DEP.ARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION .1.USTR.l.Ll.I.

Number 84 April 1973

/ 7 Number 84 April 1973 DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION AUSTRALIA

Contents Page He Didn't Recover ...... 2 That Sensitive Touch . 6 What About The Pilot? ...... 10 How Safe Is Gliding? ...... 14 The Price of Knowing Better . 16 A Mouthful Of Red Dirt 21 In Brief ...... 24

A viario11 Safety Digest is prepared in the Air Safety fovesligal ion Branch arid published by the Depart111~111 of Civil A viati'?n at two monthly intervals. It is distributed free of charge to Australian licence holders (except student pilots), registered air­ craft owners and certain other persons and organfaations having a vested operational interest in. A_ustraJiat~ civil aviation. Aviation Safety Digest is also a vailable on subscription from the Australian Government Publ1shmg Service us shown on the order form below. Contributions for publication should be addressed to Tire Editor, Aviation Safety D igest, Box /839Q, G .P.0. Melbourne, 3001. Change of address: R eaders on the Department's free distribtt lion list should notify rheir nearest Regional Office, S11 b­ scriberJ' should notify the A ustralian Government Publishing Service. © Commonwealth of Australia 1972. T he contents of /his publication mar n ot be reproduced in whole or in part, without the wrillen authorilJ' of the Department of Civil A viation. Where material is indicat ed to be extracted from or based on another publication, the authority of the originator should be sought.

Editor: Ci.· M acurtlwr Job. Assistant Editor: R , J. M aclean. Design: N. Wintrip untl P. Moo11e)1• Cover and above: Printed by The Rusk in Press Pty. Ltd., 39 L eveso11 Street, N o rrh Melbourne.

The Glider Pilots: Now taking pride of place as Australia's fastest-growing aviation activity, the incom­ parable sport of gliding finds a response in every true flying enthusiast. Drawn from almost every walk of life and representing the widest possible range of aviation experience, devotees find in the sport much the SUBSCRIPTION ORDER sort of challenge and spirit of adventure that characterised the aero club flying of pre-war years. Frequently too, there is the same esprit de corps of yesteryear (so often lacking in some flying schools today) resulting ASSISTANT DIRECTOR (SALES AND DISTRIBUTION), AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT no doubt from the quality of enthusiasm and sense of participation that gliding club members enjoy. PUBLISHING SERVICE, P.O. BOX 84, CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA. With the cost of power flying for pleasure beyond the pocket of many, and the constraints inevitably imposed by the airspace controls that are so necessary to the safe ordering of today's air traffic, it is not Please record one year's subscription (six issues) to Aviation Safety Digest at $2 post paid. surprising that many enthusiasts are finding their answer in the comparative freedom and sense of achieve­ ment, as well as the economy, that glider flying offers. I enclose $2.00 in payment [ ] But far from being a way of life utterly removed from the realities and demands of powered aviation, (Cheque or money order) gliding, especially in Europe, has traditionally been the means by which young pilots have been intr?duced to the skills of flight. Today, with the advent of the self-launching motor glider, such as the SportaVIa RFSB Please debit my AGPS account [ ] and the Slingsby T61A depicted on our covers, the gap between gliding and power flying is narrowing even further. Each of these disciplines has much to learn from the other and though this issue of the Digest is Name ...... Signature ...... addressed primarily to the.gliding fraternity it is hoped that their power-flying colleagues will find in it much food for thought too. Address ...... Date ...... (Please use block letters)

Remittances should be made payable to 'Collector of Public Moneys - Australian -!b,!\.\J STRA,~!f-ii '" Government Publishing Service'. -~~>"~~.... flying normally at between 2,000 and safety. The spin continued unchecked and what could be learnt of the pilot's 3,000 feet. But just before 1230 hours, and as he watched, the Blanik and its techniques. the senior flying instructor on duty at the shadow on the ground converged upon Although the pilot was regarded as a launching point, having temporarily lost one another until the glider impacted very enthusiastic glider pilot, and was in sight of the glider, asked other club heavily on its nose and port wing tip. It the habit of spending nearly every HE members standing nearby, "Where's the then bounced back on to its tail, before weekend at the gliding club, the progress Blanik?" Shortly afterwards several coming to rest in a level attitude. of his training had not been without its members sighted the glider about two problems. Much of the difficulty was miles to the south of the field, spinning * * * associated with inconsistent performances to the left from about 2,000 feet. The pilot involved in the accident was a from day to day, and an apparent Although one of the pilots watching middle aged man and had taken up difficulty in accepting and absorbing DIDN'T gained the impression that the spin gliding just over two years before the instruction. seemed to slow down or hesitate at times accident. During this time, he had made Even the instructor who had finally as though the pilot was attempting to 260 launches and accumulated 37 hours taken over his training and succeed~d in recover, the Blanik's steep nose-down glider flying, of which 78 launches and 13 sending him solo found, during a check attitude did not change, and they saw it hours were solo flying. He had no flight three weeks later, that the pilot's continue to spin towards the ground until previous flying experience of any type. flying tended to deteriorate whenever he RECOVER .. it was lost to their view behind trees on a The pilot did not regain consciousness was fa ced with an unfamiliar situation low hill. A number of members, including for two days after the accident. When he indicating that his flying would require the senior instructor, drove immediately did recover, he was found to be suffering close supervision. Half an hour after being winch­ to the accident site. They found the from amnesia and could remember Shortly after this time, the pilot had badly damaged Blanik lying in an open nothing of the accident or of the events transferred to the club with which he was launched from a glider field in field with the unconscious pilot still in his that led up to it . For this reason and the flying when the accident occurred. Up to South Australia, a Blanik sailplane harness in the crushed cockpit. fact that no fault lay with the glider this point, all his flying had been carried itself, the investigation of the accident out on Kookaburra gliders but, as the spun to the ground and crashed. * * * was limited to the eye witness evidence only training machine available at his new The pilot, who was the only Examination of the wreckage showed occupant, was seriously injured that the glider had struck the ground nose-first, while spinning to the left. It and the glider was badly damaged. was evident that all the damage sustained by the glider was the result of impact T he crushed and distorted nose section and cockpit of the Blanik clearly indicates the with the ground and a close examination force with which the glider struck the ground. of the wreckage established that no airframe defect had contributed to the accident. As well as having been seen by a The glider was one of several being number of club members on the ground, operated at the field, and after under­ some of the Blanik 's manoeuvres immedi­ going a daily inspection on the morning ately before the accident were observed of the accident, it had made several local by the pilot of the KA6. This pilot said soaring flights in the hands of different that he had been watching the Blanik pilots. The day was warm and cloudless from time to time, as well as looking out with a light south-easterly breeze and for other aircraft, and it had been plentiful thermals allowing soaring to thermaUing to the right, flying quite about 4,000 feet. normally at about 3,500 feet. Soon after \ A little after midday, it was the tum of this he saw it in quite a steep tum, the pilot subsequently involved in the apparently still in a thermal. At this stage accident to fly the Blanik and, with the he was thermalling himself at a little over assistance of one of the duty instructors 3,000 feet. After making two or three he prepared to make a local soaring solo more turns, he looked for the Blanik flight. After loading 14 pounds of ballast, again and saw that it was now spinning to the pilot took his seat in the front the right a little below his own height. cockpit and, after the canopy had been This did not concern him at first because secured and the pre-take-off checks the glider had plenty of height in which completed, the glider was winch-launched to recover, but when it still continued to into the south. spin after several more turns, he began to The launch appeared to be normal in a11 wonder if anything was wrong. Soon respects, the glider releasing the cable at afterwards however, the pilot of the KA6 about 1,000 feet , after which it began saw that the Blanik, now well below him thermalling a mile or so to the west of the at about 2,000 feet, was in a wings-level aerodrome. A KA6 was also winch nose-down attitude. The pilot looked launched immediately the Blanik had around briefly to check his position, cleared the take-off area, and it too began hoping to find another thermal and, when soaring fligh t and thermalling in the he next looked for the Blanik he saw that vicinity of the aerodrome. it was now spinning to the left. After it For twenty minutes or so, the Blanik had spun through three more turns of a was seen from time to time, apparently very stable spin, he began to fear for its 3 Top: The main impact was also taken 011 spin recovery technique. The instructor the glider's port wing. This close-up concerned had subsequently passed on his shows the severe distortion and wrinkli11g· misgivings to the Gliding Federation. of the wing structure. To determine what control inputs could have been made by the pilot of the Blanik involved in the accident, a series of test flights were carried out in another I ~ > Blanik. As a result of these tests, it was determined that the glider would remain in a fully developed spin if full opposite rudder was applied with the elevator control held on the rear control stop. The glider would in fact remain in this spin, regardless of where the rudder was positioned, for as long as the control •. column remained fully back. If in-spin rudder was held on, and the control column moved progressively forward, the glider would enter a spiral dive and, with the rudder in any other position, it would recover from a fully developed spin, whenever the control column was moved progressively forward from its rear stop. From these tests, together with the Bottom: The distortion of the nose scctio11 other evidence that came to light during as seen in this picture indicates the attitude the investigation, it seems likely that, of the Blanik at impact. while thermalling in his normal way, the pilot inadvertently stalled the glider, possibly during the steeper than normal thermalling turns seen by the pilot of the KA6. Because of the fact that the pilot suffered a loss of memory however, the exact sequence of events that led to the glider entering a spin cannot of course be known, and for the same reason, it was not possible to determine why the pilot was unable to effect a recovery. Neverthe­ less, it seems likely that this was the result of the use of an incorrect recovery technique. The accident has the same message for gliding clubs as one published in Aviation Safety Digest No. 54 in 1968 - the paramount importance of ensuring that students understand fully what is involved in recovering from a spin. As well as being included in the Digest, this earlier accident was the subject of a circular letter which the Gliding club was the Bialik, it was necessary for The instructors had also noticed that, investigation indicated that other glider Federation forwarded to all gliding clubs, the pilot to be converted on to it. During while thermalling, the pilot tended to use pilots, who had trained at about the same emphasising the importance of correct the flying training involved in the the controls rather coarsely. One of the time as the one involved in the accident, spin recovery technique, and requiring all conversion, the pilot's standard of skill instructors said that he would try and did not have a very clear idea of the solo glider pilots to undergo spin recovery continued to vary as before, with maintain his speed by reference to the correct technique for recovery from a checks. inconsistencies in his circuit planning. As airspeed indicator, rather than by using spin. It was learned that not long before The two spinning accidents have much a result, he was required to undergo the horizon for reference. This sometimes the accident, one of these pilots, while in common and there is little to be further dual instruction before being resulted in an excessive nose-high attitude being briefed by the instructor, was asked derived from this more recent one, that permitted to fly solo. when he compensated for an increase in the correct spin recovery technique and could not have been learnt from the The instructors supervising his flying airspeed, and a reduction in airspeed, gave as his answer, "full opposite rudder accident publicised five years earlier. The during this period said that they had below that recommended would occur until the rotation stops, then pull it out lesson of both these accidents clearly has checked him in spin recovery procedures before he could take corrective action. of the dive keeping a close watch that the an application to power flying also. It is on a number of occasions and nearly Usually the pilot would realise that his placarded speed is not exceeded". The salutary to consider the facts as revealed always he would recover more quickly airspeed was low, but occasionally it instructor was very concerned about this by the investigation of this latest spinning than usual after only one rotation. These would fall almost to stalling speed and answer and subsequently confirmed with accident, in the light of the Department's instructors were certain that the pilot the instructor would have to point this other instructors that there did seem to "Operational Alert" No. 1 on spin and would not deliberately spin-off height or out to him. be a problem with some students spiral recovery techniques, issued to carry out practice spins while flying solo. Further enquiries made during the concerning their knowledge of the correct pilots on the 16th April. ._ 4 During the initial stages of an aero-tow behind a THAT SENSITIVE TOUCH Chipmunk tug, the pilot of a Skylark II lost control of • • • the glider, and it climbed quickly into a steep nose-up attitude. The tow-line parted and the glider fell away to the right and dived into the ground. The pilot was seriously injured and the glider was destroyed.

