Erdogan As an Admired Sultan Or an Instrument in Political Competition? Locals' Perceptions of the Turkish Presence in Serbian Sandžak Stefan Jojić

WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY 07

Erdogan as an admired sultan or an instrument in political competition? Locals' perceptions of the Turkish presence in Serbian Sandžak Stefan Jojić

January 2021 Erdogan as an admired sultan or an instrument in political competition? Locals' perceptions of the Turkish presence in Serbian Sandžak

Author: Stefan Jojić

Proofreading: Zack Kramer

Published by the Prague Security Studies Institute, January 2021, Prague

The publication is written within the framework of the project “Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Ways Forward in Analyzing External Actors Influence“ led by the Prague Security Studies Institute with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy.

WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper seeks to fill the gap in research of Turkish policy However, the Bosniak elites are not homogenous in their in the Balkans, providing original insight into Turkey’s perception and not all of them see the Turkish presence presence in the Sandžak region of Serbia with a special in solely positive terms. Unlike their opponents from other focus on local perceptions. More specifically, this study Bosniak parties, members of the conservative Justice and deals with locals’ understanding of the Turkish presence, Reconciliation Party and liberal elites can be singled out as well as differences in perception between different as having somewhat more pragmatic and critical views ethnic, political, ideological, and interest groups. The article of Turkey. Hence, this case signals a clear divergence in also deals with how the foreign factor is being used in attitudes about Turkey among different political and political confrontations between different political-interest ideological poles of the Bosniak populace. groups in Sandžak. Given its historical, demographic, and geopolitical features, and declared significance for The results also indicate that Turkey’s reputation among the strategists in Ankara, Sandžak region is a fruitful area for Bosniaks of Sandžak is instrumentalized by local political- exploring Turkey’s foreign policy in the region. interest groups in their mutual clashes. Intending to undermine the positions of rivals in Turkey or to influence The research draws on primary and secondary sources, and local public opinion, some local actors try to present data obtained from dozens of interviews with elites and others as enemies of Turkey, while promoting narratives citizens of Sandžak cities and towns. The results confirm about their own close ties with Ankara. The paper provides the assumed divergence between the perceptions of original insights in the Turkey’s engagement in the region ethnic Serbs citizens and political elites, and their Bosniak and is of interest to researchers of socio-political realities counterparts. While the former mostly have negative in Sandžak and the Balkans, as well as those interested in attitudes about the Turkish presence, which they observe presence of Turkey in Sandžak, the Balkans, and Europe through the lens of a more or less transparent realpolitik in general. agenda, the latter group is characterized by positive attitudes about Turkey’s presence.

3 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Contrary to the passive foreign policy during the most the political, intellectual, media, and religious elites, and of the 20th century, after Erdogan and his Justice and residents of Sandžak (both Muslim and non-Muslim) of the Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) Turkish presence in the region. It examines the following came to power Turkey has pursued a more ambitious and research question: In what ways do locals understand and unilateral policy in international relations. In line with perceive the Turkish presence in Sandžak, its pros and cons, the guidelines formulated in the early 2000s by Ahmet and the reasons for its engagement? How do perspectives Davutoglu (2014), a former leading Turkish foreign policy differ between various socio-political groups in the region? figure, Turkey has increased its international activities in How do local actors use Turkey’s presence and popularity many areas and promoted its interests in its geographical for their own political interests and clashes? vicinity. The Western Balkans are also on the radar of AKP’s ambitious foreign policy agenda, and the multiethnic In order to answer the research questions, it was necessary region of Sandžak with its unique Ottoman legacy plays to employ data collected through both desk and field an important role in Turkish presence in the region. Once research. During 2020, 35 semi-structured interviews were dividing and now divided by Serbia and Montenegro, the conducted with local elites – representatives of the local Sandžak region was among the last territories to remain administration, politicians, religious leaders, journalists, under the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. In addition to its and NGO representatives. Furthermore, 57 interviews specific geographical position, the geopolitical importance were conducted with citizens of four municipalities in of the region is reflected in its demographics, since the Serbian Sandžak – Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica, and Prijepolje area of both Serbian and Montenegrin part of Sandžak is to obtain the data necessary for the examination of lay- inhabited by a mixed population of Christians and Muslims. citizen perceptions. Interviews were tailored for different The importance of this region has been widely recognized categories of interviewees and included both closed- by key foreign policymakers in Ankara during the 21st and open-ended questions. By conducting in-depth and century, making this area suitable for Turkish foreign comprehensive research, the paper aims to bring a better policy research. understanding of various groups’ perceptions of the Turkish presence in the region and get beyond the widespread Hand in hand with Turkey’s intensified activities, academic notion that Muslims have a much more benevolent attitude and public interest in Ankara’s foreign policy has also towards Turks than non-Muslims. increased, sparking debate on Turkey’s influence in neighboring regions, including the Balkans. While The first chapter gives a brief overview of Turkey’s presence there have been many recent reports investigating the in the Western Balkans. The second chapter deals with the Turkish presence in the Balkans, little is known about socio-political specificity of Sandžak. The third chapter local perceptions of that presence. With a focus on locals’ gives insight into locals’ perceptions and the differences perceptions and Serbian part of Sandžak as its spatial focal among various ethnic, political, and interest groups. It also point, this paper aims to fill this gap. With its socio-political deals with the political dynamics of interactions between and geographical specificities, more broadly discussed Turkey and Sandžak, observing both Turkey’s relations with in the following chapters, Sandžak is a promising area for local political actors and the way the Turkish card is being exploring perceptions of Turkey’s foreign policy in the played by locals in their political clashes. era of Erdogan. This study aims to analyze perceptions of

4 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKEY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

