Human Rights and Christian-Confucian Dialogue

LAI PAN-CHIU

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE

Introduction The issue of human rights plays a significant role in global politics and is re- garded as an important topic for interreligious dialogue. Due to the important role of Confucianism in political ideology in various Asian countries, the relationship between Confucianism and human rights has been widely discussed. But in most of these focused studies (e.g., De Bary and Tu 1998) Confucian- ism is not studied in comparison or in dialogue with other religions. In some of the occasions for interreligious or cross-cultural dialogue on human rights, the Confucian position is notably missing (e.g., Küng and Moltmann 1990: viii).

This article aims to engage Confucianism and Christianity in dialogue on human rights. This attempt is undertaken with the assumption that interreligious dialogue should aim at the mutually creative transformation of the religious traditions involved and takes the partners of dialogue as potential co- workers for the betterment of the well-being of human and non-human beings of the whole world (Lai 2011a; Lai 2011b). Based on this understanding, instead of comparing some of the concepts in the classical texts of both traditions, this article will focus on the contemporary Confucian and Chinese Chris- tian discourses on human rights. It is noteworthy that these discourses are made by scholars studying Christianity and/or Confucianism, but the scholars themselves are not necessarily Christians or Confucians.

Through analyzing the publications related to the Confucian and Chinese Christian approaches to human rights, this article will show that there are many possible convergences or resonances between the Confucian and Christian approaches to human rights. Furthermore, the dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism on human rights may enhance not only the mutual understandings between the two traditions but also the creative transformation of the re- spective traditions. In the long run, this kind of dialogue may contribute to the further development and implementation of human rights, especially in the Chi- nese speaking world.

The Confucian Approach to Human Rights Since the 1980s there has been a debate concerning “Asian values” and human

133 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2 rights. One of the disputed issues is whether human rights are genuinely universal or merely Western values imposed by Western countries on the rest of the world. Some suggest that the Asian countries can and should uphold certain “Asian values” to interpret or evaluate human rights in their own way and to resist the cultural domination and imperialism of Western countries. No matter whether “Asian values” are merely a pretense or a slogan fabricated for a hidden political agenda, Confucianism is often considered to be the philosophical foundation of the alleged “Asian values,” with the assumption that Con- fucianism is squarely opposed to the Western individualistic idea of human rights (De Bary 1998; Shun and Wang 2004: 1).

As Joseph Chan’s survey of Confucianism and human rights points out, schol- arly opinions on the relationship between Confucianism and human rights are divergent. While some scholars argue for the incompatibility of Confucianism and human rights, others advocate their compatibility (Chan 2012). As we will see, however, this crude demarcation between incompatible and compatible may not be able to reflect the rather complicated Confucian responses to the idea of human rights.

Among the scholars highlighting the incompatibility between Confucianism and human rights, Henry Rosemont Jr. is arguably the most outspoken. It is noteworthy that what Rosemont attempts to refute is the rights-based ethics and understanding of the human being as autonomous individual associated with the concept of human rights, rather than the content of human rights—for example, freedom of speech. Rosemont argues that the early Confucian ethics is entirely in opposition to the rights-based contemporary Western moral philosophy. Confucianism has neither the concept of “rights” nor the concept of “human beings as freely choosing autonomous individuals,” the two basic concepts underlying the idea of human rights. Instead, Confucianism views human beings in terms of their social roles, and the most fundamental ethical questions in terms of responsibilities related to these roles (Rosemont 1988). For Rosemont, this is by no means a deficiency in Confucianism. On the contrary, the Western rights-based ethics and the related individualistic understanding of human being are socially disruptive and harmful to society as a whole because they lead to irresolvable social conflict. Rosemont believes that it is possible to express one’s moral sentiment without the language of human rights and Confucianism can serve as an important alternative to the modern Western theories of human rights (Rosemont 1998).

Rosemont’s position is challenged by the framework for discussing Confu- cianism and human rights provided by Sumner B. Twiss. According to Twiss, the human rights movement underwent three generations of development. Al- though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was primarily a Western initiative, in the so-called second generation of the development of human rights since the 1970s, there were significant non-Western contribu- 134 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE tions, including Chinese ones, highlighting the concept of “conscience” along with “reason,” and shifting the emphasis from the civil rights of individuals to the collective rights for economic, social, and cultural developments. In other words, it is a mistake to interpret or restrict human rights to merely the civil liberties of individuals. This is even clearer in the third generation of development that attempts to include the ecological dimension. Considering these developments, Rosemont’s argument for the incompatibility of Confucianism and human rights is based on an outdated and inadequate understanding of human rights. In short, Confucianism and human rights can be far more compatible than Rosemont suggests (Twiss 1998: 29-46).