about I 00 feet, was in a very steep moved up into a high tow position, aero-tows. About three hours of his nose-up attitude and banked about 25 raising the tug's tail slightly an d its speed gliding time had been spent on dual degrees to starboard. At this point the to 55 knots. The pilot applied back instruction on the BJanik glider, and the tow-line parted, and the glider turned pressure to the control column to correct, remainder had been solo flight. At the sharply to the right, its angle of bank at the same time glancing in his rear time of the accident he had flown three increasing to about 70 degrees. As it vision mirror to check the glider's and a half hours on the Skylark II and the turned back towards the direction from position. He saw that it was high and to accident occurred during his ninth aero­ which the take-off had begun, the nose his left with its starboard wing down. tow in this type of glider. dropped and the glider dived towards the Shortly afterwards, he felt the drag on Despite his injuries, the pilot had a ground. Although it then began to the towline let go and, a moment later, he clear recollection of some of the events recover from the dive, there was insuf­ saw the glider in his mirror, turning which led to the accident. When inter­ ficient height for it to do so and it through 180 degrees, back towards the viewed, he said that during the initial impacted loudly on its starboard wing strip. It was steeply banked, and just a stages of the tow, before the tug became and nose. little higher than the tug, but as it airborne, he had experienced difficulty in Those watching the launch ran appeared to be under control, he assumed preventing the glider rising too high off immediately to the wreckage where they it would make a safe landing on the strip the ground. He had attempted to found the pilot, unconscious and in the opposite direction to that of compensate for this by pushing the seriously injured, still held by his take-off. It was not until after he had control column further forward, but in HE Skylark belonged to a well-known shoulder harness. turned on to the downwind leg, that he doing so, he had over-corrected and then The glider became airborne after a sighted the glider's wreckage by the side T gliding club and was being flown in short roll, and Wll8' held down to within • * * * had to apply slight back pressure. The the course of a normal day's gliding at the The pilot of the tug aircraft was not of the strip. glider then rose higher than he thought few feet of the ground, ready to.Jali;.up After he had landed, he checked the club's field. The weather was fine and the low-fow position, normally used in aware of the accident until he had desirable and before he could correct mild and the wind almost calm. climbed to 500 feet and turned left to tow line and found it had broken at its again, he saw that the tug was close to Australian gliding clubs. But it was soon weak link, immediately ahead of the On the morning of the accident, the evident to those watching the take-off, join the down wind leg for a landing back lifting off. He therefore decided to go glider had been given a daily inspection on the strip. The tug pilot said that Ottfur links which attach to the glider's into the high-tow position for the initial that the glider pilot was having-difficulty quick-release hook. The rings were later and it had then made three local soaring in controlling the aircraft in this position. during the take-off he had raised the tail climb out. But as he moved the control flights. The glider was then readied for its at 30 knots and continued the take-off to found on the strip where they had fallen column back to achieve this position, the As well as weaving from side to side, it from the glider shortly after the tow line fourth aero-tow for the day, and the pilot was tending to pitch up and down ss the an indicated 50 knots before establishing glider seemed to be caught in the subsequently involved in the accident pilot tried to remain in station. a climb. Up to this stage, he had noticed parted. Chipmunk's slip stream. Unexpectedly took his seat in the cockpit. The club's nothing abnormal in the glider's be­ * * * the glider climbed rapidly in a steep Chipmunk tug taxied into position, and Just atter the tug became airborne, the haviour, but as he climbed away at about The pilot of the glider had flown 100 nose-up attitude. As it did so, the glider the normal pre-take-off checks were glider suddenly nosed-up, moved up 50 fee t, he felt the tail of his aircraft hours on powered aircraft, but he had pilot lost sight of both the tug and the completestall, the pilot went to pull the tow signalled that all was clear for take-off starboard wing dropped and within alarmingly so . As he was correcting for accumulated 10 hours gliding experience, release knob, but just before he did so, - and he applied full power. seconds the glider, now at a height of this tail-down movement, the glider involving 26 launches, all of which were the tow-line parted. At this stage the 7 The wreckage as seen from the point on 1he airstrip at which !he tow-line failed .

There is a further object lesson to be learned from this accident. Despite the fact that the pilot was still a novice as far as aero-towing was concerned, he attempted to recover the situation, when control of the glider was getting beyond him, by attempting a manoeuvre that he had not before experienced. This suggests there is a need to impress upon glider pilots under training, that they should never attempt a manoeuvre that has not been demonstrated to them, and that, should they encounter difficulties during the initial stages of an aero-tow, they should release the tow immediately. -~ The trail of wreckage as seen from the point of impact. The airstrip is on the right of the picture and the direction of take-off was towards the camera.

aerodynamic noise had become very quiet the evidence of several club members who "wing-over", until he had succeeded in and the pilot thought he must be about were watching the launch, it seems that lowering the nose. Because of the attitude to stall. He pushed the control column the pilot was over-controlling in his in which the glider was now placed hard forward, and it was only as the nose attempts to maintain station before the however, the pilot was unable to regain went down and the ground came into tug aircraft left the ground. It seems control in the height available. view again, that he realised he was in a likely that, when the pilot decided to try The aero-tow procedure used by the turn to the right. The pilot felt there and solve his station-keeping problem by club concerned at the time, enabled a would not be time to correct this turn going into the high-tow position, he again pilot under training to build up flying and land ahead along the take-off path, so over-controlled and allowed the nose to time comparatively quickly, with each I wish .. • he allowed the turn to continue, intend­ rise excessively. The towing hook on the flight averaging about half an hour. ing to land on the strip in the opposite Skylark II is under the belly of the glider, However, this also meant that the student direction. At this stage he had the and before the pilot had time to take was only receiving training in one take-off impression his airspeed was increasing. corrective action with firm forward and one landing for approximately each From this point on the pilot was unsure elevator control, the glider rapidly half hour of training time. what had happened. adopted a steep nose-up attitude. This Presumably in deference to his power­ abnormal attitude which is described by flying experience, the pilot involved in I'd used • • • * * * pilots of winch-launched gliders as the accident had been converted to the It was evident from remarks made by "kiting", imposed too great a load on the Skylark after only six solo flights in the other club pilots during the investigation, tow-line and it parted at the weak link. Blanik, and had then made nine further that the Skylark II was regarded as rather solo flights in the Skylark without any lively during the initial stages of an This effect apparently took the pilot further type of check. In view of what aero-tow, and that it tended to swing to completely by surprise, as he had not subsequently happened however, it seems one side or the other of the tug's slip experienced anything like it before, and possible that too much confidence might stream. Nevertheless, the glider was this, together with the fact that he lost have been placed in his glider flying the chocks! considered to be quite controllable sight of both the tug and ground, ability because of his other flying provided the pilot anticipated and probably disorientated him for the background, and that at this stage of his promptly corrected any deviations from moment. As a result, he did not glider training, he should have been the flight path. appreciate that the glider was performing subject to greater supervision. (With thanks to Leigh Graetz of South From this information, together with what one witness aptly described as a * * * Australia and apologies to " Lile" Magazine.) 8 9 " '} F you prang, you have a good chance of being hurt - badly." So said an experienced member of the gliding fraternity while this special gliding issue of the Digest was being prepared. And of course, he is quite right! Consider these facts of life in the world of gliding:

GLIDER DESIGN Construction : Material used is of fine • gauge or section, and the structure is, of necessity, as light as possible consistent with required aerodynamic and ground handling strength. As well, the wood and fibreglass generally used in glider con­ struction is brittle. The overall result is that the structure has comparatively poor energy absorbing characteristics, particu­ larly in the case of wooden gliders.

