a Less Activist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs from NDU Press 90–102. 92, no. 1 (2013), 116–128. for the Center for 6 John Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged,” 27 Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 Complex Operations The National Interest, no. 129 (January 2014). War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of 7 Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Border Wars,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 2 the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the “Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy,” (June 2009), 155–170. 28 World of Social Media International Security 21, no. 3 (1996), 5–53. Christian F. Anrig, “Allied Air Power by Heidi A. Urben 8 John G. Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, over Libya: A Preliminary Assessment,” Air & and William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, State Space Power Journal 25, no. 4 (2011), 89–110. Past research Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World 29 Anthony Cordesman, NATO and the contends Politics 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 1–27. Delicate Balance of Deterrence: Strategy versus that with the 9 Robert J. Art, “Geopolitics Updated: The Burden Sharing (Washington, DC: Center for exception Strategy of Selective Engagement,” Interna- Strategic and International Studies, 2017). of voting in tional Security 23, no. 3 (1998), 80–113. 30 Scott Boston et al., Assessing the Conven- 10 Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions for tional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications Presidential U.S. Grand Strategy.” for Countering Russian Local Superiority (Wash- elections, 11 Posen, Restraint. ington, DC: RAND, 2018). military offi- 12 A National Security Strategy for a New 31 Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet cers’ polit- Century (Washington, DC: The White House, Frontier. ical participation is fairly muted. 1998). 32 National Security Strategy (Washington, 13 The National Security Strategy of the DC: The White House, 2017). Through a survey of more than United States of America (Washington, DC: 33 John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, 500 military elites attending the The White House, 2002). “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior United States Military Academy 14 The National Security Strategy of the U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/ and National Defense University, United States of America (Washington, DC: August 2016. this case study seeks to establish The White House, 2006). 34 Henry R. Nau, Conservative Internation- 15 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Compet- alism: Armed Diplomacy under Jefferson, Polk, the nature and extent of political itive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after Truman, and Reagan (Princeton: Princeton expression throughout social the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University University Press, 2015). media and whether such expression Press, 2010). 35 Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohl- is in keeping with the norm of 16 National Security Strategy (Washington, forth, America Abroad: The United States’ nonpartisanship. DC: The White House, 2010). Global Role in the 21st Century (New York: 17 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Oxford, 2016). Findings suggest that while most Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise 36 F.G. Hoffman, “Forward Partnership: A military elites continue to identify as and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” Sustainable American Strategy,” Orbis 57, no. 1 conservative and Republican, fewer International Security 38, no. 4 (April 2014), (December 2013), 20–40. appear to do so today than at any 115–149. 37 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, other time over the past 30 years. 18 Theodor Tudoroiu, “The European DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018). Union, Russia, and the Future of the Trans- 38 Emily B. Landau and Azriel Bermant, Military elites who identify as liber- nistrian Frozen Conflict,”East European “Iron Dome Protection: Missile Defense in als and Democrats are more likely to Politics & Societies 26, no. 1 (February 2012), Israel’s Security Concept,” in The Lessons of have more politically diverse military 135–161. Operation Protective Edge, ed. Anat Kurz and friends on social media, but are also 19 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Schlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute of National more likely to report feeling uncom- Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, Security Studies, 2015), 37–42. 2001). 39 John McCain, Restoring American Power: fortable by their friends’ politics. 20 William Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Recommendations for the FY 2018–FY 2022 De- This study concludes by considering Unipolar World,” International Security 24, fense Budget (Washington, DC: Senate Armed the implications these findings carry no. 1 (1999), 5–41; and Stephen M. Walt, Services Committee, 2017). for the norms of an apolitical, non- “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 40 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Prior- partisan military. 61, no. 1 (January 2009), 86–120. ities for 21st-Century Defense (Washington, DC: 21 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances The White House, 2012). (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 41 John Vandiver, “Dragoon Ride Will Send 22 Helene Cooper, “Senate Narrowly Backs U.S. Troops Through Eastern Europe in Show Trump Weapons Sale to Saudi Arabia,” New of Support,” Stars and Stripes, March 12, 2015. York Times, June 13, 2017. 23 Grygiel and Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier. 24 Martin Sorensen, “Sweden Reinstates Conscription, with an Eye on Russia,” New York Times, March 2, 2017. Visit the NDU Press Web site for 25 Janis Berzins, Russia’s New Generation more information on publications Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian at ndupress.ndu.edu
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pikner 13 Pilot Training Next students train on virtual reality flight simulator at Armed Forces Reserve Center in Austin, Texas, June 21, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Sean M. Worrell)
Beyond the Third Offset Matching Plans for Innovation to a Theory of Victory
By James Hasik
n November 2014, Secretary of (AI). While progress in these fields has Three Offset Strategies Defense Chuck Hagel announced the been brisk, their offsetting qualities To understand how the department I launch of the Third Offset Strategy. are not obvious, and they may not stumbled into this set of choices, we Despite official insistence to the con- be realms of enduring comparative should review what Americans mean by trary, the offset remains substantially advantage to the United States. If they the term strategy. In Arthur Lykke’s for- a technology strategy, and one largely do prove efficacious, military planners mulation, now widely cited within the focused on the interrelated technologies must contemplate profound organiza- Armed Forces, a strategy is a plan, tying of autonomy and artificial intelligence tional and doctrinal changes to com- means to ways, to achieve overall ends.1 pensate for rapid change in the ways of However, the effect should not be seen war. Whatever the likelihood of future as additive: applying more resources James Hasik is an Associate Professor in the military-technological trajectories, (means) through more methods (ways) Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National American strategists might consider does not generally produce better strat- Security and Resource Strategy at the National less expensive and more certain ways egy. Applying all elements of national Defense University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow for Defense in the Scowcroft Center on of dealing with some adversaries’ local power may just produce denser briefing International Security at the Atlantic Council. superiorities. slides and more frustrated officials.2 Any
14 Forum / Beyond the Third Offset JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 good strategy must embed an econom- Soviet conventional superiority in central skip-echelon command hierarchy, which ical theory of victory, and that requires Europe, transoceanic distances over accords mostly administrative functions deeper thinking.3 One alluring concept which American reinforcements would to groups and numbered air forces. Air can be an offset strategy, which is con- need to travel, and reluctance of its North divisions were completely eliminated in sciously designed to diminish or balance Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the 1990s. This approach, however, may adversaries’ known advantages with Allies to fully rearm during postwar re- be more feasible in relatively static trench asymmetric alternatives. Done well, an construction.9 In war, in Nathan Bedford warfare, or when managing a 3-day air offset strategy may impose such costs Forrest’s famous formulation, it is gen- tasking order. For the U.S. Army in the on adversaries that they will decline to erally best to “get there first with the 1950s, the organizational change went become actual enemies.4 In 2014, after most men,” but no one on the friendly unloved, substantially because of the years of enduring insurgents’ asymmet- side had a direct solution. The indirect inherent command and control problems ric attacks, Pentagon leadership decided solution was to threaten massive retalia- with the communications technologies to borrow the approach, taking a page tion, in which the United States would of the time.12 In early 1961, President from one of its old playbooks.5 Thus, “consider nuclear weapons as available for John F. Kennedy’s introduction of the in a speech that November, Secretary use as other munitions.”10 While far more Flexible Response strategy convinced the Hagel announced the launch of the economical than matching the Soviets Army that battlefields would likely not Defense Innovation Initiative, which tank-for-tank ex ante, it would also have be nuclear. By 1965, the Reorganization would include the now widely discussed been wantonly destructive ex post. of Army Divisions plan had returned Third Offset Strategy.6 The strategy embedded two import- all Army formations to structures akin Hagel made the announcement, but ant organizational factors. At the highest to those of the armored divisions of the progenitor of the concept was clearly level, solidarity across NATO was re- World War II.13 former Deputy Defense Secretary Robert quired for deploying and threatening the Whatever the organizational initia- Work, who kept his position through use of enough nuclear weapons around tives, the problem of Soviet numerical Hagel’s handover to Secretary Ashton the periphery of communist Europe to superiority had not gone away. In par- Carter, and even into the first several crush any advance. But planning for the allel, American observers noted how months of the Trump administration New Look recognized from the start that precision aiming and guided missiles under Secretary James Mattis. Work the Soviets would eventually have many led to high loss rates in the 1973 Yom made this “big idea” initiative a central nuclear weapons themselves. In 1956, Kippur War. The first commander of occupation of his tenure. In his view, this led the U.S. Army to an intriguing U.S. Army Training and Doctrine the “job of the deputy secretary, the organizational innovation, and a Service- Command remarked shortly thereafter primary job, is to fashion a program that level response to the broader New Look: that with modern weapons, “what can is constant with the secretary’s strategic the Pentomic infantry division. Each be seen can be hit, and what can be hit vision.”7 He traced his thinking about the formation of three brigades was reorga- can be killed.”14 Conveniently, during need for an offset strategy to 2012, when nized into five regimental-sized “battle the Vietnam War, the United States had he was Under Secretary of the Navy, and groups,” each containing five infantry begun investing in a variety of new tech- Carter himself was Deputy Secretary of companies. Between the discontinued nologies for precision bombardment and Defense. Carter established a Strategic brigades and battalions, an entire level of electronic warfare, and Pentagon leader- Capabilities Office (SCO) that year, hierarchy was removed. The smaller, flat- ship had reasonable faith in an enduring designed to cost-effectively draw new ter, wider division was intended to have American advantage in these realms capabilities out of existing systems with increased survivability through dispersion over the Chinese and Soviets.15 In 1977, limited injections of advanced technol- across the atomic battlefield. Defense Secretary Harold Brown devel- ogy.8 As Work was one of the few Obama Whether that would have worked was oped a Second Offset Strategy, which he administration officials asked to remain a separate question. During World War I, actually termed the “Offset Strategy.”16 into 2017, one could surmise that the the Imperial German Army progressively He was clearly taken with the idea; his an- new administration, or at least the new flattened its command structure. In nual report to the Congress for fiscal year Defense Secretary, was reasonably taken 1916, the brigades between regiments 1982 used the word offset 15 times.17 with the concept. and divisions were effectively elimi- Effectively employing these technolo- In Work’s figuring, the first great nated; two brigades of two regiments gies further required new operational and American offset strategy was the New each became a single brigade of three doctrinal innovations, notably Follow-On Look of the Eisenhower administration. regiments, but in name only. By early Forces Attack and AirLand Battle. In 1953, the National Security Council 1918, regiments were serving mostly Organizational innovation was another took stock of several serious strategic administrative functions, with battalions matter. The structures of brigades, wings, problems: the cost of the recent Korean reporting directly to division head- and flotillas did not change radically, War, consolidation of communist con- quarters during battle.11 The U.S. Air for the weapons were just swapped in trol across much of Eurasia, growing Force takes a similar tack today with its to replace less accurate analogs, and
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hasik 15 the precision-guided violence would Forces Attack.”22 However, during his of intelligent drones, deployed from largely head outbound. However, the similar speech in Brussels the following long-range aircraft, can compensate for sophistication of those formations’ higher April, he talked almost exclusively about local enemy superiorities in missiles or headquarters would greatly increase, technology, and just two interrelated tank troops. That seems the point of the just to manage the flow of information fields of technology: autonomous systems SCO’s Perdix drone demonstration, in needed for rapid precision targeting. As and artificial intelligence. At that time, which a hundred networked tiny aircraft early as 1984, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, he gave particularly short shrift to orga- cooperate in performing reconnais- chief of the Soviet General Staff, had nization, mostly just reminding us how sance missions—or perhaps more lethal concluded that NATO’s precision Alliance solidarity was important to the missions eventually.28 Even nonlethal conventional weapons could produce First Offset.23 But during a speech to the autonomous vehicles can track enemies, battlefield effects approaching those of Air Force Association that September, he and in return create more targets for nuclear weapons, just without the vast again insisted that “offset strategies are them, alleviating the burden for units collateral damage.18 In 1991, the first not about technology per se, so it drives that place humans in harm’s way, or just coalition campaign against Iraq produced me crazy when people say, ‘Oh, the Third far from home.29 The Sea Hunter, the some astounding results. Large forma- Offset is AI and autonomy.’”24 Work prototype boat in the Anti-Submarine tions of Iraqi armored vehicles made repeated this view the following month in Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned brilliant targets against the cold desert at another speech, but it is just possible that Vessel program, a joint effort by the Navy night, and as U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff the former Deputy Secretary didst protest and Defense Advanced Research Projects General Ron Fogelman later stated, the too much.25 Agency, is promising in this regard.30 “Russians got to watch it on television.”19 At roughly the same time, Secretary Some of this work has now also been Today, the near-peer, pacing compet- Carter was establishing the Defense passed to the SCO, just under greater se- itors remain the Chinese and Russians. Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), crecy, as the Ghost Fleet project.31 Global While North Koreans, Iranians, and with locations in the information tech- presence, whatever its real political value, sundry insurgents are vexing, it is the nology hubs of San Jose, Austin, and is a very expensive business for the Navy first-division adversaries whose advan- Cambridge. The now-permanent DIU and Air Force every year. The notion tages most need offsetting. As before, has a “chief science officer,” but no that intelligent payloads can be devel- they challenge American military plan- other such chiefs. Carter’s new SCO has oped and retired faster than tanks, ships, ning through numbers, distance, and focused on technologies, and notably and aircraft is economically relieving.32 the free-riding of allies. The Russians can again, autonomous ones. Later, Work On the other hand, unless armies and notably bring local quantitative advan- established an Algorithmic Warfare fleets of killer robots are to stand watch tages in armored forces and air defenses, Cross-Functional Team to create ar- continuously in Eastern Europe and the a budding drone program, and even tificially intelligent software “to sort Western Pacific, there are practical limits qualitative superiority in artillery and through vast amounts of video collected to this approach. overland electronic warfare. Their ability by surveillance drones, a flood of data to integrate the various arms has been on that is overwhelming human analysts.”26 Just Who Is Offsetting Whom? recent display in the smoldering Russo- For all this effort, one could be excused Alternatively, the Pentagon has other Ukrainian war.20 The Chinese notably for presuming that innovation, at least developmental priorities that seem at bring quantitative superiority in guided for some of the recent leadership, has once operationally simpler, less morally missiles, and nearly a continent in which been equated with technology, and par- upsetting, and more practically off- to hide them from approaching ships and ticularly information technology. Little setting. Lasers and rail-guns hold the aircraft. Both the Russians and Chinese work seems to have been done on the promise of nearly limitless magazines have hugely improved their reconnais- required organizational and doctrinal for opposing incoming missile barrages. sance and surveillance capabilities in just changes. As Benjamin Jensen of the As the Air Force secretary and chief of the past 10 years. As such, each seriously Marine Corps University has written, staff wrote in July 2014 in their 30-year poses what was until recently officially “too much time is being spent identifying strategy, “if it costs markedly less for termed an antiaccess/area-denial threat.21 exquisite technological capabilities absent us to defeat a missile than it does for Work repeatedly stated that the a unifying concept on how to employ the adversary to build and launch it, innovations of the Third Offset would military forces.”27 the strategic calculus changes signifi- be found in technologies, operating con- There are several issues with this cantly.”33 Lasers and rail-guns each cepts, and organizational structures. In a technology-laden approach. The first demand huge power inputs, and each seminal speech in London in September is the appropriateness of the chosen has been promised as verging on break- 2015, he called for “another doctrinal technologies as offsets. Do autonomous, through for perhaps 50 years. All the revival like that of the early 1980s,” with artificially intelligent systems neces- same, the Navy’s renewed enthusiasm “an AirLand Battle 2.0” and “modern sarily offset adversaries’ advantages in for rail-guns and the pending test on concepts as game-changing as Follow-On numbers and distance? Perhaps swarms USNS Trenton are notable, even if the
16 Forum / Beyond the Third Offset JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 USS Ponce conducts demonstration of Office of Naval Research–sponsored Laser Weapon System while deployed to Arabian Gulf, November 16, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams)
recent track record is mixed.34 More- tracks. Turning Raytheon’s SM-6 missile decide first, [and] act first” on large and over, recent advances in the practicality into a ship-killer was an early accomplish- fast-moving battlefields.40 In June 2008, of solid-state lasers, and the Navy’s ment of the SCO, which indeed “reflects an independent review termed the sta- actual deployment of a small one on a Pentagon push to make old weapons do bility and scalability of that network “an USS Ponce, suggest greater promise.35 new tricks for a minimum added cost.”37 unresolved technical challenge.”41 The Those physical deployments should Similarly, “distributing lethality” onto next year, Secretary Robert Gates can- remind us that plenty of compelling more ships with more missiles would celed the entire FCS program. In 2017, and possibly offsetting technologies are seem to require some engineering work the Army’s objectives for battlefield ra- already on the shelf, or even in service. but no great technological leaps forward. dios remained yet unmet.42 One could criticize Work’s focus as just The bigger change may be found in Technological challenges and oppor- the latest new, new thing, for “basing a a new operating concept and perhaps tunities thus await on multiple fronts. strategy on technological innovation that new procurement priorities.38 What it Indeed, “in the initial stages of the Third is not in hand is nothing more than wish- does require in technology is robust Offset Strategy, administration officials ful thinking.”36 Then again, the Second long-range communications—and at a and defense commentators advanced a Offset bet on nascent technologies very time of growing adversarial capabilities laundry list of possibilities” for which successfully, and many of those advances in cyber-electronic warfare. Success in technologies would be areas of focus.43 remain not only available, but also this realm may not be inevitable. From To make the Third Offset Strategy a real sources of unique American advantage. 2003 through 2009, the Army and its offset strategy, the United States would One was stealth, and the United States prime contractors, Boeing and SAIC, need to double down in those areas in remains the leader in the field. With the worked to develop the Future Combat which it excelled, but the Chinese did F-35 and B-21 programs, the military Systems (FCS), a collection of “fourteen not, and could not. Early in the discus- Services are building an aerial armada of manned and unmanned systems tied sions in the Pentagon, an intellectual stealthy jets to penetrate dense defenses. together by an extensive communications battle emerged between advocates of big- No matter how many missiles the enemy and information network.”39 The latter ger investments in the well-understood has, they are nearly useless without target would enable commanders to “see first, assets of long-range precision strike,
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hasik 17 Only Wilhelmine Germany’s geopolitical position rendered that forlorn. Thus, the Kaiser’s peculiar naval obsessions would never do anything for his war effort. Instead, while underinvesting in the actually offsetting technology of subma- rines, his navalists built a High Seas Fleet (Hochseeflotte) that largely saw the side of a pier. Because Germany would never outbuild Britain in battleships, building any more than a few was self-defeating. Consider this in the context of another uncertainty: if autonomous systems offer the potential for faster decisionmaking in battle, they may raise the potential Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency successfully completes its Anti-Submarine Warfare for successful preemption of enemies. Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel program and officially transfers its technology demonstration Jensen thus worries that the Third Offset vessel, christened Sea Hunter, to Office of Naval Research (DARPA) could produce another conceptual Dreadnought, ushering in an era of strate- and something wholly new in AI. One realms, industry will require much less gic instability.49 can make the case that either is a source financial enticement. of American advantage, but the latter This also gets to the question of who Rethinking the Theory uniquely fits the zeitgeist. AI also prom- is offsetting whom: great commitments of Victory ised faster decisionmaking in the face of to new technologies may not produce the Finally, as in the 1950s, there may be a massive missile barrages, though with one intended winners. Consider some histor- reorganizational imperative, particularly proviso: Without rail-guns or lasers, Army ical antecedents. The British Admiralty’s if the technologies of autonomy do not and Navy missile defenses would still only opposition to steam propulsion in the perfectly offset enemies’ advantages. bring so many rounds, and those rounds 1820s may have been overblown in the If advances in AI make autonomous would often be more expensive than the retelling, but the leveling effect of the precision weapons more capable against inbound ones. new technology was still threatening.46 concentrated military forces, and those The second issue is comparative After they provided the example, could advances become generally available, advantage. Are autonomy and AI really their enemies the French just steam then it could be the Chinese who wind areas of enduring American acumen, and across the channel in a surprise attack? In up offsetting the Americans. Major specifically relative to Chinese? True, the 1930s, petroleum-poor Germany and American military expeditions still for decades, software has remained one Japan each developed military strategies depend on iron mountains of supplies, of the most competitive U.S. industries that depended inexorably on petroleum. the concentrated logistics of rail lines globally.44 But Work himself admitted Perhaps more than oil fuels modern war- and cargo ships, the chokepoints of port that sustaining a long-term technolog- fare, but offensive plans that depend on facilities, and the high-value targets of ical advantage will be much harder in it do require it.47 Today, as Josh Marcuse large aircraft carriers and airbases. The this century than the last, for the pre- of the Defense Innovation Board has ground troops still fight in formations mier-league adversaries are not the closed remarked, “software is eating the war”— similar to those that raced across France societies of the Cold War. Integrated into demand for new electronic capabilities in 1944. Back then, the Panzertruppen the global economy, they have access has been increasingly damaging afford- arrayed against them failed to func- to the same commercial technologies as ability for decades.48 Will investments in tion well under sustained attack by American industrialists, and much of the millions more lines of code lead to real the Ninth (U.S. Army Air Force) and best work in autonomy and AI is now breakthroughs or just more exquisitely Second (Royal Air Force) tactical air commercially driven. It is quite possible complicated systems? forces. Had those pilots been employing that Alphabet or Uber or Ford will create Choosing the wrong area of tech- weapons like Joint Direct Attack Muni- a reliable self-driving truck well before nological investment can then lead to tions and Brimstones, the results would any defense contractor does. Their re- pointless expenditure down dead-end have been ugly.50 wards for innovation are far greater.45 For pathways, or even costly new arms races. Yet uglier could be the results of this reason, we can at least hope that the Lord Fisher’s Dreadnought was a great future attacks carried out by artificially Defense Department will confine its re- accomplishment in 1906, but by render- intelligent hunter-killer robots. Work has search priorities to those applications with ing all other battleships obsolescent, it assured us, of course, that humans will largely military utility. In the dual-use almost lent Tirpitz hope of catching up. stay in the loop.51 Perhaps the promise
18 Forum / Beyond the Third Offset JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Russian Sukhoi Su-24 attack aircraft makes low-altitude pass by USS Donald Cook as it conducts routine patrol in U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations, Baltic Sea, April 12, 2016 (U.S. Navy)
of all this man-machine teaming will ethos of command by negation. The they do not directly produce new forms fundamentally change the ways of war. Army has been telling a good story about of combat units leveraging autonomous Work has even gone further, stating that Auftragstaktik since the 1980s, but intelligent anything. he is now “starting to believe very, very often honors it more in the breach than The fundamental question thus re- deeply that it is also going to change the observance.54 Among the military mains one of geographical disadvantage, the nature of war.”52 Or perhaps Work’s Services, only the Navy uses the acronym in which asymmetric strategies from the “war without fear” will eventually prove UNODIR (unless otherwise directed), far side of the Pacific can turn American as elusive and amusing as Admiral Bill but the rest could learn it.55 In turn, the technological strengths into weaknesses.57 Owens’s Lifting the Fog of War.53 Either resulting demands for individual initia- Simply put, “the United States is at- way, fighting through dense and intelli- tive and skill placed on relatively junior tempting to project power half a world gent threats to access may require more officers may require a new approach to away against a continental-sized power.”58 than grafting new technologies onto old human capital development, as well as the As a final alternative, we might then platforms and sprinkling machine learn- hard institutional work of cultural change consider a completely different but very ing into existing formations. Surviving in the Armed Forces. This Third Offset conventional approach. A competitive advancing lethality may require greater may need some strategic lieutenants to military strategy could take advantage dispersion—a new Pentomic formation, master employment of its strategic capa- of geography, rather than trying to cope but with modern command and control. bilities. Secretary Carter’s Force of the with it. American forces’ exposure to in- Effect has long required concentration, Future initiative sought to overturn the bound precision weapons is exacerbated but perhaps distributing lethality can military’s rather uniform and longstand- the further forward they stand. Against compensate for this. ing model for building human capital, modern mobile missiles hiding in the In the end, however, machine but most of the elements concentrated on hinterland, Lord Nelson’s admonishment learning will be no substitute for orga- matters such as extending maternity leave that any captain “place his ship alongside nizational learning. Doing it right may and creating public-private work partner- that of the enemy” is rather outweighed require rethinking and expanding an ships.56 These may be laudable ideas, but by British Admiral John Fisher’s dictum
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hasik 19 Student-researcher from Carnegie Mellon University remotely maneuvers quadrotor micro-air vehicle through narrow hallways of Naval Research Laboratory’s ex–USS Shadwell to smoke-filled, GPS-denied area to identify fire’s location and transmit data back to research team, Mobile, Alabama, November 5, 2014 (U.S. Navy/John F. Williams) that “a ship’s a fool to fight a fort.”59 Defense, October 28, 2016. Notes 8 China’s maritime trade, however, may Ibid. 9 Herman S. Wolk, “The ‘New Look,’” Air be quite susceptible to a rather distant 1 Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., “Defining Military Force Magazine 65, no. 8 (August 2003), 81. blockade. If necessary, the United States Strategy,” Military Review 69, no. 5 (May 10 A Report to the National Security Council could wage a “war of economic attrition 1989), 3. by the Executive Secretary on Basic National 2 to bring about a stalemate and cessation Jeffrey R. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means Security Policy, NSC 162/2 (Washington, DC: = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Win- National Security Council, October 30, 1953), of conflict with a return to a modified ter 2016–2017), 81–91. 60 22, available at
20 Forum / Beyond the Third Offset JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 1995), W. Singer and August Cole’s novel Ghost Fleet 46 See Peter Hore, “Lord Melville, the Ad- 85. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015). miralty and the Coming of Steam Navigation,” 15 See Kenneth P. Werrell, Chasing the Silver For a view on how this technological theorizing The Mariner’s Mirror 86, no. 2 (May 2000), Bullet: U.S. Air Force Weapons Development has already affected American military thinking, 157–158. from Vietnam to Desert Storm (Washington, see Dan De Luce, “A Novel about War with 47 James Hasik and Alex Ward, “Third Off- DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003). China Strikes a Chord at the Pentagon,” For- set Strategy, Second Adversary: What Worked 16 William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and De- eign Policy, May 15, 2016. For an uncharitable on the Soviets May Not Work on the Chinese,” terrence,” Foreign Affairs, Fall 1991. For more counterpoint, see Eric Murphy, “Reviewing Defense Industrialist, November 18, 2014. on the development, see Robert Tomes, U.S. Ghost Fleet: Go Back! It’s a Trap!” The Strategy 48 James Hasik, “Software Is Eating the Defence Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Bridge, July 29, 2015. War: Economically Unsustainable Spending Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the 32 Jonathan W. Greenert, “Payloads over Requires a Thorough Rethinking of De- New American War of War, 1973–2003 (Abing- Platforms: Charting a New Course,” U.S. Na- fense-Industrial Strategy,” Defense Industrialist, don-on-Thames, United Kingdom: Routledge, val Institute Proceedings 138, no. 7 (July 2012). November 3, 2014. 2007). 33 Deborah Lee James and Mark A. Welsh 49 Jensen, “Think Bigger.” 17 Report of the Secretary of Defense to the III, America’s Air Force: A Call to the Future 50 James Hasik, “A New New Look: The Congress on the FY 1982 Budget Authorization (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of West Needs ‘a Complete Strategic Rethink’ of Request and FY 1982–FY 1986 Defense Program the Air Force, July 2014), 15. How It Goes to War,” Defense Industrialist, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 34 James Hasik, “Must Go Faster: Will the September 22, 2015. Defense, January 19, 1981). Renewed American Enthusiasm for Hypersonic 51 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Iron Man, Not 18 Robert Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Weaponry Pay Off?” Defense Industrialist, May Terminator: The Pentagon’s Sci-Fi Inspira- Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and 5, 2017. tions,” Breaking Defense, May 3, 2016. Allies,” speech, Willard Hotel, Washington, 35 See James Hasik and Julian Eagle-Pla- 52 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “War Without DC, January 28, 2015. ton, “Heithold’s Heavy Lasers: Forthcoming Fear: DepSecDef Work on How AI Changes 19 James Hasik, “Is America’s Military Slow- Developments in Directed Energy Could Bring Conflict,” Breaking Defense, May 31, 2017. ly Becoming Obsolete?” The National Interest, Tactical and Geopolitical Change,” Defense 53 William A. Owens, Lifting the Fog of War October 12, 2015. Industrialist, March 13, 2017. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 20 See especially the notes from Phillip A. 36 James Jay Carafano, “The Third Offset: 2001). Karber, “Coming Soon to a Theater Near You? The ‘Fairy Dust’ Strategy,” The National Inter- 54 For contemporaneous thoughts on the Lessons for the U.S. Army from the Russian est, November 24, 2014. origins, see John T. Nelson II, “Auftragstaktik: Aggression in Ukraine,” General Bernard Rog- 37 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Anti-Aircraft A Case for Decentralized Battle,” Parameters, ers Lecture, Association of the United States Missile Sinks Ship: Navy SM-6,” Breaking September 1987, 21–34. Army, Arlington, VA, February 9, 2016. Defense, March 7, 2016. 55 Stanley McChrystal, Team of Teams: New 21 Robert Farley, “A2/AD Is Dead, Long 38 Thomas Rowden, Peter Gumataotao, Rules of Engagement for a Complex World (New Live A2/AD: Has One of Our Favorite and Peter Fanta, “Distributed Lethality,” U.S. York: Portfolio Penguin, 2015), 207. Buzzwords Died?” The Diplomat, October 11, Naval Institute Proceedings 141, no. 1 (January 56 Scott Maucione, “Is Force of the Future 2016. 2015); and Robert C. Rubel, “Think Outside Back from the Dead?” Federal News Radio, 22 Terri Moon Cronk, “Work Calls for the Hull,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Washington, DC, May 12, 2017. Third Offset Strategy to Bolster Future of War- 143, no. 6 (June 2017). 57 Peter Dombrowski, “Cybered Conflict fighting,” DOD News, September 10, 2015, 39 Andrew Feickert, The Army’s Future and the Third Offset Strategy,” Georgetown citing a speech that day at the Royal United Combat System (FCS): Background and Issues Journal of International Affairs (September Services Institution in London. for Congress, RL32888 (Washington, DC: 2015). 23 Remarks by Deputy Secretary Work on Congressional Research Service, August 3, 58 Peter Dombrowski, America’s Third Third Offset Strategy (as delivered), Brussels, 2017), 1. Offset Strategy: New Military Technologies and Belgium, April 28, 2016. 40 Christopher G. Pernin et al., Lessons from Implications for the Asia-Pacific (Singapore: 24 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Air Force the Army’s Future Combat Systems Program Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, June Leading Way to 3rd Offset: Bob Work,” Break- (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), xviii. 2015). ing Defense, September 21, 2016. 41 Ibid., 208. 59 James R. Holmes, “Anti-Access and the 25 Tony Bertuca, “Pentagon Leaders Make 42 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Army Reviews ‘Fortress-Fleet’: Why Regional Powers Need Closing Argument for Third Offset,” Inside All Networks—Way Beyond WIN-T: Milley & Not Run a Naval Arms Race with the United Defense, October 28, 2016. Speer,” Breaking Defense, June 7, 2017. States,” The Diplomat, September 10, 2012. 26 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “‘Algorithmic 43 Peter Dombrowski, “Third Offset 60 T.X. Hammes, Offshore Control: A Warfare’: DSD Work Unleashes AI on Intel Systems,” in Arms Racing in Asia: The Naval Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict, Data,” Breaking Defense, April 28, 2017. Dimension, ed. Richard Bitzinger (Singapore: INSS Strategic Forum 278 (Washington, DC: 27 Jensen, “Think Bigger.” Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, NDU Press, June 2012), 5. See also Hammes, 28 See David Martin (correspondent), “The 2016), 65. “Offshore Control Is the Answer,” U.S. Naval Coming Swarm,” 60 Minutes, January 8, 2017. 44 Steven Grundman, “Opinion: Pentagon’s Institute Proceedings 138, no. 12 (December 29 Phillip E. Pournelle, “Trust Autonomous Offset Strategy Needs a Big Idea,” Aviation 2012). Machines,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings Week & Space Technology, April 16, 2015. 61 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Carter, 143, no. 6 (June 2017). 45 See William P. Rogerson, “Profit Reg- Roper Unveil Army’s New Ship-Killer Missile: 30 James Hasik, “Sea Hunter: How America ulation of Defense Contractors and Prizes for ATACMS Upgrade,” Breaking Defense, Octo- Could Revolutionize Naval Warfare Forever,” Innovation,” Journal of Political Economy 97, ber 28, 2016. The National Interest, April 14, 2016. no. 6 (December 1989), 1284–1305; for the 62 Comment by a participant in the Ruger 31 Jared Serbu, “Recently Declassified Pen- longer form, see Rogerson, Profit Regulations of Chair Workshop on the Defense Industrial tagon Weapons Office Says Rapid Prototyping Defense Contractors and Prizes for Innovation, Base, Newport, RI, June 1, 2017. Is Secret to Its Success,” Federal News Radio, R-3635-PA&E (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, May 5, 2017. The name is a clear nod to Peter 1992).
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hasik 21 NDU Press Congratulates the Winners of the 2018 Essay Competitions
DU Press is proud to support the annual Secretary of Defense, Chairman Strategic Research Paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and JFQ George C. Maerz essay competitions. N NDU Press hosted the final round of judging on May 17–18, 2018, during First Place which 29 faculty judges from 15 participating professional military education insti- Sergeant First Class Daniel P. tutions selected the best entries in each category. The First Place winners in each McGarrah, USA of the three categories are published in the following pages. College of International Security Affairs “Military Medicine: The Gender Gap in Secretary of Defense National Third Place Trauma Training” Security Essay Competition Lieutenant Colonel Cory Brown, USAF Second Place Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Colonel Robert Ellison Croft, USA Security and Resource Strategy U.S. Army War College “Strategic Optionality for Defense “Understanding Uncertainty: Acquisition: An Alternative Management Incorporating the Unknown into Approach for Major Defense Military Estimates” The 12th annual competition is intended Acquisition Programs” to stimulate new approaches to coordi- Third Place nated civilian and military action from a Chairman of the Joint Lieutenant Colonel Jason Glynn, USAF broad spectrum of civilian and military Chiefs of Staff Strategic U.S. Naval War College students. Essays address U.S. Govern- Essay Competition “Is the Arctic a Blind Spot in ment structure, policies, capabilities, U.S. Strategy?” resources, and/or practices and to provide creative, feasible ideas on how Strategy Article best to orchestrate the core competen- cies of our national security institution. First Place (Tie) Major Edwin Y. Chua, Singapore Army First Place This annual competition, in its 37th Marine Corps Command and Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian Navy year in 2018, challenges students at Staff College U.S. Naval War College the Nation’s joint professional military “Political Warfare with Other Means: “Coercive Gradualism Through Gray education institutions to write research 2017 Cyber Attacks on Qatar” Zone Statecraft in the South China papers or articles about significant Seas: China’s Strategy and Potential aspects of national security strategy to First Place (Tie) U.S. Options” stimulate strategic thinking, promote Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. well-written research, and contribute Wagner, USA Second Place to a broader security debate among U.S. Army War College Major Craig W. Thomas II, USMC professionals. “Peacekeepers in the Donbas” Marine Corps Command and Staff College Second Place “The Casualty of Truth” Matt Butram College of International Security Affairs “The NotPetya Attack as a Harbinger: How Cyber Attacks Create Risk to Strategic Mobility”
22 Essay Competitions / Introduction JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Third Place Forum Features Colonel Sean C. McMahon, USA James M. Davitch Gregory C. McCarthy U.S. Army War College “Open Sources for the Information Age: “Are There Too Many General Officers “The Constitutional Divide be- Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and for Today’s Military?” tween Covert Action and Traditional Love Unclassified Data,” JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017) Military Activity” JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017) Recall Joint Force Quarterly JPME Today Phillip S. Meilinger Maerz Awards Joan Johnson-Freese and Kevin Kelley “Time in War,” In its third year, the JFQ George C. “Meaningful Metrics for Professional JFQ 87 (4th Quarter 2017) Maerz Awards, chosen by the staff of Military Education,” NDU Press, recognize the most influen- JFQ 84 (1st Quarter 2017) tial articles from the previous year’s four issues. Five outstanding articles were Commentary chosen for the Maerz Awards, named in Darryl Williams honor of Mr. George C. Maerz, former “Forensic Vulnerability Analysis: Putting writer-editor of NDU Press. the ‘Art’ into the Art of War,” JFQ 85 (2nd Quarter 2017)
Distinguished Judges
Twenty-nine senior faculty members from the 15 participating PME institutions took time out of their busy schedules to serve as judges. Their personal dedication and professional excellence ensured a strong and credible competition.
Front row, left to right: Mr. Robert Orr, National War College; Dr. Kristin Mulready-Stone, U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Richard DiNardo, Marine Corps Staff College; Dr. Benjamin (Frank) Cooling, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Kenneth Johnson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Trevor Albertson, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. Margaret Sankey, Air War College; Ms. Bonnie Calabria, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Kathryn Fisher, College of International Security Affairs; Dr. Larry D. Miller, U.S. Army War College. Back row, left to right: Ms. Andrea Connell, NDU Press; Ms. Joanna E. Seich, NDU Press; Commander Jeffrey Stebbins, USN; Captain Bill Marlowe, USN (Ret.), Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. William T. Eliason, Editor in Chief, Joint Force Quarterly; Dr. Brian McNeil, Air War College; Dr. Ryan Wadle, Air Command and Staff College; Dr. James Kiras, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies; Dr. Naunihal Singh, U.S. Naval War College; Mr. Jeffrey Turner, Joint Forces Staff College; Dr. Jim Chen, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman, NDU Press; Dr. Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College.
Not pictured: Dr. Robert Baumann, Command and General Staff College; Mr. Ray Damm, Marine Corps Command and Staff College; Mr. Jay Hatton, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Carl “CJ” Horn, College of Information and Cyberspace; Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Marine Corps War College; Dr. Wray Johnson, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting; Dr. Sorin Lungu, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy; Dr. Stephen Mariano, National War College; Dr. Nicholas Sarantakes, U.S. Naval War College.
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 2018 Winners 23 Sailors signal to MV-22 Osprey during flight quarters aboard USS Ashland, East China Sea, March 10, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Kaleb R. Staples)
Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft in the South China Seas China’s Strategy and Potential U.S. Options
By Kapil Bhatia
The supreme art of war is to subdue your enemies without fighting.
