A Case for a Tanker Capability for the U. S. Marine Corpsâ•Ž Heavy Lift

University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange

Masters Theses Graduate School

5-2005

A Case for a Tanker Capability for the U. S. Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter

Anthony Cain Archer University of Tennessee - Knoxville

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Recommended Citation Archer, Anthony Cain, "A Case for a Tanker Capability for the U. S. Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter. " Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, 2005. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/1587

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Anthony Cain Archer entitled "A Case for a Tanker Capability for the U. S. Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.

Robert B. Richards, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Richard J. Ranaudo, U. Peter Solies

Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges

Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

(Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Anthony Cain Archer entitled “A Case for a Tanker Capability for the U. S. Marine Corps’ Heavy Lift Replacement Helicopter.” I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science, with a major in Aviation Systems.

Robert B. Richards Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

Richard J. Ranaudo

U. Peter Solies

Acceptance for the Council:

Anne Mayhew Vice Chancellor and Dean of Graduate Studies

(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

A CASE FOR A TANKER CAPABILITY FOR THE U. S. MARINE CORPS’ HEAVY LIFT REPLACEMENT HELICOPTER

A Thesis Presented for the Master of Science Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Anthony Cain Archer May 2005

DEDICATION

I wish to thank my major professor, Bob Richards, for his advice and guidance. Also, I would not have been able to begin, craft, and complete this effort without the support and love of my wife Jennifer.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who have helped me complete my Master of Science in Aviation Systems, and specifically, completing this thesis project. First I must thank Bob Richards for his guidance and convincing me to write on this subject matter. Also I want to thank everyone at the program office (PMA- 261) who helped with the details of the technical and problematic aspects of this work. Additionally, my gratitude goes to all my friends and co-workers at Air Test and Evaluation Squadron TWO ONE (HX-21) who listened and commented on my ideas, good and not so good. Finally, I wish to thank my family and close friends who encouraged me along the way to make this work a reality.

ABSTRACT The idea behind this research project was to stimulate interest, dialogue, exploratory investigation, and the application of resources into the concept of an organic, rotary wing based, tanker asset for the U.S Navy’s Expeditionary Strike Group, and its future operations and role in support of Sea Power 21. Material presented was gleaned from numerous aircraft flight manuals, program office documents, contractor literature, and the author’s experiences as a Fleet Marine Force CH-53E pilot. Mission systems are presented using readily available equipment in untested configurations using proven tactics and historical experiences. The results and conclusions make plain the need for an organic tanker asset to become part of the future of littoral warfare and the Navy’s vision for future warfighting strategy.

PREFACE All material within this document is Unclassified. Specifications, capabilities, and characteristics of specific aircraft or equipment were obtained from aircraft flight manuals or other public sources. The discussion of proposed usage or capabilities of current or existing aircraft and equipment, as well as analysis, conclusions, and recommendations are presented as the opinions of this author and are not an official position of the United States Department of Defense, the Naval Air Systems Command, or the U. S. Marine Corps.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I...... 1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1 1.1 Background...... 1 1.1.1 Sea Power 21...... 2 1.1.2 The Expeditionary Strike Group Needs an Organic Tanker Asset...... 5 1.1.3 An Organic Tanker Solution for the Expeditionary Strike Group...... 5 1.2 USMC Heavy Lift Replacement Program...... 6 1.2.1 The HLR Helicopter ...... 7 1.2.2 The Acquisition Strategy ...... 8 1.2.3 Program Status...... 10 SECTION II ...... 11 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & DEVELOPMENT...... 11 2.1 HLR Development...... 11 2.1.1 HLR Capabilities ...... 11 2.1.2 Physical Specifications ...... 12 2.1.3 Performance Specifications ...... 14 2.2 HLR Tanker Specifications and Requirements ...... 15 2.2.1 Discussion...... 15 2.2.2 Requirements ...... 15 2.3 HLR Tanker Technical Proposals...... 22 2.3.1 Aerial Refueling: A Brief History...... 22 2.3.2 Aerial Refueling Store ...... 24 2.3.3 Aerial Refueling Drogue...... 24 2.3.4 Internal Fuel Cell ...... 26 SECTION III...... 28 TACTICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE HLR TANKER ...... 28 3.1 Measuring the Impact of the HLR Tanker ...... 28 3.1.1 Forcible Entry from the Sea...... 29 SECTION IV ...... 34 CONCLUSIONS...... 34 4.1 The Way Forward ...... 34 SECTION V...... 36 RECOMMENDATIONS...... 36 5.1 Actionable Tasks ...... 36 5.1.1 Marine Corps Combat Development Command...... 36 5.1.2 Program Manager Air 261 ...... 36 REFERENCES...... 37

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APPENDICES...... 39 VITA...... 43

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LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF TANKER CAPABILITIES ...... 17 TABLE 2: ESG AIRCRAFT REFUELING REQUIREMENTS ...... 18 TABLE 3: REFUELED COMBAT RADIUS INCREASES BY AIRCRAFT...... 32

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1. L CLASS SHIP ...... 2 FIGURE 2. AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP ...... 3 FIGURE 3. CH-53E HELICOPTER...... 7 FIGURE 4. HLR 3-VIEW DRAWING ...... 8 FIGURE 5. MV-22B ...... 20 FIGURE 6. AV-8B ...... 20 FIGURE 7. ESG AIRCRAFT FLIGHT ENVELOPE COMPARISON...... 21 FIGURE 8. AERIAL REFUELING STORE ...... 25 FIGURE 9. INTERNAL FUEL STORE AS INSTALLED IN THE KC-130 ...... 27 FIGURE 10. ARABIAN SEA...... 30 FIGURE 11. SEA OF JAPAN...... 33 FIGURE A-1 HLR INTEGRATED PROGRAM SCHEDULE..………………………………….40 FIGURE B-1 SARGENT FLETCHER WING POD DATA SHEET ……………………………..41 FIGURE C-1 SARGENT FLETCHER BUDDY-BUDDY STORE DATA SHEET ……...…………42

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AP Acquisition Plan ARG Amphibious Ready Group AVCAL Aviation Consolidated Allowance List BAC Boeing Aircraft Company CAG Carrier Air Group CBG Carrier Battle Group CNO Chief of Naval Operations DVE Degraded Visual Environment ECP Engineering Change Proposal EMW Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare ESG Expeditionary Strike Group GCE Ground Combat Element GW Gross Weight HLR Heavy Lift Replacement HQMC Headquarters Marine Corps IFR Instrument Flight Rules IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Committee JTF Joint Task Force KCAS Knots Calibrated Airspeed KIAS Knots Indicated Airspeed KTAS Knots True Airspeed MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit NATOPS Naval Air Training Operating and Procedures Standardization NAVAIR Naval Air Systems Command OEO Other Expeditionary Operations OMFTS Operational Maneuver from the Sea OPCON Operational Control ORD Operational Requirements Document P3I Pre-Planned Product Improvement SAC Sikorsky Aircraft Company SDD System Development and Demonstration STOM Ship to Objective Maneuver SOA Sustained Operations Ashore SOC Special Operations Capable TOC Total Ownership Costs TOGW Takeoff Gross Weight USMC United States Marine Corps USN United States Navy VFR Visual Flight Rules VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Aerial Refueling: The refueling of an aircraft in flight by another aircraft.

Air Refueling Control Point (ARCP): The planned geographic point over which the receiver arrives in position with the assigned tanker.