Shape : Fuselage cross section is kept to a minimum to reduce drag and provide the best Lift-Drag ratio. As a result, there is little room under the pilot's seat for shock absorbing or cushioning Even with the best accident material. Modern high performance prevention measures in the world, single-seat sailplanes such as the Kes'trel, Libelle and Cirrus, all have a reclining in gliding, as in power flying, it is pilot position, with only two to three inches between the underside of the hard to envisage that we will ever aircraft and the pilot's posterior. If a reach that ideal situation where parachute is worn, it is of the back-pack type so as to contain the pilot within the no accidents happen. So although limited fuselage height. Because of this we must continue doing our lack of protection underneath, the pilot's back is particularly vulnerable to injury. utmost to reduce the possibility of This is especially so in non-sprung, WHAT non-retractable, undercarriage gliders accidents to an absolute minimum, such as the Boomerang, Kookaburra, we have to live with the fact that Nymph, Cherokee etc, where the pilot's spine is close to the initial point of frail flesh and blood will always be contact with the ground. In reclining-type sailplanes, the pilot's legs and feet are also exposed, to some degree, to the very vulnerable - there is virtually no risk of injury in glider accidents. protection in front of them - only the ABOUT lightweight shell of the nose. It isn't much use pretending the risks are not there - this won't Undercarriage : The single main-wheel make them go away. On the undercarriages fitted to most types of gliders, means that the landing wheel is in contrary, a realistic appreciation the centre line of the aircraft - in single-seaters, the same line occupied by of just what these risks are in the pilot's spinal axis. In most gliders too, gliding, should help to make us the wheel is positioned slightly in front of the aircraft's centre of gravity. This is even more safety conscious. usually close to the position of the pilot's seat, and the result of these two factors is The article that follows seeks to that any heavy impact taken on the main stimulate just this sort of an undercarriage is transmitted directly to the pilot's spine. appreciation. * * * 11 TYPES OF OPERATION Many gliding clubs in Australia too, frequently concealed amongst trees, so operate from rather inadequate areas - in that it is almost impossible to detect the Launching : Winch, auto-tow and reflex some cases, gullies or ditches cross the "run" of the powerline from the air. A launching methods all place a glider in an club's paddock. A cable break, or a pilot can be faced with all these problems extremely vulnerable situation in the misjudged landing in these circumstances, close to last light at the end of many event of a power failure or cable break. can be doubly hazardous. hours of flight, during which he might >1•11• \ I ' - .. From the low airspeed, steep nose-up have been flying at high altitudes. Thus, ,,. attitude, in which a glider can be placed In-Flight Risks : Good thermals attract as well as being very tired, he might be in this situation, rapid recovery action is gliders like bees around a honey pot. In suffering from the effects of hypoxia and MMM \T WAS A WHAT necessary to prevent a stall and a very some cases as many as 15 to 20 gliders not seeing too well. heavy landing. At a greater height, a could all be working the same thermal. A BlT HEAVV ! resulting stall can lead to a spin if an good thermal will usually provide Outlandings too, even if entirely incorrect recovery technique is used. adequate vertical separation, but when an successful from a flying point of view, \I/A,, ABOUT Aero-towing, on the other hand, does not inversion puts a "lid" on the top of it, the can be made in sparsely populated areas have the same problems, though it is top layer can become a very hazardous where communications are few and far ' ,,, ' more costly. Rope breaks are unusual, slice of airspace, with a high risk of between. And with our rural economy as THE and generally occur before the glider collision. it is today, some farm houses and begins to roll. Aero-towing these days Cloud flying is not legal in Australia. homesteads are deserted and without a J• '~'''" with synthetic fibre ropes, is a compar­ But as some pilots have learnt, (see page 'w•\Vt. ... telephone. As well as proving a profound \I atively gentle operation. 24 ) it is quite possible to be drawn up disappointment to an overtired glider PILOT? into a large cumulus cloud while thermal­ pilot, an extreme case could even pose ling just beneath it, especially in a glider Volume of Aircraft Movements : Glider quite a serious survival problem. Most not fitted with powerful speed-limiting readers will remember the case of the flying involves many more take-offs and air brakes. The pilot is then faced with landings on an hourly basis than power Blanik pilot, making a local soaring flight the very real danger of disorientation, loss from Bond Springs in central Australia, flying, because there is some truth in the of control and exceeding the glider's old saying that "every landing is a forced who became lost and was forced to land design limits. In this situation it is not out at last light in a hostile, desert landing". For this reason, there is a surprising that gliders have broken up in proportionally greater exposure of pilots environment. He had no water or survival flight. Other dangers inherent in being equipment of any kind, and was in the to near-ground flying. This is manifested caught in cloud are that of hypoxia if in the fact that the number of launches, final stages of dehydration and heat carried too high by convection, hail, exhaustion when he was finally found - rather than the number of flying hours, is " ... could pose quite a serio11s s11rvival severe turbulence and the risk of a mid-air days later. problem." used as a measure of a pilot's experience. collision with a powered aircraft operat­ ing under Instrument Flight Rules. * * *

Competition Flying : The stress of Well then, what about the pilot, now competing in a major gliding event can that we have looked squarely at some of easily push a pilot beyond what he would the facts? Statistics that we haven't yet normally regard as safe operational limits. considered show that, in Australia It may tempt him to : between 1951 and 1971, a total of 119 * Fly the glider beyond its design limits. glider accidents were reported, involving IS 1 occupants. Twenty-five of these * Prolong the flight past the time when accidents resulted in serious injuries and there is enough daylight left for a safe IS in fatal injuries. In the 25 accidents landing in an unfamiliar area. that produced serious injuries, a total of * Venture over unsuitable terrain with 14 out of 29 occupants if!volved insufficient height in hand. sustained a fracture of the spine. From these figures it is apparent that if an " ... a stall and a very heavy landing." * Delay committing himself to a landing occupant of a glider does receive serious until too low to manoeuvre with injuries, there is a fifty percent chance safety. that he will have fractured his spine. Gliding is a fine sport which enables course, there is a constant temptation to many people who would not otherwise take things for granted and to make It is also quite plain from the injury Outlanding Problems: A glider or a have the opportunity, to savour the "short cuts", once a reasonable standard patterns that have been observed, that sailplane, by its very nature, is often extreme satisfaction of piloting an air­ of proficiency has been attained. Experi­ even comparatively minor accidents in forced to "land-out". In this situation the craft on their own, and of pitting their ence has well and truly attested to the pilot has to choose the best-looking area gliders can cause back injuries of some type. skill in a unique way against the forces of fact that the old truism "familiarity that is available within safe gliding nature. And provided the regulations and breeds contempt", is a very insidious foe distance of his position. But For this reason, pilots who are involved accepted procedures governing the of safety in the world of aviation. this is usually in a totally strange in heavy impacts, or even heavy landings operation of gliders are faithfully paddock, with the ever-present danger of in gliders, without apparent injury, but observed, the sport can be engaged in So without in any way allowing the concealed rocks, ditches, roots, stumps, who subsequently experience pains in the with a high degree of safety. facts quoted to cast a shadow over their and slopes - not to mention powerlines. back, should seek medical attention enjoyment of the sport, gliding The single-wire powerlines so favoured by without delay. You cannot be too careful But as with all forms of flying, the enthusiasts would do well to regard these most rural electrification schemes are when dealing with the possibility of penalties for lack of preparation and the statistics as a stimulus to take even more particularly notorious hazards - their injuries of this sort! taking of undue liberties can be severe than usual care in all aspects of their supporting poles are widely separated and * * * indeed. In any type of human activity of operations. -. 12 13 cases of actual accidents, whether or not undesirable or even dangerous over a period of time. To the instructional staff of any one club, with little trends are developing in glider flying. It is the sick who need the physician, or no knowledge of what is happening in other clubs, there has been only and unless statistical information of this sort is available, it is simply not one, apparently isolated, incident. But in actual fact the training system as a HOW SAFE possible to embark on any effective safety education programme. whole has experienced a number of incidents of the same type which, taken Air Navigation Regulations require any situation in which the safety of an together, indicate that there is a basic weakness in the training system as it is aircraft or its occupants is jeopardised to be notified to the Department in being practised. The weakness might have resulted from any one of a number the form of an Air Safety Incident Report, and pilots engaged in power of factors. For example, there could be a serious deficiency in the IS flying regularly make such reports. The purpose of these reports is not that procedures laid down by the Federation or the particular clubs. Or the the persons concerned may be disciplined, but that the information con­ standard of instructional supervision might be inadequate at Federation tained therein can be used, together with other incident and accident data, level, State Committee level, or club level. Again, new factors might have to develop safer operational procedures and practices. The situations on been introduced to the training system for which provision had not been GLIDING? made in the procedures being used. which Incident Reports are to be submitted are set out in the Visual Flight IT must be admitted that the gliding fraternity is one section of the Guide and Aeronautical Information Publications but pilots are invited to Glider pilots who are active in their clubs will see for themselves that some aviation industry that has not received its full share of coverage in the interpret these instructions in the broadest possible sense and report any of the accidents reviewed in this issue of the Digest were the outcome of a Aviation Safety Digest in recent years. Certainly, it would have been good to situation having a bearing on air safet~y. Obviously, the number of Incident developing incident pattern that went unnoticed until too late. These have been able to include much more material on gliding safety than circum­ Reports which the Department receiv~s is very much greater than the accidents demonstrate very well that an incident trend if not recognised and stances have allowed. Could this have been done, a greater consciousness of number of accidents occurring in anyjgiven period and potential accident remedied, ultimately results in an accident. It follows that any imperfections operational safety might have been inculcated in the minds of some who, situations can be anticipated by stud}f and interpretation of unsafe or weaknesses existing in an operational training system can be assessed from having chosen to do their flying without the aid of an engine, have run into operational trends as revealed by the character of the incident reports being a study of incident trends. problems of one kind or another either during their training or in their received. In this way, hazards that are shown to exist by actual experience A realistic assessment of this sort can be made, and the measure of in-built subsequent operations. can be avoided in future operations, without having to wait for an accident safety and efficiency in existing procedures determined, only if the number But apart from the fact that the present rather limited safety education to demonstrate that a particular operational problem exists. In fact, much of and nature of incidents, as well as accidents, are known. It is for this reason resources of the Digest have somehow to try and cater for all facets of the the credit which the Department receives for Australia's fine safety record is that both gliding clubs and individual glider pilots are now urged, in their aviation industry in Australia, there is another side to the coin : Except in due in no small measure to the wealth of air safety information gleaned from own interests, to follow the example of their power-flying colleagues and the case of accidents, where notification to the Department is inevitable its Incident Reporting system. recognise the fact that accidents do not merely come "out of the blue", but (though not always prompt!), comparatively few gliding clubs, and But in the Australian gliding world at the present time, there is no really are nearly always the cuhnination of a chain of events or incidents which, seemingly fewer individual glider pilots, appear to have realised the effective "life-line" of this sort. As a result, it is virtually impossible to had it been "broken" early enough by the necessary remedial action, could experience value of reporting operational situations in which safety has been recognise the symptoms of any dangerous or undesirable operational trends have prevented the accident. It is hoped that a study of the experiences compromised. As a result, both the Gliding Federation and the Department - at least not until it is already too late and a number of accidents have reviewed in this issue will carry its own conviction of the need for intelligent have been "starved" of the very information that could have been drawn occurred! Nowhere is this more so than in the field of glider flying training. reporting of any unacceptable aspect of gliding safety. upon to improve gliding safety. Also, because of this dearth of operational For example, no training system, however well devised it may be, is The overall safety record of gliding in Australia is a good one. Let us strive information, it has been almost impossible to know, apart from the isolated perfect, and several similar incidents could well occur in different clubs to make it even better! . .. ··: ... :.:.:.::: .. ::·...... ~ : :. ~ ~~ ...... :: .. :. : : : . : : .. :: :~. :: : Based 0 11 Report by Nario11al Transportation Safety B oard, U.S.A.

