The Impact of
Catholic Relief Services Aceh
Reconstruction Program
May 2008
Team: Dean Johnson, Fachrurriza, Jamal Sitepu, Lisdayanti, M. Anike, M. Zuhri, Retno Ika Praesty, Risza Lopes Da Cruz, Said Mahdani, Tamara Saukotta, T. Syamsul Alam, Yusriati and team leader Pauline Wilson Acknowledgements
The evaluation team would like to thank all the men, women and leaders of the six villages in various sub-districts of Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat who gave so generously of their time to provide feedback on the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) reconstruction program carried out with them from 2005 through 2008.
Thank you also to staff in external agencies. This includes Government of Indonesian staff based in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, and staff who worked in Aceh with Caritas Switzerland, IFRC, Mercy Corps, UNORC and the World Bank. All of these staff willingly shared their views on the quality of the CRS reconstruction program.
Many CRS Aceh staff also helpfully contributed their views of the CRS reconstruction program to the evaluation team. This enabled us to understand the great efforts made in a complex environment to try and deliver houses and other infrastructure that all stakeholders would consider of high quality.
Special thanks to the CRS steering committee of Anat Prag, Christopher Frey, Dean Johnson, Maureen Capps, Provash Budden and Scott Campbell who provided clear guidance on what questions the evaluation must answer and the type of methods that would be appropriate in the Aceh context.
The evaluation team is grateful to everyone for the assistance, time, information, and support provided. It is only with your support that the evaluation was possible.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 2 Contents
Contents 3
Abbreviations 4
Executive Summary 5
1. Introduction 10
2. The evaluation process 10
3. The post tsunami context in Aceh encourages a fast pace to reconstruction 12
4. Post tsunami conditions for people in villages where CRS worked were hard 14
5. Pressure to build permanent houses fast diverts attention from transitional shelter 15
6. An overview of CRS’s reconstruction program 16 Figure 1: The CRS permanent and transitional housing program 16
7. CRS reconstruction program activities are mostly appropriate 18 Figure 2: Owner satisfaction with their new house 19 Figure 3: The adequacy of the new house 19 Figure 4: Adequacy of water supply for drinking and washing purposes 23
6. The immediate impacts of the reconstruction program are mostly encouraging 24 Permanent housing 24 Water and sanitation 25 Other village level infrastructure 26
7. Recovery levels of communities and families is underway 27 Housing 28 Water supply 28 Village level infrastructure 28 Economic 28 CRS’ contribution to recovery 29
8. There is some community involvement in housing reconstruction 30 Figure 5: Consultation with perspective house-owners 31
9. Recommendations from others about what CRS should do in the next emergency 32
10. Main Conclusions 33
11. Recommendations 36
Annexes 37
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 3
Abbreviations
ACCORD Aceh Community-Based Recovery and Development ACT Area Coordination Team AIPRD the Australian-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission ACARP Aceh Community Assistance Research Project BRR Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (Badan Rehabilitisi dan Rekonstrucksi – a quasi Indonesian government agency) CFW Cash for Work CRS Catholic Relief Services FGD Focus Group Discussion GAM Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) GOI Government of Indonesia IDP Internally Displaced People IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross INGO International Nongovernmental Organization LOGA Law on the Governing of Aceh MOU Memorandum of Understanding NAD Nanggore Aceh Darussalem NFI Non Food Items PDAM Regional Water Supply Company (Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum)
SSI Semi structured interview
ToR Terms of Reference UN United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias VDC Village Development Committee VDP Village Development Plans Watsan Water and Sanitation WFP World Food Program YDD Yayasan Dian Desa
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 4 Executive Summary
1. Introduction On December 26, 2004 a devastating earthquake and tsunami struck the province of Aceh. In response, Catholic Relief Services carried out a number of programs one of which was a reconstruction program. The reconstruction program started in early 2005 and is currently planned to finish at the end of 2008. In March 2008, CRS commissioned an impact evaluation of the reconstruction program. The objective of the reconstruction program was ‘Affected communities have rebuilt and improved their households and community assets’ . The goal of the entire CRS program in Aceh was ‘Tsunami and earthquake affected people in Aceh live productive and dignified lives’.
The objectives of the evaluation were to assess:
The pre-construction conditions in the communities where CRS worked. The difference reconstruction work made to beneficiaries and the communities in which they lived (immediate impacts). The degree to which reconstruction activities supported individuals, families and communities to restore the dignity of their lives. The degree to which reconstruction activities helped people and communities in terms of recovery of housing, water and sanitation and infrastructure. Local peoples’ involvement in planning, implementation, and monitoring of reconstruction activities so that social problems are effectively addressed.
2. The context encourages a fast pace to reconstruction Villages and cities across Aceh, particularly along its western and northern coastlines, were devastated by the tsunami. An estimated 130,000 people were killed, 37,000 are still missing and half a million people were displaced. The villages where CRS worked had similarly high levels of destruction though the level of mortality varied greatly, from a few people in some villages to as high as 60-75% of the population in other villages.
The Government of Indonesia (GOI) and hundreds of NGOs rushed in to provide assistance. As many GOI officials were killed in the tsunami, coordination on the ground was limited while funding support available to NGOs reached unprecedented levels. Many organisations along with the GOI are involved in reconstruction efforts with the reconstruction of houses the primary focus. Speed and quality were the two drivers that influenced most agencies including CRS to use a contractor led approach to building houses. Pressure to build fast came from the GOI, the media, donors and local people. Tensions and accusations about the pace of reconstruction activities have been great since 2005 and most agencies responded by trying to build quickly.
3. The CRS reconstruction program CRS has built nearly four thousand permanent houses across fifty two villages. Each house was equipped with a bathroom with toilet area and a household septic tank system. In most of these villages support was provided to recoup water supply systems. In addition 2162 temporary shelters were distributed and 17 temporary water and sanitation systems were provided for IDPs as they awaited construction of their permanent houses. Over 200 micro-infrastructure projects are now complete. These included road culvert and bridge repair; land clearance and renovation; and construction of markets, clinics and community halls. Village development committees were established in CRS priority villages. Priority villages were the twenty nine villages where CRS built twenty five houses or more. In these villages,
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 5 processes were set up to ensure extensive consultation with local people on selection of beneficiaries for permanent houses, site location of houses and selection of a house design. A complaints system was set up so perspective home owners could voice concerns as housing construction progressed.
3. The main conclusions The post tsunami conditions for people and communities were very hard: Most people in all twenty-nine CRS priory villages became internally displaced people (IDP) dependent on emergency food aid and the support of relatives, NGOs and government. Many had lost loved ones as well as all their earthly possessions including their home. ‘ After the tsunami we didn’t even have a piece of cloth left. We were naked and had no belongings.’ People became scattered. Many lived in tents. Some lived in barracks and others with relatives. By mid 2005 some people began to relocate to transitional shelters as more agencies distributed these but many families would end up living in barracks, or with relatives for up to two years making it difficult for them to resume normal everyday activities.
The perceptions of the CRS Aceh reconstruction program were positive : Every villager we spoke to said CRS and other NGOs did the right thing by building permanent houses. Compared to other agencies villagers considered the quality of CRS houses among the very best. The positive view of the quality of CRS constructed houses was echoed by the external agencies we interviewed who also commended CRS for the professionalism of its staff and the efforts made by CRS to encourage coordination by all agencies in Aceh. The staff of CRS said that the Aceh program has accelerated CRS’s learning in the non-core competency area of housing and enabled them to build the skills and knowledge of local staff and of local contractors on constructing quality housing in Indonesia. Though some construction defects were reported, and most of them CRS already has plans to rectify, these views were tempered as most house owners first said that overall they had received a good quality permanent house.
The immediate impact of the CRS housing program is encouraging: Families who received a house spoke of many positive impacts since moving into it: of having more energy, feeling more relaxed, and settled. They spoke of being able to get back to routine activities ‘reading the Koran’, ‘ having the family together again in one place’ restarting economic activities and saving money to do other things. ‘ From being an empty village, now people have come back. Moving from barracks to permanent houses we feel more relaxed and safer even though we still feel trauma if an earthquake happens.’ They were grateful and happy ’ to have a proper place to live’ and some said ‘to have a valuable asset that can be inherited by our grandchildren.’
The impact of the water supply and sanitation program has some positive affects: Rehabilitation of water supply systems was undertaken by many agencies including CRS. As a result the availability and access to water has been returned to its pre-tsunami level for families in some villages. In other villages the tsunami has affected the quality of the water in shallow wells and even the quality of water in some boreholes and people said they cannot drink the water even if boiled. While people in one of the villages where all shallow wells were rebuilt by CRS rated their recovery on water at over 100% saying they can drink the well water once it is boiled, people in other villages rated recovery of water at 50% or less saying they cannot drink the water from the wells.
On sanitation, the septic tank systems with household flush latrines are an improvement to the systems previously used by families in Aceh. While people did not speak about the differences this has made to them, it was possible to observe that there was 100% use of latrines in one village, 50% use in a second and partial use in other villages. These utilization rates are high
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 6 given that this is a new technology for most rural villages as before the tsunami some used the forest, sea or a river as a toilet and others used pit latrines. Socialization is just starting 1 so most people have limited knowledge of the benefits of these new latrines and septic tank systems and of how to repair or maintain them. In addition latrine use in some villages is low because in earlier construction phases, septic tank systems and bathroom water cisterns were not built well though CRS is in the process of repairing the systems constructed earlier.
The impact of the infrastructure program worked well in meeting short term needs but its long term usefulness depends on strengthening local management systems: As with water supply many agencies constructed infrastructure and the level of infrastructure completed by CRS across villages varied from many projects to none. However, people rarely commented on infrastructure. In one village where the community hall had been repaired by CRS, men and women did say they now have a place to pray while in the relocation site visited many noted the lack of a place to pray. In another village men said they now have a better road than before. In all villages visited all infrastructure built by CRS whether permanent or temporary was in use including the transitional shelters built earlier by CRS and others, an indication of the importance of these public assets.
With pressure to build quickly, community involvement in the construction of infrastructure was minimal, primarily limited to labour on some of the smaller projects. The stated understanding that local government and communities would establish the management processes to ensure that village level infrastructure is managed and maintained overtime has yet to take place. Such local management structures will be critical if these public assets are to be maintained and used over the long term.
The impact of the program on social relations has both positive and negative effects: In villages where CRS was the sole NGO providing houses and it used one design and the same materials people said that ‘now there is no difference between the rich and poor as we all have the same size house of the same quality.’ In villages where there were more agencies, including the government, providing houses the quality of housing was different. Such differences people said have created social jealousy in their community.
In a few villages some people said some families who did not meet the criteria were able to manipulate the assessment process and received a house. Some also said that there are families who insist they meet the criteria yet they have not received a house. It is particularly the latter situation that is said to be creating social jealousy and much discomfort between those who now have a luxurious house whereas some families in villages still live in wooden houses or houses that were severely damaged by the tsunami.
Community involvement is satisfactory but does not build local capacity: While 97% of people considered the consultation process either all right (24%) or very acceptable (73%) some women would have liked to have been more involved in consultation processes and said they would have come to meetings if they had been invited directly. Indications that extra effort was made to involve women were not found. This may be a contributing factor to the issues about the allocation of space within the house (e.g. many said there is no kitchen and the toilet needs to be located outside the house). Such findings would likely apply to most agencies as most followed the house designs as defined by the BRR and the Acehnese architects the BRR employed. Also both men and women had questions about some of the materials used in
1 Socialization is a term used throughout Indonesia to describe awareness raising on how a product works and the benefits of its use to those who have received it.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 7 house construction and some people were not clear whether CRS had fulfilled all of its commitments to them.
The approach used by CRS and most agencies was to give major assets either to an individual or to the community and involve them very little in managing the process. With so many agencies promising so much and pressure to deliver quickly it would have been difficult to do otherwise. However the way most NGOs including CRS worked with local communities did not build their capacity to act on their own behalf.
Recovery from the tsunami and to pre-tsunami levels is well underway: In those communities where CRS worked, it contributed significantly to the recovery of families and communities. People in all six villages visited said people’s highest priority need after food and basic relief was housing. A house has provided them ‘a proper place to live and pray.’ For 79% of families, the quality of the house design and construction is better than that of the house they owned prior to the tsunami. With a house families are able to use any money they have for schooling their children and for strengthening their livelihood options.
Villagers acknowledged the various support from all NGOs and the GOI and said that without such support many families would still be living in tents, barracks or with relatives. In one village leaders said ‘by now maybe only ten families would have been able to build houses.’ Economically, many said more needs to be done to ensure livelihoods become more sustainable. Also in some villages water supply is more problematic as the quality of water in some shallow wells is poorer now compared to its pre-tsunami quality resulting in more people needing to buy water. Psychologically some people remain traumatized ‘I feel safer and more relaxed in the new house but still feel traumatized if an earthquake happens’ and earthquakes often occur in Aceh. How long it will take for communities to fully recovery from the vast devastation of the tsunami is difficult to say but most families are in a permanent house and have begun to rebuild other aspects of their lives.
Progress towards achievement of the program’s goal is substantive: In many ways CRS achieved its goal to support ‘tsunami affected people to live productive and dignified lives.’ Most of the families living in CRS constructed houses were in barracks, a transitional shelter or, living with relatives prior to moving into their house. From having nothing, people now have a safe and durable house and 89% consider it a home. Rich and poor, widows and widowers and orphans all received the same house and some villagers said the distinction between rich and poor has disappeared. They consider the house an asset that can be inherited by their children and a base for income generation (collateral for microfinance, renting their houses, and baking and selling goods). Infrastructure has supported livelihood development e.g. roads and markets, and enabled the return of social and religious activities.
At present, it is unclear whether providing major assets to affected people without giving them more control over the process and responsibility for the work has affected their ability to act on their own behalf, their sense of ownership, cohesion and pride. Definitely tensions and jealousies have emerged in some villages where some families insist that they fit agreed criteria, but did not get a house. It is uncertain whether such tensions will grow or reduce overtime. Whether conflicts arise between those along the coast who have benefited from the work done by so many NGOs and those people living in the interior who still mostly live in self- built wooden houses with few amenities only time will tell.
4. Recommendations
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 8 Recommendations for Immediate Action Where it is possible, review the current status of water supply in those communities where CRS was seeking to improve availability to confirm if projects are satisfying the original objectives. Continue advocacy with PDAM (the regional water supply company) to increase the number of CRS beneficiaries who are connected to a consistent and permanent water supply.
Where it is necessary and with those communities that embrace the opportunity, increase local capacity to operate and maintain CRS-built water systems and infrastructure either through training community members or advocating for communities to be linked with government operations and maintenance departments and budgets.
Repair septic systems that are broken and where possible rebuild or retrofit standard septic systems to include a secondary treatment system.
Formally close each reconstruction activity by acquiring signatures from the relevant officials confirming the completion of each MOU commitment. Ensure such information is placed on community information boards to avoid any misconceptions about unfilled promises and to reconfirm that CRS has no further projects in the community.
Recommendations for CRS to consider in the next large emergency response Manage the expectations of communities, government officials, donors and the media regarding the scope and timeframe of project activities to be realistic and within the capacity of CRS to fulfil. Consistently manage these expectations as the projects progress.
The contractor model of construction was appropriate given the particular conditions of Aceh. But if given sufficient time, community participation by men and women in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects should increase. This would improve community responsibility and ownership and the degree to which cultural norms are met.
In a post-disaster response, shelter programs should proceed from tents, to transitional shelters to permanent shelters. Inclusion of the transitional shelter phase will decrease pressure and ensure that best practices are followed in the permanent shelter phase.
From the beginning of an emergency response, establish communication practices that provide timely responses to queries and complaints to both men and women and give clear messages about the commitments that CRS has made.
From the beginning of an emergency response implement beneficiary verification processes that are thorough and transparent, well-documented and incorporate informal information gathering techniques as a means of augmenting a rigorous formal process.
The Engineering and Area Coordination two-team approach was successful in Aceh and should be considered in future responses.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 9 1. Introduction
Early in the morning of December 26, 2004 an earthquake measuring 9.3 on the Richter scale occurred off the west coast of Sumatra. This triggered a series of tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean. The tsunami devastated Aceh leaving 130,000 dead, 37,000 missing, and 500,000 people displaced. Housing and infrastructure and land were destroyed 2. Local people and relatives were the first to respond followed by the government, other donors and NGOs 3 including Catholic Relief Service (CRS) which had its first staff member on the ground in Aceh by December 28 th .
In March 2008, CRS commissioned an impact evaluation of the reconstruction program they implemented from 2005 to March 2008. The program included construction or repair of permanent housing, water and sanitation facilities and other village level infrastructure.4 The objective of the reconstruction program was ‘Affected communities have rebuilt and improved their households and community assets’ . The goal of the entire CRS program in Aceh was ‘Tsunami and earthquake affected people in Aceh live productive and dignified lives’.5
A steering committee of senior CRS staff in the Aceh program was formed to oversee the impact evaluation and ensure that its focus would meet the needs of the agency. The committee agreed upon the evaluation objectives and the main questions it would address as well as the methods and processes that would be used.
The objectives of the evaluation were to assess:
The pre -construction conditions in the communities where CRS worked. The difference the reconstruction work made to beneficiaries and the communities in which they lived (immediate impacts). The degree to which reconstruction activities supported individuals, families and communities to restore the dignity of their lives. The degree to which reconstruction activities helped people and communities in terms of recovery of housing, water and sanitation and infrastructure. Local peoples’ involvement in planning, implementation, and monitoring of reconstruction activities so that social problems were effectively addressed.
2. The evaluation process
The evaluation team The evaluation took place from March 18th through April 10th , 20086. The team was led by an independent evaluator. In addition there were twelve other members of the team. Eight of the team members were staff working in the CRS Aceh program, one an ex-CRS staff member of Acehnese descent and three team members were independent of CRS and recruited as they
2 Aceh and Nias One Year After The Tsunami, BRR December 2005. 3 Telford and Cosgrove, July 2006: 49-50. 4 Please see Annex One for the terms of reference for this evaluation. 5 The reconstruction program is currently scheduled to finish at the end of 2008. Most construction activities are already complete. 6 Please see Annex Two: A detailed schedule of the evaluation.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 10 worked in Aceh and had some experience with evaluations or translation. This insider -outsider team was to ensure that we had adequate Acehnese speakers on the team so that all discussions at village level could be done in Acehnese without translation. Note takers, while Indonesian speakers, knew enough Acehnese to capture the main points of discussions. An observer was part of each team to verify objectivity and the quality of the process. Half of the team members were women. A women’s team carried out all focus group discussions (FGD) with women, and a male facilitator led the FGDs with men.
To ensure reliability of data, the team engaged in regular training and debriefing sessions. For example, a two day workshop was carried out with the team at the beginning of the evaluation process to agree on methods to use and questions to cover in the various types of interviews. In addition, time was spent in simulation exercises so that team members could practice facilitating FGDs and listening skills. Debriefings were carried out following work in each village to understand the process and findings and verify that we had captured people’s views objectively and not introduced too much bias. All findings were then tabulated in English.
Villages involved in the evaluation The evaluation was carried out in five sample villages. An additional village close to the Banda Aceh office was selected for piloting the questions and methods. These were six of the twenty- nine priority villages 7 where CRS worked. Three of the villages were managed by the CRS Banda Aceh office and three were managed from the CRS Meulaboh office.8 The five villages were purposively selected to be representative of the differences found within the program against the following criteria: timeframes of housing reconstruction activities, land status of reconstruction sites and the manageability of the collaborative process – relationship between CRS and each particular village during the reconstruction process. 9
Method Used Qualitative methods (FGDs, individual interviews and observation) were used to gather evaluation data. In each village men and women FGDs were held separately. Although this was not always possible, an attempt was made to further sub-divide groups of women and men into those who had received houses during the earlier housing construction phases and those who had received houses in later housing construction phases.10 This distinction between those receiving houses earlier or later in the program’s life was to see if people’s perspectives were different depending on the length of time they had stayed in the house. Also CRS continued to make improvements in house construction and improvements in the way it engaged with communities. CRS wanted to know if these changes had influenced people’s opinion of impact. An FGD was also held in each village with the CRS-created village development committee (VDC) as they were the primary interface with CRS throughout the reconstruction process. Separate discussions were held with the village leaders in each village and random interviews completed with at least two men and two women to crosscheck the information provided by beneficiaries in the FGDs. The total number of people the team spoke with across the villages
7 CRS built either permanent or transitional houses in 52 different villages. In 19 of these villages both permanent and transitional shelters were built. A priority village was one where CRS built 25 or more permanent houses. For a complete list of all villages where CRS worked and the type of housing and infrastructure completed in each please see Annex Three: Villages and activities of the CRS Aceh reconstruction program. 8 Please see page 10 for a map of Aceh showing the location of villages involved in this evaluation. 9 Villages visited were selected based on CRS defined criteria. These criteria are detailed on page seven of the ToR in Annex One. This purposive sampling approach was used to ensure that a range of villages with these various characteristics were involved though CRS emphasised that all 29 priority villages were unique. 10 In some of the villages there were up to five phases of permanent housing reconstruction.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 11 was 310; this included 123 women and 187men.11 All teams were encouraged to visit a permanent house and any other infrastructure mentioned during discussions to verify their condition and use and to understand any problems mentioned by informants.
Other sources of information To complement village level discussions and observations, CRS documents and those of other agencies were reviewed. 12 One key document was data from a satisfaction survey carried out by the CRS program quality team in February 2008. For more detail on this survey, see section seven.
Finally semi-structured interviews (SSI) were completed with government officials and staff in other agencies, 13 and separate discussions held with senior level CRS Aceh staff, field staff based in Banda Aceh and field staff based in Meulaboh. Some members of the evaluation team including the lead evaluator met with the senior management team and steering committee in Banda Aceh on April 8 th to review a summary of the findings from village level discussions and external and staff interviews. Based on this review, conclusions were drawn and recommendations agreed.
By triangulating information from these various documents, methods and sources the team was able to bring together sufficient information to draw conclusions and recommendations about Catholic Relief Services’ response in Aceh in relationship to their reconstruction program. A summary of views from these various sources is captured in the body of this report.
3. The post tsunami context in Aceh encourages a fast pace to reconstruction
Villages and cities across Aceh particularly along its western and northern coastlines were devastated by the tsunami. Houses, water and sanitation and infrastructure were destroyed and thousands of people were killed. The villages where CRS worked faced similar levels of destruction though the level of mortality varied greatly from a few people to as high as 60-75% of the population.