Blue Water operations: Shipboard flight operations at sea in which a divert to land is unreachable, even with the use of a tanker.

Milestone B: Acquisition decision point to determine if results warrant establishing a new acquisition program.

Pre-Planned Product Improvement: Designed-in provision for future enhancement. May require initial version to have excess capability to accommodate later enhancement.

Pre-Contact Position: A stabilized position three to five feet behind the aerial refueling drogue.

Refueling Position: A stabilized position behind the tanker that is maintained while taking on fuel.

Spiral Development: An iterative acquisition process in which a capability is identified but does not specify how the final system specifications will allow for growth and integration of new technologies.

System Development and Demonstration: An acquisition process to develop a system or an increment of capability while reducing integration and manufacturing risk.

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

The Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is typically composed of U. S. Navy (USN) L- class ships, Figure 1, which embark a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and is deployed to various areas around the world. The MEU is composed of two elements, a Ground Combat Element (GCE) and an Aviation Combat Element (ACE). The MEU, by way of the ARG, is America’s rapid response force used to control situations that might develop in which the United States, or its allies, has a vested interest. For more than twenty years the ARG has embarked at least one aircraft model, which has had the capability to be refueled in flight. For many of those years, two types of aircraft have had an aerial refueling capability; the AV-8B Harrier attack jet, and the CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter. Although the MEU commander has U. S. Marine Corps (USMC) KC-130 Hercules tanker aircraft under his operational control (OPCON) when deployed, these aircraft are typically designated as “theater assets”, and not always immediately available because they are land-based aircraft. It is not unusual for the KC-130 aircraft to be hundreds or sometimes thousands of miles from where the ARG is conducting training, contingency operations, or real world expeditionary operations.

In the instances where the tankers have been utilized during missions, they have proven invaluable in making the mission a success by their ability to refuel other aircraft in flight, thereby extending the range of the refueled aircraft dramatically. Such was the case in Operation Eastern Exit conducted in January of 1991, in which two CH-53E helicopters from the USS Guam, carrying a 60-man security force, were refueled twice en-route during a 466 nautical mile flight to evacuate the embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, literally minutes before being overrun by rebels. The first refueling ensured

Figure 1. L Class Ship Source: USS Wasp Official US Navy website photograph archives.

enough fuel to reach the embassy while the second provided enough fuel to begin the return flight to the ship. By the time the operation had ended, over 280 Americans and foreign nationals from 30 different countries had been safely evacuated.

1.1.1 Sea Power 21 In 2002, Admiral Vern Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) outlined his vision for tomorrow’s Navy. He described a globally distributed force that delivers unprecedented firepower, defensive assurance, and operational independence to joint force commanders. Three fundamental concepts make up the framework of Sea Power 21 and the Navy’s dominance over our enemies in tomorrow’s dynamic environment: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing. The transformation will be implemented using a Global Concept of Operations to provide widely dispersed combat power by creating independent operating groups capable of responding concurrently around the world.

Figure 2. Amphibious Ready Group Source: USS Wasp Official US Navy website photograph archives.

Key to this transformation is the creation of the Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG), consisting of an Amphibious Ready Group, Figure 2, augmented by surface combatants and submarines. These groups will conduct missions in lesser threat environments. As operational concepts evolve, and new systems and tactics are developed, the Navy will leverage this increase in aviation capability. The Global Concept of Operations calls for the creation of 12 Expeditionary Strike Groups, the same number as the newly designated Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), highlighting the importance of possessing a highly mobile, decisive strike capability, to provide presence and project power, if required, in the growing number of littoral, regional conflicts worldwide. Admiral Clark goes on to write, “New platforms being developed for Expeditionary Strike Groups should be designed to realize this warfighting potential” (Clark 10).

1.1.2.1 Sea Strike When operational objectives cannot be achieved from over the horizon, it’s time for the Navy-Marine Corps team to move on land. Using the combination of vertical and horizontal envelopment tactics, Marines will conduct a ship-to-objective maneuver by exploiting the maritime maneuver space made possible with the MV-22B tilt-rotor assault aircraft. This will increase the reach of sea-based infantry five times the current medium lift rotary wing asset, the CH-46E. Taking advantage of the MV-22B’s aerial refueling capability could increase this dominance even more (Clark 6).

1.1.2.2 Sea Shield One of the capabilities of Sea Shield is Sea and Littoral Control. Control of the battlespace near the landmasses is absolutely essential to ensure quick access and the freedom of maneuver for joint maritime forces moving from the sea to objective areas, which may be on the beach or deep inland. Arguably, aerial dominance is a function of aircraft sortie rate, on station time, combat radius, and threat. Because surface and subsurface threats include small, fast, though lightly armed surface combatants, as well as an array of floating, moored, and buried mines, vertical (aerial) movement of forces is the fastest, safest, and preferred method of moving assets ashore (Clark 7).

1.1.2.3 Sea Basing It can be said that Sea Basing is the Core of Sea Power 21. Off our enemy’s coast, it puts to sea all the capabilities which are critical to operational success: offensive and defensive firepower, command and control assets, maneuver forces, and probably most importantly, logistics. By doing this, it reduces the vulnerability of forces and supplies ashore, protects the resources required to defend the forces by risk avoidance, and increases operational mobility, which is key to all maneuver warfare doctrine. However to be fully successful, the aforementioned advantages must not come with the traditional limitations normally encountered by sea-based forces (Clark 8).

1.1.2 The Expeditionary Strike Group Needs an Organic Tanker Asset

The Expeditionary Strike Group needs an organic (ship-based, under the operational control of the MEU Commander) tanker asset that can provide aerial refueling support to receiver capable aircraft that make up the ESG today and the aircraft that will be embarked in the future. USN Carrier Battle Groups (CBG) have enjoyed this capability since the Vietnam era using A-3, A-6, and S-3 carrier launched aircraft. Even more recently, the U.S. Navy incorporated this important capability in its new F-18 E/F Super Hornet models, which are being introduced and serving in the fleet today.

The Carrier Air Group (CAG) commander has long understood the importance of having tanker assets organically attached to support the myriad of missions of a carrier embarked air wing. Not only does it give the CAG incredible tactical advantage and flexibility, it is also an important safety asset during blue water operations when aircraft in fuel-critical situations don’t have the option of diverting to a land-based airfield. Organic tanker assets are a force multiplier for the wing commander; tankers increase the range and endurance of all carrier based, aerial refueling capable aircraft attached to Carrier Battle Group.

1.1.3 An Organic Tanker Solution for the Expeditionary Strike Group Program Manager Air 261 (PMA-261), Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), and requirements personnel from Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) have developed and defined the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR) to design, procure, and field an improved H-53 helicopter with greater lift capability and range. Much work has been done in the last two years and will culminate in the fall of 2005 with what is hoped will be a decision for official program initiation and approval for entry into the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase (PMA-261, 2004).

This new production helicopter, properly designed and equipped, could fulfill the ESG requirement for an organic tanker asset. If begun during the early phases of the

acquisition program, a conceptual design study of a tanker capability of the helicopter could be initiated to analyze the tactical benefits and design requirements. Early inclusion of the requirements for a tanker capability would not have to be implemented in the initial design but could be part of a spiral development or a pre-planned product improvement (P3I). Lessons learned could be leveraged from both the C-130 and the F- 18 communities on peculiar and specific equipment required to conduct tanker operations, as well as conducting trade studies exploring state-of-the-art systems, such as buddy-stores currently in use by many fixed wing platforms. If successful, the HLR helicopter could become a multi-mission success story on par with the F/A-18 E/F program and provide the MEU commander capability and versatility that has not been enjoyed by forward deployed littoral forces before.