According to Chan, Rosemont’s argument misinterprets both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Confucian understanding of personhood. Contrary to Rosemont’s interpretation, the Declaration, Chan suggests, presup- poses that people are social and cultural beings rather than a-social or a-cultural. The Declaration actually affirms that people are “endowed with reason and conscience” and have duties towards one another “in a spirit of brotherhood,” which might reflect the adoption of the Western concept of fraternity and recalls the Chinese sentiment concerning universal brotherhood in recog- nizing all human beings as brothers and sisters. With regard to Rosemont’s interpretation of Confucianism, Chan argues that the Confucian concept of benevolence (ren) refers to a common humanity rather than merely differentiated social roles. Furthermore, according to the position of Xunzi, Confucianism does not necessarily oppose or suppress basic individual interests (Chan 2012: 89-93).

Among the scholars affirming the compatibility of Confucianism and human rights, William Theodore de Bary is probably the most prolific and best known. Unlike Rosemont’s focusing on early Confucianism, De Bary’s study covers its later development. Based on his previous studies of Neo-Confucianism and the liberal tradition in China, including particularly Huang Zongxi’s (1610-95) critique of the political totalitarianism of traditional China, De Bary holds that Confucianism has its liberal tradition, which can be described in terms of per- sonalism rather than individualism in the Western understanding of the word (De Bary 1970; De Bary 1983).

For De Bary, Confucianism is a humanistic tradition, holding a reverential attitude toward human life, which is understood to be deeply rooted in primarily the family and the wider community. Although early Confucianism emphasizes on the role of ritual in maintaining social harmony and appeals to the law only as the final resort in settling interpersonal conflict in its further development in Neo-Confucianism, the dignity and equality of all human beings are affirmed together with and through the recognition of the moral nature of human beings. Some Neo-Confucian thinkers even developed a more positive attitude towards the law, affirming its role in maintaining social order, unlike 135 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2 the early Confucian emphasis on rituals to maintain social harmony (De Bary 1988).

In his Asian Values and Human Rights, De Bary further suggests that the Con- fucian view of the human being is more in line with communitarianism than individualism and can offer an alternative approach to human rights (De Bary 1998). Regardless of whether it is fair to criticize De Bary’s argument for Con- fucian communitarian as an “uncritical and uninformed attempt to re-appro- priate selective monuments of China’s Confucian legacy” (Yu 2000: 302), his argument can be understood as an attempt to reinterpret, reform, and even reconstruct the Confucian tradition while acknowledging the historical limitations of Confucianism with regard to the issue of human rights. This Confucian approach to adopt and transform the idea of human rights, as we are going to see, is shared by many other scholars involved in the discussion concerning Confucianism and human rights.

Lee Ming-huei, a Confucian scholar from Taiwan, also admits that traditional Chinese culture has neither the concept of democracy nor the concept of rights—not to say human rights. Referring primarily to Mencius, among some other Confucian thinkers, Lee argues that Confucianism affirms human dignity, the universality of human nature, a communitarian view of human beings, and the principles of both “of the people” and “for the people”—though not “by the people.” Without adopting the Western individualism associated with the concept of human rights, these Confucian resources can provide certain justifications to human rights, especially the first and second generations of its development. Admittedly, Confucianism does not have the modern concept of human rights, but it does have the potential to further develop in this direction and contribute to the implementation of human rights. Lee himself declares that what he seeks to do can be called “reconstructive hermeneutics of ac- commodation,” through which he attempts to reconstruct the Confucian tradition in order to adapt it to the contemporary world (Lee 2005: 71-98).