HE aircraft was operating a scheduled T passenger service from Washington, D.C. to Newport, Virginia, with en route stops at Groton and New Haven, Connecticut, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Because of fog in the Groton and New Haven areas, the flight's normal "despatch release" had been amended so as to enable it to proceed IFR from Washington to Philadelphia, via Groton and New Haven, without the necessity to refuel at Groton as was customary. To permit this change in plan, additional fuel was taken on before departing from Washington. The aircraft set heading from Washing­ ton at 0714 hours as planned, but only five minutes later elected to cancel its IFR flight plan and continue direct to New London VFR. When the aircraft arrived over New London 54 minutes later, fog had reduced weather conditions at the airport to below the minima prescribed for a VOR approach, and the crew advised that they would hold "VFR on top" while awaiting an improvement in the weather. At 0841 hours, after holding for half an hour, the aircraft made the first of three abortive IFR approaches to land at Groton. But each time, even after deliberately descending well below the minimum descent altitude of 510 feet AMSL, the captain was forced to execute a missed approach. The first two approaches were broken off only when the aircraft had descended to 175 feet AMSL and the third, flown with even greater determination, was not dis­ continued until the aircraft had descended to 125 feet. The fourth approach to land was successful and the aircraft finally arrived at the Groton passenger terminal at 0921 hours, nearly an hour behind schedule. While the aircraft was on the ground, the captain was asked by the company's agent if he required fuel. After making some calculations on the fuel needed to continue to Philadelphia and commenting to the first officer that they would have 17 THE PRICEOF KNOWINC BEi IER Top: Aerial view of New Haven Airport, showing the approach path to runway 02. The aircraft struck the homes fronting the beach in the lower right of the picture.

Bottom : Diagram showing direclion of impact and wreckaxe trail.

enough if they didn't "run into any New Haven airport is close to the reason, any consideration of the factors The aircraft's first approach to Groton delays", the captain advised the agent northern shore of Long Island Sound and leading to the accident at New Haven, was begun about 30 minutes after its that they had sufficient, mentioning a has an eleva tion of only 14 feet AMSL. must also take into account the circum­ arrival over the Groton VOR. But by this figtire of 6,000 pounds. The aircraft The final approach path to runway 02 lies stances that prompted the captain to time the flight was 20 minutes behind subsequently taxied for departure at over Long Island Sound itself and the depart from acceptable standards of schedule and about a third of the 0933 hours and reported setting heading shoreline, with the runway threshold airmanship earlier in the flight. available holding fuel had been con­ for New Haven at 0936 hours. 4,000 feet north of the beach. The It seems quite clear from the way in sumed. While holding, the crew had seen airport is served by a VOR located near which the captain conducted the flight up the fog over the airport and the captain the centre of the airport and, for a At 0944 hours, the aircraft was cleared to the time of the accident, that the knew that, on reaching the 510 foot straight in IFR approach to runway 02, aircraft's fuel requirements were of minimum descent altitude in these to descend from its cruising altitude of the minimum descent altitude is 380 feet. 4,000 feet and the New Haven weather primary concern to him and were conditions, the runway would not be was passed to the crew. The weather was The minimum visibility required is one occupying much of his attention. Once visible. Rather, if his landing attempt was reported as "sky partially obscured, mile. having amended · his flight plan to to be successful it would be necessary to visibility a mile and three quarters in fog, The aircraft had struck three adjoining eliminate the need for refuelling at descend to 200 feet within a mile of the houses fr onting the beach, some 500 feet Groton, the captain evidently determined runway. The captain was thoroughly wind 180 degrees at five knots." New to the right of the runway centre line. Haven Tower then offered the aircraft the that he would conduct the flight with the familiar with the area and, mindful of his The fuselage had come to rest 270 feet least possible delay in order to have the fuel and schedule requirements, he choice of runway 02 or 20, advising that beyond the initial impact point, and apart the wind was now from 190 degrees at maximum possible fuel at his destination decided to make such an attempt to land, from the cockpit area, had remained sub­ in case holding became necessary. apparently believing that sufficient five knots. The aircraft nominated run­ stantially intact until destroyed by visibility would be available to do so. way 02 and was cleared to land. When the aircraft left the terminal at the fierce fire which followed the crash. Washington it was given a clearance to Although such an approach was not A detailed examination of the wreckage taxi to runway 15. But, as time could be authorised, the captain evidently believed Making a straight in approach, the crew produced no evidence that the aircraft saved by using runway 03, which is closer he could conduct it safely. completed their final check list and the was other than fully serviceable at the to the terminal, and more nearly aligned During the first attempt to land, the time of the accident. captain called for 40 degrees of flap. The with the route to be fl own after take-off, captain did not acquire sufficient forward cockpit voice recorder subsequently Both members of the crew were the crew requested, and were approved, visibility and a missed approach was properly qualified for the flight they were showed that as the aircraft continued to use this runway. Similarly, several b 10 executed. A second attempt, following undertaking. The captain had over 12,000 inbound on its final approach, the first minutes after take-off, when the de­ "9 the same type of approach was unsuccess­ officer called " SOO feet", "top mini­ hours, nearly 4,000 hours of which had parture controller instructed the aircraft ful for the same reason. On his third mums" and "decision height". Then, been flown in Convair aircraft of the type to execute a 360 degree turn, the captain attempt the captain's increasing concern seeing that they had descended through involved in the accident. His ability had elected to cancel his IFR clearance rather to effect a landing manifested itself in his been consistently rated as satisfactory by the prescribed minimum descent altitude than make the turn. He later refused the aggressiveness and determination in con­ check pilots, and he had no history of of 380 feet, the first officer announced air traffic controller's offer to retain the tinuing down to an altitude of only 125 physical or emotional illness. The surviv­ that they had an airspeed of lOS knots IFR clearance even though the turn was feet before initiating a missed approach. ing first officer said that the captain had with a sink rate of SOO feet per minute. no longer required. The captain obviously The aircraft then circled the airport for a seemed perfectly normal during the flight The captain replied "All right", telling saw that if he proceeded VFR via the further 10 minutes before the fog cleared on which the accident had occurred. He lf H.D the first officer to "Keep a real sharp eye most direct route, additional time could sufficiently to permit a landing. A landing also mentioned that the captain was an 5 out there". Eighteen seconds later, the be saved . was fi nally accomplished an hour and excellent pilot and that he liked flying ·./ first officer, obviously concerned, The scheduled flight time from Wash­ 1 Prqi~llub l e>dw R. eight minutes after the aircraft had with him. ington to Groton was one hour 15 i remarked "This is - low" and then, "You 0 ~ arrived over the airport. can't see down through this stuff". The * * * minutes but, on this particular trip, the captain replied that he could see the aircraft arrived over Groton only 59 Although the captain said that he had S, Landin') v•;:w micrcs: tt.;h, water "straight down". The first officer It is clearly evident that the accident minutes after departing from Washington. 6,000 lbs. of fuel on board when asked at then sighted the water too, exclaiming resulted from the captain's decision to Had the weather conditions at Groton ~-,~1 ~'0:.!fl. e. Sectionc.lri h1-hondo.;tbo..1rd•it19<1ndo...tboord•ingFI~ Groton if he intended to refuel, the that they were "not 20 feet off it!". Two continue his approach to land at New been suitable fo r a landing the flight 1 . he . I l"Mi"fprope-11... r 'IJC-.ll' c~c mdbf.Jdel U, l3 ond LA, aircraft's actual fuel at that stage was a and a half seconds later, the first officer Haven, to a dangerously low height. Yet would have arrived at the terminal 10 e. rif'C. of ri.;.t-hond in ..o:ud fJ :IP; ft!'"IOY"~lit- 1ec:.tion cf dcorsol lin. little less than 5 ,800 lbs. The shortage was called out "Hold it", as a building his attitude to the conduct of this minutes ahead of schedule. As a result of pi'"'' of >Jh luw:l°"-'e Pin ... ith I.lit ~lid att~hed. small and of no significance as far as the appeared out of the fog in front ·of the approach seems to have been little this saving the aircraft was able to hold next leg to New Haven was concerned, aircraft. Impact followed almost different from that demonstrated during over Groton for a time without the need but it is possible that the captain's the three extremely low but unsuccessful /lh. decision to continue with less than the immediately. for operational considerations or nd ela , In reo --... lONf. l',tl.J D Ii LINO .j< * * approaches he made at Groton. For this decisions. or 1011. ~· ..~. l reserves required for the following leg to 18 19