1.2 USMC HEAVY LIFT REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

The current Marine Corps heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53E, Figure 3, designed in the 1960s and introduced in 1980 as an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to the CH-53D, has developed significant fatigue life, interoperability, maintenance supportability, and performance degradation concerns. In order to support the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and the Joint Task Force (JTF) in the 21st century joint environment, an improved CH-53 is needed to maintain the Marine Corps’ heavy lift capability through the year 2025 and beyond. This helicopter must provide improvements in operational capability, interoperability, reliability, and maintainability while reducing costs. Analysis has concluded there are no non-material alternatives that will satisfy this requirement. The Heavy Lift Replacement program mission is to provide an air vehicle system, which will provide the very best solution for the Marine Corps’ vertical heavy-lift mission. The HLR program is required to provide full system capability at Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in FY15, with Full Operational Capability scheduled for FY21. An integrated program schedule is included in Appendix A (PMA-261, 2003).

Figure 3. CH-53E Helicopter Source: U.S. Navy Internet website photo archives, PO1 Jeffrey Truett

1.2.1 The HLR Helicopter As the Nation’s premier expeditionary force, the Marine Corps is prepared to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, anywhere national interests require. Marine Corps Strategy 21 and the capstone concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) build upon and support future warfighting challenges depicted in Joint Vision 2020. Specifically, HLR supports the Joint Functional Concepts of Dominant Maneuver and Focused Logistics. HLR supports Sea Power 21, specifically the MAGTF’s participation in Sea Strike and Sea Basing by enabling rapid, decisive operations and the early termination of conflict. EMW establishes the basis for the organization, deployment, and employment of the Marine Corps to conduct maneuver warfare, and to provide the means or opportunities to make joint and multinational operations possible. EMW operational concepts include Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), Sustained Operations Ashore (SOA), and Other Expeditionary Operations.

Figure 4. HLR 3-View Drawing Source: PMA-261 briefing to the FY04 Operational Advisory Group, Dec 2003

Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), a subset concept of OMFTS, enables forces to rapidly move directly from ships to objectives deep inland. STOM facilitates the rapid, long-distance air movement of heavy equipment, cargo, and personnel that supports the evolving joint fundamental applications of agility, maneuverability, adaptability, and sustainability (PMA-261, 2003).

1.2.2 The Acquisition Strategy An Acquisition Plan (AP) to address this shortfall, originally called CH-53E modernization, later known as CH-53X, and now referred to as the Heavy Lift Replacement (HLR), Figure 4, was initiated to design, procure, and field a new CH-53 series helicopter. The new aircraft will increase heavy lift capabilities in support of expeditionary and sea-based operations. It is planned to incorporate systems and

technologies that will maximize interoperability and commonality with existing systems (PMA-261, 2003).

1.2.2.1 Source Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (SAC), as the sole designer, developer, and manufacturer for the CH-53E, is the only known source with the necessary skills, experience, facilities, and manufacturing techniques to meet the Government’s needs. Moreover, award of any follow-on contracts to any other source likely would result in a substantial duplication of cost to the Government that will not be recovered through competition. Therefore, the Government has determined that SAC is the only known firm, which possesses the necessary knowledge, experience, and technical data to provide and perform the required efforts (PMA-261, 2003).

1.2.2.2 Competition The HLR, which will be a major CH-53E engineering change that will result in a new CH-53 series helicopter, will be procured by other than full and open competition under title 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(1), only one responsible source, as implemented by FAR 6.302- 1(b)(1). SAC is the only known qualified source that has the technical data; unique logistics support experience, and detailed knowledge/familiarity with the CH-53E to provide the required support within the required time frames. Therefore, it is planned for contracts and provisioned orders to be awarded to SAC by other than full and open competition.

The SDD contract will contain provisions for the procurement of interim spares and support necessary to the conduct of Contractor and Development Test and Evaluation, and early Operational Assessments. Competition for spares and repair parts will be sought, promoted, and sustained through the development of documentation and provisions for the data rights necessary to the implementation of Performance Based Logistics during the CH-53X Production and Deployment program phase (PMA-261, 2003).

1.2.3 Program Status As of November 2004, PMA-261 was moving forward toward Milestone B approval and continues to refine the requirements, conduct engineering trade studies, and evaluate risk reduction alternatives, in preparation for SDD contract award. Upcoming milestones will include approval from the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC) of the HLR ORD; a Systems Requirement Review and risk reduction contracting will follow.

The PMA-261 systems engineering team completed the Technology Readiness Assessment and both a draft Air Vehicle Specification and Engine Specification have been completed. Under a contract from PMA-261, Sikorsky is conducting a conceptual design study of the HLR, which will analyze the design compromises based on weight and performance estimates. The program office has received the completed Structural Design Criteria and Tail Rotor Effectiveness studies. These results, along with the results of the Avionics and Survivability studies are being evaluated and their findings are being used to refine the conceptual design of the vehicle.

NAVAIR is currently working with the program office and SAC to ensure supportability requirements for the HLR are incorporated in the Air Vehicle Specification, Risk Reduction Statement of Work, and the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (PMA-261, 2005).

SECTION II

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & DEVELOPMENT

2.1 HLR DEVELOPMENT

The HLR air vehicle currently being proposed will be based on the existing USMC CH- 53E helicopter. The basic aircraft system configuration will look similar to the current model but will incorporate many improved systems leveraging technological advancements made in rotary wing technology since the aircraft was designed in the mid 1970s. These may include, but are not limited to the following: 4th generation Main Rotor Blade, elastomeric rotor head with electric blade fold, split torque main gearbox and new nose gear boxes, composite empennage components, fly by wire Flight Control System, fully integrated glass cockpit with embedded navigation, communication and open architecture mission systems, and must demonstrate survivability on the 21st century battlefield (PMA-261, 2003).

2.1.1 HLR Capabilities

The HLR will be the only Marine Corps helicopter capable of effectively meeting the Marine Air Ground Task Force vertical heavy-lift assault transport requirements. It supports many crucial Direct Fire and Maneuver mission tasks by providing combat assault transport of heavy weapons, equipment and supplies as a primary function. Mission capabilities include:

Delivering combat assault transport of troops as a secondary function. Supporting Forward Arming and Refueling Points as well as providing Rapid Ground Refueling. Performing assault support for evacuation operations and other maritime special operations. Augmenting local search and rescue assets and providing casualty evacuation from the field to suitable medical facilities or other aero medical aircraft. Conducting tactical retrieval and recovery operations for downed aircraft, equipment and personnel.