—Sun Tzu
hina’s graduated use of coercive Such coercive gradualism is supported Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian Navy, wrote this instruments of national power by gray zone tactics, which are mea- essay while a student at the U.S. Naval War College. It won the 2018 Secretary of Defense in the South China Sea (SCS) sures that are aggressive yet designed C 1 National Security Essay Competition. constitutes an informed strategy. to remain below the threshold of
24 Essay Competitions / Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 conventional military conflict.2 This in the SCS to further its interests. A acceptable costs.14 China’s gray zone combined approach minimizes inter- chronological analysis of Chinese ac- strategy involves skillfully orchestrating national involvement, localizes issues, tivities in the SCS reveals a cohesive and political, military, and commercial instru- and ensures contentious outcomes in graduated strategy. Starting with simple ments to influence, intimidate, and/ China’s favor. For smaller players in the firing incidents in 2005, Chinese strat- or coerce target states, while containing region, this implies significant security, egy has sequentially and incrementally such approaches below the threshold of sovereignty, and economic challenges, advanced to harassment actions from unacceptable political costs or outright especially due to their limited capacity 2009, clashes from 2011, standoffs from military provocation.15 to counter the sophisticated and inte- 2012, and ship collisions post-2014.6 While the gray zone concept is not grated Chinese approach. At the same Incremental fishing control—initially in- new, it is the scale and sophistication of time, the U.S. approach of avoiding stituted as a ban in 2012—has graduated Chinese gray zone approaches that merit a stake in regional issues has resulted into a requirement for Chinese fishing close attention. To be fair, several coun- in partner/ally nations questioning permits since 2014.7 Furthermore, all tries—including Russia, North Korea, American commitment. Absence of disputed territory in the SCS has been and Iran—have effectively employed a comprehensive U.S. response also placed under the administrative control gray zone tactics over time. However, allows China to alter the regional geo- of Hainan Province.8 China’s declara- Chinese gray zone tools in the SCS are strategic landscape immutably. Poten- tion of an air defense identification zone more comprehensive, coercive, and coor- tial changes in SCS dynamics also have (ADIZ) in the East China Seas in 2013, dinated than similar strategies employed wider implications for U.S. and global in airspace controlled by South Korea and by other states in recent history. Some of security interests with implications for Japan, is yet another example of creep- the tactics include area domination, in- international sovereignty, jurisdictional ing control. Analysts contend that China cremental fisheries controls, fishing zone frameworks, and global commerce. could attempt to implement similar iden- denials, resource exploration in contested There is a need for broader recalibra- tification zones in the SCS in the future waters, cyber and information operations, tion of the American approach to com- in alignment with its overall gradualist and lawfare. Each activity is orchestrated prehensively address coercive gray zone aims.9 Large-scale reclamation activities to remain below a notional threshold to challenges posed by China in the SCS in the SCS constitute another example prevent broader regional/international through articulation of a coherent strat- of gradualism, where artificial islands consternation and response. The Chinese egy and orchestrated employment of all have incrementally altered the status quo, Maritime Militia, for instance, has un- diplomatic, informational, military, and overcoming what John Mearsheimer dertaken activities that would qualify as economic options. alluded to as the “stopping power of classic military missions, such as patrols, water.”10 One scholar referred to this as access control, and kinetic engagements. Chinese Strategy in the SCS “gradual fait accompli,” stating that “We Examples include the 2009 harassment of Gradualism can be defined as prin- make a big deal of this now, but we’ll the USNS Impeccable, as well as the 2012 ciples or policies for achieving a goal forget about it after a while.”11 In effect, seizure of the Scarborough Shoal.16 Yet by gradual steps, rather than by drastic China employs a graduated strategy of the militia is a preferred tool, since there change. As an international relations coercive actions and outcomes in the SCS is a grudging admissibility to militia ac- concept, coercive gradualism may be to advance its interests. tions in comparison to full-scale military defined as a “state employing coercive The unstated Chinese strategy of actions. Not surprisingly, the militia is instruments of national power in a coercive gradualism in the SCS is actively referred to as the “third sea force of blue synchronized and integrated fashion supported, indeed enabled, by com- hulls” (after the navy’s gray hulls and to achieve objectives by incremental prehensive gray zone tactics.12 A U.S. coast guard’s white hulls), undertaking steps.”3 Coercive gradualism allows Special Operations Command white what the Chinese call a “war without states to advance their interests in incre- paper published in 2015 defined the gray gun smoke.”17 Use of the militia is com- mental moves, as opposed to a single zone as “competitive interactions among bined with other gray zone tools, such coup de main.4 For China, coercive (and within) States and non-State actors as merchant ships, maritime surveillance gradualism is a broader precept that that fall between the traditional war and vessels, fishing fleets, and information informs its strategy across paradigms. peace duality.”13 Gray zone tactics are an operations. Such tools signal “sea power Deng Xiaoping, paramount leader of essential accessory to coercive gradualism, as a ‘continuum,’ constituting a range of the People’s Republic of China, referred as risk management is a crucial element options, [where] even merchantmen and to gradualism as “fording the river by of gradualism. Since the purported end is fishing boats can lay mines and monitor feeling for the stones.”5 This article, to ensure that the “real or perceived reac- foreign warships.”18 Indeed, Chinese however, predominantly focuses on tion to incremental moves will not entail scholars view gray zone tools as legitimate such approaches in the SCS. unacceptable costs,” gray zone tactics means to further national aims. One China has consistently employed activate the full potential of gradualism by scholar notes that the “approach can yet broader principles of coercive gradualism supporting incremental moves through be regarded as a flexible method to settle
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bhatia 25 disputes. . . . Such actions are normal key locations through an unprecedented apace on prevaricate grounds such as and justified activities for China within reclamation and militarization pro- “what activities should be ‘frozen’ have its own waters.”19 It is no surprise, then, gram.26 As retired Major General Peng not been listed and stipulated definitely that China is taking the maritime militia Guangqian of the People’s Liberation in the [declaration].”33 The situation to new heights with vessels that include Army pointed out during a U.S.-China is aggravated by ASEAN’s inability to reinforced hulls, external rails to mitigate Dialogue at the Naval War College in bring about a consensus and consolidate collision damage, and water cannons.20 In 2010, “Every inch of ‘blue-colored terri- its response, a situation often orches- effect, gray zone tactics constitute a con- tory’ is extremely precious to China.”27 trated by China itself, allowing Chinese spicuous vector, supporting the broader strategies to continue unabated. Chinese strategy of coercive gradualism Regional/International Even where a state may lodge a strong in the SCS. Commitments and Response protest against the Chinese approach, Coercive gradualism combined with A crucial subtext of the gradualist China often disregards such concerns, gray zone tactics is not an ephemeral gray zone approaches is the orchestra- provided that the response lacks adequate approach, and China’s strategic calculus tion of issues so as to avoid strong international traction or is not force- dictates continued impetus to such ap- regional/international opposition or ful enough. An example would be the proaches. Two key reasons underscore response. In essence, the core intent is landmark 2015 ruling of the Permanent such impetus. First, graduated gray zone to minimize external interference, while Court of Arbitration (PCA) involving tactics are particularly favored by states systematically altering regional dynam- the Philippines and China over rights and pursuing revisionist aims, such as China, ics. One scholar notes that Chinese responsibilities in the SCS. Even though Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These efforts “remain below thresholds that the ruling was a legitimate international states are “dissatisfied with the status quo would generate a powerful U.S. or instrument in unequivocal favor of the and [are] determined to change aspects international response, but nonethe- Philippines, the Chinese simply rejected of the global distribution of power and less are forceful and deliberate . . . to the ruling. An explanation of the Chinese influence in their favor.”21 At the same gain measurable traction over time.”28 stand lies in the scale and coherence of time, revisionist states do not wish to risk Chinese rationale for creating 10,000- the international response to such an major escalation, but rather to employ a foot airstrips on artificial islands is, outcome. In the aftermath of the ruling, “sequence of gradual steps to secure stra- ostensibly, for a “better response to international pressure on the Chinese to tegic leverage.”22 These tactics present a typhoons and other climate-related admit that the ruling was muted failed way to challenge, and ultimately change, disasters.”29 Reclamation activities to register as a conspicuous factor in the way global politics work without en- are projected by the Chinese as being Chinese considerations. With the interna- tailing unacceptable cost and attention.23 insignificant, in addition to being based tional response, an entreaty—rather than Second, China views the SCS with a stra- on precedence, since other claimants an ultimatum—that China perceived was tegic significance, the intensity of which have also undertaken reclamation in that the “reaction to [its] incremental is often underestimated. Just as Alfred the past. Yet reclamation activities, even moves” did not entail “unacceptable Thayer Mahan argued that the Caribbean though insignificant in isolation, are costs.” Thus, the gradualist gray zone Sea and Gulf of Mexico were crucial alarming in aggregate. From 2013 to approach was preserved. This is especially to the United States in the early 20th 2015, for instance, China reclaimed relevant, given the limited Philippine ca- century, China views control of the SCS 17 times more land over a period of pacity to impose costs upon the Chinese. as a prerequisite to its broader maritime 20 months than all other claimants Alternately, analysis shows that when- resurgence. Mahan believed that “geog- combined over the past 40 years.30 This ever a concrete and forceful regional/ raphy underlies strategy” and highlighted includes approximately 95 percent of all international response is encountered, that the strategic value of any position de- reclaimed land in the Spratlys.31 Even Chinese strategy is suitably revised and pended on “its situation . . . strength . . . where regional mechanisms exist, China recalibrated. For instance, in 2004, when [and] resources.”24 Mahan also observed has attempted to sidestep its underlying a Chinese submarine made its maiden that certain regions “rich by nature and spirit and erode its effectiveness through submerged passage through the Ishigaki important both commercially and politi- ambiguity and diversion. An example Strait, a sharp Japanese response forced cally, but politically insecure, compel the would be the 2002 Association of China to retract from its position and attention and excite the jealousies of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Dec- express regret in public.34 Similarly, China more powerful nations.”25 China views laration on the Conduct of Parties in has not proceeded with the same island- control over key locations within the SCS the South China Seas. The declaration building approach in the Senkaku Islands, from a similar lens to avoid jealousies of requires parties to “refrain from inhabit- due to an unambiguous U.S. articula- other powers while underwriting its own ing the presently uninhabited islands, tion of Senkaku being part of the U.S. security. In Mahanian parlance, China is reefs, shoals, cays, and other features.”32 security umbrella to Japan.35 A similar incrementally altering the regional geog- Chinese reclamation and militarization approach can be seen regarding Taiwan, raphy, adding strength and resources to activities have, nonetheless, continued where tacit U.S. involvement limits the
26 Essay Competitions / Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 One of 24 Airmen on U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft involved in April 1 accident with Chinese F-8 aircraft salutes as he departs C-17 Globemaster III, while en route to Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii, April 12, 2001 (U.S. Air Force/Adrian Cadiz)
scope for Chinese gradualist gray zone Chinese, in respect to its overall strategy the SCS, the absence of a U.S. response actions.36 Even where smaller players are in the SCS, may be attributed to the to graduated gray zone activities in the involved, resolute action has sometimes adequacy and coherence of the regional/ SCS has essentially given a free pass to forced China to recalibrate its approach. international response to such incidents. Chinese actions. But before the absence One example would be the 2014 Hai In addition, the unambiguous intent and of a U.S. response to issues related to Yang Shi You 981 oil platform standoff capability of concerned states to impose the SCS is lamented, it is essential to between China and Vietnam, where costs on Chinese actions is a significant critically examine the underlying causes China deployed its state-owned National factor. As the PCA ruling shows, Chinese and effects of such actions. Offshore Oil Corporation oil platform admittance of such outcomes is contin- The broader U.S. reticence toward near the disputed Paracel Islands.37 The gent on the ability of the protagonists to participation in SCS issues emerges incident involved an aggressive response pressure and persevere with outcomes. At from a principled stand to avoid a stake to Chinese gray zone tactics by Vietnam. the same time, the Hai Yang Shi You 981 in regional territorial disputes, with the Vietnamese fishing boats and coast standoff reflects the ability of a regional United States exhorting parties to resolve guard vessels collided with and used state (Vietnam) to persevere with its issues in a “manner consistent with inter- water cannons against Chinese fisheries stand by imposing equivalent costs within national law.”39 In addition, the United enforcement/maritime militia vessels, the gray zone. A paradigm thus emerges, States perceives that, other than the based on similar practices employed by where international involvement and freedom of navigation enshrined in inter- the Chinese. In the face of persistent and integral capacity of regional claimants are national law, SCS issues do not impinge resolute action by the Vietnamese, the the key to containing Chinese gradualist on its core national interests. Thus, the Chinese finally withdrew, stating that the gray zone approaches within the SCS. U.S. strategy in the SCS is a conscious exploratory work had been completed choice exercised within the politico- (even though most analysts contest this).38 The U.S. Stand strategic context for nonparticipation In essence, the distinction between Given the need for a coherent and con- in regional issues. Secretary of State action and inaction on the part of the solidated response to Chinese actions in Hillary Clinton had stated in 2012 that
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bhatia 27 Two B-52H Stratofortress bombers fly over Pacific as part of joint training mission near Japan over East China Sea in support of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s Continuous Bomber Presence operations, August 2, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gerald R. Willis) the “United States has been clear and In essence, China is slowly expanding its of navigation” patrols need to be seen in consistent . . . we do not take sides on the maritime territories, each of which beget this light, since China is in the process competing sovereignty claims to land fea- an area of expanded maritime jurisdiction of consolidating its maritime territories tures in the South China Sea.”40 In 2016, within the SCS. Furthermore, Chinese before jurisdictional claims under interna- Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter interpretation of international mari- tional law can invite its full consideration. further reiterated that the “United States time jurisdiction, on which the United Once control of disputed maritime ter- is not a claimant in the current maritime States clearly has a stake, remains deeply ritories is complete, China may proceed disputes in the Asia-Pacific, and takes no contested between the two parties. For to articulate a more limiting jurisdictional position on which party has the superior instance, China interprets international entitlement to the global commons as- sovereignty claim over the disputed land law to exclude innocent passage within sociated with these territories. Clearly, features.”41 At the same time, the United territorial waters, as well as surveillance China is playing the long game, not States has reiterated its right to “fly, sail, and intelligence collection within exclu- intending to challenge the U.S. peace- and operate wherever international law sive economic zones.43 In essence, China time freedom of navigation enterprise allows.”42 Such a strategy on the part of is employing coercive gray zone tactics yet, but nonetheless preparing for a time the United States, however, presents sev- to expand its control over maritime ter- when it must. A short-term myopia in the eral conundrums. ritories in the SCS, which would in turn American strategy, thus, becomes evident. At the outset, while the United States assert expanded maritime jurisdictional A connected issue is that at a time reiterates that its interests lie only on control over wider swathes of global when an effective response to graduated issues involving international maritime commons in the SCS. Thus, the U.S. gray zone strategies requires deeper inter- jurisdiction and freedom of naviga- stand inadvertently facilitates Chinese national commitments and exhortations, tion (and not on territorial disputes), it expansion of the nature and definition of U.S. noninvolvement on SCS issues fails must be remembered that the Chinese international jurisdiction within the SCS, to reassure allies, with several seeking interpretation of maritime jurisdiction is which eventually impinges on its core alternatives. Even though the United linked to its claims to maritime territories. interests. The inefficacy of U.S. “freedom States has articulated its Rebalance to
28 Essay Competitions / Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Asia approach, allies perceive a mismatch military rightly attempted to restore the a U.S. response, but current responses between intent and action.44 Regional status quo ante (through statements and are inadequately oriented to counter states find the United States unwilling to B-52 sorties), while the FAA focused on the threat. The U.S. military remains act as a bulwark and the principal archi- aviation safety. A strategic reassignment oriented to war and peace dualities, tect of coherent international consensus and recalibration of the U.S. approach while gray zones operate between two on SCS issues. This is no small issue in may, thus, be in order. absolutes. In effect, the black-and-white East Asia, where trust and consensus At a more abstract level, the U.S. Western approach to conflict “creates the are key considerations, especially with stand on SCS issues also goes beyond very gaps and seams gray zone adversar- the United States seen as an “outside the superficial to a more profound issue ies pursue and exploit.”53 There is also power.” A statement distributed by underlying the contest between a great an asymmetry in risk perception, where the Philippines Department of Foreign power and rising power. Analysts see the decisionmakers are “hypersensitive to the Affairs in 2015 read, “America has failed declining U.S. engagement in the SCS as hazards associated with potential escala- us.”45 General Benjamin Defensor, for- one of the possible symptoms and deeper tion in the gray zone and [thus] more mer Philippine chief of staff, stated in an verdict on retrenchment of a great power. conservative in response to gray zone interview that the United States will “not Two U.S. scholars argue that whenever competition.”54 Authoritarian regimes come to our aid . . . the Philippines [is] the “power, authority, and legitimacy are also better equipped at executing better off employing restraint and an ap- of the existing order is challenged, re- gray zone strategies in comparison to peal to world opinion.”46 South Korean trenchment by the leading power marks democratic checks-and-balances systems and Japanese officials in Track 1.5 chan- an inflection point in the decline and where power is diffused and decision- nels indicate “rising angst that gray-zone eventual fall of the leading power.”51 making is dispersed.55 Gray zone issues challenges may erode the credibility of At the same time, other scholars see also create a sense of persistent conflict, U.S. commitments.”47 Not surprisingly, broader gray zone challenges—to include which is anathema to democratic systems states find realignment with China an Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North anchored to traditional concepts of war attractive proposition. As Robert Kaplan Korean endeavors—as a means to chal- and peace.56 Thus, the United States, pointed out, in the “short run, a weaker lenge the current U.S.-led international having unarguably the most capable American commitment to the region order. Gray zone adversaries constitute a military in the world, may not be poorly might result in the States on China’s “globalizing insurgency challenging the equipped, but poorly oriented to deal periphery bandwagoning with China.”48 foundational regime of the current ad- with such challenges.57 This reinforces the Seen in this light, the Philippine “pivot to vanced industrial nation-state-based (and need for acceptance of gray zone conflict China” makes imminent sense. “America largely Western) international system and as a distinct category of state-on-state has lost it. . . . I [have] realigned myself order.”52 The developing security matrix action.58 Japan, for instance, has identi- in your [Chinese] ideological flow,” in the SCS, thus, calls for a deeper reas- fied the gray zone in its 2014 annual proclaimed President Rodrigo Duterte sessment of U.S. strategies and priorities defense white paper as “situations neither during the keynote address at the in the region. purely peacetime nor contingencies.”59 Philippine-China Trade Forum in Beijing Similarly, Australia has flagged gray zone in October 2016.49 The Need for a Strategy actions, such as reclamation and selec- A linked issue is that even when The more difficult question is what are tive interpretation of maritime law, as the United States has responded, there the options in such a scenario. It may areas of concern, necessitating concerted are noticeable inconsistencies in the be argued that the United States has response.60 response, which are not lost upon allies. limited options to tackle such issues. The next step in creating an over- An example would be the declaration of To address this aspect, the follow- arching strategy involves unambiguous the East China Sea ADIZ in November ing discussion offers certain options/ articulation of intent to challenge such 2013. The U.S. military expressed “deep recommendations. approaches. This includes defining clear concern” at the unilateral action, and At the outset, the U.S. approach to red lines in gray zone scenarios where B-52 long-range bombers flew sor- the SCS needs to transcend from mere necessitated by national interests. The ties through the ADIZ to demonstrate tactical expedients into a broader and breach of a red line must be responded resolve. At the same time, the Federal more comprehensive strategy. In essence, by escalatory, multidimensional, Aviation Administration (FAA) issued there is a need for a broader conceptual cost-imposing measures. It must be Notice to Airmen instructing U.S. civil recalibration of U.S. strategy to tackle remembered that gradualist gray zone aircraft to comply with China’s ADIZ.50 graduated gray zone tactics posed by approaches thrive in the absence of red While such inconsistencies may be dif- various powers. Three aspects underscore lines. Island-building, ADIZ declara- ficult to reconcile, it must be seen in such recalibration: acceptance, articula- tion, and disregarding PCA ruling are all light of the absence of a broader U.S. tion, and application. examples where a red line—or a retalia- strategy on dealing with graduated gray Acceptance is the recognition that tory response—was not articulated. A zone challenges. Seen in his context, the Chinese gray zone approaches necessitate clear red line, as was achieved during the
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bhatia 29 Sailor takes bearing as USS Dewey conducts replenishment-at-sea with USNS Henry J. Kaiser, Pacific Ocean, July 16, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Devin M. Langer)
Cuban Missile Crisis or Russian interven- commitment to enforce red lines. Such a for legitimate regional concerns and tion in Ukraine, asserts that “noticeable move clearly requires a broader interna- highlight irresponsible graduated gray punishments [would] be imposed on an tional consensus to be effective, a facet zone measures by parties concerned. aggressor who flouts international norms that gray zone tactics aim to avoid in the Statements such as “our commitment with their gray zone revisionism.”61 There first place. to the Philippines is ironclad” may be are obvious consequences for perpetra- Apart from conceptual reorientation, inadequate, absent cogent international tors, which are particularly effective if the it is apparent that present responses to support for the core interest of the protagonist does not intend irreversible gray zone challenges invariably involve partner involved, such as the outcome consequences, China being an example. pure military instruments. Yet, such an of the PCA arbitration in the case of the The last aspect is application. Gray approach is flawed because gray zone ac- Philippines.63 The U.S. “three halts” zone actions are often shrouded in am- tions aim to invoke the quasi-military and diplomatic approach, which required biguity and plausible deniability, making nonmilitary aspects of a situation. Any re- parties to halt reclamation, construction, them difficult to counter. Dispelling sponse through military means, therefore, and militarization on disputed features in ambiguity and demanding clarity from suffers from an inadvertent escalation the SCS, may need to be reinvigorated.64 potential actors help narrow the problem and response mismatch to begin with. There may also be a need for a legislative and invoke red lines to penalize such There is an overarching need to integrate backing to coordinated U.S. response to actions. One example would be present- options beyond the U.S. Department gray zone tactics in the region. Among ing firm evidence to the international of Defense alone. A coordinated whole- these, the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security community of Russian-backed separat- of-government approach becomes Initiative Act of 2016, which recalibrates ists’ downing of MH-17 over Ukraine, imperative to tackle graduated gray zone U.S. commitment to that of an actor in paving the way for harsher sanctions actions, with appropriate integration of all the SCS, may need to be pursued.65 The against Moscow.62 This was in light of instruments of national power. bill, pending with the U.S. Congress, outright Russian disassociation with the Diplomatic Measures. At the mandates that the U.S. military routinely event. Application requires confronting diplomatic level, there is a need to enforce America’s right to freedom of initiators with proof, supported by a shore up greater international support navigation in the waterways of the Asia
30 Essay Competitions / Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pacific and authorizes greater U.S. as- sistance to Southeast Asian states. Speed of action may be important considering the fact that the time involved in passage of the draft bill in the U.S. Congress has been more than the time taken by China to reclaim over 3,000 acres of land in the SCS.66 Informational Measures. The $425 million Maritime Security Initiative under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 involves the creation of a shared maritime information network for Southeast Asia. Early conclusion of the initiative would overcome informational gaps faced by partner nations.67 The United States has also pledged enhanced support to countries with claims in the SCS by “publicly disseminating infor- mation about China’s activities at sea,” an intent that needs concerted follow- up action.68 Military Engagement. Numerous measures could be considered in the mili- USS Ronald Reagan and Izumo-class helicopter destroyer JS Izumo break formation during combined tary domain. At the outset, conventional Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S. Navy exercise, South China Sea, June 15, 2017 (U.S. U.S. forces would need to be structured, Navy/Nathan Burke) trained, and equipped to handle gray zone activities. U.S. forces would be regional integration as well as minimize missions. Such cooperation could be required to operate within the gray zone U.S. involvement.72 Indonesia, Malaysia, diversified to counter gray zone activities, with speed, purpose, intent, and resolve.69 and the Philippines have recently signed such as combat search and rescue, night Synchronization of the overall effort an agreement for joint patrol of maritime capability, maritime interdiction capabil- would need to be continually steered by borders to thwart piracy and militancy in ity, visit-board-search-seizure capabilities, combatant commanders, who need to be the region. Extending such cooperation and so forth.76 empowered to operate against active gray to counter regional gray zone postures Economic Measures. Economic penal- zone competition with new capabilities could be considered.73 Closer coast ties for those actors pursuing graduated and agile models for campaigning.70 At guard–to–coast guard ties could promote gray zone tactics constitute a visible the same time, the United States could a nuanced approach to gray zone threats and effective deterrent. Russian hybrid consider building “counter–gray zone in lieu of more kinetic and conspicuous warfare activities in Crimea, for instance, capabilities” among partner nations to navy-to-navy ties. were countered through economic sanc- tackle such challenges. The aim would Another line of effort could include tions.77 In addition, funding support be to progressively reinforce the futility better access to island territories. Several could be considered for states seeking of gray zone actions by perpetrators by sea areas in the SCS remain uncharted, to shore up their defensive capabilities building partner capacity. These could with hazards to navigation and limited against gray zone challenges. include developing information opera- communication facilities.74 Better access tions—such as cyber capabilities to shape to such areas, dredging operations, and The evolving security situation in perceptions and highlight issues—and charting of these areas could overcome the South China Sea is complicated by counter–gray zone capabilities through some of the Chinese advantages in the graduated strategies adopted by China assets (fast patrol boats, coastal radar gray zone. Additionally, there is a need to that utilize coercive instruments of na- chains, surveillance capabilities, small assist regional navies in building capacity tional power. These instruments operate unmanned aerial vehicles), counter-militia for increased maritime domain awareness, in the gray zone, ensuring incremental forces, reclamation capability, and out- along with intelligence, surveillance, and gains without invoking an escalatory post-building capability, for example.71 reconnaissance operations.75 U.S. Special response or international intervention. Diversifying military partners for Operations support remains focused The time-space synchronization of regional nations, including Australia, on foreign internal defense, apart from these approaches is such that they ap- India, and Japan, would strengthen security cooperation and train-and-equip pear as incidents, instead of a series of
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bhatia 31 interconnected and cohesive elements. Jackson Atoll,” ABS-CBN News, June 3, J-39/Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment Branch 2011, available at
32 Essay Competitions / Coercive Gradualism Through Gray Zone Statecraft JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 29 Keith Johnson, “The Meltdown of 43 Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclu- 64 See Amy Sawitta Lefevre and Trinna the Global Order,” Foreign Policy, July 23, sive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving Leong, “Southeast Asian Nations Back Halt 2015, available at
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bhatia 33 Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, provides command and control of airpower throughout Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and 17 other nations (U.S. Air Force/ Joshua Strang)
tions with Qatar, a fellow member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).2 Political Warfare The four countries released a list of 13 demands that aimed to align Qatar’s national policies with that of other with Other Means Gulf and Arab countries.3 However, Qatar’s state news agency quickly dis- avowed the report on its Web site and 2017 Cyber Attacks on Qatar Twitter account and attributed it to a cyber attack.4 The attack on Qatar’s By Edwin Y. Chua state news agency to promulgate false and misleading information marks a new phase in the use of cyber means It’s one of the great paradoxes of our time that the very for political warfare. An analysis of the goal, target audience, and means of technologies that empower us to do great good can also be this cyber attack, as well as the results used to undermine us and inflict great harm. of the attack and the implications of evolving technologies, suggest that —President Barack Obama defending against such attacks requires a multifaceted effort from individuals, organizations, governments, and the n May 24, 2017, Qatar’s state international community. news agency reported that Political analyst Graham Fuller, a Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad O former vice chairman of the National Major Edwin Y. Chua, Singapore Army, wrote Al Thani supported Hamas, Hizballah, this essay while a student at the Marine Corps Intelligence Council at the Central Iran, and Israel.1 In response, Saudi Command and Staff College. It tied for first place Intelligence Agency, postulates that the in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Arabia, the United Arab Emirates aim of the 2017 cyber attacks was to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt cut off rela- Essay Competition. compel Qatar to align its foreign policy
34 Essay Competitions / Political Warfare with Other Means JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 with Saudi Arabia, end its good rela- Libya severed their diplomatic ties with cyber attacks in support of political war- tions with Iran, cut off military ties with Qatar.12 The Saudi coalition also closed fare. The proliferation of such attacks Turkey, and terminate its support for al their airspace to Qatari aircraft and could indicate that the “strategic logic of Jazeera news network.5 Qatar has close banned all ships flying the Qatari flag cyber is shifting to one of disruption and diplomatic ties with Iran because they or serving Qatar from docking at any constant harassment designed to signal jointly exploit the South Pars natural gas ports.13 Saudi Arabia closed Qatar’s only capability and the threat of escalation.”21 fields.6 In 2014, Qatar signed a defense land border as well.14 These efforts on agreement with Turkey and agreed to land, sea, and air aimed to cut off Qatar’s Looking Forward allow Turkey to establish a military base supply routes and threaten its economy. Future cyber attacks and information in Qatar.7 Fuller explains that these operations would exploit the develop- international ties allowed Qatar to chart Less Than Success ment of software that could manipulate its own foreign policy independent of Despite the use of all elements of voice and video. In November 2016, Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the national power, the Saudi coalition Adobe, a company known for its Arab Spring, which threatened the rule did not succeed in achieving its aim Photoshop software, unveiled Project of authoritarian leaders in the region, of isolating Qatar from the GCC VoCo, a program that makes it possible many Arab leaders saw al Jazeera’s news and the United States. Qatar did not to take an audio recording and alter channels as threatening to their control give in to the 13 demands presented it to include words and phrases that of information in the region.8 The target by the coalition.15 In the immediate the original speaker did not say, in the audience of the cyber attack was not only aftermath, the U.S. Secretary of State voice of the original speaker.22 Another the political elites in Qatar, but also the called for the crisis to be resolved dip- company, BabelOn, is developing leaders of other countries in the GCC lomatically, while the U.S. Department software that can translate a person’s (that is, Kuwait and Oman) and key of Defense and Ambassador to Qatar voice into another language instantly.23 decisionmakers in the United States. By publicly praised Qatar for hosting the al Researchers at the University of Wash- highlighting Qatar’s close ties with Iran Udeid Air Base and its commitment to ington are experimenting with the use and Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist regional security.16 Kuwait and Oman, of artificial intelligence (AI) to convert group, the bogus news reports aimed to the other two members of the GCC, audio files into realistic mouth move- politically isolate Qatar from the United did not cut off their diplomatic ties ments, which could be used to falsify States. The other GCC states were with Qatar. Less than a month after the videos of public personalities giving expected to rally along religious lines hacks against Qatar, U.S. intelligence speeches.24 The widespread use of to support the Saudi coalition, which officials attributed the cyber attack to such technologies would blur the lines adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam, the UAE and stated that the attacks between truth and falsehood, allowing against Iran, a Shiite state. had been directed by senior members malicious actors to conduct a persistent To reach these audiences, the UAE, as of its government.17 The land, sea, and campaign of distortion to smear the part of the Saudi coalition, enacted a pro- air blockades did not have a significant reputation of certain world leaders or gram of cyber attacks into Qatar’s state impact, as Turkey and Iran sent food countries in order to reduce their soft news agency to insert false news reports. and basic supplies directly to Qatar.18 power and influence over time. Hackers began their operation in April Turkey also sent more military forces to A strong, multifaceted defense is 2017, gaining total control of the Qatari its base in Qatar in order to deter any needed against the abuse of such new News Agency’s network, email accounts, Saudi military action.19 The failure of software and AI. This defense will require Web sites, and social media platforms.9 this cyber attack, despite the close coor- action by individuals, organizations, This control was used to disseminate dination of all instruments of national governments, and the international com- false information from May 24 to May power, supports the theory posited by munity. Adobe’s acknowledgment of the 25, before the state media’s information some cybersecurity researchers that potential abuse of its software is a good technology experts were able to regain states using cyber attacks rarely achieve step toward building public awareness control.10 The cyber attacks supported their intended objectives, and successful to inoculate individuals against insidious a broader campaign that included all compellence could require the over- influence campaigns. More effort should elements of national power including whelming national power of countries also be focused on developing software diplomatic, military, and economic ef- like the United States.20 that can detect such voice and video forts. After the attack, the Saudi coalition However, while the ploy to isolate manipulation quickly. Learning from severed diplomatic ties and gave Qatari Qatar was exposed, there has not been the experience of Qatar, governments citizens 14 days to leave their territory any public censure or consequences to and organizations should be prepared to while banning their own citizens from the UAE for its conduct of the cyber embrace transparency and quickly report traveling to or residing in Qatar.11 Under attacks. The lack of consequences for cyber attacks when they occur to shape diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia, the UAE could set a precedent and the narrative, clarify the position of the countries such as Yemen, Maldives, and embolden future adversaries to leverage government or organization, and prevent
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Chua 35 3 the spread of distorted information. “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to Nakashima, “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of End Qatar-Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera, July 12, Qatari Government Sites”; and Phil Stewart, Governments and organizations should 2017, available at
36 Essay Competitions / Political Warfare with Other Means JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Eastern Ukrainian woman, one of over 1 million internally displaced persons due to conflict, has just returned from her destroyed home holding all her possessions, on main street in Nikishino Village, March 1, 2015 (© UNHCR/Andrew McConnell)
cal ploy; they have suggested calling Putin’s bluff. However, they also realize Peacekeepers the idea of a properly structured force with a clear mandate operating in support of an accepted peace agreement in the Donbas could offer a viable path to peace that is worth exploring.2 By Michael P. Wagner Putin envisions a limited deploy- ment of peacekeepers on the existing line of contact in Donbas to safeguard OSCE-SMM personnel.3 Such a plan ince the conflict in Ukraine September 5, 2017, when he proposed could be effective in ending the conflict began in 2014, over 10,000 introducing peacekeepers into Eastern and relieving immediate suffering, but it people have died in the fighting Ukraine to protect the Organiza- S could also lead to an open-ended United between Russian-backed separatists tion for Security and Co-operation in Nations (UN) commitment and make and Ukrainian forces in the Donbas Europe–Special Monitoring Mission long-term resolution more challenging. region of Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrai- to Ukraine (OSCE-SMM). Despite Most importantly, freezing the conflict nian government has repeatedly called halting progress since that time, restart- in its current state would solidify Russian for a peacekeeping mission to halt ing a peacekeeping mission remains an control of the separatist regions, enabling the bloodshed, so Russian President important opportunity.1 Many experts it to maintain pressure on Ukraine by Vladimir Putin surprised the world on remain wary and dismiss it as a politi- adjusting the intensity level as it de- sires. This plan would also prevent the Ukrainians and Russian-backed separatists Lieutenant Colonel Michael P. Wagner, USA, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Army War College. It tied for first place in the Strategy Article category of the 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of from implementing many of the Minsk Staff Strategic Essay Competition. II Accord tenets—including instituting
JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2017 Wagner 37 constitutional reforms and reestablishing civilian administration (ICA) to maintain 90,000 heavily armed combatants facing control of sovereign borders—effectively control of the separatist regions during each other.16 Countervailing trends that blocking Ukraine from seeking North the transition. An ICA would fill the void will dramatically reduce force require- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in local governance while the Ukrainian ments include the existence of a peace membership.4 A more comprehensive parliament would amend the constitu- agreement, relatively open agricultural peacekeeping mission than Putin’s could tion to implement the decentralization land outside the cities, and limited ethnic address these issues and ease Russia’s requirements of Minsk II and necessary tensions. Additional challenges a force economic and governance burdens, re- political changes to form legitimate local might face would likely include crimi- turn sovereignty to Ukraine, and deliver governance structures throughout the nality, conflicts surrounding returning important constitutional reforms to Donbas.9 The former UN Transitional IDPs, and the remnants of separatist and the people. Administration for Eastern Slavonia, nationalist militias as well as any stay- The existence of a legitimate peace Baranja, and Western Sirmium in Croatia behind Russian elements. Based on these agreement is rightly considered one after the Balkan wars offers precedence factors, a force of approximately 20,000 of the key components of a successful for such a transitional authority under peacekeepers would be suitable, if appro- peacekeeping operation.5 The Minsk II UN auspices.10 priately organized and outfitted. It would framework must be updated to address Most discussions of the appropriate require a wide variety of capabilities, in- outstanding questions such as sequencing size of peacekeeping and counterinsur- cluding unmanned aerial vehicles to help actions and authorizing a peacekeep- gency forces focus on force-to-population patrol the borders, rotary-wing aviation ing force with an international civilian ratios with minimal concern for other assets, target acquisition radar to identify administration. The mandate of the force considerations such as terrain, lengths of any indirect fire attacks in violation of should be tailored to match its size and borders, population density, and the ex- the peace agreement, and a robust intel- capabilities to avoid creating unrealistic istence of a legitimate peace agreement.11 ligence analysis and fusion capability to expectations.6 Operating with the consent These analyses are also not particularly better share information and ensure more of all parties under a viable peace agree- well grounded in history.12 The most focused and effective employment of the ment, this force would primarily deploy commonly cited ratio of forces to popula- force. The mission should include civilian under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. tion is 20:1,000, with others suggesting police and a military formation consist- It would also require Chapter VII au- ratios as low as 2.8:1,000, depending on ing of a mix of armor and infantry forces thorization to compel compliance with levels of violence.13 Donetsk and Luhansk to ensure sufficient manpower to patrol the peace agreement; protect civilians; have a combined total of approximately the urban areas and sufficient firepower oversee the return of Ukraine’s estimated 7 million people and 53,200 square km to protect itself and the mission. Twenty 1.7 million internally displaced persons representing approximately 15 percent thousand troops would be sufficient to (IDPs); and safeguard critical civilian of Ukraine’s prewar population and field two brigades of peacekeepers in infrastructure to include roads, gas and 9 percent of its territory, along with a each oblast, or region, with a headquar- oil supplies, and power distribution facili- significant amount of its industrial capac- ters staff and the additional enabling ties.7 The force cannot effectively perform ity.14 The separatist-controlled portions capabilities. To put this in context, it is these missions if it is limited to operating account for an area roughly the size nearly the same number of troops as in solely along the line of contact. The force of Kosovo or one-third of the 53,200 the International Security and Assistance must have sufficient capacity to secure the square km of Luhansk and Donetsk, with Force’s Regional Command East during international borders, the separatist areas an estimated 2.8 million people still in the the Surge in 2010–2011 for about half of of Luhansk and Donetsk, and a 75-kilo- separatist areas.15 Assuming that up to 1.2 the population, just over one-tenth of the meter (km) artillery buffer zone on the million of the estimated 1.7 million IDPs land mass, less challenging terrain, and a Ukrainian side of the line of contact. This return to the Donbas, the peacekeeping more permissive threat environment.17 broader geographic area and a Chapter force could be responsible for a popula- Identifying troop-contributing VII authorization in the mandate would tion of up to 4 million people. Using countries that have sufficient capacity to give the mission a credible capability to pure ratio-based calculations, the size of execute a mission and are acceptable to all respond to violations and address issues a peacekeeping force could range from parties involved will be challenging. One that flair up. The existing OSCE-SMM of 11,200 to 80,000. option is to recruit from non-NATO, 1,078 personnel, including 600 monitors With this as a general range, we must OSCE member countries to avoid plac- from 44 countries, should remain in place also consider the other factors that could ing NATO troops close to Russia’s and integrate with the UN peacekeep- complicate or simplify the mission. Key borders, or relying on Russians to enforce ing force for protection as it executes its issues that tend to warrant a larger force a peace in a conflict that they are a party mission, expands its reach, and verifies include the dense urban terrain in several to. If NATO or Collective Security Treaty compliance.8 major cities, an international border of Organization countries participate, it Perhaps the most critical component just over 400 km, and a line of contact must be proportional. Another option of the agreement would be an interim approximately 500 km long, with around would be to select a power like Brazil or