TURKEY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

After the centuries of Ottoman domination over the Balkans, people have obtained higher education in Turkey through the period between the collapse of the Empire and the last a system of state scholarships provided by Turkey (Pačariz decade of the 20th century could be described as one of 2020, 92), while on the other hand young people have been Turkish absence rather than presence in the Balkans. Turkey’s encouraged to study at some of the Turkish universities visibility in this region increased during the 1990s when Ankara opened in Balkans (Ajzenhamer and Trapara 2013). took a strong stance on the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo as a promoter of the interests of Muslim Increased Turkey’s regional activity has been accompanied communities in conflict areas (Jojić, 2018). But real increase in by popularization of the term “neo-Ottomanism”, instigated Turkey’s presence in the Balkans came during the 2000s, when by political, academic and media circles outside of Turkey, the AK Party formulated an ambitious foreign policy. raising suspicions that Turkey is motivated by “imperial nostalgia” in advancing in its neighborhoods (Bechev 2012, Since the Balkans were defined as an area vital to Turkey’s 131; Tanasković 2010; Prasanna 2020; Bechev 2017; Somun foreign policy (Davutoglu 2014) during the early period of 2011). The popularity of the term “neo-Ottomanism” was the AKP’s rule, Turkey significantly increased its presence further enhanced by the rhetoric of Turkish officials, especially there in many spheres. In political terms, Turkey has worked Davutoglu who frequently referred to Ottoman times in to establish closer relations with the Balkan countries, positive manner. The term itself provokes a lot of controversies especially those with significant Muslim populations, while and, due to the danger of evoking negative memories, is seeking to impose itself as a mediator in resolving conflicts extremely unpopular in pragmatic circles in Turkey.2 With between the region’s various actors.1 The activities of the the desire to restore the empire or not, the foreign policy Diyanet, Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, should agenda of modern Turkey is based on ambitions of global be considered in terms of strengthening Turkey’s political proportions, with a focus on areas once under the control of influence as well. The Diyanet engaged in supporting the Ottoman Empire, including the Balkans. education, construction of mosques, and other forms of material support (Muhasilović 2018, 64; Oktem 2012, 43), in The dynamics and various aspects of Turkey’s relations with close cooperation with local Islamic communities. the Western Balkans states are to a large extent reflected by its presence in Sandžak. According to Davutoglu (2014, A good indicator of increased Turkish activism in the 285), Sandžak, along the banks of the Drina river, is an area Western Balkans is in the economic field, where, thanks to of vital geopolitical interest for Turkey and the link between free trade agreements between Turkey and countries in the Bosnia and the Albania, the region’s two predominantly region, economic and trade relations between the two sides Muslim states. In political terms, Turkey maintains close significantly deepened (Bechev 2012, 136-143; Hake 2020, ties with political actors in Sandžak, primarily with Jojić 2018b, 65-75). Another important consequence of competing Bosniak parties, which were even reconciled Turkey’s economic development is the growth of unilateral through the efforts of Turkey’s diplomacy. Another, far material assistance to the countries of the Western Balkans, more complex area of Turkish involvement in Sandžak where the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency was an attempt to mediate the conflict between the two (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı – TIKA) Islamic communities competing for influence in the region. stands out as the most visible actor. By restoring Ottoman Turkey also distributes material assistance to Sandžak, cultural heritage in the Balkans, as well as assisting local where actors such as TIKA comes to the fore. Finally, Turkey communities with their material needs, TIKA “presents itself is also active in the economic field – for decades there in a timely constructive manner by considering both the has been significant trade between Turkey and Sandžak, past and present” (Nuroglu 2013, 2). especially in the field of the textile industry, while recently Turkey has emerged as a financier of and contractor for The Turkish presence can also be noticed in the area of infrastructure projects. However, Sandžak lacks profitable education. On the one hand, a large number of young and employment-oriented Turkish direct investments.

1 As key communities for Turkey’s long-term interests in the Balkans, Davutoglu highlights Bosniaks and Albanians as “heirs of the Ottoman Empire” (Davutoglu 2014, 134). 2 A typical example of academic critics towards the term “neo-Ottoman” is the work of Inan Ruma (2012, 133) who labeled neo-Ottomanism as “…fancy, but inherently empty shell”.

5 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITY OF SANDŽAK

SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITY OF SANDŽAK

Sandžak is a multi-ethnic cross-border region covering administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire. After Austria northern Montenegro and south-western Serbia. Although annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Sandžak of the area is not formally organized as an administrative Novi Pazar occupied a unique position on the peninsula region, its Bosniak inhabitants have a strong sense of as the northernmost Ottoman territory in Europe, dividing distinct regional identity. As one of the last regions in the Serbia and Montenegro. Through to frequent invocation Western Balkans to remain under Ottoman rule, Sandžak of its status as a former Ottoman province, the modern is one of the areas with the most surviving traces of identity of this region was formed over time (Morrison and its Oriental past. The region owes even its name to its Roberts 2013). However, the issue of the name is among the Turkish past – Sandžak (sanjak) was the name for a type of points of contention between Serbs and Bosniaks.3

Location of Sandžak on the map of Serbia and Montenegro

Note: In 2014, the Montenegrin municipality of Plav was divided into two – Plav and Gusinje.

Sandžak’s socio-political reality is specific because of its well as in Sjenica and Tutin. Serbs are a majority in Priboj multiple ethnic, religious, and political cleavages that are and Nova Varoš, while the ratio in Prijepolje is nearly equal. concentrated on the small territory. The population of In the overall demographic structure of Sandžak, Bosniaks Serbian Sandžak consists of two dominant ethnic groups – predominate with almost two thirds of the total population, Bosniaks (Muslims) and Serbs (Orthodox Christians). In the with an increasing trend in their demographic share over largest urban center, Novi Pazar, Bosniaks are a majority, as past decades.

3 While the name Sandžak is most frequently used by the Bosniak/Muslim population, Serbs usually refer to it as an area of Raška (Raška oblast) or Old Serbia (stara Srbija). The Serb/Montenegrin population from Montenegro would simply call it the North (Sjever).

6 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY SOCIO-POLITICAL REALITY OF SANDŽAK

Demographic structure of the Serbian part of Sanždak Novi Pazar Tutin Sjenica Prijepolje Priboj Nova Varoš TOTAL Population 100 410 31 155 26 392 37 059 27 133 16 638 238 787 Bosniak* 81.21% 93.5% 78.55% 44.01% 21.2% 7.89% 64.83% Serbs 16.16% 3.49% 19.55% 51.61% 75.85% 89.54% 32.48% Note: Data according to 2011 census. Source: Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia,https://www.stat.gov.rs/ . * The number of Bosniaks also includes those Sandžak residents who still declare themselves as Muslims in the national sense.