Providing airborne control and coordination for assault support operations. Maintaining a self-defense capability against ground-to-air and air-to-air threats. Retaining the capability to self-deploy and conducting extended range operations employing aerial refueling. Presenting the capability to operate from amphibious shipping, other floating bases and austere shore bases. Maintaining the capability to operate at night, in adverse weather and under Instrument Meteorological Conditions at extended ranges (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2 Physical Specifications

2.1.2.1 Transportability The ORD states the HLR Air Vehicle must be air transportable by C-5 Galaxy and C-17 Globemaster III strategic-lift aircraft. The transported air vehicle and any removed sub- assembly shall meet the dimensional, towing, lifting, tie-down, clearance, access, pressurization, temperature, vibration, and load limit constraints of the specified method of transport (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.2 Shipboard Compatibility The logistics footprint for operations aboard L-class amphibious assault ships must be less than or equal to the current CH-53E requirement. USMC logistics footprint will be based upon a 16-aircraft squadron acting as an element of a composite group or four acting as an element of a composite squadron. The footprint must support 90 days Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL) exclusive of petroleum, oil, and lubricants and ordnance. The HLR Air Vehicle AVCAL and Individual Material Requirement List and Support Equipment footprint shall fit within the existing shipboard logistics footprint of the CH-53E detachment on current L-class ships. Aircraft size shall be similar to the current CH-53E dimensions and cannot exceed CH-53E flight-ready length or width (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.3 Internal Cargo System The cargo system shall be able to accommodate a centerline row of standard USMC 40” x 48” wooden pallets, Type 463L pallets as specified in MIL-P-27443 (pallet Types I, II and III), and standard 48” airdrop skid-boards identified in FMFM 7-47. Additionally, the internal cargo system shall be convertible to a flat floor condition without roller removal from the aircraft such that wheeled vehicle(s) may be rolled and personnel may walk on the resulting cargo floor (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.4 External Auxiliary Tanks The aircraft structure and fuel subsystem shall be able to utilize 650-gallon external fuel tanks. The plumbing for these tanks shall be designed in such a way that the tanks are able to accept fuel via ground and aerial refueling (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.5 Range Extension Tanks The aircraft structure and fuel subsystem shall be able to utilize internal range extension fuel tanks. The plumbing for these tanks shall be designed in such a way that the tanks are able to accept fuel via ground and aerial refueling (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.6 Pressure Refueling The fuel subsystem shall allow the aircraft to be pressure refueled through the single point refueling adapter, the air-to-air refueling probe, and the Hover In Flight Refueling (HIFR) pressure refueling system (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.7 Air-to-Air Refueling Compatibility The aircraft shall be capable of receiving fuel in-flight and must be compatible with US and Allied tanker aircraft using a hose and drogue refueling system and associated procedures, airspeeds, and altitudes for air-to-air refueling (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.8 Air-to-Air Refueling Provision When missions dictate that receiving fuel in-flight is required for the mission, provisions shall be made for the installation of an air-to-air refueling probe kit. The kit shall be

delivered installed on each aircraft, and shall be considered as Special Equipment. Cockpit controls, indicators, and internal fuel lines shall be provided for an aerial pressure refueling system. When the refueling probe kit is used, tanks shall receive fuel simultaneously (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.2.9 Aerial Refueling Flow Rates With the main and auxiliary tanks receiving fuel simultaneously, applicable fuel system components shall be capable of functioning at an aerial refueling flow rate of 175 gallons per minute (gpm) (minimum) to 230 gpm (maximum) at a pressure not to exceed 55 psig at the probe nozzle (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.3 Performance Specifications

2.1.3.1 Speed The following shall be performed at a pressure altitude of 3000 feet and 91.5 Degrees Fahrenheit (° F). a. The HLR shall have a maximum continuous level-flight airspeed of not less than 150 KTAS for the maximum internal load Takeoff Gross Weight (TOGW). b. At the TOGW for the 110 nm SOA / External Lift mission with a 24,000 lbs / 56 ft2 load, the HLR shall have a maximum continuous level flight airspeed of not less than 130 KTAS. c. At the maximum external gross weight (GW), with a 29,200 lbs / 56 ft2 external load, the HLR shall have a maximum continuous level flight airspeed of not less than 110 KTAS (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.3.2 Maneuverability The operational flight envelope for gross weights up to 74,000 lbs and airspeeds up to 130 KCAS shall permit defensive and obstacle avoidance maneuvers at angles of bank angles not less than 53 deg at sea level on a standard day and not less than 40 deg at 3000 ft at 91.5° F (PMA-261, 2004).

2.1.3.3 Mission Performance The HLR helicopter will be capable of flying the six representative OMFTS/OEO/SOA mission profiles in support of MAGTF and JTF commanders. The aircraft must perform

the defined missions in adverse weather, at night, in low visibility, to unimproved surfaces, in moderate turbulence, under Instrument Flight Rules, Visual Flight Rules, Instrument Meteorological Conditions, Visual Meteorological Conditions, and Degraded Visual Environments unless otherwise excluded (PMA-261, 2004).

2.2 HLR TANKER SPECIFICATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

2.2.1 Discussion

To provide the Marine Corps and Joint Force Commanders maximum flexibility, the HLR would be able to execute tanker missions with the installation of a mission kit, thereby not interfering with the helicopter’s primary or secondary missions. The mission kit would consist of components that would enable the aircraft to be converted from the normal, cargo and personnel configuration, to conduct tanker operations. This is critically important because the Marine Corps is a relatively small force, and will procure a limited number of heavy-lift assets. Additionally, typically only four to six helicopters will be embarked with the ESG when forward deployed. To convince decision makers that an HLR tanker makes sense, there must be no statistical degradation of the heavy lift mission, while at the same time enhancing the capabilities of the receiving aircraft, as it maximizes naval power projection through increased on-scene endurance and greater combat radius. Enhanced on-station presence and improved combat radius compresses deployment and employment timelines, decreases sortie generation rates, reduces transit times, provides commanders more options and greater flexibility, and increases the operational effectiveness of every Sailor and Marine in the battlespace.

2.2.2 Requirements In order for an aircraft to conduct tanker operations it must have the following characteristics. It must have enough payload capacity to give fuel to one or more receiving aircraft. Further, the method of transferring the fuel must be compatible with the way in which the receiver takes fuel in-flight. The tanker must also be able to fly to some predetermined point, loiter long enough to conduct the fuel transfer, and return to

base (sea-base). Finally, some, or its entire flight envelope must overlap that of the receiver’s airspeed range to allow the fuel transfer to take place.

2.2.2.1 Fuel Load Non-strategic tanker operations are generally conducted for one of two reasons: to refuel aircraft in an emergency situation or to extend the combat radius and on-station time of the receiving aircraft. At the present time, there are two types of carrier aircraft capable of serving as tankers in the Carrier Battle Group: the S-3 and F-18 E/F. Current ESG aerial refueling capable aircraft receive fuel from the KC-130 Hercules. If the HLR is to make a viable tanker, then it must do one or both of the following: be capable of giving fuel on the same order of magnitude as the aforementioned aircraft, or be capable to give enough fuel to receiver aircraft that it significantly extends their combat radius or loiter time. Table 1 summarizes the fuel payload of the current tankers and what an HLR tanker might be capable of carrying.

From Table 1, it can be seen the HLR tanker could give a comparable amount of fuel as is given today by the tactical tankers and could carry approximately 70% as much fuel in the cargo compartment alone as the KC-130, assuming a 2,500 gallon internal fuel tank (the CH-53E currently utilizes a mission kit that allows it to carry 2,400 gallons of fuel internally in support of Rapid Ground Refueling (RGR) missions). In fact, some circumstances may result in the HLR tanker having as much, or more fuel available for transfer, than the KC-130, depending on mission configuration and the distances the KC- 130 must fly to reach the area of operations of the ESG.