The tsunami destroyed many government offices and killed one third of all government officials based in Aceh leaving few government staff in place to cope with the wide level of destruction. While hundreds of NGOs rushed in to provide assistance there was little Government of Indonesia (GOI) or UN capacity on the ground initially to coordinate efforts and ensure a sensible and coordinated response to the emergency. With more funds than ever to respond NGOs got on with relief activities often competing with one another to take care of particular communities.14
One hundred and ten INGOs and other international organisations along with the GOI are involved in reconstruction efforts and much of this work relates to reconstruction of houses. Speed and quality became the two driving factors that influenced the way agencies did their housing programs. These factors would push many organisations into a more contractor led
11 Please see Annex Four for a summary of those we spoke with in each village and information on the total number of FGDs the team was able to carry out. 12 Please see Annex Five: References, for a list of the documents reviewed. 13 Please see Annex Six for a list of those interviewed from external agencies and of CRS staff who participated in staff focus group discussions or individual interviews. 14 Bennett et al, July 2006.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 12 approach to building rather than a community led one which would have taken more time to implement. However, there was no consistent or coordinated approach followed across agencies and the quality and speed at which housing reconstruction took place has varied.
The scale of the devastation, international donor support, media interest, and the fact that half a million displaced people were either living in tents, barracks or with relatives would all press agencies into responding quickly. With the GOI pushing agencies to make written commitments about the number of houses they would build, many NGOs did make commitments to build houses. For some agencies these commitments would prove difficult for them to meet over the long term.
As in most large scale natural disasters, beneficiary selection and land allocation processes took time to resolve while pressure to build fast mounted. Such pressure came from displaced people who were mostly interested in the speed of house construction. ‘People affected seemed far more interested in resuming normal life than building their own houses. ’15 The GOI also pressed NGOs to deliver on written commitments within specified timeframes while the media watched and reported that reconstruction was not moving fast enough to a global public that had given more money to this particular emergency than to any other in the past. 16
The GOI finally established the BRR (Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agency) in April 2005 and its first meeting with NGOs and the UN was held in May.17 Estimates of the number of permanent houses needing to be rebuilt in Aceh were 120,000.18 Along with these thousands of houses needed to be repaired and water and sanitation facilities, roads and other community buildings needed to be built to ensure viable communities.
Since the number of agencies offering to provide permanent houses to communities was large, beneficiaries could select who they wanted to work with and some communities did elect to have houses built by another agency if they thought they could get a house faster. In addition, some agencies supplying houses offered more then a house. 19 Such conditions encouraged local people to make demands particularly in relationship to the speed at which houses were constructed.
The complex post emergency context was further complicated by the limited experience of NGOs in Aceh. Due to the thirty-year conflict in Aceh between the GOI and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), Aceh had been closed to outsiders for many years. This included INGOs and donors as well as Indonesians from other parts of the country. As a result there was limited knowledge of Acehnese society and culture by most agencies that responded. Agencies began working with Acehnese communities that had not benefited from the GOI social sector and
15 This quote is from a presentation by Habitat on their work in Aceh. Such a view seems to be have been held by the GOI, donors and NGOs. Extracted from Oxfam Report, December 11, 2006. 16 The amount of money committed by the GOI and the international community for reconstruction in Aceh is estimated at US$7.5billion over a period of five years. This level of funding after a large scale natural disaster is unprecedented (BRR, BAPPEDA Aceh Province and the World Band: 20008:41). 17 For more details on the context please see Annex Seven: A brief chronology of post tsunami events and CRS Aceh’s reconstruction response. 18 BRR Aceh Nias Fact Sheet for February 2008. 19 Some agencies did provide furniture as well as a house. Some women focus group participants also spoke about receiving curtains from agencies though it was not clear if these agencies had built houses as well.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 13 economic reform programs reaching other parts of Indonesia,20 and who had little experience of working with NGOs.
The thirty-year conflict had affected people across Aceh and the Acehnese members of the evaluation team said that the conflict had reduced community solidarity and trust between people though other studies have found that social capital in Acehnese society is quite high where local and traditional leadership is strong and transparent.21
All these contextual factors would influence the reconstruction approach taken by NGOs including that of CRS and encourage them to implement reconstruction programs quickly.
4. Post tsunami conditions for people in villages where CRS worked were hard
Tsunami destruction in the six villages that participated in this evaluation was vast. Some of the villages were completely destroyed and other villages were left with a few houses and some infrastructure that was damaged but still standing. Sadly the biggest difference between the villages where CRS worked was the mortality levels. These varied across the villages. In one village it was around 2% as people all ran into the hills and were able to save themselves while losing everything they owned in the village. In the worse affected village the mortality level was close to 75%. This was a village where the tsunami waves came from both the North and West.
Most people in all twenty-nine priory villages where CRS worked became internally displaced people (IDP) dependent on emergency food aid and the support of relatives, NGOs and government. Many in the villages we visited spoke of living off coconut milk for two to four days until food relief began to be distributed by agencies, various militaries and the government. ‘After the tsunami we didn’t even have a piece of cloth left. We were naked and had no People became scattered. Many lived in tents. belongings. We went to find refuge in the These were the worst conditions as people lived on mountains and then lived in tents. Some then moved to barracks and others went into the ground and this became muddy with the transitional shelter. Then we moved into a frequent rain. Others lived with relatives. They felt permanent house’ (Women’s FGD in one uncomfortable about putting such a strain on their village ). relatives and usually conditions when sharing were crowded. The most favoured location was barracks mostly built by the government. Here people were also cramped but they were off the ground and had a roof over their head. Many spoke of living in conditions before they got a house where people often fell sick. 22
5. Pressure to build permanent houses fast diverts attention from transitional shelter
20 A recent report notes that the thirty year conflict in Aceh had hindered economy development, weakened local government structures, and reduced public services delivery resulting in the highest levels of poverty in Indonesia (BRR, BAPPEDA Aceh Province, and World Bank, January 2008: 9). 21 ACARP Report December 2007: 161. 22 For more details on conditions after the tsunami in each village that participated in the evaluation see Annex Eight: Village profiles and villager’s views of the CRS reconstruction program.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 14 Some agencies including CRS began constructing transitional shelters in mid-2005. Once these shelters were built, they became the favoured dwelling among IDPs. Yet, a variety of complex factors delayed agencies including CRS from focusing on a transitional shelter program. Two main factors were 1) in early 2005 the GOI actively steered INGOs away from transitional housing solutions and 2) most displaced people felt that accepting a short-term housing solution might jeopardize their opportunity to receive a permanent house and therefore many rejected such support. 23 INGOs underestimating the enormity of the task and eager to produce results bypassed transitional shelter projects and launched directly into their permanent shelter projects. The issue was multifaceted and all parties involved had a stake in its failure resulting in some families living in tents and barracks for as long as two years.24
Even with the momentum to move straight into permanent shelter construction, many issues delayed onset of these programs during the emergency phase. Among these delays were government and BRR deliberations over the buffer zone, recipient eligibility, division of responsibilities among government entities and the various international agencies, timber sourcing and environmental issues, sourcing of relocation land, and concerns about GAM and the on-going conflict. CRS was closely engaged in the meetings where these issues were debated.
Similar to other agencies involved in permanent shelter, CRS did not receive approval to start building until June 2005. It quickly became apparent to CRS and other agencies that permanent shelter, if done correctly, would be a far more lengthy process than originally envisioned. With this awareness, CRS re-started its transitional shelter project in August of 2005 while simultaneously building the capacity to pursue a large-scale permanent shelter project. In total, CRS distributed 2,162 self-build transitional shelter kits.
The primary beneficiaries of these kits were families who had been residing in tents, though in some circumstances families with other transitional living arrangements (i.e. barracks) were also eligible. The kits provided a transitional shelter for families that had lost their home in the tsunami, and in most cases allowed families and communities to reunite and to live in close proximity to where their new house was being constructed. This phase of work also enabled CRS to develop a relationship with households in priority villages and to begin discussions with them on eligibility criteria for beneficiaries of permanent houses. Once families did receive a permanent house they would either convert the transitional shelter into a kitchen connected to the permanent house or sell it.
6. An overview of CRS’s reconstruction program
CRS committed to doing a large reconstruction program worth US$65 million. There was some revision in the number of permanent houses it built as beneficiary assessments provided more
23 For a more detailed discussion of factors that divert attention from transitional shelter see Ferris, 2006: 31-32. 24 The GOI and many INGOs including CRS would learn from the Aceh experience and focus primarily on transitional shelter in their responses to the Jogyakarta Earthquake in mid-2006. The importance of providing transitional shelter and then permanent housing is also set out in the Sphere standards as historically permanent housing programs take time to complete. Knowledge of housing programs is embedded in some of the CRS Asia programs which already have much experience with shelter programs. Evidence that this internal knowledge was adequately communicated is limited.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 15 precise numbers for families meeting agreed criteria as set by the BRR 25 and negotiations with government on reconstruction commitments were finalised. The numbers of houses nearing completion reflect closely the commitments CRS made in early 2005.
Housing commitments for each village were written into memorandums of understandings (MOUs) that CRS signed with various GOI offices. Figure 1 below summarises by district the number of permanent houses CRS committed to build, the houses already handed over to families, and the houses remaining to be handed over. Also noted are the housing occupancy levels as of March 2008 and the number of transitional shelters provided in each district. A much more detailed list showing both housing and other reconstruction work done in each of the villages where CRS worked is provided in Annex Three.
Figure 1: The CRS permanent and transitional housing program
District Permanent Houses Occupancy rate Transitional Shelter March 2008 26 Distributed Committed Handed Remaining Over Aceh Berat 2386 2194 192 95% 1600 Nagan Raya 272 272 0 93% 79 Aceh Besar 1294 1165 129 74% 483 Nias 129 0 129 0% 0 Grand Totals 4,081 3631 450 87% 2162
With a large number of houses to be built within a tight timeframe, CRS hired private sector engineers to work with CRS staff that had more of a community development background. The housing construction approach used was a contractor led rather than a community self-build approach.27 Though comments from men in rural villages indicate that there was some tradition of self building of houses, there was no pressure for agencies to support a self-build approach. As noted earlier the interest of tsunami affected people was that agencies should build their houses quickly.
Yet a contractor led approach took time to put in place as CRS, other NGOs and the GOI debated and considered ways to deliver many permanent houses rapidly. As pressure from communities and the GOI grew, CRS brought in more technical engineering capacity to build quality houses fast and an initial reliance on external consultants was reduced.28
25 Beneficiary selection criteria were the person: owned a house before the tsunami, they were living in the house, their house was destroyed and they owned the land. Criteria were revised later so that renters could qualify for a house if they bought land. The revised criteria were living in a house and the house was destroyed. 26 The average occupancy rate does not include the Nias percentage which would distort this figure. Occupancy is more clearly represented in Annex Three where occupancy rates are shown for each village. Occupancy rates vary. Most villages have occupancy rates between 80 to 100% though seven villages have occupancy rates under 80%. 27 For a discussion of contractor versus self-build approaches to permanent housing see Housing Reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat by Barenstein, March 2006. 28 Summary of Lessons Learnt in the CRS Aceh Program, August 2006: 3.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 16 Each permanent house was built with a toilet either within the house or connected to the back of the house and a household septic tank system. All CRS houses built in urban or peri-urban areas that were projected to be served by the GOI water supply agency, PDAM, are fitted with the proper connections to access this service. At the time of this evaluation, 4 of the 29 CRS priority villages are serviced by PDAM. It is projected that several other villages will have this service in the future, but in the interim period and for those villages out of PDAM’s planned service area; CRS completed other projects to restore or improve people’s access to water. This included construction of: household shallow wells in 14 villages and in five of these villages a borehole with a communal tap-stand; and construction of household tubewells in five priority villages and in one of these villages a borehole with a communal tap stand. In three other villages community water distribution systems were constructed, two are gravity-fed and one is a borehole-fed system. Two priority villages have shallow wells built by BRR. In the one remaining priority village (a sample village in this evaluation) community members obtain water from a variety of sources: pre-tsunami shallow wells, one community borehole and shallow wells built by IRC. PDAM is also connected to several homes, but at the time of this evaluation, the service was not operating. According to community members, this patchwork of water sources is not sufficiently meeting their needs.
According to CRS conducted tests, the quality of water provided by the projects described above varies. Many of the water sources do not provide good drinking water, unless it is boiled and/or filtered. In two urban villages CRS has advised families not to drink the water, even after boiling and filtering, due to higher than acceptable arsenic levels. CRS continues to explore appropriate solutions for water, but considers a well-functioning PDAM the only long term permanent solution for most of its shelter beneficiaries. 29
In addition to provision of transitional and permanent houses, CRS completed over 200 different public infrastructure projects primarily at village level. These projects included road, culvert and bridge repair; land clearance; renovation and construction of markets, schools, clinics and community halls. Often CRS village level infrastructure projects were to fill gaps in response to requests from local government. In several villages, CRS constructed secondary roads to allow transport of materials for house construction by CRS and other NGOs. Details of all infrastructure projects completed are provided in Annex Three.
The total number of people benefiting from the permanent housing program is estimated to be around 20,405 people. 30 More than half of these people were also recipients of transitional shelters and around 70% of them have benefited from the improved water supply activities undertaken by CRS and described above. An additional 11,294 beneficiaries will be served by a gravity-fed water distribution system being built for 24 non-CRS permanent shelter villages. A much larger number of people are benefiting from the public infrastructure projects completed particularly projects such as the park and maternal child hospital in Banda Aceh and the markets constructed in various locations. However, it was beyond the scope of this evaluation to assess the total number of people using the different infrastructure built by CRS in Aceh.
7. CRS reconstruction program activities are mostly appropriate
29 PDAM services before the tsunami were very low and reports done by the World Bank indicate that it will take time for PDAM to develop management capacity to expand their services in Aceh. 30 This estimate is based on the total number of houses that will be completed times the average household size in Aceh (4,081 X 5).
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 17 According to the villagers we interviewed, CRS and other NGOs did the right thing by addressing their relief needs first and then constructing permanent houses. This view was echoed by CRS staff who said the work they were most proud of was provision of permanent housing. Half of the external agencies interviewed also said that given the context CRS did the right thing by building permanent houses. All the externals interviewed commended CRS for both the quality of the houses it built as well as the quality of staff saying they are competent professionals with the right skills to implement a large scale permanent housing construction program. 31
The standard of construction and safety of CRS houses was assessed by independent civil engineers in 2006. The review examined the quality of permanent houses built by the BRR and nine other agencies including CRS. The engineers said ‘In comparing the various houses, CRS was the best in terms of quality and workmanship.’ 32 In November 2007, independent engineers conducted a DEC Tsunami Assurance Mission. In their draft conclusions they state, “CRS has an extremely thorough and professional construction unit working closely with the area coordination which provided a balance between the need for both construction and community focus.” The high level of quality as well as the strength of CRS houses was also acknowledged by villagers we spoke with who often said ‘compared to the houses provided by other agencies CRS houses are the best. ’
The views expressed about housing by villagers correlate well with the satisfaction survey results carried out in February 2008.33 The survey assessed three areas: is my house habitable, is my house durable and was consultation during and after construction satisfactory. Access to water and sanitation, and electricity were also assessed.
As seen in Figure 2 below, seventy nine percent of respondents indicated that the design and construction quality of the house built by CRS is better than their previous house. To the question does your house feel like home, eighty-nine percent of the people said yes and eleven percent said no. These responses correspond closely to what we heard in focus group discussions. In the four rural villages participating in focus group discussions many people said their new house is of much better quality, more luxurious and stronger than the house they had before the tsunami. Prior to the tsunami many rural people said they had lived in wooden or semi-permanent houses.34 In the two peri-urban villages many people participating in focus groups said they were pleased with the house and its quality though they had lived in a permanent house before the tsunami that was much bigger.35
Figure 2: Owner satisfaction with their new house
31 Please see Annex Nine: Summary of views from external agencies. 32 The100% report done on behalf of Muslim Aid noted that the CRS house was well engineered and that there was much on-site supervision during construction resulting in a structure that meets ‘design intent’ for seismic safety. As earthquakes remain the most significant risk in Aceh the engineers considered this an important feature of a house (Lubkowski, April 2006: 19-21). 33 For this survey CRS randomly selected 10% of individuals who had received a permanent house in each Yesof the five 50% sample villages. This resulted in 67 completed surveys out of a total population of 635. Some participantsNo completed questionnaires themselves and others did so with the assistance of an enumerator. 43% of those completing a questionnaire were women, 39% were men and 18% were husband and wife. 34 Traditional houses in Aceh are made of timber and many of these can be seen once you drive ten miles inland from the coast. 35 In the satisfaction survey only 28% indicated that their new house is bigger than the pre-tsunami house. Is the design and constructi on quality of your Does the house feel like home? house better than your previous house? Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 18
Responses in the satisfaction survey to questions of risk of the house being damaged from natural causes also indicate that home owners of CRS houses believe houses are appropriately built. While a small percentage of respondents thought their house was at risk from flooding, heavy rain, strong winds or minor earthquakes, many (58%) did feel the house was at risk from a major earthquake and a tsunami (83%). However 96% of respondents said that the level of risk from these natural phenomena was acceptable.
Figure 3 below shows that sixty-five percent of respondents indicated they found the overall design and construction quality of their house very acceptable, twenty-five percent thought it was all right and nine percent indicated that it was unacceptable. On the adequacy of the kitchen and cooking space provided in the house thirty percent found it acceptable, twenty two percent considered it all right and forty-eight percent considered it unacceptable. These responses correlate well with the information we heard in discussions at village level where all men, women, and leaders said that the most successful activity done by CRS was housing. Women often added that it was the house with a well and latrine that was the most successful activity. However, there were some concerns about houses raised which could explain the wide range of responses to these questions. These concerns are discussed below.
Figure 3: The adequacy of the new house
50%
40% Definitely Unacceptable 30% Unacceptable OK 20% Acceptable Issues raised on the quality of the house Definitely Acceptable Only10% a few people mentioned the length of time they had waited for a house and the challenges faced by them during the beneficiary selection and housing construction processes. 36 For most 0% How satisfied are you w ith the design How adequate is the kitchen and 36 and overall construction quality of your cooking space? There were many complaintshouse? heard during the impact evaluation commissioned by CRS in February 2006. At that time only a few permanent houses were constructed. Many informants of that evaluation expressed frustration with how long it was taking to build houses. These frustrations and the challenges in supervising contractors to ensure
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 19 people these concerns faded when they moved into their new house. The new issues of concern relate to the overall quality of the house and whether there are any defects as well as to the location of the kitchen and toilet.
In four villages there were some reported defects though only in one village were defects consistently raised by many people we spoke with. In this village many said the open cistern in their bathroom/toilet area continues to leak though CRS and they themselves have tried to fix it. 37 In addition in this village some ceiling and roof areas of houses leak and door locks don’t work. In other villages defects were reported much less often and mostly related to broken septic tanks, un-even floors, and the quality of door frames and locks. When describing any defects in the house almost everyone blamed these on contractors and not on CRS. CRS confirmed that it is continuing to follow up with households reporting defects to rectify them as appropriate especially as most defects are occurring in the houses built in the initial phase of construction when supervision of contractors was less rigorous.
Views on the different housing phases Another issue raised during village discussions related to changes in the materials used in CRS housing construction. These changes were undertaken by CRS to 1) address complaints they heard from those who received houses early in 2006, 38 and 2) to improve the quality of houses so that houses would be stronger and more earthquake resistant. . Despite these changes, beneficiaries rarely mentioned an improvement in CRS’ construction quality in the later phases and never went deeply in issues related to the quality of construction. The comparisons beneficiaries made most often were in relationship to their pre-tsunami home and between the houses built by CRS and other agencies. In almost all cases beneficiaries said that their CRS house, compared to their previous house and those built by other NGOs, is stronger. Many women considered the house built by CRS prettier.
In three out of six villages where the evaluation was done there were a number of housing construction phases and new materials introduced. Men in two of theses villages said they were happier with the earlier construction quality because clay bricks were used A CRS built house is 42 or 45 square meters and has rather than concrete blocks. They said Two bedrooms that clay bricks are stronger and the A living room and a kitchen space. materials used in the houses built later A latrine with a water proof septic tank system. made the houses hotter. Women, while An external terrace. saying the houses built later were Fittings to be hooked up to electricity mains. Fittings in houses in urban and peri-urban villages to prettier, believed the gypsum board be hooked up to water supply mains. used in the later models was causing health problems. Women said that dust from the gypsum board was making their children cough and get sick more often. They said they had taken their children to the doctor. The doctor
good construction quality are also noted in the brief chronology in Annex Seven. Such frustrations lead to tension between CRS, contractors and local communities. At times this resulted in public demonstrations by villagers outside of the CRS office. 37 Such cisterns are common in permanent houses in Aceh. Locally available materials are used making it possible to repair and maintain them at a relatively low cost. 38 For details of the type of complaints raised by people on structure of the houses and how they were addressed please see -Annex Ten: Development in house designs.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 20 told them the house was not causing their children’s sickness but rather the weather. In one of these villages women thought asbestos was used.39
Throughout the period of housing construction CRS held numerous community meetings 40 to discuss the materials they were using, the rationale for their use and any changes they were making in design and specific materials. These meetings were conducted both by CRS engineers and staff from area coordination teams (ACT). These ACT staff were the primary interface with communities and responsible for leading any decision-making or consultation processes with communities. Such meetings were important as CRS continued to make changes to house construction based on complaints they were hearing from house-owners who had already received a house and changes to address technical quality concerns identified from earlier house constructions. Yet discussions during the evaluation indicate that people were more concerned that everyone got the exact same house and that many people did not understand the rationale or benefits of the construction changes made.