38 Essay Competitions / Peacekeepers in the Donbas JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2017 12 India to lead the mission. Their participa- thehill.com/opinion/international/351512- Riley Moore, “Counterinsurgency Force real-peacekeeping-in-the-donbas-will- Ratio: Strategic Utility or Nominal Necessity,” tion could expand economic opportunity put-putin-to-the-test>; Carl Bildt, “Is Peace in Small Wars & Insurgencies 24, no. 5 (2013), in Ukraine and help guarantee Russian the Donbas Possible?” European Council on 856–857, 859–860; David Michael Green, compliance out of fear of angering an- Foreign Relations, October 12, 2017, available Chad Kahl, and Paul F. Diehl, “Predicting the other power. Ukraine would welcome at JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2017 Wagner 39 Marine with Combat Logistics Battalion 31, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares to print 3D model aboard USS Wasp while underway in Pacific Ocean, April 7, 2018 (U.S. Marine Corps/Bernadette Wildes) Additive Manufacturing Shaping the Sustainment Battlespace By Michael Kidd, Angela Quinn, and Andres Munera here is widespread interest and items such as novelty bottle openers, enabling factors that will make the a level of euphoria surrounding the Navy recently printed a carbon technology a useful part of the Depart- T the potential benefits of bringing fiber submersible.1 The Defense Logis- ment of Defense (DOD) supply chain additive manufacturing (also known tics Agency is working with industry and not simply an impressive applica- as three-dimensional printing [3D to print hard-to-source parts and is tion that ends up at best a fleeting printing]) to the military logistics tool experimenting with printed food—and initiative, and at worst an incredible kit. The technology has tremendous printed human organs are finding their drain on scarce resources and a public potential, with new uses being demon- way into the medical field.2 It is impor- embarrassment. strated weekly. In addition to mundane tant, however, to fully understand the Additive manufacturing and the abil- ity to create single- or small-batch runs of parts should be managed carefully to Lieutenant Commander Michael Kidd, USN, is a Supply Officer at the Defense Logistics Agency. ensure that this technology is deployed as Major Angela Quinn, USA, is a Joint Logistics Planner at U.S. Joint Forces Command–Naples. Major a force multiplier versus a niche program Andres Munera, USAF, is a Medical Logistics Flight Commander in 11th Wing Medical Group and is en route to serve as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program Medical Advisor for Operation with limited readiness impacts. Initial Resolute Support in Kabul. pilot programs are in place across several 40 Commentary / Additive Manufacturing JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 of the Services to provide feedback on not formerly possible.6 Also, advances while setup costs are kept at a minimum, how this equipment is working in the in material and bonding of layers providing the flexibility to produce vari- field. Specifically, the Army Breaching create higher end quality-controlled ous components on a single machine. Tools, 3D printers on deployed aircraft products that include critical high- Of particular interest to the military carriers, and mobile radio solutions significance items such as aviation valves supply chain is the experience of aero- provide insight into the use of this whose failure could have catastrophic space corporations. Companies such as technology, as they are already fielding consequences. General Electric (GE) and Boeing have additively manufactured resources.3 While Significant technological advances in taken advantage of additive technologies these programs have tapped into the in- 3D printing have occurred over the past to produce complex geometries that are novative spirit of Servicemembers to solve several years. In the decades before 3D difficult and expensive to manufacture unit-level problems, they have not yet printing, prototypes were designed using under legacy technologies. GE Aviation provided enterprise solutions to sustain modeling techniques, or low production is printing fuel nozzles, and the National critical systems. runs, which were expensive and time Aeronautics and Space Administration With an understanding of the poten- consuming. Today, with the use of com- is examining which rocket engine parts tial positive results such as cost avoidance, puter-aided design (CAD) techniques, could be additively manufactured.10 reduced inventories, and time to deliver, additive manufacturing is capable of pro- Currently, the manufacture of these parts as well as the challenges of implemen- ducing prototypes, and even fully capable involves low production runs that re- tation, acquisition and sustainment items, faster and at lower costs, allowing quire significant investments in machine programs can transition DOD 3D print- for rapid development of technologies. tools, which are thereafter underutilized. ing capabilities into readiness multipliers. As the technology matures, there is a shift Furthermore, the quest for weight reduc- Additionally, updates to guidance are from merely a prototyping niche, morph- tion has brought expensive materials required to ensure officials are actively ing into low production runs, to large into the manufacturing process. When shrinking the supply chain through batch runs. Industry wide, 3D printers titanium or other high-value materials are investments in additive manufacturing are now producing nearly one-third of applied additively versus using subtractive and just-in-time manufacturing as part of items for end use.7 manufacturing processes, which waste their overall acquisition strategy. Focusing Still a nascent technology, 3D print- costly raw materials, companies can real- on the manufacture of parts to increase ing of parts on demand has not taken a ize significant cost savings.11 systems sustainability, we examine costs foothold in terms of gross capacity, con- and cost avoidance, supportability, and sisting of less than 1 percent of industrial Potential Benefits technical limitations in order to develop production. However, looking at those Following 15 years of war, and the $5.6 constructs for when to implement at vari- dipping their toes into the technology trillion in treasure expended, there is ous levels. The current DOD roadmap across the commercial spectrum, the more pressure than ever to find efficien- concentrates on technology development automotive, medical, and aerospace in- cies, cut costs, and redefine the way rather than enabling factors.4 Therefore, dustries are early adopters, consisting of business is conducted across DOD.12 So this article identifies those factors that nearly 50 percent of commercial additive pervasive is the pressure to reform busi- contribute to a methodical approach to applications.8 The medical field’s engage- ness practices that Secretary of Defense additive manufacturing in support of ment is still fairly close to prototyping, as James Mattis lists “bringing business DOD sustainment. they are taking advantage of the capability reforms to DOD” as one of his top to create unique prosthetics and fitted three priorities, along with strengthen- Industry Overview medical devices such as hearing aids ing partnerships and rebuilding war Additive manufacturing uses several and orthodontia. Conversely, automo- fighting readiness.13 Three-dimensional methods to produce exceptionally thin tive manufacturers have been pushing printers offer the promise of creating layers of material that are stacked on top the technology past its initial low run items constrained only by imagination. of each other (added) and then fused limitations. General Motors is producing The goal of producing parts on demand together using a power source to create larger components, including bumpers promises to eliminate time, costs, and 3D items. Conversely, many traditional and spoilers, while firms such as EDAG infrastructure while contributing signifi- manufacturing methods like casting Engineering and the BLM Group have cantly to readiness levels. and forging are subtractive, removing moved additive manufacturing from a Large production runs currently ben- excess material and creating waste in minor part of the supply chain to ad- efit from the speed and economies of scale the production process.5 Though still ditively manufacturing close to entire of more traditional manufacturing meth- an emerging technology, 3D printing concept cars.9 Utilization on a handful of ods, such as injection molding (which has several advantages over traditional automotive assembly lines notwithstand- are able to distribute capital costs over methods of production. For instance, ing, the technology is still predominantly high numbers of units).14 As 3D printers the micron-thin width of successive defined by its ability to produce goods develop, large batch runs will become layers allows the creation of geometries without high-cost molds and castings, more affordable. The maturing industry JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kidd, Quinn, and Munera 41 LulzBot TAZ 6 prints small-scale ship model in Manufacturing, Knowledge, and Education Laboratory at Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division, Bethesda, Maryland, July 25, 2018 (U.S. Navy/Justin Hodge) should provide opportunities to reduce Diminishing Manufacturing Sources/ for the storage of these casting molds supply chain labor and long-term sustain- Material Shortages (DMS/MS) is a electronically. Printers can utilize globally ment costs. Collapsing the supply chain significant force degrader as the military available casting sand, currently in use at by producing parts on demand eliminates continues to extend the service life of foundries worldwide, to recreate molds not only warehousing functions but also weapons systems far in excess of design on demand, versus warehousing large the process of creating and transporting parameters. Many production lines have numbers of molds or employing highly the part and/or entire assembly.15 shut down and companies have gone skilled individuals to recreate molds While supply chain savings will excite out of business due to the generally low in the event of downstream require- budgeteers and logisticians, the reduc- demand signal for many parts support- ments.18 Such methods allow castings to tion in time to reliably deliver parts will ing DOD systems.16 As such, there is be poured without high costs and long produce significant improvements in a struggle to field spare parts.17 With lead times. It is likely that initial large- equipment readiness. With advances in excessive costs associated with restarting scale fielding within DOD can have the self-diagnostics, emerging failures can production lines or conducting reverse most significant impact in mitigating be detected prior to systems and equip- engineering, the Services are forced to DMS/MS cases. ment degrading, and systems can identify cannibalize parts from degraded or even required parts as soon as failures appear. previously discarded equipment. Challenges If parts can be produced locally, rather A significant challenge to produc- Although there are examples of high- than waiting for nonstocked items to be tion line retooling is the creation of dies quality airworthy valves being additively ordered and delivered, maintainers can and molds. Under traditional methods, manufactured, concerns over quality eliminate equipment down time. fine silica-based sands are used to cre- control of printed parts remain.19 Under In addition to the ability to deliver ate molds for molten medal, and this the best circumstances, parts certifica- parts without warehousing, additive requires skilled artisans and substantial tion can be a lengthy and cumbersome manufacture provides the ability to investments in both production and stor- process. Depending on the system, parts mitigate manufacturing obsolescence. age costs. Retained CAD files now allow may be subject to review and testing 42 Commentary / Additive Manufacturing JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 from Service engineering authorities, down the supply chain 3D printers are kilogram.25 Though prices will likely drop original equipment manufacturers, deployed. Unit-level distribution provides as the market for these raw materials non-DOD governmental or nongov- the fastest production to the end-user grow, this is still a significant challenge ernmental agencies, or combinations timeline but produces other risks; main- to overcome. thereof.20 These quality concerns are taining changes to technical specifications Driving the largest financial impact compounded when parts are manufac- and ensuring the information technology is the cost of data. Without quality data, tured at the end use location without infrastructure to deliver CAD files to the the military would have to engage in the benefit of robust quality assurance production printers require a significant reverse engineering of a product, which resources. Furthermore, military appli- investment. As manufacturers’ technical is expensive and not guaranteed to pro- cation of 3D printing often takes place directives are issued, and parts specifica- duce successful results.26 The technical in austere environments that suffer tions are altered, it is imperative that specifications required may be critical from vibration pollution from aircraft updates are pushed to the lowest level of intellectual property of vendors, covered engines, heavy vehicles, and even production to reduce defective, or even by patents and other relevant regulations ocean movement on ships at sea. When dangerous, parts due to lax data manage- that drive up acquisition and manage- producing precision parts with narrow ment processes. ment costs. Furthermore, in those cases tolerances, these environmental disrup- As the technology continues to ma- where the government has an obligation tions can negatively affect the produc- ture and engineering and quality control to protect vendors’ intellectual property, tion process and insert invisible flaws concerns are rectified, the cost-benefit there will be significant challenges in the into finished products.21 equation will shift toward additive man- information technology infrastructure to Not only do locations face the qual- ufacturing, especially for DMS/MS cases store, update, and deliver required secure ity risks associated with any production and low-demand items. Once the cost information to 3D printers. process, but there are also emerging to field and maintain the technology and There are also a number of nuances cyber risks to be considered. Without to procure the required raw material and that should be understood when mak- robust cyber security covering technical data packages is less than the total costs ing decisions. Traditionally, simple and files and even the printers themselves, of complete products, more products low-cost items will quickly become read- internal flaws can be inserted into will transition to additive production. iness-limiting factors as technologies and printed parts that are difficult to detect. The cost to store and maintain invento- parts become obsolete. This will quickly These structural flaws have the ability ries, and the difference in transportation move an item from inconsequential to to degrade weapons systems and create that traditionally manufactured parts highly relevant in the supply chain. An equipment and even personnel casual- require due to the distance from the examination of shelf-life shrinkage must ties.22 Therefore, program managers must end user, offers opportunities for cost also be considered; many parts degrade in implement risk assessment and mitiga- savings, too. storage over time to the point where they tion strategies to counter these quality Within each of these cost silos are a must be discarded. Lowering the pre- and cyber vulnerabilities before fielding number of factors that must be consid- use loss of parts to shelf-life expiration additive manufacturing, or additively ered prior to implementation. Within by on-demand production can reduce manufactured parts. the maintenance category, determination system costs. Perhaps the most significant hurdle to must be made on who conducts the Warehousing and transportation unit-level implementation of on-demand maintenance (military or contractor). The costs are anticipated to be negligible in additive parts production is the procure- former will require development of pre- the short to medium term due to the ment and maintenance of intellectual ventative maintenance protocols as well as volume of production required to affect property, which often originate from significant training. Contractor support net requirements. Should the technol- multiple sources with various levels of allows faster fielding but will have more ogy expand, its future capabilities for certification requirements.23 Though significant upfront acquisition costs and limiting warehousing requirements and Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) may result in slower response times to ad- downsizing both real estate and manning 27-406 directs the identification of data dress equipment failures. in the supply chain will further draw costs requirements upfront, DOD procured Regarding bringing costs under con- down. On the other hand, it is important tens of thousands of weapons systems be- trol on the additive manufacturing side of to note that production is not instan- fore the potential to produce spare parts the equation, raw material is second only taneous. Shifting to 3D printing–based locally was even a concept. Acquisition of to data costs. Where injection-molded sustainment may decrease time to deliver data, postcontract award, entails signifi- plastics are available in the ranges of $2 parts when the part is not locally ware- cant costs and in some cases may not be to $3 per kilogram, comparable raw housed; however, it will likely increase possible, necessitating large investment in materials for 3D printers can run from delivery time in those cases where one reverse engineering.24 $175 to $250 per kilogram. When look- would otherwise issue directly off the Once data are procured, the cost ing at high-end titanium and titanium shelf for immediate delivery to the flight and management may also limit how far alloys, those costs can grow to $880 per line or address an emergent casualty. JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kidd, Quinn, and Munera 43 Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic employees review CAD software designs for additive manufacturing and verify printer is properly calibrated, Charleston, South Carolina, October 24, 2017 (U.S. Navy/Joe Bullinger) Enabling Factors vendors, resident knowledge within has the lead for logistics during an op- Given the possible advantages inherent DOD organizations, combined with eration and is supporting ground forces in this technology, getting it right is a existing manuals, will cover many training from other Services, it could rely on the professional imperative for those design- requirements. Support Maintenance Company as a ing supportability plans for military pro- Deployment levels and volume of common user logistics asset. Other envi- grams and those supporting warfighters the technology are as important as the ronments may be more complicated and in the field. A new deployment triad of training and enabling instructions. Field require additional assets. For instance, training technicians, equipment fielding too few systems and the benefits of short a littoral fight with a smaller footprint strategies, and operational policies must supply chains are lost; field too many could rely on an offshore amphibious be developed. and it becomes cost prohibitive. Placing readiness group or carrier strike group to Unlike other emerging technolo- additive manufacturing assets at a central support emergent needs, delivering parts gies, training may be less difficult than hub with intermediate-level maintenance via short-hop airlift. anticipated. Much like automotive skills capability within the theater of operations Policy shifts regarding how acquisi- 40 years ago, 3D printing and CAD tech- will balance these concerns. Across the tion professionals approach supportability nology are being taught in high schools, joint forces, the support would need to of equipment will ensure that deliberate community colleges, and universities deploy within the Support Maintenance assessments of 3D printing’s technical throughout the country.27 There is a Company (Army), Marine Expeditionary feasibility are conducted. There are scores large population of young people that has Unit (Marines), Intermediate of regulations, policies, and instructions exposure to 3D printers, and while there Maintenance Centers (Navy), or Logistics ripe for additive manufacturing–based will always be platform-specific training Readiness Squadron (Air Force). The as- parts supportability; however, focusing requirements, DOD can leverage exist- sets required in theater can be tailorable on the FAR, DOD Instruction 5000.2, ing skill sets within the force. Though depending on who the lead agency is for Operation of the Defense Acquisition maintenance concepts for equipment will logistics as well as mission, location, and System, and executive orders will provide be developed in conjunction with specific participants. For instance, if the Army the largest impact, due to downstream 44 Commentary / Additive Manufacturing JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 NASA successfully hot-fire tested 3D printed copper combustion chamber liner with E-Beam Free Form Fabrication manufactured nickel-alloy jacket, March 2, 2018 (NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center/David Olive) policy nesting of higher instruction. “performance contracting as an impor- Additionally, DOD should conduct Requiring programs to examine the feasi- tant tool to help meet identified energy a review of the existing parts inventory bility of acquiring technical data for parts efficiency and management goals while to identify those that could be shifted capable of additive manufacture during deploying life cycle cost-effective energy from traditional inventory levels to print- the first article delivery (FAR §52-299.4) efficiency and clean energy technology.”28 on-demand strategies. The assessment will set the appropriate criteria. While With such constructs in mind, additive would require a significant effort, as data acquisition is a key enabler for locally manufacturing will increase efficiency there are over 5 million line items to be produced additive parts, drilling down and decrease the added resources needed assessed—with countless limitations to re- to the DOD instruction will force critical in the process of acquiring, shipping, view even before a business case is made, examination of the parts manufacturing and distributing resources by producing including material and item size. Once process. Specifically, DOD Instruction them locally. the technical specifications are validated, 5000.2, §3.9.2.4.3, should be added With the growth of Performance- business cases are required for each item directing sustainment decisions to actively Based Logistics procurements, to determine if additive manufacturing work with Service engineering agencies encouraging manufacturers to establish is a viable solution for the DOD supply to examine the feasibility of additive additive manufacturing as part of their chain. In addition to setting the criteria manufacture for parts sourcing. long-term sustainment should be an to use in this assessment, the study needs Executive orders can jumpstart the easier sell. As contracts demand system to address how to present results to the process of new construct implementation operational availability as a performance supply system. End users need visibility and effectively communicate the value of metric rather than time to reliably deliver regarding any parts to be printed on new processes and technologies to public parts, putting the capacity to produce demand when they are researching parts programs. President Barack Obama’s parts close to end users could bolster availability. Any limitations on transpar- Executive Order 13693, Planning for profits by limiting the requirement ency on observed inventory levels (or Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade, to hold significant contractor inven- lack thereof) may incentivize customers achieved this by directing utilization of tory on hand. to seek out more expensive alternate JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kidd, Quinn, and Munera 45 16 options that limit operational availability. and James Zunino, “Additive Manufacturing Michael Kidd and Miranda Sullivan, Methods, Techniques, Procedures & Applica- “Reactive Obsolescence Management Measure- Possible criteria for parts to be additively tions: Enabling Technologies for Military Ap- ments: A Better Approach,” Naval Engineers manufactured should include, but not be plications,” Armament Research, Development, Journal 122, no. 1 (March 2010), 75–80. limited to: and Engineering Center, n.d., PowerPoint slide 17 Diminishing Manufacturing Sources presentation, available at 46 Commentary / Additive Manufacturing JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Navy Sky Raiders from USS Valley Forge fire 5-inch wing rockets at North Korean field positions, October 24, 1950 (U.S. Navy/Burke) World War II.1 This article explains The U.S. Air Force why U.S. Air Force airpower was key to the United Nations Command’s ability to defeat the North Korean invasion and then rescue U.S. Army forces from and Army in Korea disaster when the Chinese intervened. Too often, the critically important role How Army Decisions Limited airpower played in Korean ground operations has been neglected, a short- coming this article intends to correct.2 It Airpower Effectiveness also illustrates that Army commanders in Korea had a poor understanding of By Price T. Bingham airpower and that this caused them to make decisions that handicapped the effectiveness of U.S. airpower, making uring the first year of the Korean the Korean War much more costly than Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, USAF War, U.S. airpower resumed the it needed to be. The Army’s failings in (Ret.), is a former Combat Fighter Pilot, Aviation key role that it had played in the Korea continue to have important policy Expert, and frequent commentator on Air Force D and joint issues. Allies’ defeat of the German army in implications today given the threat JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 47 Astonished Marines of 5th and 7th Regiments, who hurled back surprise onslaught by three Chinese communist divisions, hear that they are to withdraw, circa December 1950 (U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. National Archives and Records Administration/Frank C. Kerr) posed by North Korea, since Army doc- ant General George E. Stratemeyer, to under the command of Lieutenant trine still does not recognize the key role provide air cover for the evacuation of General Walton H. Walker, Eighth U.S. airpower, in the form of air interdiction, American nationals. On June 27, patrol- Army in Korea (EUSAK), began arriving. must play in order to defeat an opposing ling Fifth Air Force (5AF) F-82s based Yet even with these reinforcements, U.S. army at the lowest possible cost.3 in Japan and commanded by Major and ROK units were forced to continue General Earle E. Partridge engaged and their retreat. The North Korean Invasion shot down four North Korean aircraft. From the very beginning, Air Force On June 25, 1950, a 135,000-man As powerful North Korean forces began effectiveness was handicapped by the North Korean army—organized, overrunning the lightly equipped South availability of airfields.6 There were only trained, and equipped by the Soviets— Korean forces, FEAF was ordered to five improved bases in the South, along employing 150 T-34/85 tanks, artil- begin bombing attacks against North with six primitive short sod strips. The lery, and trucks, and supported by its Korean forces who were moving rapidly two bases suitable for the F-80, Kimpo air force, launched a surprise invasion down the peninsula.4 and Suwon, near Seoul, were quickly of South Korea. Although shocked by In addition to employing airpower, captured by the North Koreans, making news of the invasion, initially the United the United States began deploying Army it necessary for F-80s to fly from bases States was confident that the Republic forces from the 24th Infantry Division, in Japan.7 The 310 miles from Itazuke of Korea (ROK) army could handle which was on occupation duty in Japan. to the Seoul area gave F-80 pilots little the invasion. As a precaution, the com- Task Force Smith, the division’s initial time to search for targets. Even so, the mander of Far East Command (FEC), deployment, was quickly defeated by first 24 F-80 sorties on June 28 caused General Douglas MacArthur, soon to be a tank-equipped North Korean attack significant damage when they found the named commander of United Nations and forced to withdraw.5 As the North roads crowded with North Korean tanks, Command (UNC), ordered Far East Air Koreans exploited this victory and con- trucks, artillery, and troops.8 B-29s and Force (FEAF), commanded by Lieuten- tinued to advance, more Army forces B-26s based in Japan also began bombing 48 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 and on June 30 inflicted severe damage were stationed at Taegu Air Base (AB), The need to educate Army command- on North Korean tanks, trucks, and other followed soon after at Pohang AB. The ers about the importance of air bases was vehicles stuck in a traffic jam waiting to F-51’s ability to fly from bases in Korea also never-ending. During the battle on cross the Seoul railway bridge.9 allowed them to carry more weapons the Pusan Perimeter, Partridge sent a letter Given that its focus was on the (for example, napalm, which proved to Walker explaining 5AF had been caught defense of Japan from a possible Soviet especially effective at destroying tanks), off balance repeatedly by unexpected attack and not fighting an army offensive while also being able to devote more time ground force actions. He stressed the in Korea, FEAF had only 22 B-26s, 12 to looking for targets. Brigadier General importance of the Taegu AB to EUSAK B-29s, 70 F-80s, and 15 F-82s available Timberlake, deputy commander of 5AF, operations, stating the insecurity of Taegu for missions in Korea. Moreover, like the explained the basing advantage on July 8, had already canceled the movement of Army in Japan, training for fighting an stating, “One F-51 adequately supported three squadrons of F-51s from Japan to enemy army had received little attention. and fought from Taegu Airfield is equiva- Taegu and caused one squadron’s move- Recognizing the urgent need for more lent to four F-80s based on Kyushu.”13 ment to Pohang AB to be withheld. This airpower, FEAF requested reinforcement From the beginning of the war in meant that 100 F-51s were flying missions from the United States, including 164 Korea, one of the major challenges the from Japan, rather than from Korea. He F-80s. However, due to its shortage of Air Force faced was the result of U.S. went on to point out that if Taegu falls, F-80s and the problems with basing, the command arrangements. MacArthur’s Pohang will follow, and before this occurs, Air Force substituted 150 F-51s.10 general headquarters (GHQ) was not the remaining two squadrons of F-51s Initially, an even higher priority for a joint staff. As Partridge noted in his will be returned to Japan, reducing their the Air Force than attacking the invading diary, “There is nothing even vaguely rate of operations and almost eliminating ground forces was ensuring control of resembling a joint staff. GHQ is an Army airlift into Korea.18 Later, when General the air. As a result, many bomber sorties Staff.”14 Not only did MacArthur’s staff Matthew Ridgway took command of were devoted to attacking North Korean consist almost entirely of Army officers, EUSAK, the basing education process had airfields rather than their ground forces. these officers frequently attempted to to be repeated. In this case, MacArthur To prevent enemy aircraft from attack- directly “run the air forces” or take ac- was now the one who pointed out to the ing the bombers and ROK forces, F-80s tions that affected airpower’s effectiveness new EUSAK commander that recovering began flying patrol orbits at 10,000 feet without first discussing the proposed the use of Kimpo would be of value for over the Han River. Fuel reserves meant action with Air Force leaders. As a result, strengthening air operations.19 that these aircraft could stay on station Air Force leaders often had to explain Control of theater airpower had for only 15 to 20 minutes before return- why key operational-level decisions quickly become a contentious issue ing to Japan, but on the way home they that concerned airpower and had been when MacArthur’s staff began telling would attack any North Korean forces made without consideration of Air Force FEAF how to conduct air operations. In they saw moving south.11 expertise were wrong and needed to be response, on July 10, Stratemeyer had Their attempt to win the war quickly changed.15 These decisions involved air personally carried a memorandum to by moving in accordance with Soviet interdiction, including emphasis on air in- MacArthur stating he hoped MacArthur doctrine exposed North Korean forces terdiction as opposed to close air support; would have the same confidence in him to devastating air interdiction attacks. responsibility for the control of airpower; that he had with his Airmen during Almost every FEAF sortie destroyed logistics, including basing availability and World War II. Although MacArthur told some enemy target. Air interdiction had operability; and air reconnaissance. Stratemeyer that he had his confidence this effect because it could exploit North While Airmen had a sound and was to run his own show, the strug- Korea’s reliance on motorized vehicles appreciation from World War II of air in- gle for control of airpower was not over.20 and trains. Unlike close air support where terdiction’s potential contribution as part One point of contention was control enemy forces were dispersed, dug in, and of a balanced concept of airpower, many of B-29 operations since MacArthur’s often well concealed, forces attempting ground officers in Korea did not.16 Like chief of staff, Major General Edward to move rapidly were out in the open the Marine Corps, they saw airpower as Almond, had established a GHQ- and often concentrated, making them far mainly close air support and did not have dominated group to choose bomber easier for Airmen to locate and destroy. a good understanding of the factors at the targets. Weyland pointed out deficiencies Airpower’s ability to exploit traffic operational level of war that made air in- with the targets chosen by this group. jams caused by bridges destroyed by air terdiction effective. It was only after FEAF Only at this point was it agreed that interdiction was evident when, from July vice commander for operations, Major FEAF should be allowed to take a more 7 to 9, aircrews claimed 197 trucks and General Otto P. Weyland, explained the active role in target selection.21 44 tanks destroyed.12 To augment aircraft importance of interdiction to MacArthur’s Despite this agreement, the Army was flying from Japan on July 10, FEAF GHQ staff that, on July 26, FEAF was not finished with its efforts to direct B-29 converted six F-80 squadrons in Japan finally allowed to begin the first of several operations. On August 13, MacArthur to the F-51s. The first F-51s in Korea comprehensive interdiction programs.17 told Stratemeyer he wanted the entire JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 49 Marine infantrymen take cover behind tank while it fires on communist troops ahead, Hongchon Area, May 22, 1951 (U.S. Marine Corps/John Babyak, Jr.) B-29 force that was currently performing Perimeter. While UNC ground forces Thanks to possession of air superiority interdiction to “carpet bomb” a sus- were defending the Pusan Perimeter, the and the enemy’s lack of heavy antiaircraft pected enemy concentration in support of FEAF and carrier-based naval air forces artillery, B-29s could make multiple EUSAK. Air Force officers were further had been conducting intensive air attacks individual attacks from altitudes as low as dismayed when the size of the Army’s tar- against the North Koreans. In addition 10,000 feet.23 get area turned out to be far larger than to providing close air support, FEAF It was not long before FEAF air at- what the Air Force recommended. After fighters and bombers were continuing to tacks persuaded the North Korean army’s reconnaissance revealed no evidence of perform air interdiction. leaders that they could not afford the enemy activity in the area bombed by the By the time the North Korean army losses moving during the day incurred. B-29s on August 16, both Stratemeyer had reached the Pusan Perimeter, its In response, the North Koreans came and his bomber commander, Major vulnerability to air interdiction had been to accept the delays inherent in limiting General Emmett O’Donnell, would significantly increased by its dependence movement to the hours of darkness. recommend that no more such missions on support traveling over long lines of Despite the problems imposed by dark- be flown unless the ground situation communications (LOCs). Korea’s terrain ness, air interdiction—along with close air was extremely critical and the enemy was with its rivers, ridges, and rice paddies support—greatly degraded the effective- concentrated.22 made cross-country movement difficult ness of the North Korean army. By early Although more Army divisions and to impossible, especially for motorized September, airpower was responsible for a Marine brigade were deployed to vehicles. As a result, the North Koreans much of the North Korean army’s supply Korea, the North Korean offensive was depended heavily on a rail and road shortages and troop losses. EUSAK lead- not stopped until it reached the Pusan network that crossed numerous bridges. ers thought they were fighting an enemy 50 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 army of 100,000, possessing 75 percent Marine Division and followed by the The Army’s attempts to control of their equipment. Instead, the North 7th Infantry Division.28 MacArthur’s airpower in Korea were not limited to Koreans actually had only about 70,000 plan called for withdrawing the Marine MacArthur and his staff. On October troops and 50 percent of their equip- brigade from EUSAK while EUSAK 7, Stratemeyer wrote in his diary that ment.24 Losses were not the only way was still engaged in hard fighting, he had learned Almond had written let- the North Korean army was degraded. attempting to hold back North Korea’s ters to General Mark Clark and others The flexibility of enemy operations was Great Naktong Offensive.29 At this time in the United States. In these letters, severely degraded by the need to confine the North Korean offensive had made Almond stated that he recommended their movements and assaults to the so much progress that some 5AF units Marine Corps–type air support where, hours of darkness. Moreover, their sol- were forced to evacuate Taegu AB. according to Almond, Marine aviation diers had far lower morale because of the FEAF airpower played a major role in operates under the ground commander. destruction caused by airpower and their the success of the Inchon landing. The Stratemeyer noted that Almond made inability to fight back effectively.25 intense interdiction effort FEAF had this recommendation, even though he It was only after the advance of UNC begun in mid-August not only destroyed was not supported by the Air Force in ground forces out of the Pusan Perimeter North Korean forces and supplies, but any of his later ground actions. In ac- that FEC intelligence was able to accu- it also damaged LOC infrastructure, cordance with established procedures, rately assess the immense effect airpower preventing North Korean forces from the 1st Marine Air Wing was tasked to had had on the North Korean army. A moving rapidly to reinforce Inchon. In support X Corps within the amphibious third or more North Korean personnel addition, FEAF was carrying out counter- objective area. Stratemeyer also wrote of losses and more than half of their equip- air missions against North Korean being told there was “quite a drive on in ment losses were caused by airpower. airfields to ensure air superiority. As a the Army led by Mark Clark to attempt U.S. Army leadership finally realized that result, the landing met light resistance to secure for the Army its own support airpower, not the landing at Inchon, had from the 2,000 comparatively new North air force.”31 Much of the rationale for been the key to the North Korean army’s Korean troops defending Inchon. Army efforts in Korea to run the Air defeat. As Walker put it, “I will gladly To the south, EUSAK played an Force was based on the belief the Air lay my cards on the table and state that important role in helping the landing Force was providing inadequate close if it had not been for the air support that at Inchon by three different attacks. air support. we received from the Fifth Air Force, Although EUSAK’s offensive began we would not have been able to stay on schedule, it quickly ran into strong Advance across the 38th Parallel in Korea.”26 North Korean defenses, with FEAF The consequences from Inchon were During the fight on the Pusan operations being hindered by poor far-reaching. On September 27, Perimeter, FEAF had available for opera- weather. However, when the weather MacArthur received orders authoriz- tions seven squadrons of F-51s, three began improving the next day, an increas- ing amphibious and ground operations of which were based in Korea at Taegu ing amount of airpower was brought north of the 38th parallel. MacArthur’s and Pohang. Also at Taegu was the T-6 to bear. Finally, on September 19, the plan was not to put X Corps under “Mosquito”–equipped 6147th Tactical 1st Cavalry Division managed to break Walker, whose forces would continue Air Control Squadron.27 The remainder through North Korean defenses and soon their advance north across the paral- of 5AF units committed to Korea were all enemy forces began falling back with lel. Instead, he would use X Corps to based in Japan. For operations in Korea, resistance collapsing. EUSAK forces then make a second amphibious landing FEAF also had O’Donnell’s Bomber pursued the retreating enemy forces, with at Wonsan. Giving X Corps priority Command (Provisional) with five B-29 T-6 Mosquitoes flying column cover. at Inchon so it could meet the tight groups, and Combat Cargo Command Army decisions created problems for schedule for landing at Wonsan created (Provisional) under Major General airpower again after the Inchon landing. a massive logistical problem.32 With the William H. Tunner. On September 20, Stratemeyer noted plan’s assumption of little enemy resis- in his diary that he had called X Corps tance, airlift was the primary demand Inchon and the Breakout to tell them that for “their own good put on FEAF.33 from the Pusan Perimeter [ability to receive air support and airlift] UNC’s logistics advantage was On August 28, 1950, the Joint Chiefs and the maintenance of Kimpo Air Port, quickly diminishing as the distance from of Staff (JCS) gave MacArthur approval our Aviation Engineer Battalion and our Pusan increased and UNC forces had to to make an amphibious landing at own air base troops for Kimpo should move over a severely damaged road and Inchon, scheduled for September 15. be debarked [at Inchon] without delay. rail network. The logistics problem could The plan called for X Corps, com- Everyone agreed but indicated that it have been much smaller if the port of manded by General MacArthur’s chief had been held up on Almond’s order Inchon had been available to support ad- of staff, General Edward M. Almond, as he needed fighting doughboys and vancing EUSAK and 5AF units instead of to make the landing, led by the 1st ammunition.”30 X Corps.34 With EUSAK and 5AF unable JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 51 Chinese Intervention MacArthur’s assumptions regarding the threat posed by enemy action were proved wrong when, on October 25, the Chinese, in what they called their first campaign, began attacks against elements of EUSAK, followed by similar attacks against X Corps on November 2. These attacks brought a halt to EUSAK’s advance and caused units to withdraw into defensive positions to wait for their logistical situation to improve.37 On November 1, a MiG-15 based in China attacked 5AF aircraft operating near the border, making it increasingly urgent for 5AF to move its units to airfields closer to the enemy. Then, to the puzzlement of the UNC leaders, by November 7 the Chinese had broken off all contact. The Chinese attacks caused MacArthur to order 2 weeks of intensive air attacks against the Korean end of the Yalu bridges. Learning of this order, which was in clear violation of directives to stay well clear of the border, the JCS ordered the postponement of all bomb- ing and asked MacArthur his reasons for the order. MacArthur’s answer was that Chinese troops were “pouring” across the bridges and their movement threatened the ultimate destruction of UNC forces.38 MacArthur’s answer shocked the JCS since he had reassured them on Lead bomber attacks enemy positions, as seen from B-29 Superfortress of Far East Air Forces 19th Bomber Group on its 150th combat mission since start of Korean War (Air and Space Museum) November 4 when asked his appreciation of the situation given Chinese interven- to rely on Inchon for the movement two fighter wings and the Mosquito tion. On November 6, the JCS reversed of supplies and forces in their advance Squadron forward to the Pyongyang themselves and authorized the bombing above the 38th parallel, both relied heav- area, and only 1,000 tons of total airlift as long as the border was not violated. ily on airlift. However, little airlift was was available, 5AF agreed to reduce its Surprisingly, despite his previous mes- immediately available because it was requirement to 60 tons, preventing the sage, MacArthur told the JCS it would being withheld for MacArthur’s planned forward movement of fighter bases.36 be “fatal” to weaken current policy and drop of the 187th Airborne Regimental During the advance of the UNC change his mission.39 Combat Team. This planned airdrop not ground forces, 5AF units had been Much of the reason for the low only tied up aircraft, but its dependence moving into Korea from Japan as fast estimates of Chinese strength was on Kimpo as a forward strip also forced as bases could be made operable and MacArthur’s belief that intervention 5AF units to move to make room for the the constrained transportation system by large numbers of Chinese would transports.35 permitted. By the end of October, 5AF be detected by “our Air Force.”40 The Logistical constraints had made had one RF-80 and three F-80 squadrons success of airpower against the mecha- EUSAK’s advance into North Korea at Taegu, two F-51 squadrons at Pusan, nized North Korean army had caused a calculated risk, with its supply being two F-51 squadrons at Pohang, one F-51 MacArthur to come to dangerously almost entirely by airlift. EUSAK stated squadron at Kimpo, and the Mosquito wrong conclusions about airpower’s it needed 1,000 tons of daily airlift. Since Squadron first at Kimpo and later at ability to prevent intervention by the 450 tons would be needed to move Seoul Municipal. Chinese.41 Clearly he did not understand 52 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 the much greater difficulties Airmen had detecting light infantry moving at night a relatively short distance into North Korea, and who were well trained in camouflage, when compared to detect- ing a mechanized ground offensive. He also was probably not aware of how little reconnaissance capability his air forces actually possessed. After a November 9 attack by MiGs on a vulnerable RB-29 along the Yalu River, 5AF began using only the faster RF-80 squadron to con- duct reconnaissance in this area. Since 5AF possessed only one RF-80 squadron, rather than