The demographic complexity of this society is also reflected three most influential Bosniak political actors, if not the in local political dynamics. Ethnic Serb political parties are most influential. mostly monolithic political subjects, with parties strongly leaning towards Belgrade and gathered around the ruling A significant point of conflict on the socio-political map Serbian progressive party (Srpska napredna stranka – SNS). of Sandžak is the division that emerged in the Islamic The situation with Bosniak parties is much more complex. Community in 2007. After the adoption of the Law on Sandžak is dominated by three Bosniak political parties of Churches and Religious Communities in 2006, prescribing similar strength. The oldest party is the Party of Democratic there may only be one Islamic community on the territory Action of Sandžak (Stranka demokratske akcije Sandžaka of Serbia, the hitherto non-united muftiates in Serbia had – SDA) led by Sulejman Ugljanin, who imposed himself as to be united into a single Islamic community. In early 2007, the political leader of the Bosniaks of Sandžak in the early a group of disgruntled imams of the Muftiate of Sandžak 1990s. In the mid-1990s, Rasim Ljajić, a former secretary left the organization and embarked on the independent of the SDA, left the party to form his Sandžak Democratic formation of a single Islamic community. As a result, there Party (Sandžačka demokratska partija – SDP) at the end are two Islamic communities in Serbia today. The first is the of the decade. The party soon grew into a respectable Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS), founded by the imams political force, taking part in many coalition governments remaining in the former Sandžak Muftiate and loyal to at the national level. During the last decade, the Justice Mufti Muamer Zukorlić. The other, founded by a group of and Reconciliation Party (Stranka pravde i pomirenja – dissatisfied imams, was named the Islamic Community of SPP), led by the former key Muslim religious figure in Serbia (ICoS) and is based in Belgrade. The first community, Sandžak, Muamer Zukorlić, has emerged as a new force led by the President of the Meshihat and the Mufti, is a on the political scene of Sandžak. His religious authority functional part of the Riyaset of the Islamic Community of among Bosniaks in Sandžak, the position of the continued Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH). The ICoS has its own Riyaset informal leader of his Islamic community, together with its and calls for the continuity of the Islamic Community of resources, enabled Zukorlić to quickly become one of the Serbia, founded in 1868, later merged into the Islamic community of Yugoslavia.

7 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCE IN THE EYES OF LOCALS

TURKISH PRESENCE IN THE EYES OF LOCALS

The following sections analyse locals’ views of Turkey’s population itself. The third part provides an insight into the presence, with an aim to enrich existing knowledge about perceptions of Turkey’s role in mediation between ICoS and Turkey’s engagement in the Balkans from the receiving Zukorlić’s ICiS. The fourth section deals with the perception side. Examining how locals view, understand and make use of the economic aspect of Turkey’s presence in Sandžak. of the Turkish presence helps to break some stereotypes The fifth section refers to the interaction between Turkey’s about the assumed clear borders between the perceptions presence and local political dynamics, observing Ankara’s of different ethnic and religious groups. The first and second direct influence on those dynamics and its relations with sections offer answers to questions about how locals see local actors. The last section examines how Turkey passively the political aspect of the Turkish presence. In that sense, affects local political dynamics, by being an object and an differences in dominant perceptions between Serbs and instrument used by locals in their political competition. Bosniaks will be examined, as well as within the Bosniak

Turkey – imperial actor with neo-Ottoman ambitions?

In accordance with popular understanding of perceptions The key Bosniak political actors in Sandžak, as well as most of the Turkish presence in the Balkans, the Serb citizens of of my interviewees of Bosniak ethnic background, reject the Sandžak and their political elites hold a mainly negative term “neo-Ottomanism” as a way to stigmatize Turkey, but view of the Turkish presence, seeing it through the it is interesting to note that, unlike the Serb respondents, framework of neo-Ottomanism and the hidden political not all of the Bosniak citizens were familiar with the term. agenda behind Turkey’s activities. Many ethnic Serb citizens Rasim Ljajić, the president of the SDP, sees the term as a see a plan to return to the Balkans and achieve their “political phrase and nonsense” (Sandzakhaber, 2016). Most imperial ambitions behind the increased Turkish presence. of the Bosniak interlocutors perceive neo-Ottomanism as a Some quoted Erdogan’s famous statement from Prizren in malicious term for describing contemporary Turkish foreign 2013 that “Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo” and policy and something aimed at manipulating the domestic Davutoglu’s statement about golden Ottoman times in the non-Muslim population’s negative sentiment about Turkey. Balkans as evidence of Turkey’s intentions. A member of But the opposite perception of the term was present as well. the Serbian party from Sjenica views Turkey’s entire foreign For example, a journalist from an independent media outlet policy, especially in the Balkans, through the prism of neo- from Novi Pazar does not see neo-Ottomanism as a gimmick Ottomanism, pointing to Davutoglu’s guidelines from his of Serbian Orientalists as most of the Bosniak non-liberal elite capital work “Strategic Depth” and his later statements.4 do, but as Erdogan’s intention to manipulate his own public, Another member of the Serbian party from Prijepolje playing the card of imperial nostalgia with his own voters.6 supported his position, bringing up the previously According to this understanding, the term was not coined by mentioned statements of Erdogan about Kosovo and the malicious domestic Turkophobes in order to spread the fear call for Turks in Europe to have more children “because they about Turkey’s return to the Balkans, but by Turkish political are the future of Europe”.5 elites with the goal of mobilisation of their voters.

4 Personal interview with a Serb party member, Sjenica, July 3, 2020. 5 Personal interview with a Serb party member, Prijepolje, July 6, 2020. 6 Personal interview with a journalist, Novi Pazar, June 24, 2020.