Views on the location of kitchens and toilets Many villagers told us they were very pleased with the house but that it did not have a kitchen. The CRS house design shows a small space that is a kitchen. In Acehnese society the kitchen is a big room where women can cook together and often where the family can eat together. The space designated by CRS as a kitchen was often used for other purposes such as a bedroom, a prayer room or as an extension of the living room. In Meulaboh in April and May 2005 local government officials met with Reasons people gave for not INGOs and asked that they built houses to a particular specification. using the space as a kitchen Houses built by CRS were initially per the GOI defined design with was that it was too close to the small modifications as beneficiaries provided feedback e.g. a window bathroom and so it would built to provide more light into the house. In spring 2006, CRS Meulaboh did consult deeply with people in the village of Cot Mue on smell. Some women said ‘we the house design. This consultation resulted in advice 1) to build toilets cook with wood and don’t want and kitchens outside of the main part of the house and 2) to ensure to make the house dirty so we kitchen and toilet doors are not facing each other. The results from this cook outside of the house.’ consultation were built into the design of the final 2000 houses Similar views about smell and constructed. Thereafter communities were not consulted to the same being too close to the kitchen degree though some small modifications were possible such as the were reasons given for non- choice of colour for the house or the orientation of rooms. Similarly in use of toilets besides the fact Banda Aceh the BRR set standards for permanent house construction. that for rural households in CRS then asked contractors to submit designs based on the standard. Aceh the toilet is usually Three contractor developed designs were selected and CRS submitted and had them approved by the Department of Public Works. Families outside of the house. and communities could choose from the three designs but opportunities to change them were fairly limited. (Written communication from the While people in four out of the CRS Aceh engineers in Meulaboh and Banda Aceh in May 2008 ). six villages said they selected a house design for their village, in two villages some people said they had not selected a house design. In one of these villages women said they had to choose between model A, B and C for a house and once the model was chosen no changes could be made. Across the six villages that
39 CRS has completed laboratory tests on the materials used in house construction. These tests confirmed that no asbestos was ever used. In addition CRS ran tests to confirm that the concrete blocks used by CRS are stronger than clay bricks. 40 The CRS quarterly reports for 2007 describe the many meetings held by CRS staff to socialize or explain the changes being made in house construction design and materials. Materials and pictures were used to help explain the technology.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 21 participated in this evaluation, evidence that women particularly had been consulted about the cultural and traditional use of space within a house was not really found. 41
Water supply Self provisioning through wells and springs was the most common source of drinking water in Aceh before the tsunami. Only 9% of households across Aceh were connected to the formal water supply services provided by PDAM. 42
Given the vast devastation by the tsunami of household wells, CRS cleaned and repaired over 2,200 tube and shallow wells across the villages where it worked. Views expressed by villagers in five of the six villages participating in this evaluation indicate that the quality of the water in some shallow wells is not as good as before the tsunami. Many people said that water from shallow wells is more salinated and turbid now.43 Only in one village were all wells said to have clear water that people say they can drink once it is boiled.
Housing construction sites were not selected based on the adequacy of water but on where families said their house should be located and also where government purchased land and allocated plots to families for housing construction. It would have been very difficult for CRS to have based selection of housing construction sites on the availability of drinking water as families were usually adamant about having their house built on their pre-tsunami housing site. It is only now as families settle back into villages that they are finding that some of the shallow wells they had in the past are now either more salinated than before the tsunami or more turbid (yellow) or both.
Houses constructed in urban and peri-urban villages were equipped to be hooked up to the PDAM water supply network though only a few households we met had actually done so. 44 In one village where CRS had built a borehole, another agency had built a second one. One of these boreholes is now broken and the other is not easy to access by all families. Women said ‘the location of the second borehole was chosen by the Keucik and the process was not transparent.’ They said they now have to buy water for drinking whereas before the tsunami more of the shallow wells in the village had water they could drink.
In the three CRS priority villages where gravity fed water supply systems were constructed, one system is pending completion while village members and local government negotiate with the landowner about the price of land where a water tank needs to be installed and for a second gravity fed water supply system constructed to serve the other two villages, the system is not working to capacity particularly as it is the dry season.
Per the MOUs signed with the GOI, it was expected that local government would work with communities to establish committees responsible for long term maintenance of public water
41 The more detailed written communication from CRS engineers on housing design consultations and changes to construction material s used in houses is provided in Annex Ten: Development of housing designs. 42 Information on the quality of water in wells before and after the tsunami was not found. The limited information on pre-tsunami water supply conditions is from an unpublished report. This report describes the thin capacity of PDAM to extend services in the future. It recommends that more focus be given to self provisioning water sources that are largely built by households themselves when developing a sustainable water supply plan for the province (Plummer, 2005: 10). 43 Shallow wells are naturally susceptible to contamination by surface runoff and water quality in such wells does vary overtime. 44 The cost of obtaining water from PDAM is estimated to be US11cents per person per month. PDAM water is not potable and needs to be boiled before drinking.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 22 supply systems. Yet, there was little evidence found that such processes are being established. This indicates that the software aspects of water supply are not in place to ensure that these public assets will continue to operate over the long term.
A question on the adequacy of water for drinking and washing was included in the satisfaction survey. In the survey 39% of respondents said that water supply for drinking and washing is definitely acceptable and 24% find it acceptable. Others however only consider it all right or unacceptable indicating some families now have difficulties in obtaining water for drinking purposes. Responses to the question on water adequacy in the satisfaction survey are shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Adequacy of water supply for drinking and washing purposes
16%
Definitely Unacceptable 39% Unacceptable 15% OK Acceptable Definitely Acceptable 6%
24%
Sanitation Flush latrines and septic tanks were installed in all houses built by CRS and other NGOs. For many rural villages in Aceh this would be the first time for people to have these systems. Previously some rural families had used the forest, sea or rivers for defecation and others had used septic tanks and pit latrines. Socialization on the rationale for use of flush latrines and their health benefits was only started by CRS in February 2008 and is now underway in two villages in Meulaboh.
However, use of the new latrines in some of the villages appeared to be high, except where easy access to water was difficult and latrines were located within the house where they were thought to smell up other rooms. In situations where water was not readily accessible 45 and the water cisterns in the bathroom were said to be leaking, many latrines were unused and collecting dust. In other villages where people are used to having latrines outside and away from the house people are using the latrine in the house for storage purposes and building a latrine out back away from the house. In at least one village participating in the evaluation women said
45 With high rainfall, water in Aceh water is plentiful. Yet people we spoke with had quite firm views on the location of latrines in relationship to the water cistern and well with a few saying they still use public toilets built during the emergency phase because the well is located in easy access to the public latrine.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 23 ‘we were involved in selecting a house design but not in deciding where to put the toilet or septic tank.’ 46
In many locations septic tank systems appeared to be fine and villagers expressed satisfaction with the system as the septic tank and drainage are separated. Though in other villages pipes were broken and grey water was visible around plots.
CRS recognises that it has much work to do to ensure people have more knowledge about the benefits of using and maintaining the septic tank system and latrines they have installed. It acknowledges that the water, sanitation and hygiene education aspects of the program were not top priority issues when the housing program started as the emphasis was on constructing the house. In addition local knowledge by contractors on construction of waterproof septic systems and flush latrine systems is low. This area of work is only now receiving much more attention and CRS is committed to repairing septic tank systems in houses built in the early phase of its reconstruction program. CRS has also commenced a program of education and capacity building to inform communities about proper sanitation and hygiene and the care and maintenance of septic systems.
6. The immediate impacts of the reconstruction program are mostly encouraging
This section describes the changes that people said are taking place after they occupied their permanent houses and used the infrastructure that CRS has built. The social effects of the program are also discussed. 47
Permanent housing As so many people were living in tents, transitional shelters or barracks before occupying their new house many of them were speechless when asked what difference it makes now that they have a house. They looked stunned to be asked and replied how very grateful they are to CRS. Others spoke of going from absolute zero to having a house. Men said they consider the house a valuable asset ‘This house can be inherited by my son or grandchildren.’ 48 ‘From being an empty village, now people have They said they were happy to have a come back. Moving from barracks to permanent proper place to stay, were getting energy houses we feel more relaxed and safer even though we still feel trauma if an earthquake back to do other things, feel more self happens. The village and the houses are better confident about restarting their lives, and now than before the tsunami as before we just had now feel comfortable if they have to leave wooden houses with palm leave roofs. If CRS and their families when they go away. the other NGOs had not come we might still be in barracks’ (Women’s focus group discussion). Women said that with a house they now have ‘a proper place to live and a place to pray.’ They spoke of feeling more relaxed and
46 CRS had standards for placement of toilets, water cisterns and septic tanks and these depended on plot sizes and the standards set by the BRR. As described in the box on page 22 some changes to the placement of toilets based on feedback from villagers occurred for the last 2000 houses built in Meulaboh. 47 CRS defined a goal and objective for its reconstruction program. Goal level indicators for measuring results were not defined. Indicators for measuring the objective were quantitative targets related to outputs. There were no indicators set that defined specific changes for people involved in the program beyond asset replacement. 48 According to one of the evaluation team members, it is common practice in Aceh for the youngest child (preferably a daughter) in a family to inherit the house. This is because the oldest sons and daughters usually marry and move elsewhere.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 24 comfortable. Some spoke of feeling safe and secure, and others of being happy to not have to move from one place to another. They were happy to now have their family and community around them.
Some men and women said that after moving into their house they could concentrate on other things such as their economic activities. Others spoke of having money to send their children to school rather than needing to use the money to rebuild a house or shelter. In the past they had often used any funds to repair their house but now they said they can use this for other things.
Some said if no one had come to their village to build houses then only a few houses would be complete by now. Others said that they would be living in self-built wooden and bamboo structures. Some thought they would be dependent on the government to help them to build a house and some people said they would still be living in tents. Without assistance such as that provided by CRS and other NGOs few people in these villages thought they would have had a house by now. One widow said ‘by now I would probably only have a kitchen.’
Water and sanitation People did not speak of the difference made by CRS activities to improve water supply and sanitation. Women were however very pleased to receive a house with a shallow well and latrine. In one village all shallow wells have water that people drink after boiling. In the other five villages some wells have water that it is possible to drink and others do not. Water from all shallow wells can at least be used for washing though in some villages it needs to be filtered first. In one village some get drinking water from a CRS constructed borehole and in another village a gravity fed water supply system provides drinking water to some families.
In three villages where shallow wells are more salinated, families now have to buy drinking water. Among the beneficiaries we spoke with, the cost of buying drinking water varied from Rp75000 per month to Rp200,000. This variation in cost was likely due to family size. This is equivalent to between US$8 and $21 a month. While purchase of bottled water is common practice across Indonesia, it was clear from some respondents that this was an added economic strain on household finances. In one of the villages where some families now need to purchase water, a lack of drinking water in the village was one reason given for the high number of houses still unoccupied. 49
In all six villages there is use of the new latrines. In one village use was 100%. There latrines were connected to the back of the house and people had easy access to their household well with good quality water. Women were pleased that the latrines in this village were connected at the back of the house and the septic tank system was very effective, including treatment gardens and good coverage of all pipes.
In another village latrine use was 50%. In three other villages some latrines were used and some not. In these latter villages it is difficult to estimate utilization rates based on what we heard and saw. In a final village women said there is little use of latrines because it is dry season and water is not easy to access. Easy access to water and the location of the latrine in relationship to the rest of the house were the primary factors influencing use of latrines. Where either was problematic, latrines were not used. These rates of latrine use are high given that
49 The other reasons given for why houses are not occupied were because 1) orphans in the village had received a house but were still living with relatives and 2) some people are still working in other places and have not yet returned to the village. This village had a housing occupancy rate of 50% in March 2008.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 25 rural communities did not have latrines before the tsunami and little hygiene education work has been done by NGOs or government to promote behavioural change.
However, the long term health impacts of increased use of latrines and the waterproof septic tank systems are likely to be considerable. A recent study completed by CRS showed that the current water proof septic tank model installed in the last one thousand houses – those built since mid-2007 - is successfully filtering black and grey water into a post treatment garden area so that faecal and total coli form levels are within WHO specifications. This prevents the spread of cholera and other types of water borne and diarrhoeal diseases.
Other village level infrastructure Only a few people mentioned the infrastructure built by CRS and its immediate impact for them. In a village where CRS had repaired a community hall women and men said ‘we now have a place to pray’. People in another village said that the road work done by CRS has provided them with a better road than the one they had before the tsunami and a market constructed near another village provides people there a place to buy goods. 50
Through observation the evaluation team was able to assess use of infrastructure. All infrastructure was being used including the infrastructure built by CRS for temporary purposes. This included public toilets and temporary community halls.
In Banda Aceh CRS had rehabilitated a public park, built a maternal child health hospital and a market. These infrastructure projects were commended by most ‘The renovation of the park in Banda Aceh was one of CRS best people from external agencies that projects. The park is jammed packed with families all the time and we interviewed during this particularly on weekends. I’d estimate that at least 50 vendors are evaluation. The CRS field staff in selling things at the park and so they are able to make their living.’ Banda Aceh said that they were particularly proud that CRS had renovated the park. In one village 30 families had partly Social relations damaged houses from the tsunami. They did Everybody received the same size house of similar not receive a new house because they quality whether you were a widow, a widower, an wouldn’t allow CRS to tear down their old orphan, rich or poor. We visited many houses and house, a necessary step given space spoke with people with these different backgrounds. constraints, thinking the original house would be all right. The severity of the When asked what difference the program had made to tsunami damage manifested itself as time them some respondents said ’ now there is no rich and went by and the walls began to crumble from poor as everyone has the same type and size of the effects of the water damage. Some people house.’ This view was expressed in some of the in this village said ‘ This is resulting in social villages by both men and women. jealousy. I feel bad when I sit in my beautiful house yet some families are still living in houses which are now deteriorating.’
50 The ACARP study was carried out in July 2007. It found that village road construction was the most effective assistance for supporting resumption of production (p. 164), and that renovation of community halls, mosques and mushollas were critical for social capital development. Such facilities enabled people to meet together and built trust (p. 161).
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 26 In three villages where there were different phases in CRS house construction, people said houses are built with different materials and are of different quality. In one of these villages people said this was creating some social jealousy. However, there were two main reasons given for a rise in social jealousy. The first was where more than one provider of housing worked in a village and so different types of houses with varying levels of quality were built. This was said to be creating social conflict as families had received different types of houses. Also the provision of furniture by some NGOs along with the house they built was said to be creating social jealousy.
The other major reason for a rise in social jealously and discomfort was in villages where some families that were perceived to meet beneficiary criteria had not received a house. This had occurred in two villages. The situation in one village is described in the box above. In the second village most respondents said that some families who met the criteria did not receive a house. This was blamed on a poor beneficiary selection process. According to the VDC, ‘we were not involved in the beneficiary selection process and CRS worked with the village head and people who were at the emergency posts. This has led to wrong verification data and some families ended up without houses, although they are eligible. ’51
One village is now separated with some families living in the original site of the village and others living in a relocation area. Those living in the original site seem jealous of the residents in the relocation site and claim they have received more support than themselves (this related to the CRS improved septic systems and socialization process). This perceived treatment of one group over another is fuelling tensions which have grown since some members of the community agreed to relocate because they had lost land while others decided to stay in the original village. Those living in the original site also seemed jealous about the houses built in the relocation area although all agreed they chose their own design.
7. Recovery levels of communities and families is underway
We asked participants how far they feel families and communities have recovered from the tsunami 52 . Such recovery was recognised by the evaluation team and local people to be due to the support of many different agencies including local people themselves. Many participants talked about overall recovery which they said was between 50% and 100%. This was attributed to the work done by themselves as well as the many NGOs and GOI departments that assisted their villages.
People in a village could remember a vast array of agencies that had assisted them over the last three years. Agencies remembered ranged from GOI departments to INGOs and local NGOs and even some military contingents. 53 The response was subjective and a lower percentage was given if some families had not received a house yet in a village or some infrastructure is yet to be repaired or rebuilt.
51 This finding is from one of the villages where the permanent housing program was started in mid-2005. While processes for beneficiary selection were rigorous they were further strengthened once the ACT was established in 2006. Any family that considers that they qualify for a permanent house can apply to the BRR. The BRR completes a verification process and in many cases BRR has built permanent houses for families that NGOs did not find met the criteria. 52 For this exercise a line was drawn on a flipchart and numbered from one to ten. People were asked to indicate what number represented their level of recovery. 53 For details of the various agencies assisting in a village please see Annex eight: Village profiles.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 27 Housing The majority of people we spoke with now have a permanent house that they occupy. This physical asset was considered the most important one for recovery. Some said ‘We prefer houses to business capital. What will we do with the capital if we don’t have a place to stay?’ For some the quality of the house they now have is better than the one they had before the tsunami and these families often said that recovery was over 100%.
The percentage given for recovery on housing however varied. Many estimated housing recovery at between 80 to 100%. Lower percentages were given in villages where any household had not received a house that was considered deserving of one according to the criteria as set by the BRR or if there were defects in the structure. High percentages for housing recovery were also given by the external agencies we interviewed.
Water supply Recovery on water was only given a 100% in one village where all shallow wells have drinking water. Otherwise it was below 50%. The three villages where people say shallow wells are now salinated and they need to buy water for cooking and drinking estimated recovery of water supply at 20% or lower. Some of the external informants said that much work to improve water supply still needs to be undertaken.
Village level infrastructure This was variable and the percentage given depended on whether some infrastructure was yet to be provided. In the relocation site many said that the recovery of infrastructure was at zero because they no longer had a place to pray and meet.54 In another village where much infrastructure was completed by CRS and other NGOs some informants said recovery for infrastructure was 100% or more. Externals said that at least 90% of all village level micro- infrastructure is in place and that larger infrastructure such as roads will be an on-going task for government and themselves.
Economic Three of the villages participating in the evaluation appeared prosperous. Two were peri-urban villages and the other was on a main road between two major towns. In these villages there were many motorcycles, TV satellite dishes, and TVs. Most houses had electricity and some families had refrigerators and had built an extension on their house or were in the process of doing so. Some we spoke to said that cash for work as well as their wages from construction jobs had enabled them to buy things. Now that cash for work has ended and construction opportunities are reducing some said they felt they are going to face hard times. ‘What is left for us is the economic problem.’
In at least three villages families had lost land to the sea or swamps and in others some fields were still too sandy or too salty to plant. Women spoke of generating income themselves before the tsunami. Some said it is difficult to do business now e.g. there are no coconuts to make products and ‘we are unable to work in the fields supporting our husbands because of land loss.’
In one village people had been relocated three kilometres away from the sea and they said this made it difficult for them to continue fishing. At the relocation site, people spoke of having
54 While more socio-political in nature, this village also gave a low rate for recovery because they do not have a village leader.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 28 difficulty getting jobs nearby. Some live in other places so they can work and therefore their houses are not occupied. Others at the relocation site said they are threatened by residents of the surrounding villages if they try to get jobs in the nearby fields or construction sites.
In four of the villages some respondents said the economy has not recovered. However the level for economic recovery given in these villages varied greatly from thirty to eighty percent. Compared to before the tsunami, many people said prices are higher now for goods including the price of food so their economic level had not returned to what it was before the tsunami. 55 Some people spoke of having more money but needing to spend more. Others spoke of difficulties in finding a job. Some people said ‘ we are poorer now than before the tsunami.’ Definitely the tsunami has had varying affects on the economic opportunities of families with those losing land for farming purposes now feeling economically vulnerable. 56
CRS’ contribution to recovery In all six villages, CRS’ contribution to housing recovery was generally rated high though the percentage given ranged from 25% to 100%. In villages where CRS had provided most of the housing and infrastructure a high percentage was usually given. Even in villages where there were many providers of houses and other infrastructure and emergency assistance the percentage of CRS’ contribution to recovery was higher than one would have expected. 57 Women often rated CRS’ contribution at fifty percent saying ‘our house is our place to stay, where we pray to God and the most important thing for us so we will give CRS fifty percent.’
8. There is some community involvement in housing reconstruction
55 According to a recent study in Aceh, inflation after the tsunami rose to 41.5 percent compared to 17.1 percent for the rest of Indonesia. While the inflation rate in Aceh was by mid-2007 on par with the rest of Indonesia high inflation overtime did affect the purchasing power of Acehnese (BRR, BAPPEDA Aceh Province, and World Bank, January 2008: 33). 56 The ACARP study was completed in 18 tsunami affected villages found that 30% of families were better off than before the tsunami, 34% were the same and 36% were worse off than before the tsunami. 57 In some interviews people were extremely grateful for the house built by CRS and its quality. A house is something that is tangible and long lasting whereas some of the goods received during the relief phase are gone. These are some of the reasons the evaluation team believes that so many people gave CRS a high contribution rating even when many other agencies had worked in a village.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 29 In the early stages CRS held community meetings on a weekly basis. Many of these were to finalize beneficiary lists and to select a house design. 58 The design selected for each house was sometimes dependent on the size of the plot, but in most cases there were about three options to choose from. Some villages elected to use one design for all houses constructed in their village and at times this decision was taken by the VDC. In other villages each family made Processes in which CRS involved people the decision on the design they wanted for their Development and finalization of beneficiary lists. house but normally everyone picked the same Site location of their house. model. It is likely because of these two different Selection of a house design from three pre-defined approaches that some people told us that they models. had not been involved in selecting the house Complaints to CRS during the entire housing reconstruction process. design. After handover of the house, a period of six months in which to report to CRS on any defects so repairs could Initially during construction, villagers were be done. involved (unofficially) in monitoring construction. This proved ineffective as conflicts between villagers and contractors grew. CRS then established a system whereby villagers could register complaints to CRS in writing or by cell phone with regards to contractors or on other issues related to the housing program. CRS would then follow up with contractors to resolve the issue. This minimized beneficiary involvement but reduced the tensions between perspective house owners and contractors and increased the efficiency and pace at which houses were completed.
As construction progressed CRS was often asked by communities to reduce the number of formal community meetings, as these were considered very time consuming. CRS gradually moved to problem-solving and decision making with VDCs, and involved individuals, which often were men. Formal community meetings were still held when it was critical to make decisions or communicate progress or changes related to construction. Bulletin boards were established in each priority village and the house design, beneficiary lists and dates of construction were posted on the boards. 59
In the satisfaction survey most people said they were satisfied with the level of consultation and participation they had regarding their house construction – 73% noted it was acceptable, 24% all right and 2% said it was unacceptable.
Figure 5: Consultation with perspective house-owners
100%
58 For80% details of the processes used by CRS to ensure that the beneficiary selection process was accurate please see Annex60% Eleven: The CRS Aceh community engagement process for the reconstruction program. Yes 59 No Details40% of the meetings held and the problems resolved across these villages during the reconstruction are detailed in CRS’s quarterly reports. These reports also tracked levels of satisfaction in villages with reconstruction activities and actions20% undertaken to address problems in villages where satisfaction levels were reaching a volatile level. 0% Were you Were you Were you Did you Were changes Aceh Evaluationconsulted Report about 18 Mayconsulted 2008 about consulted during participate in the made as a result 30 where your the design of the construction actual of the house would be your house? of your house? construction of consultation built? your house? process?
Responses to questions in the satisfaction survey related to consultation and participation correspond well with what the evaluation team heard in the six villages participating in the evaluation. During focus group discussions most people spoke of being involved in the processes described in Figure 5 above and others said they were not involved. As 43% of respondents in the satisfaction survey were women, the responses above closely correspond to what we heard from them. Namely that most women were involved in determining the site of their house and thereafter their participation began to decrease. Definitely many men and women we spoke with said they would have liked to have been involved more in monitoring the construction process.
Men were more involved in planning, community meetings and monitoring than women, though in one village some men were not aware of the complaints procedure. Men were not involved in the construction of permanent houses though sometimes they contributed labour for small infrastructure projects. Only in one village did the VDC say they were not involved in the beneficiary selection process and in this village there were reports that eligible beneficiaries had not received a house.