the three squadrons required by doctrine, reconnaissance in areas south of the Yalu where Chinese troops were already hiding was significantly reduced. Moreover, sorties that were flown focused on the Yalu bridges that MacArthur wanted to attack, not areas in the mountains where Chinese forces were already massing. Adding to the problem was the lack of photo interpreters, night reconnaissance units, and smoke from forest fires that the Chinese had set to provide concealment.42 If these handicaps were not enough, the Mosquito Squadron was not allowed to achieve its full potential for performing the visual reconnaissance that was needed to provide accurate intelligence. The squadron’s small size limited the number of sorties available for visual reconnais- sance.43 But even those sorties that were Major John F. Bolt, USMC, with his U.S. Air Force F-86 “Sabre” jet fighter, July 13, 1953, two days after flown rarely penetrated much beyond he shot down his fifth and sixth MiG-15s (U.S. Marine Corps/ Tom Donaldson) friendly lines because of restrictions im- posed by the Army, which depended on supplies were built up he planned to have On November 24, when EUSAK the Mosquito to make up for its own lack EUSAK launch an offensive to complete resumed its advance, MacArthur reported of communications capabilities.44 the destruction of communist forces to the JCS the delay was entirely the re- Later, his remarks at a conference in Korea. As this ground offensive was sult of logistics difficulties.48 Meanwhile, with Matthew Ridgway on December about to begin, 5AF’s basing situation 5AF had finally been able to move some 26 would provide even more evidence had improved only slightly. Kimpo now of its fighter squadrons to forward fields that MacArthur had a seriously flawed had two F-51 squadrons, and three F-51 in North Korea. From November 17 understanding of airpower’s capabilities squadrons had just moved forward to to 19, three F-51 squadrons arrived at and limitations. It seems that he failed to join the Mosquito Squadron. Hamhung; on November 22, three F-51 appreciate how an army was organized, Earlier, on November 7, Stratemeyer squadrons arrived at Pyongyang East; and trained, equipped, and employed (for ex- had noted that 5AF should now have air- on November 25, two more F-51 squad- ample, mechanized fast-moving offensive lift priority.46 When EUSAK complained, rons reached Pyongyang.49 versus light infantry infiltrating and envel- a new arrangement was adopted where X The UNC ground offensive met only oping) had an impact on the effectiveness Corps would get only emergency airlift. light resistance the first day, but on the of air interdiction.45 Finally, on November 21, Partridge night of November 25 the offensive again On November 17, MacArthur had noted to Stratemeyer that for the first came to an abrupt halt. The Chinese had estimated that not more than 30,000 time in months EUSAK’s supply system begun their second campaign by ambush- Chinese troops were in Korea. Once was in good shape.47 ing the ROK II Corps and exposing the JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 53 U.S. 2nd Division and the Turkish brigade By attempting to overtake and destroy Review, Weyland reminded readers that to possible destruction.50 MacArthur now the mechanized UNC ground forces, the “effectiveness of [air interdiction] is reported the Chinese had 200,000 troops the Chinese marched on roads, even directly proportional to the time, space, and ordered his forces onto the defensive during daylight. Moving rapidly during and fire-power available for air attacks.”60 while asking for new policy guidance. daylight exposed Chinese troops to such He went on to warn that The JCS approved the shift to the defen- devastating attacks that, by December sive and recommended a withdrawal. The 16, airpower had killed or wounded an There is a tendency among many to regard sudden withdrawal of the UNC ground estimated 33,000 Chinese troops, the all such air [interdiction] operations forces had a major impact on airpower equivalent of four full-strength divisions. against ground forces merely as support by forcing 5AF units to quickly abandon Their massive losses caused the of the army. This generates misguided several bases that they had only just Chinese to return to hiding by day and concepts of organization, control, and begun operating from and forcing them moving by night. When it was discovered employment which tend to affect adversely to abandon much of their equipment. that the enemy’s troops were hiding in a smoothly functioning team. But more The Chinese ambush had shocked the villages, these became prime targets for basically it prevents us from seeing the normally confident MacArthur who now air attack.56 While it may be difficult to possibilities of employing both air and sur planned to pull EUSAK and X Corps quantify accurately, it can be assumed that face forces in the most effective combined into separate beachheads and prepare for these attacks greatly degraded the effec- strategy.61 possible evacuation of all UNC forces tiveness of surviving enemy soldiers.57 from Korea.51 At this point, Stratemeyer Even though UNC forces had In what some even today might see as a reported that he hand-carried a memo abandoned or destroyed vast amounts radical view, he then noted that to MacArthur explaining why he should of supplies and equipment during their order a withdrawal rather than an evacu- retreat, they also benefited logistically overall strategy must be geared to the ation.”52 Shortly afterward MacArthur by moving closer to the port of Pusan. air situation and the capabilities of the suddenly changed his mind, and on The reverse was true for the pursuing friendly air forces as much as to ground December 7 ordered the withdrawal that Chinese. As had been the case with the forces concepts of maneuver and fire. There Stratemeyer had suggested.53 original North Korean offensive, the should likewise be no stigma attached to the It is interesting to note the differ- Chinese advance in December 1950 and concept that ground force strategy may be ent attitudes Soldiers and Airmen had January 1951 rapidly increased their designed to exploit the effects of air strategy. about the situation facing UNC forces. logistical problems. Where it had been an If the objectives and situation are such that, Partridge, who had a good appreciation advantage for the Chinese to be free of in order to be successful, air power must be of the handicap airpower was imposing more easily detectable motorized trans- exploited to the fullest, then ground forces on the enemy, noted in his diary that he portation when moving into concealed must support the air forces.62 was not as concerned as Walker about ambush positions near the border, their the immediacy, strength, or location of dependence on soldiers carrying their Weyland believed an examination of enemy attacks as Walker. Partridge real- own ammunition and food now became the record in Korea would show that the ized that “we’ve moved by truck—our a rapidly increasing logistical problem as “effective employment of air forces can troops are fresh—[whereas the] enemy they advanced. Not only did the UNC’s permit a great reduction in the size and forced to march at night only, supply air attacks take a growing toll, but the composition of friendly ground forces.”63 routes long and under constant attack.”54 fierce cold and snow also added to their The amount of reduction would depend Just like MacArthur, Chinese leaders problems, contributing to their extremely on “how completely the friendly air force also had much to learn about airpower. high number of casualties.58 can exploit opportunities for attacking While initially they showed great respect Thanks in large part to airpower, ground force organizations, logistics, and for UNC airpower, this attitude changed especially air interdiction, by February facilities.”64 after they successfully ambushed UNC 1951 UNC ground forces were able to ground forces in late November. For the bring the enemy pursuit to a halt and Conclusion first 2 weeks of December, the Chinese even force their withdrawal. In announc- Analysis of this period of the Korean began moving rapidly in their attempt to ing this success, MacArthur’s press release War reveals that not only did many exploit their success and destroy the re- made what had happened largely by acci- key Army officers not understand the treating UNC ground forces.55 Now the dent appear to be the result of his design. capabilities and limitations of airpower, Chinese leaders were to be given a lesson In any case, it was clear that MacArthur but worse, many of them also were in air interdiction. had learned how vital factors such as time unwilling to listen to Airmen who were Thanks to air interdiction, the and space could be to the effectiveness of trying to explain how their decisions Chinese pursuit put UNC forces into air interdiction.59 were harming air power’s effectiveness. a position where they could return to In an article published in the Fall The problem may be the result of the the offensive and push the enemy back. 1953 issue of Air University Quarterly Army’s emphasis on the tactical rather 54 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Black-painted U.S. Air Force Douglas B-26C Invader assigned to 3rd Bomb Wing, 5th Air Force, drops bombs over communist target in North Korea, ca. 1953 (Air and Space Museum) than the operational level of war, which as the North Vietnamese Easter Offen- Army’s logistical decisions handicapped is apparent in their focus on close air sive and the Iraq wars) who have been the ability of the Air Force to move its support rather than air interdiction. As on the receiving end of U.S. airpower squadrons closer to the enemy. This a result, the Army failed to appreciate have had no such problem in recogniz- handicap on the movement forward of the importance of how rapid move- ing how air interdiction contributed to fighter squadrons was particularly im- ment—especially movement by mecha- their defeat.65 portant after Inchon when UNC ground nized forces—multiplies the ability of The Korean War also provides power- forces advanced into North Korea. air power in the form of interdiction ful evidence of how basing availability Target detection was still another key to delay and destroy opposing ground and operability contributes to air power’s factor determining airpower’s effective- forces. Their lack of attention to air effectiveness by its impact on the move- ness in Korea. Army officers, especially interdiction helps explain why many ment of airpower. Basing, even with air those in command and intelligence posi- Soldiers have failed to recognize that, refueling, plays a major role in determin- tions, did not appear to recognize the beginning in World War II, the success ing the number of sorties that can be vast differences between the difficulties of U.S. ground forces has come to flown, the type of aircraft that can fly, the Airmen faced finding Chinese light in- depend greatly on the effectiveness of target areas these aircraft can reach, their fantry infiltrating through the mountains U.S. air interdiction. In contrast, enemy time in the target area to find and attack and North Korean mechanized units army officers in both World War II and enemy forces, and the weapons payloads moving along roads. Compounding the Korea (as well as in wars since then such they can deliver. Too often in Korea the problem of finding enemy forces was JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 55 Enemy fuel truck hit by North American F-51 on highway east of Kumchon, Korea (Air and Space Museum) the Army’s decision to use Air Force Given that the overall theater strategy as has been noted, the Army’s paradigm Mosquitoes to substitute for their lack needs to be geared to the air situation, of war expressed in its doctrine still fails of communications preventing the Air an Air Force officer is far more likely to recognize the need to design ground Force’s Mosquitoes from ranging far than an Army officer to understand how force maneuver to exploit the key role ahead of advancing UNC ground forces. to design the employment of ground air interdiction must play in achieving It is quite possible that visual reconnais- forces in a way that will exploit fully the success. Even joint doctrine does not sance provided by Mosquitoes would effectiveness of U.S. airpower. Yet despite recognize the need to design ground have detected the magnitude of the dan- this reality, Service-based prerogatives maneuver so that it enhances the effec- ger the Chinese posed because of their continue to play a major role in the selec- tiveness of air interdiction.68 JFQ infiltration into ambush positions. tion of combatant commanders, making Finally, recognizing the truly im- it likely that if war breaks out again on the mense advances in Air Force capabilities Korean peninsula an Army officer will be Notes for detecting and precisely targeting the commander. As one expert explained, 1 mobile ground forces, even at night or “the presence of strong inter-Service For an excellent treatment of airpower’s role in the defeat of the German army, see during bad weather, that have been made politics suggests that jointness has served Omar N. Bradley, Effect of Air Power on Mili 66 since the Korean War and the increas- more as a cover to allow the Services to tary Operations, Western Europe, U.S. Strategic ing dependence of the United States on remain dominant in their traditional roles Bombing Survey and Air Effects Committee, airpower for defeating opposing mecha- and missions without fear of encroach- 12th Army Group, Wiesbaden, Germany, July nized ground forces, it is past time for ment. And second, it suggests that the 15, 1945. The summary of prisoner of war interrogations is especially interesting, as it considering whether campaigns against Services offer their unique paradigms of provides the perspective of soldiers who were such armies should be commanded, as war to compete for who can best achieve on the receiving end of Allied airpower. Weyland suggested, by an Airman. U.S. national security objectives.”67 And, 2 For example, see Robert M. Citino, 56 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Op States and its allies could employ. employment of airpower. Moreover, despite erational Warfare (Lawrence: University Press 7 Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower recommendations by Airmen, there had been of Kansas, 2004), 148. In his discussion of this Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 (Lawrence: Uni- little joint training to teach the GHQ about period of the Korean War, in a book suppos- versity Press of Kansas, 2000), 24–25. official doctrine for Army–Air Force operations. edly about the operational level of war, Citino 8 Robert Frank Futrell, The United States See O.P. Weyland, Some Lessons of the Korean asserts that “Armor and airpower had played Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953 (Washington, War and Conclusions and Recommendations a purely subordinate role, supporting infantry DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 27. Concerning USAF Tactical Air Responsibilities, in the attack or defense. It was as if the great 9 Ibid., 33. October 10, 1950, AFHRA File K720.609B. military debate of the 1920s over the role of 10 The F-80 required stronger and longer Brigadier General Edward J. Timberlake, Fifth these new ‘machine weapons’ had never taken runways than the F-51, which limited the bases Air Force Deputy Commander of Operations, place or had been stood on its head.” it could use and how quickly a base suitable for observed that the staff of Eighth Army “did not 3 Current Army doctrine fails to provide the F-51 could be upgraded to make it avail- exactly go along with the idea that we [Fifth appropriate guidance by not recognizing how able for the F-80. Runways had to be stronger Air Force] were on a parity with them and we Army maneuver can make air interdiction more because aircraft gross weights had doubled were their opposite numbers.” See Futrell, The effective, creating an irresolvable dilemma for since World War II. Besides weighing more, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953, the enemy. While it does use Task Force Smith jets also needed stronger runways because their 119. Air Force officers were not the only ones from Korea as an example, there is no men- smaller wheels had tire pressures of 200 pounds excluded when the Army made plans. Before tion of airpower being key to the defeat of the per square inch. In contrast, the tire pressure of Inchon, a critical conference excluded key Ma- North Korean army or the role it played when World War II fighters was only 80 pounds per rine generals. See D. Clayton James, Refighting the Chinese ambushed the Eighth Army. In square inch. Still another problem with jets was the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea ignoring these cases, the manual fails to provide their higher takeoff and landing speeds. This 1950–1953, with Anne Sharp Wells (New York: any treatment of retrogrades and withdrawals made it necessary for runways to be longer and The Free Press, 1993), 166. and the key role airpower in the form of air in- smoother, as well as stronger. The need for lon- 16 O.P. Weyland, “FEAF [Far East Air terdiction can play in making these operations a ger runways was apparent in F-80 operations at Force] Report on the Korean War,” February success. The closest the manual comes to any of Itazuke, Japan. See Joseph L. Albert and Billy 15, 1954, AFHRA File 720.04D, 52. One this is mentioning that Army formations need C. Wylie, “Problems of Airfield Construction Army officer, a World War II infantry veteran to be capable of maneuvering from positions of in Korea,” in Air Power: The Decisive Force in serving in the joint operations center, stated, disadvantage in order to create opportunities Korea, ed. James T. Stewart (New York: D. Van “It is my firm belief that the average infantry- for exploitation by other members of the joint Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957), 232–235. man on the frontlines has no idea or conception force. See Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Wash- During the summer of 1950 it was not unusual of this effort placed in the rear area to halt the ington, DC: Headquarters Department of the for an F-80 carrying only two rockets and full enemy. I do not believe that you can go along Army, October 6, 2017), 2–299. drop tanks to hit the PSP (perforated steel with the doctrine of placing a terrific amount 4 It is the importance of rapid movement platform) overrun before getting airborne. of support directly in front of the infantry, or that explains why modern armies, including the First Lieutenant George Thomas, 36th Fighter in other words, using airborne artillery. I think North Korean army both in 1950 and today, Squadron, interview, USAF Evaluation Group, that is a waste of aircraft and a waste of money.” are mechanized. Vehicles, especially tanks, allow Book 2, June 25–December 1950, Air Force Major White, USA, interview, November 15, armies to move quickly while providing the Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), File 1950, USAF Evaluation Group, June 25–De- heavy firepower and armored protection that K168.041-1, 11–12. cember 1950, AFHRA File 168.041-1, 11–12. they need to overwhelm opposing forces and 11 Futrell, The United States Air Force in 17 Weyland, “FEAF Report on the Korean then exploit their success. Besides transporting Korea, 1950–1953, 31. War,” AFHRA File K720.609B. troops, trucks provide vital engineering support 12 As Colonel Stanton T. Smith, command- 18 Letter, General Partridge to Gen- and, along with railroads, the supplies that er of the 49th Fighter Bomber Group, noted, eral Walker, August 4, 1950, AFHRA File armies need to achieve and then sustain rapid the “enemy troops were not too well indoctri- K720.13A. movement. nated in what airpower could do. Either that 19 In what seems to be a surprising admis- 5 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America or they had a lot of guts, because we would sion of ignorance for an officer about to in Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Times Books, time and time again find convoys of trucks that become a theater commander in chief, Ridgway 1987), 94–103. were bumper to bumper against a bridge that also admits that MacArthur pointed out to him 6 This reality is key to understanding both had been knocked out, and we’d go in to strafe the importance logistically, psychologically, and the Air Force’s effectiveness and also how deci- them, and every man in the truck would stand politically of recapturing Inchon and Seoul. See sions made by Army officers regarding bases up where he was and start firing his rifle at us. Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New limited, often severely, that effectiveness. Es- I don’t think that I would have done that with York: Doubleday, June 1967), 107. pecially before air refueling became routine for the power that we were putting on them.” 20 Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life: An the Air Force in Vietnam, the location of a base Ibid., 85–86. Autobiography by General of the Army Omar determined the depth of attacks by its aircraft, 13 Ibid., 94. N. Bradely, with Clay Blair (New York: Simon number of weapons they could deliver, number 14 General E.E. Partridge, Diary of and Schuster, 1983), 543–544; and Futrell, The of sorties they could fly per day, and amount Korea, June 29–July 6, 1950, AFHRA File United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953, of time they could spend on station looking K168.7014-1. Also see General Otto Paul 48. for suitable targets. Time in the target area was Weyland, USAF oral history interview, Novem- 21 Futrell, The United States Air Force in especially important because this determined ber 19, 1974, AFHRA File K239.0518-813, Korea, 1950–1953, 53–55. Also see Weyland, how long pilots could search for often difficult- 195–196. “FEAF Report on the Korean War,” 195–201. to-locate enemy forces. But the location of 15 For an excellent treatment of the frustra- 22 Futrell, The United States Air Force in bases was not the only critical factor influenc- tion for Air Force officers caused by Douglas Korea, 1950–1953, 138–139. ing airpower’s effectiveness. Equally important MacArthur’s staff, see Weyland interview, 23 It took an average of 13.3 runs to destroy was the number of available bases and their especially 196–200. Generally speaking few, a bridge. In an effort to increase accuracy, size, both of which did much to determine if any, of the general headquarters (GHQ) FEAF requested deployment of RAZON how many and what kind of aircraft the United staff had previous experience involving the (1,000-pound) and TARZON (12,000-pound) JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 57 radio-controlled bombs. Unfortunately, despite 60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. Stratemeyer diary, December 26, 1950. some successes, equipment problems were to They have no air force. Now that we have bases 51 D. Clayton James, The Years of Mac end the effort to employ guided bombs. Ibid., for our air force in Korea, if the Chinese tried Arthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964 130, 320. to get down to Pyongyang there would be the (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1985), 536; and 24 Blair, The Forgotten War, 281. greatest slaughter.” See Bradley, A General’s Partridge diary, 224. 25 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Life, 575. 52 His memorandum explained that United Korea, 1950–1953, 168–175. 42 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Nations Command ground forces should 26 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Mili Korea, 1950–1953, 228–229. instead conduct a withdrawal. A withdrawal tary Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in 43 6147th Tactical Control Squadron (Air- would have the advantage of “extend[ing] the War (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 179. borne) History, July–October 1950, AFHRA Chinese LOCs [lines of communications] to 27 Airmen had applied a lesson from World File K-SQ-AW-6147-HI. Also see J. Farmer such a point that thousands would freeze to War II where the “Horsefly” airborne forward and M.J. Strumwasser, The Evolution of the death besides thousands killed by air—lengthen air controller (FAC) concept using a light Airborne Forward Air Controller: An Analysis Chinese LOCs and our’s shortened—eliminates aircraft had been developed. The airborne FAC, of Mosquito Operations in Korea, RM-5430-PR great property loss on the part of Army and AF with its ability to fly at slow airspeeds while (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, October 1967), that would result from forced evacuation from at low altitudes, was able to make fighters far 30–33. beachhead. Admiral Joy tells him [it] takes 6 more effective and efficient by finding enemy 44 The Mosquito Squadron commander days to evacuate [division] from Inchon [with] troop concentrations and also managing air observed that “Ground commanders seem 5,000 tons [maximum capacity] . . . staying in attacks conducted in close proximity to friendly reluctant to let airborne controllers out of his Seoul all landlines, FM relays and many VHF ground forces. To perform this mission, Airmen [sic] sight. This has been more noticeable each stations would be lost. Comm[munications] determined that the unarmed, but speedy, T-6 day since the airborne controller assumed the bad now and would practically stop by going trainer aircraft equipped with eight-channel division identification. Less thought is being into beachhead. Strongly recommends 8th Army radios was the most suitable aircraft. Given the given to the enemy’s build-up fifteen to thirty not take up beachhead defense in Seoul-Inchon call sign “Mosquito” on July 15 by Fifth Air miles behind his lines.” Much of this reluctance area & ASAP X Corps evacuate by water to Force, these aircraft, based at Taegu Air Base, could be traced to the Army’s shortage of com- Pusan.” Stratemeyer diary, December 6 and 7, began making FEAF air operations even more munications required by Army doctrine, which 1950. effective. Futrell, The United States Air Force in made it dependent on the Air Force’s Mosquito 53 Stratemeyer’s memo explains MacAr- Korea, 1950–1953, 83. and tactical air control parties for relaying air thur’s sudden turnabout that puzzled Blair. See 28 Bradley, A General’s Life, 554. requests. See Farmer and Strumwasser, The Evo Blair, The Forgotten War, 532. 29 Blair, The Forgotten War, 263. lution of the Airborne Forward Air Controller, 54 Partridge diary, December 17, 1950, 30 Lieutenant General George E. Strate- 33–34, 57–58. 253–254. meyer’s diary, vol. 2, September 16–December 45 According to Ridgway, MacArthur 55 Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s 16, 1950, AFHRA File K168.7018-16. “decried the value” of airpower “flatly” stating Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 31 Ibid.; Weyland interview, 109–111. that it could not “isolate the battlefield or stop 1950–1951 (New York: Newmarket Press, 32 Bradley, A General’s Life, 567–568. the flow of hostile troops and supply.” See 1988), 239, 251–252. 33 Futrell, The United States Air Force in Ridgway, The Korean War, 82. Ridgway seems 56 The result was even more enemy casual- Korea, 1950–1953, 160–161, 180–181. to have shared MacArthur’s seriously flawed ties, inflicted directly by airpower or indirectly 34 Inchon lacked piers and had only five perspective of air interdiction’s capabilities and by denying the enemy shelter from the bitter berths in the tidal basin. Ibid., 177, 220–221. limitations. He notes that “we had in Korea a Siberian cold. Futrell, The United States Air 35 Futrell, The United States Air Force in prime example of how mistaken it is to imagine Force in Korea, 1950–1953, 261–264. Korea, 1950–1953, 180, 208. that an enemy’s supply lines can be interdicted 57 Chinese prisoners of war reported car- 36 “HQ Fifth Air Force Memo for Record through air power alone.” See Ridgway, The rying 65-pound packs to make up for supplies on 22 October 1950 Meeting on Airlift to Korean War, 75. destroyed by airpower. Marching at night Pyongyang Attended by Eighth Army Chief of 46 Stratemeyer diary, November 7, 1950. in poor terrain made the soldiers drip with Staff, Major General Allen, Colonel Dabney, 47 Ibid., 197. perspiration at the end of a night’s march. G-3, Colonel Steblens, G-4, and Brigadier 48 Stratemeyer diary, November 18, 1950. Despite the extreme cold, they were not al- General Timberlake, Fifth Air Force Vice 49 Futrell, The United States Air Force in lowed to build fires to dry their clothes or cook Commander,” AFHRA File K168.041-1, vol. 6 Korea, 1950–1953, 232. Also see “Study on for fear of air attack. See Alexander L. George, (part 4). Also see Futrell, The United States Air Fifth Air Force Command Use of Forces Avail- Interdiction Bombing Experiences of Selected Force in Korea, 1950–1953, 201–202. able,” AFHRA File K730.3102-25. CCF and North Korean Army Units, report no. 37 Eighth Army had 1½ days’ worth of am- 50 Brigadier General Bradley, Assistant Divi- 4, Project RAND, May 11, 1951, AFHRA File munition and 4 days of food. See Cohen and sion Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, wrote, 730.3102-25. Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 184. “It is my very definite opinion that had it not 58 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese 38 Futrell, The United States Air Force in been for the closest cooperation and all-out Attacked: Korea, 1950 (New York: Paragon Korea, 1950–1953, 222. help given by your close air support, we would House, 1993), 167; and Spurr, Enter the 39 Bradley, A General’s Life, 583–587. not have gotten through that block [south of Dragon, 119, 239, 250, 253, 308. Also see 40 James, Triumph and Disaster 1945–1964, Kunuri] in any order at all. Never before have I Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 528. had metallic links from [fighter] MG fire drop 1950–1953, 261–264; Stratemeyer diary, De- 41 During their October 15 meeting on on my head, nor have I seen napalm splash cember 6, 1950, and February 13, 1951; and Wake Island, President Harry S. Truman had on the road. The support was that close. That George, Interdiction Bombing Experiences of asked MacArthur what were the chances the needed close support sealed up the machine Selected CCF and North Korean Army Units. Chinese or Soviets would intervene. MacArthur gun and mortar fire in the pass, which was 59 The press release stated that “our field answered, “Very little. . . . The Chinese have holding up our vehicular movement on a one- strategy, initiated upon Communist China’s en- 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these probably way road. . . . Please convey to your little fel- try into the war, involving a rapid withdrawal to not more than 100,000 to 125,000 are dis- lows my deepest appreciation. They materially lengthen the enemy’s supply lines with resultant tributed along the Yalu River. Only 50,000 to helped in saving some 8,000 dough boys.” See pyramiding of his logistical difficulties and an 58 Commentary / The U.S. Air Force and Army in Korea JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 almost astronomical increase in the destructive- ness of our airpower has worked well. In the development of this strategy the 8th Army has achieved ideal tactical successes through maxi- mum exploitation of the air’s massive blows on extended enemy concentrations and supplies.” Stratemeyer diary, February 13, 1951. 60 Otto P. Weyland, “The Air Campaign in Korea,” Air University Quarterly Review 6, no. 3 (Fall 1953), 14. 61 Ibid., 17. 62 Ibid., 17–18. 63 Ibid., 26. 64 Ibid. 65 To appreciate the critically important role air interdiction played in Allied success in World War II, see A German Evaluation of Air Interdiction in World War II, United States Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff Studies and Analysis, November 1970. One of many officers quoted was General Walter Warlimont, OKH (Army High Command) operations officer, who said of the German commanders in France: “All were discouraged by the Allied overpowering air force. They said that whatever they [the Germans] planned was impossible to execute and control because the Allied air force Coming Soon from NDU Press spotted and attacked every movement.” 66 As was evident during Operation Desert Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA Storm’s battle of Al Khafji, the E-8 Joint Assessing Chinese Military Reforms Surveillance Target Attack Radar System makes Edited by Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. it possible for U.S. forces to detect and target Yang, and Joel Wuthnow enemy vehicles moving throughout a large area, even when they move at night or during bad China’s current military reforms are unprecedented in their ambition and weather. With the fielding of the Small Diam- in the scale and scope of the organizational changes. Virtually every part eter Bomb II, it now becomes possible to hit of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now reports to different leaders, and destroy these moving targets at any time has had its mission and responsibilities changed, has lost or gained subor- and in all weather conditions. 67 See R. Russell Rumbaugh, “The Best dinate units, or has undergone a major internal reorganization. Man for the Job,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (4th Drawing on papers presented at two conferences co-organized by Quarter 2014), 91–97. the U.S. National Defense University, RAND, and Taiwan’s Council of 68 Joint doctrine treats ground maneuver Advanced Policy Studies, this edited volume brings together some of the differently from air interdiction by calling for a world’s best experts on the Chinese military to analyze the various dimen- Joint Targeting Process Authority, while failing sions of the reforms in detail and assess their implications for the PLA’s to call for a Joint Maneuver Process Authority ability to conduct joint operations, for the Chinese Communist Party’s con- that could ensure ground maneuver is designed trol of the army, and for civil-military integration. to assist air interdiction in the defeat of the The contributors review the drivers and strategic context underpinning enemy army. See Joint Publication 3-0, Joint the reform effort, explore the various dimensions of PLA efforts to build Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, January 17, 2017), III-27. a force capable of conducting joint operations, consider the implications for the PLA services, and examine Xi Jinping’s role in driving the reforms through and using them to strengthen control over the military. The chap- ters chronicle successes and outstanding problems in the reform effort, and consider what the net effect will be as the PLA strives to become a “world- class” military by mid-century, if not much sooner. To receive email notification when the book is available or to request a hardcopy, visit JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Bingham 59 Soldiers jump with Finnish, Polish, and Estonian special operations forces from Lockheed C-130 Hercules during airborne operations over Rovaniemi, Finland, as part of Finnish-led Northern Griffin, March 14, 2018 (U.S. Army/Kent Redmond) Beyond the Gray Zone Special Operations in Multidomain Battle By James E. Hayes III n their quest to alter the post–Cold tional, economic, political, and tech- on land, at sea, in the air, and through- War world order, revisionist nations nological means to achieve their objec- out the electromagnetic spectrum.1 I such as Russia, China, and Iran are tives, often while remaining below the MDB’s animating principle, therefore, increasing their military capabilities to threshold of a decisive U.S. response. is the employment of ground forces to challenge the traditional U.S. suprem- To counter this new threat paradigm, gain temporary windows of advantage acy in arms. These potential adversaries the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have against a near-peer foe in order to are also linking their growing military developed a joint operational approach enable other components of the U.S. power to a willingness to employ it in known as multidomain battle (MDB). joint force. an integrated fashion with informa- Although it remains in the conceptual In their evolution of the MDB con- phase, both Services envision MDB cept, Army and Marine senior leaders as the combined arms concept for the assume that U.S. special operations forces 21st century based on the assumption (SOF) will play a critical, albeit currently Colonel James “Jamie” E. Hayes III, USA, is Chief of Staff in the Deputy Directorate for Special that future near-peer adversaries will undefined, role. This is a valid assump- Operations at the Joint Staff J3. contest U.S. superiority in all domains: tion given the lessons learned from the 60 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 past 15 years of combat in Afghanistan operate jointly at the tactical level to influ- are unconventional warfare and foreign and Iraq, not the least of which is the ence the human domain for strategic and internal defense. Like opposite sides of idea that conventional and SOF forma- operational effects that truly sets it apart. a coin, unconventional warfare entails tions must operate in an integrated SOF’s broad range of missions dictates the employment of SOF to support an and interdependent manner in order to the need for small, purpose-built task indigenous resistance movement against ensure success on the modern battle- forces consisting of ground, maritime, a hostile power, whereas foreign internal field. Integration and interdependence and air elements optimized to engage in defense calls for SOF operators and con- lie at the heart of MDB, as the concept the irregular, population-centric conflicts ventional forces alike to assist a friendly envisions SOF conducting activities in occupying the contested space between government in defeating an insurgency or support of conventional forces and vice war and peace. This space, known col- other forms of domestic lawlessness. versa. But what specifically should we loquially as the Gray Zone, has become As mentioned, both the direct and expect SOF to do within the context of the focus of SOF’s recent efforts against indirect sides of SOF outlined in the MDB? What unique function could SOF terrorism and insurgency across the value propositions are important to the play in assisting the joint force to counter globe and has increasingly defined its conduct of operations in the Gray Zone. this new threat paradigm? raison d’être when compared to conven- However, only those activities focused tional forces.3 on the human domain in contested or Current Value U.S. Army Special Operations denied environments are truly unique to Perhaps the best point of departure Command further refines this under- SOF and not duplicated by conventional for envisioning SOF’s potential role in standing of SOF’s role in Gray Zone forces. For example, a U.S. Marine MDB is to examine what they currently conflict with the following value proposi- Expeditionary Unit possesses the capabil- offer the joint force. To that end, Joint tions: precision targeting operations, ity to conduct direct action and other Publication 3-05, Special Operations, crisis response, indigenous approach, and crisis response–focused missions and, provides a comprehensive definition of developing understanding and wielding under certain circumstances, may be bet- SOF characteristics: influence.4 While originally crafted to ter suited to the task than an equivalent showcase Army SOF’s strategic value to SOF formation. On the other hand, only Special operations require unique modes the Nation, these propositions can be SOF are specifically trained and equipped of employment, tactics, techniques, pro- generally applied to special operations for joint operations to advise, assist, and cedures, and equipment. They are often units from the other Services as well. employ local resistance fighters and other conducted in hostile, denied, or politically The first two value propositions—pre- irregular forces to act in support of U.S. and/or diplomatically sensitive environ- cision targeting operations and crisis interests. This optimization for operat- ments, and are characterized by one or response—address the more well-known ing with indigenous partner forces in the more of the following: time sensitivity, components of SOF such as unilateral di- Gray Zone is what makes SOF “special” clandestine or covert nature, low visibil- rect action and counterterrorism missions and consequently offers the greatest po- ity, work with or through indigenous forces, that employ exquisitely refined targeting tential for contributions to MDB. greater requirements for regional orienta- processes and highly trained, rapidly de- tion and cultural expertise, and a higher ployable and scalable formations. These SOF and the Physics of MDB degree of risk. Special operations provide capabilities provide options for senior de- In its description of an approach for joint force commanders and chiefs of mis- cisionmakers throughout the spectrum of fighting a technologically sophisticated sion with discrete, precise, and scalable conflict, in addition to buying time and near-peer adversary, the Army’s MDB options that can be synchronized with activi- space for longer term Gray Zone activities white paper identifies multiple emerg- ties of other interagency partners to achieve to gain traction. ing enemy capabilities that will negate United States Government objectives.2 The latter propositions—indigenous traditional U.S. strengths in a future approach and developing understanding conflict. Topping this list are modern- Thus, SOF are by design organized, and wielding influence—speak to the ized integrated air defenses and long- trained, and equipped to succeed in indirect side of SOF Gray Zone opera- range precision strike capabilities that environments where the enemy may tions. They emphasize operating among provide adversaries with the ability to dominate one or more domains. This local populations as well as by, with, deny U.S. forces freedom of movement idea comports with the popular view of and through partner forces in order to while shielding theirs from preemptive special operations: namely, a small team deliver strategic and operational effects. or retaliatory strikes.5 This ability to of highly trained operators conducting Accordingly, these propositions require prevent access to a theater of operations missions in enemy-controlled territory. SOF operators who are proficient in not and then threaten forces operating there While relevant, this viewpoint does not only traditional combat skills but also undermines two longstanding tenets illustrate the totality of SOF capabilities, language and cultural understanding. of American warfighting: naval and air nor does it represent the unique character The mission sets that best exemplify supremacy. Since the Korean War, U.S. of SOF. Rather, it is SOF’s ability to this indirect side of Gray Zone activities ground forces have been unencumbered JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 61 Green Berets assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Operational Detachment-A, prepare to breach entry point during close quarter combat scenario as part of Exercise 2-16 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, February 10, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Efren Lopez) by threats emanating from both the sea and reconnaissance (ISR) systems will with multiple dilemmas throughout the and air due to the joint force’s over- have virtual free reign of the battlespace, battlespace. whelming superiority in those domains. affording adversary commanders greater SOF contributions during the ini- Likewise, since the end of the Cold situational awareness while rendering tial phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom War, U.S. maritime forces have oper- U.S. forces blind. Combined with an offer a clear historical example of this ated with virtual impunity on the seas aggressive cyber and electronic warfare employment method and its efficacy. with no peer navy able to challenge the campaign that degrades command and During the outset of the campaign, SOF status quo. Looking forward, U.S. joint control systems, enemy formations could teams operating under the direction of force commanders will no longer enjoy paralyze U.S. joint force commanders’ the U.S.-led Combined Forces Special these longstanding advantages. U.S. air- ability to understand the operational en- Operations Component Command craft will fight to remain in, much less, vironment and direct forces to positions (CFSOCC) conducted multiple strikes control the sky. Concurrently, American of relative advantage. in all domains to set the conditions for warships will contend with sophisticated By applying their experience work- the coalition’s conventional land, mari- threats above, below, and on the surface ing in the Gray Zone, SOF can assist in time, and air components. Army special of the sea and accept losses not seen ameliorating these operational challenges operations aviators fired the first shots of since World War II in order to protect by offering other components of the joint the war to destroy Iraqi border observa- vital maritime lines of communication. force temporary windows of advantage tion posts on the country’s western and Adversaries’ growing capability to over enemy strengths. For instance, SOF southern borders, thereby depriving deny U.S. forces’ access and freedom conducting unilateral raids from the land, Saddam Hussein of his most reliable of maneuver will also lead to their sea, and air against enemy antiaccess/ early warning net.7 This action was soon dominance in the reconnaissance/coun- area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities can sup- followed by Rangers and Special Forces ter-reconnaissance fight.6 Free from U.S. port U.S. conventional forces’ freedom of infiltrating Iraq’s western desert to strikes, enemy intelligence, surveillance, maneuver while presenting an adversary conduct counter–theater ballistic missile 62 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 operations. Backed by coalition airpower, cross-domain threats and, in many in- than 400 unit members), Detachment these teams conducted a series of com- stances, provide more enduring effects. 101 maintained a persistent presence plex direct-action raids that effectively Indigenous forces offer SOF and, by in Japanese-controlled Burma and, in prevented Saddam from threatening extension, the joint force commander a doing so, provided temporary windows Israel and Jordan with Scud missiles while more comprehensive understanding of of advantage to other components of the denying his ground forces access to Iraq’s the operational area and insights on the Allied joint force operating in the China- western approaches. In the Arabian Gulf, human domain that can be leveraged Burma-India theater. In support of the SEALs and their Polish SOF counterparts against an adversary. SOF teams con- Allied air component, Detachment 101 assaulted key infrastructure along the ducting unconventional warfare, unlike elements designated targets for 75 per- waterways near Al-Faw Peninsula in order their counterparts tasked with unilateral cent of the 10th U.S. Air Force bombing to secure maritime access points for coali- missions, can mass indigenous forces to missions and rescued 425 Allied airmen tion naval vessels.8 destroy enemy air and maritime A2/AD from capture.10 Additionally, Detachment In addition to direct action, SOF capabilities and then occupy those loca- 101’s fierce Kachin guerrillas raided employing their Gray Zone expertise tions in order to prevent regeneration. numerous Japanese airfields, thereby de- in MDB can assist in regaining the Due to their connection with the local grading the enemy’s air superiority from initiative in the reconnaissance/counter- populace and ability to threaten enemy the ground. Their operations to harass reconnaissance fight. SOF ground and lines of communication, SOF—paired Japanese lines of communication also maritime reconnaissance teams provide with indigenous forces—can also redirect bought time for the British 14th Army the capability to emplace persistent eyes enemy resources from opposing U.S. and other conventional Allied ground on enemy targets in order to meet joint conventional land forces to conducting a units to reform and reorganize after force commanders’ intelligence require- manpower-intensive counterinsurgency their initial setbacks, and then set the ments, thereby filling a gap left by the effort. Thus, SOF teams working in conditions for their successful counterof- loss of ISR platforms due to enemy ac- the human domain offer the joint force fensives in Burma during the latter stages tion, weather, or other adverse battlefield commander opportunities to shift battle- of the war. conditions. As necessary, these teams can field dynamics to U.S. advantage with a CFSOCC’s activities during the quickly transition from reconnaissance to minimum investment in personnel and opening phase of Operation Iraqi other missions as the battlefield situation material assets. Freedom in April of 2003 delivers a evolves, and even assist in tipping and History abounds with examples of the more recent example of SOF paired queuing airborne ISR platforms once cross-domain, force multiplication effects with indigenous forces for strategic and conditions are set for their re-introduc- of SOF operating with indigenous forces. operational effects. In contrast to the tion into the fight. Looking back to World War II, the Office unilateral operations of its southern and CFSOCC’s experience in Iraq also il- of Strategic Services (the forerunner of western task forces, CFSOCC’s Joint lustrates the value of SOF in the unilateral present day SOF and intelligence orga- Special Operations Task Force–North reconnaissance role. Special forces with nizations) fielded numerous units that (JSOTF-N) enlisted the assistance of attached Air Force combat controllers assisted resistance movements in Europe thousands of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters provided vital information on enemy and Asia. These organizations and their to achieve its objectives. JSOTF-N, while dispositions at the Karbala Gap and other locally raised counterparts gathered intel- originally envisioned as the supporting key chokepoints along the coalition axis ligence, rescued downed aircrews, and effort to a conventional land assault from of advance and continued their reporting tied up thousands of enemy troops in Turkey into northern Iraq, soon became despite sandstorms that grounded other counterguerrilla operations, all of which the only force able to take the fight to ISR assets.9 Like their direct-action breth- set the stage for conventional Allied of- Saddam’s forces in the north once the ren, these SOF derived much of their fensives against the Axis powers. Turkish government refused to grant success from previous deployments to the The Office of Strategic Services’ the Army’s Fourth Infantry Division Middle East conducting foreign internal Detachment 101 offers a powerful ex- permission to conduct operations from defense and other Gray Zone activities. ample of SOF’s cross-domain potential Turkish soil.11 Undaunted, JSOTF-N’s Their operators possessed a deep, tactile with indigenous partners. Formed in Special Forces infiltrated via Air Force understanding of the operational environ- 1942 after the Allied defeat in Burma by special operations aircraft, linked up with ment as a result of repeated interactions the Japanese Imperial Army, Detachment their Peshmerga counterparts, and then during this pre-hostilities phase and could 101 recruited and trained thousands of facilitated a follow-on parachute drop therefore exploit that knowledge once Burmese Kachin tribesmen for missions of the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade combat operations commenced. deep in enemy-held territory. In addition into northern Iraq. With the 173rd Unilateral operations aside, SOF to earning credit for the highest kill/ placed under the operational control of teams working by, with, and through loss ratio of any unit in U.S. military his- JSOTF-N, the combined U.S.