------THE PRICE OF KNOWINC II BETTER MOUTH Philadelphia, influenced his conduct of but it may be significant that both pilots COMMENT : The relevance of this the leg to New Haven. When he took off acquired visual contact with the water accident to Australian operations is hard from Groton, the reported weather at directly below them not long before to assess, but on the "law of averages" New Haven was apparently of no great impact. This contact could have dis­ there may well be some pilots in Australia The author of this issue's Pilot concern to him, but fuel and time were tracted the captain to the point that he who feel tempted to "bend the rules" at Contribution was taking part in a probably still occupying much of his did not realise the aircraft was still times. Certainly in the case of some light FULL attention. If for instance the flight descending. The fog layer lying over the aircraft accidents in Instrument Meteoro­ competition cross country flight encountered no ATC delays at New area at the time extended from the logical Conditions, evidence has come to Haven and could make a straight in surface to about 400 feet AMSL, but light of instrument rated pilots conduct­ on the final day of State Gliding approach to runway 02 several minutes, both the ceiling and visibility were ing operations which were not in accord Championships. The weather was involving several hundred pounds of fuel, considerably less over the water than the with "the book". It is for any other such could be saved. And, if even 200 pounds fine and mild with only weak airport. The horizontal visibility in the pilots that this ov~rseas accident should OF of fuel could be saved in this way, the fog was restricted to less than SO feet have a convincing safety message.--~ actual fuel remaining at New Haven over the water and to between 150 to thermal activity. Before departing would be very close to the legal 200 feet over the beach area. The aircraft he had attended a pre-flight requirements for the next leg to Phila­ had descended into the top of the fog at delphia. Thus, in his attitude to the about 400 feet AMSL but the crew did briefing at which the weather conduct of the approach at New Haven, it not acquire any visual contact with the forecast for the flight was seems that the captain adopted the same water until they descended below 100 RED philosophy as he had with the Groton feet AMSL. There was nothing to indicate discussed, and at 1200 hours his approaches. Indeed, the captain probably that the crew had any forward or considered the New Haven approach less horizontal visibility. This is corroborated aircraft was aerotowed to 2,000 difficult than the one at Groto11 because by the fact that the first officer sighted feet where he released. He of the lower surrounding terrain. the houses in the aircraft's flight path continues the sad story himself: The investigation established that the only about a second before impact. DIRT captain elected to land on runway 02 with a five knot tailwind component, despite the fact that this action was contrary to his company regulations which prohibit any downwind landings at New Haven. The captain was aware of the tailwind component, so it is reasonable to PROBABLE CAUSE : The National believe he had a compelling reason for Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident selecting runway 02 rather than circling was the captain's intentional descent to land on runway 20. It is very likely below the prescribed minimum descent that the reason was his desire to save fuel altitude under adverse weather conditions so that refuelling at New Haven would without adequate forward visibility or the not be necessary. crew's sighting of the runway environ­ It is quite clear that the first officer ment. The captain disregarded advisories performed his duties throughout the from his first officer that minimum flight in accordance with company descent altitude had been reached and procedures, and to the best of his ability. that the aeroplane was continuing to It is obvious that, after· the flight had descend at a normal descent rate and descended below the minimum descent airspeed. The Board was unable to altitude, he had attempted in several ways determine what motivated the captain to to alert the captain to growing danger disregard prescribed operating procedures resulting from the continued descent. It is and altitude restrictions and finds it perhaps difficult to understand why the difficult to reconcile the actions he captain continued the descent in the face exhibited during the conduct of this of the first officer's repeated warnings, flight. 20 ITH OUT delay I joined a thermal large fire. Another advantage was that I paddock over there. But I carry on, up to I don't know if I undid the harness or departure from accepted outlanding pro­ extend full flap and spoilers at this stage Walready occupied by an M200 and would be spending time in the thermal on 1,000 feet again, then down to 700. I not - the straps were in very good cedures, as he himself points out. was based solely on the aircraft's Blanik and together with a KA6 which the downwind run. Off-setting these sight a large, sunny contour field on the condition. I had no pain or later bruising The pilot had already reached a point apparent nose-down attitude. The pilot joined later, we all thermalled to 3,000 advantages however, was the chance that side of a hill - maybe I'll find better lift that indicated I had been thrown forward on base leg from which a safe outlanding realised afterwards that he was misled by feet which, owing to drift, positioned us the thermal might not be what I hoped there. Flying around the field, it seems to any great extent. Not long after the could have been effected and when he the upward slope of the field into which about half a mile south-east of the and, in this case, 1,500 feet wouldn't give reasonable for a landi ng. And there's no crash a farmer drove up the road on his found lift he was· at a height of only he was approaching, with the result that aerodrome. me much time to find another. I decided lift. Do I give up or carry on over the hills tractor and was greatly surprised to see about 300 feet. As all glider pilots know he thought the aircraft was in a much Max Howland in the M200 was the first to go on, and rounded the turning point and try my luck there? That side of the me on my feet. He took me to his home very well, G.F.A. procedures require that, steeper nose-down attitude than was to leave with the KA6 in close pursuit; at 1330 hours. This put me in the lead. I range is a bit too far for a retrieve on the and I rang the aerodrome. I suffered only once having committed himself to land­ actually so. ' the Blanik moving off a little later. I struck a little lift at the turning point, but last day of the championships so I decide minor shock. ing, a pilot should ignore any further lift There is one other important lesson to decided to maintain my relatively secure after trying a few turns, decided it wasn't to give up. I believe the accident happened because he might encounter and continue with his be learnt from this story. It very much position until I saw how my companions worth bothering about. At 350 feet, I enter the downwind leg, 1:- approach. But in this instance, the pilot concerns the fact that the pilot was able made out. Back now around the fire, I searched check my harness and turn left on to * Attempted to pick up a thermal when disregarded the established procedure and to tell the story at all. Good! Max had found lift, a little to the for lift in vain, flew through the smoke, base. Suddenly I hit lift under my port committed for a landing. attempted to work the lift. Doubtless his Some readers may recall an earlier, west so I headed off, crossing the starting tried every trick I knew, but still I went wing. Almost without thinking I pull the * Tried to thermal too slowly close to the judgement was coloured because he was serious outlanding accident, that was line at 1230 hours at 2,800 feet. I joined down. Now I was at seven hundred feet - machine into a steep cl imbing turn to ground and thereby al lowed the competing in a major gliding event and reviewed in detail in Aviation Safety the thermal about 500 feet below Max, I decided to give it away and set up a wash off excessive airspeed. The lift was machine to stall when it fell out of it. was leading at that stage. However, as Digest No. 62. In this instance also, the circuit for landing. But all wasn't lost yet, indicated by the fact that the pilot was worked it to 3,200 feet and left it about good but then I was out of it again, the * Had insufficient respect for an aircraft glider, a Vogt LOISO, stalled at low for just then I smelt smoke. I threw the "BG" giving its customary wing drop. unable to centre and remain in the three minutes behind him. Max Howland which I knew had certain vices altitude and dived into the ground. The "BG" into a turn - sure enough up Recovering quickly, and a little appre­ thermal, the area of lift he encountered is one of Australia's best soaring pilots, so particularly when dropping out of a unfortunate pilot was killed, in all comes the variometer to the neutral hensive, I maintain the turn and check was of insufficient width to contain his I decided to stick with him as far as thermal. probability for the simple reason that his possible. position. Get the speed back - only one the ai rspeed. Forty miles per hour. Too radius of turn. harness failed when the impact occurred. * Was disorientated in the p itching plane Another two miles and Max had found foot a second! Come on, come on - fi nd slow - get the nose down! Full flap and I A glider working a thermal at a steep Tests made on the harness after the during the later part of the last turn another thermal. Again I attempted to it! Thump - she had found it! Another grope for the spoiler lever - got it now, angle of bank and at low airspeed, can accident revealed that not only was it of a follow suit, but he must have sensed my thump, and she had lost it just as quickly, full spoiler. That's it, now I'm heading in which was made through fairly steeply stall very quickly if it passes out of the rising ground. non-approved type, but also that it had intention, for he left it before I had time dropping her wing to show her protest. I the same di rection as my original base leg lift into a surrounding area of sink. It is been subjected to an unauthorised repair to join him. After searching for a little, I curse as I bring the machine around and maintaining the turn. I'm 40 feet up * Was apprehensive during the last few apparent that this is what happened on in the past and altogether was well under found the thermal's centre and to my towards the thermal again. Thump again! with another 45 degrees to turn before seconds of flight, which would have this occasion and the pilot, recognising the minimum strength specified by the delight discovered that I had a good 200 I tighten the turn, lower a notch of flap, I'm lined up on finpl. tended to make me lose the "feel" of the onset of a spin, effected a recovery Department. feet per minute climb which carried me tighter still, and a bit more speed. Good But suddenly the nose drops sharply. the aircraft. with a minimum loss of height. But with As the damage sustained by the gliders to 4,000 feet. This gave me a definite on you, you've got it! But we only Good grief, the ground's coming straight Needless to say the accident was little or no time to consider the glider's in each of these cases was very much the advantage over the others. manage