Liu Shu-hsien, a famous representative of contemporary Confucianism with extensive teaching experience in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the USA, acknowledges that, like science and democracy, the idea of human rights, originated in the West. But Asians may be able to develop something comparable in Asian terms. In his own words, We Confucians are lagging behind when it comes to the defense of human rights, but we have much to offer in connection with personal concern for a higher ethical aware- ness, which also makes an important contribution to bringing about social harmony and even world peace. (Liu 1996: 219) Liu further suggests that the Confucian emphasis on human dignity will make its acceptance of the idea of human rights rather easy (Liu 1999: 162). But this does not mean that Confucianism will accept the Western individualism asso-

136 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE ciated with the concept of human rights wholeheartedly. In accordance with the philosophical idea of one principle with many manifestations proposed by Neo-Confucianism, it is not necessary for China to blindly follow the “West- ern” manifestation of the idea of human rights. In other words, the Chinese people can make use of Confucianism to provide the cultural resources to develop a new interpretation of human rights without the drawback of individualism (Liu 1999: 164). Liu further proposes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which addresses merely “external” laws, needs to be com- plemented by a declaration of universal ethic that addresses the more internal aspect of ethics (Liu 1999: 169). It is interesting to note that, as Liu himself admits, his participation in the discussion concerning global ethic made him realize that the differences between Christianity and Confucianism was not as absolute as he had previously thought (Liu 1999: 156).

An even more interesting example can be found in Anthony Yu, who is not considered to be a Confucian by himself or by others. Though he reviews De Bary’s Asian Values and Human Rights very critically (Yu 2000) and launches a thorough and penetrating critique of “Chinese Confucianism as it is tradi- tionally received,” he also attempts to offer “a reinterpretation of certain Con- fucian concepts that may provide the basis for the formulation—perhaps even the advocacy—of universal human rights” (Yu 2005: 104). Yu attempts to demonstrate “how certain Confucian tenets may be critically retrieved for contemporary reflection, thereby also honoring cultural particularity within a comparative and pluralistic context” (Yu 2005: 105). Yu declares that his approach “makes no appeal to assumptions of theistic transcendence”; instead, it is focused on the concept of desire (yu) and takes desire to be “the defining feature of our common humanity” (Yu 2005: 105). This makes his approach different not only from those adopted by the Western scholars with theistic background but also from those posed by many Confucian scholars. Yu attempts to re- trieve, in particular, the resources from the work of Dai Zhen (1723-1777) who, based on his definition of “virtue as life productive of life” (shengsheng shi de), suggests that one person’s desires are the same as other people’s, and humanness (ren) means desiring not only the fulfillment of one’s own life but also that of other human beings. In this way, the value of individual human life is affirmed in an equalitarian way, without negating other people’s values and one’s moral responsibility towards the fulfillment of other human lives (Yu 2005: 125-32).

One may notice that, of these four scholars from diverse academic, cultural, and religious backgrounds, there are many similarities with regard to their approaches to human rights. They tend to agree that the Confucian tradition does not have any concept equivalent to the Western understanding of human rights. They also acknowledge that there are significant conceptual differences between the Confucian tradition and the formulations of human rights so far. Confucianism has the cultural resources to affirm human rights in its own 137 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2 way(s), however, and can offer an alternative interpretation of human rights that may be able to complement, correct, or counter-balance the predominantly Western interpretation of human rights.

They suggest that Confucianism can offer an alternative interpretation of human rights that is more communitarian than individualistic, affirming human rights without neglecting responsibility to one’s family and wider society. Their proposals for the interpretation of human rights are thus more in line with the second generation of the human rights movement than the first. Their affirma- tions of human rights are based primarily on the Confucian understanding(s) of human nature and do not require a Creator God.

The efforts made by these scholars of Confucianism can be described as attempts to transform Confucianism creatively, acknowledging its limitations in the past as well as the diversity or richness of its tradition. This attempt in- cludes certain retrievable and useful resources to help Confucianism reform it- self and adapt to the contemporary world and to contribute creatively to the development of human rights.

It is interesting to note that many of the scholars involved in the discussion concerning Confucianism and human rights tend to affirm the first generation of development of human rights with certain reservations. Their views are more in line with the development of the second generation, but they usually neglect the third generation of development. Furthermore, they tend to identify the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and some other Western discourses on human rights as something entirely secular—highlighting their origins in the Enlightenment and neglecting their Christian background. For example, at a conference on Confucianism and human rights held in 1995, many of the participants gave their responses to the contemporary Western philosophical thought associated with the idea of human rights (Twiss 1998: 49) rather than Christianity. In fact, Christianity does not feature in the index of the post-conference volume at all. Moreover, it mentions the word “ecology” only once, but without direct relationship with human rights (De Bary and Tu 1998: xiv). Of course, this does not mean that the Confucian approach to human rights has nothing to do with ecology or Christianity. On the contrary, individualism is one of the contributing factors behind the ecological crisis, and the Confucian understanding of humanity plays a crucial role in its approach to ecological ethics and offers a significant alternative to individualism (Lai 1998; Lai 2004). Furthermore, as we will see, there are some significant convergences between the Confucian and Chinese Christian approaches to human rights.