8 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

Erdogan – sultan of Sandžak’s big brother state

Contrary to anti-Turkish attitudes among Serbs, many among from the local political scene shortly after being identified the Bosniak citizens and part of the political elite perceive as a Gulenist.11 The overall attitude of the political actors in Turkish presence in positive terms and cited fraternal Sandžak towards the situation in Turkey after the 2016 coup assistance and support as a motive for the presence of Turkey attempt speaks to the importance of relations with Ankara in in Sandžak. For many citizens of Bosniak background, Turkey their local political calculations. Local self-government has is perceived as a “big brother” and President Erdogan as a gone far beyond its competence in its treatment of Erdogan’s “sultan”. Esad Džudžo, former president of the Bosniak National opponents, in an obvious attempt to prove itself a loyal Council,7 sees Turkey as a “protector country” of Bosniaks partner to Ankara. On the other hand, mutual support for (Sandzakhaber 2014). A political activist from Novi Pazar and Erdogan has united opposing political actors from Sandžak a member of the local administration in Sjenica, both coming like never before. from the SDA, have a similar stance, referring to the fact that good state relations between Turkey and Serbia are beneficial, However, despite prevailing sympathy among Bosniak since Turkey’s intensive presence makes Bosniaks feel secure.8 citizens and elites towards Erdogan’s Turkey, critical voices Among the Bosniak residents of Sandžak, negative emotions also exist among more liberally-oriented Bosniaks. Sead towards Erdogan are very rare and for the vast majority, he Biberović, director of the pro-civic Urban In NGO from is simply a “sultan”.9 Some of them cited Turkey’s rise during Novi Pazar, points out the absurdity of the abstract and Erdogan’s rule as his greatest source of credibility. Noticeably, unrequited love of most Bosniaks towards Turkey, comparing respondents had a strong identification with the rise of it with Serbs’ sentiments towards Russia.12 Biberović’s opinion Turkey, affected by narratives about glorious common past could be considered among pragmatic views, that also and a privileged position of Balkan Muslims in the Ottoman include the views of most respondents of liberal provenance Empire.10 Part of the credit for this situation may be found and a few from a conservative milieu close to Zukorlić’s SPP. in the local media, which broadcast Turkey’s foreign policy Unlike the uncritical stances of the SDA and SDP, members of activities with special enthusiasm. Zukorlić’s structures share the valorization of Turkey’s role in Sandžak with liberals. They mostly judge Turkey’s presence Erdogan’s popularity in Sandžak is vividly illustrated by the in terms of concrete benefits for the local population, relying events that followed Turkey’s 2016 coup attempt when rallies less on the emotional component and identification with in support of Erdogan in Novi Pazar briefly united members of the Turkish rise itself. In observing Turkish politics, both Sead opposing Bosniak political camps. A few days after the coup, Biberović and Jahja Fehratović, Zukorlić’s close associate, the local SDP administration in Novi Pazar issued a statement emphasize the need to differentiate between the Turkish fully supporting the legally elected Turkish government state, people, and Erdogan himself.13 But the vast majority and warning citizens of Turkish opposition figure Fethullah of Bosniak respondents do not make that distinction Gulen’s “terrorist” network in Sandžak (Politika 2016). Several – Erdogan is the most popular politician among them, interviewees pointed to the case of the mayor of Novi Pazar’s even when their own political representatives are taken adviser for international cooperation, who was removed into account.

7 National councils are representative bodies of national minorities in Serbia. 8 Personal interview with an SDA member, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020; Personal interview with an SDA member, Sijenica, July 6, 2020. 9 During Erdogan’s visit to Novi Pazar in 2017, thousands of gathered citizens ecstatically chanted “Sultan Erdogan”. 10 “We were elite then” (during the Ottoman times, A/N), proudly said one middle-aged Bosniak citizen. Personal interview by author, Novi Pazar, June 24, 2020. 11 Personal interview with a journalist, Novi Pazar, June 23, 2020; Personal interview with a journalist, Novi Pazar, June 24, 2020; Personal interview with a pro-civic NGO activist, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020.. 12 Personal interview with Sead Biberović, director of Urban In NGO, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020. 13 Both pointed to the strong historical ties between Bosniaks and Turks, whose relations cannot be viewed only through the framework of the contemporary Turkish government’s attitude towards Bosniaks. Personal interview with Sead Biberović, director of Urban In NGO, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020; Personal interview with Jahja Fehratović, a member of SPP, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020.

9 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

Turkey and the economy of Sandžak – a betrayal of raised expectations

Although significant Turkish investments have been infrastructure, and poor local administration. However, announced, the economic field is a problematic case for Jahja Fehratović, a close associate of Zukorlić, questions finding evidence of Ankara’s declared intentions to help this argument, citing the example of Turkey’s investment in the „brotherly“ Bosniak people, who perceive Turkey Raška, only 20 kilometers away from Novi Pazar.17 as economically potent enough to solve many of their problems.14 Investments in the manufacturing sector Unlike Fehratović and most of Zukorlić’s other associates, and agriculture have not gone further than pompous the members of SDA and SDP I talked to have an announcements during Turkish officials’ visits to Sandžak. uncritical tone about the lack of direct investments, Most of my interviewees pointed to the trade that has been rather seeing the reasons for this in the geography and going on for decades between the businessmen of Sandžak bad infrastructure of Sandžak, or even obstacles posed and those from Turkey, especially in the textile sector. by the central government in Belgrade. A high-ranking However, putting aside visible TIKA investments, most of member of the SDA, with the experience of meetings with my interlocutors point out the absence of direct profit- and delegations from Turkey, points out the desire of the Turks employment-oriented investments from Turkey, despite not to provoke public opinion in Serbia by investing in the promises.15 Several years ago, then minister Rasim Ljajić Sandžak.18 According to him, Turkey first intends to change announced an investment from a prestigious clothing its negative stereotypes among the Serbian public by manufacturer from Istanbul, but it was never realized. investing throughout Serbia. Turkey’s increased regional During Erdogan’s visit to Serbia and Novi Pazar in 2017, presence has been accompanied by narratives of a Muslim contracts were signed for the export of traditional Turkish population-centric ‘return to the Balkans’, and investment dumplings from Sandžak to Turkey, which never started. across Serbia before direct investment in Sandžak could Another project agreed to during the same visit, which also contribute to a favorable shift in Serbian public opinion. required some investments in processing facilities, was the annual export of 5,000 tons of beef to Turkey, but it was The only economy-related project is the reconstruction of never realized as well. the road connecting Novi Pazar and Tutin, misinterpreted as a direct foreign investment by many interlocutors. The failure to realize the mentioned projects caused The project, announced back in 2010, is currently under discontent among the elites with whom I had the realization by the Turkish company “Tashyapi”. However, opportunity to talk. The indignation is greater given the the reconstruction is being funded with loans provided by fact that there are hundreds of Turkish factories operating Turkey, which is why the investment cannot be classified as throughout Serbia. The interviewees mostly agree that the FDI. Some of my interviewees pointed out the unfavorable often-repeated assessment that “Turks give investments aspects of the project, namely the engagement of a foreign to Serbs and love to Bosniaks” absolutely corresponds company instead of competent domestic companies, and to the truth. Salahudin Fetić, journalist close to Zukorlić, the fact that the project is financed through a loan. recalls Erdogan’s statement that “Sarajevo and Istanbul are brothers, while Belgrade and Ankara are partners”, Despite the close ties between Bosniak citizens and alluding to the emotional rather than utilitarian relations politicians with Turks, the mentioned cases indicate that between Bosniaks and Turks.16 The most frequently cited Turkish business is guided by profit rather than emotion. reasons for the lack of investment are pragmatic ones – Otherwise, at least one among the hundreds of Turkish the unfavorable geographical position of Sandžak, bad manufacturing facilities opened in the rest of Serbia would