-Kurdish indigenous surrogate forces are also tory (killing or wounding over 15,000 team quickly defeated a unit of the terror- a potent tool to counter adversary Japanese soldiers while losing fewer ist group Ansar al-Islam before turning JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 63 Special forces launch surface-to-air missiles during training mission on Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, June 11, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Tyler Woodward) their attention to Saddam’s forces fixed second front against Saddam’s forces. Like a veneer of legitimacy for their objec- on the Green Line separating Iraq from their predecessors in Detachment 101, tives, foment unrest in target popula- the semi-autonomous Kurdish region. JSOTF-N demonstrated the effectiveness tions, and sow distrust and discord in During the ensuing battles, JSOTF-N of massed indigenous forces striking in the Western institutions such as NATO and and their 60,000-strong Kurdish partner enemy’s rear areas. As what’s past is pro- the European Union. force attacked and defeated four Iraqi logue, today’s SOF aligned with willing Accordingly, adversary nations will divisions, thereby preventing Saddam partners can generate these same effects in employ nonkinetic, psychological effects from repositioning significant forces support of other joint force components to enhance their more traditional military to counter the coalition’s main thrust conducting MDB. capabilities, employing them in tandem against Baghdad.12 with conventional ground, maritime, and Upon closer examination, one discov- Engaging in the air forces or as the vanguard of aggres- ers that JSOTF-N’s victories in northern Nonkinetic Fight sive military action against U.S. interests. Iraq can be attributed in large part to the Carl von Clausewitz opined about the Much like their physical A2/AD systems, relationships established between SOF and distinctions between the moral and potential enemies will manipulate the in- Kurdish partners during pre-hostilities ac- physical factors in war and, in doing formation sphere to stymie the U.S. joint tivities. In fact, many of JSOTF-N’s senior so, emphasized the importance of the force’s ability to understand and shape officers and noncommissioned officers had moral over the physical.14 Recent events the operational environment. participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Ukraine, Syria, and the South China SOF’s continuous presence con- in 1991, during which SOF provided Sea illustrate that potential adversaries ducting Gray Zone activities in over 80 humanitarian relief to Kurdish refugees recognize the importance of winning countries in a given year provides the fleeing Saddam’s reprisals after his defeat the psychological battle and are willing joint force a significant psychological in the first Gulf War.13 Consequently, to devote considerable resources to that deterrent against potential adversaries and these SOF leaders leveraged the trust end. By using a combination of political can assist in regaining the initiative in the established over a decade earlier to pro- subversion, information operations, and cognitive realm.15 Prior to hostilities, SOF duce an indigenous force that opened a cyber activity, adversary nations proffer teams conduct foreign internal defense 64 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 missions to enhance the combat skills (JTF-510)—later renamed Joint Special of diplomatic, informational, military, and professionalism of partner-nation Operations Task Force–Philippines—fo- and economic activities. The Russian military and paramilitary forces. As a cused on working with the U.S. country government’s ability to manipulate result, partner forces’ increased capability team and its local Philippine partners in a the information sphere is particularly to provide security raises the confidence comprehensive civil-military effort.16 In significant, as its use of propaganda, mis- of the local populace, rendering them contrast to the more kinetically focused information, social media, and deception less susceptible to the effects of adversary SOF campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, all combine to create a sense of chaos and propaganda and information operations. JTF-510 took the opposite approach due uncertainty that helps attain Russian stra- Concurrently, SOF teams training with in large part to historical Philippine sen- tegic objectives while remaining below foreign partners gain valuable insights sitivities to American troops conducting the threshold of a conventional Western on the operational environment with operations on the archipelago.17 military response.19 Accordingly, MISO respect to the human domain that can Targeting the main ASG stronghold teams are well suited to respond to this be exploited by the joint force during on the island of Basilan, JTF-510 MISO threat. By modifying tactics, techniques, subsequent combat operations against a teams established a robust information and procedures developed in the Gray near-peer adversary. operations cell with a combined team of Zone in order to legitimize the actions of SOF military information support Philippine military, U.S. Embassy public alliance partners in the Baltics and other operations (MISO) teams are yet another affairs, and host-nation media outlets. By regions threatened by Russia, information nonkinetic tool to apply against adver- employing carefully designed radio, print, warriors can fight effectively against the sary efforts to dominate the cognitive and television messages that legitimized aggressive designs of this near-peer com- realm. Trained and organized specifically the Philippine government and security petitor. Like their Russian adversaries, to influence both enemy and friendly forces, MISO operators working in the SOF MISO teams thrive in the “left of audiences, MISO teams employ a wide information operations cell comple- boom” pre-hostilities space. Their asym- array of outlets (radio, television, social mented JTF-510’s other lines of effort metric advantage, however, comes in the media) to counter enemy propaganda directed at foreign internal defense and form of integration with U.S. interagency and misinformation. MISO teams work conducting civil works projects with local community and partner-nation capabili- with U.S. country teams, partner security communities on Basilan.18 As a result, ties to deliver meaningful effects against forces, and other stakeholders to help win JTF-510 and its Philippine counterparts threat messaging. the battle of ideas and prevent adversaries effectively isolated the ASG from the from exploiting political, societal, and populace and secured Basilan from A Multidomain Tool, economic fault lines that can lead to con- Islamist extremism. Not a Panacea flict escalation. Although JTF-510’s success on The demands of the future battlefield— This ability to fight the psychologi- Basilan was in many respects a product of characterized by increased lethality, cal battle passively (SOF teams working the Philippines’ longstanding ties to the complexity, and the loss of traditional with partner security forces) and actively United States and other unique circum- U.S. supremacy in all domains—will (MISO elements conducting influence stances, it does illustrate the power of a certainly test the tactical skill and strate- operations) offers significant benefits deftly crafted SOF information opera- gic acumen of SOF operators. To maxi- to a joint force commander conducting tions campaign influencing the human mize SOF’s effectiveness in this future MDB, particularly in an environment domain for outsized effects. When placed fight, commanders must be willing to where other components are strug- against the MDB template, we can envi- accept a greater level of risk to the force gling to get into the fight. For example, sion such an effort influencing friendly than has been customary during recent SOF-trained security forces paired with audiences to resist the aggressive actions operations. We can safely assume that effective MISO can prevent adversaries of a near-peer adversary in his homeland SOF teams conducting unconventional from fomenting civil unrest at partner- and consequently buying time and space warfare and other dangerous tasks nation ports and airfields, thereby for other components of the U.S. joint against a capable and determined near- facilitating conventional U.S. ground and force to effectively respond. peer adversary will not have the same air element deployment into the theater Countering Russia’s highly developed protections afforded to their predeces- of operations. unconventional warfare capability is sors in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, SOF’s recent experience conducting one potential use of SOF’s expertise in SOF will most likely operate without Gray Zone activities against terrorists in the informational realm. As evidenced the benefits of routine medical evacu- the southern Philippines offers a glimpse by the recent deployments to Crimea ation and fire support, as these assets of MISO’s potential contributions to and Ukraine’s Donbas region with its may be degraded by enemy action, allo- MDB. Deployed in 2002 to assist the shadowy paramilitary fighters known cated against higher priority missions, Armed Forces of the Philippines in de- as “Little Green Men,” Russia seeks to or possess insufficient operating range feating the outlaw Islamist Abu Sayyaf undermine U.S. and Western interests to assist deployed teams. Therefore, like Group (ASG), Joint Task Force–510 through a sophisticated combination their conventional ground, maritime, JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Hayes 65 4 ARSOF Value Propositions (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special Operations Command, March 12, 2016), 1. 5 Multidomain Battle, 2. 6 Ibid. 7 Leigh Neville, Special Operations Forces in Iraq (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 10. 8 Ibid., 24. 9 Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Op- eration Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 54. 10 William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, Behind the Burma Road (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), 24. 11 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 78. 12 Ibid., 90. 13 Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Interven- tion: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2004), 64, available at 66 Features / Beyond the Gray Zone JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Cyber warfare operations journeyman monitors live cyber attacks on operations floor of 27th Cyberspace Squadron at Warfield Air National Guard Base, Middle River, Maryland, June 3, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.) A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities By Michael P. Carvelli he highest levels of national the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of based on the attack’s effects. To be power hold approval authority Staff issues the authorization to U.S. sure, understanding the full implica- T for any cyberspace operation Strategic Command, which then del- tions of any attack is never absolute, that goes outside of a Department egates execution to the commander of but this caution in this instance needs of Defense (DOD) network. An U.S. Cyber Command.2 This process is to be balanced against the significant operational commander, who wants inefficient, cumbersome, and needlessly advantages conferred by attacking to conduct cyber attacks, submits a complex. Operational commanders effectively first in cyberspace. A system request seeking Presidential or Secre- certainly shy away from cyber attacks of nationally preapproved cyber attacks tary of Defense approval.1 If approved, because the authority to conduct them would likely ensure that commanders is restricted to national and strate- have access to a menu of appropriate gic levels. The United States should attacks while balancing concerns of the delegate cyber attack authority to national leadership. Major Michael P. Carvelli, USA, is a Joint Engineer Planner at Headquarters U.S. Forces– operational commanders, but it should This article seeks to illustrate how Afghanistan. impose restrictions on the authority restricted cyber attack authority enables JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Carvelli 67 Soldier conducts cyberspace operations while supporting 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, during Danger Focus exercise at Fort Riley, Kansas, February 2017 (U.S. Army/Alvaro Luna) operational commanders to attack ef- of the locations in land, sea, air, and space military force in it precisely because the fectively while at the same time mitigate where elements of the network reside; domain is constructed of physical and unintended consequences. It provides the hardware, software, systems software, nonphysical components.6 Moreover, recommendations for the restriction of and infrastructure (wired, wireless, cabled the nature of the cyber domain is one cyber attack authority. In the last few links, satellite, and optical) that sup- where small changes or disruptions occur years, several defense professionals argued port the network; and the connectors in unpredictable ways.7 The decision to for pushing cyber attack authority to the (wires, cables, radio frequencies, routers, execute a cyber attack should be limited operational level.3 This article thus ex- switches, servers, and computers). The due to the complexity of cyberspace and plains how the delegation of cyber attack logical layer consists of how the physi- the risks confronted when releasing a authority could balance the advantages cal network components relate to each cyber weapon. and risks. By incorporating some limita- other (that is, multiple servers host a Web tions, it would be possible to ensure that site, which is accessed through a single Recent Adversary Activities operational commanders could safely URL). The cyber persona layer is the Yet the United States faces adversaries employ cyber attacks against an adversary, most abstract because it uses the rules who have already shown their ability to which would minimize the risk of unin- of the logical layer to develop a digital employ cyber attack capabilities and act tended consequences. representation of an individual or entity. without regard for the proliferation of Cyberspace is the newest domain These three layers combine to form unintended effects. Over the past two that DOD operates in.4 It consists of networks that, when aggregated, form decades, America’s adversaries have three layers: physical, logical, and cyber the cyberspace domain. Cyberspace is demonstrated increasing skill, speed, persona.5 The physical layer is composed complicated and it is difficult to employ and agility in their use of cyber attacks. 68 Features / A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 In 1999, following the accidental physical (routers, switches, cables) and commanders, they need to apply this les- bombing of the Chinese embassy in nonphysical (software, operating systems) son: account for unpredictable effects. Belgrade, Chinese hackers targeted U.S. elements that constantly and rapidly Government Web sites, resulting in a change. Likewise, obtaining full under- Design White House–directed shut down of standing of the second- and third-order Designing a cyber attack to create its official site.8 This attack showed the effects of a cyber attack prior to execution reversible effects is the best method to ability of adversaries to inflict damage is difficult, and joint task forces may not limit attack authority for operational through cyber attacks on U.S. Govern- be able to determine fully the range of commanders. Creating a cyber attack ment systems. reactions that could occur. with reversible effects is possible. One In the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, Perhaps the most discussed instance example, a denial-of-service attack, Russia used cyber attacks to disable the of unintended consequences was floods a Web site with more traffic than Georgian leadership’s communications Operation Olympic Games, more com- it can handle, resulting in deterioration network prior to the movement of monly known as the Stuxnet worm. The or temporary failure. When the attacker Russian forces into Abkhazia and South worm’s designers intended to disable stops the deluge of Web traffic, he Ossetia.9 This cyber attack shut down covertly Iranian centrifuges; however, it reverses the effects, resulting in normal much of the Georgian government’s created irreversible damage to more than operation. communication inside Georgia and to its intended target.13 The worm spread Reversible cyber weapons offer the outside world, as well as created and replicated itself globally creating ir- considerable advantages over traditional fear and discontent within the Georgian reversible damage to industrial control kinetic weapons. Providing others (ad- population. In addition to Russian cyber systems along the way. Although the versaries, allies, corporations, or the U.S. attacks in a conventional conflict, the United States and Israel allegedly created Government) the ability to reverse the Russian Federal Security Service coor- the weapon together with some of their damage allows them to mitigate a cyber dinated an attack with private software best cyber teams, its effects were not fully attack’s effects when these effects are firms and criminal hackers targeting known prior to its release.14 The nature of unintended. Restricting an operational Ukraine’s power grid and financial the cyber domain—constantly changing commander’s authority to reversible system in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine in the physical, logical, and cyber persona damage ensures that if the cyber attack’s conflict.10 This hybrid attack, in conjunc- layers—prevents fully understanding how effects reach catastrophic levels (for ex- tion with the conventional attack on a cyber attack will spread. Stuxnet is an ample, nuclear weapons command and Georgia, shows Russia’s willingness to example of a national-level cyber attack control, national infrastructure), then use cyber attacks in war and in conflicts that authorities and designers resourced the adversary could restore the system to short of war. The so-called Islamic State and built to create a specific effect, yet it the previous state. Limited cyber attack conducted a cyber attack in 2015 when unintentionally proliferated. authority based on reversibility enables a the group hacked into the U.S. Central While Stuxnet offers an important commander to mitigate the cyber attack’s Command Twitter account and posted cautionary lesson, it should not end unknowable propagation effects while an image of a masked militant.11 This the debate. Better balanced authorities maintaining his ability to attack effectively attack displayed the ability of nonstate could address the legitimate concerns of first. Operational commanders’ author- actors to attack the United States and policymakers and the needs of the U.S. ity, limited to reversible effects, allows achieve strategic effects in cyberspace. military. Limited cyber attack authority any unintended consequences caused General James Mattis, then commander ensures that operational commanders by the attack to change back to the sta- of U.S. Central Command, stated, “Our can achieve operational objectives and tus quo ante. enemies operate within cyberspace . account for the lack of complete knowl- The current authorities’ structure . . to plan, coordinate, recruit, train, edge of a cyber weapon’s effects. Cyber pushes commanders toward a bias in equip, execute, and garner support for attacks allow them to create positions favor of using kinetic weapons due to operations against the [United States], of advantage to hasten the achievement the withholding of cyber attack author- its allies, and interests.”12 Clearly, state of operational objectives. Commanders ity at the highest levels of the U.S. and nonstate adversaries possess the need the authority to employ cyber Government. The following scenario capabilities to degrade and disrupt U.S. attacks in a constrained manner, even demonstrates the methodology of ap- domestic and foreign military and non- though they cannot be aware of every proval for both weapon types.15 Using military operations, so it is time for the possible effect. The Stuxnet virus, de- an aerial-delivered munition to destroy national leadership to give operational signed with reversible effects, would have a building or releasing a computer commanders the authorities they need in created the intended damage to Iranian virus on a router can create the same this new environment. centrifuges and left those affected with desired effect. To attack the router, the There are, of course, risks in granting a way to prevent the virus’s effects from commander requests approval from operational commanders blanket cyber creating further damage. When delegat- the President or Secretary of Defense. attack authority. Networks consist of ing cyber attack authority to operational However, the operational commander JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Carvelli 69 has the vested authority to bomb the any change to the three layers (physical, of destroying it with a kinetic weapon. building. Additionally, the kinetic attack logical, and cyber persona) will affect This allows the attacking agent to repair approval process is comparatively short the way in which the virus proliferates. the damage through cyber means at a due to several factors: “comfort” with These nuances make it difficult to predict lower cost when compared to the kinetic traditional munitions, understanding of the proliferation effects that the cyber weapon’s physical destruction. Reversible collateral damage, and standard operat- weapon will cause once someone releases cyber attack effects offer benefits that ing processes. By contrast, the lack of it. To account for this problem, cyber the kinetic weapon cannot match. They cyber weapon understanding and longer attack authority needs to be limited to permit the commander to set favor- approval time entice commanders to design reversible effects thereby reducing able conditions without permanently preselect the building. Because the op- residual risk. If the weapon’s effects were destroying important infrastructure. erational commander has the authority to to spread beyond the intended target, Limited cyber attack authority translates approve the bombing, approval takes only perhaps into the adversary’s commercial into cost savings depending on the in- minutes, whereas the time to approve sector, then the effects could be reversed, tended target. the cyber attack can take from hours thereby lowering the possibility that to days. Lieutenant General Edward widespread destruction would occur. Preapproved Cyber Authorities Cardon, the former head of U.S. Army The difficulty in fully understanding From the point of view of policymak- Cyber Command, reinforced this notion a cyber attack risks creating dispropor- ers, a preapproved set of authorities when he stated, “it should not be harder tionate and indiscriminate effects from should offer some solace and confi- to use cyber than it is to use kinetic to a cyber weapon’s release. Cyber opera- dence in granting greater authority to accomplish your goal. Right now, it is in tions and weapons can cause more severe operational-level commanders because some cases.”16 Delegating limited cyber damage, or with consequences more it offers national leaders greater insight attack authority eliminates this selection widespread in space and time.18 Using and control than they would have in bias and encourages commanders to use a cyber weapon within the context of a kinetic operation. From the point of cyber weapons because they possess the the Law of Armed Conflict requires the view of the U.S. military, operational authority to approve both cyber and weapon to be discriminate, distinct, and commanders, armed with preapproved kinetic attacks. If some sort of limited au- proportionate. Operational commanders cyber attack methods, can attack faster thority were delegated, then operational and their staffs understand the relation and with the least cost of blood and commanders could make an equally between a bomb’s effects on a target treasure. Limited cyber attack author- informed choice between the bomb and building and these three requirements. ity increases the options available to virus. Delegation of authority creates A cyber weapon’s effects cannot be fully national authorities who choose how parity between the building and router, known; therefore, commanders need to best to serve vital, core, and peripheral allowing the commander to evaluate the find the cyber weapon’s collateral dam- national interests. Granting national advantages and disadvantages inherent age acceptable when compared to the authorities greater control over military in each. This creates an environment in bomb. Designing the cyber weapon to operations enhances the ways in which which operational commanders do not have reversible effects ensures that if the the military can achieve strategic and continually chose kinetic weapons over anticipated effects are incorrect, then political objectives. Limiting cyber cyber weapons. subordinates can control the effects. The attack authority to reversible effects Attacking an adversary first within same is not true for the bomb; once an enables national and strategic authori- clearly defined limited cyber attack airplane drops it, the bomb’s effects are ties to make choices to accept, transfer, authority enables an operational com- permanent. Designing the cyber weapon avoid, or mitigate military operational mander to fight from a position of to generate reversible effects ensures that risks.20 Part of this greater control is the advantage without creating unacceptable discriminate, distinct, and proportionate preapproval of specific military opera- risk. If designers were to create only effects result when attacking an adversary. tions that generate reversible effects. reversible effects in a cyber attack, the Cyber attacks allow the United States There are several types of cyber operational commander would attack the to avoid the costs of kinetic destruction attacks that national authorities need adversary first, thus reducing the pos- in terms of rebuilding or repairing infra- to preapprove: distributed denial of sibility of damage that his subordinates structure damaged in a conflict.19 The service, cryptographic, obfuscating, and cannot change. Creating reversible cyber costs of such damage can be staggering. resource-deception attacks. Distributed weapon effects lowers overall operational However, if operational commanders had denial-of-service attacks use hundreds residual risk. Predicting how a computer the authority to conduct limited cyber or thousands of compromised systems virus will outbreak is extremely difficult attacks, then they could lower the overall to force Web site failures and shutdowns due to the human nature of the attack.17 costs in comparison to destroying targets or to deplete resources like bandwidth, Humans create the cyber weapon and with kinetic weapons. For example, a memory, or processing capacities.21 With any alteration in the weapon causes the commander could disrupt an electri- either strategy, the attacker creates dis- weapon’s effects to change. In addition, cal system with a cyber weapon instead ruption ranging from inconveniences, to 70 Features / A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Marine with Service Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, 1st Marine Logistics Group, participates in Exercise Deep Strike II, at Blythe, California, September 8, 2017 (U.S. Marine Corps/Timothy Shoemaker) a lack of reliability for the Web site, and oversight of specific military operations vehicles and food production. When the finally to a shutdown of the server and prior to execution. United States decided to stop the ef- some delay until the restoration of Web In a scenario on the Korean fect, it could decrypt the attack to allow services occurs.22 Cryptographic attacks Peninsula, operational commanders petroleum to return to normal supply use encryption, which only the attacker could use these four types of cyber attacks levels. The United States could use an knows, to encrypt key programs of the to mitigate risks of unintended conse- obfuscating attack, which would result in adversary; the attacker can later decrypt quences and provide options to restore the same way as the cryptographic attack. them.23 Obfuscating attacks seek to North Korea’s existing infrastructure at Although the method is different, the ef- rearrange the software and data of a com- costs lower than those associated with fect is the same. Lastly, the United States puter system in a way known only to the kinetic weapons. A distributed denial-of- could use a resource-deception attack if attacker. After the attacker decides to end service attack, such as the one that U.S. it decided to attack North Korea with the attack, he can rearrange the system Cyber Command allegedly conducted in military forces. The Nation could use back to the status quo ante.24 Resource 2017, provided temporary and nonde- this attack to deceive the North Korean deception deceives the adversary with structive effects on North Korea.26 U.S. military in a forced entry operation. If the illusory damage.25 When the attacker Cyber Command turned off the attack, United States seemingly attacked North reveals that he did not alter anything, this and there were no unintended conse- Korean infrastructure in a resource- deception operation ends as the attacked quences reported. Using a cryptographic deception attack, the North Koreans party realizes what happened. These attack aimed at North Korea’s two oil might avoid certain routes because of types of cyber attacks impart reversible refineries could disrupt the country’s perceived damage. This could provide damage to an adversary allowing the transport and agriculture production.27 the Nation with a marked advantage to negation of the residual effects once the If the United States used this type of use routes without the preponderance attack is complete. Preapproving these attack, it would disrupt North Korea’s of North Korean military forces located attacks grants national authorities greater petroleum supply, affecting military near them. All of these examples of JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Carvelli 71 preapproved attacks mitigate unintended the cyber weapon’s release. Employing 27 combat mission teams generating consequences because they are temporary a cyber weapon, even if designed with integrated cyberspace effects in support and nondestructive. reversible effects, risks escalation if the of operational plans and contingency Preapproved cyber attacks decrease weapon’s effects target an adversary’s operations in their support to combatant operational costs and lower risk to sensitive networks. Yet this argument commands.29 In addition, 25 support Servicemembers while increasing costs does not withstand scrutiny because the teams provide analytic and planning sup- to the adversary. An adversary who relies use and knowledge of cyber attacks are port to the national mission and combat on Web-based commercial enterprises increasing exponentially in civilian and mission teams.30 Both teams could aug- can lose money quickly, depleting his military circles. The time to develop the ment and aid operational commanders financial resources. From the attacker’s required precision in cyber targeting is and their staffs to conduct cyber attacks perspective, most costs to conduct decreasing rapidly. As cyber weapons through their assigned combatant a cyber attack, such as a distributed proliferate, collateral damage estimates command. Preapproved cyber attack denial-of-service attack, do not change are becoming more accurate. Reversible methods provide operational command- because they are fixed. For example, effects ensure that collateral damage, ers the ability to attack adversaries within the costs of electricity, connectivity, when it occurs, can change to the status existing resource limitations. computers, and personnel are part of quo ante, thereby lowering escalation The nature of cyberspace challenges normal expenditures. When compared hazards. Lastly, kinetic weapons always military leaders to apply force within to the employment of a fixed-wing result in death and destruction, while legal, ethical, and resource limitations. aircraft to bomb a building, cyber at- cyber weapons do not necessarily result Many unknowns exist and persist that tack expenses are significantly lower. in the same. certainly provide operational command- Cyber attacks also limit the exposure Others argue that operational ers with challenging but surmountable of Servicemembers to physical hazards. commanders and their staffs cannot obstacles in the application of military Manned and unmanned aircraft need to possibly design cyber attacks without force in cyberspace. It is in the best fly near the target to deliver ordnance, vast resources to achieve reliable results interest of policymakers to grant, yet exposing Servicemembers and high-cost with reversible effects. They say that limit, cyber attack authority to hedge equipment to the dangers of enemy operational staffs cannot reliably design greater risks in operational-level decisions fire. Cyber attacks do not face such reversibility into a cyber weapon. These that use cyber weapons. Operational physical hazards. In addition, cyber at- critics might point to the error in the commanders face adversaries capable tacks require lower maintenance and Stuxnet code that let it unintentionally of degrading and destroying military fewer logistical needs in comparison to spread and replicate itself globally.28 They capabilities; they need to be armed with aircraft. The features of cyber attacks argue that the Intelligence Community as many tools as possible to achieve ob- decrease the risks and costs that national and strategic commanders have the niche jectives. Limited cyber attack authority authorities incur when selecting military capabilities, resources, and knowledge expands the available set of tools. Cyber operations to achieve political objectives. to understand the complexities of the weapons need to be made available to op- design of cyber weapons. The constantly erational commanders to pursue national Counterargument evolving nature of cyberspace makes the interests through military operations. In There have been many arguments quick design of a cyber weapon almost cyberspace, offense has the upper hand.31 against pushing cyber attack authorities impossible. This argument does not The best way to provide operational down to the operational level, but these stand because most countries commu- commanders with the ability to attack an fail to address the change in this new nication systems, electric grids, and so adversary includes providing them with domain. Some argue that cyber attacks forth use commercially available software limited cyber attack authority based on are more dangerous than kinetic attacks and systems well known throughout the the reversible effects of the cyber weapon. because of the inherent unknowns in world, and “off the rack” cyber weapons Reversible effects lower the risk inher- cyberspace. Cyber attacks require preci- could conceivably meet such needs. Not ent in military operations and mitigate sion in targeting that is unachievable every cyber weapon requires individual unintended consequences. National due to time and intelligence collec- construction to achieve desirable effects authorities gain greater control over tion requirements in comparison to against an adversary. Operational staffs military operations in preapproving cyber kinetic weapons. Decades of military have robust intelligence, operations, attack methods. They also gain access operations have shown the high and communications sections capable to more military options to select in the degree of accuracy and precision with of assessing adversary networks. If exist- event of a crisis. National authorities need the employment of kinetic weapons. ing staffs were unable to conduct cyber to grant limited cyber attack authority A cyber weapon’s collateral damage planning and targeting, U.S. Cyber to operational commanders so they can is inherently greater than a kinetic Command has two types of support achieve operational, strategic, and politi- weapon because unintended conse- teams to augment their cyber planning cal objectives aligned with vital, core, and quences cannot be fully known prior to and targeting capabilities. There are peripheral national interests. JFQ 72 Features / A Smarter Approach to Cyber Attack Authorities JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 com/2015/01/13/us/isis-is-cited-in-hacking- links/559eefee08ae03c44a5cdef5.pdf>. Notes of-central-commands-twitter-feed.html>. 21 Lech Janczewski and Andrew M. Colarik, 12 Statement of General James N. Mattis, Cyber Warfare and Cyber Terrorism (Hershey, 1 The Department of Defense (DOD) in- U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, U.S. Central PA: Information Science Reference, 2011), cludes cyber attacks in a larger category referred Command, Before the Senate Armed Services 263. to as “offensive cyberspace operations.” This Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Com- 22 Ibid. article refers to all offensive cyberspace opera- mand, 112th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 2011, 23 Neil C. Rowe, “Towards Reversible Cy- tions as cyber attacks. DOD definesoffensive 39, available at JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Carvelli 73 USS Nautilus entering New York harbor August 25, 1958, after voyage under North Pole (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command) Military Transformation Applying the Kotter Eight-Step Methodology for Change in the U.S. Armed Services By Hassan M. Kamara We should value the faculty of knowing what we ought to do and having the will to do it. Knowing is easy; it is the doing that is difficult. The critical issue is not what we know but what we do with what we know. The great end of life is not knowledge, but action. —Admiral Hyman G. Rickover San Diego Rotary Club, February 10, 1977 he global security environment by powerful nation-states (Russia and is unstable, characterized by China), development and proliferation Major Hassan M. Kamara, USA, is a Strategic concerns such as revisionism of weapons of mass destruction, terror- Studies Fellow in the Office of the Chief of Staff, T Headquarters Department of the Army. and breaches of international norms ism, persistent conflict, and worsening 74 Features / Military Transformation JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 global climate with implications for Polmar write that Rickover’s “ill-tem- ensuing activities. By diligently aligning food security. These trends will likely pered nature was necessary” to realize change efforts to the eight-step process, persist in the future, and their grave the nuclear submarine.2 Ultimately, the institutions can create conditions sup- strategic and operational implica- consistency of Rickover’s transformation portive of lasting, viable change. tions for the Armed Forces necessitate efforts with the Kotter change methodol- Though Kotter’s methodology origi- continued military transformation. ogy helps explain why the change was nated and is primarily used in the private Given the inherent complexity of orga- successful and highlights insights for con- sector, it can be successfully applied to nizational transformation in the U.S. temporary military transformation. military transformation—with necessary military, using a highly effective change adaptation for governmental bureaucratic management approach is vital for Concepts nuances—for the ultimate modernization success. To this end, this article consid- A brief discussion of modernization and of the Armed Forces. This hypothesis is ers how the John Kotter Eight-Step transformation is essential to fostering proved by successively highlighting the Process for Leading Change can help understanding and clarity in the ensuing consistency of arguably one of the most the Services transform to attain their analysis. In this article, modernization prolific military transformation efforts long-term modernization objectives. is defined as the progressive transition since World War II—nuclear propulsion Through adaptive application of the of the present or status quo, through in the Navy—with the eight steps of the tenets of the Kotter process for leading transformation, into the future.3 For the Kotter methodology for leading change. change, the military can successfully Armed Forces, modernization carries Some might argue that adapting what implement transformation initiatives in implications for every aspect of the insti- they view as primarily a change model for support of their long-term moderniza- tution (doctrine, organization, training, a business or company to change in the tion objectives. equipping, and others) based on inher- military is unrealistic given the expansive Using the Navy’s successful nuclear ent or nested transformation efforts. bureaucracies of the Services as well as propulsion transformation effort led by Military transformation refers to civil-military concerns in interacting with Admiral Hyman G. Rickover as a case, specific changes a Service plans and Federal agencies outside the Department this article highlights the applicability implements over time that aggregate of Defense and industry. Through its and utility of Kotter’s methodology to to realize modernization objectives. study of the nuclear propulsion trans- military transformation. By analyzing this In other words, diverse transforma- formation case, this article shows that highly successful mid–twentieth century tion efforts in different areas within the Kotter’s methodology can be success- military transformation through the lens Services aggregate over time to real- fully applied to Service transformation of the Kotter change methodology, this ize broader modernization objectives. in a way that mitigates the constraints to article highlights insights that can help Consistent with this understanding, the change inherent in Service bureaucracies, the Armed Forces adaptively apply the Army uses the DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, Congress, Federal agencies, and industry. methodology to successfully prosecute organization, training, materiel, leader- 1. Create a Sense of Urgency. This is contemporary transformation efforts. ship, personnel, facilities, and policies) arguably the most important step in the The article also highlights concerns framework as a change management tool change process because it advocates iden- that could cause a change effort to fail. to ensure synergy among individual trans- tifying and highlighting the enduring, John Kotter concurs “that major change formation efforts, and with the status urgent reasons for change to the organi- will not happen easily for a long list of quo, to modernize the institution. The zation or institution. This step provides reasons” and identifies factors of failure Army states that “change deliberately the impetus that drives subsequent steps in each step of the change process to cau- executed across DOTMLPF elements en- in the change or transformation process. tion change leaders.1 ables the Army to improve its capabilities A sense of urgency for change is arguably Admiral Rickover was known to be to provide dominant land power to the what the change agent needs most to quite cantankerous and abrasive at times, joint force.”4 enlist and motivate change activists and and it seems this demeanor soured in- supporters within and without the orga- terpersonal relationships that could have Nuclear Transformation and nization. Writing on the importance of strengthened his guiding coalition and the Kotter Change Model creating a sense of urgency in the initial ultimately helped his cause. Interestingly, The Kotter Eight-Step Process for step, Kotter states that “when the ur- these same personality traits—which are Leading Change is an enduring meth- gency rate is not pumped up enough, the generally antithetical to the coalition- odology for successful change imple- transformation process cannot succeed building tenet of the Kotter change mentation. This methodology takes and the long-term future of the organiza- methodology—also seemed to have a holistic approach to realize lasting tion is put in jeopardy.” According to helped Rickover spearhead the Navy’s change. Among other things, the meth- Kotter, the urgency rate “is when about nuclear propulsion transformation. Some odology advocates building a strong, 75 percent of a company’s management scholars share this observation. For enduring impetus for change that will is honestly convinced that business-as- example, Thomas B. Allen and Norman inspire people and drive supportive usual is totally unacceptable.”5 JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kamara 75 The U.S.