2.2.2.2 Receiver Fuel Requirements Determining the receiver’s fuel requirement is difficult unless the specific mission is known. Fuel requirements to extend sortie time while waiting to execute a Close Air Support (CAS) mission are different than ferrying the aircraft from one point to another.

Table 1: Summary of Tanker Capabilities

Fuel Not Maximum Fuel Payload (lbs)(2)(3) Available Fuel for Available for Transfer (2) Transfer (1)(2) Aircraft Internal External Store

A-6 16,000 8,000 2,000 3,600 22,400

S-3 13,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 15,000

F-18 E/F 15,000 14,000 2,000 6,000 25,000

KC-130 45,900 0 24,500 500 24,000 (5)

HLR(4) 6700 8900 17,000 1,500 31,100

Note: (1) Does not include fuel required for tanker to fly to and from the refueling point. (2) Payloads rounded to nearest 100 lbs. (3) External and Store Payloads are for a typical mission configuration. (4) Proposed capability (5) Does not include internal fuel

However, a good rule of thumb for tanker operations can be applied for our purposes of comparison. Unless operational necessity dictates, the receiver aircraft should never be put into a “must plug” situation; in other words, if the aircraft is unable to receive fuel at the aerial refueling control point (ARCP), then it must be able to safely return to base or divert to another landing site where fuel is available.

In order to comply with NATOPS requirements for fuel remaining after landing, and to allow some time to loiter at the refueling point and upon arrival for landing, the aircraft should have used no less than 40% of its takeoff fuel load prior to arriving at the ARCP. Table 2 is a summary of what each aircraft would take on from the tanker observing the limitations outlined. Assuming the HLR fuel consumption rate is similar to the current CH-53E rate during transit, and using a two-hour tanker transit time, the HLR tanker will use about 7,000 lbs of fuel and will need another 2,500 for loitering at the ship and for

Table 2: ESG Aircraft Refueling Requirements Fuel Required Fuel Remaining from Tanker Aircraft Total Fuel (lbs) (60%) (40% of takeoff) CH-53E 15,500 9300 6200

HLR 15,500 9300 6200

MV-22B 9900 5900 3900

AV-8B 7,300 4400 2900

JSF 13,000 7800 5200

Note: All fuel weights rounded to nearest 100 lbs.

NATOPS fuel requirements after landing. Subtracting the 9,500 lbs fuel requirement from Table 1 leaves more than 21,000 lbs available to transfer to receiver aircraft. Aircraft typically operate in what is called a section, two aircraft conducting the same mission; each section consists of a flight lead and a wingman. So to meet the receiver’s mission requirements, nominally the HLR tanker would have 10,500 lbs of fuel available for each aircraft. It should be noted that for mission planning purposes, the F-18E/F community plans about 2,500 lbs. of fuel per receiving aircraft when conducting its role as a mission tanker.

Considering the results presented in Table 2 and comparing them to the results of the above discussion, it can be seen, in the scenario developed, the HLR tanker would have more than enough fuel to meet the receiver’s needs. The 21,000 lbs total fuel available could refuel three CH-53E/HLR equivalents, or as many as five MV-22B aircraft. Many scenarios are possible and each mission would be peculiar to the situation depending on a myriad of factors.

2.2.2.3 HLR Flight Envelope For aerial tanking to be conducted, the HLR tanker must have a flight envelope that allows the receiver aircraft to fly at the same airspeeds, have acceptable flying qualities, and in the case of fixed wing aircraft and tilt rotor aircraft, have adequate stall margins. As stated in paragraph 2.1.3.1, sub-paragraph (a), the HLR shall have a maximum continuous level flight airspeed of not less than 150 KTAS for the maximum internal load TOGW. The maximum continuous airspeed of the current CH-53E is 150 KIAS, although several years ago it was 170 KIAS. The airspeed was reduced to increase airframe fatigue life. As will be shown, 160 KIAS is the nominal, minimum continuous airspeed that will be required to conduct the tanker mission.

2.2.2.4 Receiver Flight Envelope There are four aircraft that could be capable of receiving in-flight fuel from the HLR tanker when it is introduced into the fleet, sometime after 2014. The H-53 in its present version or the HLR version would certainly be capable given the fact the flight envelopes would be nearly identical. The MV-22B, Figure 5, due to begin Operational Evaluation summer of 2005, and scheduled to begin deploying in 2008, has an aerial refueling probe. The AV-8B, Figure 6, which takes off vertically then flies like a jet, has a retractable aerial refueling probe. Lastly, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), which will eventually replace the AV-8B, will be embarked aboard the ARG and will also be capable of aerial refueling. As with any proposed tanker-receiver combination, flight-testing must be conducted between the two aircraft and the fuel delivery system, which will be used, whether it is a probe-drogue system or a boom system. Flight-testing should include at a minimum; aircraft handling characteristics, structural vibrations, engine response, field- of-view and wake turbulence.

The results of a flight envelope comparison are presented as Figure 7. As can be seen, the MV-22B has the least overlap with the proposed HLR Tanker envelope. The MV- 22B published minimum airspeed with the aircraft in airplane mode is 136 KCAS. At typical mission weights and loadings, the MV-22B stall warning sounds at about 125

Figure 5. MV-22B Source: National War College Internet website military image archives

Figure 6. AV-8B Source: U. S. Navy Official Website, Chief of Naval Information, PH3 Timothy C. Ward

HLR Tanker

CH-53E

AV-8B

JSF

MV-22B

0 50 100 150 200 Airspeed (KIAS)

Figure 7. ESG Aircraft Flight Envelope Comparison

KIAS and stalls at approximately 110 KIAS. Stall characteristics are benign and recoveries are affected with the simple application of power and reduction in aircraft attitude. Currently the MV-22B NATOPS manual prohibits the aircraft from conducting aerial refueling operations in any mode other than airplane mode. Being conservative, and using 140 kts as the minimum level flight airspeed for the MV-22B and a 160 kts maximum continuous airspeed for the HLR tanker, results in a 20 kts overlap in airspeed envelope between tanker and receiver. Assuming a 155 kts aerial refueling airspeed, the tanker would be able to maintain a 5 kts buffer below its 160 kts maximum; maintainable since the tanker’s goal is to provide as stable a platform possible while the receiver works into the pre-contact, contact, and refueling positions. At 155 kts, the MV-22B would still be 15 kts above the conservative 140 kts minimum level flight airspeed, approximately 30 kts above the stall warning airspeed, and more than 40 kts above stall airspeed. The other receiver aircraft would all have similar or greater margins.

2.3 HLR TANKER TECHNICAL PROPOSALS

2.3.1 Aerial Refueling: A Brief History It has been more than 80 years since the idea of aerial refueling was first conceived. In 1921, a stunt pilot named Wesley May conducted a “refueling” demonstration for a group of curious onlookers in Long Beach, California. Strapping a gas can to his back, May then walked out onto the wing tip of a Lincoln Standard biplane, stepped onto the wing skid of a Curtis JN-4 and poured five gallons of fuel into the JN-4’s tank. This deed of daring was proclaimed the first air-to-air refueling.