two turns and fall out again. You up at me! This is it! Will it kill me? How entirely my fault for which I feel most flight path during this recovery, the pilot same, it is difficult not to conclude that ***! clearly defined the ground is! Bang! disgusted at myself. But I hope wh at I found himself apparently overshooting the vast difference in the outcome of the Two miles from the first turning point This went on for the next quarter of an Crash! . .. I see the canopy hitting the have written might convey the challenge, his original aiming point and he immedi­ two accidents can be attributed almost found me level with Max Howland's hour. By then I had squeezed all I could ground in front of me ... trials, frustrations and great absorption of ately extended the flap and spoilers. entirely to the fact that our contributor's M200, which was thermalling about 1,000 out of it. It was time to move on - I was * * * mental energy which I'm sure every gl ider Although the pilot had recovered control, harness was a sound one. As the article on feet below me and a quarter of a mile east down to 1,000 feet again. I try a little ... I don't feel any different except for pil ot experiences whilst competing under it is clear that the glider had not regained page I 0 shows, gliders by their very of track. Should I use this lift or carry on further to the east and find some lift the red dirt filling my mouth and eyes. such conditions. Finally I hope it will sufficient speed to permit the extension nature afford little enough protection to around the turning point and pick it up there. I manage to maintain 700-1,000 But I'm frightened to move ... I look at stress the importance of knowing when to of full flap and spoilers with any margin their occupants. The least that glider on the way back? I was at 3,000 feet - feet, but am drifting downwind towards my arms and tug them out. I feel my legs give up and land, despite the dis­ of safety. As a result, the glider lost what pilots can do is to ensure that their plenty to round the turning point and get some hil ls. I tell myself to give it away - and find they sti ll have feeli ng . .. I appointment! flying speed it had, stalled, and nose harness gives them the best possible back to Max's thermal. It was clearly you could be having tea and scones at decide I'm not hurt after al l! The time is Comment : There is no doubt that the dived into the ground from about 40 feet. chance of survival in the event of an marked as it was originating from quite a that farmhouse if you land in that 1430 hours. accident was the result of the pilot's It seems that the pilot's decision to Kci~~ ~ II MOUTH FULL OF RED DIRT The pilot of the Schleicher can * That, when he did break out It was evident from the for a shorter base leg. be considered extremely for­ of cloud at such a low altitude subsequent investigation that the Although the pilot turned on tunate on several counts : above ground level, there field which the pilot had chosen * That he did not lose control of to final approach at about the happened to be an area open was the most suitable in the right position in the circuit the glider in the cloud and enough for a safe landing area, despite the presence of the turbulence. pattern, the glider was obviously within gliding distance of his powerline and the trees at the very low at this stage and it was l11 ll1·ief * That his aircraft was not approach end. The wind position. Most of the sur­ damaged, either by gust load­ clear that it would strike the rounding area is rocky and direction which the pilot had high tension wires. ing or hail, while flying in the heavily timbered. estimated was close to the actual No.84. APRIL 73 storm. surface wind direction, and the * That he was not carried to a Altogether, the occurrence r-1o--""'""'""'""'""4""4____ ,_,,,..,.,.NN""4""4""4 ____ ,.,...,_,,,..,.,.""'...,.., height where he could have underlines how extremely direction he had chosen for the * * * landing was the most suitable in been affected by hypoxia. hazardous it is to " push one's The eye witness evidence that luck" in the vicinity of a the circumstances. The ploughed the arr brakes were fully * That he did not collide with surface of the field, though obstructing terrain while still thunderstorm, despite the excit­ extended just before the glider ing amount of lift that is likely loose, consisted of hard lumps of turned base, together with the ENCOUNTER WITH in cloud, as could possibly soil and what furrows there were have happened if he had flown to be found there. In this pilot's statement that he had instance, the pilot was highly would certainly h ave restricted lowered full flap just before a little further to the south of the sideways movement of a where he actually did. experienced in gliding and turning base and the fact that A THUNDERSTORM clearly possessed above average glider's tailskid as occurred on the dive brakes were unlocked * That he broke out of cloud this occasion. bef_ore overflying the coast, flying ability. But what would when the glider came to rest, SHORTLY before 1300 hours, after a busy morning's gliding at which was only about three have happened if the glider was strongly suggests that the pilot Camden aerodrome, a well-developed thunderstorm was seen miles from where he finally being flown by someone of misidentified the controls on the approaching from the south-west. landed. lesser skill and experience? The WRONG HANDLE! port side of the cockpit and $ $ $ extended the dive brakes in the So as to "hangar fly" his club's Schleicher AS-W 15, and facilitate mistaken belief that he was its return to the hangar before the storm broke, an experienced The only other aspect of the It could have been so MUCH WORSE lowering full flap. It is also glider pilot was aerotowed to 2,000 feet, intending to make use of accident that remained to be evident that although the pilot $EXPENSIVE OUTLANDING $ appreciated that the glider's rate the lift being induced by the proximity of the storm, until its im­ considered, was whether it was pending approach dictated that he return and land. T HE pilot of this Slingsby Skylark was on the last leg of a reasonable in the circumstances AFTER being aero-towed to 2,000 feet from Byford aerodrome, of descent had greatly increased, for the pilot to have misjudged Western Australia, the pilot of a Blanik Ll3 released from the he did not immediately react to The glider pilot released from The Schleicher was equipped competition cross-country flight, originating and returning to Massey Field, Warwick, Queensland. About 15 miles short of his the control of his aircraft during tug aircraft and commenced thermalling. After about a quarter of the likely cause for this con­ the tug aircraft to the south of with only a basic instrument the landing run to the extent an _hour's flight, during which the glider attained a maximum dition, nor did he check to the town and immediately en- panel and, as the pilot had no destination, while soaring at 4,000 feet the pilot encountered that the starboard wing tip dug height of 2,300 feet, the pilot returned over the aerodrome to ensure that it was in fact the countered good lift and, as the IFR experience, he had great overcast cloud and began losing height. When he had descended to flaps he had lowered. into the ground. However, enter a right hand circuit pattern for a landing. base of the overlying cloud was difficulty in maintaining any­ about 2,000 feet, he began looking for a suitable paddock in which because of the Skylark's high well over 4,000 feet, he decided thing like a level attitude. to make an outlanding. Joining the downwind leg at The pilot was 60 years of age aspect ratio wing, as with all 850 feet, the pilot saw that he to make use of this lift. By the However as he knew the sky was high performance sailplanes, The accident was seen by the and had been a service pilot and time he had climbed to 3,800 relatively clear to the east, he only about five degrees of bank was well positioned for a normal chief flying instructor who had flying instructor during the war approach and landing, and feet, he found that his view of attempted to maintain a heading would have been required for been supervising operations at years. After the war he had held the aerodrome was obscured by in this direction, expecting that this to happen. Hence, with the carried out the pre-landing cock­ the strip and had been watching a commercial pilot licence for 1 S cloud, but as he could see he would break out of the storm pilot attempting to counteract pit checks. When the Blanik had the Blanik's circuit and approach years and later a private licence Campbelltown, seven miles away before long. At 8,000 feet the drift from the right during the descended to 7SO feet , the pilot to land. He ran to the scene which had expired two years to the east , still in sunshine, he glider encountered heavy hail lowered what he thought was immediately the glider ca me to before the accident. His total landing, and the landing itself rest. Seeing the wire draped decided to fly in that direction. and there were flashes of light- taking place on the rough full flap and began a turn to the hours on powered aircraft were After flying east for about ning, but at 10,000 feet the pilot right on to base leg. During this across the cockpit canopy, he in excess of 3,000. He had taken surface of the ploughed turn, the pilot saw that the called to the pilot to keep still. four miles, he made a 180 degree at last managed to check the paddock, the starboard wing's up gliding only a matter of turn to check what the visibility ascent and the glider then began glider was now sinking rapidly so Then taking up a dry branch of a weeks before the accident and in contact with the ground was he cut short his base leg, turning tree, he removed the wire from was now like in the vicinity of to descend. quite understandable. this time he had accumulated a early towards the threshold of the aircraft, opened the canopy little over 12 hours. He was Camden aerodrome. From 3,500 The descent in cloud con­ the strip. The glider continued and assisted the pilot out. feet he saw that although the tinued for what seemed a long regarded by his gliding instructor to descend steeply however, with as a competent glider pilot. aerodrome itself was still ob- time, during which the pilot had very low ground speed, grossly scured by cloud, most of the to continue to concentrate very From I ,S OO feet, he selected a southern boundary of the field, * * * ploughed field which he con­ and crossed the threshold at 1 SO $ $ $ undershooting the pilot's The misidentification of the town was clearly visible and the h ard to maintain control but original aiming point. When the damaged glider was pilot thought he would be able finally, nearly an hour after sidered suitable and well feet at an indicated 55 knots. At dive brakes for the flaps is an situated. The field was rect­ this stage he noticed the effect It is of course a fact that some While still turning to line up inspected, it was found that the easily-made error in Blanik to get back to the aerodrome by being launched, the glider broke with the strip, the Blanik flap lever was still in its " up" descending towards the town out of cloud in a level attitude at angular in shape, with its longer of the crosswind he had glider pilots show a preference gliders, and has in fact occurred side of abou t 1,200 feet aligned expected from the right, so he for ploughed paddocks when descended into a set of detent, but the dive brakes, on a number of occasions, but and then diving beneath