-Soviet military rivalry homeland and military with a concealed, Rickover also recruited bright and during the Cold War fomented a sense highly mobile, strategic nuclear strike capable naval officers. He selectively of urgency that helped Rickover gain capability.7 This emergent strategic value hand-picked well-respected officers support for nuclear propulsion transfor- lent an increased sense of urgency to from the submarine community. mation within the Navy, Congress, and Rickover and the Navy’s transformation Theodore Rockwell concurs and writes White House. Prior to the development efforts and heightened the willingness of Rickover’s “slow process of recruiting of nuclear reactors for propulsion at sea, in Congress and the White House to additional bright young engineers for his U.S. submarines used a combination support the Navy’s nuclear propulsion permanent headquarters staff.” Among of diesel combustion engines (which transformation. the recruited was Eugene P. “Dennis” only ran, and charged the submarine’s 2. Build a Guiding Coalition. Like Wilkinson, a submariner with eight war electric batteries, when it surfaced) and the preceding step, this one is seminal patrols during World War II, who would electric batteries (which powered the in that it is essential for progress in the go on to captain the USS Nautilus, and vessel when it was submerged). The ensuing steps. The guiding coalition is the USS Long Beach, the Navy’s first batteries could only power submerged typically a core group of people (approxi- nuclear surface ship.11 Among some submarines for a relatively short time, mately up to 50) who feel the urgency of the talented naval officers Rickover and at rather slow speeds. The lack of for change, share the underlying strategic interviewed and approved for hire was submerged operational endurance and vision of the change or transformation, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt. Though he de- speed in U.S. submarines, coupled with and are committed to communicating clined to work for Rickover in the nuclear the threat of a growing Soviet submarine and spreading the vision.8 In other words, submarine community, Zumwalt would force, created a sense of urgency for the the people in a guiding coalition are go on to become the youngest Chief of development of nuclear propulsion. The deeply committed to implementing the Naval Operations.12 military and technological competition change. Kotter concurs by writing that Rickover had the backing of powerful with the Soviet Union reached a new the “guiding coalition of people deeply Members of Congress and the President high on October 4, 1957, when it suc- feels the urgency.”9 The guiding coalition in the nuclear propulsion transformation cessfully launched Sputnik 1 into orbit. is typically diverse in that it comprises effort. Powerbrokers in Congress, such The fiscally conservative Eisenhower individuals from different areas of the as Senator Brien McMahon (D-CT)— administration needed to offset the institution who have the intellect, skills, then Chair of the Joint Atomic Energy apparent Soviet advancement with an and capacity within the organization’s hi- Committee—were part of Rickover’s American technological advancement. erarchy to address the strategic challenges guiding coalition, and they helped him According to Dave Oliver, “To answer of the transformation effort. In many gain the organizational authority in the this Soviet technical challenge, President cases, the guiding coalition is comprised Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Eisenhower . . . looked for inexpensive of powerful members within the orga- necessary for successful transformation.13 answers. Controlling military spending nizational hierarchy. For major military Additionally, through the cost-effective was important to the President’s domes- transformation efforts, the guiding coali- development and fielding of the USS tic and military priorities.”6 Rickover’s tion is greatly helped by incorporating Nautilus, Rickover gained the support of nuclear propulsion transformation efforts those powerful change agents outside the the Eisenhower administration, as well as had produced its first prototype subma- Services that have the power to influence the American public. rine, the USS Nautilus, at the relatively or spur change in the Services—these 3. Form a Strategic Vision and cheap cost of $70 million (made possible are the Members of Congress and Initiatives. A successful transformation by the liberal use of used and refurbished the President. effort requires a vision of the future that parts). This economically produced From the above understanding of is easy to communicate and understand. prototype aptly suited the Eisenhower a guiding coalition, it is apparent that This requirement is critical for cultivating administration’s preference for decreased Rickover was successful in large part rapid, widespread support for change military spending, while offsetting Soviet because he built a capable and power- across the organization. In other words, a technological advancements. So, despite ful guiding coalition to pioneer nuclear clear and pragmatic vision that is consis- Rickover’s apprehension about stressing propulsion in the Navy. His coalition tent with the prevailing sense of urgency the platform prematurely by attempting included some of the best civilian is vital to realizing meaningful transfor- too great a feat, President Eisenhower subject-matter experts in the nascent mation. Kotter writes that “without a used Nautilus’s submerged transition of field of nuclear power. Oliver writes that sensible vision, a transformation effort the Arctic as his administration’s response “Rickover was in the habit of taking his can easily dissolve into a list of confusing to Sputnik 1. The Nautilus, on success- own people to meet with experts in the and incompatible projects that can take fully completing a submerged transit of burgeoning nuclear field.” Among the the organization in the wrong direction the Arctic, altered the strategic balance experts Rickover consulted was Enrico or nowhere at all.”14 of the Cold War by demonstrating the Fermi, winner of the 1938 Nobel Prize While observing and studying new U.S. ability to threaten the Soviet for Physics.10 nuclear reactor power production in the 76 Features / Military Transformation JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 U.S. Army Research Laboratory’s DOD Supercomputing Resource Center uses high-performance computing to increase mission effectiveness and advance modernization priorities, November 2017 (U.S. Army) Daniels Power Pile project at Oak Ridge, aggressive consultation and use of experts relative to the present state in order to Tennessee, in 1946, Rickover envisioned helped him convincingly articulate the get widespread support throughout the the safe and effective use of nuclear strategic viability of this vision within the ranks of the organization. power for propulsion in submarines. context of the Cold War and the feasibility Rickover’s communication of the vi- Interestingly, the Navy had considered of its attainment to powerful stakeholders sion for nuclear propulsion in the Navy and committed some funds to the study and capable supporters within the Navy, was effective in terms of the powerful of using nuclear power for propulsion in Congress, and White House. stakeholders and capable change agents. submarines as far back as 1939. According 4. Enlist a Volunteer Army. Kotter He was able to convince these stake- to Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, asserts that employees and members of an holders and agents that useful change in March of 1939 Rear Admiral Harold organization have to believe that “useful in the form of nuclear propulsion could Bowen, Chief of the Bureau of Steam change is possible” to invest—up to the be attained, and was preferable, to the Engineering, authorized $1,500 to fund point of making personal sacrifices—in status quo (diesel combustion engines in research on nuclear fission (a fission a transformation effort. Such belief in a submarines and ships). Arguably, it was chamber) “that would generate steam to transformation initiative cannot happen the powerful conviction for change that operate a turbine for a submarine propul- without clear, continuous, and credible Rickover invoked in influential stakehold- sion plant.”15 The war temporarily stalled communication aimed at winning hearts ers that got them to support the nuclear efforts on this transformation initiative and minds in the organization.16 In transformation he was pioneering. He in favor of the development of the atom other words, once they have developed successfully communicated the feasibil- bomb, but after the war in 1946, the a clear future vision for the organization ity and necessity of nuclear propulsion Navy sent Rickover and other capable of- in line with the proposed transforma- to his immediate superior at the Navy’s ficers to study nuclear reactors. The use of tion, change leaders have to employ Bureau of Ships, Admiral Earle W. Mills, nuclear power for submarine propulsion every practical means and available and, ultimately, the Navy’s leaders, was an easily understood vision, even to opportunity to communicate both the Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval laymen unfamiliar with naval engineering vision and specific aspects of the change Operations, and the Honorable John L. and nuclear physics, and this simplicity across the organization. Change agents Sullivan, Secretary of the Navy, to get aided Rickover in convincing others to in the guiding coalition have to clearly their buy-in and commitment. Theodore support the transformation. Moreover, and persistently spread the word on how Rockwell writes that Rickover crafted let- Rickover’s grasp of the subject matter and the change will better the organization ters articulating the military necessity of JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kamara 77 nuclear-powered submarines that Nimitz centralizing program managerial author- Nautilus was laid by Harry Truman on and the Navy Secretary signed and for- ity over nuclear reactor development in June 14, 1952, and the submarine was warded to the Secretary of Defense and the AEC, and nuclear submarine devel- launched in January 1954.24 Thanks to Congress. These letters espoused the goal opment in the Bureau of Ships, would the significant technological maturation of completing a nuclear submarine pro- empower him with the level of command work on nuclear propulsion reactors totype by the mid-1950s and designated (ability to describe and direct, as well as going as far back as 1939, this relatively the Bureau of Ships as the Navy’s propo- incentivize and discipline) necessary for short time to successfully build the first nent for building the new platform.17 successful transformation. To this end, nuclear-powered submarine helped Legitimized by the Navy leadership’s Admiral Rickover aggressively sought and Rickover garner support within the validation of the requirement for nuclear- was successful in consolidating control Navy, U.S. Government, and Nation for propelled submarines, Rickover prevailed over the organizational structures that nuclear propulsion in the early stages of on the AEC, through Admiral Mills, to were central to successfully pioneering transformation. Moreover, the second commit to partnering with the Navy on and implementing nuclear propulsion in nuclear submarine, the USS Seawolf, was nuclear reactors for submarine propul- the Navy. According to Oliver, “Congress launched just a year later in July 1955. sion. Impressively, Rickover’s effective established Rickover as the director Duncan describes the impact of successive communication of the vision for naval of naval nuclear energy in the Atomic short-term wins to the nuclear propulsion nuclear propulsion and demonstrated Energy Commission.”19 Rockwell writes transformation effort. He writes that “as grasp of the subject matter convinced that at the Bureau of Ships, Admiral Mills one nuclear ship after another—begin- Admiral Mills and Senator McMahon “chose Rickover and made him head of a ning with the Nautilus—went to sea, to appoint him as head of the Nuclear new Nuclear Power Branch (designated Rickover won a reputation with Congress Power Branch within the Navy’s Bureau Code 390) within the bureau’s Research of a man who got things done, and the of Ships and Director of Naval Nuclear Division.”20 This consolidation of author- naval nuclear propulsion program was Energy within the AEC, respectively. ity gave Rickover the mandate and power recognized as one of the most efficient 5. Enable Action by Removing to effectively pioneer nuclear power enterprises in government.”25 Barriers. Successfully implementing a transformation in the Navy. Francis Additionally, Nautilus’s record- new or emerging change in an organiza- Duncan writes that under Rickover (no setting voyage under the Arctic and the tion requires removal of organizational doubt equipped with the needed authori- resulting shift in the strategic nuclear bal- hindrances coupled with the institution ties) “Naval Reactors did not coordinate, ance of the Cold War constituted a major of incentives to promote the change. administer, or manage: it decided and short-term win for Rickover’s transforma- Sometimes the residual organizational directed.”21 It is conceivable that if tion efforts—one that earned him the structure and existing policies become an Rickover had not been so empowered, resources and mandate to continue this obstacle to the successful implementation the factions resistant to the change within change. According to Oliver, Rickover of a transformation initiative. According the AEC and Bureau of Ships would have used Nautilus’s Arctic crossing to sup- to Kotter, simply communicating the vi- wielded and exercised the power to delay port his transformation efforts: “He sion and details of the new change is not and possibly thwart the transformation. would tout the event to cement congres- enough, “renewal also requires the re- 6. Generate Short-Term Wins. sional support for nuclear submarines.”26 moval of obstacles.” Kotter writes that in Setting and attaining some short-term 7. Sustain Acceleration. This step most cases, even though employees and goals is vital to building and sustaining cautions change leaders and agents members of the organization may have the forward momentum of a change or against overconfidence in the irreversibil- bought in to the change, real hindrances transformation initiative. Kotter concurs, ity of the nascent transformation initiative or “blockers” may prevent them from and writes that “real transformation they are pioneering. Sometimes change acting to implement the change within takes time, and a renewal effort risks leaders tend to believe, mostly based their sphere of the organization.18 losing momentum if there are no short- on short-term successes, that the trans- A key organizational hindrance that term goals to meet and celebrate.”22 formation they have realized cannot be could have scuttled Rickover’s trans- Supporters and advocates of a change reversed by those opposed to it. Kotter formation efforts at the start was the or transformation initiative can become advises against this, and writes that “while decentralization of authority for nuclear disillusioned if it is not demonstrating celebrating a win is fine, declaring the war reactor development and submarine improvement relative to the current state won can be catastrophic.” Instead, Kotter (platform) construction. Nuclear reac- of affairs in 1 to 2 years. According to advises change leaders to use the capital tor development for the propulsion of Kotter, “without short-term wins, too of goodwill and support won by short- submarines and ships was the responsibil- many people give up or actively join the term victories to solve big challenges to ity of a nuclear reactor suborganization ranks of those people who have been lasting change, and argues that successful within the AEC, while the Navy’s Bureau resisting change.”23 change leaders use the credibility won by of Ships managed nuclear submarine According to Norman Polmar and initial transformation successes “to go development. Rickover understood that Thomas B. Allen, the keel of the USS after systems and structures that are not 78 Features / Military Transformation JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Soldiers assigned to 1st Battalion, 63rd Armor Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, conduct training with M1A2 Abrams tank during Combined Resolve X Live Fire Exercise at Grafenwoehr, Germany, April 19, 2018 (U.S. Army/Miguel Pena) consistent with the transformation vision radiation exposure (and consequent Rickover and his team were successful in and have not been confronted before.”27 radiation sickness) of the crew. This pioneering the first nuclear surface ship— As a change leader, Rickover ac- greatly benefited crews and the overall the USS Longbeach. Undoubtedly, this tively consolidated the early wins and development of the submarine force. For succeeding accomplishment helped un- improvements of the transformation example, U.S. submarine crews were able derscore the long-term utility of nuclear he was implementing. Through efforts to return from patrols, refit, and resume propulsion transformation over the status that spanned engineering and technical new patrols much faster than their Soviet quo. Today’s nuclear-powered aircraft innovation, education, and talent man- counterparts, which means they grew carriers are in part a product of Rickover’s agement, he sustained the momentum of experience faster. On the other hand, continued innovation with nuclear power, transformation to produce more change. Oliver writes that the Soviet submarine which is consistent with the continuous Ultimately this momentum would crews of this era experienced considerable change improvement advocated by the result in the institutionalization of this radiation exposure and sickness from less Kotter change model. This anecdotal transformation. safe designs, to the extent that crews had evidence proves that the Kotter model is In terms of engineering and technical to be put on “enforced leave away from not only a good approach for one time innovation, Rickover inspired confidence nuclear plants . . . to permit the sailors’ change in a private-sector organization, and support with initial change improve- bone marrow to regenerate.”28 but also can actually be utilized for en- ments that set favorable conditions for Additionally, having successfully dem- during military modernization. sustained long-term advancements. onstrated the relatively safe use of nuclear 8. Institute Change. A change or For example, he increased the radia- propulsion in submarines, Rickover transformation’s irreversibility is greatly tion shielding of the nuclear reactor on worked diligently to incorporate the tech- dependent on the activities in this step. submarines to significantly lower the nology into the surface fleet. To this end, The step advocates the acculturation of JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kamara 79 an organization to a transformation or of education, self-study, and performance effort with the Kotter methodology for change initiative. Kotter posits that “until necessary to grow talent that would change highlights not only the adap- new behaviors are rooted in social norms maintain the momentum of the trans- tive applicability of the methodology to and shared values, they are subject to formation.32 This model also ensured a military transformation but also offers degradation as soon as the pressure for viable career progression track that would important insights for contemporary change is removed.”29 Cultural change is eventually make it possible for members transformation efforts in the U.S. mili- critical because an organization is less likely of the nuclear submarine community tary. These insights should be caveated to reverse a transformation or change if to viably compete for flag rank, and with the understanding that Admiral it is now part and parcel of the organiza- even become Chief of Naval Operations Rickover served as Head of Naval Reac- tion’s culture (the way it views itself and (the current Chief of Naval Operations, tors for over 30 years, which helped operates). According to Kotter, “change Admiral John M. Richardson, last the nuclear propulsion transformation sticks when it becomes ‘the way we do held Rickover’s office as Director of effort. However, Rickover’s extensive things around here,’ when it seeps into the Naval Reactors). tenure as Head of Naval Reactors bloodstream of the corporate body.”30 Within the nuclear submarine com- should not be assumed as the sole Admiral Rickover changed the Navy’s munity, Admiral Rickover established reason for success. This was an excel- culture to ensure that the transformation and enforced a subculture of exacting lently executed military transformation he had pioneered would endure after engineering standards for both the Navy effort. Moreover, its consistency with him. To this end, Rickover was fortunate and private industry for dealing with the the Kotter model highlights the poten- to have been left in his position for four complex engineering inherent in nuclear tial utility of adapting the model to help decades to implement this institutional reactors. For context, Oliver compares manage contemporary Service transfor- transformation—something that is Rickover’s exacting process standardiza- mation efforts. It is likely impossible for unlikely to happen in today’s military. tion for the development and operation contemporary military change agents Rickover was relentless in creating a new of naval nuclear reactors to popular to remain in a leadership position and subculture within the Navy that was sup- management applications for quality and drive a change as long as Rickover did. portive of perpetuating this change. He efficiency: Bill Smith’s Six Sigma meth- However, the advantage of continuity selectively recruited talent and instituted odology for performance and quality and that nuclear propulsion transformation a career management model that helped W. Edwards Deming Kaizen principles.33 enjoyed under Rickover can be emu- attract, educate, challenge, and advance Rickover’s subculture of high standards lated by enlisting a younger generation the high-performing talent he had re- minimized failures, which sustained the of change agents when building the cruited to perpetuate and institutionalize momentum of the transformation and guiding coalition that Kotter recom- the transformation. Furthermore, he helped the change take root within the mends. In other words, Rickover’s promoted and strictly enforced a culture submarine community and the Navy. extended tenure does not disqualify the of continuous process improvement and In addition to enforcing high Navy nuclear propulsion transformation professional excellence. standards for processes, Rickover’s suc- effort as an excellent example of military Rickover was personally engaged in cesses in naval nuclear reactors show he organizational transformation consistent the recruitment, education, and manage- recognized the integral importance of with the Kotter change methodology. ment of the officer (and to some extent Continuous Process Improvement to the Rapidly modernizing potential peer noncommissioned officer) talent in the long-term, successful institutionaliza- adversaries create a sense of urgency for nuclear submarine community—a key tion of nuclear propulsion in the Navy. U.S. military modernization, much akin factor in consolidating and generating Subsequently he built a team and cul- to that created by the Soviet Union dur- continuous change improvements. As ture that practiced Continuous Process ing the Cold War. Emulating Rickover, mentioned earlier, Rickover had a rigor- Improvement, which helped produce change agents within the military should ous screening process for new talent. more change improvements. Oliver con- leverage the rapidly growing capabilities According to Admiral Zumwalt’s narra- curs, and writes that Rickover “gathered of potential peer adversaries and general tive of his interview with Rickover, it is a team of people that would inculcate a global instability to cultivate a sense of ur- clear that Rickover personally interviewed system of continuous improvement into gency for transformation efforts. This will and hired new high-performers to con- submarines. With the culture Rickover es- require military change leaders to clearly tinue accelerating the change.31 He also tablished, American submarines become develop and articulate how contempo- structured the career development model so technically advanced that they were rary transformation efforts will serve as (punctuated by intensive periods of study, essentially invulnerable.”34 economical alternatives for shifting the and experiential learning and testing, fol- strategic competition in America’s favor. lowed by operational service) for nuclear Contemporary Transformation Some of the challenges Rickover submarine personnel. From Duncan’s Efforts in the Armed Forces faced many decades ago are still relevant account, it is evident that Rickover’s The demonstrated consistency of the to change or transformation efforts career model ensured the high standard Navy nuclear propulsion transformation now. For example, Service and Defense 80 Features / Military Transformation JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 4 Department leaders, Congress, and through policy and legislative changes, Field Manual 1, The Army (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, the President are still powerful allies to existing value systems and practices 2012), 4-11. gain and leverage as part of the guiding that are incompatible with the nascent 5 John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why coalition for a major and lasting change change. Emulating Rickover’s example in Transformation Efforts Fail,” Harvard Business in the Armed Services. These allies can aggressively building the exacting organi- Review, March–April 1995, 60, 62, available help change or institute policies and zational standards, process improvement at JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Kamara 81 Ex–USS Alabama hit by white phosphorus bomb dropped by NBS-1 in bombing tests, as Army Martin twin-engine bomber flies overhead, Chesapeake Bay, September 23, 1921 (U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command) Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints from World War I to Vietnam By Michael M. Trimble rom the early days of airpower tional factors led influential American means to defeat enemy states if neces- to the Cold War, a variety of Airmen to focus narrowly on the idea sary. Yet whenever an actual shoot- F geopolitical, domestic, and institu- of strategic bombing. This narrow ing war broke out, the United States focus occurred most obviously during called upon Airmen to do far more peacetime, as strategic bombing in one than just strategic bombing, while the form or another represented the most results of strategic bombing were often Major Michael M. Trimble, USAF, is an Airpower Strategist in the Strategy Division at cost-effective means of deterring threats ambiguous at best. As a result, wartime Headquarters Department of the Air Force. to the homeland, and the most decisive Airmen adapted equipment designed 82 Recall / Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 for strategic bombing to a variety of while commanding more than 1,400 nation’s industry, war materiel stock- other roles, or persevered with old Allied aircraft at St. Mihiel.2 Called a piles, and transportation systems, and equipment while the Service developed “crusader for airpower” by one biogra- thereby deliver decisive victory without and fielded new technology. These pher, Brigadier General Mitchell became the slaughter of World War I. The Air adaptations in wartime yielded varying an unusually political Airman after the Corps found the idea deeply compelling degrees of success, depending on the war. He raised the public profile and as a strategy, and very useful as a narra- enemy’s capabilities, the war’s particu- expectations of military airpower in the tive during an interwar period charac- lar character, and the abilities and will United States, despite deep institutional terized by fiscal constraints and a broad of the Airmen themselves. resistance in the U.S. Government.3 His public fascination with aviation. The inadequacy of Air Force ideas and public and insubordinate crusade made Later in the interwar period, the equipment at the outset of several succes- an impact on popular opinion and the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) built sive wars speaks to a need for education government, but it eventually cost him Gorrell’s framework into its doctrine. and innovation, rather than indoctrina- his career.4 Within the Army, Mitchell Faculty member Laurence Kuter called tion and dogma. The Air Force in its also argued influentially for the division the Gorrell Plan the “earliest” and “clear- first 50 years would have benefited from of the Air Service into strategic and tacti- est” conception of American airpower.9 developing and refining the great variety cal forces—and that the strategic force ACTS taught in the 1930s that precise of capabilities that airpower offered. By would affect the war’s outcome more bombing of key nodes in an enemy’s focusing instead on strategic bombing as than any other combat arms branch.5 As “industrial web” would destroy the en- the primary purpose of airpower, Airmen America’s first true airpower theorist, emy’s warmaking ability and his will to and airpower theorists unnecessarily Mitchell and his ideas influenced genera- fight. Faculty members Kenneth Walker, channelized American airpower thought. tions of airmen, especially those of the Robert Olds, and a few colleagues be- The Air Force transitioned from war to interwar period and World War II. Two came known as the “Bomber Mafia” war following a similar pattern. Despite of his closest aides, Kenneth Walker and because they viewed the fighter, attack, the broad contributions of airpower Robert Olds, would go on to integrate and reconnaissance missions as secondary. in World War I, World War II, and the his thoughts on bombing and his forceful Walker taught that “a well-organized, smaller hot wars within the Cold War, approach into their work at the Air Corps well-planned, and well-flown air force from the 1920s until at least the 1970s Tactical School.6 attack will constitute an offensive that the Air Force continued to cling to an cannot be stopped.”10 early vision of airpower that promised de- The Interwar Period The Bomber Mafia succeeded in cisive victory through strategic bombing. During the interwar period, the U.S. steering the ACTS curriculum increas- Army Air Corps struggled to attain the ingly toward strategic bombing, at the World War I resources and independence necessary expense of other airpower functions During World War I, airpower was to make its concept of decisive airpower that had proven valuable in World War new. Despite tribulations and losses, a reality. The basic melody of American I. Among those marginalized were the Airmen adapted and persevered to strategic bombing theory had emerged innovative George Kenney, an observa- achieve many operational successes as World War I ended. In late 1917, tion and attack aviator in World War over the course of the war. While aerial U.S. Army Air Service Major Edgar I, and Claire Chennault, leader of the battles and bombardments captured Gorrell collaborated with (some would ACTS pursuit aviation course in the early worldwide attention, airpower did not say plagiarized) Royal Air Force (RAF) 1930s. As the intellectual center of the exert a determinative influence on the Major Lord Tiverton on a plan for an Air Corps, ACTS, with its narrow focus course of the war. Nevertheless, the air campaign in 1918, designed to break on strategic bombing (to the exclusion huge leaps forward in airpower driven the bloody stalemate of the preceding of other mission sets), clearly channelized by the demands of the war cleared paths years.7 Gorrell advocated bombing the the thoughts of generations of Airmen. for most modern functions of military “commercial centers and lines of com- Most of the officers who would guide aviation, including reconnaissance, munication in such quantities as will and command the Army Air Forces transport, counter-air, interdiction, and wreck the points aimed at and cut off during World War II attended ACTS of course, strategic bombing.1 the necessary supplies without which in the 1930s, including Ira Eaker, Carl World War I also gave many of the the armies in the field cannot exist.”8 “Tooey” Spaatz, and the ubiquitous Airmen who would drive interwar air- Gorrell’s plan, and the postwar reports Curtis LeMay.11 power development their first formative he compiled and edited, met a warm experiences with combat aviation. Most reception among Billy Mitchell’s pro- World War II famously in the United States, Billy tégés. Airmen of the interwar period During World War II, the U.S. Army Mitchell cemented his reputation as an were easily convinced that Americans Air Forces, built primarily for strategic early airpower leader, and his own belief might use their superior technology and bombing, struggled to adapt in the face that airpower would decide future wars, air-mindedness to strategically bomb a of determined, powerful enemies and JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Trimble 83 U.S. Army Air Forces North American B-25B Mitchell bomber takes off from USS Hornet as part of first wave of Doolittle Raid, April 18, 1942 (U.S. Navy/ U.S. National Archives and Records Administration) unforeseen challenges. Despite tribula- British, confident that their superior tech- on August 17, 1943. This unsustainable tions and staggering losses, Airmen nology and doctrine would prevail. attrition culminated in the October raids adapted and persevered to achieve many Major General Ira Eaker, Eighth on Schweinfurt, in which 198 of 291 operational successes over the course of Air Force Commander, had expressed bombers were shot down or damaged.16 the war. confidence that “well-flown formations” Braced by this bloody crescendo, General British strategic bombing advocates of B-17s could execute their bombing Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, Commanding learned the hard lessons before the missions into Germany with a loss rate General of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Americans. In December of 1939, the of 5 percent or less.14 Like many of his finally recognized the dire need for long- RAF sent its vaunted strategic bomber peers, Eaker underestimated the toll that range fighter escorts in the fall of 1943.17 force to attack the German port of German interceptors and antiaircraft Beyond the Combined Bomber Wilhelmshaven. Twelve of 22 bombers fire would take. Losses experienced by Offensive, General Arnold empowered on the mission were shot down.12 The unescorted U.S. Army Air Forces bomber battlefield commanders to adapt airpower RAF fared little better as the war went on. formations wildly exceeded Eaker’s esti- to the needs of Allied forces and the Historian Tami Davis Biddle writes, “In mate as the offensive raged into autumn challenges of their respective theaters, the early months of 1943, only 17 per- of 1943. August strikes on fighter and with outstanding results. Arnold chose cent of Bomber Command crews could ball-bearing plants caused considerable Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle to be expected to complete the required damage to German war production, but organize and lead 16 modified B-25s 30-mission tour of duty.”13 Yet the U.S. 60 B-17s were lost in the process.15 A sin- on an audacious carrier-launched strike Army Air Forces entered the Combined gle bombardment group led by Colonel against the Japanese mainland in retali- Bomber Offensive (CBO) with hubris, Curtis Lemay lost 9 of its 21 aircraft in ation for Pearl Harbor in April 1942. In dismissing the lessons learned by the the Schweinfurt-Regensburg mission North Africa, from late 1942 to 1943, 84 Recall / Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 the 12th Air Force under Doolittle and that aircraft and air units should not the ground scheme of maneuver. The later General Carl Spaatz used C-47 be designated “strategic” or “tactical” Cobra bombardments proved vital to cargo aircraft to conquer the vastness because the same aircraft might bomb the Army’s successful breakout, and the of the Sahara. Troop carriers resupplied targets near the frontlines on one day and resupply missions enabled the Allied far-flung units, evacuated hundreds of targets 5,000 miles away the next.25 advance.28 Cobra and the many preceding wounded, and executed the first-ever Kenney’s remarks could certainly examples, spanning the globe and the combat drop of a weapon used with describe “Big Week” and Operation entire range of operations, speak to the great effect throughout the conflict: the Cobra back in the European theater, adaptability of Allied Airmen, and belie American paratrooper.18 In the 1943 wherein the concentration of air assets, the interwar underselling of the Air Force Battle of the Atlantic, B-24 bombers tactical and strategic, provided opera- as solely a strategic bombing force. under Eaker’s 8th Air Force aided British tional breakthroughs. During Big Week During World War II, the demands forces in defeating the German U-boat in February 1944, the tactical aircraft of of total war briefly illuminated the full fleet, providing assured delivery of war 9th Air Force contributed to a successful range of airpower’s potential. Strategic materiel to Britain for the duration of strategic bombing campaign against the bombing yielded synergistic effects the war.19 Eaker also built up special German aircraft industry, led by the 8th when combined with true air superior- operations squadrons in the 8th and Air Force under Doolittle. It had taken ity machines and tactics. Interdiction 15th (Mediterranean) Air Forces, which time for P-51 and P-47 escorts with drop campaigns in the Pacific and Western proved immensely useful to the U.S. tanks to arrive in theater once Eaker and Europe demolished enemy lines of com- Office of Strategic Services in supplying Arnold recognized the need. But by sum- munication and kept vital materiel from the French resistance and infiltrating mer 1944, after months of fully escorted reaching the enemy’s frontlines. Troop agents into occupied territory.20 In the bomber missions and independent fighter carriers, small liaison aircraft, and even China-Burma-India theater, Lieutenant sweeps, the air war had turned fully in civilian airliners found indirect, unex- General William Tunner led a trans- the Allies’ favor. The Allies executed the pected ways to take the Allied fight to Himalayan airlift effort known as “the D-Day invasion with the advantage of air the enemy.29 As historian Phillips Payson Hump,” supplying several different forces superiority. Bomber formations faced a O’Brien puts it, “airpower in its totality” fighting the Japanese: Chiang Kai-shek’s Luftwaffe short on aircraft—and desper- proved decisive in Europe and the Pacific nationalist Chinese forces, the multina- ately short on experienced pilots—in the because it “multiplied the physical space tional Flying Tiger fighters and bombers skies over Germany. The CBO proved and conceptual possibilities of the area under Claire Chennault, and now–Major vital to the overall Allied effort in Europe, of battle.”30 General Curtis LeMay’s B-29s.21 but not in the way its progenitors ex- Meanwhile, in the Southwest Pacific, pected. Recent historians have concluded The Atomic Bomb strategic bombing theory had lost one that the “major contribution of strategic Airpower did not win World War II of its staunchest advocates. In January bombing by June 1944 was its role in quickly by executing one mission set on 1943, Brigadier General Kenneth Walker bringing about the weakening of the its own. Instead, it contributed across of the ACTS Bomber Mafia was tragically Luftwaffe’s fighter arm . . . through the battlespace—even expanding the killed while flying an ineffective high- attrition.”26 battlespace—by doing a dozen things altitude precision daylight bombing Operation Cobra in July 1944 also well. By striking independently behind mission in the Bismarck Sea.22 General blurred the distinction between strategic enemy lines, while other units reinforced George Kenney’s Southwest Pacific Air and tactical airpower, while revealing the land and sea campaigns, Allied air- Forces soon abandoned high-altitude airpower’s inherent flexibility. During power created unsolvable dilemmas for bombing. Instead, Kenney prioritized an Cobra, strategic bombers provided vital Germany and Japan. Yet the broad view air superiority campaign against Japanese tactical firepower against German fielded of airpower that emerged during World fighters and pioneered low-level bomb- forces and supply trains, supporting the War II would be overshadowed by a ing tactics against enemy shipping. This Allied ground troops’ breakout from the strategic bombing mushroom cloud that strategy successfully protected American Normandy peninsula following D-Day. arose at the war’s end. The common supply lines and isolated Japanese ground The Allies also appropriated a wing of misperception that the atomic bomb forces.23 Meanwhile, Kenney’s troop B-24 bombers to resupply the advancing answered every counterpoint to strategic carrier squadrons achieved new levels of ground troops.27 Given the stakes of the bombing theory proved unfortunate for effective joint operations and force pack- invasion, General Dwight Eisenhower, the Airmen who would fight the limited aging, working with fighter and attack as Supreme Allied Commander, had air campaigns of the Cold War with escorts, naval forces, Australian forces, taken operational control of 8th Air Force equipment built for strategic bombing. and the troops they carried to seize air- in April 1944. He maintained control “The good of the bomb,” writes Profes- fields in the Southwest Pacific and roll through September in order to ensure sor Michael Sherry, “seemed blindingly back the Japanese strategic perimeter.24 that the Army Air Forces concentrated apparent, and the evil remote, if fear- Interestingly, Kenney remarked in 1944 the mass of available airpower to support some. The bomb, it appeared, had JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Trimble 85 ended an awful war and in so doing Manchuria and greater China, where employment” for future wars.38 It was realized a half-century’s fantasy about the rules of engagement (ROEs) or not to be. Instead, LeMay and Strategic transcending and erasing the horrors of simple geography kept them invulner- Air Command would dominate Air Force conventional warfare.”31 able to U.S. strikes. Airpower supported strategy, culture, and acquisitions during It was tempting for Airmen to General Douglas MacArthur’s defense the period between Korea and Vietnam, perpetuate the narrative: The United of the Pusan Perimeter in August and and the Air Force would mistake the States Army Air Forces—in particular, September 1950, as well as his subse- Korean War’s politically restrained air two aircraft under Spaatz’s Strategic Air quent drive north to the Yalu River.35 campaign for an anomaly, rather than the Forces—dropped two atomic bombs on But in November 1950, the Chinese new reality of aerial warfare.39 Japan in August of 1945, and thereby intervened en masse and pushed United won the war. After all, the bombs were Nations (UN) forces back below the Vietnam dropped on August 6 and 9, and the 38th parallel, which had been the border During the Vietnam War, an Air Force Japanese announced their surrender before the war broke out. In the first built primarily for strategic bombing on August 15. But in truth, the atomic half of 1951, the conflict settled into a struggled to adapt to a limited, irregular strikes on their own did not constitute a stalemate on the 38th parallel, and air conflict. Despite tribulations and heavy decisive blow, as some strategic bombing operations constituted the majority of losses, Airmen achieved many opera- advocates would have had it. UN offensive action for the duration of tional successes over the course of the To attribute Japanese surrender di- the war.36 However, with most of the war. In 1965 and 1966, pilots of the rectly and entirely to two B-29 missions is industrial targets and military targets F-105 Thunderchief—a fighter-bomber to ignore everything that set the stage for in North Korea already destroyed, and resembling a rocket with stubby wings, those missions, most notably the years of little enemy maneuver or resupply to built for nuclear weapons delivery— costly naval, amphibious, and combined- interdict, an Air Force built for strategic struggled to defend themselves against arms warfare fought by the Army, Marine bombing found that strategic bombing highly maneuverable North Vietnamese Corps, Navy, and Army Air Forces, which either had not worked—or had not MiGs and Russian-supplied surface-to- strangled Japan’s economy while seiz- been allowed to work. air missiles (SAMs). In 1967, the Air ing vital islands and airbases.32 Like the For years after the conflict, Airmen Force fielded a two-seat, SAM-hunting European war, the Pacific conflict became would claim the latter. As Chief of “Wild Weasel” configuration, the a war of attrition between industrial pow- Strategic Air Command, General LeMay, F-105G, which proved effective in its ers—in which Japan was outproduced by stated, “we never did hit a strategic tar- designated role, suppression of enemy the American war industry and immo- get” during the Korean War and that the air defenses. Nevertheless, nearly 400 bilized by American forces.33 A narrow conflict provided a lesson in “how not to F-105s would be lost over the course of focus on the bomb also ignores the sig- use the strategic air weapon.”37 Claims the war, including dozens of Weasels. nificant geopolitical factor of the Soviet like these reflected a widely held belief Although the Air Force could have Union’s entry into the Pacific war on among Airmen—that if they had been been better equipped and trained for August 8. Most historians do agree that allowed to prosecute the strategic bomb- Vietnam, many operational and tactical the atomic strikes hastened the end of the ing campaign that their doctrine called airpower success stories emerged from war and obviated the need for invasion.34 for, then the United States could have the war. Colonel Robin Olds’s Operation Yet to say that this consensus redeems the won the war in short order. Whatever Bolo, on January 2, 1967, is perhaps the promises of strategic bombing is a logical their merits, such claims overshadowed most well known in today’s Air Force. island-hop too far. American airpower’s Korean War achieve- Exploiting the predictability of strike pack- ments, most significantly gaining air ages in the ongoing Operation Rolling Korea superiority and fighting to maintain it Thunder, a force of F-4 Phantom II fight- During the Korean War, a U.S. Air throughout the conflict, improving all- ers led by Olds and his 8th Tactical Fighter Force built primarily for strategic weather and night attack, and executing Wing flew into North Vietnam using the bombing struggled to adapt to a numerous successful airdrops for troop routes, altitudes, airspeeds, radio callsigns, limited, nonnuclear conflict. Despite insertion and resupply. and electronic jamming pods usually tribulations and losses, Airmen achieved Shortly after the war, General Otto used by the more vulnerable F-105s. The many operational successes over the Weyland argued that distinctions between ruse worked. Multiple flights of North course of the war. In 1950, the B-29 “tactical” and “strategic” airpower had Vietnamese MiG-21s were drawn into bombers of the Far East Air Forces proved obsolete—a fascinating insight, the air and were likely surprised to find destroyed most of North Korea’s coming from the chief of Tactical Air the entire “strike package” composed of industry. Yet the enemy fought on, Command. Having led the Far East F-4s, equipped with air-to-air missiles. The in part because his airfields and the Air Forces during the war, Weyland North Vietnamese air force lost 7 MiGs true “key nodes” or “bottlenecks” of concluded that the Air Force should that day; the U.S. Air Force gained a his industrial system were located in focus on developing “new patterns of air much-needed operational victory. 86 Recall / Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 At the same time, the American theater strategy demanded that the Air Force hunt for elusive enemy supply convoys flowing down the Ho Chi Minh trail. Special operations “air commandos” flying World War II–era, prop-driven air- craft at low level proved more effective in this role than their jet-fighter brethren.40 Airmen adapted this old fleet of aircraft to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail, and their impressive operational results stand in stark contrast to the high-altitude, high- tech trends that dominated Air Force thinking leading up to Vietnam. Furthermore, the use of U.S. air- power to blunt North Vietnam’s 1968 Tet Offensive and 1972 Easter Offensive proved vital to the support of American forces and the defense of South Vietnam. During the Tet Offensive, the besieged Marines at Khe Sanh depended on close Atomic bomb “Little Boy” hoisted into bomb bay of B-29 Superfortress, Enola Gay, Tinian Island, air support from the Air Force, much of August 1945 (U.S. Navy National Museum) it delivered oddly, but effectively, by B-52 strategic bombers—strategic bombers freed from the encumbrances of the aviation enterprise of the United States that would not be employed against the ROEs and allowed to prosecute the maxi- repeatedly fielded the wrong aircraft enemy’s capital city, military headquar- mal bombing campaign that they had or employed the wrong doctrine . . . ters, or industrial port city until 1972. initially proposed against North Vietnam until one realizes that in each case, the The responses to the 1972 of- in 1964, as they eventually did in 1972, aircraft or doctrine went wrong in the fensive in particular helped bring the then the United States would have won same way, pursuing the same singular, war to a close. Operations Linebacker the war in short order.42 However, that powerful idea. During each interwar I and Linebacker II saw President claim has been debated many times since, period until the post-Vietnam period, Richard Nixon direct masses of U.S. and has even been refuted at times by the U.S. Government cut defense airpower—tactical and strategic—against Airmen themselves.43 General Chuck spending and bet the remaining budget all manner of targets in North Vietnam. Horner, a Vietnam veteran, would later on the possibility of deterring enemies Emboldened by a new diplomatic open- dispute the very idea of “strategic” or defeating them far from the United ing with China, and with the 1972 bombing, instead emphasizing airpower’s States, without sacrificing American election increasing U.S. domestic pres- ability to provide strategic and tacti- lives, through strategic bombing. sure to end the conflict, President Nixon cal effects, often simultaneously, with a Of course, no single mission or ca- demanded a maximum effort bombing variety of platforms.44 In any case, the pability, no matter how well-resourced campaign against previously restricted claim that strategic bombing in the mid- and organized, is sufficient to defend the targets in Hanoi and Haiphong. Nixon 1960s could have won the war fails to country and its interests. There are many repeatedly and explicitly ordered more acknowledge that avoiding escalation to reasons that the Nation’s defense cannot B-52 strikes in Vietnam during 1972, general war—a negative objective—was be guaranteed by a single capability or culminating in the 11-day Operation foremost in U.S. political leaders’ minds even a single military Service. The clearest Linebacker II in December of that at the time.45 The claim also overshadows reasons are the fog and friction of war, its year. Postwar accounts from the North the broad contributions Airmen did make political nature, and its paradoxical logic, Vietnamese side vindicate Nixon’s belief over the course of the conflict, thanks in which every move is opposed by a that B-52s in particular induced great to airpower’s inherent versatility and the thinking, willful enemy.46 Therefore, just fear among the population, and more Airmen’s ability to adapt. as strategic bombing in Europe proved importantly, that the massive casualties far more difficult and less decisive than its resulting from the B-52 strikes coerced Coda pre–World War II advocates had hoped, North Vietnamese leadership during the Peering through a narrow aperture at America’s post–World War II strategic Paris peace negotiations.41 these episodes in American airpower nuclear forces neither guaranteed peace, For years after the conflict, Airmen history, one might wonder how a nor did they provide acceptable options would claim that if they had only been nation with the resources and robust in limited war. But fortunately for the JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Trimble 87 B-52 bomber takes off from Andersen Air Force Base in support of bombing effort of North Vietnam from December 18–29, 1972, known as Operation Linebacker II (U.S. Air Force) Airmen of those wars, airpower’s endur- an identity, that was more whole. The strategists of this generation, whose ing utility lay in its ubiquity, flexibility, Service had been reluctant to send its careers spanned from combat experi- and speed; airpower could go many B-52 bombers into North Vietnam for ence in Vietnam to planning and leading places and do many useful things—fast.47 much of the conflict, for fear of com- Operation Desert Storm, turned strategic In each conflict where strategic bomb- promising its cutting-edge electronic bombing from a singular blunt instru- ing’s effects may have disappointed or warfare technology if one was shot ment into a system-wide capability in the remained ambiguous, Airmen managed down. In the meantime, the majority of Air Force.50 This generation of Airmen, to adapt airpower thought and technol- strikes up north were executed by fighter including Moody Suter, Chuck Horner, ogy to the challenges at hand. crews. As a result, Tactical Air Command John Warden, John Jumper, and many emerged from Vietnam with the lion’s others, built on the systems thinking Postlude share of combat experience in the Air that lay at the heart of strategic bombing Professor Sherry writes that “continuity Force. These fighter pilots would go on doctrine, while organizing, training, and in the history of aerial warfare seems as to emphasize and institutionalize several equipping the post–Vietnam Air Force striking as change.”48 Certainly, the Air significant changes: more aggressive, re- to execute a great variety of missions. Force’s 50-year-long strategic bombing alistic flying training; greater emphasis on Essentially, they managed to take the key- fugue supports Sherry’s point. But in air superiority, to enable strike and other stone of strategic bombing theory—the the post–Vietnam period, the Air Force airpower functions; and a more holistic idea of the enemy as a system—and build began to produce a new arrangement. strategy for employing the flexible, adapt- and train a force that could attack the A number of factors influenced the able air weapon against the entire enemy entire system, rather than just certain key Air Force transition to a strategy, and system.49 One scholar suggests that the nodes. Perhaps during the post-Vietnam 88 Recall / Air Force Strategic Bombing and Its Counterpoints JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 15 38 period, the Air Force finally developed Phillips Payson O’Brien, How the War Crane, American Air Power Strategy in Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in Korea, 1950–1953, 171–172. “completely new patterns of air em- World War II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 39 Ibid., 170; and Brian D. Laslie, The Air ployment,” as General Weyland had University Press, 2015), 280, 297. Force Way of War: U.S. Tactics and Training urged in 1953. 