It was the military aviator who took the idea of aerial refueling from barnstorming gimmick to something of real value to the aviation community. In 1923 a DH-4B aircraft was contacted by another DH-4B fifteen times, using nothing more than the force of gravity to receive oil, supplies, and 75 gallons of gasoline by means of a fuel hose. The aircraft stayed airborne just over 37 hours. Others, some of which ended in tragedy, followed this exchange. But it was Fokker C-2 tri-motor monoplane called the Question Mark and two Douglas C-1 biplanes, which demonstrated the importance of mid-air refueling. The Question Mark was fitted with additional tanks to receive fuel. The two biplanes were configured with two 150-gallon fuel tanks and a 50-foot hose with a lead weight attached to the end. The hose was then lowered through a small door in the bottom of the C-1’s fuselage. For more than six days the Question Mark was kept aloft, during which time it received more than 40 tons of supplies, including 5,660 gallons of fuel, 245 gallons of oil, in addition to food, water, batteries, and other essentials.

Despite the success demonstrated by pioneers early on, the progress of aerial refueling over the next couple of decades was limited. When the United States entered World War II, fighter escorts conducting missions over Germany were forced to return to base while Luftwaffe aircraft attacked the un-escorted bombers. In the Pacific, a proposed attack on Tokyo from Hawaii was scrubbed due to a lack of refueling crews and equipment even though some tests had proved successful during 1943 and 1944. The war ended with

little or no progress in aerial refueling development. However in 1946, all this would change with the activation of the Strategic Air Command at Bolling Air Force Base.

Strategic Air Command planners realized very quickly if they were going to fulfill their global mission, in-flight refueling would have to become an integral part of the equation. The Boeing Airplane Company (BAC) was contracted to study transferring fuel between two B-29 Superfortresses by hose. Using a crude but effect method of grappling hooks and “hauling lines”, the trials were ultimately successful. This later evolved into the probe and drogue system used by fighters today. This method did not work well with large aircraft and necessitated the design of an aerodynamically controlled, swiveling and telescoping arm known today as the flying boom (Tankers, 1999).

Although the equipment used to transfer the fuel has undergone many evolutions and transformations, as well as countless variants of receiver jet aircraft, there have been only a handful of different platforms to assume the tanker mission. That is changing today as the importance of tankers and the aerial refueling mission is becoming increasingly important. The concept of forward peacetime basing is becoming increasingly unpopular and politically untenable. Bases in Europe, specifically Germany and the United Kingdom are being closed or downsized. Bases in the Philippines have already been closed for more than a decade now; not to mention the ever-increasing pressure to reduce our military presence in Japan. Also, the aging fleet of KC-10 and KC-135 tankers of the U.S. Air Force’s, Air Mobility Command, is coming to the end of their designed service life. All of this has spurred the development of commercially available Hose-Reel systems, wing pods, and Buddy-Store systems designed to be used on modified, commercially available aircraft. The need has become so great that the U.S. Air Force attempted to lease modified 767’s from the Boeing Aircraft Company. The proposal was for 100 tanker transports, but the agreement was terminated when it was found an Air Force contracting manager was giving special treatment to Boeing in return for a high- level position within the company after her Air Force tenure. However the aircraft

designated the KC-767, continued in production, and the first of four aircraft being built for the Italian Air Force was rolled out February 2005.

2.3.2 Aerial Refueling Store To conduct the aerial refueling mission the HLR helicopter will require a way to transfer the fuel to the receiving aircraft. This could be done in one of several ways; streaming a drogue from inside the aircraft, out of the ramp area, much the way the Navy MH-53E streams the equipment needed for the minesweeping mission. Another method could be to use an aerial refueling wing pod, much like those used on large fixed wing aircraft. The pod would be mounted to the hard-point; outboard of the fuel sponson, at the current position the auxiliary fuel tank is mounted on the CH-53E. The Sargent Fletcher company manufactures a wing pod today that could be adopted for use and meets all the specifications for fuel transfer rate, coupling compatibility, and has all the emergency provisions required for military use. Detailed information on this pod is presented in Appendix B. A similar but more suitable solution to the wing pod would be to make use of an aerial refueling “buddy-buddy” store, shown in Figure 8, used by tactical aircraft. The advantage of the buddy store is that unlike the wing pod, which is dry (does not contain a fuel cell), buddy store’s not only contain the hose-reel equipment needed to conduct the refueling evolution, they also hold transferable fuel, thereby making maximum use of the station. Specifications for a buddy store in use today are included in Appendix C.

2.3.3 Aerial Refueling Drogue The aerial refueling drogue, or paradrogue is used to provide an aerodynamically stable platform for the refueling coupling. Drogues generally fall into two categories; high speed and low speed. Low speed drogues, employed for helicopter aerial refueling, have a range of 100 –120 KIAS, while high-speed drogue ranges are anywhere from 200 – 325 KIAS. The size and design of the drogue are the major influences on what airspeed range the drogue will be used, and only modest amounts of engineering and testing would be required to design a drogue to operate in the ranges needed for the HLR tanker. This

Figure 8. Aerial Refueling Store Source: Naval Air Systems Command, Air-to-Air Refueling Manual, NAVAIR 00-80T-110, Oct 1992

“medium” speed drogue would be somewhat smaller than the low speed drogue and designed to be the same size or larger than the high speed drogue and projected to be used in the 150 – 170 kts range.

2.3.4 Internal Fuel Cell The HLR tanker will make use of an internal fuselage tank, similar but smaller, than the 3,592-gallon tank used by the KC-130, shown in Figure 9. A cradle-mounted fuselage fuel tank of 2,500 gallons, the same volume used in paragraph 2.2.2.1 would have approximately a 17,000 lbs fuel capacity, well within the proposed specification identified in the HLR ORD. The fuselage tank would be the primary source for transfer for in-flight refueling. If additional fuel were needed, provisions could be made to transfer from the HLR sponsons fuel cells, into the fuselage tank, and then to the receiver aircraft. Maximum flexibility would be achieved by being able to pump fuel from the fuselage tank to a fuel cross-feed manifold for consumption in the HLR engines for extended range refueling missions.

As part of a refueling mission kit, the tank would be designed to be mounted on a portable cradle that can be easily installed or removed from the helicopter’s cabin on short notice with the use of equipment already available aboard the L class ships. Using chains to tie-down fittings would secure the tank and cradle assembly to the floor. Ideally a cargo loading system would be designed to lock the system directly to the floor using a system of adaptor plates and locking side-rails. The system would work almost identical to the system in the KC-130; located in the cabin, at or near the aircraft’s center of gravity, and would be the primary fuel used for transfer.

Figure 9. Internal Fuel Store as Installed in the KC-130 Source: Naval Air Systems Command, KC-130R Flight Manual, NAVAIR 01-75GAG-1, July 2002

SECTION III

TACTICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE HLR TANKER

3.1 MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE HLR TANKER

The investment of resources, engineering analysis, trade studies, and test and evaluation time and energy must support an enhanced capability for the ESG and its aviation assets in order to justify designing, testing, and incorporating a tanking capability for the Heavy Lift Replacement. The justification must come in the form of a measurable improvement in the operational capability of the ESG through its embarked aircraft. If the receiver aircraft can fly farther, stay on station longer, and have a greater effect on shaping the battlefield because they were able to increase their range and endurance by receiving fuel during their mission, then it is a move forward in closing warfighting gaps and overcoming technical barriers in support of littoral warfare.