Greater involvement of men is normal culturally and in one village women said they were satisfied that their husband or male relative represented them. In some villages women were involved and in other villages they were not. Some women said they would have liked to have been more involved and informed about CRS’ work. They said ‘women will come to meetings if they are asked directly.’
In two villages women did not know about the liability period and process and in another some were aware of the liability process and other women were not. These women did not know CRS staff. Women said if they had known about the liability process they would have reported to CRS immediately any concerns they had. As women spend the most time in the house and in Aceh do all the cooking and cleaning, the gains of involving them more at least in the design of the house was a missed opportunity by CRS, the BRR and likely other agencies.
9. Recommendations from others about what CRS should do in the next emergency
Everyone at community level said that CRS was right to do permanent housing and the way it was done was satisfactory. Taking the recommendations below into account they recommended
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 31 CRS do such a program again should the need arise. One man said that ‘if there is another emergency I will collect money for housing and give it to CRS so they can build houses.’
Recommendations common across the villages • First meet people’s basic needs such as food, transitional shelter, and water. The next priority to address is permanent housing followed by livelihood support.
Ensure assistance is based on the priority needs of the people affected. Women added that if CRS has more funding a bigger kitchen and furniture would be good.
When building houses, involve people in the house design e.g. location of toilets, kitchens, wells and ensure these meet with cultural norms.
Provide both housing and livelihood support.
Ensure aid is equally provided to all and that houses are all of the same design and material.
Recommendations made by some villages Work with the community more and not through contractors. 60
Some women said involve women more, men said ensure that there are good communications processes and that the complaints procedures are clear to everyone in a village, and a VDC in one village recommended that CRS involve them more.
At least two villages recommended that CRS be more concerned with water.
Two villages recommended that agencies keep the commitments and promises they make.
Recommendations from externals varied. Two thought that livelihood support was more important than building houses. ‘If you have a job you can eventually build your own house’. One said ‘NGOs should leave housing construction to the government and local people’ and focus on livelihoods and community development support.
Four said CRS should do the same thing the next time. They have demonstrated they can run a large reconstruction program. Others said that if you are going to do housing ensure that there is tight supervision of contractors and a payment system with contractors so they are checked at key stages of construction so defects are caught and addressed early. 61
Finally one said all NGOs need to coordinate and partner more with others in emergencies of this scale. ‘ Too many NGOs worked alone during this crisis.’
10. Main Conclusions
60 This was initially tried by CRS in some villages and the results were poor so may need to be decided on a village by village basis to ensure that responsibilities of all parties are clear and doable. 61 Some of the external informants interviewed spoke of difficulties that CRS had with contractors in the early phases of the reconstruction program and how quickly CRS had learnt and strengthened their contractor management system.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 32 The post tsunami conditions for people and communities were very hard: Most people in all twenty-nine CRS priory villages became internally displaced people (IDP) dependent on emergency food aid and the support of relatives, NGOs and government. Many had lost loved ones as well as all their earthly possessions including their home. ‘ After the tsunami we didn’t even have a piece of cloth left. We were naked and had no belongings.’ People became scattered. Many lived in tents. Some lived in barracks and others with relatives. By mid 2005 some people began to relocate to transitional shelters as more agencies distributed these but many families would end up living in barracks, or with relatives for up to two years making it difficult for them to resume normal everyday activities.
The perceptions of the CRS Aceh reconstruction program were positive : Every villager we spoke to said CRS and other NGOs did the right thing by building permanent houses. Compared to other agencies villagers considered the quality of CRS houses among the very best. The positive view of the quality of CRS constructed houses was echoed by the external agencies we interviewed who also commended CRS for the professionalism of its staff and the efforts made by CRS to encourage coordination by all agencies in Aceh. The staff of CRS said that the Aceh program has accelerated CRS’s learning in the non-core competency area of housing and enabled them to build the skills and knowledge of local staff and of local contractors on constructing quality housing in Indonesia. Though some construction defects were reported, and most of them CRS already has plans to rectify, these views were tempered as most house owners first said that overall they had received a good quality permanent house.
The immediate impact of the CRS housing program is encouraging: Families who received a house spoke of many positive impacts since moving into it: of having more energy, feeling more relaxed, and settled. They spoke of being able to get back to routine activities ‘reading the Koran’, ‘ having the family together again in one place’ restarting economic activities and saving money to do other things. ‘ From being an empty village, now people have come back. Moving from barracks to permanent houses we feel more relaxed and safer even though we still feel trauma if an earthquake happens.’ They were grateful and happy ’ to have a proper place to live’ and some said ‘to have a valuable asset that can be inherited by our grandchildren.’
The impact of the water supply and sanitation program has some positive affects: Rehabilitation of water supply systems was undertaken by many agencies including CRS. As a result the availability and access to water has been returned to its pre-tsunami level for families in some villages. In other villages the tsunami has affected the quality of the water in shallow wells and even the quality of water in some boreholes and people said they cannot drink the water even if boiled. While people in one of the villages where all shallow wells were rebuilt by CRS rated their recovery on water at over 100% saying they can drink the well water once it is boiled, people in other villages rated recovery of water at 50% or less saying they cannot drink the water from the wells.
On sanitation, the septic tank systems with household flush latrines are an improvement to the systems previously used by families in Aceh. While people did not speak about the differences this has made to them, it was possible to observe that there was 100% use of latrines in one village, 50% use in a second and partial use in other villages. These utilization rates are high given that this is a new technology for most rural villages as before the tsunami some used the forest, sea or a river as a toilet and others used pit latrines. Socialization is just starting 62 so most people have limited knowledge of the benefits of these new latrines and septic tank
62 Socialization is a term used throughout Indonesia to describe awareness raising on how a product works and the benefits of its use to those who have received it.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 33 systems and of how to repair or maintain them. In addition latrine use in some villages is low because in earlier construction phases septic tank systems and bathroom water cisterns were not built well though CRS is in the process of repairing the systems constructed earlier.
The impact of the infrastructure program worked well in meeting short term needs but its long term usefulness depends on strengthening local management systems: As with water supply many agencies constructed infrastructure and the level of infrastructure completed by CRS across villages varied from many projects to none. However, people rarely commented on infrastructure. In one village where the community hall had been repaired by CRS, men and women did say they now have a place to pray while in the relocation site visited many noted the lack of a place to pray. In another village men said they now have a better road than before. In all villages visited all infrastructure built by CRS whether permanent or temporary was in use including the transitional shelters built earlier by CRS and others, an indication of the importance of these public assets.
With pressure to build quickly, community involvement in the construction of infrastructure was minimal, primarily limited to labour on some of the smaller projects. The stated understanding that local government and communities would establish the management processes to ensure that village level infrastructure is managed and maintained overtime has yet to take place. Such local management structures will be critical if these public assets are to be maintained and used over the long term.
The impact of the program on social relations has both positive and negative effects: In villages where CRS was the sole NGO providing houses and it used one design and the same materials people said that ‘now there is no difference between the rich and poor as we all have the same size house of the same quality.’ In villages where there were more agencies, including the government, providing houses the quality of housing was different. Such differences people said have created social jealousy in their community.
In a few villages some people said some families who did not meet the criteria were able to manipulate the assessment process and received a house. Some also said that there are families who insist they meet the criteria yet they have not received a house. It is particularly the latter situation that is said to be creating social jealousy and much discomfort between those who now have a luxurious house whereas some families in villages still live in wooden houses or houses that were severely damaged by the tsunami. 63
Community involvement is satisfactory but does not build local capacity: While 97% of people considered the consultation process either all right (24%) or very acceptable (73%) some women would have liked to have been more involved in consultation processes and said they would have come to meetings if they had been invited directly. Indications that extra effort was made to involve women were not found. This may be a contributing factor to the issues about the allocation of space within the house (e.g. many said there is no kitchen and the toilet needs to be located outside the house). Such findings would likely apply to most agencies as most followed the house designs as defined by the BRR and the Acehnese architects the BRR employed. Also both men and women had questions about some of the materials used in house construction and some people were not clear whether CRS had fulfilled all of its commitments to them.
63 Families who consider themselves eligible per the BRR criteria can apply to the BRR for a house.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 34 The approach used by CRS and most agencies was to give major assets either to an individual or to the community and involve them very little in managing the process. With so many agencies promising so much and pressure to deliver quickly it would have been difficult to do otherwise. However the way most NGOs including CRS worked with local communities did not build their capacity to act on their own behalf.
Recovery from the tsunami and to pre-tsunami levels is well underway: In those communities where CRS worked, it contributed significantly to the recovery of families and communities. People in all six villages visited said people’s highest priority need after food and basic relief was housing. A house has provided them ‘a proper place to live and pray.’ For 79% of families, the quality of the house design and construction is better than that of the house they owned prior to the tsunami. With a house families are able to use any money they have for schooling their children and for strengthening their livelihood options.
Villagers acknowledged the various support from all NGOs and the GOI and said that without such support many families would still be living in tents, barracks or with relatives. In one village leaders said ‘by now maybe only ten families would have been able to build houses.’ Economically, many said more needs to be done to ensure livelihoods become more sustainable. Also in some villages water supply is more problematic as the quality of water in some shallow wells is poorer now compared to its pre-tsunami quality resulting in more people needing to buy water. Psychologically some people remain traumatized ‘I feel safer and more relaxed in the new house but still feel traumatized if an earthquake happens’ and earthquakes often occur in Aceh. How long it will take for communities to fully recovery from the vast devastation of the tsunami is difficult to say but most families are in a permanent house and have begun to rebuild other aspects of their lives.
Progress towards achievement of the program’s goal is substantive: In many ways CRS achieved its goal to support ‘tsunami affected people to live productive and dignified lives.’ Most all families living in CRS constructed houses were in , barracks, a transitional shelter or living with relatives prior to moving into their house. From having nothing, people now have a safe and durable house and 89% consider it a home. Rich and poor, widows and widowers and orphans all received the same style of house and some villagers said the distinction between rich and poor has disappeared. They consider the house an asset that can be inherited by their children and a base for income generation (collateral for microfinance, renting their houses, and baking and selling goods). Infrastructure has supported livelihood development e.g. roads and markets, and enabled the return of social and religious activities.
At present, it is unclear whether providing major assets to affected people without giving them more control over the process and responsibility for the work has affected their ability to act on their own behalf, their sense of ownership, cohesion and pride. Definitely tensions and jealousies have emerged in some villages where some families insist that they fit agreed criteria, but did not get a house. It is uncertain whether such tensions will grow or reduce overtime. Whether conflicts arise between those along the coast who have benefited from the work done by so many NGOs and those people living in the interior who still mostly live in self- built wooden houses with few amenities only time will tell.
11. Recommendations
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 35 Recommendations for Immediate Action Where it is possible, review the current status of water supply in those communities where CRS was seeking to improve availability to confirm if projects are satisfying the original objectives. Continue advocacy with PDAM (the regional water supply company) to increase the number of CRS beneficiaries who are connected to a consistent and permanent water supply.
Where it is necessary and with those communities that embrace the opportunity, increase local capacity to operate and maintain CRS-built water systems and infrastructure either through training community members or advocating for communities to be linked with government operations and maintenance departments and budgets.
Repair septic systems that are broken and where possible rebuild or retrofit standard septic systems to include a secondary treatment system.
Formally close each reconstruction activity by acquiring signatures from the relevant officials confirming the completion of each MOU commitment. Ensure such information is placed on community information boards to avoid any misconceptions about unfilled promises and to reconfirm that CRS has no further projects in the community.
Recommendations for CRS to consider in the next large emergency response Manage the expectations of communities, government officials, donors and the media regarding the scope and timeframe of project activities to be realistic and within the capacity of CRS to fulfil. Consistently manage these expectations as the projects progress.
The contractor model of construction was appropriate given the particular conditions of Aceh. But if given sufficient time, community participation by men and women in the design, implementation and monitoring of projects should increase. This would improve community responsibility and ownership and the degree to which cultural norms are met.
In a post-disaster response, shelter programs should proceed from tents, to transitional shelters to permanent shelters. Inclusion of the transitional shelter phase will decrease pressure and ensure that best practices are followed in the permanent shelter phase.
From the beginning of an emergency response, establish communication practices that provide timely responses to queries and complaints to both men and women and give clear messages about the commitments that CRS has made.
From the beginning of an emergency response implement beneficiary verification processes that are thorough and transparent, well-documented and incorporate informal information gathering techniques as a means of augmenting a rigorous formal process.
The Engineering and Area Coordination two-team approach was successful in Aceh and should be considered in future responses.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 36 Annexes
Annex One: ToR for evaluation of CRS December 26TH 2004 tsunami reconstruction program in Aceh (Amended April 16, 2008) 38 Annex Two: Detailed evaluation schedule 46 Annex Three: Villages and activities of CRS Aceh reconstruction program as of April 2008 49 Annex Four: Village level evaluation process 53 Annex Five: References 54 Annex Seven: Brief chronology of post tsunami events and CRS Aceh’s reconstruction response 57 Annex Eight: Village profiles and villager’s views of the CRS reconstruction program 62 Profile of village A and villagers’ input to the evaluation 62 Profile of village B and villager’s input to the evaluation 65 Profile of village C and villagers’ input to the evaluation 68 Profile of village D and villagers’ input to the evaluation 71 Profile of village E and villagers’ input to the evaluation 75 Profile of village F and villagers’ input to the evaluation 78 Annex Nine: Summary of views from external agencies 81 Annex Ten: Developments in housing design 83 Annex Eleven: The CRS Aceh community engagement process for the reconstruction program 85
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 37 Annex One: ToR for evaluation of CRS December 26TH 2004 tsunami reconstruction program in Aceh (Amended April 16, 2008)
1. Background The undersea earthquake with a magnitude of between 9.1 and 9.3 that occurred at 07:58 local time on December 26 th 2004 with an epicentre 160km off the west coast of Sumatra (by Simeulue island) triggered a series of devastating tsunamis along the coasts of most landmasses bordering the Indian Ocean. The earthquake, the second largest earthquake ever recorded on a seismograph was also reported to be the longest duration of faulting ever observed, lasting between 500 and 600 seconds. A massive rupture in the seabed, the earthquake caused tsunami waves up to 30 meters high. Aceh province in Indonesia was hit by the largest of these tsunami waves, while other coastal regions of the Indian Ocean were hit by less powerful waves. The tsunami devastated Aceh. 900 miles of coastline was destroyed and in some places the Indian Ocean came 5 kilometres inland before receding. Over 160,000 people were killed in Aceh. Seventy- three percent of the dead and missing tsunami victims worldwide were in Indonesia. In Aceh alone, 120,000 houses were destroyed and 70,000 others damaged; 500,000 people were displaced. The tsunami also destroyed significant levels of infrastructure, which impeded relief efforts. More than 3,000 km of roads were destroyed. 120 arterial bridges and 1,500 minor bridges were washed away and 14 sea ports were seriously damaged or destroyed. In some areas the geography of the land was changed forever- with the coastal shelf being pushed down as the tectonic plates shifted during the earthquake. Areas around Singkil in southern Aceh are 1.5 meters lower than prior to the tsunami. 60,000 farmers were displaced and 60,000 hectares of agricultural land were damaged. The economy was further affected by the loss of 4,717 costal fishing boats and the damage or destruction of 20,000 hectares of fish ponds. Moreover, some 100,000 small business persons lost their livelihoods. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) is supporting the reconstruction of homes, schools, roads, businesses, community buildings, medical facilities and markets in multiple districts of Aceh. This assistance is made possible through donations of more than US $100 million, primarily from the US public and private sector. To date, CRS has reached nearly one-quarter of a million Acehnese tsunami survivors with food and non- food relief items, shelter, livelihoods and medical care. The CRS Aceh program is the largest reconstruction program CRS has ever administered. In addition, CRS is the facilitating agency in the SOA sponsored by Caritas Internationalis. The USD value of the full Caritas response is US$82 million. Overview of the CRS/Aceh Program The CRS Aceh Community-Based Recovery and Development (ACCORD) is an ambitious strategy that calls for a comprehensive and integrated response to the devastating tsunami and earthquake on December 26, 2004. CRS/Aceh is completing its 3 rd year of implementation of what was envisioned as a 5-year, $123 million strategy. The ACCORD was first developed in March of 2005, and formally approved by the Board on October 3 rd , 2005. In January 2007, CRS/Aceh Senior Management Team announced significant revisions to the ACCORD Strategy, which affected both the breadth and scope of the Aceh Program.
The original ACCORD strategy served CRS well and helped to quickly establish CRS as one of the leading humanitarian agencies in Aceh. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, the food and non-food distributions were critical in saving lives. During the recovery period, quick impact livelihoods initiatives, such as Cash for Work (CFW), the OFDA supported Market-Revitalization Program, and grants to cooperatives and joinery workshops were extremely well received and contributed significantly to the recovery of the Acehnese people. As CRS reconstruction projects got underway in earnest in the fall of 2005, CRS established itself as one of the leaders in both policy developments with the BRR as well as a key implementing partner of temporary shelters with IFRC and the UN. Today CRS/Aceh is widely recognized as one of the leaders in shelter and infrastructure reconstruction.
Despite the many programmatic accomplishments during the emergency and rehabilitation/reconstruction phases, endeavours to transition to a longer-term development program have been hampered by
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 38 numerous challenges. First and foremost, due to the enormity of the destruction, the operational context in Aceh remained largely in the rehabilitation and recovery phase more than two years after the tsunami. The needs on the ground mandated a large scale response for reconstruction in shelter, infrastructure and water and sanitation throughout the third year of relief efforts. Secondly, recruitment and retention of qualified staff, both international and national, was especially difficult in Aceh during the initial years of the tsunami response. As a result, internal controls and systems to support the scale of our programs were initially weak and inadequate. Lastly, in discussions with the region it became clear that CRS does not desire a long-term presence in Aceh partly due to the absence of strong church partners and more so due to the greater need in other parts of Indonesia. This represented a fundamental shift in the overall goal and orientation of the Aceh Program. The livelihoods and civil society initiatives in the concept paper and relief stage were predicated on a long-term presence and investment. These factors when considered in totality led the Senior Management Team to reconsider the strategic focus of the Aceh program.
As such, beginning in the fall of 2006, CRS/Aceh Senior Management led a consultative process to redefine the ACCORD strategy with the aim of refocusing energies for the next 1-2 years of CRS programming in Aceh. The deliberations were centred on the imperative to deliver a high quality of programming in a timely fashion on those programming commitments that CRS/Aceh had already made to the Government of Indonesia (GOI), BRR and most importantly, to the communities we aim to serve. To do so, there was a need to curtail expansion in program areas where there were no firm commitments and/or capacity to implement quality programs. The result is a much more focused strategy that builds on the Aceh Program’s current capacities as well as the demonstrated need in communities. Importantly, it is also achievable in the given timeframe of our envisioned exit at the end of CY 2008.
Evaluation Activities implemented to date In early 2006, one year after the tsunami, CRS commissioned assessments of its tsunami response in India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. The purpose of the assessment was to 1) gather information on program delivery, including impact on beneficiaries, 2) review the initial response to set the stage for the current program response, and 3) identify issues to consider for future programming direction. The assessment observed operations during a period of transition from an emergency phase to a reconstruction phase. The assessment noted that the Acehnese were beginning to recover, heal, and move on with their lives as a result of their tenacity and the massive aid response. The assessment team saw signs of a return to community life, including the resumption of men’s and women’s’ prayer groups, women’s social groups and the production of fruits and vegetables for local consumption, among other indicators. The assessment team also noted successful as well as challenging aspects in CRS’ shelter programming at the time. Key areas for improvement in the operation of CRS’ tsunami response in Indonesia were presented and have been followed-up during 2006 and 2007.
In June 2007 a CRS internal, “Lessons Learned” survey and interview process was conducted. It culminated in a verification workshop with key CRS staff in August 2007. As noted in the workshop records “the great challenges and obstacles encountered by CRS in Aceh should not overshadow its significant achievements. In the wake of a disaster of unprecedented devastation and with no partners existing in the area, CRS was able to quickly establish effective relief operations that helped sustain and stabilize tens of thousands of affected families. Within months, CRS scaled up to create a separate Country Program (the largest in the agency) to carry out an ambitious strategy of recovery and development interventions. This would require enormous resources and staffing, and would stretch existing capacities of staff and systems to the limit. Enormous efforts and sacrifice were made by Indonesian and international staff who learned a variety of lessons, often through difficult and painful processes. In light of this learning, CRS/Aceh made adjustments and restructured itself several times. One of the most difficult lessons was having to reduce the overall numbers of beneficiary targets and interventions after commitments had been made and staff hired. (This indicated) CRS’ ability to learn, make tough decisions and do what was necessary to meet core commitments through high quality work. The equilibrium between commitment and capacity is central to learning from the Aceh experience.”
The goal of the CRS Program is Aceh is that Tsunami and earthquake affected people in Aceh live productive and dignified lives .
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 39 Since January 2007 CRS has focused its efforts to meet its current commitments in health programming and in constructing shelter, infrastructure and water & sanitation in a timely, efficient and cost effective manner within the constraints of our current capacity and resources . Hence, the focus of the Aceh program moving forward is on SO1 Reconstruction and SO2 Health strategies. Strategic Objective 1 – Reconstruction : Affected communities have rebuilt and improved their households and community assets. Under this Objective, key accomplishments will include: • More than 2,000 temporary shelters distributed • Approximately 4,000 permanent houses built (including septic system) • Household water sources provided to approximately 4,000 houses • 250 community infrastructure projects built As of December 2007 – 2,162 temporary shelters have been distributed, 3,380 permanent shelters have been constructed, and over 200 community infrastructure projects have been completed. Strategic Objective 2 – Health: The health status of mothers and children under 5 in the districts of Aceh Barat, Aceh Singkil and Aceh Barat Daya, is improved Under this objective, key accomplishments will include: • The health status of 16,000 women and children is improved • Knowledge and skills of 3,000 health workers will be enhanced Caritas Support: Furthermore, CRS is actively engaged in supporting the work of Caritas in Indonesia through contributing to the following objective: Supporting a Caritas Forum to set the ground rules on structure and methodologies for future disaster and mitigation, built upon the relationships and lessons learnt during the Aceh, Nias and Jogja SOA’s for clearer coordination for future disasters through Risk Reduction strategies - CRS provides support through the Special Operations Appeal Coordination Unit. The unit is responsible for coordination of information management and capacity building with Caritas partners in Aceh and Nias.
This TOR is designed to focus evaluation of the impact of CRS interventions under SO1. The CRS health program is developing a new strategy until 2010; the Caritas support applies a periodic learning review to the work of the SOA Caritas partners.