Chinese Christian Discourse on Human Rights In the aftermath of the June 4th event in Beijing in 1989, Chan Sze-chi, a doc- toral student from Hong Kong studying systematic theology in England at that

138 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE time, who returned to Hong Kong later and has been teaching at the Baptist University until now, published a rather lengthy article on the theological foundation of human rights (Chan 1990). The article adopts a largely Christo- centric approach, arguing that in comparison with the natural law theory, Christology can provide a much better foundation for human rights. According to Chan, the concept of human rights is a remarkable achievement in Western ethics, but if people emphasize their own rights as their possession at the expense of their responsibilities, the result will be forth certain negative social consequences that are quite clearly shown in some Western societies. Furthermore, without any reference to teleology, the ontology underlying the Western theory of human rights fails to affirm human subjectivity in a proper way (Chan 1990: 67-68). Chan suggests that a better alternative can be found in Christology, especially in the doctrine of the Incarnation. For Chan, human rights should be based on human subjectivity or personhood, which is to be affirmed by the human being’s status as God’s son/daughter/child. This “childship,” according to Chan, is endowed by God, fulfilled in Jesus Christ and conferred as a divine gift to all human beings equally and universally (Chan 1990: 74-80). It is not merely a gift, but it entails responsibilities as well. Following the example of Christ, especially how He emptied Himself, became a servant, and even died on the cross, Christians should learn to surrender or forsake their own rights for the sake of others, especially the fulfillment of other human beings’ human rights. One possible way of practicing this “childship” or “dis- cipleship” is to struggle for the human rights of the others in a peaceful or non- violent way (Chan 1990: 87-96).

It is quite clear that, while endorsing the basic content of human rights, Chan attempts to offer a solid theological foundation to human rights, to counter-balance the one-sided emphasis on rights at the expense of responsibilities and to correct the individualistic tendency of Western ethics of human rights. Based on his interpretation of the Incarnation together with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, Chan advances a relational understanding of the human person and uses the Confucian concept of ren to translate the Western concept of “person” into ren zhe (literally the ren one). He also uses the concept of yi (righteous- ness) to explain how “childship,” which involves a certain teleological understanding of the human being, involves having not only rights but also certain responsibilities—including what is right for a human person as a child of God to do (Chan 1990:82-87). This reflects Chan’s aim of indigenizing the Chris- tian discourses in traditional Chinese terms. Moreover, Chan’s theological approach to human rights attempts to offer and declare a better alternative to Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. For example, Chan claims that the Christological affirmation of human subjectivity, which is created by God, fulfilled in Christ, conferred to all human beings universally and equally rather than being attained entirely through self-cultivation, is better than the Confu- cian approach to human subjectivity, which tends to be too elitist—something that can be attained only by a few sages (Chan 1990: 88). Chan’s critique of 139 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2

Confucianism may not be entirely fair to Confucianism because the Confucian affirmation of human subjectivity is also in a sense universal and innate to all human beings. This is because, according to Confucianism, human goodness or capacity for sagehood is universally and equally conferred on all human beings in terms of potential or nature, though the actual moral attainment may vary from human being to human being.

Chan’s theological discourse on human rights criticizes not only the one-sided- ness of the idea of human rights, which might overlook human responsibilities, but also the Western individualistic understanding of human rights, which un- dermines human sociality or the relationality of the human person. The aim of his theological approach to human rights is not only to offer a better alternative to the Western approach and the traditional Chinese culture but also to contribute to the better implementation of human rights in China. A comparable yet significantly different theological approach is advocated by Kwan Kai- man, a professor of philosophical theology at the Baptist University in Hong Kong.