the an indicated heigh t of 1,200 feet powerlines bordering the aero­ though only slightly extended cloud layer. and the pilot glimpsed the ocean north-south. The pilot circled lowered the starboar d wing to choosing a field for an outland­ there is no reason why this ahead of him. He then saw he the field twice, losing about SOO counteract the drift and touched ing in unfamiliar terrain. They drome boundary 1,500 feet with the glider at rest, were should have led to an accident if As he approached Camden, he was only about 500 feet above feet as he did so, and noticed down flying parallel with the make this choice because of the short of the threshold. The unlocked and free to move. the pilot had recognised his recognised the need to lose the ground, but there happened that there was a powerline, also furrows, 700 feet into the field. better opportunity this often glider struck the powerlines with Several eye witnesses, includ­ mistake from the glider's sharply hejght more quickly' so he to be two paddocks below him. aligned north-south, passing But after touching down affords to see obstructions such its raised port wing, severing one ing the chief fly ing instructor, increased rate of descent. It lowered the glider's under- At that stage the cockpit canopy through the middle of the field. initially, the starboard wing tip as powerlines on the approach, wire, and slewed violently to the had seen the glider join the seems likely however, that the left. The starboard wing tip carriage and opened the dive- became fogged, but despite this, Judging the wind to be a light dug into the ground, slewing the and other possible h azards such circuit at a position which pilot'.s reaction time was such brakes. But as he neared the the pilot was able to land glider sharply to starboard. As as stumps and holes in the struck the ground and the seemed satisfactory in the exist­ that, when the unexpectedly north-easterly, h e decided he aircraft cartwheeled, falling to overlying cloud the pilot found cross-wind in one of the would land into the north on the the glider swung, its tail skid ground itself. But even this ing conditions. At least one high rate of sink occurred, he himself completely enveloped paddocks, incurring only very western side of the powerline. caught in the ploughed furrow precaution is by no means the ground in a flat attitude . It witness noticed that when the did not instinctively return the with his visibility reduced to slight damage. The paddock in along which the glider had infallible and it seems clear that finally came to rest, still en­ glider was abeam the pilot's control he was operating to the zero. The glider, instead of which he landed proved to be at Entering his final circuit, the landed. The glider still had some any possible advantages which tangled in the severed powerline, planned touchdown point, the closed or retracted position to continuing to lose height, Darke's Forrest near Helens­ pilot descended to 700 feet at speed, and the side load imposed ploughed paddocks might seem facing back in the direction of dive brakes extended and the reduce the rate of sink. Instead suddenly began to ascend. Very burgh, nearly 20 miles south-east the southern end of the down­ by the swing snapped the to offer, need to be offset flight. The pilot was unhurt, but glider began to descend rapidly. he persisted with his approach to soon afterwards the rate of of Camden in comparatively wind leg and turned base. On the fuselage in two, immediately aft against the risk of damage to the seeing the live wire still entwined It was evident to watchers on land, even though it should have ascent increased frighteningly to rugged country close to the final approach the pilot had to of the rear cockpit bulkhead. glider which might occur, as in around his aircraft, he wisely the ground that when the pilot been obvious that the glider over 2,000 feet per minute and coast. clear 60 foot high trees on rising The pilot was unhurt. this case, as a result of landing remained seated in the cockpit realised his rate of descent had could not reach the intended the glider ran into heavy rain. * * * ground immediately outside the * * * amongst furrows. to await assistance. increased, he modified his circuit landing area. 24 25 t Continued from i instead of adopting a level contributed to the force of were not aware of thet The pilot said later that after the continual high rate of fell into a level attitude, swing­ page 25 t attitude as the pilot expected, impact. phenomenon, not having experi-t being launched, he had experi­ descent. When about a mile ing sharply around to the left A the Grunau dived heavily into Consideration was also given enced it themselves. The briefing! enced good lift and worked a short of the strip, at 1,800 feet, thrnugh almost 180 degrees as it 'f the ground. The pilot immedi- to the possibility that the .club's which the glider pilot was given thermal in company with the he had encountered another did so, snapping the fuselage in The accident indicates thet ately released the winch ca ble procedure in laying the cable before his first flight in the other glider. While doing so, patch of lift, which he two midway between the wing !lee? ~or gliding instruct.ors tot but the glider slid for more than along one side of the strip, so as Grunau did not mention the t A both gliders were drifting down­ attempted unsuccessfully to and empennage. The wreckage mstil mto students the 1mpor-t 100 feet before coming to rest. to keep it well away from need to be alert for a spurious t wind, but such was their gain in work. As a result, he not only finally came to rest after sliding tance ? f positively id~ ntifying ,t The nose of the glider was torn landing aircraft, could have con­ winch power failure on lift-off, ONE height that it would have been lost further height, but again backwards for 70 feet. both visually and physica lly, t.het and buckled and the nose skid tributed to the accident. Laid in and it seems possible that if the A quite possible to get back to the drifted downwind, thus throw­ * * * correct c?ntrol for flaps, .divet was broken off. The pilot was this way, the cable has a glider pilot had been fore- 'f TRACK field. ing away any hope of reaching Although the pilot made an brakes, tnm, a.nd ~nder~~rna.ge,t apparently unhurt but two days considerable bow in it when the warned, his reaction to the t When about three miles down­ the field that might still have error of judgement in initially so that t.h1s tden tif1cat~on A after the accident experienced launch commences, which is apparent winch power failure t MIND wind from the field, the Bocian remained. At this stage, he thinking he had sufficient height becomes habit and part of vital Xpains in his back and neck. taken up as the launch proceeds. might have been less violent. t broke off and returned to the assessed a small ploughed field to make a direct flight back to action drills. The brief span of'f * * * In the case of Kookaburra The question could also be t aerodrome, but at about this beneath him as suitable for an the field, there was no reason ~ime . necessary to positively t The subsequent investigation launches, because of the weight posed as to whether the pre- t time, the pilot of the Skylark outlanding, but then, because he why he had to persist with this i~entify. a control nee ~ not be at established that there had been of the aircraft, this bow poses no flight briefing, particularly in A found some particularly good thought that his angle of glide course of action when its success distraction ~o a pilot, and t no failure of the winch and it problem, as the resulting slack in relation to the glider's apparent 'f lift. Wanting to make the most would still bring him safely to began to look increasingly correctly earn ed out, can be thet ' attitude, was adequate. However t of it for his endurance attempt, the field he decided to continue. doubtful. The pilot admitted he means of ensuring that accidentst in the case of single-seat aircraft, t wards, they saw that the Bocian he concentrated on working this Reaching the area immediately had recognised several cues of this type are avoided. t demonstrations of this sort can t had managed to return to the downwind from the glider field, prompting him to make an only be given with the aircraft t vicinity of the field with about the pilot again made a mental outlanding, but for one reason ~+~~~~~~~~~~~~ on the ground and this has t 1,000 feet in hand, but the assessment of whether he should or another, he had rejected them obvious limitations. The cause of t Skylark though it was reason­ set up an approach and land all. There was no dearth of there, but as the area was the accident can only be t ably high, was now so far suitable areas in which a success­ ascribed to the fact that the t bordered by fences and trees, GRUNAU downwind that the instructors ful outlanding could have been pilot misjudged the recovery and he had not previously made i thought it would have difficulty made, even right up to the final technique required when dealing an outlanding, he was undecided fence where the line of trees GLIDER with a suspected winch power making it back to the field. as to what to do. At this point were, but the pilot apparently failure. t They next saw the Skylark he encountered a further small had a fixation about getting DAMAGED As a result of this accident all t heading back directly towards area of lift, which made up his back to the strip as quickly as members of the club concerned t the field, descending quite mind for him. He kept going, possible. Had he accepted the were ma,de aware of the t rapidly as it did so. At one stage, possibility of an outlanding in ON FIRST possibility of obtaining a t the glider broke off its approach the first place, and gone looking spurious power failure indication t and made a 360 degree tum as for other areas of lift on either during the initial stages of a t though attempting to thermal, side of the direct track back to SOLO winch launch in a Grunau glider. A the field, he might well have but instead of gaining height, the t~~~~~~~~~~~~~ found some which would have Skylark had obviously en­ enabled him to continue the glider pilot whose experience had been gained mainly on two-seater Kookaburra gliders had been t countered an area of sink, for ii flight. Even if he had found A assessed as suitable for conversion on to the lighter single-seat Grunau GB-2. t A QNE lost more height before it could none, he could still have out­ On the morning of the proposed conversion, the pilot made one flight in a Kookaburra glider and a complete the turn. Certain now landed normally and been no gliding instructor then briefed him on the handling characteristics of the Grunau and told him how he that the glider could not make worse off. would like him to fly the circuit. The briefing took about 20 minutes and covered all the likely t TRACK MIND the field, the instructors saw it From this accident it seems situations which the instructor thought the pilot might encounter. He particularly stressed the t resume its straight-in approach, that glider pilots, especially difference in flight attitudes and elevator control response between the Kookaburra and the Grunau, t getting lower and lower as it those who are comparatively and drew the pilot's attention to the fact that the stalling speed of this type was 28 knots. He also neared the downwind boundary new to the sport, need to be t . constantly reminded that there made reference to the greater sensitivity of the Grunau's elevator controls. THE pilot of