2. Timing of the Evaluation 17 th March – 10 th April 2008
3. Objectives of the Evaluation The primary objective of the evaluation is to: Measure the impact of CRS’ post-tsunami Aceh reconstruction programs in shelter, infrastructure and water and sanitation by reviewing quality and quantity indicators over the duration of the project delivery. The evaluation is comprised of a primary research question, with sub-questions: To what degree did CRS/Aceh reconstruction activities contribute to the ability of families and communities to restore the dignity of their lives following the devastation of the earthquake and tsunami? This will be evaluated with regard to beneficiary participation, beneficiary and stakeholder relations, beneficiary satisfaction and the impact 64 of completed projects on families and communities.
64 Impact measurement is defined per the definition on page 5 of the ‘ Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies: the Good Enough Guide ’. Per the guide, impact measurement means measuring the changes taking
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 40 Key questions for the evaluation to answer are: • What were the pre-construction conditions in the communities where CRS worked? • What difference did the housing and water and sanitation activities carried out by the CRS Reconstruction program make to beneficiaries and the communities in which they live? • To what degree did reconstruction activities support individuals, families and communities to restore the dignity of their lives? • To what degree have reconstruction activities assisted communities to recover from the effects of the tsunami? • How satisfied were beneficiaries with reconstruction activities? • How were local people and other stakeholder groups involved in planning, implementation and monitoring of reconstruction activities so that related social problems were effectively addressed?
Evaluation activities will include: • Determining an estimation of conditions (with respect to shelter, infrastructure and water and sanitation) in the CRS target communities immediately following the earthquake and tsunami through a review of literature and background information, staff and stakeholder interviews and field-based observations. • An appraisal of the extent to which CRS/Aceh interventions mitigated the effects of the tsunami via their contribution to an accelerated recovery for affected communities in the form of shelter, water and sanitation and infrastructure construction. • A review of CRS/Aceh pre-construction and construction activities and beneficiary-level participation in these activities. • A review of CRS/Aceh processes for working with beneficiaries and other key stakeholders to define roles and responsibilities for solving social problems that arise during reconstruction activities and verification of the extent to which these processes were successful. • Documentation of beneficiary satisfaction with CRS/Aceh reconstruction activities through a review of internal progress reports, staff and stakeholder interviews and field-based observations. • Evaluation of project impact through an analysis of present conditions (with respect to shelter, infrastructure and water and sanitation) in CRS target community’s vis-à-vis the same conditions immediately following the earthquake and tsunami. • Identification and documentation of “best-practices” and “critical gaps” in the CRS/Aceh reconstruction project.
4. Specific Issues for Consideration IMPACT: Due to data collecting challenges in the earliest phases of the CRS/Aceh response and the evolving nature of the program, baseline data wholly consistent with the reconstruction indicators as they ultimately evolved, were not gathered. However, early field observations, beneficiary assessments, construction assessments and situation reports can be comprised to create a nearly complete portfolio of baseline data, albeit with some ambiguities.
INDICATORS: The evaluation should use the CRS indicators and results framework to reflect upon SO1 impact and level of participant and community satisfaction in both the outcome and the process. These include:
Strategic Objective 1 - Affected communities have restored and improved their homes As evaluated by: # houses built, # of temporary shelters built, # of temporary shelters built for other NGOs, # of villages served
place as a result of an emergency project. At its simplest it means asking the people who participated in the project ‘What difference are we making?’
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 41 Intermediate Result 1: Families and communities participate in the planning and implementation of shelter construction. As evaluated by # of Community Consultation Meetings, # of issues identified, # of issues resolved, # bulletin boards maintained, # of site plans approved by community, # of village beneficiary lists completed, # of meetings (Village Representative and Area Coordinator) with local officials 5. Methodology Evaluation Management It is proposed that a steering committee with a chairperson is established to manage the evaluation. The proposed composition of the group is a • Aceh Program Director - Chair • Senior Manager – Aceh – FOD Banda Aceh • Senior Manager – Meulaboh – FOD Meulaboh • Senior Manager – Engineering • Two program managers from the Aceh program involved in evaluation planning and implementation (Anat and Dean)
The purpose of this committee is to ensure that the evaluation meets the needs of CRS in Aceh. It is expected that this group will be the primary users of the evaluation results. The evaluation team will be accountable to this steering committee. The evaluation team will meet with the steering committee on day one of the evaluation. During the meeting we will: • Review and finalize the Evaluation guide with the steering committee and amend it as necessary e.g. questions to be asked, stakeholder groups to be consulted, etc. • Verify the dates for each of the different types of interviews particularly at village level • Verify logistics arrangements and how interviews have been organized with each of the stakeholder groups • Ask steering committee members to share their views on what was done by the reconstruction program and what difference it made to program beneficiaries and their community. Data gathering – data will be collected via a combination of the following stages. One is to review relevant literature and documentation provided by CRS.
The key tasks associated with the implementation of the evaluation are as follows: • CRS will implement a simple survey in consultation with the consultant and prepare the data analysis before consultant arrives in Sumatra • Aceh based planning with the Evaluation Steering Committee will focus on measuring impact of CRS Aceh’s work against SO1 as outlined in the Results Framework • CRS staff workshops in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh to reflect against perceived SO1 impact and challenges • Field based structured Focus Group Discussions in a number of CRS communities, this would be disaggregated by phase of housing competition and gender • Semi-structured individual interviews in a number of CRS communities • Structured interviews with other actors • Conclusions and recommendations would be developed with the Evaluation Steering Committee; they would focus on SO1. There are likely to be recommendations to follow up with the analytical process on reflecting on the “Why?” associated with CRS impact. This would be CRS / Aceh’s responsibility outside this terms of reference • Reporting
Number of Target Villages to be involved in the evaluation: CRS targeted 29 communities as the primary recipients of reconstruction activities (there are smaller reconstruction projects in a number of other villages). Twenty of these villages are in the Meulaboh working area and nine are in the Banda Aceh working area. It is suggested that 5 villages - 2 in Banda Aceh and 3 in Meulaboh - are included in the evaluation. This represents over 16% of CRS target villages. Reconstruction was completed at
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 42 different times in different communities; representation of these different reconstruction phases will be a primary consideration in the selection of sample communities for the impact evaluation. Where a village has had a phased approached to completion of houses research will need to target each of the phases. For example, a village with 2 or 3 distinct phases of completion should focus evaluation activities on each group of houses in the village. Identification of sample communities will be completed in November 2007. Sampling - Selection criteria for sample villages include: • Timeframe of Reconstruction Activities: a) Construction Start Dates 1. Projects that began in 2005 2. Projects that began in 2006 3. Projects that began in 2007 b) Duration and Phases of Construction in a Particular Village 1. All houses rebuilt in a 6-9 month timeframe 2. Houses rebuilt in multiple phases over a 1-2 year period 3. Villages in which partially-built homes stood unattended while poor-performing contractors were replaced. • Land Status of Reconstruction Sites a) Houses rebuilt on the original site b) Houses rebuilt in or near the original village, but on a different site purchased by the beneficiary c) Houses rebuilt in a relocation site provided by the government • Collaborative Process - Refers to the degree of difficulty in managing the relationship between CRS and each particular community during the reconstruction process. a) Basic: Modest degree of challenges on a regular basis; few or no significant challenges that required problem solving on the Senior Management level. b) Difficult: Higher degree of challenges on a regular basis; occasional challenges that required problem solving on the Senior Management level. c) Extremely Difficult: Significant challenges requiring consistent problem solving at the Senior Management level over a prolonged period of time.
A description of the criteria Timing of housing completion : In some villages housing completions occurred over a scattered period of time, usually resulting from a phased approach or changes in contractors. These villages are of particular interest in this evaluation because they reflect CRS in its different phases of operation. It is suggested that the target group is disaggregated by the timing of shelter completion. Land status : Some villages were able to rebuild upon their original housing site; land tenure verification was generally straight forward in these cases. Other communities had to relocate because the tsunami had rendered their original village unsuitable for reconstruction. In many cases, some beneficiaries within the community had to relocate, while others rebuilt on their original sites. Generally speaking, relocation required a more arduous process than reconstruction on an original site. Each relocation project had unique characteristics and each was managed differently; these nuances are all of interest to CRS and a cross-section of experiences should be represented among the target villages. Collaboration with the community : Many issues - land tenure, beneficiary verification, contractor performance, intimidation and local power struggles to name a few - impacted the CRS process of managing SO1 interventions. A cross section of issues and level of challenges should be represented in the target communities selected to represent the broad range of issues in CRS communities. ii. Ethical considerations – the Evaluation Team will take all reasonable steps to ensure that the security and dignity of affected populations is not compromised and that disruption to on-going operations is minimized;
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 43 iii. Confidentiality of information – all documents and data collected from interviews will be treated as confidential and used solely to facilitate analysis. Interviewees will not be identified in the report without their express permission. iv. Communication of Results – the Evaluation Team will present the preliminary findings and recommendations to the CRS evaluation steering committee and other designated managers in order to provide immediate feedback to CRS managers, and to ensure their input in defining conclusions and recommendations. Following publication of the evaluation results, CRS will present key findings and recommendations to different stakeholder groups, including government authorities, donor representatives, NGOs as well as representatives from the communities. v. Use of Results – the results of this evaluation are intended to measure the impact of CRS’ tsunami reconstruction programs in Aceh. The findings of the evaluation will be placed on the CRS intranet and will be distributed to CRS donors and other partner agencies in Aceh and beyond.
6. Team Composition Overall responsibility for leading the evaluation (including drafting and editing each version of the report) resides with an external team leader consultant. The Evaluation Team will consist of: • Evaluation Team Leader - In consultation with CRS staff, the Team Leader will have overall responsibility for the evaluation process design and implementation of the evaluation. The following 9 CRS staff will be the members of the Evaluation Team, consisting of: • 2 staff from other CRS Indonesia offices to ensure that the learning is shared within the agency. • 7 CRS Aceh field staff with knowledge of the program, facilitation skills and some with Acehnese speaking skills. • Two external recorders with experience of recording information from FGDs and SSIs in the local language and then typing it in English into an excel spreadsheet • A translator with Bahasa Indonesian, English and Acehnese speaking skills.
The Skills and knowledge it would be ideal for evaluation team members to have are: 1. Facilitating of focus group discussions and one to one interviews (essential) 2. Data compilation, synthesis and analysis (essential) 3. Report writing (essential) 4. Knowledge of participatory accountability systems and complaints mechanisms (desirable) 5. Knowledge of Sphere common standards and shelter standards (desirable) 6. Speaks the Acehnese language and understands the culture (desirable) 7. Enjoys working as part of a team (essential) 8. Prior experience of doing an evaluation or collecting monitoring and evaluation data (desirable)
7. Schedule & Milestones (October through June 2008) The proposed calendar of activities is as follows: • Drafting TOR, Service Request and Budget October 2007 • Selection of consultants and Evaluation Team members November - December 2007 • Contract consultants January 2008 • Document Research, Fieldwork March 2008 • Draft report circulated to agency interviewees April 2008 • Report finalized and communicated to stakeholders June 2008
8. Consultant Requirements
Evaluation Team Leader: An appropriately skilled, qualified and experienced consultant will be required to lead and support implementation of an Impact Evaluation for CRS Aceh. The successful candidate will
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 44 have significant experience in leading complex evaluations, good knowledge of post-disaster reconstruction theory and practice and experience and ability to facilitate focus group discussions and consultation processes, Significant experience in implementing social surveys and research activities; experience in survey sampling, design, data compilation, analysis and presenting findings through the use of data analysis tools, Computer literate with working knowledge of Word and Excel, Excellent report writing skills and analytical skills; Previous experience in Indonesia and/or Aceh. The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for evaluation process design in consultation with CRS staff, implementing the social impact evaluation and integrating findings from the construction quality review activities to present a final report on the overall impact of CRS interventions under SO1. The Evaluation Team leader should be available 31 days for the implementation of the evaluation, including a maximum of 2 days travel each way to and from Aceh. Sundays will be scheduled as non-work days.
9. Deliverables The evaluation team will produce a draft and final report in MS-Word within the time lines specified by CRS. The report will consist of an Executive Summary of no more than 5 pages that covers the main findings of the evaluation. The main text should consist of no more than 30 pages, covering methodology, findings and recommendations, This report will be circulated to CRS for comment prior to finalization and publication. The report will be produced in English, and at least the executive summary will be translated into Bahasa Indonesia to enable National and Local Government, partner agencies and the local community to read and understand the findings. An appropriate budgetary provision will be made for translation. The final report will be presented to key stakeholders as agreed by CRS and brief presentations carried out in the villages that took the time to provide feedback to CRS on its work.
11. CRS Focal Points
Dean Johnson [email protected] Program Quality Manager Anat Prag [email protected] SOA Program Manager
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 45 Annex Two: Detailed evaluation schedule
Travel Day - Members of the evaluation team arrive in Banda Aceh by the evening
AM - Meeting with the steering committee to finalise the evaluation guide and logistics and hear their views of the program. PM - Meeting with a cross section of Banda Aceh field staff to understand their views of the program
Meeting with the evaluation team to review the evaluation plan and practice FGD and SSI.
Meeting with the evaluation team to agree teams and norms for operating in the field.
Fieldwork in pilot village near to Banda Aceh office to test the methods and questions. Evaluation team meeting to analyse the process and data.
Evaluation team members review findings on impact and decide the number of FGDs that will be done in each sample village, analyse the process and all other data findings from previous day and amend methods and questions as necessary. The team agrees the detailed plan of work for the following week.
Day off
Data tabulated from pilot village by evaluation team. Interviews with external agencies in Banda Aceh.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 46 Field work in a Village of Aceh Besar. Process review at end of day by the evaluation team and data tabulated.
Travel and field work in another Village in Aceh Besar.
Mar 27 Travel back to Banda Aceh and complete process review and data tabulation. Mar 28 Travel to Meulaboh Meeting with a field staff of Meulaboh office to understand their views of the program. Mar 29 Evaluation team members complete any remaining data tabulation from Aceh Besar. Evaluation team briefing of work in villages served from the Meulaboh office, plus agreement on teams and schedule. Day off
Mar 31 Fieldwork in a village of Aceh Barat. Process review.
Data review and tabulation by team members. Interviews with externals in Meulaboh.
Fieldwork in another village of Aceh Barat. Process review and data tabulation by team members.
Fieldwork in another village in Aceh Barat. Process review and data tabulation continues.
Data tabulation from all sources completed and village level analysed done by evaluation team.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 47 Analysis of all data from all villages completed and a summary document prepared to send to Steering Committee and other managers for workshop on April 8.
Day off
Travel to Banda Aceh and continue writing initial report.
Prepare for the steering committee and manager’s meeting with other evaluation team members. Workshop with steering committee and managers to analyse findings and draw conclusions and recommendations.
Other evaluation team members return to their work base Continue to write initial report.
Finalize initial draft report and send to steering committee chair and comment and agree date for finalizing draft and sending to CRS Aceh to comment by and agreed date.
Travel Day - Evaluator Travels home and continues writing. Amends draft report following receipt of comments from the steering committee by an agreed date before the end of April.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 48 Annex Three: Villages and activities of CRS Aceh reconstruction program as of April 2008 65
No. KECEMATAN Permanent Houses Transitional Permanent Infrastructure Projects Water Supply Projects Shelter Housing completed DESA Committed Handed Remaining Distributed Occupancy Over Rate ACEH BARAT Johan Pahlawan 1 Kampong 356 356 0 46 77.53% 40 Shallow wells Belakang 217 tube wells 2 Leuhan 192 0 192 169 0.00% Construction of 2203 meters 1 communal tap of village Road, 17 units Slab stand system from Culvert and Drainage System. borehole. . Construction of village road and drainage at the Salvation Army relocation site at Leuhan Village 3 Panggong 289 289 0 162 87.89% 40 shop houses (included 240 tube wells among the 289 houses) and 5 kiosks 4 Rundeng 153 153 0 93 87.58% Renovation of Tgk Chik 133 tube wells Dirundeng Mosque Kuta Padang 0 0 0 103 Construction of 2 storey Nabila Women Dormitory & Kindergarten Total Johan 990 798 192 573 Pahlawan Samatiga 5 Gampong 29 29 0 79 100.00% Construction of New 1.2km 29 shallow wells Teungoh Road including 5 slab culverts Gampong 4 4 0 0 100.00% Village road 2 KM done, 4 shallow wells Cot contract signed for another 72KM of village road 6 Suak 182 182 0 91 76.92% 2 box culverts 182 shallow wells. 1 Guedebang communal tap stand from deep borehole. 7 Pucok Leung 110 110 0 0 100.00% Construction of 1624 meters 110 shallow wells. Village Road with slab culvert 1 communal tap and drainage system, TPA stand system from (Islamic Learning Center), deep borehole. Renovation of village Mosque, CRS supplied materials. Leukeun 5 5 0 0 100.00% 5 shallow wells Cot Pluh 3 3 0 0 100.00% 3 shallow wells 8 Cot 97 97 0 33 100.00% Construction of one(1) 97 shallow wells. 1 Seumerang* Mushalla, 1264 meters village communal tap stand road, 5 slab culvert and system from deep drainage, Mosque and Village borehole. road renovation projects 9 Suak Sikee* 176 176 0 144 82.95% Construction of Drainage and 176 shallow wells. Bridge Mosque Renovation. 1 communal tap stand from deep borehole.
65 Highlighted villages are the priority villages where CRS built 25 houses or more.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 49 10 Suak 119 119 0 195 90.76% Construction of 2 units slab 119 shallow wells Suemaseh culvert Kerueseng 3 3 0 0 100.00% 3shallow wells Mesjid Baro 5 5 0 0 100.00% 5 shallow wells Reusak 0 0 0 8 Lhok Bubon 0 0 0 5 Suak Pandan 0 0 0 2 11 Pribu 40 40 0 0 90.00% 40 shallow wells Total 773 773 0 557 Samatiga Meureubo 12 Pasi Pinang 74 74 0 0 95.95% Construction of 840 meters 74 tube wells Village Road, 4 Slab Culverts and 877 meters Village Drainage 13 Ujong Drien 53 53 0 0 100.00% 53 shallow wells 14 Langung 195 195 0 0 96.92% Construction of (1) Community 195 shallow wells Hall, 1954 meters Village Road Construction, 10 slab culverts and drainage Meureubo 0 0 0 195 Paya 16 16 0 0 100.00% 16 shallow wells Peunaga Pasi Mesjid 1 1 0 0 100.00% 1 shallow well Ujong 3 3 0 0 100.00% 3 shallow wells Tanjung Ranto 1 1 0 0 100.00% 1 shallow well Panyang Barat Peunaga 0 0 0 40 Rayeuk Ranup Dong 1 1 0 0 100.00% 1 shallow well Ujong Tanah 1 1 0 0 100.00% 1 shallow well Darat Total 345 345 0 235 Meureubo Arongan Lembalek 15 Arongan* 27 27 0 83 96.30% Construction of Temporary 27 shallow wells. Community Hall in Arongan 1 communal tap Original Village stand system from deep borehole. Suak Bidok 0 0 0 102 16 Seunebok 48 48 0 50 100.00% Construction of Permanent 48 shallow wells Leung* Community Hall, TPA, 1200 meters Village Road associated with drainage system, mosque renovation and small bridge 17 Seunebok 193 193 0 0 95.34% Construction of Temporary 193 shallow wells. Teungoh Community Hall in IDP camp 1 communal tap and 2203 meters village road stand system from with drainage system and 17 deep borehole. slab culvert Ujong 5 5 0 0 100.00% 5 shallow wells Simpang Aloe Batee 5 5 0 0 100.00% 5 shallow wells
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 50 Total 278 278 0 235 Aronga n Lembalek NAGAN RAYA Kuala 18 Kubang 124 124 0 0 95.97% 124 shallow wells Gajah 19 Padang 70 70 0 0 94.29% Land Clearing of Relocation 70 tube wells. Rebuk* Area and construction of Pulo 1 communal tap 2100 meters Village Roads, stand system from Village Drainage, 10 Slab deep borehole. Culverts, One(1) Permanent TPA, Area= 80 m2 and One(1) Permanent Musholla, Area=76 m2 20 Cot Mue 78 78 0 79 89.74% 1.1 KM temporary road, 2 78 shallow wells bridges, and land clearing work Total Kuala 272 272 0 79 TOTAL 2658 2466 192 1679 83.23% MEULABOH BANDA ACEH Jaya Baru 21 Punge 154 154 0 5 57.14% Meunasah and Health Clinic PDAM service Blang Cut available Total Jaya 154 154 0 5 Baru Syiah Kuala 22 Alue Naga 199 70 129 0 64.29% Site clearing, Meunasah with (Shallow wells built toilets and fence by BRR) 23 Rukoh 170 170 0 5 100.00% PDAM service available Total Syiah 369 240 129 5 Kuala Peukan Bada 24 Gurah* 111 111 0 12 73.87% Meunasah and Multipurpose (Shallow wells built Building and land clearing by BRR); gravity-fed system begun by CRS but not completed due to land use issue. 25 Lamlumpu 201 201 0 0 57.06% Meunasah PDAM service available 26 Rima Jeuneu 163 163 0 20 95.71% PDAM service available Total 475 475 0 32 Peukan Bada Lhok Nga 27 Mon Ikeun 180 180 0 94 49.44% (Self-built shallow wells; borehole and shallow wells from other agencies); PDAM connection (inoperable at time of evaluation)
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 51 Total Lhok 180 180 0 94 Nga Pulo Aceh Lampuyang 0 0 0 80 Village road, Multipurpose Gravity-fed water Building, temporary bridges, system with harbour, pier, and land communal tap stand clearing 28 Paloh* 57 57 0 36 89.47% Village road, land clearing, Gravity-fed water Women's Activity Building, system with Multipurpose Building, communal tap stand temporary bridge. 29 Blang 59 59 0 36 100.00% Village road, land clearing, Gravity-fed water Situngkoh* Women's Activity Building, system with Multipurpose Building, communal tap stand temporary bridge. Total Pulo 116 116 0 152 Aceh Kuta Alam Lam Dingin 0 0 0 147 Kampung 0 0 0 48 Pande Total Kuta Alam 195 TOTAL BANDA 1294 1165 129 483 73.81% ACEH Nias 129 0 129 0 0% Renovation of pre-school (Caritas Sibolga providing water) GRAND 4081 3631 450 2162 83.89%@ TOTAL * indicates villages where CRS built almost all of the houses Water projects carried out by other agencies are bracketed. @ Figure is calculated only from those houses that have been handed over
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 52 Annex Four: Village level evaluation process
The evaluation team went to six different villages, three in Banda Aceh and three in Meulaboh. Villages were in different sub-districts. In all we spoke with 310 people, 187 men and 123 women. The table below summarised, who we spoke with in each village,
Villages Men’s FGDs Women’s FGDs VDC Village Men’s Women’s Total Grand FGD Leaders SSI SSI Total First Second First Second Men women Village A 8 8 6 8 10 4 2 2 32 16 48 Village B 5 10 8 9 11 1 2 5 28 23 51 Village C 10 7 10 8 7 2 2 2 28 20 48 Village D 8 20 12 8 5 2 2 6 37 26 63 Village E 18(M) 11 9 11 4 2 2 2 37 28 65 6 (W) Village F 9 3 6 - 11 1 1 4 25 10 35 Totals 64 59 51 44 48 12 11 21 187 123 310
In each village four FGDs were planned with villagers- one with women in houses built early in the program, one with women in houses built later in the program, one with men in houses built early in the program and one with men in houses built later in the program. However only 23 of 24 planned FGDs were held because in one village only a small number of women participated, so only one women’s FGD was held. In addition, an FGD was held with each VDC bringing the total number of FGDs held to 29.