In comparison with Chan, Kwan’s discussion on human rights is more philosophical than Christological, and he pays more attention to the Western discussion than the Chinese context. Like Chan, Kwan also addresses the issues concerning the theological foundation of human rights (Kwan 2007), but Kwan’s effort aims primarily to defend the legitimacy and/or superiority of a theological foundation for human rights against the criticisms made by some Western secular philosophers who reject any Christian or theistic foundation, rather than offering an ethical foundation for the praxis of fighting for human rights. From time to time, Kwan attempts to argue, on the one hand, that the idea of human rights is not self-evident and cannot be adequately justified on a naturalistic basis (Kwan 2008; 2009a) or empirical experience (Kwan 2009b). On the other hand, he advocates that “transcendent moral laws grounded in God can provide solid foundation for human rights” (Kwan 2007: 225).

Although Kwan endeavors to provide a solid theological foundation for human rights, he is by no means uncritical of the idea of human rights. It is interesting to note that Kwan uses the expression “love-hatred intertwined” to describe the relationship between Christianity and human rights (Kwan 2011: 153). Other than the secular or naturalistic rejection of the religious or theological approach to human rights, Kwan is particularly critical of the “unlimited expan- sion” of human rights proposed by some “extreme liberals” campaigning for the rights of homosexuals and other groups. Kwan is not against basic human rights for homosexuals, but, for him, the acceptance of same-sex marriage, le- gislation for their rights for child adoption, etc. is beyond the proper scope of human rights. To counter the extreme individualism underlying these “abuses” of the idea of human rights, Kwan advocates the transformation of human rights through a Christian liberal communitarianism (Kwan 2011). 140 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE

It is interesting to note that when articulating his Christian liberal communitarianism, Kwan makes reference to some primary and secondary works by Mi- chael J. Sandel, Daniel Bell, Charles Taylor, etc., without referring to Confu- cianism (Kwan 2011: 174-77). In fact, Kwan makes use of the Doha Declar- ation of 2004, which acknowledges the importance of family life, to support his opposition to the individualistic interpretation of human rights. But, again, he does not mention Confucianism at this point, which is particularly famous for its emphasis on the importance of family for human life (Kwan 2012: 177- 80). Similarly, when Kwan acknowledges that human nature should play an important role in moral philosophy, the sources he quotes are J. Bud- zsiszewski, William Alston, and others, rather than Confucianism (Kwan 2012: 217-20).

Kwan argues that Christianity can provide a better foundation than secular approaches can offer. This kind of argument tends to assume some demar- cations or oppositions between the secular and religious or between the naturalistic and theological approaches. As Kwan himself admits, however, his theological approach is not entirely “from above,” for he accepts the “from below” approach too. On the one hand, he interprets the meaning of human rights from the perspective of Christian faith but, on the other hand, also uses reason, experience, and culture to confirm this faith-based view of human rights (Kwan 2011: 169). In fact, Kwan cites Mencius to illustrate that, due to God’s universal grace, people may be able to affirm certain human dignities or inherent values and to reject some serious violations of human rights (Kwan 2008: 146-47). Kwan also affirms that the idea of natural law is consonant with Chinese culture, including Confucianism particularly (Kwan 2012: 206-09). He even proposes that “Chinese theologians and Christian ethicists need to learn to use natural law wisely and effectively in our context” (Kwan 2012: 224).

Convergence of Christianity and Confucianism on Human Rights Based on the above survey of Confucian and Chinese Christian discourses on human rights, one may find that both Christianity and Confucianism, while affirming the basic contents of human rights, indicate similar reservations regarding the individualistic liberalism or liberal individualism behind the Western articulations of human rights. In fact, both contemporary Christian theology and Confucian philosophy attempt to develop a third way between collectivism and individualism through responding to the communitarian philosophy developed in western academia respectively, without engaging each other in dialogue. It is rather unfortunate that, even though Alasdair McIntyre, the champion of communitarianism with a strong Christian background, did give his responses to the Confucian ethics of self and community, the Christian position is not mentioned in the relevant comparative study, which focuses on the comparison with the ethics of Western philosophy rather than with Chris- tian theology (Shun and Wong 2004).