The littoral environment is a complex warfighting theater of operations. Disputed areas of the water are less clearly defined then those on land. Littoral warfare encompasses the landward as well as the seaward portions of the battlespace. Maritime history has shown time and again that littoral warfare is a more relevant application of naval combat power than that of blue water engagements. This requires a shift in strategic focus away from blue water warfighting against a naval superpower to conflicts of a regional nature where control of the coastline and its surrounding waters is the objective. Obviously the Navy must do more than restate the strategic focus to execute littoral warfare; there must be something of a transformation. This transformation begins with doctrine like Sea Power 21, but it must include follow-through with changes to education and training, improvements in equipment, and adjustments to the support infrastructure.

In November of 2003, General J.L. Jones, who was at the time the Commandant of the Marine Corps, published Marine Corps Strategy 21. In his vision he states the Marine

Corps, “will enhance its strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility…” all of which will be enabled by an organic tanker asset for the Expeditionary Strike Group.

3.1.1 Forcible Entry from the Sea The Navy and the Marine Corps provide this country with its primary capability to project and sustain power ashore in the face of armed opposition. America’s reliance on this continuous forward presence and sustainable maritime power projection is integral to our foreign policy and is instrumental in convincing any potential enemy in the wisdom of keeping the peace. To this end, effectiveness is then measured by how much power can be projected, how far can it be projected, and for how long it can be sustained.

3.1.1.1 Operational Reach To understand the implications of how an organic tanker asset can greatly enhance the capabilities of receiver aircraft, one has only to look at a recent historical example. When the national authority made the decision to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, the United States had little or no support from the other nations in the region. Although these countries were not overtly hostile to the United States, there was not open support of our mission due to the political climate and religious affiliations of the populace. America had no forward base in the region to build up combat power or to operate from in order to get a foothold in the theatre, much less to conduct combat operations. Even though Afghanistan is 300 miles from the Arabian Sea, the closest avenue of approach from the ocean, the Navy and Marine Corps was tasked to establish a foothold in Afghanistan to facilitate the build up of heavier-armed, follow-on forces. Diplomatic compromises and political pressure resulted in Pakistan eventually allowing the United States use of its coastal waters and over-flight of its borders but would not allow aircraft to land to refuel, or rearm during the assault. Because of the distances involved, the helicopters could not conduct the assigned mission without the use of tankers to conduct aerial refueling which would be needed to reach the objective area in Southern Afghanistan. Figure 10 shows the un-refueled range and the range with one refueling evolution with the CH-53E helicopter, the aircraft that eventually executed the initial missions of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Aerial Refueling Point

300 nm

Figure 10. Arabian Sea Un-refueled Combat Radius vs. Refueled Combat Radius (Actual Mission) Source: Centennial World Atlas, Hammond Incorporated, Maplewood New Jersey, 1999.

In November of 2001, six CH-53E helicopters flew almost 400 miles, conducting a night aerial refueling evolution with KC-130 aircraft en-route, and established Camp Rhino, the first forward operating base established during Operation Swift Freedom. The objective was an airstrip approximately 50 miles south of Kandahar in Southern Iraq, and within hours of the helicopters landing, the airfield was secure and KC-130 aircraft were landing non-stop with troops and equipment until dawn. The mission was the result of hundreds of hours of briefs, planning, and rehearsals and was only accomplished because of the increased range the United States was able to project military power ashore. The KC-130 aircraft were land based and required diplomacy and negotiation to allow their basing in close enough proximity to be able to fly the long flight to the refueling point. These negotiations and political maneuverings would not have been required if the tankers were ship-based and organically attached.

3.1.1.2 Tactical Flexibility The previous scenario was an historic example of tanker aircraft extending the operational reach of the receiver aircraft. Beyond that, these aircraft enabled the Marines to establish a forward operating base, enabling the rapid build up of combat power in theatre. This one mission was the basis for the coalition’s foothold into Afghanistan and the eventual defeat of the Taliban regime. Tactical flexibility, like operational reach provides geographic combat commanders with scalable, interoperable forces that have the ability to shape the regional environment, and respond quickly to a complex spectrum of crisis and conflicts to prosecute forcible entry operations.

In the following mock scenario, diplomatic options are running out in negotiations between the United States and North Korea due to the county’s recent buildup of forces on the South Korean border. The ESG has taken up station in the Sea of Japan and is tasked to conduct EMW lift missions including the insertion of a rapid response force, follow-on response force, and surge response force to reinforce South Korean positions. The ESG has also been ordered to prepare to reinforce any success of coalition land forces that are pushing North Korean forces back north of the border. The MV-22B and

the HLR with tanker mission kits are embarked with the ESG and is maintaining a 250- mile standoff from the shoreline due to North Korea’s naval coastal defenses and an underwater mine threat. In the event of mission execution, carrier based tactical aircraft have been assigned to neutralize all immobile surface-to-air missile threats, and only short-range, man portable, shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles will remain.

The map in Figure 11 shows what the range of the MV-22B would be with a 24-man insertion force with and without aerial refueling. Without aerial refueling, the MV-22B would only be able to conduct limited operations along the eastern coastline of the peninsula. Depending on the exact location of the ship, winds, and other factors, the MV-22B would have approximately a 275-mile combat radius. By conducting just one aerial refueling evolution on the ingress, the MV-22B would now increase its combat radius by approximately 175 miles. With a full load of fuel, just prior to crossing the shoreline, the aircraft can now conduct the insertion mission almost anywhere on the peninsula and still return to the ship without having to refuel again, avoiding the must tank situation to make it back to the ship. This same scenario could be used to highlight the advantage of the organic tanker with any of the embarked aircraft. Table 3 summarizes the increase in combat radius that could be gained by the receiver aircraft.

Table 3: Refueled Combat Radius Increases by Aircraft

Increase in Combat Increase in Combat Aircraft Fuel Payload Combat Radius Radius (refueled). Radius (refueled). (Combat) (un-refueled) (Nautical miles) (%) CH-53E 15,500 225 125 56% HLR 15,500 225 125 56% MV-22B 9850 275 175 64% AV-8B 7750 90 50 56% JSF 15,000 600 325 54% Note: All loadings are configured for the aircraft’s primary mission.

Un-refueled Combat Radius

200 nm Refueled Combat Radius

Figure 11. Sea of Japan Un-refueled Combat Strike Area v. Refueled Combat Strike Area of MV-22B (Scenario based) Source: Centennial World Atlas, Hammond Incorporated, Maplewood New Jersey, 1999.

SECTION IV

CONCLUSIONS

4.1 THE WAY FORWARD

An organic rotary-wing tanker asset embarked on Expeditionary Strike Group, L-class ships is a technical solution that directly supports the vision of Sea Power 21. By expanding ship-to-objective maneuver it exploits the maritime maneuver space by dramatically increasing the operational reach of the MV-22B Osprey and the AV-8B Harrier, providing the offensive punch that is at the heart of the Sea Strike concept. The increased range and tactical flexibility the HLR tanker will give to the MV-22B and the HLR helicopter enhances operational mobility, the cornerstone of Sea Basing, by leveraging the extended ranges and on-station times of receiver aircraft. Making more of the enemy’s infrastructure vulnerable while making an even greater obstacle of the sea to our enemies will support operational Maneuver from the Sea. Tactical strike aircraft (AV-8B, JSF) and assault aircraft (HLR, MV-22B) that can fly farther and stay aloft longer allow the Strike Group Commander to apply precise fire power over a larger area rather than massing assets on a small defensible area. Where conflict has not yet begun, the enhanced operational reach provided by the HLR tanker will allow the clandestine insertion of advance parties of Special Operations Forces and Marines sooner, and deeper into the enemies lands to gather intelligence. On scene endurance will allow the ESG to form a defensive shield that will protect an allied nation from a threatening neighbor while the international community has a chance to negotiate or begin a buildup of forces.