FGDS were conducted using open-ended questions. We intentionally tried to keep FGDs to six to eight people per group so that a conversation could be facilitated whereby each participant could speak deeply of their views. Small focus groups were possible in some villages but in others many people arrived at the same time and wanted to join discussions.
Similar questions were used for individual interviews with people randomly selected by walking in different directions in the village and asking people if they would speak with us. Many of these randomly selected people were also beneficiaries of CRS houses but some of them were not. These random interviews were to cross check what we were hearing in the FGDs. Separate discussions were held with twelve leaders both to hear their perspective and develop a profile of the village. In addition focus groups were completed with the village development committee that CRS had encouraged villagers to establish so that ongoing communications and consultations could be channelled through a smaller village group.
People were open, honest and happy to engage in a conversation with us about the CRS reconstruction program except in one site where people were less open.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 53 Annex Five: References
ACARP (2007, December) The Acehnese Gampong Three Years On: Assessing Local Capacity in Post- tsunami Aceh.
Barenstein, J D (2006, March) Housing reconstruction in post-earthquake Gujarat: A comparative analysis. London: Humanitarian Practice Network Paper Number 54.
Bennett, J, Bertrand W, Harkin C, Samarasinghe S, and Wickramatillake H (2006, July) Coordination of international humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.
Bell, T and Holt R (2007, September 17) Aftershocks rock earthquake-hit Sumatra from www.Telegraph.co.uk
BRR and international partners (2005) Aceh and Nias One Year After the Tsunami: The Recovery Effort and Way Forward Executive Summary .
BRR, BAPPEDA Aceh Province, and the World Bank (2008, January) ACEH POVERTY ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT, THE TSUNAMI AND RECONSTRUCTION ON POVERTY IN ACEH. Jakarta: World Bank.
Catholic Relief Services (2005, 15 June) CRS ACCORD Program: CRS Aceh Community-Based Recovery and Development Strategic Results Frameworks.
Catholic Relief Services (2007, 12 July) CRS Aceh Strategy Paper.
Catholic Relief Services (2007, August 31) Summary of Lessons Learnt in the CRS Aceh Program by Ryan Russell.
Catholic Relief Services, December 2006 through September 2007 Quarterly Reports and April 2005 through January 2008 Monthly reports.
Ferris-Morris, Margie (2006, May) Independent One Year Post-Tsunami Impact Assessment of Catholic Relief Services Programs in Aceh, Indonesia.
International Crisis Group (2005, August 15) Asia Briefing No. 40 from www.crisisgroup.org
International Crisis Group (2007, March 22) Asia Briefing No. 61 from www.crsisgroup.org
Lubkowski, Z, and da Silva, J (2006, April) The People of Aceh and Nias: Post Tsunami Reconstruction Review of Aceh Housing Program. London: ARUP.
Oxfam (2006, December 11) Rising to the Challenge in Aceh: NGO Led Shelter Construction.
Plummer, J (2005, August) Anti-corruption efforts in the Post-tsunami Reconstruction of Water and Sanitation Infrastructure and Services in Aceh, Indonesia. World Bank: Jakarta, unpublished paper.
Reuters Foundation (2008, February 25) Quake off Indonesia’s Sumatra triggers panic, from http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/JAK203283.htm
Telford, J, Cosgrave, J (2006) Joint Evaluation of the international response to the Indian Ocean tsunami: Synthesis Report. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition.
Tsunami response watch.org (2007, January) Land rights in Aceh from www.tsunamiresponsewatch.org
World Bank (2007, March 1-31st) Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 54 Annex Six: External agency and CRS staff participants in the evaluation
External agency participants
Name Organisation Function Andre Bald World Bank Infrastructure Specialist
Dewi Elyana UN Office of the Recovery Head of Office - Meulaboh Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC) Gotz Caritas Switzerland Head of Office - Meulaboh Rauschenberger Joseph Ornato BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Advisor to the Housing Rekonstruksi) Department Kevin Duignon IFRC Construction Coordinator Mark Fredig Mercy Corps Director Ray Benson BRR Advisor to the Housing Department T. Ahmad Dadek District Government of Aceh Chief of Governmental Barat Department and Civil Register
CRS Aceh staff participants in the evaluation
Name Function
Ardi Adelin Engineer Banda Aceh
Christopher Frey Senior Engineer
Dean Johnson Program Quality Manager
Edi S. Girsang Contract Administrator
Ernest-Jan Martijin Sanitation Consultant Meulaboh
Eri Sumantri Design Engineer Meulaboh
Henny Malina Engineer Banda Aceh
Lisa Andriani Archive Officer
Maureen Capps Field Office Director for Banda Aceh
Provash Budden Field Office Director for Meulaboh
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 55 Ridha Yuadi Village Representative Banda Aceh
Risza Lopez da Cruz Program Quality and Language Support Officer
Scott T. Campbell Aceh Director
Sihar Pargaulon Butar-butar Engineer Banda Aceh
Tommy Lumbanyoruan Watsan Engineer Banda Aceh
Yusnaidi Project Coordinator Meulaboh
Yusufri Area Coordinator
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 56 Annex Seven: Brief chronology of post tsunami events and CRS Aceh’s reconstruction response 66 Date External Events Response by CRS Dec 26 Earthquake measuring 9.3 on CRS begins preliminary 04 the Richter scale generates a assessments in Aceh on Tsunami that devastates Aceh. December 28 th . 137,000 are killed, 30,000 missing, 500,000 displaced. Jan. 05 CRS establishes programs in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh focusing on immediate relief, reconstruction, well cleaning, health, civil society strengthening and livelihoods. Mar 28 Earthquake measuring 8.7 on CRS leads INGO response and 05 the Richter scale hits Nias sends 1,918 family kits to Nias. taking 900 lives and displacing GOI agrees that CRS is to work 70,000 people, in Pulo Aceh and Aceh Besar GOI begins to allocate tsunami district. affected villages to specific Initial draft of Five year strategy NGOs in effort to coordinate for Aceh developed. response. April 05 GOI completes a blueprint for Verbal agreements are reached reconstruction of NAD and Nias with the NAD provincial health which bans reconstruction on department to build a maternal coasts. As housing child hospital and a health construction gets underway clinic. Other commitments are land title becomes an issue. made to GOI to support All NGOs agree to support land reconstruction of markets, ownership processes that start roads, bridges, schools, land at community level and go up to clearance, and water and Sub-District office level. sanitation rehabilitation efforts. Coordination is not effective in These commitments will be Meulaboh and competition for included in an MOU with the project areas by NGOs is high. GOI officials at a later date. BRR is established by GOI with Many of these projects are skilled staff to strategically initially carried out with workers coordinate the response. employed under a CFW scheme. May 05 State of emergency in Aceh is CRS submits its ACCORD lifted by the GOI though fighting proposal to BRR who respond continues and negotiations with to it positively. CRS is assigned GAM proceed. 2,818 permanent houses in 33 The newly formed BRR holds villages of Aceh Barat and 374 its 1 st meeting with Aceh based houses in Nagan Raya to build NGOS and UN agencies. and begins working with people in assigned villages to establish committees of local people and local officials to monitor the process of reconstruction. Former President Clinton visits Aceh and meets with CRS and
66 All information in this chronology unless otherwise noted was sourced from CRS monthly reports for the period April 2005 through January 2008.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 57 other NGOs to discuss humanitarian accountability of agencies responding. June 05 The 500,000 people displaced CRS begins its permanent by the tsunami have a roof over housing construction work. This their head with the majority begins phase one construction- being with host families. 70,000 a learning phase. are in tents. 1,000 new houses are being built each month. 67 July 05 Ministry of Public Works issues CRS gets approval from the a building code for Aceh. BRR for its shelter work in Banda and Aceh Besar. Three housing designs out of 20 are approved by the Banda Office of Public Works and Resettlement. First community water committee formed and training of the committee begins. Aug 05 GOI and GAM sign peace Formation of Village agreement following 30years of Development Plans (VDPs) conflict in which 9,000 people begins in CRS priority villages. died and 1.4milion people were In the VDPs, communities displaced 68 . . express their vision for Multi-donor fund of rebuilding their community, in US$28.5million managed by terms of physical reconstruction the World Bank for the (shelter, infrastructure and Reconstruction of Aceh’s Land water and sanitation) but also Administration (RALAS) project re-establishing the social, starts. It funds a community economic, educational and driven adjudication and land religious life of the community. titling process. It aims to title 600,000 plots of land by December 2008. 69 Sept 05 GAM begins turning over The CRS Civil Society and weapons to the AMM and Shelter Assessment teams Indonesian military police begin continue helping IDPs to obtain to leave. The security situation temporary land title certificates in Aceh begins to improve. from the Indonesian National Land Department (BPN). Work with local NGOs to complete the VDPs continues. The establishment of Village Development Committees (VDCs), a representative village committee with which to work begins. October Rains, flash floods and Five year strategy for is Aceh 05 landslides in southeast Aceh kill finalised and approved by the 21 people and displace 1000s. CRS Board. Nov 05 Clinton visits Aceh.
67 Bennett et al, 2006: 27. 68 International crisis group, August 15, 2005. 69 Tsunami response watch.org report of January 2007.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 58 GAM continues to handover weapons and GOI to withdraw military personnel from the province. Dec 05 The GAM completes handover CRS constructed Mother and of weapons to the Aceh Child hospital in Banda Aceh is Monitoring Mission to be inaugurated. destroyed. In return the last GOI military troops leave the area December 29. Jan 06 CRS holds a programme summit and firm decisions are made on staff restructuring and better defined processes and procedures so that it can meet its commitments in Aceh. Feb 06 Aceh Peace Reintegration Independent one-year impact Agency established to oversee assessment of CRS’s program the reintegration process. GOI in Aceh is completed. to provide US$150million for This begins phase II of 2005-07 for programmes construction in Meulaboh. This targeted to conflict affected phase seeks to address issues people in all of Aceh’s 5,726 on the quality and speed at rural villages 70 . which permanent houses are built. More engineers are hired and less reliance is placed on consultants. A few permanent houses are completed and handed over to house owners. March BRR criticises NGOs for 11 OFDA funded markets are 06 reducing their housing completed. In Meulaboh, commitments, slow progress construction of shallow wells, and poor quality housing wash areas and latrines are construction. underway to provide temporary watsan facilities in 12 villages and camps. April 06 A more community based- geographic approach using area development teams is established and a greater number of experienced and qualified housing engineers are brought in to manage construction. May 06 Total temporary shelter units distributed since May 2005 are 1,342. June 06 BRR issues regulations entitling Phase II construction approach pre-tsunami homeowners of established in Banda Aceh and land to a 36square meter over the next few months all house, renters to US$2,800 reconstruction systems are and squatters to US$1,150 71 . tightened up and improved so
70 World Bank, March 2007: 4. 71 Tsunami response watch.org. , January 2007.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 59 that the quality of housing construction is improved. July 06 GOI Parliament passes the A detailed monitoring and LOGA (Law on Governance in evaluation system is developed Aceh). This is tentatively to track both the construction agreed with GAM. It must be and community relationship signed into law to give Aceh aspects of the work. The greater self-rule. construction programme has a computerised system which tracks all project management aspects of housing and infrastructure construction. Sept 06 IDP demonstrations occur over Housing contracts remain land issues and the pace at behind schedule due to which housing is being material and labour shortages. provided. Nov 06 48,000 houses reported to be rebuilt in the province out of a total required of 128,000 72 . Dec 06 Province holds its first direct CRS assists flood affected democratic local elections. families though floods are not in Former GAM rebel Irwandi the areas where they are Yusuf is elected provincial operating. governor 73 . 85% of people who are eligible vote do so. Torrential rains cause serious flooding and landslides in parts of Aceh, Northern Sumatra and Reau. Jan 07 More rain worsens conditions The milestone of 1000 for flood affected people in the permanent houses completed three provinces mentioned and handed over to occupants above. 500,000 people are is reached. Strategic objectives affected and crops lost and are revised to focus on meeting damaged. For some tsunami current commitments in a affected farmers this was a loss timely, efficient manner. A new of their first harvest in two years structure is put in place to since the tsunami. deliver the strategy. Feb 07 First democratically elected An average of 225 houses is Governor Irwandi Yusuf is being completed each month inaugurated. though targets are still behind as contractors claim to have problems with material delays, lack of qualified labour and village interference. March Incidents of violence reported Taman Sari Park renovation is 07 to be increasing due to results completed in Banda Aceh and of District elections and misuse opened to the public. of GOI reintegration funds 74 . April 07 Conflict arises in some of the Banda Aceh communities due
72 Ibid. 73 International crisis group, March 2007. 74 World Bank, March 2007:1.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 60 to frustrations over housing delays and suppliers of material for house construction. May 07 Reports of armed robberies are The second 1000 houses are on the rise, now averaging one completed. The quality of a day across the province. For housing and the speed with the most part. INGOs are not which houses are built is targeted. continually improving. Relations with housing recipients are tense and some demonstrate outside CRS offices about the delays in housing construction. Disgruntled contractors report CRS to the police. June 07 As community threats towards NGOs regarding housing construction delays arise, the BRR releases an official statement saying that if an NGO pulls out of a community for security reasons, the BRR will not finish the housing project, nor will it identify another NGO to do so. July 07 A number of INGOS are finishing their programs and leaving Aceh. Floods and earthquake tremors continue to affect Aceh. Daily power cuts are happening in Banda Aceh. Sept 07 An earthquake measuring 8.4 Number of permanent houses on the Richter scale occurs off built reaches 3000. the coast of Sumatra. Security incidents, threats and Aftershocks follow the next day theft occur at CRS construction that peak at 7.7 on the Richter sites. scale. 75 . January An earthquake registering 6.2 CRS completes plan to 08 on the Richter scale occurs 15 integrate Aceh programme miles west of Nias. 76 under CRS Indonesia over the course of 2008. Feb 08 An earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale occurs off the west coast of Sumatra. 77 Heavy rains across Aceh cause flooding and landslides. March Impact evaluation of CRS 08 Aceh’s reconstruction program is carried out.
75 Bell and Holt, September 17, 2007. 76 www.alertnet.org January 2008 77 Ibid, February 2008.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 61 Annex Eight: Village profiles and villager’s views of the CRS reconstruction program Profile of village A 78 and villagers’ input to the evaluation Pre-Tsunami Village A is located on an island which is part of the district of Aceh Besar. Before the tsunami the total population on the island was 6,462 people and that of the village was 225 (59 households). The village is set on the west coast of the island, with large hills rising immediately to the east of the village. The primary pre-tsunami livelihoods were fishing and farming. Others made a living by diving for octopus and lobster and selling their catch. The best divers can dive to a depth of 20 meters for two hours with only a simple compressor. A small number of people are traders, civil servants or teachers. About 10% of the population was considered poor, while 13% of the population is considered “well-off”.
Tsunami The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 killed three people in the village. Relative to most other tsunami affected Acehnese coastal communities this death toll is low. Although there was no official warning, community members residing near the beach saw the wave coming about four minutes before it struck land, and alerted others. This forewarning, albeit brief, was enough for most people to climb the hills to safety. Other villages on the island suffered a much higher death toll; total deaths on the island were 1,629, about 25% of the population. The immediate post-tsunami population of the island was 4,833.
People from the village remained in the hills for several days. They survived by eating coconuts and other foods they could forage. When they did return to the village, they found their houses and infrastructure destroyed completely. Some shallow wells were destroyed and others were contaminated. Many rice fields were filled with sand and salt water. Several days after the tsunami, a fishing boat arrived and transported community members to other locations. Some took refuge in Sabang and others were taken to Banda Aceh.
Emergency During the emergency period, most villagers stayed in tents at an IDP camp in a village in Seulimum sub- district of Aceh Besar. Others lived with relatives. CRS distributed UNDP tents, food and family kits. CARE, WFP and the Indonesian Red Cross also distributed food items. Oxfam, among other NGOs, offered Cash for Work (CFW) to clean up debris that was left in the village following the tsunami. CFW became a key source of income for community members. The government built barracks in the IDP camp, clean water was brought in with tanker trucks and NGOs provided drinking water.
Recovery Most community members remained in the Seunebok barracks until June 2006, 1.5 years after the tsunami. During this period, many people worked in the construction sector; others continued to earn money through CFW. In June 2006 CRS, in partnership with IFRC, provided a wooden transitional shelter to each family from the village. At this point, people began returning to their original village site. A gravity- fed water system, built by CRS in partnership with Yayasan Dian Desa (YDD) brought spring water from the hillside to public taps in the village. During this period of return, CRS coordinated activities with the sub-district office, BRR and Green Corner, a local partner.
Reconstruction CRS started to reconstruct 59 houses in June 2005. House construction was in the original village but on different land as the original land was not suitable for reconstruction. A disagreement between CRS and the contractor regarding the rate of inflation for building materials to be used when renegotiating the contract resulted in a stop in construction. The contractor was ultimately replaced, but a full year passed without progress. During this period tensions ran high and people from the village protested at the CRS office and a neighbouring village on the island disengaged from CRS to have houses built by the BRR. In November 2006, construction restarted and was finished in May 2007 and houses were soon handed
78 In the profile section, information was confirmed with the village leader and additional input provided by focus group participants.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 62 over to families. CRS also repaired a village road, built a women’s center and a temporary community hall and worked with rice farmers to rehabilitate their fields and adopt improved farming techniques. A Meunasah was built by the Sub-district Development Program (PKK) and the British Red Cross provided cosh for business. Community members have largely returned to their pre-tsunami livelihoods. Currently, there are 62 families and 229 residents in the village.
Views on the CRS Reconstruction Program from people in village A
Question Responses
What CRS Houses (all respondents). did well, Other comments varied and included successfully Women said houses as we have a place to stay and can start to live again. The house is a good model and pretty. Men said all families got a good house from CRS. We have a place to dwell although the emotional value of the house is less compared to previous one as we had built the previous house ourselves. One man noted that the house has a bathroom and kitchen but we don’t use the bathroom because we have no water. Men also said the agriculture assistance helped us start to plant again and to gain back our economic life. Impact/ Men and women said that all houses in the village have the same size and design, the difference community feels much better, happier, as everyone got a house. There is no more made social jealousy and the social gap has reduced since everyone has a similar house. Other comments varied and included Houses are better than the ones we had before the tsunami, feel we are living properly now. The house is luxurious and a valuable asset. The community has gained their self confidence to restart their life, we feel safer; more secure. Families can focus on their children’s needs as the biggest burden a house is provided. Now we have cattle and there is more infrastructure in the village. CRS agricultural activities provided us knowledge and seeds to get some harvest. Recovery Housing: Ranged from 50-100% with those giving 100% saying most have a house and it is better than before the tsunami and some giving less saying the septic tanks leak.
Psychologically: not fully recovered. Women said we often wake up at night remembering family lost during the tsunami.
Watsan: Ranged from 30-50% as the quality of the water in some of the shallow wells is not as good as before the tsunami. In the dry season many of the wells have no water by noon. The gravity fed water system is not working well due to a lack of maintenance.
Infrastructure : Ranged from 30 to 80% with those saying 30% noting that the road is worse that before the tsunami.
Overall recovery : 60-80% with those giving lower percent saying the economy has not recovered.
Economic : Ranged from 30-80%. Those giving low percent said not all rice fields can be used and the economy was better before as we could earn money more easily. Before the tsunami we had jobs but now we don’t. Others said though some of us have more money we can’t purchase anything because prices have increased. ‘ Economically our lives are more difficult than before the tsunami.’
CRS’s Ranged from 50 to 100%. Women gave 50% saying CRS has given a house the most contribution important thing. Others gave CRS a higher percent saying the same thing.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 63 to recovery
Community Community was satisfied with its level of involvement in planning, and monitoring. VDC was involved in beneficiary selection and some men were paid workers. Complaints involvement went through the village leader and the men had meetings with CRS staff. Men were involved in meetings often when they were invited though some of them did not know how to complain and get a response. Some women were involved in selection of house design. Otherwise women were not involved though their sons were. Community was 35% involved in construction of the water system. Do differently Everyone said be more concerned with water. next time Ensure all assistance is appropriate (some agricultural support was of no use). Some said keep commitments and promises as help with a meunasah was promised and has not yet been kept. Have a good complaints handling system that everyone in the village knows about and can use. Observations In one FGD some people dominated the discussion. Other discussions flowed well and in FGDs people openly shared their views. Some women in FGDs were widows and many of the women were older and very happy with the house especially as it was free.
Observations Occupancy level for houses is high. outside FGDs Plots around houses are large and people have planted flowers, vegetables and fruit trees. Small animals are around such as ducks, goats and some cows. There are coffee shops and men have gone back to fishing. Some houses had electricity.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 64 Profile of village B 79 and villager’s input to the evaluation
This village is in the district of Aceh Besar. It is where we piloted the questions and methods so a full village profile was not completed. Villagers were very engaged when we spent a day with them and gave us much of their valuable time to share their views. This section sets out what we learnt.
Tsunami The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 killed 600 people an estimated 75% of the village’s population. Prior to the tsunami there were 350 households (800 people) and after 134 households (200 people). Besides the human toll, the tsunami swept away all houses and infrastructure and damaged and polluted all shallow wells. ‘It was a dead village. It looked like a desert and you could see straight to the sea.’
Emergency Survivors lived in tents, others moved to barracks and some took refuge with relatives. People were desperate and water was scarce. Some agencies started to distribute rice and other NGOs distributed NFI kits; community members could not remember the names of all the agencies. Later various NGOs including CRS provided families temporary shelters. Cash for work was used by CRS to support families as they cleared debris from the village.
Reconstruction CRS constructed 111 permanent houses. Also BRR, UPLINK and Muslim Aid each built some houses. Water supply improvement projects have been done by AIPRD, BRR and CRS. Mercy Corps built a village office and a women’s centre, BRR provided drainage and CRS a temporary community hall with plans to make this permanent soon. Other NGOs supported livelihood activities by providing animals, sewing machines and handicraft training to women.