16 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 224. after Vietnam (Lexington: University Press of If the first 50 years of American air- 17 Dik A. Daso, Hap Arnold and the Evolu- Kentucky, 2015), 1. power teach any coherent lessons, one tion of American Airpower (Washington, DC: 40 Warren A. Trest, Air Commando One: Smithsonian Books, 2000), 192–193; and Heinie Aderholt and America’s Secret Air Wars must be that every conflict will involve O’Brien, How the War Was Won, 541n73. (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution new challenges and surprises for airpower. 18 Christopher M. Rein, The North African Press, 2000), 207–208. Therefore, it is the task of the Service’s Campaign: U.S. Army Air Forces from El Ala- 41 Marshall L. Michel III, The Eleven Days leaders and strategists to prepare it for mein to Salerno (Lawrence: University Press of of Christmas (New York: Encounter Books, the most lethal threats, while building Kansas, 2012), 86–90, 121. 2002), 26, 49, 234. 19 Bernard Victor Moore II, “The Secret 42 Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power: in flexibility and anticipating an array Air War over France: USAAF Special Opera- The American Bombing of North Vietnam of more likely threats as well. In this tions Units in the French Campaign of 1944” (New York: Free Press, 1989), 206–210; and way, the Air Force can avoid repeating (master’s thesis, School of Advanced Air and Crane, American Air Power Strategy in Korea, its 20th-century fugue, wherein various Space Studies, 1993), 24; and O’Brien, How the 1950–1953, 178. 43 modulations and mutations of the stra- War Was Won, 247–251, 260–264. Clodfelter, an Airman himself, explains in 20 Moore, “The Secret Air War Over The Limits of Air Power that such claims either tegic bombing subject dominated each France,” 22–35. ignore or deliberately marginalize the changes progression of airpower. By building in 21 John D. Plating, The Hump: America’s in the character of the Vietnam War and U.S. flexibility through superior, adaptable Strategy for Keeping China in World War II political aims between the mid-60s and 1972. platforms and continuous innovation, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 44 Tom Clancy, Every Man a Tiger, with and by training for core missions as well 2011), 1–2, 240–241. Chuck Horner (New York: Penguin Putnam, 22 Griffith,MacArthur’s Airman, 102–103. 1999), 14–16. as unpredictable scenarios, Airmen can 23 Ibid., 96. 45 Clodfelter, Limits of Air Power, xv, 204. hone core skill sets while cultivating the 24 John D. Poole, Jungle Skippers: The 317th 46 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. critical thinking and adaptability that Troop Carrier Group in the Southwest Pacific and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret future conflicts will require. JFQ and Their Legacy (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), Air University Press, 2017), 80. 87–88, 119–121, 605; and Edward N. Lu- 25 Griffith,MacArthur’s Airman, 118. ttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace 26 Ibid., 144. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, Notes 27 Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality, 238. 2001), 2–3, 8–13. 28 Rick Atkinson, “Operation COBRA and 47 Colin Gray, Airpower for Strategic Effect 1 Lee Kennett, The First Air War, 1914– the Breakout at Normandy,” Army.mil, July (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University 1918 (New York: Free Press, 1991), 44–45, 22, 2010, available at JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Trimble 89 how past strategists practiced their the challenges and choices facing specific craft. leaders/strategists in today’s world. Gaddis takes an unusual approach. As enjoyable as it is to read On Grand In effect, he has written a collective and Strategy, I could not help but feel misled selective history of various critical periods by the book’s title. This is not, strictly in history by focusing on individual lead- speaking, about grand strategy in the ers (like Pericles, Octavian, and Franklin way understood by most historians and Delano Roosevelt [FDR]); their contem- political scientists researching and writing poraries (Thucydides, Agrippa, and Harry in the field today. With a few exceptions, Hopkins); their internal and external most recent analyses of grand strategy rivals (Archidamus II, Marc Antony, recognize the limits of the so-called Great and Joseph Stalin); and, most unusually, Man of History approach taken by schol- strategists and intellectuals facing similar ars since Thomas Carlyle in 1840s. In challenges but separated by time and the modern era, it is not enough to un- space, as the primary focus of each chap- derstand how a supreme leader seeks to ter. For example, the late Oxford political reconcile national ends, ways, and means. theorist Isaiah Berlin appears throughout It is not enough to understand the strata- the book; Gaddis uses Berlin in order to gems of leaders who also led armies in examine the difference between strategic battle (for example, Xerxes), or who un- “hedgehogs” who know one big thing, dertook personal diplomatic negotiations and “foxes” who know many. with their counterparts (for example, The reason for this approach is clearly the Big Three of Winston Churchill, On Grand Strategy thematic. It allows Gaddis to discuss FDR, and Stalin). Rather, it is critical to strategic teaching and religion or judge recognize that even the best leaders are By John Lewis Gaddis which strategist was grander—but it can constrained by the institutions in which Penguin Press, 2018 also be disorienting and a bit too idio- they are embedded. Since the rise of the $26.00 384 pp. syncratic at times. Some readers may be modern nation-state and the decline of ISBN: 978-1594203510 left nonplussed, for example, by chapter absolutist monarchs, even the brightest, Reviewed by Peter Dombrowski 4, “Souls and States,” which begins with most experienced, and most forceful chief a few paragraphs on George F. Kennan’s executives must rely on the other organs distant relative, George Kennan, who of state for funds, intelligence, analysis, ohn Lewis Gaddis, deemed the explored and surveyed Siberia in the lat- and, most of all, implementation. “Dean of Cold War Historians” ter half of the 19th century. Gaddis uses This is true of most of the person- J by a New York Times reviewer, the example of the senior Kennan to alities surveyed by Gaddis. As Geoffrey has published yet another book, at illustrate the theme of chapter 4—that Parker’s fantastic volume The Grand least the 14th in a long and productive “this fear of understanding roots religion Strategy of Philip II (Yale University career. The latest, On Grand Strategy, in all great cultures which we know” Press, 2000) makes clear, the Hapsburg however, will disappoint those hoping and thereby introduces a discussion emperor could convince himself that for another learned exposition on the of Augustine (in the 4th century) and to fulfill his earthly mission of unifying American role in the post–World War Machiavelli (in the 15th century), mixed Roman Catholic lands and stamping out II era. Rather, Gaddis, the Robert A. with a smidgeon of Isaiah Berlin (in infidels, he should single-handedly exer- Lovett Professor of Military and Naval the 20th century). Yet Gaddis skillfully cise command and control in the form of History and Director of the Brady ransacks nearly two millennia of Western his own person. By the time of Abraham Johnson Program in Grand Strategy history to conclude that these strategists Lincoln or Otto von Bismarck, much at Yale University, has written a wide- prescribed procedures, drew on history, less FDR, even their strategic wisdom ranging essay on strategic thinking developed “checklists,” and deliberately required vast bureaucracies to imple- that begins with the dawn of recorded proportioned “aspirations to capabilities” ment—not only large armies and navies history and concludes with the momen- (pp. 116–117). These are good and use- but also domestic agencies to raise funds tous challenges facing American leaders ful lessons, but following Gaddis’s logic and acquire the instruments necessary to during World War II. As such, On through the epochs in history and figures wage both modern war and the peace- Grand Strategy will bring joy to those might be hard going for all but the most time preparations for war. Moreover, few whose professions depend on strategiz- broadly educated strategic thinkers. At its of the modern leaders discussed in On ing and anyone wanting to rummage best, however, the mixing of perspectives Grand Strategy functioned without war through history seeking insights into by Gaddis provides a broad overview on councils, strategy development groups, or cabinets (constitutional or kitchen) 90 Book Reviews JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 to help them formulate strategies 2001—the day after Ghost Wars cul- great and small. minated—and takes the saga through Shortly before defining grand strategy 2014. In its more than 750 pages, Coll as the “alignment of potentially unlim- chronicles the complex web of tensions, ited aspirations with necessarily limited rivalries, suspicions, and miscalcula- capabilities,” Gaddis makes the case for tions that prevented strategic success common sense— “Common sense, in for the United States and thwarted this sense, is like oxygen: the higher you a long-planned U.S. departure from go, the thinner it gets.” Afghanistan. Coll shows how a lack of To much criticism from both the trust and a misappreciation of deeply political left and the right, President held security and cultural narratives Barack Obama famously asserted that among the United States, Pakistan, his first task as President was “Don’t do and Afghanistan—as well as between stupid shit”—a pungent shorthand for frequently competing U.S. national “use common sense.” It seems that a security and intelligence agencies—made U.S. President with little formal training America’s search for decisive victory in in strategic affairs had stumbled upon a Afghanistan languish unrealized for more truism Professor Gaddis developed over than a decade and a half. a lifetime of study. Rather than simply do Directorate S provides an extremely something that conventional wisdom in- valuable reference for scholars and poli- sisted was required, Obama tried to keep cymakers working on the complexities of his options open, a strategy that Gaddis Directorate S: The C.I.A. and South Asia security. Coll’s story is based calls “pivoting.” The President took so America’s Secret Wars in on at least 100 interviews with a myriad long to make a decision, however, that he Afghanistan and Pakistan of critical U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani was openly accused of dithering. He piv- policymakers and their supporting staffs. By Steve Coll oted to the point where he even changed His interview-based writing is leavened Penguin Press, 2018 his policies when he realized the implica- with the experience of a journalist boast- $35.00 784 pp. tions of earlier decisions, such as when ing 3 years as a reporter in South Asia ISBN: 978-1594204586 he decided not to enforce his proclaimed and another three decades tracking and red line against Syria’s continued use of Reviewed by Thomas F. Lynch III writing astute shorter works on the most chemical agents. critical security topics for the region. The President Obama might be classi- number and quality of sources accessed fied as a proverbial “hedgehog” with an irectorate S by longtime Washing- by Coll during the years of his research overarching idea that dissatisfied many ton Post journalist, former think are remarkable and unique, going well professional national security scholars and D tank president, and now dean beyond the tell-all political texts of those politicians. He pursued what he under- of the Graduate School of Journalism like journalist Bob Woodward, or political stood to be common sense and applied at Columbia University, Steve Coll, is figures Bob Gates and Hillary Clinton. Gaddis’s preferred “proportionality,” a seminal book. It is a highly worthy Directorate S accurately captures the even in the face of many foreign policy successor to the author’s Pulitzer complexities of strategic analysis and crises and emerging geopolitical develop- Prize–winning 2004 work Ghost Wars. the conflicting policy perspectives from ments. He applied this strategy among Directorate S is impressive in its scope, Washington to Kabul to Rawalpindi (the his many advisors and the Department of level of detail, and readability. It suc- home of Pakistan’s military and intelli- Defense, as well. cessfully fills much of the gaping void gence leadership). Coll logically identifies As frustrating as that was to many in prior literature on the controversial that the relationship between the Central observers, Mr. Obama was simply dem- topic of the U.S. role in Afghanistan Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistan’s onstrating the ability to be both fox and and Pakistan. As a reference for scholars Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) hedgehog by combining approaches. and policymakers, this book is first rate. was the most critical in the multimodal This flexibility, Gaddis claims, is the Although it will not be the final word strategic dynamic, but one based on a “strategist’s keys to victory.” JFQ on the strategic trajectory of South paradox. The CIA needed the ISI and Asia and the future arc of complex U.S. Pakistani army to gain intelligence on the policy choices in that region, Coll’s movement and recruitment of Taliban Dr. Peter Dombrowski holds an appointment work makes an indelible mark. and al Qaeda militants. Yet the ISI was as Professor of Strategy in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the U.S. Published in early 2018, Directorate covertly enabling its Taliban proxies Naval War College. S picks up the story of America, Pakistan, from semi-feudal towns, refugee camps, and Afghanistan on September 11, and jihadist safe havens inside Pakistan JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 91 to attack Afghan government and in- biography to consult for decisionmaking led Obama to freeze the drawdown of ternational forces there. In this “double context or to balance against the impres- U.S. forces and make changes in rules of game,” the ISI continued Pakistan’s sions of subordinate staffers or the naked engagement to allow for greater pressure decades-long security imperative of fa- text Coll cites from Wikileaks cables. Yet on these international terror groups. cilitating and managing Islamist militant as Coll writes, Admiral Mullen had 27 U.S.-Pakistan relations also took a groups like the Afghan Taliban—groups separate meetings and more than 100 noteworthy turn beginning in early 2015. deemed essential to Pakistan’s existential phone calls with Pakistan’s all-powerful Pakistan’s military undertook an exten- struggle with India. army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, from sive antiterrorist operation in its western Coll’s conclusions are solid and well 2008 to 2011. Coll speculates about North Waziristan Province that ran from documented. He finds that the “failure to the degree to which Mullen knew about 2014 to 2017. Simultaneously, U.S.- solve the riddle of the ISI and stop its co- the Pakistani military’s intransigence Pakistan strategic interactions withered vert interference in Afghanistan became, and duplicity. His speculation seems to and tense rhetoric between the two be- ultimately, the greatest strategic shortfall derive from Wikileaks extracts and from came far more common, but still with no of the U.S. war” and that successive the perspectives of other U.S. actors— real change in Pakistan’s approach toward American Presidents “tolerated and even few, if any, of whom were on Mullen’s Islamist militant groups. promoted stovepiped, semi-independent staff or in the meetings to see Kayani. The Trump administration has added campaigns waged simultaneously by Consequently, several critical elements of yet another major act to the arc of U.S. different agencies of American govern- the U.S.-Pakistan interactions are poorly strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan dur- ment.” Coll also chronicles the divide developed or untold, including the criti- ing 2017–2018. In August 2017, Donald that far too often bedeviled U.S. military cal yearlong buildup to Mullen’s famous Trump formally reversed the U.S. troop interactions with Afghan culture and tra- call-out of Pakistan’s duplicity with the drawdown planned and then halted ditions, featuring the tragedies of Afghan Haqqani Network in front of Congress in under President Obama, threatened civilians killed in U.S.-led military opera- September 2011. greater pressure on Pakistan if it did not tions and American personnel killed by Directorate S also is a bit misrepre- alter its policy toward the Afghan Taliban supposedly friendly Afghan military and sented as chronologically complete. Coll’s and Haqqani Network, and called for government personnel. introduction advertises a comprehensive greater Indian economic engagement Despite the myriad of personalities history of the U.S. role in Afghanistan in Afghanistan. This strategy has yet to and region-specific organizations and and Pakistan from 9/11 to 2016. But produce any major change in the general terminology, Directorate S is crisp and its 35 chapters culminate in late 2014 as framework of the policy conundrum engrossing. Even casual readers should the United States was making good on faced by the United States in Afghanistan find it to be a page-turner. But 14 years President Barack Obama’s 2013 decision and Pakistan. Thus, Coll’s general is a long period to cover in an interview- to draw down almost all U.S. military conclusions about the vexations of U.S. driven narrative and many readers may forces by the end of 2015. Coll offers strategy in the region remain largely find 784 pages more than a bit daunting. the reader a short epilogue that covers germane. However, salient contemporary The pacing slumps a bit with Coll’s excur- a couple of the major happenings in policy dimensions are left unaddressed sions into the personal stories of individual Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2015 to in Directorate S, and many of its details U.S. and British soldiers in Afghanistan. 2017. Despite the epilogue, Directorate already require updating. Coll’s basic Understandably, Coll’s editors may have S already feels dated in mid-2018. The insights remain sound, but Directorate S wanted to interweave the human toll of story of the United States in Afghanistan already needs a chronological successor. complex policy decisions into the narra- and in bilateral relations with Pakistan has Its limitations notwithstanding, tive, but the micro-level discussion of the moved far, far along since 2014. Directorate S is valuable. It is not quite personal and often tragic stories dragged In fact, the full story has at least two as invaluable as Coll’s Ghost Wars, but it on the otherwise crisp pace. other acts since 2014. In its next act, is pretty close. Directorate S is readable, If there is a downside to Directorate staged from 2015 to 2016, the Obama compelling, and an important contribu- S, it is found in two missing dimensions. administration encountered the incon- tion to the literature on the topic of Despite its commendable detail and venient truth that a too-rapid exit from U.S. strategy in an almost 20-year his- voluminous, if often anonymous, use of Afghanistan led to alarming Taliban gains tory across Afghanistan and Pakistan. first-person interviews, it seems to lack in territory across south and southwest Directorate S merits a prominent place direct interviews with a couple of critical Afghanistan. Later in 2015 and into among the most important books on U.S. personae. Among them, Vice President 2016, fragments from Afghan Taliban national strategy published in 2018. JFQ Joe Biden, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and Pakistan Taliban units declared them- from 2007–2010 Anne Patterson, and selves to be affiliated with the so-called former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Islamic State and began low-level guer- Dr. Thomas F. Lynch III is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Staff Admiral Mike Mullen stand out. rilla operations across Afghanistan. Coll Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the These key characters have no written notes this, but not the fact that the alarm National Defense University. 92 Book Reviews JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 were building the coalition to help Fortunately, academia is increasingly us win the war in Afghanistan, but turning its attention to these issues. Enter in so doing, we were distracting our Olivier Schmitt’s recently published warfighters from actually being able book, Allies That Count. It is a volume to do so. Why were we spending so that seeks to answer the questions that much time and effort recruiting forces we had no theoretical or conceptual from allies without accounting for the framework to answer when I was in the significant operational strains that Pentagon: what qualities make allies their incorporation into the ISAF force useful in coalition warfare, and when are laydown might cause? they more trouble than they are worth? It would be easy chalk up the NATO By comparing the experiences of ISAF coalition force generation pro- select junior coalition partners in the cess—and its outcomes—to one of the Persian Gulf War, the Kosovo interven- many problems inherent in conducting tion, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and complex operations, especially those ISAF, Schmitt helps us understand when, that involve allies and partners from and how, coalition contributions have many states. But it seemed that there the most utility for the overall conduct was something deeper at play: a failure of the campaign, both strategically and to appreciate, at a conceptual level, what operationally. In order to do so, he breaks best practices in coalition-building and down utility into two main categories: management looked like. What were the political and military. Political utility, tradeoffs between adding flags to bolster according to Schmitt’s formulation, Allies That Count: Junior a coalition’s legitimacy and operational comprises a state’s international political Partners in Coalition Warfare effectiveness? Was prioritizing numbers standing and its behavioral norms, such of boots on the ground the right way to as respect for humanitarian law. Military By Olivier Schmitt think about force generation, or should utility, by contrast, comprises a state’s Georgetown University Press, 2018 we have prioritized quality over quantity? integration (both in terms of the size of $36.95 264 pp. No coalition warfare “best practice” the force element it contributes to a coali- ISBN: 978-1626165472 playbook existed at the time. Indeed, tion and its ability to interoperate with Reviewed by Kathleen J. McInnis despite how important it was from a coalition partners); responsiveness, or its national strategic perspective to get coali- ability to adapt to evolving circumstances; tions “right,” when I began my own skill, which refers to a state’s military ears ago, when I was working research on coalition warfare in 2012, being sufficiently trained and capable on the North Atlantic Treaty I found out quickly that the academic to the mission; and quality, which refers Y Organization (NATO) Interna- scholarship on these questions was to the equipment that a military has as tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) limited. Lessons learned from the force well as its ability to minimize tradeoffs desk in the Office of the Secretary of generation experiences of prior post– between firepower, maneuverability, Defense, we were asked by both the Cold War coalitions such as the Balkans and others. George W. Bush and Barack Obama and the United Nations Operation in In evaluating these different attributes administrations to help persuade Somalia II interventions floated around, of a state’s contribution to military coali- allies and partners around the world but most of them focused on the nuts tions, he finds that partners with the most to contribute additional forces to the and bolts of coalitions rather than defin- utility have a high degree of integration mission in Afghanistan. To their credit, ing heuristic models needed to help and quality, as well as a high degree of many countries around the world did decisionmakers critically evaluate and international political standing. Standing so. But shortly thereafter, operators make sense of the complex dynamics of helps bring international political legiti- on the ground began signaling that coalition warfare. Especially when consid- macy to an intervention—perhaps even many such contributions were so dif- ering that successive U.S. national-level more so than the number of flags associ- ficult to integrate into the mission that defense strategy documents have consis- ated with a given operation. Integration it was distracting from ISAF’s ability tently noted the importance of coalition and quality are the key factors that allow to prosecute operations. Some states warfare to the overall advancement of fielded forces to get the job done. It is a had caveats on their forces, others had U.S. national security objectives, more good way to conceptualize the interac- interoperability issues, and still others theorizing was—and is—necessary if we tion of strategic- and operational-level approached the mission with wholly are going to be able to prevent ourselves dynamics, and a helpful rubric for assess- different strategic mindsets than many from repeating past behaviors and expect- ing which partners will add utility to a of their counterparts. In short, we ing different results. campaign, and which ones may contribute JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 93 more strategic and operational headaches from the perspective of coalition leaders. Ultimately, Schmitt concludes that when it comes to coalition operations, “the more is not necessarily the merrier.” As with any book, there are areas that the author could have further developed. For example, it would have been interest- ing for Schmitt to more fully explore a state’s strategic culture and its associated operational or political risk thresholds as part of the analysis. A state may have util- ity by Schmitt’s formulation, but if there is a limited political-level appetite to un- dertake hard tasks involving considerable military risk, that surely must diminish the usefulness of a state’s contribution. Still, given what Schmitt set out to do—an enormous task in its own right— his analysis delivers a compelling answer to the question of how to judge a coali- tion partner’s utility. His work, in turn, compels us to assess its effects on how we build future multinational military opera- tions. What does this mean for coalition construction and burden-sharing in the future? Many key U.S. allies have signifi- cantly shrunk their defense budgets in the 1990s and 2000s; it is therefore much New from the Office of Joint History more difficult for those countries today than it was in 1991 to deploy and sustain The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil- brigade-size force elements. Under these Military Relations conditions, if integration, judged in terms By Christopher J. Lamb of interoperability and numbers of forces 2018 • xxiv + 284 pp. that a state can contribute, is critically im- portant, what does it mean when a state President Gerald R. Ford’s 1975 decision to use force after the Cambo- does not have the quantity of forces to dians seized the USS Mayaguez merchant ship is one of the best docu- sufficiently integrate? Moreover, especially mented but least understood crises in U.S. history. U.S. behavior is still given that the 2018 National Defense explained as a rescue mission, a defense of freedom of the seas, an exercise Strategy states the United States will in realpolitik, a political gambit to enhance Ford’s domestic political continue to rely on coalition partners, is a fortunes, and a national spasm of violence from frustration over losing state’s assumptions about its actual ability Vietnam. Widespread confusion about what happened and why it did con- to contribute in a manner that does not tributes to equally confused explanations for U.S. behavior. constrain campaign effectiveness valid? If Now, with new sources and penetrating analysis, Christopher J. Lamb’s not, what must be done—both now and The Mayaguez Crisis, Mission Command, and Civil-Military Relations dem- in the future—to rectify or ameliorate onstrates how three decades of scholarship mischaracterized U.S. motives the situation? When is a larger and more and why the common allegation of civilian micromanagement during the robust coalition constellation worthwhile crisis is wrong. He then extracts lessons for current issues such as mission and when does it become a liability? JFQ command philosophy, civil-military relations, and national security reform. In closing he makes the argument that the incredible sacrifices made by U.S. Dr. Kathleen J. McInnis serves as an Analyst Servicemen during the crisis might have been avoided but were not in vain. for International Security at the Congressional Research Service and is the author of How and Why States Defect from Coalition Operations (Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming). 94 Book Reviews JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 operations or “search-and-destroy,” or While Villard focuses on American that American forces overlooked the combat operations in a narrow timespan, need to build up the South Vietnamese these larger themes come through in a military and do so in a sustainable compelling way. In earlier military his- way. The overall effect is to restore tories, the North Vietnamese and Viet clarity and urgency to the Army’s Cong come across as a faceless, shadowy, efforts in Vietnam in that fateful year, alien, and unthinking force, like the mon- as MACV’s leaders fought against the soon rains. In Villard’s narrative they are clock to shield and secure the popula- a proper enemy with goals, strategy, plan- tion and build up the Republic of ning, command and control, logistics, Vietnam and its armed forces against a and every kind of operational constraint. thinking and reacting enemy with bur- And, like any enemy, they attempt to geoning plans of its own. adapt to American efforts, sometimes Villard’s approach fits within what successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully. might be called the New Revisionism in Detailed, careful analysis allows Villard Vietnam War military history, standing to usually present American, North alongside Greg Daddis’s Westmoreland’s Vietnamese, and South Vietnamese War (Oxford University Press, 2014), operations in ways that make them Lien-Hang T. Nguyen’s Hanoi’s War meaningful. Not only big events like the (University of North Carolina Press, Tet Offensive or the Battle of Khe Sanh, 2012), and Martin Clemis’s The Control but minor engagements like the battle War (University of Oklahoma Press, for the Special Forces camp at Kham Staying the Course: October 2018). Contra the orthodox historians of Duc or small-unit counterinsurgency in 1967 to September 1968 the Vietnam War, the New Revisionists II Corps in Summer 1968 seem like part By Erik B. Villard disclaim broad-brush characterizations of an actual campaign, where a tacti- U.S. Army Center of Military History, of American or South Vietnamese in- cal outcome plays a part in both sides’ 2017 competence, hubris, or connivance at strategies. While the level of detail can 773 pp. $35.00* every level. With careful evidence and be numbing, the payoff is an approxima- ISBN: 978-0160942792 access to new sources, they reconstruct tion of what Carl von Clausewitz labeled American strategy-making, operations, ortsinn—the sense of locality that enables Reviewed by Jon Askonas and tactics and put them in political and a commander to read the battlefield and international context. American leaders make sense of the enemy’s activities in the were generally sober, focused, informed, context of physical and human terrain. rik Villard’s new volume casts savvy, and sincere; in the field, American Villard helps us understand how William clarifying light on stubbornly units were usually disciplined, fero- Westmoreland and his chief subordi- held myths about the conduct and E cious, adaptive, and worked well with nates—men like Creighton Abrams, Fred strategy of America’s intervention in the Vietnamese. These historians view Weyand, William Rosson, Julian Ewell, Vietnam. Even more than the preced- the Vietnam War as a deeply complex and John Tolson—saw the war. ing volumes in the Combat Operations event, one that resists any kind of “meta- And their visions, generally, come series, Staying the Course incorporates solution” or silver bullet explanation of across as clear, nuanced, and contextual- the latest historiography, including victory or defeat. But while they have ized. MACV’s goals are unified across the extensive North Vietnamese sources built on some of the earlier revisionists’ country: maintain and expand popula- and newly released Military Assistance rehabilitation of U.S. military efforts tion security, in part by deterring North Command–Vietnam (MACV) docu- in Vietnam, the New Revisionists have Vietnamese conventional forces; support ments. By carefully linking American little sympathy for any simplistic notions development and pacification through strategic thinking to MACV 1968 that America “snatched defeat from the civic action; and train up the Republic of campaign goals and actual opera- jaws of victory” or that the Nation was Vietnam Military Forces. But how that tions, Villard, a historian at the U.S. betrayed by fickle politicians, military mission is carried out, and what matters Army Center of Military History, uses incompetence, a back-stabbing media, most, is a matter of physical and social careful analysis to dispel a variety of or the antiwar movement. By focusing geography. Up north in I Corps Tactical myths: that MACV was over-focused on the agency of the North and South Zone (CTZ), III Marine Amphibious on attrition, that the American mission Vietnamese in determining their fates, the Force and some Army elements sup- lacked a focus on counterinsurgency New Revisionists highlight the limitations ported the Army of the Republic of or population security, that the Army of American military power, even when Vietnam in defending major cities along was overcommitted to “conventional” applied with wisdom and insight. the coast, while trying to maximally JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Book Reviews 95 disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese strategy, politics, or other aspects of the men and materiel southward along the war. The result is necessarily a truncated New Ho Chi Minh Trail, vitally important to view of American engagement with the MACV’s strategy in the rest of the coun- Vietnam War. Nevertheless, Villard has from NDU Press try. In sparsely populated II CTZ, First set out not to write a general history for the Center for the Study of Field Force placed a heavy emphasis on but to fill the gap of operational-level Chinese Military Affairs security, presence, and development oper- military history in Vietnam, and he fulfills Strategic Forum 299 ations in the hamlets surrounding Dak To his mission. China’s Future SSBN Command and (60 percent of the provincial population), While Villard’s narrative ends well Control Structure but saw taking the fight to the enemy in before the war concludes, one can discern by David C. Logan its highland strongholds as a means of in the shadows of 1968 what is to come. China is de- avoiding additional civilian casualties. In The North Vietnamese are far more veloping its III CTZ, Second Field Force shielded resolute, patient, and adaptable than the first credible the approaches to Saigon and used air initial American strategy had given them sea-based mobility to disrupt main force units, credit for; even when faced with stag- nuclear forces. while applying maximum support to both gering losses, they maintain the strategic This emer- American and South Vietnamese coun- initiative. The Republic of Vietnam, gent nuclear terinsurgency efforts in the provinces though growing steadily, faced substantial ballistic mis- ringing Saigon. In the populated delta handicaps, building up its military and sile submarine of IV CTZ where the enemy was mostly counterinsurgency infrastructure essen- (SSBN) force will pose unique chal- Viet Cong living among the people, 9th tially from nothing. Moreover, the enemy lenges to a country that has favored Infantry Division commander Julian had the strategic initiative and could tightly centralized control over Ewell placed a heavy emphasis on opera- disrupt pacification progress whenever it its nuclear deterrent. The choices tions with and the training of local South wanted, using conventional offensives, China makes about SSBN command Vietnamese forces. In any case, whatever terrorism, rocket attacks, and other and control will have important plans MACV had for steady progress in means to seize territory, assassinate ef- implications for strategic stability. 1968 were thrown into disarray by the fective local officials, recruit new troops, China’s decisions about SSBN com- Tet Offensive. Although Tet created as and generate destabilizing refugees. mand and control will be mediated many opportunities as constraints—and Moreover, little could be done to avert by operational, bureaucratic, and ended up being a real operational victory the social and economic destabilization political considerations. A hybrid for MACV—it also created new demands caused by the mere presence of nearly approach to command and control, on MACV’s limited resources and pushed 700,000 foreign soldiers. And while with authority divided between the the American public toward withdrawal. many Americans came to believe that navy and the Rocket Force, would In a book as long as Staying the they could not “win” the war after Tet, be most conducive to supporting Course, having a clear structure makes all even more began to question whether strategic stability. the difference. Villard tracks corps- and they could trust their leaders to tell them division-level activites in each of the the truth about it, and whether it was four CTZs from October 1967 through worth the substantial cost. JFQ September 1968. The book is roughly divided into three sections: before Tet, the Tet Offensive, and the aftermath. Dr. Jon Askonas is an Associate Professor at Catholic University. The before and after Tet sections are short scene-setting chapters overviewing * This book is available for free download in important political and strategic dynam- PDF format at 96 Book Reviews JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 USAID Assistant Administrator for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance Nancy Lindborg meets with Syrian refugees at Islahiye Refugee Camp in Turkey, January 24, 2013 (State Department) The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security Focus on Campaign Activities By George E. Katsos n an effort to cross-reference U.S. campaign activity focus on civilian secu- (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization Government policies, practices, and rity (personal, community, political).3 (NATO), or the U.S. Government. For joint doctrine with human security,1 Protection from violence is crucial for civilians who remain in place, the pursuit I 2 this article completes the discussion on people, especially vulnerable populations. of desperate or questionable measures to its most relevant dimensions—health, The inability to establish and maintain safe steady a favorable environment or attain a food, environmental, and economic and secure environments through effective better standard of living may also result in security—with a combatant commander governance may result in population dislo- counterproductive stabilization practices cation or displacement.4 These conditions and weaken the foundation of civilian can overwhelm institutional capacities security and society as a whole. Therefore, and disturb regional norms, resulting in viable security institutions and their active Colonel George E. Katsos, USAR (Ret.), is the Department of Defense Terminology Program assistance or intervention from security role in providing civilian security are cen- Manager and a Joint Doctrine Strategist. providers such as the United Nations tral to U.S. national security interests. JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Katsos 97 Definitions and Descriptions contribute to a secure and stable environ- citizenship rights, legal and equal Both governmental and nongovern- ment for civilians over the long term.10 protections under the law, and voting mental documentation provide insight This approach informs the understanding rights. Congress can also limit the through definitions and descriptions on of operational environments including Federal Government and executive current protection practices in order to efforts that alleviate harm, facilitate access power such as preventing Federal mili- present a better understanding of civil- to basic needs, and contribute to safe tary personnel from enforcing domestic ian security as an element of effective and secure environments.11 Additionally, policies at home.15 More recently, governance. For the U.S. Government, NATO descriptions include avoiding, Congress authorized the use of military the White House defines protection minimizing, and mitigating negative force against nations, organizations, or as capabilities necessary to secure the effects that might arise from military persons that plan, authorize, commit, homeland against acts of terrorism and operations, conflict-related physical or aid in terrorist attacks in order to manmade or natural disasters.5 Within violence, or threats of physical violence prevent any future acts of international the executive branch, the Department by other actors.12 The International terrorism against the United States.16 of Homeland Security (DHS) defines Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Regarding governmental func- protection as actions or measures taken defines protection as all activities aimed tions, Congress can create, eliminate, to cover or shield from exposure, injury, at obtaining full respect for the rights or restructure executive branch entities or destruction including those needed of the individual in accordance with the and agencies. In the first year of George to ensure protective reactions that do letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of Washington’s Presidency, Congress cre- not unnecessarily interfere with citizen’s law, while the concept as a whole ensures ated the position of Attorney General freedoms and liberties.6 The Depart- authorities and other constituted groups that now leads the Department of Justice. ment of Defense (DOD) adds another comply with their obligations under IHL, After World War II, Congress estab- definition of protection: to preserve IHRL, and refugee law.13 lished the Central Intelligence Agency, the effectiveness and survivability of For purposes here, civilian security in- National Security Council, U.S. Agency mission-related military and nonmilitary cludes supporting law and order, the rule for International Development (USAID), personnel, equipment, facilities, infor- of law, and establishing security through and DHS.17 For significant judicial deci- mation, and infrastructure deployed or effective governance (for example, viable sions, the Supreme Court is the final located within or outside the boundaries police, justice, and defense systems). arbiter of legal issues to be resolved under of a given operational area.7 DOD poli- These measures contribute to addressing Federal law. After the Civil War, some cies further discuss protection as peace- policy issues on sheltering civilians from rights codified in constitutional amend- keeping forces that employ active and physical and systematic violence (personal ments were not observed, as subsequent passive measures to protect themselves security), providing family and culture Supreme Court decisions undermined ci- against adversaries, accidents, diseases, protection from identity-based tensions vilian security protections that could have and other threats to mission success.8 (community security), and protecting extended under state law.18 However, by Outside of the government, inter- from oppressive governing practices such the mid-20th century these rights were national organizations such as the UN as repression and human rights abuses eventually enforced by subsequent court use the terms protection and protection of (political security).14 decisions and new legislation.19 civilians when addressing issues related to civilian security. Based on mandate Legislative and Judicial Actions International Engagement language in UN Security Council U.S. legislative and judicial efforts For over a century, the United States Resolutions (UNSCRs), descriptions address civilian security concerns within has been involved in protecting civilians focus on preventing or responding to the boundaries of the Constitution. Per outside national borders. After World threats of physical violence against civil- legislative action, Congress develops War I, the United States joined the ians by the host government. Other Federal laws in support of issues such League of Nations to mitigate future definitions in UN workforce documenta- as national defense and protection from conflict between nations. By the end tion include protecting civilians under oppressive domestic governing. For of World War II, the UN replaced the imminent threat of physical violence and the latter, the Constitution contains league and broadened its purpose over also acknowledge state obligations under provisions that protect civilians from time to protect civilians beyond the international humanitarian law (IHL), unlawful imprisonment or detention, effects of conflict. In 1949, the United international human rights law (IHRL), punishment for conduct not illegal States became a signatory to a set of and refugee law.9 Regional organizations at the time performed, punishment international treaties and protocols such as NATO define protecting civilians focused on individuals or groups, states known as the Geneva Conventions to as activities conducted with the intent to favoring their own citizens over others, protect civilian victims during armed safeguard noncombatants from physical and unreasonable searches per the Bill conflict and internal violence. Building violence, secure their rights to access of Rights. Constitutional amendments on the Geneva Conventions, the Nation essential services and resources, and passed after the Civil War acknowledge ratified the 1954 Hague Convention 98 