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General Gareev's Legacy in Russian Military Science

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General Gareev's Legacy in Russian Military Science EURASIA General Gareev’s Legacy in Russian Military Science OE Watch Commentary: In May 2020, Russia will commemorate the 75th anniversary of its victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II). This triumph has become the absolute centerpiece of the current Kremlin ideology and continues to affect how many Russians see the world. Within the Russian military, the painful lessons from this war continue to be studied and analyzed for how they might be applied today. One of modern Russia’s most influential military theorists, Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, who frequently referred to the lessons of World War II, passed away on 25 December at the age of 97. The brief excerpt from the pro-Kremlin daily Izvestia describes General Gareev’s background and some of his impressive legacy within Russian military science. The article begins by reminding readers that Gareev’s understanding of World War II was based on his personal experience, where he went from Vladimir Putin met with Army General Makhmut Gareev in July 2013 to wish him a Happy 90th Birthday. “leading a rifle battalion in the battle of Moscow” at the beginning of the Source: Kremlin.ru, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/18946, CCA 4.0 Intl war, to serving as “a senior officer in the operational department of the army headquarters” by the war’s end. After the war, Gareev continued his schooling and field experience, serving in a variety of leadership positions both within the USSR and abroad. For instance, as the article points out, “after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, General Gareev was instructed to head the task force of military advisers to President Najibullah,” where thanks to his efforts, “the Afghan government managed to hold out for several more years.” Even though General Gareev retired in 1992, he continued to play an influential role as the new head of the Academy of Military Sciences, a position he held until his death. In this capacity, General Gareev was a prolific writer, authoring “several books and more than 250 scientific publications.” The excerpt stresses that “Gareev anticipated the modern development of the Russian Armed Forces.” For example, even in the 1980s, Gareev “was an ardent supporter of equipping troops with drones.” He was also a strong proponent of “mobility and combat readiness… and the introduction of military automated control systems.” While General Gareev will not be present at the World War II commemoration in May, his writings will continue to influence the Russian military.End OE Watch Commentary (Finch) “…His ideas are still in demand in the Armed Forces…” Source: Anton Lavrov, “Пять войн генерала Гареева (Five wars of General Gareev),” Izvestia, 25 December 2019. https://iz.ru/958399/ anton-lavrov/piat-voin-generala-gareeva On the morning of December 25, at the 97th year of life, an outstanding Soviet and Russian military commander, Army General Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, suddenly died. Over more than 50 years of service, he went from a cadet of a military school to the deputy chief of the General Staff, took part in five wars and military conflicts, and became a major theorist. His ideas are still in demand in the Armed Forces. In March 1941, at less than 18 years old, Makhmut Gareev entered the Tashkent Military School. After graduating from a shortened program due to the outbreak of war, the young lieutenant had to lead a rifle battalion in the battle of Moscow…. As the war ended, he was serving as a senior officer in the operational department of the army headquarters…. In 1974, he began serving in the General Staff as head of the military scientific department. Mahmut Akhmetovich quickly established himself as a talented military theorist. He became a doctor of military sciences, doctor of historical sciences, professor, president of the Academy of military sciences, author of several books and more than 250 scientific publications. As a faithful ally of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the general took an active part in the development and preparation of the giant strategic exercises Vostok-81 and the operational-strategic research Dozor-86. It was on them that a new strategy for controlling the Soviet army was born in the conditions of full-scale modern wars. …Many ideas of Mahmut Gareev anticipated the modern development of the Russian Armed Forces. He was an ardent supporter of equipping troops with drones. In the 1980s, more than a thousand reconnaissance Tu-141 and Tu-143 were put into service with the USSR…. …In the military reform of Minister of Defense Serdyukov, the ideas of Mahmut Gareev were used, originally from the early 1990s. Then he, together with Marshal Ogarkov, tried to modernize the army of the new Russia, turn it into a mobile effective force, creating experimental army corps consisting of brigades…. …More than ever, his work on the introduction of military automated control systems looks more modern. At the current technical level, the automation of military operations control at the operational-tactical and strategic levels has become one of the key areas for increasing the capabilities of the Russian troops. …But the matter was not limited to one theoretical work. From 1989 to 1991, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, General Gareev was instructed to head the task force of military advisers to President Najibullah. During this period, he again sometimes had to personally lead the hostilities and again was injured. Thanks to the help of advisers, the Afghan government managed to hold out for several more years…. …Approaching his 70th birthday, in 1992 he retired, but did not stop his scientific work. In 1995, Makhmut Akhmetovich headed the Academy of Military Sciences, established by decree of the President of Russia…. OE Watch | February 2020 14.
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