Incorporating an aerial tanker capability into the HLR program now, early in the development stage, provides an opportunity to achieve an enormous benefit with modest developmental costs little time expenditure. Much of the tanker-receiver compatibility testing outlined in paragraph 2.2.2.4 could be conducted now with the current version of the CH-53E and receiver aircraft in service today, including the MV-22B.

Achieving the above will take transformation; a shift from thinking that we will be alone, fighting a large, immobile force, at sea - to a conflict fought as a coalition, with a smaller, more mobile enemy, whose boundaries are not found on a map. Admiral Clark, the former Navy CNO wrote, “Sea Power 21 commits our Navy to developing innovative concepts, technologies, and organizational initiatives.” Developing an HLR tanker capability will require all of this, and deliver even more.

SECTION V

RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 ACTIONABLE TASKS

In order for the HLR tanker capability to be incorporated into the HLR acquisition program, the requirement must be defined, tasking assigned, and engineering and programmatic issues resolved. The following recommendations outline a place to start, near-term, and are presented to illustrate the scope of development and modest expense required to evaluate and analyze this increased capability for Marine Aviation.

5.1.1 Marine Corps Combat Development Command The mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is to develop Marine Corps warfighting concepts and to determine the associated capabilities in the areas of doctrine, organization, training and education, and equipment to enable the Marine Corps to field combat-ready forces, and to support other major processes of the Combat Development System. Since the HLR Operational Requirements Document was recently signed in January 2005, MCCDC would only need to write an amended ORD that would include a tanker capability in the form of a mission kit. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL), which is part of MCCDC, is tasked to improve current and future naval expeditionary warfare capabilities and is structured such that it can conduct experimentation and Science and Technology initiatives. The war-gaming division of MCWL needs to quantify the benefits of the HLR tanker capability and present these findings to Marine Corps leadership.

5.1.2 Program Manager Air 261 With a defined need statement from MCCDC, PMA-261, conduct engineering liaison with industry and determine the technical requirements for the inclusion of an aerial refueling tanker capability mission kit. Execute analysis in such time as to be able to include requirements within the constraint of the existing HLR program schedule.

REFERENCES

Acquisition Plan No. 261-04-01, rev 1. PMA-261, Nov. 2000.

Augustin, Stephen C, Major (USMC). Personal interview. 24 Feb 2005.

Clark, Vern, Admiral USN. “Sea Power 21.” Proceedings Oct. 2002.

Jane’s Information Group Limited, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, Jane’s Information Group Limited, Surrey, UK, 2003-2004 edition

Masica, Richard M, LCDR (USN). Personal interview. 28 Feb. 2005.

Neblett, Nathan G, Major (USMC). Personal interview. 25 Feb 2005.

Naval Air Systems Command, Air-to-Air Refueling Manual, 00-80T-110, Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1 Oct 1992 w/ Ch. 1, 15 July 19996

Naval Air Systems Command, KC-130R Flight Manual, 01-75GAG-1, Naval Air Technical Services Facility, NAS North Island, CA, 1 July 1996

Naval Air Systems Command, F/A-18E/F Flight Manual, A1-F18EA-NFM-000, Naval Air Technical Services Facility, 1 Aug 2001

Naval Air Systems Command, CH-53E NATOPS Flight Manual, A1-H53BE-NFM-000, Naval Air Technical Data and Engineering Service Command, NAS North Island, San Diego, CA, 15 August 2002

Operational Requirements Document for the Heavy Lift Replacement Program, PMA-261, 15 Dec. 2004.

“Tankers.” Military Analysis Network. 2 May 1999. http://www.fas.org

U. S. Marine Corps. “Marine Corps Strategy 21.” Nov 2000.

“USMC Heavy Lift Replacement Program.” The Heavy Lift Quarterly. PMA-261, Sep. 2004.

APPENDICES

Fiscal 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Quart 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 Pre-Syst System Development & Production / O& Acquisition stages, OR System Dem LRIP / FR Acquisition phases o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o JROC x x x x x x x Acquisition Mio lestones x = NAR = DAES IA M S- DR MS-C / IOC FRP = SAR Contract Events J& IB 00 = Progress Reviews 0 SDD = BOA DO LL LRIP IB MY FRP IB Engineering Events x x x x x x x x = Software IERs FR SVR/PRR/ECP PC = Trade Studies SR SF PD CD

ILS Events IL IL IOC- PDE MS Core Capability Production LRI FR 6x16 (HMH) Lot L1 x 1x15 (FRS) GT L/Lead 1x6 (HMX) = Production EDM Lot x 1x1 (R&D) x 15% BAA = Aircraft Deliveries Lot L/Lead x .2% over 35 S/W Labs Lot Attrition Lot x H/W Labs Total 146 Lot x Lotx x Lot x 146

System Int. First Test Events CT TEM DT DT DT 3 = Test Report OA OA Un-refue ALFT I O TE FOTE ALFT& OTR Rf ldOTR Training Systems TDF POM0 KA Lot RF KA Lot2 RFT Lot2 8

Figure A-1 HLR Integrated Program Schedule Source: PMA-261 briefing to the FY04 Operational Advisory Group, Dec 2003 40

Figure B-1 Sargent Fletcher Wing Pod Data Sheet Source: Sargent Fletcher Inc. Internet website

Figure C-1 Sargent Fletcher Buddy-Buddy Store Data Sheet Source: Sargent Fletcher Internet website

VITA

Anthony C. Archer was born in New York City, New York, on May 29th, 1961. After graduating from high school, he enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and completed Basic Training at Paris Island, South Carolina in December 1979. In 1985, Sergeant Archer was selected to the Marine Enlisted and Commissioning Education Program and attended the University of Florida from September 1985 to May 1989, graduating with a B.S. in Aerospace Engineering. After completing Fleet Replacement Squadron training at Heavy Helicopter Training Squadron 302 (HMT-302) in 1992, First Lieutenant Archer was assigned to Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 (HMH-464) and served in various squadron billets and participated in numerous contingency and combat operations in Bosnia and Somalia. In 1996 Captain Archer was selected for duty as a Forward Air Controller (FAC) for 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion and attended the FAC course of instruction at the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, Coronado, CA and the U.S. Army’s Cavalry Leaders Course at Fort Knox, TN. From 1997 to 2001, Major Archer served as the Scheduled Depot Level Maintenance H-53 Program Officer at the Naval Aviation Depot, Cherry Point North Carolina and as the Squadron Maintenance Officer for HMH-461 at MCAS New River, NC. In 2001, Major Archer was selected for Test Pilot Training at the United States Naval Test Pilot School and graduated in December of 2002. In January of 2003, Major Archer was assigned to the Naval Rotary Aircraft Test Squadron and assigned as an H-53 project pilot, testing and evaluating various avionics, weapons, and survivability systems for H-53 helicopters. He is currently serving as the Operations Officer of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron Two One (HX-21, formerly designated as the Naval Rotary Wing Aircraft Test Squadron) and continues to work as an engineering test pilot on the H-53 helicopter.