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Some Chinese Christian theologians, such as Chan and Kwan mentioned above, for example, indicate their concerns with some of the theoretical problems as well as practical implications of the idea of human rights. They are aware of the possible tensions between Christianity and the idea of human rights, which may sound too secular, right-based and individualistic for Chris- tianity, which tends to uphold the transcendent ground of human rights, human responsibility along with human rights, and a more relational or communitarian understanding of human being. In fact, this relational or communitarian understanding of the human being is very much in line with some recent trends in Western Christian theology that attempt to interpret the image of God (imago Dei) in Trinitarian terms and to develop a relational understanding of the human person (e.g., McFadyen 1990; Grenz 2001; Shults 2003). According to this kind of theological anthropology, human nature, uniqueness, or dignity is defined by one’s personal relationship with God, as well as the capacity for inter-human relationships. A human person must be relational because, as a creature, a human being is always in relation with God the Creator, no matter whether he recognizes it or not. This kind of interpretation differs from the traditional interpretation of the image of God exclusively in terms of autonomous individual reason or soul but is quite in line with the relational understanding of human being advocated by Confucianism.

Confucianism may share the preference for a more communitarian approach than the individualistic and rights-based approach to human rights, but it may also challenge some of the presuppositions underlying the advocacy of a transcendent ground for human rights. For Confucianism, while human nature is universal, Christian beliefs about God are accepted by Christians only. In comparison with the Christian theistic beliefs, human nature or the Confucian understanding of human nature should be a better foundation for human rights. Based on the Confucian understanding of the unity between Heaven and humanity (Tian ren he yi), Confucianism may further query if the Christian theological approach, which very much emphasizes the transcendent ground, might problematically assume the opposition between the secular and the religious/ theistic/Christian, that between the naturalistic and the transcendent approaches, or, in the final analysis, that between the human and the divine.

This possible query might overlook the fact that some Christian theologians actually adopt the natural law approach to human rights, which takes natural law, including its embodiment in human nature, as the foundation for human rights. In this sense, there is no absolute distinction or necessary contradiction between the Christian and Confucian approaches. In fact, Kwan acknowledges the natural law approach to human rights and mentions the efforts made by some scholars in Taiwan attempting to work out the idea of natural law in con- sonance with Chinese culture, including, in particular, the Confucian idea of conscience (liang zhi) (Kwan 2012: 206-09), though he also indicates his reservations about this. In his own words: 142 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE

However, in the Chinese culture, although it is vaguely acknowledged that the moral and social order originates from the Heaven, the Heaven only sees through the eye of the people and hears through the ears of the people. So, its transcendence is to some extent compromised. (Kwan 2012: 209) In response to Kwan’s comment, scholars of Confucianism may dispute the statement “Heaven only sees through the eye of the people and hears through the ears of the people” affirms only that Heaven does see or listen through the people and does not exclude other possible channels. In fact, the original Chi- nese text reads “tian shi zi wo min shi, tian ting zi wo min ting,” which does not include any word equivalent to “only,” and the English translation by James Legge does not have the word “only” or its equivalent either (Legge 1879). Furthermore, in its original context in the chapter of the “Great De- claration II” of Shang Shu of the periods of spring and autumn (772-476 BCE), the main theme is to suggest that Heaven appoints the emperor to govern the people. But if the emperor seriously misbehaves, Heaven may withdraw the mandate, and it becomes legitimate to revolt against the tyrant. So, the transcendence of Heaven, which is maintained against tyranny, cultural hegemony, or the monopoly of the divine mandate of the emperor or government, is by no means compromised by the statement.

Admittedly, the Confucian understanding of transcendence is radically different from the understanding of “transcendence” advocated by many of the schools of Christian theology, except for process theology, which exhibits certain similarities with Confucianism (Berthrong 1999: 133-64). Considering the diversity of the Christian understandings of divine transcendence, including the Trinitarian approach to divine transcendence and immanence, one may find that the Christian and Confucian understandings of the divine transcendence and immanence are not as incompatible as some Confucians suggest (Lai 2005: 51-71). After all, for Confucianism, human nature is considered an en- dowment or mandate received from Heaven. In this sense, Confucianism cannot deny that human rights have some kind of “transcendent” ground. Confu- cians may, however, query if and how far the differences between the Christian and Confucian understanding of God, Heaven, or transcendent, ultimate reality are important for the articulation and implementation of human rights.

