Correspondence of James K. Polk

Correspondence of James K. Polk VOLUME XI, 1846 JAMES K. POLK Oil on canvas by Thomas Sully, 1783–1872 Dialectic Society Room University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Correspondence of JAMES K. POLK Volume XI 1846 WAYNE CUTLER Editor JAMES L. ROGERS II BENJAMIN H. SEVERANCE Associate Editors Cynthia J. Rogers, Trevor A. Smith, William K. Bolt Assistant Editors 2009 The University of Tennessee Press Knoxville Copyright © 2009 by The University of Tennessee Press / Knoxville. All Rights Reserved. Manufactured in the United States of America. Cloth: 1st printing, 2009. The paper in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials. The binding materials have been chosen for strength and durability. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA (Revised) Polk, James Knox, Pres. U.S., 1795–1849. Correspondence of James K. Polk. Vol. 11 edited by W. Cutler CONTENTS: v. 1. 1817–1832.—v. 2. 1833–1834.—v. 3. 1835–1836. v. 4. 1837–1838.—v. 5. 1839–1841.—v. 6. 1842–1843.—v. 7. 1844. v. 8. 1844.—v. 9. 1845.—v. 10. 1845.—v. 11. 1846 1. Polk, James Knox, Pres. U.S., 1795–1849. 2. Tennessee—Politics and government—To 1865—Sources. 3. United States—Politics and government—1845–1849—Sources. 4. Presidents—United States— Correspondence. 5. Tennessee—Governors—Correspondence. I. Weaver, Herbert, ed. II. Cutler, Wayne, 1938– III. Title E417.A4 1969 973.6’1’0924 75–84005 ISBN 1–57233–647–6 Sponsored by The University of Tennessee and assisted by grants from The National Endowment for the Humanities The National Historical Publications and Records Commission The Tennessee Historical Commission To James L. Rogers II, Benjamin H. Severance, Brian E. Crowson, Cynthia J. Rogers, Trevor S. Smith and William K. Bolt PREFACE Early in the first year of his administration Polk advised George Bancroft that he had set four goals for the new administration: resolution of the Oregon boundary dispute with Great Britain, acquisition of California, creation of an Independent Treasury system, and reduction of tariff duties on non-luxury imports. Polk’s correspondence in 1846 mirrored his efforts to achieve those goals and more; that the new president did not include a fifth objective, friendly relations with Mexico, probably reflects his recognition that the issue lay very much beyond his control. Polk’s efforts to resume diplomatic relations with Mexico proved fu- tile, for he would not agree to pay her indemnity for the annexation of Texas. In his private 1845 correspondence with John Slidell, his se- cret emissary to Mexico, Polk had anticipated President José Herrera’s difficulty in resuming diplomatic relations with the United States. Herrera’s demand for indemnity for the annexation of Texas bespoke the controlling weaknesses of his government, which included large unpaid debts foreign and domestic as well as military and church con- spiracies to restore authoritarian rule. Even had Polk been willing to consider Herrera’s indemnity demands, Congress would not, could not, reverse its annexation resolution or repudiate Texas’ rights of separa- tion and self-determination; to do so would deny the legitimacy of the United States’ break with the British crown in 1776. Polk could and did offer to purchase Upper California and New Mexico as a means of relieving Herrera’s financial embarrassments and fending off the overthrow of constitutional government. ix x Preface Perhaps a stronger government in Mexico might have given up its claims to Texas, backed off its war threats, and still suppressed further fragmentation of the Mexican state. Yet Herrera’s fragile government could not alienate Mexico’s frontier lands for the same reason it could not accept the independence of Texas. In any case, the military overthrow of the constitutional government in early January 1846 ended further indirect negotiations undertaken to resolve the Texas question peacefully. In his inaugural address Mariano Paredes, leader of the military coup, reasserted Mexico’s sovereignty over Texas, called for the suppression of the revolutionaries, and pledged to protect Mexico’s borders, the eastern boundary of which lay along the Sabine River. To those ends Paredes sent Manuel Arista to head a force of nearly 15,000 troops with instructions to engage Zachary Taylor’s 4,000 troops encamped on the northern shore of the Rio Grande op- posite Matamoras. The resumption of warfare in Texas did not arise from a simple border dispute or the failure of the two states to accept the partition of Texas at the Nueces; rather the underlying causes of dispute lay deeply rooted in conflicting national pride, internal divi- sions, and international insecurities. On April 24 a Mexican cavalry unit crossed the Rio Grande River and attacked a U.S. army unit patroling the eastern shore of the river, the boundary line claimed