14 Many of my Bosniak citizen interviewees see Turkey as an economic power, and the rapid infrastructure development over the past 20 years was the most frequently cited indicator of its strength. 15 Even though TIKA had significant investments in the restoration of public infrastructure or Ottoman cultural heritage, it rarely invested in productive fields. Distribution of raspberry seedlings or agricultural equipment to Sandžak residents are among the rare production-oriented donations, though ones of marginal reach. 16 Personal interview with Salahudin Fetić, director of Sandžak TV, Novi Pazar, June 29, 2020. 17 Personal interview with Jahja Fehratović, a member of SPP, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020. 18 Personal interview with an SDA member, Prijepolje, July 7, 2020.

10 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

end up in Sandžak. Instead, Turkish businessmen preferred the interviewees expressed the view that raising locals’ to invest in more geographically favorable areas with expectations was for Turkish domestic use, and in the developed infrastructure. The Turks’ insistence that the service of Erdogan’s personal interests. reconstruction of the Novi Pazar – Tutin road get carried out by a Turkish company and with Turkish labor despite A pro-civic NGO activist from Novi Pazar considers the the competence of local enterprises to perform such work failure to fulfill promises made during Erdogan’s visits to shows that Turkish investors worry little about the added be hypocritical.19 He states that the visits were organized value of their project for the local population. On the other and timed in a way that, at key moments for the AKP, hand, the apparent divergence between Ankara’s rhetoric raised Erdogan’s rating at home, especially among Bosniak and economic activity speaks to its insincere approach to descendants from the Balkans living in Turkey.20 His stance Sandžak. The rising of expectations by top officials, followed is shared by a journalist from Novi Pazar, who sees “the by pompous media content, further fuels the narrative of way of populist reign in Turkey” in Ankara’s activities in Turkey as a protector of Bosniaks. However, Turkey does not the Balkans, and the tool with an echo for domestic use, act in accordance with its declared intentions. serving the mobilization of voters.21 NGO activist from Sjenica cites that “misuse of sentiments” as a negative side The attitude towards local economic issues, therefore, of Turkey’s presence.22 And indeed, Erdogan’s visit to Novi remains the most significant litmus test of overall attitudes Pazar and promises made there were timed in a way that about the Turkish presence in Sandžak, through which they could produce some benefits at home. Namely, crucial both liberals and Zukorlić’s conservatives perceive the presidential elections were held a few months after his true intentions of Turkey. Given that there are no direct visit, when Erdogan materialized the results of the 2017 investments in Sandžak on the Turkish side, some of Constitutional referendum, further centralizing power.

Turkish religious diplomacy in Sandžak

The case of division between two Islamic communities The first of its initiatives for reconciliation, known as “the operating in Serbia is one of the most significant issues of Turkish initiative”, dates back to 2011. It was a diplomatic contestation among Bosniaks in Sandžak, with reflections one, with Ahmet Davutoglu, at that time Turkey’s Minister of on the religious, political, and legal spheres of Sandžak’s Foreign Affairs, as its main protagonist. Later initiatives were socio-political everyday life. The features of the conflict go taken over by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), beyond the continuous raising of questions of “legality” and a Turkish state institution dealing with religious issues both “legitimacy”, or its effect on the quality of religious services domestically and internationally. The first initiative was provided to the Muslim inhabitants of Sandžak. The conflict unsuccessful and definitively abandoned in 2012. During has an unequivocal political connotation and is a first-class Diyanet’s subsequent initiatives, the attitudes of Zukorlić’s political issue for some local actors, especially Zukorlić ICiS toward the Turkish reconciliation attempts were further and his SPP. The political dimension of the conflict can sharpened, as they accused Diyanet of trying to take control also be seen through the engagement of mediators from over their community and condemned the initiatives as Turkey, who have been repeatedly offering their assistance interference in its internal affairs (Mesihat 2013). to the warring parties in order to reach a compromise. Turkish mediation in the reconciliation of the two Islamic The most severe ICiS statements against Turkey were Communities in Serbia not only represents a significant issued in 2019, during Diyanet’s representatives’ visit to component of the Turkish presence in Sandžak but is also a the enthronement of ICoS’ Senad Halitović as Sandžak game-changer in the way in which some local political and Mufti. Zukorlić himself, the former Mufti of the ICiS, called religious authorities perceive this presence. on Erdogan and Diyanet to stop those who break up the

19 Personal interview with a pro-civic NGO activist, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. 20 Ibid 21 Personal interview with a journalist, Novi Pazar, June 24, 2020. 22 Personal interview with a pro-civic NGO activist, Sjenica, July 3, 2020.

