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Partner Or Spoiler: the Case of the Islamic Army in Iraq

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Partner Or Spoiler: the Case of the Islamic Army in Iraq JANUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 2 Partner or Spoiler: The claims that “repelling the Western We do not recognize any treaty Crusader-Zionist campaign” is its top or any agreement held by these Case of the Islamic Army priority. To illustrate its commitment consecutive governments…We in Iraq to this proclaimed goal, the IAI releases do not recognize the constitution daily rosters of attack claims against which was written during the time By Pascale Combelles Siegel coalition forces. of the occupiers and we do not recognize any bill that opposes the the islamic army in iraq (iai) is often The IAI is no less harsh on the current Shari`a of Allah.4 referred to as an Islamist-nationalist Iraqi government. Applying its own organization fighting to secure a space version of the fruit of the poisoned tree, The IAI went even further in its for Sunnis in the post-Saddam political the IAI unequivocally opposes the Iraqi rejectionist approach in the PCIR era. The subtext of this view is that the government. Indeed, because the current political platform, stating: “There is no IAI is an insurgent organization with government was established under Shari`a legitimacy for any constitution, which the U.S. and Iraqi governments rules decided by the United States, it any ruling regime or law which was can possibly reconcile to move toward has no legitimacy. In May 2007, the IAI legislated during the occupation.”5 a peaceful post-Saddam era. Recurring subscribed to the political program of Practically, these statements deny the rumors of informal negotiations the RJF, which states: democratic legitimacy of the current between the IAI and U.S. government political process. They also imply that representatives and evidence of IAI We do not recognize the there is an inherent and irrepressible military engagement against al-Qa`ida constitution which was written contradiction between Shari`a-based in Iraq have reinforced the image of the during the time of the occupiers... and Western-based legislations. Pushed IAI as a “reasonable insurgent.” We do not recognize any political to its logical conclusion, the IAI stance games starting [sic] by the ill- means that what comes from the West This image, however, does not comport reputed Bremer’s council up to must be, by definition, anti-Islamic. with the group’s public statements. his sectarian agent, al-Maliki... Through a series of pronouncements We do not recognize the sectarian The IAI does not limit itself to during the past year, the IAI does not elections or what it was based on... criticizing the current political system. appear as a moderate Islamist-nationalist We do not recognize any treaty To demonstrate its commitment to organization willing to compromise in or any agreement held by these changing that system, the IAI routinely order to be reintegrated into the post- consecutive governments.2 attacks Iraqi government targets, Saddam political system, but rather as principally ISF members and facilities. a rejectionist group seeking to make The IAI also accuses the Iraqi It also encourages Sunni politicians who a blank slate of the current system in government of being sectarian and have opted for a reintegration strategy favor of a new political arrangement serving the interests of Iraqi Shi`a at to withdraw their support. The IAI’s solely designed by the Iraqis based the expense of Sunnis. Therefore, in stance regarding those Sunnis involved on Shari`a. These tenets of the IAI’s October 2007, the IAI characterized the in the political process only confirms ideology have become those of the larger Iraqi government as “bringing to the this hypothesis. The IAI praised the fronts in which the IAI is participating: Sunni nothing but misery, torture and Iraqi Accordance Front for leaving the the Reformation and Jihad Front (RJF) displacement.”3 In particular, the IAI government in July, but condemned Vice and the Political Council of the Iraqi routinely accuses the Iraqi government President Tariq al-Hashimi for meeting Resistance (PCIR). of covering the nefarious activities of with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Shi`a militias (the Badr Corps and the A Rejectionist Political Platform Mahdi Army) and of using the Iraqi A Radical Discourse In a string of statements released Security Forces (ISF) for campaigns of The IAI does not shy away from using during the past few months, the IAI Sunni brutalization. As a consequence, Salafist fundamentalist and sectarian (like the fronts it joined, the RJF and the IAI proposes to “reconstruct the references, akin to those used by the the PCIR) has repeatedly reaffirmed its Iraqi government on a just basis with a Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Qa`ida’s opposition to the presence of coalition government of professionals.” In short, affiliate in the country. The IAI forces in Iraq, the Iraqi government and the IAI argues for a coup d’état against castigates