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Abbas swears in Palestinian unity government Oren Dorell / June 2, 2014 A new Palestinian unity government was ushered in Monday in the form of a joint venture between rival factions Fatah and Hamas, but the coming-together leaves Hamas with its militia and radical ideology in place, analysts say. The agreement, announced in the West Bank capital Ramallah, was received with apparent acceptance by the U.S. State Department, concern in Congress and anger in Israel. It involves the appointment of 17 non-political Cabinet members nominated by the two factions that have ruled separate Palestinian territories since a 2007 coup, when Hamas overthrew Fatah rule in the Gaza Strip, thus splitting Palestinian territory. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who formulated the new government, "threaded the needle here," says Jonathan Schanzer, an analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. "He found a way to not formally include Hamas, but there are technocrats (in the new government) that represent Hamas." Although the U.S. and Europe have branded Hamas a terrorist organization the Obama administration said it could work with the new government. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said it seems that Abbas "has formed an interim technocratic government that doesn't include any Hamas ministers." She added: "Moving forward we'll judge the government on its actions." Psaki also said the U.S. expects the Palestinian Authority "to do everything in its power" to prevent rocket and terror attacks from Gaza against Israel, now that it's taking charge of security there. But the move will also increase friction with Israel, which has made clear it will reject the new government. The Israeli government said Monday that it would not negotiate with the new Palestinian government and authorized Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to impose financial sanctions. And the U.S. ambassador to Washington expressed dismay at the State Department's reaction. "Israel is deeply disappointed by the State Department's approach to a Palestinian technocratic government backed by Hamas," said Ron Dermer, Israel's ambassador to Washington. "Had Hamas changed, it would be one thing. But Hamas hasn't changed. It remains as committed to Israel's destruction today as it was yesterday." Abbas nonetheless said the new government will pave the way for elections that have not been held since 2006. "Today, with the formation of a national consensus government, we announce the end of a Palestinian division that has greatly damaged our national case," Abbas said, according to the Palestinian Ma'an News Agency. "This black page in the history (of the Palestinians) has been turned forever, and we will not allow it to come back." However, Rep. Eliot Engel of New York, the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the PA "is casting serious doubt" on its commitment to a two- state solution with Israel and threatening future American assistance. "The United States is under no obligation to give a dime to the PA as it reconciles with a known terrorist group," Engel said. "The path toward a two-state solution does not go through Hamas or the United Nations." Earlier, Secretary of State John Kerry called Abbas to express his concern about Hamas' role in the new government. Kerry urged the new government to maintain its commitment to the principles of non- violence, recognition of the State of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements — principles that form the basis of the stalled peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, but which Hamas does not accept. "President Abbas assured the Secretary that the new government would be committed to these principles," the State Department said in a statement. "The Secretary stated that the United States would monitor the situation closely and judge any government based on its composition, policies, and actions." As part of the new agreement, Fatah security forces will deploy in the Gaza Strip for the first time since they were ousted in 2007 and take over security along the Gaza border with Egypt, but Hamas is not dismantling its security apparatus. The group, a Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that was once backed by Iran, has fought two wars with Israel since 2007. If Hamas begins to operate independently, outside the reach of the Palestinian government, it would create a situation similar to the Shiite militia Hezbollah's in Lebanon, which has Iran's backing and has also launched rockets and attacks on Israel from the north, said Kobi Michael, former Deputy Director General at Israel's Ministry of Strategic Affairs, now at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. Rep. Ed Royce, R-Calif., chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the new government will be an impediment to peace. "It's hard to see a government that embraces Hamas getting us closer to peace, much less helping its people," Royce said. Contributing: The Associated Press http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/06/02/abbas-palestine-unity-government/9858537/ .
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