Views on the CRS reconstruction program from people in village B
Questions Responses
What CRS Housing - All respondents did well - successfully Other comments varied and included Women said the house is a good design with 2 bedrooms, a bathroom and terrace. Other houses did not have a terrace. They liked that they could choose the house design, there was rehabilitation of some of the houses in the liability and maintenance period, and building was done well without any hidden agenda and the higher house foundation in the 2 nd phase. They said it is a beautiful model but there are damages. Men said the house is better than houses built by others, though there is damage and the contractor should have been supervised better. They liked that houses have a bathroom and the houses were checked before everything was finalized. The VDC liked the community monitoring and faster speed of the later housing construction phases. Though men and women were very grateful for the house some were disappointed in the quality as there are defects in some of the houses e.g. the septic tanks and pipes, doors and uneven flooring.
79 In the profile section, information was provided by focus group participants and individual informants.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 65 Impact/ Comments varied and included
Difference Men said families have received a house and many are living there. If NGOs had not made come they would still be in barracks. They are happy to have a place to stay and so now have more of a sense of security. One man said I could not have built the house by myself as everything was destroyed by the tsunami. Women said they were happy with the house and thanked God for the assistance from CRS. Now we have a place to stay, we are more relaxed. Those receiving houses in the early phases said they have started to plant. We are able to make small money off it and don’t need to buy from market. Started to have livestock, started to bake cakes as we are in our own house and have money so we can send children to school. No more social gap or jealousies as we all have the same kind and size of houses. Women receiving houses later said they no longer have to move from place to place, so they are more relaxed but we are poorer now compared to before the tsunami.
Recovery Housing : Ranged from 50-100%. Better than before tsunami. Men gave high percents with some of them saying the house is better than before the tsunami and women 50% for as some septic tanks do not work.
Psychologically : Men said they are still traumatized by the loss of their families. The leader said the spirit has gone from the village.
Economy: No percent given but men said the economy has not fully recovered and women said we are poorer now.
Watsan : 0-100% Those giving 0 said many shallow wells are not producing drinkable water and we must purchase water for drinking and cooking (Rp120, 000 per month). Others gave 100% because the wells in the village were renovated and other support from AIPRD and CRS was provided to improve water supply.
CRS Leader said it was very high in housing but did not put a percent on it. Women said it was contribution 50% of all support as CRS built houses. There were no other responses. to recovery
Community The leader said CRS staff were open and friendly. involvement Women said the community did monitoring and worked with contractor to provide drinks. Men and women were involved in weekly meetings, and the community decided the model of house to have but did not decide the location of toilets or septic tanks . Men said contractors involved them in providing materials. CRS staff sometimes listened to their complaints, and sometimes not (MFGD). The VDC said CRS worked well with them involving them in house design and selection of beneficiaries. Do Ensure staff communicate well and provide a response to their complaints differently Be quicker in making decisions so houses go up faster. Choose good contractors and next time supervise them tightly. Better if CRS deals with the community rather than contractor, as many were corrupt and we couldn't give opinion when things were not done right. Complete all work on septic tanks before people move into houses and consult them about location of septic tanks. Locate toilets outside the house and provide a kitchen and some basic furniture. Ensure there is no hidden agenda and be open and transparent like you were this time. Fulfill your promises – at beginning promises were made. Not all were fulfilled and staff that came later could not explain reasons for change in commitments.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 66 Observation Participants were active, open, and well dressed in women’s group. Their age range was in FGDs and 19-53 and some of them were widows. In men’s group age range 19-60; middle other economically. VDC has one woman. Age range in VDC was 25-50, 3 ex combats, and comments VDC members were neither rich nor poor.
Leader described how houses in next village went up quicker. The village had made agreement with CRS though wondered if CRS was coming or not and felt confused when another agency ask them if they wanted a house.
Observation Occupancy rate in the village is 80%. Assessment based on foundations left after tsunami, s outside but many people had died. Gravity fed water system installed by CRS and YDD but it is not FGD yet hooked up due to dispute with land owner over payment for land where the water tank needs to be installed. Villages said it is a problem they must solve. Village was relatively quiet compared to the others we visited with fewer motorcycles around.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 67 Profile of village C 80 and villagers’ input to the evaluation
Pre-tsunami This village consists of three sub-villages and borders the Indian Ocean to the West and a river to the South. Prior to the tsunami approximately 2,700 people (463 households) resided in the village. This figure does not include military personnel who resided on a base located in the village. The total area of the village was 180 hectares, though much of this was undeveloped coastal areas, or lands used for farming. The primary livelihoods were farming, fishing, trading and operating private businesses. Others in the community were teachers and civil servants.
The village has a strong tradition of passing religious and cultural values from one generation to the next. There are many activities to strengthen religious values and deepen beliefs. These include Koran readings for children and teenagers and Yasin readings for parents. Community issues, such as farm planning, are often discussed during these types of religious activities. Ninety percent of the villagers are of Acehnese descent and an estimated seventeen percent of villagers are considered poor. The educational levels of the pre-tsunami adult population were relatively high with around 40% of adults having completed high school and 6% university.
Tsunami The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 killed approximately 1,800 people, about two-thirds of the entire population. Dead bodies were still found in the area six months later. The immediate post- tsunami population was 897 (346 households). The tsunami destroyed all 360 houses in the village, plus water and sanitation facilities. Several roads and bridges were also destroyed, as well as drainage, electricity and communication systems. Approximately 37 hectares of farm land were rendered unusable by the resulting salinity and debris. The destruction, high death toll and debris paralyzed the local economy.
Emergency Due to the village’s distance from Banda Aceh, the muddy conditions in the area and difficult road access following the tsunami, post-disaster evacuation efforts were difficult. One week after the tsunami, only a few villagers had been successfully evacuated. Eventually, residents were relocated to a village five kilometres away. The Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) coordinated the following relief efforts: food aid from WFP, clean water and medicines from the American military, Cash for Work from CRS, school supplies from UNICEF and Plan, health support from World Vision, and livelihoods program support sponsored by Save the Children.
Recovery Village residents lived in different locations during the recovery period. About 20% of residents lived with extended family members. Others were initially divided between barracks and tents. After three months forty six families received semi-permanent houses in the village from JENGGALA, an Indonesian NGO. Though they were intended to be permanent houses, the JENGGALA beneficiaries insist that because they are partly wooden, they are only semi-permanent. These families are still hoping to receive a permanent concrete house. Approximately one year after the tsunami, CRS distributed temporary shelters to those beneficiaries who had been living in tents and also established a Community Action Plan (CAP). Other NGOs supported trauma counselling through communal consultations and interventions, and other NGOs such as Oxfam provided water.
Reconstruction CRS constructed 180 permanent houses and these were handed over at the end of 2007. There were four house construction phases with the first beginning in February 2006 and the final one starting in August 2007. All houses were built on original homeowner sites and poor construction resulted in 70 houses being torn down and rebuilt. The beneficiary assessment process proved challenging. Other
80 In the profile section, information was confirmed with the village leader and additional input provided by focus group participants.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 68 permanent houses were built by: Muslim Aid (12), BRR (10) and UNDP (10), and UMCOR provided some house owners furniture. The BRR constructed a community health center, a drainage system, clean water facilities, a road extension and other supporting infrastructure. Most homes have shallow wells, but the water quality in most of the wells is not drinkable. A borehole at the community center built by Plan is another source of water. All the houses built by CRS are equipped to be connected to PDAM (local water utility). About 25% of these are now connected to the PDAM water lines. At the time of this evaluation, these lines were not operational, despite PDAM indications that service will be offered in this village.
Views on the CRS reconstruction program from people in village C
Question Responses
What CRS Houses (all respondents). did well, Women added that the house is strong, pretty, good quality materials were used, and successfully CRS built the largest number of houses in this village, though some said the house does not have a kitchen. Men said CRS established good relationship during the construction. One woman said the houses are better than those of other NGOs even though they do not have a kitchen or a shallow well. Impact/ Many said they are happy to now have a house. We have gone from 0 with no house difference after the tsunami to having a house and we can now get on with other livelihood made activities. Women said they have developed a sense of security, have no more worries, and feel more relaxed, calmer and healthier compared to living in a tent or barracks. Men said they have more energy. Though some men said the house is smaller than their previous house still they are happy to have a house. The VDC was grateful to CRS for the house as living in tents was so very hard. One of the VDC members said it is difficult to say the difference made as before ‘I built my own house and my family was complete.’ The leader said if NGOs had not come only 10houses would be built by now. Recovery Overall : Ranged from 50 to 80%. With those giving higher percents saying that life is getting back to normal and regular HH activities are taking place, such as the reading of the Koran.
Housing: Ranged from 50 to 90%. With those giving high percents as so many families have houses. Those giving lower percents said that some septic tanks are broken and some people must sleep on the floor because they have no furniture, and some families are only in semi permanent houses built by JENGGALA.
Watsan : Ranged from 0% to 20% as shallow wells are saltier and some families must buy water to drink and cook with.
Infrastructure : Ranged from 50 to 100% and no reasons given.
Economy : Ranged from 20 to 40% with some saying that the local economy is weak.
CRS’s Varied from 40 to 80% as there were other providers of houses and other agencies that contribution built infrastructure and supported people after the emergency. to recovery
Community Women involved in the early phases said they were not involved in monitoring involvement construction and did not participate in CRS meetings while women in the later phases said they were involved in these processes plus in choosing the house design, measuring the plots, and monitoring. These women knew about the liability process, how they could complain, and said CRS put information on the information board.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 69 Men said communications and the relationship with CRS was good. The VDC said the community agreed they would work through the VDC and the leader said he was satisfied with the process. Do differently When houses are complete do a livelihood program. Ensure that houses have kitchens, shallow wells, furniture and bigger rooms. Next time Ensure houses have access to water or have wells. Use wooden door frames instead of aluminium ones to reduce the heat. Improve keys as now one key opens all doors. Observations Women’s’ ages ranged from 23-63. Some participants in FGDs were widows. Some came in FGD late, noisy but manageable and people spoke freely. Conversations in the other focus groups flowed easily.
Observations Some said social jealousy was created because many in the village have permanent outside houses and others only have semi-permanent houses. FGDs Reasons given by the leader for unoccupied houses was because some housing beneficiaries are under age (orphans) and live with relatives, others are working outside the village and there are water problems in the village so many have to buy water for drinking and cooking and others must use their neighbours well. Many transitional shelters were sold (Rp3-8million). Some latrines are not used as pipes are broken and the water tanks in the bathroom leak. Villagers use river as toilet. Village was lively with music playing, many motorbikes, electricity, and TVs. Many different types of houses were provided by the different NGOs. Houses have electricity and some house owners were in the process of building extensions on to their house.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 70 Profile of village D 81 and villagers’ input to the evaluation
Pre-Tsunami This is a coastal village in the district of Aceh Barat. It is bordered by the Indian Ocean on the west, with farmland and other rural villages to the north, south and east. It is three kilometres from the sub-district center. The village can trace its roots back to the Dutch colonial period and in the past has won an award as a model village. The pre-tsunami population of the village was approximately 450 people, with 150 households. Of the working population, 75% were farmers, 15% were fishermen, 7% were civil servants and 3% were traders.
Tsunami The earthquake and tsunami of 26 December 2004 devastated the village. Approximately 200 people (44 % of the total population) were killed. Ninety-nine families survived. Every house and building was destroyed. The high death toll was largely attributable to the villages close proximity to the coast. To worsen matters, the earthquake opened a crevice in the road out of town and a minibus fell into the hole. The road was blocked and many community members gathered to survey the scene. The tsunami wave, a wall of water estimated at 15 meters in height, arrived in the village with very little warning. Some people fled inland. Others took refuge in the mosque, but the mosque was destroyed. To illustrate the tsunami’s power, one truck that was parked in the village was later found 3 km away. Many rice fields were damaged and covered in water and 800metres of the coastline was lost. Survivors emerged from the ruins throughout the day on 26 December. Many had been stripped of their clothes by the waters’ force. They began the search for loved ones.
Emergency There was no food on the first day. Many survivors searched for loved ones. Others scattered away from the village. By the third day, village leaders tried to gather all survivors in the sub-district centre, which was largely intact. Food assistance was organized by the Mukim and Bupati, with some of it being delivered by the Indonesian military and some being provided by communities nearby. On the 5th day after the tsunami, additional food was dropped from helicopters by the American military. Water was provided by neighboring villages which were not affected. In the initial days, people were mostly sleeping outdoors in front of homes and shops. Tents provided by MSF Netherlands arrived six days after the tsunami. An IDP camp was established in the sub-district centre and most community members stayed in tents in the IDP camp for the next year. Others stayed with relatives. Food was provided by WFP and World Vision. Japan Peace Winds and CRS provided Cash for Work (CFW) opportunities.
Recovery One year after the tsunami CRS provided temporary shelters in the original village and at a relocation site 3kms from the original village. Temporary water and sanitation facilities were also built by CRS. CFW and food assistance continued for a full year. Livelihoods were slow to recover though many agencies including Indonesian Government Social Department, Oxfam, Mercy Corps and others provided various types of livelihood support.
Reconstruction House construction started in January 2007 as land allocation by BRR took time as did the negotiations among families about relocating from the old village where many families had lost land because of the tsunami. CRS built 64 permanent houses in the relocation site. Twenty-seven families with suitable land and a desire to stay in the old site received a permanent house on the original land. The houses were handed over to the community in September 2007. All houses were built with the new improved septic tank system and shallow wells.
81 This profile was confirmed with a leader and additional input provided by evaluation participants in both the original and relocation sites.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 71
Views on the CRS reconstruction program from people in village D
What CRS Houses. Before we had no house and now we have one (All respondents both did well, sites). successfully Original Site: Other comments varied and included Now we have a place to stay and to pray. The CRS house is stronger than those from other NGOs. CRS provided a house with a well and a toilet; it is beautiful. Relocation Site: Other comments varied and included Houses are strong and beautiful; valuable because they can be used for a life time. For some it is a bigger house with kitchen and bathroom, and women said with a bathroom we don’t have to use public toilets like we did in the barracks. House is important because we couldn’t have built it without NGO help. Water is clean now with two rings and two filter boxes for septic tank in very house. The market in a nearby village. Impact/ Original Site: Comments varied and included difference made People are happy now. Before we were in tents or barracks. Generally, people have no more trauma and feel more relaxed. For many though the house is smaller than before, it has no kitchen, or plants, and one said CRS made a grave in front of the house (septic tank with wetland area). Relocation site: Comments varied and included Community is happy to have a place to live and start our lives. Grateful to go from living in tents to a house making our circumstances better now. For some the house is more beautiful compared to the one we had before the tsunami. Women said the difference is significant. After the tsunami we only had the cloth on our backs. Now we have clothes, a house and a motorcycle. We have a place to pray. Now we can live together with the family and village gathered around us. Before we were like a lady with dry skin, now the skin is back and beautiful again and differences between us because of housing have disappeared. Men said the house location and the organisation of the site is better but in terms of work it is difficult to find a job in the new site as the old village had land to work on. Some of us no longer have rice farms and we are far from the sea so it is difficult to go fishing. Now there is conflict between those living in the new site and the old one. Because of one person’s view some people decided to stay in the original village but now they are jealous of what CRS has done in the relocation site. And one man said from having nothing I now have a house and I got married. Recovery Original site
Housing: Ranged from 70-100%. Lower percent from those who said house is smaller now and has no kitchen.
Watsan: Ranged from 30 -100% Lower from those whose well has yellow and undrinkable water and 100% from those whose well has clean drinkable water. Sanitation: women said 100% because now the latrine is inside the house and men 50% because septic tank system is leaking.
Economically: Ranged from 30 to 60%. Because there is less work, and some of us no longer have land and coconut plantations. Before we could plant and now we have to buy all vegetables.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 72 Relocation site
Housing: Ranged from 70 to 120%. Lower percent from those who said it is a smaller house and from women who said there is no kitchen. 100% as all received houses. 100- 120% from some women because it is the best house I’ve ever had and it is luxurious.
Infrastructure : 0% there was a mushalla/mosque in the old village and a community hall. Here there is neither; only a road that is muddy when it rains. Plus we have no village leader.
Watsan: 100% even over as houses have access to clean well water. Women said all latrines work and repair was done correctly. We are glad to have toilet inside the house though the water tank in the bathroom is located in the left side of toilet and the tank is small for ritual washing before praying so we have to get water from the wells. While this is not perfect, the toilet position for praying is and the septic tank is a good model as water that comes out is clean. We plant flowers in the wetland and they grow well.
Economically : Ranged from 20-40%. Difficult to find job around here. We feel safe but uncomfortable. Before villagers had their land; got money from growing things but now they only work as labourers. Relocated people are not invited to work in the palm fields and some said they had become worse off. Prices are getting higher. There is no stable income but I can send my children to school. When there are no construction jobs there will be no work. For civil servants there economic situation is the same. Some depend on their children and few earn money from small businesses e.g. sewing.
CRS’s Original site : Women said 25-50% because CRS gave us a complete house with a contribution bathroom. Men said it is difficult to estimate given all the different NGO support since the to recovery relief period.
Relocation site : 70-100%. Those who gave 70% said the rest was from BRR who gave us land and NRC the borehole. 100% given by those who considered housing the most important input. The community said their contribution was 0%.
Community Original site involvement CRS held meetings with all the community when doing beneficiary selection, involved us in site location of the house, selection of a house design and monitoring the construction process. We know about the liability process but CRS only fixed minor defects and now there is little communication. They promised us ceramics, house equipment, and flowers but we haven’t got these. Relocation site
• The leader and VDC said information flow and communication with staff was good. Everyone said that the community was involved in choosing house design, monitoring construction and reporting defects during liability period. • The VDC said their role was not clear and they knew about complaints system but got no response when they complained. • Men said staff turnover was high so it was difficult to communicate. • Women said they complained about the location of water tanks in the bathroom but were told that the design cannot be changed. • Do differently Original site next time Provide houses and not capital. If we got capital we would have used it to pay rent and would still not have a house. Provide a house with kitchens and do a livelihood program, a road and community hall.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 73 Relocation site Coordinate well with community on beneficiary assessment and monitor contractors more strictly as contractors threatened us if we complain too much. Ensure staff are disciplined and have more authority than the contractor. Often staff kept quiet if there were complaints about the contractor. Ensure the VDC and CRS talk together. Provide quality houses and provide furniture. Ensure the position of the water tank is to the right of the toilet and that communities are provided a place to pray. Observations Original site : People were reserved and less open compared to the other villages that in FGD participated in the evaluation. They are unhappy about the relocation of some members of the village. Tensions now exist between people located in the two different sites though families are related.
Relocation site: People were very open, friendly and smiling though some noted that jealousy has arisen between residents in the new and old sits over perceived differences in treatment by CRS. .
Observations Original Site: A complaint about a subsiding floor was checked by visiting the house. It outside FGDs was found not to be true and no one was even living in the house. The old village has a small population, no coffees shop and one small kiosk. 6houses didn’t look occupied. In one house visited the woman had changed the kitchen into a prayer room.
Relocation site : There were many satellite dishes, and some motorcycles around. Every house had electricity. Some houses were not occupied.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 74 Profile of village E 82 and villagers’ input to the evaluation
Pre-Tsunami This village is in the district of Aceh Barat. It is a peri-urban area that stretches out along the coast approximately 5 km south of Meulaboh. Running parallel to the coast and dividing the village between east and west is a highway that links Aceh Barat with other coastal communities to the south. The road serves as the primary thoroughfare through the village. Prior to the tsunami, there were 349 households in the village with a total population of 1,449. The primary livelihoods were fishing (30%); farming (30%), civil servants (10%), and entrepreneurs and other trades people (30%).
The village is located by a beautiful and famous beach. Members of the community were able to earn extra income because of the large number of visitors to the beach. The origin of the village’s name is not known for certain, but it may be derived from the historic name for a Mango-like tree.
Tsunami Community members were engaged in their usual morning activities when the 26 December 2004 earthquake occurred. Following the earthquake, many people feared a tsunami, or were warned that one was coming. These individuals fled inland. Forty-eight village residents (from 1,449) died in the tsunami. When survivors returned home, they found most of the community destroyed, though nine houses as well as the school and mosque, remained standing. These structures along with the road would require significant repairs. The tsunami left the village covered in knee high deep mud and debris. One hundred metres of land was lost from the coastline and agricultural fields were damaged as were many shallow wells.
Emergency Following the tsunami, a surviving school became a place of refuge for some. Others moved to a nearby village while some used standing walls of houses to build a wooden shelter. No assistance was provided for four days and people lived on coconut milk. Thereafter, many agencies provided assistance. UNHCR and MSF Holland provided tents and built barracks. UNDP and CRS (in partnership with WFP) distributed food. Other NGOs including the Indonesian and Spanish Red Crosses distributed non-food items. The community earned income through Cash for Work programs implemented by Oxfam and Mercy Corps.
Recovery The community ended up living in different locations. Approximately 25% lived in barracks, 30% remained in tents and 45% stayed with extended family members. Livelihoods projects were sponsored by Mercy Corps, other aid agencies and CRS carried out an enterprise development project that supported joinery workshops and traditional cake sellers.
Reconstruction CRS constructed 195 permanent houses in the village. There were five construction phases with the first beginning in July 2005 and last in September 2006. All houses were rebuilt on original plots. Habitat built 129 permanent houses and BRR 15. Various agencies repaired the mosque and school; village roads and a community hall were rebuilt. CRS sponsored a Community-based Shallow Well project providing materials and technical support to homeowners who wanted to build their own shallow-well. AIPRD and Oxfam also improved water supply. Many fishermen have returned to their work. Farming is not fully recovered. Many residents of the village have for now found better paying jobs in construction and other sectors boosted by the tsunami recovery.
82 This profile was confirmed with a leader and additional input provided by those participating in focus group discussions.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 75 Views on the CRS reconstruction program from people in village E
Question Responses
What CRS Houses (All respondents). CRS was the first to build houses here. did well, successfully Other comments varied and included Men said phase one house is strong with brick and steel. Phase 2 has nice wood but there are problems with windows and door frame. They were happy to get cows from Mercy Corps as they had doubled in number from 20 to 40. Women said a house and shallow well as a house is the most important thing for us. Impact/ Comments varied and included difference made Many said they are happy to have a bigger house complete with toilet and water. Women said people have come back to the village. After moving from barracks to a permanent house they feel more relaxed and safer. Now we can focus our efforts to get livelihood support from other aid organizations Men and women said there is no gap within the community as we feel there is no rich and poor anymore. Though there is some social jealousy because not everyone received a house. VDC said now we have a place to stay and the house can be inherited by our grandchildren. As CRS has provided houses we no longer have to cut trees from the forest to build houses. A woman said that the road is better so we bought a motorcycle. A man said now with a house we can save money for our children’s higher education. The leader said that support from other agencies as well as CRS had helped things to return to normal. Compared to before the tsunami houses are better. If no NGOs had come they would still be living in tents and if some had houses they would not be as good as the ones they have now. Recovery Housing: Range varied from 50-100% with men, leaders and VDC giving high percentages. Women gave 50% with some women saying they greatly appreciate the house but suspect it is causing health problem as asbestos was used. Some women gave lower percents as ceilings and water tanks leaking and they cannot use toilets.
