SUMMARY NOTE

Subject: Explanation of Mr. Adeniji regarding Reuters Report.

Document: Letter of Mr. Adeniji dated 8 June to the Secretary-General

Summary points:

• On Sunday 14 May, Mr. Adeniji met with President Taylor in Monrovia to discuss fogistic requirements for the release of detainees. It was agreed that Mr. Manlove, UN Security Officer who was also present, would arrange for two UNAMSIL helicoptersjo be dispatched to Monrovia first thing on Monday 15 May.

• However, Mr. Manlove did not carry out the instructions, instead, he tried to put in place his own elaborate rescue plan, that Mr. Adeniji had discarded. Even though Mr. Downes-Thomas reminded him that his plan would be a breach of the agreement reached with President Taylor, Mr. Manlove persisted.

• After the deadline passed, the Liberian authorities, exasperated, decided to lease- helicopters from a local contractor. They expressed fear that a "deliberate attempt was being made to sabotage their efforts".

• Alerted by Mr. Downes-Thomas, Mr._Adenyi__came^bjicJ^oJylqnrOTi_a from Freetown and found at the airport that the two UNAMSIL helicopters that had finally showed uj2_in the late afternoon were detained. The authorities were preventing the offloading of the equipment, including communications gadgets.

• It took hours of contacts by Mr. Adeniii^ndjv^Dg^nesjvrhomas to soothe the anRer and distrust of the Liberians. Consequently, the first batch of detainees was not released that day but only on Tuesday.

• Under these circumstances, when the newsmen asked Mr. Adeniji why the UN had created a delay, he decided to put the blame squarely where it belonged, in order not to raise further doubt in the minds of the Liberian authorities and to facilitate the release of all detainees. ,c Binta Dieye une 2000 UNITED NATIONS mmKm NATIONS UNIES X|||^

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL) JUN | 9 2000

The Special Representative of the Secretary-General ' ' ..•—>. .

8 June 2000

Dear Mr. Secretary-General,

I wish to acknowledge with thanks your letter of 19 May 2000 and to offer the following explanation of the circumstance and the reason why I had to give the reply attributed to me in the Reuters report.

As a result of your instruction to discuss with President Charles Taylor details of his logistic requirements connected with the release of the detainees, I arranged an appointment to see him in Monrovia on Sunday, 14 May. I informed Mr. Manlove, the Security Officer sent temporarily to the mission from New York and who was then the head of the detainee cell which we had set up, to travel with me to Monrovia. On the flight to Monrovia he presented me with an elaborate plan which savoured more of a commando rescue plan than the provision of logistics which I was going to discuss with President Taylor. I told him, therefore, that we would not need such a plan since the situation was much simpler, as President Taylor had assured the Secretary- General. Indeed, in Monrovia Mr. Downes-Thomas, RSG UNOL, and Mr. Manlove were present with me during the discussion I had with President Taylor.

The main points in the discussion were: i) President Taylor's initial complaint that, in being given the responsibility of obtaining the release of the detainees from the RUF, he was conscious that he was being put to a risky test. He was also conscious that the international community, and he pointedly included some members of the United Nations, was looking forward to his failure so that he could be further accused of being behind the RUF. He was, therefore, concerned that the United Nations Secretariat had not responded earlier to his request for logistic support, even after he had given clear indications to you in your telephone conversation. He wondered aloud if his fears about a trap for him might be justified and that he might not be able to rely even on the UN. I immediately assured him that he had nothing to fear on the part of the United Nations and of the full support which you had promised him and that, if there had been any delay, it had been caused by the impossibility of getting through to him on the telephone from Freetown, which had therefore occasioned my visit.

JUN 2 0 ^ ii) He said his main requirements would be helicopters to move the released detainees from the border town of Foya and, of course, some financial provision for the payment of hotel bills and basic provisions for the detainees who, from reports, had all been stripped even of their clothing by the RUF. I assured him that UNAMSIL could immediately make available to him as many helicopters as would be required and that the associated expense we would gladly bear. Regarding hotel expenses, however, for the released detainees, I observed that that might not be necessary since we would move them directly from the border town of Foya to Freetown. iii) My touching on the direct transportation of the detainees from Foya to Freetown evoked a long debate with President Taylor who insisted that all detainees would have to be brought first to Monrovia before being handed to UNAMSIL for the onward journey to Freetown. His reason for insisting on that route was because, as he put it bluntly, he wished to derive maximum publicity and credit for the release in the hope that that would be the beginning of a change of perception of his role in Sierra Leone and the sub-region. With such plain talking I could not again insist on direct transportation to Freetown from Foya. I therefore agreed with the President that UNAMSIL helicopters would be sent to Monrovia early on Monday which was the first day he expected the release to Foya to commence. iv) President Taylor requested that I nominate someone who would immediately get in touch with his own nominee to discuss details of how to proceed the following day and subsequent days thereafter. I immediately informed him that Mr. Manlove would stay behind in Monrovia as my nominee. The President also requested the Foreign Minister, who was present at our discussion, to immediately ensure that a nominee of the Liberian Government was in touch with Mr. Manlove to establish the timetable for the trip to Foya the following day.

On taking leave of the President I instructed Mr. Manlove that he should establish contact with the detainee cell and arrange for two helicopters to be dispatched to Monrovia first thing on Monday morning as it was already too late that Sunday. I then flew back to Freetown arriving late at night.

Instead of carrying out my instruction arising out of the discussion with President Taylor which he witnessed, Mr. Manlove apparently tried still to revive his complicated plan. He tried to persuade Mr. Downes-Thomas that President Charles Taylor could not be trusted and might just be laying a trap for the United Nations. It was therefore necessary for an elaborate presence to be established in Monrovia as well as in Foya and that, before any UNAMSIL helicopter could go to Foya to fetch detainees, he had first of all to undertake a reconnaissance to Foya followed by the establishment of a permanent presence there. It was only after these steps that the airlift of the detainees could start.