the Shi`a as “polytheists,” the post-Saddam political system. The the elected government. calls Shi`a political leaders “Safawis” IAI decries the occupation of Iraq as an and characterizes the ISF as “apostates.” “act of aggression,” both “illegitimate Additionally, the IAI rejects the current All of these references are negatively and unjust.”1 The group argues that the body of legislation that underpins the connoted. In Islam, polytheists are ultimate goal of U.S. policy in Iraq is to present political system. The IAI put it considered infidels because their plunder Iraq’s wealth and advance the plainly in May 2007 when it pledged: venerating multiple divinities directly “Crusader-Zionist” plot to divide the contradicts with the Islamic principle umma and subdue the great nation of of the unicity of God. Salafi-jihadi Iraq. As a result, the IAI consistently 2 Ibid. 4 Islamic Army in Iraq, “Jihad and Reformation Front 1 Islamic Army in Iraq, “Jihad and Reformation Front 3 Islamic Army in Iraq, “Press Statement on the State- Establishing Statement,” press communiqué, English Establishing Statement,” press communiqué, English ment of a Member of al-Maliki’s Government,” press version, May 3, 2007. version, May 3, 2007. communiqué, English version, September 17, 2007. 5 The announcement was reported by al-Jazira. JANUARY 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 2 ideologues have argued that the Shi`a U.S. goals by publicly and physically the radical Islamism rhetoric to gain are polytheists because they venerate clashing with the ISI since mid-2007. exposure and support, its mere use may the twelve imams. The term Safawi Indeed, the IAI publicly denounced the facilitate IAI’s foot soldiers passage to refers to the Persian empire of the 16th ISI for committing crimes against other international jihadism in the future. to 18th centuries that extended well into mujahidin and for trying to submit other The IAI’s followers will have received modern Iraq (Basra, Najaf, Karbala, groups to its control. Subsequently, IAI in Iraq an ideological formation into Baghdad). The connotation here is that members have attacked ISI strongholds Islamist radicalism, accepting some of Iraqi Shi`a are outside the bounds of in Anbar Province and Baghdad.7 It the fundamental premises of al-Qa`ida’s both the Islamic and national (Iraqi) is possible that if the IAI were able to ideology. Among these premises are community. The characterization of achieve power, it would adopt a more the belief that the Sunni community is bona fide Iraqi Shi`a political parties as secular and non-sectarian approach to being wronged and under threat from a “Safawis” is intended to cast doubt on governing. supposed “Crusader-Zionist” complot; the legitimacy and allegiance of millions that those declared non-believers can of Iraqi Shi`a, intrinsically suspected of The significance of these developments, and should be attacked; that armed betraying Iraq’s best interests to further however, should not be overstated. struggle is the way to redress these their supposed sectarian interests. First, the informal talks have not borne torts; and that the Qur’an and sunna fruit. According to public accounts provide the answers to most questions. More generally, IAI propaganda is of the discussions, the IAI posed replete with Salafist references. French unacceptable conditions for engaging Even if the IAI does not seek to export journalists Christian Chesnot and in official negotiations. These include its jihad outside of Iraq officially or does Georges Malbrunot, who were taken setting a timetable for a U.S. troop not seek to restore the caliphate in the hostage by the IAI in 2004, testified to Middle East (key strategic differences the radical ideology underpinning the “More generally, IAI with the ISI), its demobilized foot group. “References to ‘Chief Osama’ soldiers, rich of battlefield experience abounded…and there was much talk of propaganda is replete with and molded into a rather radical living by Muslim law,” said Chesnot Salafist references.” brand of Salafism, might be primed upon returning from 124 days in for rolling over into international captivity. His colleague, Malbrunot, jihadism. The IAI might not be using concurred: the terms “Zionist-Crusader complot” withdrawal, the recognition of the Iraqi or “takfiris” or “Shari`a” in exactly They are adamant jihadists, Islamic resistance as the sole legitimate the same sense as al-Qa`ida’s Usama convinced that they are waging representative of the Iraqi people bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, but war to defend the Muslim faith and the trial of all officials involved by using a similar vocabulary the IAI against the West. There was a in murders or corruption since the might ultimately facilitate the passage lot of talk about Chief Osama, occupation. Second, the IAI’s conflict to a more extreme interpretation. In references to Chechnya and how with the ISI should not be misconstrued the end, al-Qa`ida is likely to be the the Muslim world is fighting and it seems that it does not mean a benefactor of this confusion.
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