the Skylark where there was a line of gum glider shown in the picture need be no stigma attached to an trees about 30 feet high. outlanding·. There can be iittle The Grunau was then wheeled was evident that the accident the cable is usually taken up well ton this page, .was a~tem~ting a But not until the glider had doubt that most clubs would into position for a winch launch had resulted from the pilot's before the aircraft becomes t five-hour soanng flight m the descended to tree top height. lift to the detriment of noticing but very soon afterwards, when prefer to retrieve their glider and the pilot took his place in lack of experience on a type of airborne. Even if the cable !vicinity of the gliding field, to only a short distance from the that he was continuing to drift he was down to I SO feet and intact from 60 miles away, the cockpit. Pre-take-off checks glider that was much lighter than becomes caught on a tussock as meet the duration qualification line of trees, did it divert from away from the field. The pilot approaching the trees bordering rather than from the next were completed and when all he was accustomed to. There it moves across the strip surface for his "Silver C" Certificate. its direct approach to land. At admitted he was not paying as t~e aerodrome, J:te encountered a paddock in pieces! was ready, the command was was little doubt that the marked to take up its natural alignment When he was winch-launched this point, the glider suddenly much attention to drift as he high rate of smk .and shortly ~+~~~~~~~~~~~~ given for take up slack and then difference in handling character- between winch and glider, this is t from the field soon after 1 OOO entered a steep turn to the left. should have with such a strong afterwards found himself down for full power. As the glider istics between the Kookaburra a very momentary nature in the 'f hours a hot and gusty north­ Realising the glider would come wind blowing. When he finally to tree-top height with insuffici-I b~gan to roll, th~ pilot held the and the Gr~nau, as w~ll as th~ case of the Kook~burra. In the t weste~ly wind was blowing at to earth on the other side of the ran out of lift altogether, he ent room remaining to make a stick forward m the normal apparent difference m long1- case of the much lighter Grunau t trees, the instructors started out found himself at 3,800 feet, but landing straight ahead before CARE IS THE PRICE manner to keep the glider tudin al attitude as viewed from glider however, the situation is t about 1S knots. But sho~tly towards the scene. Just then, as six miles downwind from the reaching the trees. running on its landing wheel the cockpit, led the pilot to different and the cable couldtafterwards the wind the glider turned crosswind in field. At the Skylark's normal Having flown himself into this OF SAFETY - until flying speed had been make an incorrect assessment of quite easily remain caught t strengthened to abou~ 2~-30 the strong, gusty conditions, its angle of glide of 24: 1, this position, the pilot had no attained. He then centralised the at.titude when h ~ suspected a around a tussock until th~ glider tknots from the same .direc~1on . already steep angle of bank height would have been more alternative but to turn away at! controls and the aircraft became wmch power failure, and to becomes airborne and vrrtually t A dual control Boc1an glider, increased, and the aircraft dis­ than sufficient to return to the low level, and he did so, 'f airborne. But only a few over-correct with the controls. lifts the cable clear. When this Awith an instructor and student appeared from view below a rise field, but against a 30 knot intending to land crosswind and moments afterwards the aero- Although the pilot believed he happens, the tension on the 'f on board had also been winch­ in the ground where the line of head-wind, it became a doubtful parallel with the line of trees.I WE CAN ALL dynamic noise see~ed to de- was only about two feet off the cab~e naturally slackens ~lightly tlaunched' not long before the trees was situated. proposition. The pilot saw this But forced to turn so steeply in crease and the pilot glanced at ground when h.e a dopte~ the until taken up by t?e wmch. It t Skylark and two other in­ When the instructors reached might be so, but decided he the gusty conditions, just before HAVE SAFETY the airspeed indicator. The air- nose-down attitude, witness was found that this character-t tr t ' n the gro nd at the the site, they found the glider would try it anyway. reaching the trees, the glider, . . .d . d. t d th th . t. f G . 1 As uc ors o u The pilot said he realised overbanked, and the turn con-A speed was falling off. Suspecting evi ence m 1ca e at e is 1c o runau wmch aunches..,1 h" . t th t b th had come to rest with its back a power failure in the winch, he glider had already climbed to a was well known to some of the t ~unc mg pom. ~aw a ? broken and nose section badly afterwards that when heading tinued until the tip of the 'f instinctively adopted the pro- height of about eight fee t. club instructors and that they t aircraft were ~nftmg dowo-wmd damaged. The pilot who had directly towards the eastern end lowered port· wing brushed the t cedure applicable to a Kooka- Probably the fact that the glider usually included it in their t from the rurfield under the escaped unhurt, was already out of the strip, he was literally ground. Before the pilot could y BUT WE MUST burra in this situation and was still attached to the winch type-endorsement briefings. t influence of the strong north­ of the cockpit. flying in "a street of sink", recover, the nose struck the! pushed the stick forward. But cable when it struck the ground, Other club instructors however, t westerly stream. Soon after- * * * which no doubt accounted for ground heavily. The glider then ~ PAY THE PRICE. 26 27 dition, either because it was being climbed too steeply, or the pilot was slow in recognising the loss of power from the winch and allowed the speed to decay before lowering the nose. Possibly a combination of both factors was present and the steep climbing attitude resulted in a swifter decay of airspeed than usual. As a result, the aircraft had insufficient speed to recover from the loss of power, and insufficient height to regain HE pilot involved in this accident was making only his third flight in a Slingsby Skylark. speed, before the pilot was T forced to flare for landing. But although not experienced on the type, he was experienced in the technique of winch launching. From the point at which the Preparations for the launch were normal and after the pilot had given the command for full power, the glider pitched over, a safe glider accelerated with a surge and left the ground quite rapidly. The pilot continued to maintain the landing could still have been initial climbing attitude until he had reached about 60 feet and then assumed the full climb attitude, c~rried out in the .re~aining noticing at the same time that the airspeed indicator was reading slightly better than SS knots. Shortly d~stance of the s.tr~p if the afterwards he became aware that the winch had lost power so he lowered the nose of the glider and aircraft had had suffl.cient speed. ' As well, had the aircraft been pulled the rel~ase ~ob. approach, but now he realised d th gh th bl h d flying at a significantly higher Assessmg his. height above the spee up as ou e ea e a speed when the power loss ground, the pilot saw that. he tchoantd1.tth1·oen.glider was in a stalled broken so he declutched the occurred, the accident could ld b bl t l d t ht winch, closed the throttle and wou e. a e o . a!l s ra1g Before he could regain speed, applied the brake. When he have been avoided if the loss had ahead without difficulty a_nd the pilot was forced to level the looked up again, he was amazed been recognised quickly· This would not need to use the dive aircraft for landing and saw that to see the glider about 70 feet margin of speed would have bra~es. It was '?nly then t~at .he he was going to land heavily. He up, and descending rapidly to permitted the pilot to assume a rea~sed the glider was smk~ng braced his back and legs to take land again. His impression was nose-down approach attitude rapidly· ~e had not been lookmg the shock. As he pulled back on that the glider adopted the almost immediately, and thus at the mstruments as he had the control column he knew that correct nose-down attitude then have had sufficient speed to flare been concentrating on a visual even if he succeeded in getting levelled out, but its rate of properly and land. the nose up he was approaching descent remained high. From the evidence however it the ground too fast to arrest the The evidence of witnesses who is apparent that the glider was in descent. The aircraft struck the were watching the launch indi- a steep attitude, approximating EDITOR'S ground heavily in the landing cated that the glider was in a full that of full climb when it should attitude with minimum forward climb attitude at a height of still have been in the flatter speed. The initial impact, taken about I 00 feet or less. Also, attitude of the initial climbing LAMENT on the landing wheel and skid, from the evidence of both the segment. For safe operation, broke the fuselage in two behind pilot and those watching from gliders should not take off at Getting out a publica- steep angles of climb, or adopt the full climbing attitude below tion has its problems. 250 feet. During a winch launch If we print jokes, some the glider in a full climbing attitude reaches a stalled con- readers call us adoles­ ~'!!!~~!!~~'!~!!~~~~~!~~~~ ' lossdition of inpower three and seconds it is necessa after rya cent ... if we don't the that a height be achieved from book is too serious. If which a glider can be safely recovered from a full stalled we change author's condition. Although in this case copy, we're too critical the take off was jerky and fast, it should not have prevented the ... if we don't, we are pilot stabilising the aircraft in reproved for slip-shod the initial climb segment at the correct angle and abandoning editing! If we appeal the launch in that segment when the aircraft did not continue to for contributions we're the wing and the wreckage the ground, it was apparen t that accelerate. However as the pilot skidded to a halt about 50 feet the glider remained in a nose­ too pushy . .. if we re- was inexperienced on this type from the initial point of impact. high attitude until it had almost of aircraft, it would probably be print items from other The pilot was not hurt. reached a stalled condition. As a more accurate to say that he resu1t, its pitch-over to a nose­ publications we're too * * * allowed the aircraft to assume a It was learned that the winch down attitude was sluggish. In steep climbing attitude, rather lazy. You might even driver, soon after he had opened actual fact it was never fully than that he initiated the climb the throttle to full power, had completed as the glider had to in this attitude. Whatever the say we borrowed this heard an unusual banging noise be flared for landing before it reason, the accident resulted item .. . well you're ab­ in the winch. At this stage he could fully regain speed. from the fact that the pilot, who looked down the strip and saw was inexperienced on the type, solutely right, we did! the glider was still on the "' * * permitted the aircraft to adopt a ground. Almost at the same It was clear that the glider full climb attitude too soon after time, he heard the winch engine reached an almost stalled con- take off. ~ 28