In his study of the Christian foundations for human rights, Xu Aiguo, a professor of Peking University Law School, comments that people with extremely divergent worldviews—Christians and rationalists, for example—may put for- ward opposite arguments for human rights, but, interestingly, they can agree to or endorse the same declaration on human rights. Perhaps the most important thing is the fact that they agree on the declaration, and the question concerning which argument is correct or better is relatively unimportant (Xu 2008: 53-54). Xu’s comment raises an important question about humanity: Why do people of different cultures agree on certain human rights, even though they did not come up with the idea and do not even have any comparable concept in their 143 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2 culture? The corollary questions are: Does it mean that it is natural for human beings to accept certain human rights? In what sense does human nature provide the foundation for human rights?

In China, some scholars hold that the Western discourses on human rights are based on the Christian doctrine of the sinfulness of the human being. For example, Yu Wujin, a professor of philosophy in mainland China, suggests that the Western theory of human rights is based on and developed from the Christian theory of the sinfulness of human nature. Since Confucianism is based on a theory of human goodness, it has not developed a comparable theory of human rights. To justify human rights, Confucianism needs to reinterpret its own tradition creatively and to explore its own resources concerning evil in human nature (Yu 2004). Yu’s interpretation of the relationship between Christian faith and the Western theory of human rights contradicts the views articulated by the scholars specializing in law and/or theology. For example, Xu Aiguo suggests that the Western legal theory of human rights is in a sense a secularized theology of human rights based on the Christian affirmation of human dignity (Xu 2008: 57). This understanding of the connection between human rights and the Christian emphasis on human dignity is supported by many scholars in the Judeo-Christian tradition (e.g., Hess 2013). Yu’s interpretation betrays a rather basic misunderstanding that the doctrine of human sinfulness, especially the doctrine of original sin, represents the essence of Christianity and provides an explanation for most of the Christian influences on Western civilization. This kind of misunderstanding of Christianity is widely shared by other scholars in mainland China (e.g., Lin 2011). It can overlook the fact that the Christian understanding of human being concerns not only the sinfulness of human being but also human goodness. As Reinhold Niebuhr argues, both dialectical aspects of human nature are important for the vindication of democracy (Niebuhr 1944).

With regard to the Confucian approach to human rights, the Confucian emphasis on human goodness does not necessarily make it incapable of develop- ing a proper foundation for human rights. For example, according to Mencius, every human being, regardless of their gender, social class, or intelligence, has a conscience or benevolence (ren) that constitutes human nature and human dignity, distinguishing the human being from other kinds of lives. This may provide a certain theoretical justification for human rights. Alongside ren, there is another cardinal virtue in Confucianism called shu, which can be translated as “reciprocity,” “altruism,” “other regarding,” etc., meaning “put- ting oneself in the other’s place” (Ames 2011: 194-200). This virtue is em- bodied in Confucius’ famous “Silver Rule” or “Negative Golden Rule” that “do not impose on others whatever you do not desire for yourself.” According to Confucianism, both ren and shu are not only virtues to be upheld and practiced but are also tendencies innate to human nature. This may explain why people of different cultures, religions, or worldviews can agree on the 144 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE same declaration of human rights. Similar to the aforementioned view articulated by Anthony Yu concerning the desire for the fulfillment of one’s own life and those of others, it is quite possible to say that most human beings, except perhaps the elitists who prefer to be ruthless dictators, want to benefit from these human rights and also want to see others enjoying the same benefits or rights too. This is entirely in line with the Confucian understanding of human nature in terms of ren and shu. According to this understanding, human nature constitutes not only the theoretical foundation for the articulation of human rights; it also constitutes the existential or psychological foundation for the universal acceptance of human rights.

This approach of taking humanity instead of divinity as the foundation for human rights is not entirely new to Christianity and does not necessarily deviate from the Christian tradition. For example, Reinhold Niebuhr’s justification of democracy, especially his famous saying that “man’s [sic] capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s [sic] inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary” (Niebuhr 1944: xiii) is also based on an understanding of human nature rather than a doctrine about divine nature. This understanding of the human being is informed by the Christian doctrine of the image of God and human sinfulness, but it is also basically understandable by and even acceptable to the wider public. In like manner, Christianity may perhaps be able to develop a comparable vindication of human rights through dialogue with Con- fucianism.

