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36 2016 PETROS GIANNAKOURIS/AP/SIPA

World Wide Webs: who governs the diasporas? by Roderick Parkes and Annelies Pauwels

Global migration patterns have changed over the past aimed to empower their diaspora communities, ex- two decades. Formerly linear, unidirectional and often horting their expats to benefit from educational op- permanent, migration has fast become more ‘circu- portunities in the West, to learn the language and lar’, pluridirectional and temporary: globalisation fa- participate in local politics. But, as diasporas rise, so vours frequent and intense contact between migrants too does ‘diaspora lobbying’, and now there are fears and their home countries. This has allowed for tighter that governments like or Rabat may seek to economic connections between the host-country and instrumentalise their expatriates. homeland, and Western states have come to view diasporas as a useful conduit for channeling wealth, Are migrant groups manipulated? expertise and perhaps even values. For the most part, countries of origin gratefully accept the advantages Governments can use their overseas nationals to ex- their expatriates bring – such as remittances, invest- tend their international influence. , which has ments, or the transfer of innovative technologies and been engaged in diaspora politics since at least the skills. 1980s, is trying to increase its hold over the approx- imately 4 million Turks in Western for just More than half of UN members have now adopted such reasons. The Turkish government apparently diaspora strategies, creating institutions, engaging aims to further not just the national interest but its in outreach or extending rights for citizens abroad. own political agenda. The AKP government has vast- India, for instance, has eased travel rules for overseas ly expanded overseas voting rights in a bid to shore citizens and set up a public-private partnership be- up its electoral base. tween its Diaspora Ministry and the Confederation of Indian Industry. Such initiatives have in turn spurred Across the West, support for (functional) integration many Western states to deepen their engagement with is usually gladly accepted. Problems arise, however, diaspora communities, using them as peacebuilders when the sending-state’s interference conflicts with or democratisation actors but also in other spheres the interests of the host state. The debate regard- such as intercultural dialogue. ing foreign interference recently resurfaced when a Turkish consulate in Europe called upon local Turkish Numerous studies have shown that migrants with organisations to report Turks who insulted President strong ties to their homeland become self-aware and Erdogan, or when the Turkish state-run press agen- confident, leading to better employment prospects. cy Anadolu Ajansi published a list of local schools Thus, when states like Turkey and Morocco recent- and organisations which allegedly maintain links to ly intensified their diaspora outreach efforts, this Fethullah Gülen, suspected by the Turkish govern- seemed to complement Western policies: the pair ment of having orchestrated the July coup attempt.

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) October 2016 1 Eritrea is another tricky case. Asmara has long been initiative to attract investments from Ethiopian émi- suspected of extorting taxes from its overseas popu- grés to develop a state-owned hydro-electric power lation. Currently, exiles loyal to Afewerki’s repressive project – failed to raise enough money due in large regime appear to be attempting, through a series of part to reluctance to finance the authoritarian regime. court cases, to dissuade European newspapers and Yet, emigrants often adopt hardline – more nationalist academics from investigating and reporting about the or conservative – views with regard to their country regime’s intimidation of expatriates. of origin. Armenian-American lobbying repeatedly exerted influence on US foreign policy, allegedly stall- is seemingly trying to increase its influence over ing Armenia’s reconciliation processes with Turkey its diaspora across Europe, too. In 2015 a number of and . demonstrations against one EU government fuelled suspicions that the Kremlin is intentionally mobilis- Play or be played? ing its diaspora to bolster division in host countries. EU governments are also concerned that a handful Europeans have only just got used to the idea that di- of Russian asylum-seekers, mixed in among a recent asporas’ engagement in their home countries is a po- influx of Chechen refugees, may act as trolls, sowing tentially useful asset rather than a sign of split loyalties dissent. Following Russian actions in , and – whether it be Egyptian diaspora groups support- before that in , is suspected of por- ing their country’s struggle for democracy, or Somali traying its diaspora as vulnerable in order to justify women pushing for greater gender equality at home. overseas actions in its defence. Yet now Europeans fear seeing their societies split by dissent and conflicts imported from outside. They Are states losing grip? fear ’s funding of Wahhabi mosques, or lobbying by South Asian diasporas to take sides in In reality, however, diaspora groups can seldom be in- polarised geopolitical debates, or the growth of for- strumentalised in this way. They undertake their own eign fighters and of Kurdish-Turkish and Sunni-Shiite independent advocacy activities. , under the tensions. previous Harper government, provides an illuminat- ing example: 1.2 million Canadian-Ukrainians lob- Yet European societies rank as cohesive and stable. bied for and managed to obtain Canadian arms and Their governments have the means to manage inte- loans for Ukraine after Russia’s incursions there. gration problems. The situation only really becomes problematic, however, when they are bargaining Some diaspora organisations are flatly hostile to their with other states over issues such as migration. In home country’s government. Turks in Europe are the course of the migration crisis, it has become clear a fragmented community, and include and that some governments actively fear their overseas other minorities hostile to the current government diasporas. Ethiopia and Mali are reluctant to take in Ankara. A 2013 protest organised by a diaspora back irregular migrants from the EU, for fear that organisation close to the AKP, and aimed at support- they will foment political dissent. One South Asian ing the government during the Gezi Park protests, country has reportedly lost track of citizens who have had a relatively poor turnout. In frustration at such been given passports by its consulates, and now frets setbacks, President Erdogan alleged that Turkish- about who might be expelled from Europe. German parliamentarians have ‘impure blood’ since they had voted for the recognition of the Armenian The risk for European governments is clear: they are genocide in June 2016. coming under pressure to help authoritarian regimes increase control of their diasporas. Major sending The Iranian regime too is finding it difficult to es- countries stipulate which of their citizens should be tablish links with its diverse (and mainly liberal) di- returned from Europe, and which not. They are mak- aspora: many Iranians fled the country for political ing demands about which of their citizens may move reasons, whether after the Islamic Revolution, dur- to Europe, and which not. Thus, when these states ing the war with , or after conservative president demand that the EU create ‘legal migration oppor- Ahmadinejad’s re-election in 2009. Although this di- tunities’ for their citizens, they are not talking about aspora has occasionally entered into a series of brief classic ‘mobility partnerships’. What they really want rapprochements with Teheran, they may be pursuing are benefits for a small number of people with un- their own agenda – such as investment opportunities questioned loyalty to the government and official in post-war reconstruction or under the international passports. sanctions regime. Roderick Parkes is a Senior Analyst and Annelies Diasporas are not always a force for . Pauwels a Junior Analyst at the EUISS. Certainly, Ethiopia’s 2008 diaspora bond project – an

European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) October 2016 2

© EU Institute for Security Studies, 2016. | QN-AL-16-036-2A-N | ISBN 978-92-9198-410-7 | ISSN 2315-1129 | doi:10.2815/809442