Mr. Downes-Thomas, according to the report he gave me, said clearly to Mr. Manlove that his plan would be a breach of the agreement I had reached with President Taylor and that might put in jeopardy the release of the detainees. Mr. Manlove apparently persisted, this was reflected in the fact that no UNAMSIL helicopter went to Monrovia until the afternoon of 15 May. By that time, the Liberian Government had become exasperated and had decided that the United Nations would no longer have any role to play in the release which they would fully undertake themselves. Mr. Downes-Thomas had therefore to make an emergency call to me and request my urgent presence since he was getting nowhere with Mr. Manlove. A few minutes after his call I had to be on my way to Monrovia. When I arrived at the airport I found a situation of great tension with the Liberian authorities having detained two UNAMSIL helicopters that had ultimately showed up and having prevented the off-loading of all the equipments including communications gadgets and vehicles that had gone from Freetown. They argued that bringing those gadgets constituted a violation of their sovereignty and that they had already decided they would no longer make use of UNAMSIL helicopters.

My efforts to explain the unfortunate delay in the arrival of the helicopters did not change their decision and I had therefore to agree that they should continue with their own arrangements of hiring helicopters from a local contractor. By that time anyhow, (that is, Monday afternoon) they had in fact already transported the first batch of the released detainees to Monrovia. When I met the Minister of Defence he was hardly willing to speak to me, believing that I had displayed great disrespect for President Taylor with whom I had an agreement the previous day, only to want to put into action a totally different plan.

About the same time as I was meeting the Minister of Defence at the airport, the Liberian Foreign Minister was addressing a meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers which was taking place that day in Monrovia. He told the Ministers that his President had made all preparations to immediately commence the implementation of the ECOWAS mandate given to him to help in the release of the detainees and that release was to commence that day. However, he complained that the United Nations, which had promised logistic support, had failed to deliver and had thus created a situation which was likely to put in jeopardy his President's well conceived plan. He repeated again the fears of his government that a deliberate attempt was being made to sabotage their efforts with a view to exposing Liberia and its President as being the brain behind the perpetuation of the war in Sierra Leone.

It took the whole afternoon of contacts by me and Mr. Downes-Thomas to soothe the anger and distrust of the Liberians. The upshot was that the first batch of detainees was not released for onward transportation to Freetown that day and I had to wait until very late the following day before that batch and the subsequent batches that came on Tuesday were released to me for transportation to Freetown.

It was under these circumstances that newsmen threw the question at me as to why the United Nations had created a delay about which the Liberian Government had bitterly complained. The choice was to gloss over the question and raise great doubts in the minds of the Liberian President and his government as to the unfortunate delay or to put the blame, as they were aware, squarely where it belonged and therefore end the issue once and for all, to facilitate the release of all the detainees. It is instructive that in the press conference which he gave on the release of the detainees, President Taylor, rather than complain about the lack of logistic support from the UN, paid tribute to the cooperation which he had received from Mr. Downes-Thomas and me in facilitating his task.

3 As a long-time bureaucrat, I am all too aware of the need for institutional solidarity. However, where a functionary, on the basis of illusion of his own omniscience, deliberately acts in a manner to portray in a harmful way the integrity of the whole Organisation in honouring an agreement, he or she creates a dilemma which confronted me in Liberia.

My best regards,

Yours sincerely,

Oluyemi Adeniji

The Secretary-General United Nations Headquarters New York THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

CONFIDENT!

19 May 2 000

Dear Mr. Adeniji,

I read, with concern, an article that appeared in Renters on 16 May, expressing your view that the delay in the return of the peacekeepers who were freed on 14 May was caused by "bureaucratic bungling by lower-ranking UN staff in Liberia".

I share your concern over the delays that were encountered in Liberia and have asked for an explanation of what happened. At the same time, I would like to stress the importance of maintaining a "team-spirit" in difficult moments such as those experienced in recent weeks by our staff in Sierra Leone and Liberia. It is essential that problems and failures be raised and discussed, but this should not be done in the public eye, where it can lower the morale and spirits of those already working in extremely difficult circumstances.

I am certain that 1 can count on your cooperation in this regard, as you continue to face the very difficult challenges that exist on the ground.

Yours sincerely,

Kofi,A. Annan \

Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone Freetown ,,6Q 1<3 May RTRS-U.N.hostages, freed in Liberia,'return to S.Leone FREETOWN, May 16 (Reuters) - Ninety-three U.N. peacekeepers, freed by rebels in Sierra Leone ' Sunday, flew from Liberia back to Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital, late on Tuesday, eye-witness • said. .•.«.,, The U.N. persofhe!, heWeaptive for two weeks in the bush by Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary Unite: Front (RUF).flanded at Freetown's Lungi airport aboard a Russian transport plane after the short flighV neighbouring'Lib.er.ia. . . They vtere'ffeJdased by the RUF into Liberian custody on Sunday along with another 46 peacekeepe and military observers who are still in Liberia, waiting to return. Almost 350 U.N. hostages remain in the hands of the rebels. U.N. officials at Lungi said the freed hostages would be debriefed and given medical checks. The special U.N. representative for Sierra Leone, Oluyemi Adeniji, preceded the freed hostages into after spending the day organising the airlift from Monrovia, the Liberian capital. He said the delay in their return was caused by "bureaucratic bungling by lower-ranking U N staff in Liberia".

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Tuesday, 16 May 2000 19:36:08 RTRS[nST171100]