It is noteworthy that the Confucian affirmation of human rights through the concept of ren and shu mentioned above may assume the human tendencies for both selfishness and altruism. On the one hand, human nature is defined in terms of conscience, altruism, empathy, desiring the fulfillment of other lives, etc., and, on the one hand, it is also characterized by the inclination towards self-preservation, self-love, the desire for the fulfillment of one’s own life, etc. These aspects of humanity, especially altruism, were brought up in the recent dialogue between Christian theology and science. Though a similar dialogue between Confucianism and science is relatively less developed, it is quite possible for Christianity, Confucianism, and evolutionary science, particularly biology and psychology, to have in-depth and fruitful conversations on these issues (Lai and Wang 2013). This kind of trilateral conversation may contribute to the creative transformation of the relevant traditions and the formation of a foundation for human rights that is endorsable not only by Christianity and Confucianism but also by the scientific community and the wider public.

Re-thinking Christian-Confucian Dialogue It is notable that the Chinese Christian discourses on human rights prefer to highlight the distinctiveness or even superiority of the Christian theological ap-

145 STUDIES IN INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 23 (2013) 2 proach. In contrast, the Confucian discourses tend to provide a foundation for human rights through affirming certain common ground in humanity or a theory of human nature acceptable to all human beings.

From the Confucian standpoint, De Bary suggests that, without denying the Western origin of the concept of human rights, it is better not to make the concept of human rights distinctively Western: Despite these differences, in my opinion nothing is gained by arguing for the distinctively Western character of human rights. If you win the argument you lose the battle. That is, if you claim some special distinction for the West in this respect, as assert some inherent lack on the part of Asians, you are probably defining human rights in such narrow terms as to render them unrecognizable or inoperable for others. If, however, you view human rights as an evolving conception, expressing imperfectly the aspira- tions of many peoples, East and West, it may be that, learning from the experience of others, once can arrive at a deeper understanding of human rights problems in different cultural settings. (De Bary 1988: 184) Similarly, apart from affirming the Christian roots of or contributions towards the establishment or development of human rights, Christian theologians may have to consider if it is necessary and desirable to develop and highlight a distinctively Christian approach to human rights.

From the standpoint of Christianity, it is rather natural for Christian theologians, especially those in the Western world, to affirm human rights as a universal value and to highlight the distinctiveness or superiority of the Christian approach to human rights. The considerations of Chinese Christians are more complicated, however. Apparently, to indigenize Christian theology in Chinese culture and society, Chinese Christian theologians may have to consider care- fully the question if certain elements from the Chinese culture can be affirmed and incorporated into their theological discourses on human rights. In addition, given the fact that Christians constitute a minority group in the religiously pluralistic context of contemporary China, highlighting the distinctiveness of the Christian theological approach to human rights may not be the most effect- tive strategy to promote human rights.

As David Ownby points out, the demand for religious freedom made by Chris- tian groups in China is religiously or theologically motivated, but it echoes the “secular” concern for human rights (Ownby 2011: 220-25). The logic of these rights-based claims for human rights, however, “must still compete with the logic of local and national politics in China” (Ownby 2011: 224). Given this political background, if it is believed that human rights must be accepted together with Christian theism, the officially Marxist government of China must, to uphold its atheistic ideology, reject or suppress human rights together with Christianity. Furthermore, if Chinese Christians have to form a partnership or alliance with people of other religions or those without any religious affiliation in their efforts to promote human rights and the accompanying religious lib- 146 HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHRISTIAN-CONFUCIAN DIALOGUE erty, they may have to highlight the common ground shared by the others rather than isolate Christianity from the other religions through upholding its distinctiveness.

This consensus-seeking strategy may be radically different from the interreligious dialogue on ecological issues that may place greater emphasis on the diversity, though the ultimate goal remains the enhancement of the well-being of the whole world (Lai 2011c). It is understandable that some Christians may be concerned with the question if the distinctive Christian identity may be compromised. But if the ultimate goal of the Christian affirmation of human rights is the healthy development or enhancement of human rights, rather than proving the superiority of Christianity vis-à-vis other religions or ideologies, Chinese Christians may have to reconsider if it is necessary and desirable to adopt a theocentric approach and highlight the distinctiveness of the Christian approach to human rights. Perhaps, to achieve this ultimate goal, as a matter of strategy for cultural negotiation, Christianity should focus on and emphasize the common ground in humanity it shares with Confucianism and some other religions. It should explore and highlight the Christian understanding of the human being that non-Christians can agree with rather than the Christian doctrine of God as the distinctive and solid foundation for human rights. This consensus-seeking and/or partnership-building strategy may be more in line with the Confucian ethics of ren as well as the Christian spirit of agape.

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