11 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

Islamic community in their name, while the ICiS threatened The case of Turkish intervention into mediation between to sever relations with Diyanet (Mesihat 2019; Snews 2019). two Islamic communities is an important one, given the Interlocutors close to Zukorlić, such as Rešad Plojović, fact that it produced ruptures in the perceptions of Turkey believe that mediation initiatives were Turkey’s attempt within the Bosniak populace. The positive attitudes of to subsume local Islamic communities under the service the SDP and SDA towards Turkish mediation may be of the Turkish Diyanet.23 The ICiS’s refusal to agree on observed as a pragmatic political calculation. While they such terms then, according to him, resulted in Diyanet’s did not risk worsening relations with Ankara, the religious hostility towards ICiS (Plojović 2019). Salahudin Fetić, dispute is a place where their and Turkey’s counter- close to Zukorlić, also believes that Diyanet did not want a Zukorlić interests meet. Moreover, if the dispute between partnership on equal terms, but a superior relationship, as two Islamic communities remains in force, Zukorlić would in the case with the Islamic Community of Montenegro.24 have a continuous obstacle in his attempts to establish Jahja Fehratović, another of Zukorlić’s close associates, sees good relations with Turkey. Otherwise, the positions of Diyanet as a political instrument of Turkey’s current state the SDA, the nationalist Bosniak Party, which insists so apparatus used to govern Islamic communities in Albania, much on Bosniak unity with Sarajevo, would be hardly Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro.25 understandable. Their support for the ICoS, based in Belgrade and outside the jurisdiction of Sarajevo, certainly In contrast, leader of the competing ICoS, Sead Nasufović, does not contribute to bringing Sandžak closer to Bosnia who is close to Turkey, talks about more than 30 attempts and Herzegovina. For the ICoS, the positions are quite clear by Diyanet to reconcile the two Islamic communities, – any initiative that offers the possibility of any compromise stating that Diyanet approached impartially.26 Reis has a solution is better than agreeing to the rigid demands manifestly positive attitude towards the role of Turkey, of the ICiS for their unconditional abolition. Finally, for seeing the reasons for the failure of the mediation attempt Zukorlić and his ICiS, any cooperation with Turkey in the in the rigidity of Zukorlić’s ICiS.27 Members of political reunion plan would undermine their hard line. They chose parties rivalling Zukorlić’s also emphasize the positive side independence at the cost of lack of Diyanet material of Turkish initiatives. A senior member of the nationalist assistance and at the expense of the political interest of SDA highlighted Turkey’s good intentions to help the SPP to dominate the Sandžak political scene, something reunion of the Islamic communities, given Turkey’s interest certainly more achievable in the case of good relations in Bosniak unity.28 The SDP member holds a similar stance, with Turkey. seeing Diyanet’s engagement as a fraternal hand given to locals.29

23 Personal interview with Rešad Plojović, the ICiS official, Novi Pazar, July 2, 2020. 24 Personal interview with Salahudin Fetić, director of Sandžak TV, Novi Pazar, June 29, 2020. 25 Personal interview with Jahja Fehratović, a member of SPP, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020. 26 Personal interview with Sead Nasufović, Reisu-l-ulema of the ICoS, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. 27 Ibid The issue of IC unity has been permanently raised to a political level by Zukorlić’s ICiS, adding the issue of Bosniak national survival in Serbia on the table, while inviting the other side to unconditionally return under the auspices of the only legal Islamic community. More in: Mesihat (2016). 28 Personal interview with an SDA member, Prijepolje, July 7, 2020. 29 Personal interview with an SDP member, Prijepolje, July 6, 2020.

12 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

Turkey and the local political dynamics

Turkey’s presence affects local political dynamics in Sandžak Islamic community, and was later further strained during to a large degree, whether actively through relations with Turkish attempts to interfere. According to Rešad Plojović local political actors, or passively where the Turkish card is from the ICiS, Zukorlić was marked as a disruptive factor played by locals for their own political interests and in their during the mandate (prior to 2010) of the former Turkish own disputes. ambassador to Serbia, Suha Umar, who allegedly provided false information about Zukorlić to Ankara (Plojović 2019). Turks have the closest political cooperation with Ugljanin’s Plojović pointed out that the ICiS had written to Erdogan SDA. A member of that party sees the reason in fraternal on several occasions about the omissions of his diplomatic relations between SDA and Erdogan’s AKP and good officials, but without success.33 personal relations between the two party leaders.30 Although none of the three dominant Bosniak parties in In 2017, Zukorlić himself expressed hopes that the Sandžak, nor media close to them, lack support for Turkey, departure of a key duo blamed for straining relations the SDA remains Erdogan’s favorite on the ground.31 between his ICiS and Turkey, Davutoglu and Mehmed However, the problem for this long-term arrangement Gormez, Diyanet’s president, could resolve the is the fact that SDA is losing power in Sandžak – after the misunderstanding (Sandzakpress 2017). However, 2020 local elections, they remained in power only in Tutin. Zukorlić’s relationship with relevant Turkish actors has not For that reason, Rejhan Kurtović, a member of Zukorlić’s significantly warmed. Zukorlić’s political opponents see SPP, does not see anything good in Turkey’s favoring of the the reason for this in his alleged closeness to religious- SDA.32 He considers it a declining party, kept alive only by political movements of which Turkey is not in favor, such as funds and support from Turkey, and wonders whom Turkey Gulenism or Wahhabism. will rely on once the SDA greatly weakens. Regardless of criticism of certain Turkish actions by some Turkey’s second favorite is Ljajić’s SDP, which can be partly Bosniak actors, the overall media image of Turkey, and attributable to Erdogan’s close relations with the Serbian Erdogan specifically, remains very positive in Sandžak. president and the SDP’s participation in every single state- Even media close to Zukorlić supported Erdogan at key level coalition government with Vučić’s SNS. It is Ljajić who moments, such as the confrontation with the Gulenists can offer more to Ankara than the rival SDA these days, or the situation after the failed 2016 coup attempt especially after Ugljanin sharpened his rhetoric against (Sandzakpress 2014; Sandzakpress 2016a). Media close Belgrade, which in turn ignores his SDA for their pro- to Ljajić’s SDP are also highly supportive of Erdogan. For Sandžak-autonomy agenda. example, the portal Sandzakhaber (2020) supported Erdogan’s decision to send an army to Libya in early 2020 Muamer Zukorlić and organizations close to him stand in a laudatory article with the title “Sultan has made his out as political actors the least close to Turkey. However, decision”. Such headlines and the enthusiastic transmission now the political leader, and once the Chief Mufti of the of Turkish foreign policy activities are certainly part of the ICiS, Zukorlić together with his entourage do not attack reasons why Turkey was perceived as a leader and protector Erdogan directly. Instead, they object exclusively to lower of the Muslim world. levels of government, diplomatic representatives of Turkey in Serbia or Diyanet, which they see as an actor who Given Turkey’s image in Sandžak, maintaining close provides wholehearted support to the rival ICoS (Fehratović relations between Sandžak politicians and the Turkish 2013). Tense relations between Zukorlć and some actors authorities certainly has positive implications for their local from Turkey date back to the time of the split in the popularity. The partisan media are working hard to publicly

30 Personal interview with an SDA member, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. 31 There are frequent mutual inter-party visits between Erdogan’s AKP and Ugljanin’s SDA. Also, the Bosniak National Council, which is under SDA’s control, is in excellent relations with Turkey’s state authorities. 32 Personal interview with Rejhan Kurtović, a member of SPP, Sjenica, July 5, 2020. 33 Personal interview with Rešad Plojović, the ICiS official, Novi Pazar, July 2, 2020.