Watsan : Range varied from 20%-100%. Those giving low percentages said that shallow wells don’t have drinkable water. Others gave a higher percent saying that most houses have a well with drinkable water.
Infrastructure: ranged from 70%-100% and no reasons were given.
Economic: Ranged from 50%-100% with those giving lower percentages saying even though we have more money than earlier, goods are more expensive. Others gave a high percent with a former leader saying economy more than 100% recovered because people have more cars and motorcycles now.
Overall recovery : VDC said it is only 90% because 30families have not received a house. Their houses were damaged by the tsunami and the damage has got worse overtime. ‘Some feel uncomfortable when sitting in our beautiful houses while these families live in houses which continue to deteriorate. This is causing social jealousy .’
CRS’s Ranged from 40% - 95% for housing. Some women gave 40% saying the new house is contribution smaller. Others gave higher percent as many have received good houses. to recovery Water: 15- 20% as some wells don’t have drinkable water.
Overall recovery from 33-90%. One man and the former leader gave CRS high
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 76 percentages though there were other providers of housing in the village and many agencies had done infrastructure.
Community Men said that the community participated in beneficiary selection and men knew involvement about the complaints system. Some women were sometimes involved in the community meetings for beneficiary selection, and choosing a house design. Some women represented the men in their family and participated in monitoring house construction. Some of them reported to CRS directly about house defects. However other women did not know about the defect and liability period and some did not know about the complaints system. Some did not receive much information from CRS. The leader said that sometimes the community did not understand the procedures given by CRS (former leader). Do differently Men and women said ensure assistance meets priority needs. next time Men said first meet basic needs including health and follow this with permanent housing, and then livelihoods. Provide assistance directly to community and not through leaders and others. Use the same materials and design for all houses in a village and use local materials that are familiar to people in that place. Women said have good communication with entire community not only men but also women and provide a bigger kitchen. The VDC said ensure beneficiary selection is thorough and check to verify that all beneficiaries meet criteria. Observations Age range: VDC: 24 – 50 years old (all men), in men’s group it was 29 – 63 years old, in FGD and women’s groups women were 24 – 60 years old.
Discussions flowed well and participants were willing to share.
Observations Most houses are occupied. A few rent CRS houses. People are planting vegetables in outside FGDs gardens for their own consumption. Village seemed a busy suburb near to Meulaboh and it is on a main road. Local businesses are operating, i.e. kiosks, vehicle workshops, etc. Houses built by various NGOs are easily noted throughout the village. Water tank in mosque and school area are visible and seemed to be running well, particularly for praying purposes.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 77 Profile of village F 83 and villagers’ input to the evaluation
Pre-Tsunami This village is located in the district of Aceh Barat. It is approximately ½ kilometre east of the Indian Ocean, and there are other villages located between this village and the sea. Most of the other surrounding land is rice fields. Prior to the tsunami, there were 111 families living in the village and a total population of 480. Among the employed, 70% are farmers (including those working on rubber plantations), 15% fishermen, 5% traders, 5% entrepreneurs and 5% civil servants.
Tsunami When the earthquake occurred on 26 December 2004, many people were already working in the fields or rubber forests. Some residents of the village were warned that a tsunami was coming by residents of coastal communities who were fleeing the beaches after seeing the water recede. Others had little or no warning that the waves were coming. As the waves hit the village, many people were running further inland towards the surrounding villages. Others had climbed to the second story of the village mosque. Fortunately, the mosque, though heavily damaged, withstood the waves and those who sought refuge there were saved. A total of three significant waves struck the coast, with the second wave being the most destructive. Forty people in the village (about 8% of the total population) died in the tsunami. Almost all homes and buildings, other than the mosque, were destroyed. The day after the tsunami, many survivors travelled to a nearby village in Woyla sub-district where they received assistance from the Camat of Woyla. Others, who had been separated from their loved ones by escaping in different directions, were reunited at the village mosque.
Emergency Soon after the tsunami, the Indonesian government built barracks in the village and most community members stayed there. Some families stayed with their relatives in other villages. WFP and World Vision provided food. Mercy Corps, Spanish Red Cross and CRS sponsored Cash for Work (CFW) programs. Solidarite provided water.
Recovery Many people could not return to their traditional livelihoods. Many rice fields were permanently flooded, becoming small saltwater inlets. All fishing boats had been destroyed. There were many CFW activities in the village. Among them, CRS rehabilitated the mosque and built a road through CFW. WFP continued to provide food in cooperation with CRS and World Vision.
Reconstruction CRS built 110 permanent houses and rehabilitated seven other houses that had been heavily damaged. There were three phases of house construction and the first one started in August 2005. It was stopped due to poor quality work by the contractor. These houses were finally finished by a new contractor in November 2006. Phase II ran from September 2006 to July 2007 and the third phase from February 2007 to August 2007 and some community based shallow wells were refurbished. BRR rebuilt 16 additional permanent houses. World Vision rebuilt the kindergarten that had been destroyed. CRS, partnering with Norwegian Red Cross built a borehole. ICMC was active in delivering health services. Livelihoods are still not fully recovered. Fewer people are farming than before the tsunami, but some former farmers are now harvesting rubber. Other workers have found jobs with NGOs or in the construction sector.
83 This profile was confirmed with the village leader and additional input provided by those participating in focus group discussions.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 78 Views on the CRS reconstruction program from people in village F
Questions Responses
What CRS Housing, the mosque and CFW (all respondents). did well successfully • Women said the house is strong and beautiful. • Men said the house is a luxury for us. Impact/ • Many said they were very happy to have a house but feel uncomfortable because some difference who met the criteria did not get a house. made • Men said now we have a proper place to live and don’t have to live in tents. Most houses are better than before. We can save money for children’s schooling as we don’t need to use money for building a house. • Women said now have a proper place to live and a place to pray. The house and our village are more beautiful than before the tsunami. One woman said that public facilities are better than before the tsunami. Another woman said that before the tsunami we could work in the farm, but now there are no more rice fields. There was plenty of assistance but there is no maintenance. • The VDC said that those they received a boat can earn money fishing. Recovery Housing : Ranged from 80 – 100% with many giving lower percent and saying not all received houses due to poor beneficiary verification process.
Infrastructure : Ranged from 20-90%. Those giving lower percents said that the road still needs fixing and those giving higher percent said overall infrastructure is enough and it is being used by entire village.
Watsan : Ranged from 0-20%. Many said that the water quality in wells is worst than before tsunami. Some toilets are leaking, and some of the shallow wells are not completed. Economy : Most said it is mostly back to normal or around 70%. Only a few reported that the price of food is higher and this makes it hard for them. A microfinance institution was established by members of VDC and villagers and a donor (name not mention), and the house is used as collateral to get a loan of Rp 5,000,000/hh. The loan can be obtained within a week’s time.
Psychologically: 1 traumatized villagers possibly due to social conflict (1W)
CRS Housing: 60 – 80% most gave high percents and those giving lower percent because contribution 24families still don’t have houses. to recovery Infrastructure: 10-75% with those giving high percents saying the mosque was renovated.
Watsan: 70% as shallow wells were only done for phase one houses and a borehole and latrines built though the women said they could not use the borehole as it is too far so they have to buy water for drinking and cooking.
Community • Men said in the first phase people were not very involved because they were still in tents involvement and later if people complained the contractor threatened them. • The VDC said they were not involved in beneficiary selection and CRS only worked with keucik and the people posted at emergency posts in the village. • Men and women said the community was involve in planning, monitoring of house construction, shallow well repairs and we could complain but we did not select the house design and house colour. • One woman said she felt left out from meetings with CRS and that meetings were not transparent as they were only with the important people.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 79 Do differently The VDC said involve the VDC in all aspects of the program especially beneficiary selection. next time Men said build permanent houses like you did this time.
Women made various recommendations including: build the same houses for all to avoid conflict/social jealousy, do needs assessment and ensure response fits the context and ensure all public facilities including boreholes are built in the centre of the village.
Observations There was only one FGD with women. Only one woman came for the second group. Second in FGD FGD for men only had 3men. Men said that there was a football match on which all the other men had gone to. Some people dominated in some of the FGDs.
Observations Village on main road between two major towns so gets a lot of traffic. Many small kiosks and a outside FGD few coffee shops and restaurants. Gardens and small animals were seen around many of the houses. Leader showed us his rubber producing area and reported many in the village had returned to rubber extraction to earn money. In a visit to widow’s house she said she was very pleased with the house and would only have a kitchen by now if she had not had support. She uses the latrine for storage as she is used to having the toilet outside. She is in the process of building a latrine.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 80 Annex Nine: Summary of views from external agencies
Who was interviewed? Eight different external informants were interviewed. Three of them work with the GOI, three with NGOs and two with multilaterals. All respondents have known CRS for a few years at least and some since CRS began their work here in 2005. Two know CRS outside of Aceh. A number of informants said they were speaking in a personal capacity and not on behalf of their agency.
What they said CRS did well The GOI informants and others commended CRS for working well with government and other agencies. They said CRS coordinated meetings and was always willing to share knowledge and information about what they were doing and learning with other agencies. CRS they said tried to encourage coordination between all agencies.
Many commented on the staff saying that CRS was staffed well with professional competent people who had the right skills. CRS staff were considered approachable, capable and one said enjoyable to work with, while another said he would be happy to work with CRS again.
CRS housing they said was of high quality. Some said that the standards set for construction were high and showed concern for the safety of structures and the appropriateness of land where houses were built. ‘They did not want to create slums.’ ‘ They met their commitment to build safe high quality houses that are earthquake resistant. ’ ‘ At a glance the houses they built look outstanding, like a home you would like to move into.’ ‘For the amount of money they were spending on each house they were way better than what other NGOs built.’ One said ‘ CRS took shortcuts on community involvement to build a lot of houses fast and this was probably appropriate given the pressures to build quickly. ’
On larger infrastructure CRS was also rated highly. A number of people spoke of the park in Banda Aceh saying how well it is used and ‘it is one of the best projects CRS did. The park provides a livelihood for at least 50people who sell items there and it is the only green public space in Banda Aceh not owned by the military.’
The impact of CRS’s reconstruction program Some noted that CRS’s housing program ensured families moved from tents to living in a house and from not having to having a house. This they thought must make a real difference to these families but that we needed to ask them. ‘Only they can speak of the quality of the house and whether they have amenities such as water and electricity.’ Another said ‘ the impact must be enormous as families can be grounded and now get on with other aspects of their lives.’
One said that CRS influenced a better house design that was followed by other NGOs. On the other hand he noted that all NGOs including CRS increased rental costs for local people as NGOs were all paying such high prices for offices and houses.
Recovery 84 The percentage given for housing recovery was between 80-100%. For micro-infrastructure some said about 80% is complete and is of better quality now than before the tsunami while for larger infrastructure they said this is an on-going task. A few said that water supply still needs to be addressed and has a long way to go.
Economic recovery provoked different responses with some saying the economy particularly in Banda Aceh is now a thriving economy. Others said economically much still needs to be done and a few said that the economy at present is distorted. This was credited to high NGO salaries, the earlier cash for work programs and the construction boom while houses were being built though this is now slowing down.
84 The question on recovery was not asked in relation to CRS’s program but generally about how Aceh has recovered since the tsunami.
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 81 These they said had increased wages, rents and the cost of other goods. There was uncertainty how the economy would fare as more and more NGOs exit and construction projects wind down.
Recommendations for what CRS should do when responding to the next large natural disaster Two thought that livelihood support was more important than building houses, ‘ If you have a job you can eventually build your own house’. One said ‘NGOs should leave housing construction to the government and local people.’ and do livelihood activities and community development programs. Another said ‘CRS does great health programs in other parts of the world and they were not sure why they had not done a larger health program in Aceh. ’
Four said CRS should do the same thing the next time. They have demonstrated they can run a large reconstruction program well.
Others said that if you are going to do housing ensure that there is tight supervision of contractors and a payment system with contractors so they are checked at key stages of construction so defects are caught and addressed early. Initially CRS had problems in these areas but it learned quickly and strengthened its contractor management and supervision procedures fast.
Finally one said all NGOs need to coordinate and partner more with others in emergencies of this scale. ‘Too many NGOs worked alone during this crisis.’
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 82 Annex Ten: Developments in housing design
Banda Aceh:
In May of 2005 BRR set standards for permanent shelter designs. In Banda Aceh CRS asked contractors to submit designs based on these standards. Three designs were chosen as the CRS Banda Aceh standard designs; these designs were 42 meters squared with kitchens, bathrooms inside the house and washrooms (for clothes) outside the house. These designs were submitted to and received approval from the Department of Public Works. Families/communities could choose from the three designs, but opportunities to change the designs were fairly limited (i.e. roof colour, and paint colour).
Overtime however, changes in the designs did occur. Most of these changes were structural (i.e. size of the columns, type of roof, and type of trusses) rather than layout. However, late phase houses in two of the villages were built with bathrooms outside. Also, changes were made in the later phases to beautify the exterior facades of the house.
Three villages are exceptions to the rules. These houses were all built by the same contractor with a pre- fab house design that was 45 meters squared. In this design the bathroom/washroom and kitchen are inside the house. One of the villages requested significant changes in the foundation and floor designs. Because of the low-elevation of the original site, the houses needed to be on pilings. Original designs called for wooden floors, but based on community requests, the designs were changed to include concrete floors which were structurally superior to the wooden floors. The change mandated an additional re-design in the foundation and pilings to support the extra weight. The other two villages requested a different design of roof. The requested design was more ornate but not structurally superior. CRS denied this request based on costs. The other design specifications of this pre-fab designed house were accepted by villages.
Meulaboh: Ministry of Public Works officials from the district governments of Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya conducted a meeting with all INGO’s involved with permanent shelter construction in May 2005. In this meeting the government officials requested the INGOs to build houses (type 45 m2) with 2 bedrooms, 1 bathroom, 1 kitchen, 1 living room, 1 dining room, a small front and back terrace and the following technical considerations: 1 bedroom min standard size 3m x 3m = 9 m2 1 bedroom min standard size 3m x 3m = 9 m2 1 bathroom min standard size 1.5m x 1.5m = 2.25 m2 1 living room min standard size 3m x 4m = 12 m2 1 dining room min standard size 3m x 3m = 9 m2 1 kitchen min standard size 2m x 1m = 2 m2 Front terrace min standard size 1m x 3 m = 3 m2 Back terrace min standard size 1m x 2 m = 2 m2 Total standard Minimum = 48.25 m2
All CRS houses have complied with these standards with the exception of 37 houses in one village (and a handful of houses in a few other villages) that required a tailored design due to a particularly small plot of land.
In late 2005 CRS initiated a process to revise the permanent shelter design. The design changes were based on engineer’s insights into improving the strength and quality of the construction and on feedback from communities where housing construction had already begun. Several draft designs were presented to people in Village M (where housing had not begun). People in Village M (not a sample village in this evaluation) commented on the designs. From this and previous feedback, three designs were finalized. These designs were given as options to all shelter beneficiaries (approximately 2,000) whose houses were started after April 2006. A beneficiary with a large plot of land could choose from all three options. Families with small or irregular shaped properties only had one or two choices. After Village M gave its
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 83 input the basic designs were finalized. Families in other villages could make small modifications (e.g. orientation of rooms, some choices in paint colour and roof colour, minor modifications in the kitchen) but they did not have the same degree of input as Village M in designing their houses.
The most significant changes made in the Meulaboh house design during the December 05-April 06 revision phase are detailed below:
1. Beneficiaries requested that their houses be wider in shape, so one of the designs was modified to be wider with less depth. Beneficiaries also requested that more sunlight be allowed into the main living space, so two windows were added. The roof was also extended in this modified design.
2. Kitchen and toilet area must be located outside the house. This is to minimize the smell circulating inside the house. Also, it is a customary practice by the Acehnese to wash their feet before entering the house. Having the toilet outside of the house allowed observance of this custom more convenient. 85
3. The kitchen door and toilet door would not directly face one another.
4. Material Improvements: These originated from the Engineers rather than the beneficiaries. Designs and building materials were presented and explained to communities, but communities were not given the choice to substitute materials as it would not be practical to accommodate a wide variety of requests and it was presumed that CRS Engineers were in a better position to make these decisions. • Concrete hollow blocks replaced clay bricks in the construction of walls • Light gauge steel trusses replaced timber trusses. • Gypsum board and calsium silicate board replaced plywood in the ceilings and outside gables. • Dry wall, light gauge steel and calsium silicate board replaced masonry on the interior walls • Long-span galvanized aluminium roof sheets replaced GI corrugated roof sheets • Aluminium window frames replaced wooden window frames • PVC replaced wood as the material for bathroom doors • Sustainable septic systems replaced standard septic tanks.
85 20% of CRS houses in Meulaboh had the bathroom and kitchen inside the house. In this evaluation, 42% of the houses in the Meulaboh sample villages had this type of design. In the focus group discussions, many beneficiaries who received houses with the bathroom and kitchen inside criticized this design detail. The frequency of this criticism is in part due to an oversampling of this population .
Aceh Evaluation Report 18 May 2008 84 Annex Eleven: The CRS Aceh community engagement process for the reconstruction program
Below is a description of the community processes which the CRS/ Aceh program followed when carrying out permanent reconstruction projects, particularly housing. The description provided is general and the exact processes often varied from village to village.
The first formal step in a reconstruction project is the signing of an MOU. The MOU is between CRS and a local government official (i.e. Bupati, Camat, and Kapala Desa). It specifies the particular projects (including the number of houses in a particular village) to which CRS is committing. In many cases, reconstruction projects were planned in communities where CRS was implementing emergency programs so relations were already established with the community.
Subsequent to signing a shelter MOU, CRS conducts a formal assessment to verify the number of houses that are to be built. The MOU mandates that the final assessment number shall constitute a revision of the number originally prescribed in the MOU. In verifying permanent shelter beneficiaries, CRS follows the four BRR criteria: 1) The beneficiary owned the house, 2) The beneficiary owned the land on which the house stood, 3) The beneficiary lived in the house at the time of the tsunami, and 4) The house was totally destroyed. Heads of household who meet these criteria in the villages cited in CRS’ permanent shelter MOUs become CRS permanent shelter beneficiaries.
There are many steps intended to ensure that eligible beneficiaries are on the list and that ineligible beneficiaries are identified and removed from the list. The first formal step after signing the MOU is a meeting with all community members. The assessment process is explained and assessment forms, which seek general family data and ask a series of questions aimed at determining eligibility, are distributed to all families. In approximately one week, CRS staff members collect the assessment forms and other documentation (copy of ID card and family card, temporary land certificate and head of household photo). After some cross-checking of information with local officials, and speaking with several of the perspective beneficiaries about their responses, a “provisional assessment” is produced and posted on the village information board, typically for one week. Community members are asked to review the “provisional assessment” and offer their comments, either privately or publicly to CRS staff members. Beneficiary lists are also regularly submitted for review to mid and senior level CRS/Aceh management, BRR, UNORC and BAPPEDA (Bupati’s public works office). During each level and phase of review, more information emerges. For some families who were left off the provisional list, evidence arises that they should be on the list. For other families who were on the list, evidence surfaces indicating that they are not eligible.
The most common example of ineligible applicants is “sub-families”. This is a situation where multiple generations (i.e. grandparents, nuclear family, eldest son and his family) are all living in the same house prior to the tsunami. Because there is a “one house destroyed, one house re-built” policy, this multi- generational family is only eligible for one re-built permanent house. However, in many cases, the eldest son will apply for a house for his family in addition to the one sought by his parents and younger siblings. In other situations, some applicants claim to have been living in the community, but were not. Also, some individuals apply for multiple houses from different NGOs in different villages. There are numerous nuances that separate eligible candidates from ineligible ones.
Following the abundance of information that emerges during the review process, the CRS staff members spend considerable time meeting with individual families, local officials and other stakeholders to triangulate information and derive the most accurate assessment possible. Sometimes community members are asked to draw a map of their original village, naming the family that resided on each plot. Other times, CRS staff members will accompany community members on a walk-through of the original village to identify the owners of specific housing footprints. These activities often yield clarity when family’s dispute placements on the map or more than one family claims the same housing site. All of these situations are difficult and delicate and require significant cross-checking to arrive at the best possible answer.
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When CRS believes its beneficiary list is correct, it is again posted on the village information board. In some villages, the process of review and revision is repeated several times before a “final” beneficiary list is posted. In other villages, the process is more easily completed. Ultimately, those who are deemed eligible beneficiaries proceed with the pre-construction steps of choosing a housing design and staking out their property indicating where the corners of the house should be. When plots are staked out and the CRS Engineering team confirms the suitability of each site for construction, the computerized site plans are updated and finalized. These site plans, along with the final beneficiary lists are posted on Village Information Boards and submitted to the Camat and other applicable authorities for approval. Those who are not deemed eligible generally have an opportunity to appeal and can be considered in a later phase of construction, assuming sufficient information surfaces in the meantime that proves their eligibility.
In the Pre-Construction Meeting, CRS Area Team and Engineering staff, the contractors and community members meet to discuss the construction process. The roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder are established. To mitigate conflicts between community members and contractors, CRS serves as the liaison between the two. Community members are asked to address their concerns or questions directly to the CRS staff (Area Team or Engineers) and contractors are asked to do the same. It is established that CRS staff members will be available on a weekly basis to address the concerns of community members. During the construction process, formal community meetings are held only when a particular issue mandates it. Most issues are resolved with the relevant individuals as they arise. Throughout the joint monitoring of community construction by both Engineering and Area Team staff, when key issues arise and meetings are facilitated to address them, CRS field staff aim to document resolutions through meeting notes that are shared with the Village Head and/or posted in the village afterwards.
When the houses are complete and ready to be occupied, the community, contractors and CRS will often gather for a handover ceremony. These are sometimes elaborate affairs with music, dancing and food, but other times it is a simple ceremony to give beneficiaries their keys and to begin the six-month “defects and liability” period. During this time, beneficiaries have the opportunity to report flaws in the construction or items that need to be repaired. CRS and the contractor are responsible for fixing those problems that resulted from faulty construction, but not from normal wear and tear. After the six-month period ends, CRS’s obligation is complete and the contractors receive their retention payment.
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