previously by the Republic of Texas. When Polk learned that eleven American soldiers had died in the attack, he advised the Congress that “Mexico has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil.” On May 13 Congress acknowledged that a state of war existed between the two countries. Parallel diplomatic contention with Britain over control of the Oregon Country and reports of British military mobilization heightened the possibility of Polk’s having a land war with Mexico on his southwest- ern frontier and a British naval blockade of its commercial Atlantic and Gulf ports. In his first annual message to Congress Polk had called for prompt action in giving Britain the required one-year’s notice for terminat- ing the 1827 convention providing for joint-occupancy of the Oregon Country. Ardent expansionists, of course, reasserted the United States’ original claims to all of Oregon, that is, all lands west of the Rocky Mountains to the sea and north to the 54º 40’ parallel. Those con- gressmen and senators who feared a two-front war with Mexico and Britain found ample grounds for dividing Oregon at the 49º parallel. Polk repeatedly urged Congress to give the required notice first and talk later, for without such prior action the British ministry need un- dertake no discussions whatever to settle the conflicting claims. Ignor- Preface xi ing Polk’s wishes members of both houses of Congress engaged in an extended four-month debate over the wording of the termination notice; the hawks and doves and those in between each wanted language most conducive to their end goals. Finally on April 23rd Congress voted to give the required notice of termination; in London the U.S. minister, Louis McLane, had con- vinced the British ministry that Polk and the Congress would accept a partition of Oregon at the 49º parallel. Even before the official notice had come to hand, instructions to negotiate an Oregon compromise had been sent to the British minister in Washington, Richard Pakenham. That the British could and did choose to partition Oregon in lieu of war may be attributed to the political, economic, and military strength of the British government both at home and abroad. For his part Polk had calculated correctly that Britain would not go to war over Oregon at the expense of its commercial interests in the North American and Caribbean trade. The young American president, almost wholely unknown to the British ministers, had to prove himself in actions as well as words before final decisions would be made in adjusting the Oregon question. Polk’s determination to end the convention of joint-occupancy, his refusal to eqivocate in the face of British war preparations, his low-tariff trade advocacy, and his deci- sion to defend the annexation of Texas brought the British ministry to a reconsideration of earlier proposals to divide the Oregon country at the 49º parallel. Patronage difficulties caused Polk just as many headaches as the negotiations with Mexico and Great Britain in 1846. “We have twenty eight states in the union, and there are usually half a dozen, and of- ten twenty applicants, to fill any vacancy which is worth having,” Polk wrote to A. O. P. Nicholson. “All cannot be served, and I most sin- cerely wish that I had no office to bestow.” In October, Polk and Silas W. Wright, governor of New York, exchanged letters in which each ar- ticulated his views on how the patronage system should function. Polk told the New York governor that he did not want to grant favors or give preference to any faction of the Democratic party—to do so might allow one branch to obtain an unfair advantage over another in choosing the presidential nominee in 1848. Pennsylvania Democrats became a particular thorn in Polk’s side. Both James Buchanan and George M. Dallas harbored presidential ambitions and struggled with each other for control of the patronage in Pennsylvania. In January, against Buchanan’s wishes, Polk ap- pointed Pennsylvanian George Woodward to a seat on the Supreme Court. Behind the scenes Buchanan lobbied his Senate friends to reject xii Preface Woodward’s nomination. When Polk chose Henry Horn to be the cus- toms collector at Philadelphia, the Senate again refused consent to the President’s nomination. Buchanan then hinted that he himself would accept the vacant position on the Supreme Court; Polk desired to oblige him but delayed the appointment so that Buchanan’s departure from the state department would not jeopardize the Oregon negotiations and Polk’s domestic agenda. Polk planned to replace Buchanan with Louis McLane, who had proven instrumental in settling the Oregon boundary dispute while serving as minister to Great Britain. By the time Polk could offer Buchanan the position, he had changed his mind and asked to remain at his post as secretary of state.

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