13 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

expose their representatives’ meetings with Turkish officials. key local political figures in a way that fits their own political But when it comes to their rival meeting Turks, they hardly interests. ever mention them. Media outlets close to parties present

Turkish factor as an instrument in local political competition

The popularity and importance of Turkey are also used as a Two days prior to Erdogan’s visit to Novi Pazar, SDP’s weapon in local parties’ mutual competition. It is often the Sandzakhaber (2017b) reminded the local public of a text case that actors in Sandžak label each other as enemies of by one of Zukorlić’s associates, Jahja Fehratović, in which he Turkey, in order to tarnish the reputation of the other side in criticized Turks for the way they were involved in mediation the local public image or damage its image in Turkey. A pro- between the two conflicting Islamic communities. An civil NGO activist from Novi Pazar points out the public’s SDP member interviewed by the author also understood negative attitude and the anti-Turkish stigma against both the Gulenists and the Wahhabis to be “on the Mufti’s anyone who publicly expressed a critical tone towards team”, asking in a concluding manner if anyone ever saw Turkey and Erdogan.34 A theologian from Sjenica supported Erdogan shake hand with Zukorlić during his visits to such a view, referring to the recent trend of labelling a Novi Pazar.37 More recently, Sandzakhaber (2019) accused person or organization as Gulenist in order to damage his Mustafa Cerić, former Bosnian Reis and close to Zukorlić, for reputation in Turkey.35 acting in an anti-Turkish manner when he publicly blamed Erdogan for not pushing Vučić to recognize the Srebrenica Zukorlić can again serve as an illustrative case in point as massacre as genocide. Sandzakhaber described the act as it was his figure which was most often accused of Gulenist a “manifestation of turkophobic discourse produced by the or Wahhabist ties by other public officials. Rifat Fejzić, Arabic centers of power”. the Montenegrin Reis (Islamic community leader) and close to Diyanet, used his position to publicly proclaim Structures close to Zukorlić did not stand aside in this Zukorlić as an enemy of Turkey (Sandzakpress 2016b). labelling, and also resorted to the stigmatization of Similarly, the Snews web-portal, close to the SDA, linked competitors as Turkey’s opponents. Immediately after Zukorlić’s associates to those on the Turkish wanted list the coup, Zukorlić’s media declared Reisu-l-ulema of the (Snews 2020). A similar opinion is held by a high-ranking competing Islamic Community of Montenegro and his member of the SDA, who was allegedly familiar with the closest associates as Gulenists (Sandzakpress 2016a). cooperation between Zukorlić and some people close to Moreover, former Reisu-l-ulema of rival ICoS Adem Zilkić Gulen’s movement before the coup in Turkey.36 He later and his closest associates were in the same manner labeled added that within “Zukorlić’s Islamic Community the as enemies of Turkey (Sandzakpress 2016a). As part of the Wahhabis have room to act”, something that certainly same campaign, one of those marked as Gulenist was Sead would not be welcomed gladly by the Turkish side. Portal Ibrić, an Islamic theologian and president of the „Most“ Sandzakhaber (2017a), close to the SDP, went a step further organization from Novi Pazar. Although he does not hide in stigmatization, describing the non-positive comments of his connection with the Hizmet movement, whose spiritual BDZ supporters (predecessor of the SPP) about Turkey and leader is Fethullah Gulen, he sees the „Gulenist“ stigma as a Erdogan on social media as “betrayal”. Also, the same portal form of inaccurate personalization of the movement.38 On accused Zukorlić and his close associates of maintaining the other hand, relying on his familiarity with the Hizmet close relations with the Mufti of Albania, allegedly a “vassal movement and the people targeted in the campaign, of the FETO organization” (Sandzakhaber 2018). Ibrić sees the campaign as an attempt by Zukorlić to fawn over the Turkish government. If Fejzić and Zilkić, leaders

34 Personal interview with a pro-civic NGO activist, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. 35 Personal interview with an Islamic theologian, Sjenica, July 4, 2020. 36 Personal interview with an SDA member, Prijepolje, July 7, 2020. 37 Personal interview with an SDP member, Prijepolje, July 6, 2020. 38 Personal interview with Sead Ibrić, director of Most NGO, Belgrade, December 1, 2020.

14 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY TURKISH PRESENCEIN THE EYES OF LOCALS

of two competing Islamic communities, were indeed rather appears as an object in local political ambitions. The close to Erdogan’s enemies, it is hard to understand how (mis)use of narratives about relations with Ankara seems they preserved good relations with Diyanet and Turkey. like a pragmatic political strategy for local political actors. Most recently, Zukorlić’s media reported how Rasim Ljajić, On the one hand, local politicians are recommending president of the SDP and then-minister in the Serbian themselves to Turks and proving their loyalty. This way, government, was on strike in Turkish media because of locals are promoting themselves in front of domestic and Serbia’s arms exports to Armenia, even though it was only international audiences as friends of Turkey, simultaneously his statement about the issue that was transmitted in struggling for the favor of Ankara and local opinion, media Sandzakpress referred to (Sandzakpress 2020). strongly in favor of Turkey. On the other side, their strategies aim to damage an opponent’s reputation in Turkey and to These examples speak to the importance of Turkey for local discredit it in front of Sandžak public opinion. Promoting political dynamics, something expected given its image in narratives about the other’s anti-Turkish stances certainly Sandžak. But instead of exerting an open influence on the rejects and alienates some of the opponents’ voters, while local political scene by using its leverage in Sandžak, Turkey an echo might also be heard in the Turkish embassy.

