This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree (e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following terms and conditions of use: This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge. This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author. The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author. When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. The Possibility and Role of Supererogation in Protestant Ethics B.J. Condrey Submitted for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy School of Divinity 2020 I declare that this thesis has been composed solely by myself and that it has not been submitted, in whole or in part, in any previous application for a degree. Except where stated otherwise by reference or acknowledgment, the work presented is entirely my own. B.J. Condrey Abstract In 1958, J.O. Urmson’s landmark article “Saints and Heroes” resulted in a renewed interest in supererogation in moral philosophy. However, religious engagement with supererogation has remained relatively low. Further complicating matters is the fact that dating back to the writings of Martin Luther, Philip Melanchthon, and John Calvin, supererogatory deeds in the form of “counsels” were rejected due to the soteriological role they played in Aquinas’ thought (and other Scholastics) which was used to justify the selling of indulgences by the Roman Catholic church. It is no wonder that the Reformers rejected supererogation in their aim to refute a view of justification that was not sola gratia, sola fide (at least from their perspective). However, philosopher Gregory Mellema suggests that there is no contradiction in affirming a sola gratia, sola fide doctrine of justification while also affirming that a person can perform acts of supererogation. Employing the Protestant doctrine of vocation, he suggests that it might be possible in Protestant Christian ethics to perform an act of supererogation though the act in no way contributes to a person being justified before God (i.e., forgiven of sin and declared righteous in God’s sight). This key insight opened the door to the possibility of supererogation in Protestant Christian ethics. Though Mellema’s proposal is valuable, no specific act is named. In chapter three, I argue that there is one clear act of supererogation in the New Testament. Working with the two divorce passages in Matthew (5:31-32 and 19:1-9), I argue that the following act is supererogatory from a Protestant Christian perspective: choosing to remain married to a spouse that has committed adultery in an effort to reconcile and prevent divorce. This is not to say that this is the only one, but it serves as a great example and can be use to justify further inquiry into additional supererogatory deeds and the overall value of the concept in Protestant thought and practice. i In chapter four, I argue that proper motive should be considered an official criterion of supererogatory acts in Protestant Christian ethics. This view is contrary to David Heyd’s and Alfred Archer’s intent-based theories which, in line with John Stuart Mill, dismiss the deontic relevance of motives to acts. I argue against their view in an attempt to demonstrate that proper motive is necessary, along with the other three basic criteria (1. Not obligatory, 2. Not forbidden, 3. Possesses moral value), for an act to be classified as supererogatory in Protestant Christian ethics. My overall aim is to build upon Mellema’s insight and offer a systematic account of supererogation in Protestant Christian ethics that is grounded in the New Testament. ii Lay Summary “Supererogation” is an awkward term but a useful concept. Essentially, it is an act that goes above and beyond the call of duty. If an act is supererogatory, then this means that though possessing moral worth, it is fully optional. If you do not do it, then no one can assign blame, yet the performance of such acts is considered praiseworthy. In this thesis, I argue that Protestants have rejected the possibility and role of such acts for far too long. From the time of the Reformation and the writings of Martin Luther and John Calvin, Protestants have rejected supererogation because this type of act was viewed as providing support for the selling of indulgences, which was closely connected with a faith+works view of justification that the Reformers wholeheartedly rejected in favor of a doctrine of justification is by faith alone. However, Gregory Mellema argued in 1991 that there is nothing inherently wrong with affirming the following two propositions: (1) acts of supererogation are possible in Protestant ethics, and (2) these same acts can in no way justify a person. This key insight opened the door for Protestants to reengage with supererogation and ask the question: “Are supererogatory acts possible now that they have been decoupled from the doctrine of justification?” Building on this insight, I argue in chapter three that there is one clear example (this is not to say that there are not others) of supererogation in the New Testament: an innocent spouse’s act of remaining and reconciling a marriage with a spouse who has committed adultery (Matt. 5:31–32, 19:1–9). Based on Jesus’ teaching, the act is not obligatory, it is not forbidden, and it possesses moral worth. This act satisfies the three standard criteria for an act to be considered supererogatory. I then conclude the thesis in chapter four by arguing that proper motive should be a fourth criterion for supererogation in Protestant ethics. This claim is somewhat unique because both David Heyd and Alfred Archer—two of the most well-known and established moral philosophers in the field—argue that proper intent, not motive, is required for an act to be supererogatory. Yet, the iii emphasis in the New Testament is upon motive (e.g., fasting, praying, giving, preaching, etc.), so I argue for this while drawing on German theologian Helmut Thielicke’s motive-centric account. It is my hope that as a result of this thesis, Protestants will engage supererogation and embrace the concept as a useful tool in counseling contexts, biblical interpretation, and homiletics. iv v Acknowledgements I am convinced that very few accomplishments, especially significant ones, are ever achieved alone. This doctorate is no exception. It is through the valuable contributions of certain people that this has been completed. I hope that they will also find great satisfaction in what I have written. First and foremost, I want to thank my wife, Allison. Without you, there would be no thesis. You have been my greatest encourager and have always found a way to speak a ray of light into my doubting heart. You have provided such strength, comfort, and fun along the way, and I am forever grateful. Thank you for allowing me to pursue my dream, and I can only imagine that you also are relieved to see this submitted! I will spend the rest of my life trying to return the favor. Secondly, I want to thank Ezra and Rhema. You both kept my feet on the ground, and served as a wild, energetic, and loving reminder that no matter what I may be reading or writing about, life is not measured by knowledge. I would not trade our family adventures for anything, and I hope that you both have enjoyed this season. Thirdly, I want to thank my mom. Towards the end of my second year, dad died. It was so unexpected, and I honestly did not know what it would mean for the doctorate. As you grieved the loss of a husband and best friend and I a wonderful dad, you never flinched: your only desire was that I remain and finish. You knew that finishing this doctorate is what dad would have wanted, and your strength and encouragement helped me continue. I look up to you and want to acknowledge the special role that you have had in the completion of this project. Fourthly, I want to thank Dr. David Grumett. I never imagined that I would receive the time, attention to detail, and encouragement that you have provided throughout the duration of the doctorate. Though never afraid to challenge me, point out errors, and provide needed guidance, everything you did was with the utmost encouragement. I can honestly say that it was a vi pleasure and honor to learn from you, dialogue on various matters, bounce ideas off of you, and get your feedback. It was clear from day one that you really cared about my success. Fifthly, I want to thank Dr. Ulrich Schmiedel. Though you did not move to Edinburgh until my second year of doctoral work, I have appreciated your involvement. You always kept a close eye on the overall coherence of the project, reminding me that introductions, conclusions, and transitions are of the utmost importance. You encouraged me to not lose sight of the forest while looking at the trees. Thank you for providing a second and different perspective on so many matters, and I have richly benefited. Lastly, I want to acknowledge and thank the Lord. I spent years praying for a season when I could “read, study, write, and teach.” This entire doctoral journey has been in answer to prayer and has resulted in an adventure for my entire family.