The Impact of International Migration on Social and Economic Development in Moroccan Sending Regions: a Review of the Empirical Literature
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Working papers Year 2007 Paper 3 The impact of international migration on social and economic development in Moroccan sending regions: a review of the empirical literature Hein de Haas The IMI does not have a view as an Institute and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this document are only those of its independent author. The impact of international migration on social and economic development in Moroccan sending regions: a review of the empirical literature Hein de Haas Abstract Despite its status as one of the world’s leading emigration countries, empirical work on Morocco has been largely absent from the lively theoretical debate on migration and development. The social and economic impact of international migration on Moroccan migrant-sending regions is assessed here through a review of empirical studies. Notwithstanding empirical gaps and methodological flaws, available evidence suggests that migration and remittances have considerably improved living conditions, income, education and spurred economic activity through agricultural, real estate and business investment, from which non-migrants indirectly profit. This has transformed migrant-sending regions such as the Rif, Sous and southern oases into relatively prosperous areas that now attract internal ‘reverse’ migrants. Although this challenges prevailing pessimism, the developmental potential of migration is not fully realized due to several structural constraints. Migration impacts are heterogeneous across space, socio-ethnic and gender groups, and tend to change over time and household migration cycles. Migration and remittances may enable people to retreat from, as much as to invest in, local economic activities, depending on the specific development context. Paradoxically, development in migrant-sending regions seems to be a prerequisite for return and investment rather than a consequence of migration. Keywords: international migration, development, remittances, investment, inequality, urbanisation, education, reverse internal migration, Morocco. Author: Hein de Haas is Research Officer at IMI, University of Oxford. Email – [email protected] 2 Introduction1 Over the past four decades, Morocco has evolved into an important country of emigration. Since the mid-1960s, Morocco has experienced large-scale migration of mostly unskilled migrants to western Europe. This migration was primarily oriented towards France, but also increasingly towards the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and, since the mid-1980s, Spain and Italy. The earlier expectation that these ‘guest workers’ would return home never materialized. Following the economic recession and the tightening of immigration policies after the 1973 Oil Crisis, relatively few Moroccan migrants returned. Migrant networks, combined with a sustained demand for migrant labour, explain why policies aiming to curb migration have had only limited effects (cf. de Haas 2005a; 2005b). Moroccans form not only one of the largest, but also one of the most dispersed migrant communities in Western Europe. Out of a total population of 30 million, over 3 million people of Moroccan descent lived abroad in 2004. The actual number may be higher, due to undocumented migration. Moreover, this does not include the approximately 700,000 Jews of Moroccan descent living in Israel. France is home to the largest legally residing population of Moroccan descent (more than 1,105,000), followed by Spain (424,,000), the Netherlands (300,000), Italy (299,000), Belgium (293,000), and Germany (102,000). Smaller communities live in Scandinavian countries (17,000), the United Kingdom (50,000), the United States (100,000), and Canada (70,000) (de Haas 2005a; Fargues 2005). 1 Data and literature collection by the author in Morocco was part of the 1998-2001 IMAROM research project, which was funded by the INCO-DC programme of the European Commission (DG XII, IC18-CT97-0134) and coordinated by the University of Amsterdam (see De Haas 2001). Subsequent funding, which enabled this review, was provided by a postdoctoral research grant (2003-2006, W 53-331) of the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) of the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO). The author wishes to express his gratitude to these funding bodies for enabling this study. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the New Moroccan Migrations Conference, 13-14 July 2005, Sussex University. The author thanks Oliver Bakewell and Stephen Castles (University of Oxford) for their valuable comments on an earlier draft. 