15 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY CONCLUSION

CONCLUSION

Despite growing interest in studying Turkey’s presence involvement in the economic sphere, the representatives in the Balkans over the past two decades, there is a lack of the opposing SDA and SDP parties did not blame Turkey of research on how locals perceive that presence. With a for the lack of direct investments. Zukorlićs’ negative views focus on Sandžak residents’ perceptions and relying on a on Turkey’s economic passivity are shared by pro-civic NGO mix of desk and field research, this study aimed to bridge activists and journalists of liberal provenance, who add that gap, using the region’s socio-political specificity as the abuse of local pro-Turkish sentiment for the internal a base for adding to existing knowledge about Turkey’s political interests of the ruling clique in Ankara to the list of presence. For that purpose, the study’s research focus was objections to Turkey’s presence. related to the understanding of Turkey’s presence by the locals, determining the difference in perceptions between Last but not least, the research indicates that Turkey’s different socio-political groups, as well as on the way popularity in domestic public opinion is being used by that the Turkish factor is used by locals for local political local actors to settle scores with political opponents. The interests and competition. importance of relations with Turkey for their political status in Sandžak imposed the using of Turkish card The results confirmed the expected differences in the as a pragmatic political strategy. While political actors attitudes of the Muslim and non-Muslim populations, i.e. and their media promote their own cooperation with Bosniaks and Serbs. Serb citizens and their local political Turkish representatives, they keep silent about their rivals’ representatives mostly view Turkey through the lens of collaboration with Turks and promote narratives according perceived negative historical experience, and see the to which political opponents are enemies of Turkey. modern Turkish state as an imperial power pursuing its Labeling opponents as enemies of Turkey may prove to be neo-Ottoman agenda in the Balkans. an effective strategy, given that it not only decreases the reputation of the rival political option before local public In contrast, many Bosniak citizens, together with the opinion but also results in an echo that may be heard representatives of the Bosniak parties SDA and SDP, have a in Turkey. positive opinion about the presence and role of Turkey in Sandžak. Bosniak citizens tend to see Turkey as a protector, The geopolitical significance of a certain area and the a “big brother,” and a country that under the leadership of declared will to help do not imply exclusively economic “Sultan” Erdogan experienced a renaissance that allowed it help. While it could likely do more to address many of the to play a much larger role in international relations and act economic problems in Sandžak, Turkey does not do so, in the role of leader in the Islamic world. avoiding acting on raised local expectations. Interest- driven policy, both in a policical and economic sense, However, the perception of Turkey’s presence among contributed to the divergence of local views, not only Bosniak elites is not monolithic, as one could assume. between the clear and expected emotion-based stances of Among the political elites, the most pragmatic and critical Bosniaks and Serbs, but also among Bosniaks themselves. position was held by interviewers coming from a milieu The cases of paternalism-oriented mediations or abusing close to Zukorlić, a conservative political and formerly economic matters for Ankara’s own political interests are religious leader. Even though they never questioned among factors that shaped that divergence decisively, Turkey’s significance for Bosniaks or Erdogan himself, signaling that the Turkish presence in the region is not a they blamed Ankara for favoring the rival SDA, the one-directional process. Instead, the Turkish presence is unfavorable role Turks played in mediating between the observed in different ways by locals, and as such it becomes two warring Islamic communities, and the lack of direct a part of local political dynamics. Turkish investment in the economy of Sandžak. Despite the unfulfilled promises and data showing dubious Turkish

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17 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Snews. 2020. „Dudić u zagrljaju Dahlana-lica sa crvene Somun, Hajrudin. 2011. “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans potjernice za terorizam u Turskoj.“ Snews March 6, 2020. and ‘Neo-Ottomanism’: A Personal Account.” Insight Turkey 13 https://www.snews.rs/dudic-u-zagrljaju-dahlana-lica-sa- (3): 33-41. crvene-potjernice-za-terorizam-u-turskoj/. Tanasković, Darko. 2010. Neoosmanizam: doktrina i spoljnopolitička praksa, Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

A journalist, Novi Pazar, June 23, 2020. A journalist, Novi Pazar, June 24, 2020. A Serb party member, Prijepolje, July 6, 2020. A Serb party member, Sjenica, July 3, 2020. An Islamic theologian, Sjenica, July 4, 2020. An SDA member, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. An SDA member, Prijepolje, July 7, 2020. An SDA member, Sijenica, July 6, 2020. An SDP member, Prijepolje, July 6, 2020. Jahja Fehratović, a member of SPP, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020. Pro-civic NGO activist, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020. Pro-civic NGO activist, Sjenica, July 3, 2020. Rejhan Kurtović, a member of SPP, Sjenica, July 5, 2020. Rešad Plojović, the ICiS official, Novi Pazar, July 2, 2020. Salahudin Fetić, director of Sandžak TV, Novi Pazar, June 29, 2020. Sead Biberović, director of Urban In NGO, Novi Pazar, June 27, 2020. Sead Ibrić, director of Most NGO, Belgrade, December 1, 2020. Sead Nasufović, Reisu-l-ulema of the ICoS, Novi Pazar, June 25, 2020.

18 WESTERN BALKANS AT THE CROSSROADS: ANALYTICAL STUDY ABOUT THE AUTHOR

About the author

Stefan Jojić is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Political of China’s rise, Stefan’s research interests include Serbian Sciences, University of Belgrade, where he previously ac- and the Western Balkans countries’ foreign policy, interna- quired his MA degree. Besides interests in the International tional relations in the Middle East, as well as the relations Relations theory, great power politics and the phenomenon among different ethnic groups in those regions.

About the project

“Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Ways Forward in Project outputs consist of fifteen analytical studies and Analyzing External Actors' Influence”is a follow-up project fifteen journalistic articles drawing on their findings. that aims to build upon a knowledge base established in Major observations on external actors’ influence gathered the preceding project “Western Balkans at the Crossroads: throughout the work on the project will be summarized in Assessing Non-Democratic External Influence Activities,” a final reflection paper. which mapped, analyzed and publicized Russian, Chinese, Turkish, and Gulf States’ influence activities in the region. The Project duration: 10/2019 – 03/2021 innovative project focuses on in-depth socially rooted research Project coordinators: Barbora Chrzová ([email protected]), and investigative journalism. Its design reflects the aim to Petr Čermák ([email protected]) and Anja Grabovac go beyond conventional analytical frameworks, overcoming ([email protected]) ideologically constructed stereotypes and methodological Scientific advisor: Ioannis Armakolas nationalism while combining a variety of methodological approaches from security studies to visual anthropology.

About Prague Security Studies Institute

PSSI is a non-profit, non-governmental organization is to build an ever-growing group of informed and security- established in early 2002 to advance the building of a minded policy practitioners dedicated to the development just, secure, democratic, free-market society in the Czech of democratic institutions and values in Central and South- Republic and other post-communist states. PSSI’s mission East Europe.

19 www.pssi.cz