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 U.S. Army captain, 1st Security Force Assistance Brigade, advises Afghan National Army major about security in Logar Province, Pul-e Alam, Afghanistan, August 7, 2018 (NATO/U.S. Navy/Aubrey Page) for the Protection of Cultural Property protection and assistance in armed con- organizational strategies and plans in in the Event of Armed Conflict. In the flict and violent situations), International support of the President’s strategy. In years following World War II, a body Federation of Red Cross and Red furtherance of setting a political agenda, of law was created around IHL (also Crescent Societies (coordinates efforts of the President can issue multipurpose known as the Law of Armed Conflict) national societies to provide humanitarian policy direction through executive to limit the effects of perpetrator assistance primarily in disaster relief and orders to the executive branch on topics actions against stability and further public health), and National Red Cross/ such as combating the trafficking of codify noncombatant legal protection. Red Crescent Societies (auxiliary entities persons and minimizing civilian casual- More recently, IHRL developed as a to national governments). ties when applying military force.21 broader body of law where nations are Executive orders issued specifically for determined to have a collective duty to The Executive Branch national security purposes are called protect their own civilian populations Civilian security fosters confidence in Presidential directives. Relevant direc- against genocide, war crimes, ethnic effective governance. Under Article tives include combatting terrorism, cleansing, and crimes against humanity. II of the Constitution, the President counternarcotic activities, and mass In the spirit of IHRL, UNSCR man- is granted authority to cultivate that atrocity prevention. The following dates contain modern “responsibility to confidence through executive power to overview captures governmental civil- protect” language that holds individual protect the people from internal and ian security efforts within the executive national authorities accountable for civil- external threats. As such, the President branch in three cascading categories: ian protection violations.20 In support of approves the National Security Strategy significant, additional, and remaining. both IHL and IHRL, the International to articulate strategic policy goals and Significant Efforts. Two departments Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement national power direction on matters and their agencies partake in significant supports civilian security through its related to civilian security. Subsequently, civilian security efforts through varying components: the ICRC (humanitarian executive branch departments produce degrees of assistance: the Department of JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Katsos 99 State and Department of Justice. State protective measures through coordinated Threats to civilian security that nations manages foreign diplomatic affairs for the responses to emergencies, Presidential and state-like entities encounter or President while its development com- direction, and critical infrastructure and generate may involve a response from ponent (USAID) implements economic key resource protection.25 Via its Federal security institutions such as DOD. In initiatives and facilitates disaster assistance Emergency Management Agency, DHS support of governmental activities, com- abroad.22 Through diplomacy and de- manages Federal assistance to help popu- batant commanders and their staffs inte- velopment, State and USAID provide a lations in state, local, tribal, territorial, grate force protection as well as civilian competitive, forward-deployed political and organizational entities.26 Through security considerations into plans, capability that can also facilitate security- the Coast Guard, DHS facilitates legiti- preparation, training, and missions. To sector assistance abroad in support of mate usage of waterways subject to U.S. socialize DOD’s role in the pursuit of national security objectives.23 At State, jurisdiction.27 Moreover, its Customs and civilian security, discussions and implica- many department bureaus lead efforts Border Protection and Immigration and tions appear in joint doctrine, including to develop partner capabilities and build Customs Enforcement agencies monitor traditional and irregular approaches that institutional capacities of nations or other border crossing, immigration, and illegal earn population support and the miti- organizations that may eventually con- entry issues. gation of civilian casualties in military tribute troops, police, or security forces DOD supports civilian security efforts operations.31 While many terms describe to future stabilization missions. Bureaus primarily through its military workforce.28 DOD support to civilian security efforts also advance efforts to mitigate conflict; Besides providing territorial and physi- (investments, deployments, operations, support law and order and police force cal security, DOD assists governmental cooperation, assistance), this discussion establishment, maintenance, or reforms; efforts to disrupt and prevent adversarial refers to them as campaign activities. and provide solutions for the displaced. and competitor practices that negatively Campaign activities involve offense, For development and relief purposes, impact national interests such as stabil- defense, and stability components. USAID bureaus and offices promote ity, security, and democratic systems Offensive actions can neutralize threats, human rights, democratic governance across the globe. Abroad, DOD defense defensive actions can reduce vulnerabili- initiatives, and coordinate responses to institution-building efforts increase ties, and contributions to stabilization overseas disasters. partner-nation abilities to meet security efforts can influence political dynamics, Justice is another entity that supports needs and contribute to regional and all in support of protecting civilians.32 At civilian security. Managed by the Attorney international security more effectively.29 the international level, DOD can provide General, Justice preserves confidence At home, DOD leads homeland defense support to peacekeeping, security-sector, in the U.S. judicial system; administers missions and supports civilian authorities. and stabilization commitments through Federal law enforcement entities; and Remaining Efforts. Outstanding individual expertise and workforce con- establishes, enables, or reforms justice departments also impact civilian secu- tributions. At the regional level, DOD systems abroad through security sec- rity. Efforts include the Department of participates in security and stabilization tor assistance. Justice components such Energy’s role in nuclear safety, Labor’s efforts normally with contributions to a as its Federal Bureau of Investigation enforcement of child labor laws and regional military workforce. At the na- uphold the Constitution and protect the human-trafficking prevention, Interior’s tional level, DOD conducts or supports American people from threats. Other focus on Native American safety, activities to achieve national objectives entities confine criminal offenders, Treasury’s strategic threat disruption and enable civilian authorities to build or enforce laws and regulations that bring efforts to deter financial practices that strengthen institutional systems (police, perpetrators to justice, and consolidate threaten stability, and Health and Human justice, defense). operations such as counterterrorism, Services management of refugee centers U.S. military resources used for counterintelligence, and export control. that assist in American society integra- civilian security may be independent To support crisis response mechanisms tion.30 As governmental entities continue conventional forces, conventional forces at home, Justice manages the National to develop plans in support of national that leverage capabilities of U.S. special Response Framework’s Emergency security policy objectives, the future is operations forces, or independent special Support Function #13 Public Safety and uncertain on how these entities will pro- operations forces. Depending on the Protection that facilitates Federal public tect civilians during international systems rules of engagement and operational safety and security assistance to local, disruption and complete collapse or from environment, campaign activities in sup- state, tribal, and territorial organizations the effects of aggressive competitor mea- port of civilian security may not always be overwhelmed by an actual or anticipated sures and severe population displacement. feasible to implement due to competing disaster or act of terrorism.24 operational interests that a commander Additional Efforts. Other depart- Military Campaign Activities must assess, such as the inherent right of ments make substantial contributions to Civilians who are neither part of an self-defense and combat. For DOD, civil- civilian security. DHS identifies vulner- armed group nor engaged in hostili- ian security can decrease the threats that abilities to U.S. security and develops ties are protected under the law of war. cause civilians and vulnerable populations 100 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Coalition advisor plays game with child during tour of Manbij, Syria, June 21, 2018, to document how safe and prosperous it has become since Syrian Democratic Forces defeated so-called Islamic State (U.S. Army/Timothy R. Koster) (identity-based groups, women, children) conducted either through a transitional DOD can provide transitional public to relocate, thus mitigating the need military authority to exercise executive, security to enforce the rule of law until for future U.S. military deployment. At legislative, and judicial authority, or a efforts are transitioned to competent, home, DOD leads the homeland defense transitional civilian authority to establish viable, and responsible forces and in- mission and provides defense support to legitimate and effective governance. Both stitutions. Campaign activities include civil authorities. The following sections can transition to a viable national or state- persistent efforts in areas secured and articulate DOD contributions to civilian like entity authority or institution. DOD held usually through intensive patrolling security efforts by, with, and through campaign activities include instituting and checkpoints, targeted search or strike international stakeholders and host- political reform and supporting elec- operations against adversaries, popula- nation partners. tions, restoring basic essential services, tion control measures such as curfews Effective Governance. DOD con- and creating effective civil administrative and vehicle restrictions, biometrics col- ducts short- and long-term campaign frameworks to protect civilians. lection and vetting, and integration of activities in support or in place of civilian Police force and institution develop- indigenous ex-combatants into newly administration. Through a range of mili- ment strengthens law and order efforts formed host-nation police forces. In tary operations, effective governance can and is usually conducted by the United Iraq in 2003, U.S. Central Command result in protecting civilians against physi- States or by, with, and through a ministry (USCENTCOM) supported interna- cal violence, crime, terrorism, and other of interior. When a central authority is tional efforts to create a competent and harm in locations where security forces weak or ceases to exist, perpetrators of responsible Iraqi police service that could occupy or operate. For security recipients, violence can target civilians to pursue maintain law and order, enforce the rule ministry or security institution develop- power. Campaign activities can ensure of law, and build confidence in the popu- ment is better conducted simultaneously basic law enforcement, public order, lation that effective governance would and not under different time horizons.33 training and education, and counter protect them. DOD’s continued involve- For nations and state-like entities, insti- perpetrator violence. When the rule of ment includes training, advising, and tutional development and reform may be law has broken down or is nonexistent, assisting recruits and police forces in areas JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Katsos 101 including integration of former fight- and responsible defense or security force One element is regime change where ers into the force and forensic science can deny access or safe havens to indi- a central authority is removed in order development.34 In 2009 in Afghanistan, viduals or groups that present a threat to to deter or neutralize negative treat- USCENTCOM assumed responsibility civilian security. In Iraq, USCENTCOM ment such as mass atrocity, political or from the State Department to train, ad- personnel trained Iraqi Security Forces state repression, or other harm to civil- vise, and mentor members of the Afghan to include the Iraqi army and assisted in ians. In 2011, U.S. Africa Command National Police and, in 3 years, led 8 of counterterrorism, civilian protection, and (USAFRICOM) provided air strikes 23 NATO training program sites.35 border security missions. Targeted action under UN authority that was followed up Judicial frameworks strengthen the was brought against violent extremist or- by NATO operations against an oppres- rule of law most likely under a ministry of ganizations such as the so-called Islamic sive Libyan regime.41 In this action the justice. With central authority turnover State and its ability to hold onto Iraqi ter- central governing authority was removed. and subsequent governance challenges, ritory.38 In Afghanistan, USCENTCOM More recently, campaign activities with perpetrators of violence can target civil- leads efforts to train and equip the Iraqi and Afghan forces were able to ians to undermine effective governance Afghan National Security Forces, includ- counter sectarian and other forms of vio- and the rule of law. Beyond providing ing the Afghan National Army, to combat lence.42 Other campaign activities include security, DOD can protect administrators threats from the Taliban and al Qaeda safe area designations that can marginal- of justice such as judges and their families and continues to provide support to the ize adversaries or threats to civilians. as well as build courts and jails. In sup- NATO International Security Assistance However, armed conflict also involves port of building or upholding an effective Force in the capital region of Bagram.39 unintended consequences such as civilian judicial system, a military governing au- At home, U.S. Northern Command and casualties and key site vulnerabilities dur- thority may operate military commissions U.S. Pacific Command provide support ing and after military operations. Civilian and provost courts, establish and provide to civil authorities that can augment exist- deaths caused by U.S. military operations security to courts and tribunals, support ing capacity and assist in the restoration often fuel narratives that support resis- investigations, and arrest war criminals. of essential basic services. tance to U.S. influence and even energize During 2007 in Iraq, USCENTCOM Oppressive Governing and the targeting of Americans. Additionally, personnel assisted Iraqi authorities to Perpetrators of Violence. DOD campaign key sites such as the National Museum of create and operate the Baghdad Rule of activities can support the coercion of Baghdad, libraries, or religious properties Law Complex that combined courts, jails, uncooperative governing authorities and make “no target” lists, but the buildings’ and an academy where personnel and other entities into protecting citizens. security may not be immediately provided faculties were protected from harassment Campaign activities include a range of to prevent looting. Nevertheless, recent and threats. Subsequent complexes were military operations from armed conflict emphasis on civilian casualty mitigation built in other cities across Iraq, sending to competition that may improve condi- and key site vulnerability practices con- the signal that administering the rule of tions for populations and prevail against firm the importance of civilian security law was foundational in rebuilding civil threats generated by a central author- to the chain of command from the administration and providing civilian ity, its security forces, or perpetrators top down.43 security.36 In Afghanistan from 2002, of violence that operate autonomously Other defensive and stabilization DOD assisted efforts to build or renovate within a country’s borders.40 Through efforts support civilian security and can courthouses and facilities and established campaign activities, U.S. forces can as- increase confidence in a state’s ability the Rule of Law Field Force Afghanistan sist in enforcing and upholding societal to protect daily life. Campaign activities to improve judicial infrastructure in prov- norms in the face of regime repression, include a variety of human security ele- inces, train on evidence-based operations human rights abuses, improper detention ments captured in this five-part series for judicial actors and law enforcement, and imprisonment, torture, mass atroci- (health, food, environmental, economic, and public outreach efforts on Afghan ties, corruption, human-trafficking, and civilian) that protect individuals and pop- law and trials.37 child labor. This includes the protection ulations from negative treatment such as Defense or security support can of cultural, ethnic, and religious identity; torture, ill treatment, unlawful detention strengthen a ministry of defense system religious locations and shrines; family and imprisonment, human rights abuses, and force capacity. With central author- systems; women and children; personal and free election disruption. International ity turnover and subsequent security values; static protection of key sites security providers can establish a safe area challenges, perpetrators of violence can (market places or refugee camps); and to provide direct protection to civilians challenge national sovereignty, civil human rights. within a nation’s borders in a tempo- administration, and governmental institu- Offensive efforts to protect civilians rary and designated geographic area. tions and target civilians to undermine are normally authorized by an interna- Normally authorized through UNSCRs, effective governance in pursuit of power tional political body such as the UN to safe areas involve safe zones (large areas and influence. In support of defending a target a central authority or perpetrators that physically protect civilians where they nation’s sovereignty, a competent, viable, of violence within a country’s borders. normally live) and safe havens (protecting 102 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 displaced or dislocated civilians in specific institution establishment and reinforce- Humanitarian Terms in Relation to the Protec- tion of Civilians in Armed Conflict (New York: places) where civilians are protected by ment central to government efforts in the UN, 2003), 21. denying belligerents access through the pursuit of productive civilian stabilization 10 See “NATOTerm,” online database, threat or use of military force. In safe practices and civilian security. JFQ available at JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Katsos 103 Security],” October 31, 2000; UNGA, 4037th Development Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (Wash- “U.S. Military Begins Training Iraqi Forces to Session, “Resolution 1261 (1999),” August 30, ington, DC: Department of Housing and Ur- Take on ISIL,” Defense.gov, January 5, 2015, 1999; UNGA, 5235th Meeting, “Resolution ban Development, 2014), 34; U.S. Department available at 104 Joint Doctrine / The U.S. Government’s Approach to Civilian Security JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Pararescuemen practice personnel recovery mission during PJ Rodeo Competition near Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, September 20, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Brandon Shapiro) Building Joint Personnel Recovery Through Multinational Collaboration By David Gayvert n Joint Force Quarterly 88 (1st paign (MCDC), a Joint Staff J7 mul- (PN) in the vital mission area of per- Quarter 2018), an article titled “Born tinational force development initiative sonnel recovery (PR). I Multinational: Capability Solutions focused on collaboratively developing The Integrated Coalition Personnel for Joint, Multinational, and Coalition and assessing concepts and capabilities Recovery Capability (ICPRC) is one of Operations” introduced the Multina- to address the challenges associated nine projects undertaken during the cur- tional Capability Development Cam- with conducting coalition and multina- rent 2017–2018 MCDC program cycle, tional operations.1 This article provides the theme of which is Rapid Aggregation additional information about how the of Coalition and Partner Forces. David Gayvert is a Multinational Engagement MCDC enables effective collaboration Personnel recovery is included within Analyst at the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. among like-minded partner nations this theme as a high-interest subject area. JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Gayvert 105 Pararescuemen assigned to 83rd Expeditionary Rescue Squadron observe medical procedures performed by members of U.S. Army Aviation Reaction Force, Task Force Brawler, on flightline at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, February 22, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/Gregory Brook) Joint Publication 3-50 defines personnel execution, and adaptation functions of multinational partnerships is among recovery as the “sum of military, diplo- personnel recovery among allies and part- Secretary of Defense James Mattis’s top matic, and civil efforts to prepare for and ners, providing common principles, terms priorities.4 Reinforcing this emphasis, execute the recovery and reintegration of and definitions, capability standards, best General Joseph Dunford recently af- isolated personnel.”2 practices, and processes. The guidebook firmed that “allies and partners are our Several studies have assessed that mul- will be a descriptive rather than prescrip- strategic center of gravity.”5 tinational forces and operations are at risk tive product and is not intended to be a Clearly, the volatile global security due to a lack of an effective and enduring doctrinal manual; its recommendations environment will continue to require— global PR network, using a common lexi- are not binding on any nation. more than ever before—a comprehensive con, and cooperation and synchronization As with all MCDC projects, the approach to effectively counter col- mechanisms to optimally employ nations’ ICPRC seeks to implement the guid- lective threats, one that must include capabilities across the full PR spectrum— ance contained in key policy documents, political, diplomatic, military, civil, and diplomatic, military, and civil domains. from the National Defense Strategy to nongovernmental activities conducted This hampers the ability of commanders Chairman of the Joint Chief (CJCS) via partnered coalitions of like-minded and other decisionmakers to prevent or issuances, joint publications, and deriva- nations and organizations. Yet in many respond effectively to isolating events. tive Service doctrine, all of which echo mission areas—and personnel recovery The ICPRC project aims to address the Department of Defense (DOD) is certainly one of these—the lack of this problem by creating an international emphasis on multinational cooperation. compatible, interoperable policies and guidebook that will provide nations As noted in CJCS Instruction 2700.01F, doctrine; education and training; tactics, and governmental or nongovernmental Rationalization, Standardization, and techniques, and procedures (TTP); ca- organizations a tool to assess and address Interoperability Activities, for example, pability standards; and strong, functional gaps in PR capability and interoperability, leveraging the capabilities, capacities, relationships inhibits optimal partnering as well as to educate senior leaders about and shared interests of partner nations with our allies and partner nations. the importance and basic elements of is a key force multiplier for U.S. military In regions like Africa and the Pacific, personnel recovery. Doing so will enable planners and commanders.3 Furthermore, where the United States has only limited more efficient preparation, planning, strengthening our allies and forging new PR-capable assets available, this situation 106 Joint Doctrine / Building Joint Personnel Recovery JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 can create significant risks to DOD and 2018) to educate leaders within their international partners—must have a com- other U.S. and PN personnel operat- nations about personnel recovery, as well mon understanding of the wide range ing in those areas. In short, the United as influence the curriculum of their PR of activities and expertise that comprise States simply does not have the capacity education and training programs. personnel recovery and be prepared to to handle all current and potential future contribute something—whether it be PR requirements. Therefore, PN support The ICPRC Project Team equipment, recovery platforms, or simply is essential to reduce risk and ensure sus- and Objectives well-trained personnel—to the collective tained PR coverage for U.S. and coalition Currently, 20 nations and multinational mission. Political, diplomatic, civilian, missions, as well as guarantee adequate organizations from around the globe and military leaders alike must continu- response to future operational threats are participating in the project in some ously collaborate to effectively prepare, that may require military response. Thus, capacity.8 In addition to specific infor- plan, and execute personnel recovery so growing the PR capability and capac- mation explaining how to effectively as to be able to locate, support, recover, ity of willing partners and improving prepare, plan, and execute personnel and reintegrate isolated personnel. They interoperability through shared doctrine, recovery, the ICPRC project promotes must recognize that requisite capabilities training, and TTP are certainly in the several key concepts: cannot be established overnight, or in interests of the United States and its allies the immediate aftermath of a PR event. PR capability, whether material (plat- and partners. •• The tendency to postpone commitment forms, equipment) or nonmaterial Why is this so important? Aside from of time and resources to this critical mis- (policy, doctrine, education, train- reducing the direct risk to our people, sion “until we need it” must be avoided. ing), cannot be produced overnight; past experience illustrates that when Preparation and planning for isolating it must be developed, acquired, and personnel are held captive, or otherwise events must be done well in advance maintained well in advance of the isolated in hostile areas or conditions, of need; history proves that virtually operational need. the lack of a timely and effective recovery all nations will experience a PR event Personnel recovery is truly a whole- operation—or an adversary’s exploita- •• sooner or later. of-nation responsibility requiring tion of isolated personnel through public The guidebook emphasizes that involvement of political, diplomatic, media—can prompt changes in policies among the most important activities is civil, and military leadership and that place collective strategic aims at risk development of national and organiza- capabilities; as such, it is an inher- and may even threaten the stability of co- tional policies for PR/JPR that establish ently joint mission area. alitions. Still burned into our minds, the priorities for capability, capacity, and The need for interoperability—both images of U.S. personnel being dragged •• interoperability development, along with internationally and among national through the streets of Mogadishu, ways and means to achieve them. components—in joint PR (JPR) Somalia, in 1993, directly led to the U.S. The good news is that nations have capabilities is paramount and should decision not to intervene in the 1994 a wide range of ways in which they may be factored into all force develop- Rwandan genocide.6 The more recent contribute to and improve the effec- ment decisions. press photographs showing the horrific tiveness of combined PR activities. In Mutual trust and working relation- fate of the Jordanian pilot executed by •• addition to developing and implementing ships among allies and partner terrorists in Syria similarly had massive formal policies that articulate the desired nations must be developed and impacts on public opinion and subse- endstate (and that specify ways and means intensified over time through train- quent political decisions made.7 for the conduct of personnel recovery ing, exercises, and other collabora- Accordingly, to address this gap in both unilaterally and within coalitions tion at all levels. PR capability and interoperability and of allies and partners), other associated Preparing, planning, and effectively provide multinational force commanders •• activities include but are not limited to executing personnel recovery is a with an improved capability to quickly providing key mission enablers such as responsibility for all nations and and effectively plan, synchronize, execute, intelligence, public affairs, strategic com- leaders. and assess joint and combined PR op- munications, and medical support. Personnel recovery is a moral obliga- erations, the Joint Personnel Recovery •• The guidebook urges that relation- tion that will only provide reassur- Agency (JPRA) teamed with the North ships, communications networks, and ance to and trust among at-risk per- Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) written agreements among partners be sonnel if leaders adequately prepare Allied Command Transformation (ACT) established early, then maintained and and plan to ensure adequate and to co-lead the ICPRC project. The strengthened throughout the prepara- available capabilities when required. project provides a means for both orga- tion, planning, execution, and adaptation Every nation can contribute some- nizations to achieve several key strategic •• phases of personnel recovery, whether as thing to PR. objectives and has already produced value part of a coalition, military operation, or for project partners who are using parts This last message is in fact key: within a diplomatic or other nonmilitary of the guidebook (published in October leaders—within both DOD and our context. It calls attention to the fact that JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Gayvert 107 Airmen with 23rd Special Tactics Squadron and Soldiers with 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) team up for personnel recovery training utilizing alternate infiltration and exfiltration training, on Wynnehaven Beach, Florida, April 9, 2013 (U.S. Air Force/Christopher Callaway) the sensitivities surrounding a particular wish to build or improve their PR capa- The fact that some of the project isolating event may require the lead for bility, capacity, and interoperability but team nations are already using the cur- recovery decisionmaking, planning, and also security assistance/cooperation and rent draft guidebook to convey key execution to shift among military, diplo- force development program officers and aspects of personnel recovery to senior matic, and civil teams, depending on the planners developing PR concepts, doc- commanders as well as to influence the political environment at the scene, assets trine, and training strategies. curriculum of their PR education and available, and leaders’ need to coordinate Measures of effectiveness for the proj- training programs is an early indicator and offer guidance, planning, and infor- ect include: that the ICPRC will produce a valu- mation support across the domains. able tool for the global PR community. Increase in (commitment to) user- Throughout the planning and project •• Particularly among developing nations, nation PR capabilities: Guidebook execution (February 2017 to present), the guidebook will provide ready access provides a useful roadmap for PR/ the ICPRC team has consistently con- to the cumulative expertise and relevant JPR capability and interoperability tributed time and expertise to create a operational experience resident within evaluation, preparation, planning, practical, compact reference, focused NATO, European Union, JPRA, and and development. on the core components and activities other ICPRC project partners. Improvement in PN PR participa- of the PR system, providing enough in- •• However, publication of the tion: Every nation can (and does) formation to understand how personnel guidebook aside, the most important contribute some capability. recovery works—and how essential it is to long-term outcome of the ICPRC Improvement in coalition interoper- national interests—without drowning the •• project will certainly be the expansion ability: Partner nations ready to con- reader in detail. and strengthening of many key bilat- tribute value to PR mission on day eral and multilateral relationships. For one (plug and play capability). ICPRC Working Session example, through collaboration on the Demand signal for the guidebook: 2, Almagro, Spain •• ICPRC, JPRA has significantly increased Have the right users asked for it and Envisioned users of the guidebook its understanding of and support to what is their feedback? include not only partner nations that complementary capability development 108 Joint Doctrine / Building Joint Personnel Recovery JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 activities under way in other nations, •• “assist other U.S. Government Finally, while there are established as well as key organizations like the departments and agencies, partner MCDC planning, approval, and report- European Personnel Recovery Centre nations, and others, as directed by ing processes, project teams are able to and European Defence Agency Project the President or the Secretary of plan, develop, and complete their work Team Personnel Recovery. This increase Defense with PR-related education largely unfettered by the bureaucratic in shared understanding constitutes real and training programs” requirements that often character- progress toward the ultimate goal of a •• “[d]evelop and manage a capability ize government-sponsored activities. truly global PR federation of capable, to share appropriate lessons learned The ICPRC project will be completed willing, and active partners. with interagency [community] and in November 2018, closing out the partner nations” MCDC 2017–2018 cycle. Concept ICPRC Supports JPRA •• “[a]ssist in developing and coordi- development for additional PR-related Multinational Outreach nating NATO doctrine and other projects are currently under way for the Objectives NATO operational publications to 2019–2020 cycle. The JPRA mission is to lead DOD distribute personnel recovery guid- Another critical element of this strat- personnel recovery, providing strate- ance and encourage synchroniza- egy under Bilateral Engagement (LOE2) gic direction, oversight, operational tion with U.S. personnel recovery is the nascent JPRA Foreign Liaison support, analysis, capability integration, doctrine.”11 Officer (FLO) program, which aims at and education and training to improve further strengthening key bilateral rela- To carry out these important PR interoperability and enable DOD, tionships by posting allied PR specialists as specified tasks, JPRA has developed an multinational partners, and the inter- FLOs at JPRA headquarters. This would international engagement strategy that is agency community to prevent, prepare enable them to share their nations’ PR ex- outcome-oriented, enabling the targeting for, and respond to isolating events. periences, expertise, and perspective while of resources in a way that ensures force As a CJCS-controlled activity and simultaneously developing expertise in the multiplication without duplication of the DOD office of primary responsibil- U.S. PR system. These exchanges serve to effort and maintains a clear path toward ity for personnel recovery (less policy), better align bilateral and multilateral ap- the development of an enduring global building and sustaining an international proaches to improving capability, capacity, PR community. network of willing and capable partners and interoperability and in the process, The strategy is organized into five is a major objective and mission-essential strengthen the global JPR community. major multinational lines of effort (LOE), task for JPRA, as the agency pursues Lieutenant Colonel Georg Stauch all derived from the agency’s authorities; its strategic vision of achieving seam- of the German army arrived at JPRA essential, specified, and implied tasks; and less, full-spectrum personnel recovery in January 2018 and is JPRA’s first aligned with the priorities of the Joint through enduring global integration and FLO. On May 8, 2018, this valuable Staff J7 Director’s Campaign Plan for interoperability.9 relationship was formally recognized Joint Force Development: The JPRA charter includes three with a ceremonial posting of the Federal separate references that give it specified •• LOE1: Strategy and Planning Republic of Germany’s flag at JPRA authority and responsibility in the area of •• LOE2: Bilateral Engagement headquarters. JPRA looks forward to multinational engagement.10 The charter: •• LOE3: Multilateral Engagement welcoming additional allied FLOs from LOE4: Strategic Communication the United Kingdom and Poland in mid– directs JPRA to “provide a team of •• •• LOE5: Education and Training. fiscal year 2019. recognized experts to support DOD, •• interagency [community], and allied The MCDC program is a major ICPRC Supports NATO efforts to identify and meet current LOE3 activity and helps JPRA advance its Commitment to JPR and future PR challenges” organizational goals in significant ways. In 2015, NATO ACT, through its directs JPRA to “maintain direct By providing a structured and proven •• Capability Development Division, initi- liaison with DOD components, the forum to collaboratively develop and in- ated efforts to establish JPR as a key interagency [community], and multi- troduce new nonmaterial capabilities, the developmental focus, to be pursued national partners” program is an ideal venue through which through a number of interrelated authorizes JPRA the “appointment JPRA can execute its directed responsi- •• activities. These included analysis of of allied personnel to serve in JPRA” bilities in the multinational arena. Among whether JPR should become a defined (after coordination with Air Force the foremost of these is ensuring that discipline within the Alliance as a means Manpower, Personnel, and Services). senior leaders—military, diplomatic, and to better establish standards of train- civil—recognize the importance of the In addition to the charter, DOD ing and professionalize execution of PR mission area and appropriately pre- Directive 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in this essential mission area. In February pare and plan accordingly. The ICPRC the Department of Defense, further estab- 2016, NATO formally promulgated guidebook does just that. lishes that JPRA shall: Allied Joint Publication 3-7, Allied JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Gayvert 109 4 Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel Medical Modular Approaches project James Mattis, “Memorandum for All Department of Defense Personnel,” Octo- in a Hostile Environment. In March is developing a concept for modular, ber 5, 2017, available at 110 Joint Doctrine / Building Joint Personnel Recovery JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Boatswain’s mate seaman apprentice assigned to Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 prepares U.S. Navy Improved Navy Lighterage System causeway ferry for on-loading during Joint Logistics Over the Shore 2016, Naval Magazine Indian Island, Washington, June 13, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/Kenneth W. Norman) JP 4-0 was developed to provide Joint Publication 4-0, the doctrinal foundation for logistics planning, execution, and assessment in support of joint operations. It focuses on the integration of strategic, opera- Joint Logistics tional, and tactical support efforts while leveraging the global JLEnt to affect the By Andrew Keene mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to sustain a joint force commander’s concept of operations. he Joint Staff Director, Logistics revised JP 4-0 in 2000, 2008, and Additionally, it provides guidance for Directorate (J4), approved the 2013. In 2000, JP 4-0 introduced the joint logistics, describes core logistics T revision of Joint Publication concept of focused logistics and sus- functions essential to success, and offers (JP) 4-0, Joint Logistics. The publica- tainment for effective combat power. a framework for combatant commanders tion, signed by the Director of Joint In 2008, the JP 4-0 update shifted and subordinate commanders to integrate Force Development (J7), is the latest emphasis by introducing the joint capabilities from national, multinational, keystone document of the joint doc- logistics environment and joint logis- Services, and combat support agencies trine logistics series since 1995. The tics imperatives. The 2013 revision to provide forces properly equipped and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff introduced the concept of the joint trained, when and where required. approved the first official version of logistics enterprise (JLEnt) while pro- The 2018 version of JP 4-0 is not JP 4-0 in 1995. Since then, the joint viding guidance on coordinating and a radical departure from the previous doctrine development community has synchronizing joint logistics. version. The majority of changes ensure the publication now contains the most current figures, terms, definitions, and Lieutenant Andrew Keene, Navy Supply Corps, USN, is Assistant to the Strategy and Readiness Division references based on changes to other JPs Chief, Joint Staff J4. in the joint doctrine library since approval JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 Keene 111 of the 2013 JP 4-0 version. Most nota- bly, the 2018 version contains five joint logistics focus areas: warfighter readiness, Joint Publications (JPs) Under Revision competition below armed conflict, global (to be signed within 6 months) integration, innovation, and strength- JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States ening alliance and partner networks. These will guide joint logisticians in the JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations performance of the integrating functions JP 3-05, Special Operations needed for successful joint operations. JP 3-06, Joint Urban Operations The joint community’s recommenda- tions resulted in the consolidation of JP JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations 4-06, Mortuary Affairs, into the JP 4-0 JP 3-11, Operations in CBRN Environments revision. The revision also incorporates JP 3-16, Multinational Operations updated information regarding health services from the 2017 release of JP JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense 4-02, Joint Health Services. It updates JP 3-28, Defense Support to Civil Authorities the description of the directive author- JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance ity for logistics and includes amplified information regarding the roles of U.S. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations Transportation Command and combat JP 3-60, Joint Targeting support agencies such as the Defense JP 3-72, Nuclear Operations Logistics Agency within the JLEnt. The latest revision more adequately describes JP 4-0, Joint Logistics technology and how it can enable the JP 4-04, Contingency Basing joint force commander to effectively con- trol logistics within the operational area, JPs Revised (signed within last 6 months) if leveraged effectively. The technology section describes how JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations new technologies, in the form of informa- JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations tion systems, decision support tools, and JP 3-14, Space Operations evolving communications capabilities, can improve visibility of logistics processes, JP 3-15.1, Counter–Improvised Explosive Device Operations resources, and requirements and provide JP 3-26, Counterterrorism the information necessary to make effec- JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Joint Staff Doctrine tive decisions. Additionally, the revision Sponsor Signature) includes clarifying information for base operating support integrator and lead JP 4-09, Distribution Operations Service support. Joint Doctrine Note 1-17, Strategy Because of the interrelationship between logistics and all phases of op- erations, JP 4-0 was developed in close collaboration with other recent versions within the JP 4-0 series. The appendices Joint Strategic Campaign Plan. This ver- of joint publications, ensuring continuity provide horizontal and vertical linkages sion provides joint force commanders between keystone JPs to address strategic, to the keystone and within the joint and their component commanders with operational, and tactical issues. Logistics doctrine publication hierarchy to best processes that allow for that flexibility and support will continue to evolve. As the support joint operations (JP 3-0) and the the ability to provide streamlined logistics JLEnt develops updated processes in foundation for joint doctrine publica- support in an uncertain and challenging the new logistics environment, the joint tion hierarchy reset considerations that environment. JFQ doctrine development community will elaborate on or improve joint doctrine capture those best practices and integrate efficiencies. them into JP 4-0 through the adaptive The updated JP 4-0 is a big step in doctrine process. aligning logistics joint doctrine with In an effort to reflect adaptive the processes used by logisticians in the doctrine, this keystone now contains combatant commands and the guidance appendices for each subsequent JP in the National Military Strategy and 112 Joint Doctrine / Joint Publication 4-0 JFQ 91, 4th Quarter 2018 call for entries for the 2019 Secretary of Defense and 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Essay Competitions Are you a professional military education (PME) student? Imagine your winning essay published in a future issue of Joint Force Quarterly, catching the eye of the Secretary and Chairman as well as contributing to the debate on an important national security issue. These rewards, along with a monetary prize, await the winners. Who’s Eligible? Students, including international students, at U.S. PME colleges, schools, and other programs, and Service research fellows. What’s Required? Research and write an original, unclassified essay on some aspect of U.S. national, defense, or military strategy. The essay may be written in conjunction with a course writing requirement. Important: Please note that entries must be selected by and submitted through your college. When? Anytime during the 2018–2019 academic year. Students are encouraged to begin early and avoid the spring rush. Final judging and selection of winners take place May 2019, at NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington, DC. For further information, see your college’s essay coordinator or go to: http://ndupress.ndu.edu/About/Essay-Competitions/ JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY ISSUE NINETY-ONE, 4TH QUARTER 2018 Flickr Pinterest Facebook Twitter www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jfq/jfq.htm You can also find us on: can also find You Visit us online at: http://ndupress.ndu.edu Visit JFQ is available online at the Joint Electronic Library: articles, occasional papers, books, and other publications. site is a great place to find information on new and upcomingsite is a great place to find information With 20,000 unique visitors each month, the NDU Press WebWith 20,000 unique visitors each month, JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY National Defense University, Washington, DC National Defense University, Washington, The Armed Forces Officer“This new edition of The Armed Forces articulates the ethical and moral underpin- nings at the core of our profession. The special trust in us by the Nation and confidence placed we protect is built upon this foundation. I commend members of our officer corps to embrace the principles of this important book and practice them daily in the performance of your du- I expect you to imbue these values in the next generation of leaders.” ties. More importantly, Available at ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/1159223/the-armed-forces-officer/ New from NDU Press New from Officer The Armed Forces 2017 • 212 pp. ChairmanStaff: of the Joint Chiefs of Dunford, Jr., From the Foreword by General Joseph F. C. Marshall, then serving George “In 1950, the great Soldier-Statesman Secretary as the of Officer page for a new book titled The ArmedDefense, signed a cover Forces . That original Marshall, who later explained that was written by none other than S.L.A. version of this book Secretary Marshall had ‘inspired the undertakingpersonal conviction that American due to his military officers, of whatever service, should share common ground morally.’ ethically and it addressed an of the Cold War, emergence at the dawn of the nuclear age and the Written officer a strategy of nuclear deterrence, corps tasked with developing facing unprecedented deployments, and adapting to the creation of the Department- of Defense and other new orga nizations necessary to manage the threats of a new global order. Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff University Press by National Defense Have you checked out NDU Press online lately? Have you checked