3 Map 1. Main zones of international out-migration in Morocco There are distinct patterns of spatial clustering and specialisation in migration, resulting in a concentration of migration from particular sending regions within Morocco towards specific countries, regions and even cities within Europe (cf. Ben Ali 1996:348). Highly marginalized regions participated less in migration than the relatively opened up ‘migration belts’ with established traditions of pre-modern, largely circular migration (de Haas 2005a). On the basis of migration participation data at the provincial level (Refass 1990:228), it is possible to distinguish three principal Moroccan migration belts: The eastern part of the Rif mountain area, the southwestern Sous region near Agadir and the river oases located southeast of the High Atlas. In particular since the 1990s, in response to new labour opportunities in southern Europe, a spatial diffusion of international out-migration has occurred beyond the historical migration belts to regions that used to be predominantly oriented towards internal migration (Bencherifa 1996), such as Khenifra in the Middle Atlas (to Italy and Spain), the region of Laârache south of Tangiers (to Spain and the United Kingdom) and the Tadla plain south of 4 Khouribga (to Italy) (de Haas 2005a; Fadloullah et al. 2000:51-52,99-100; Refass 1999:100) (see Map 1). In contrast to earlier predictions, migrant remittances from Europe to Morocco have shown an upward trend over the past decades (see figure 1). Receiving $4.2 billion in official remittances in 2004, Morocco was the fifth largest remittance receiver in the developing world, and the largest remittances receiver in per capita terms. The inflow of hard currency remittances is crucial to the balance of payments. While remittances represented 6.4 percent of Morocco’s GNP over the 1990s on average, they represented 20.1 percent of all imports in goods and services. In 2001, remittances were six times higher than official development aid, five times higher than FDI, and also exceeded revenues from tourism and the export of agricultural produce and phosphates (de Haas and Plug 2006). Figure 1. Volume of official remittance, ODA, and FDI flows to Morocco 4,500 4,000 3,500 3,000 Official development n o assistance i l l 2,500 i Foreign direct investment m $ 2,000 S Workers' remittances U 1,500 1,000 500 0 1960 1980 2000 Source: World Development Indicators database (World Bank) The so-called “Euro effect” and concomitant money laundering can only explain part of the recent surge in remittances. The structural solidity of remittances is explained by the unforeseen persistence of migration to northwestern Europe; new labour migration towards southern Europe; and the durability of transnational and transgenerational links between migrants and ‘stay behinds’. The stable economic-political environment and new policies 5 towards migrants explain why Morocco has been relatively successful in channelling remittances through official channels (de Haas and Plug 2006). It has often been feared that this increase in income is artificial and temporary and therefore creates a dangerous dependency on external sources of income (cf. Aït Hamza, 1988; Mter, 1995; Kagermeier, 1997; Lazaar, 1989). However, empirical evidence indicates that remittances are a comparatively stable, less volatile and countercyclical source of income and that the relation between migration duration and remittances is not linear. In fact, remittances tend to increase in the first two decades after migration, and the subsequent ‘remittance decay’ is more delayed and the slope of this decline is much flatter than previously assumed (de Haas and Plug, 2006). According to a 1988 study undertaken in France, 29 percent of the second generation ‘Moroccans’ abroad remit regularly (Collyer, 2004). Interpretation of this figure is ambiguous. Collyer (ibid, p. 19) observed that, although this can be a cause for disquietude, “it does nonetheless suggest a significant degree of continued contact of the second generation”. Notwithstanding the macro-economic significance of remittances and incomes of migrants’ families, the extent to which international migration and remittances can bring about more long-term, sustained development and economic growth in migrant-sending areas in poor countries is quite a different question. This very issue has been the subject of intensive debate over the past decades, in which the more pessimistic views have tended to dominate. Up to the 1960s especially, developmentalist ‘migration optimists’ argued that migration and the flow of remittances, as well as the experience, skills and knowledge of returning migrants would help sending regions in developing countries in their economic take-off (Penninx 1982, 782–3; cf. Beijer, 1970). In recent years, this optimistic developmentalist view of migration, remittances and development seems to be experiencing a remarkably renaissance (cf. Kapur, 2003;