Maritime Security, in Itself, Is Critical to Sustainable Development
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1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF REAR-ADMIRAL R.W. HIGGS KEYNOTE ADDRESS ON THE OCCASION OF “CONFERENCE ON BRICS AND AFRICA: A PARTNERSHIP FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT” Hosted by The South African Institute for International Affairs 2 I am indeed humbled to present the keynote address to such an esteemed gathering of leading academic minds, international stakeholders and subject specialists gathered here this morning to interrogate, deliberate and reflect upon the key issue of sustainable development and its symbiotic relationship with security. Pursuant to the outcomes of the 5th BRICS Summit (also known as the eThekwini Declaration and Action Plan) where BRICS Leaders expressed their commitment to Peace and Security on the African continent, I wish to reflect for a moment on the key issue of security. It has been posited that peace and stability is a pre-requisite to development and that security, is a precursor to sustainable development. I submit that maritime security, in itself, is critical to sustainable development. Thus nation states, regional and continental stakeholders (and particularly their Navies) each have a role to play in ensuring the maritime security of the region, thereby ensuring sustainable development. 3 Recognition of the importance of the sea to nation states in terms of access to trade, sustainable development of the riches in and below the sea and the other economic prospects presented by the ocean, (such as tourism), has led to the realisation that securing the maritime domain is an empirical act of national interest - therefore fundamental to the nation’s economic wellbeing. All nations, whether coastal or landlocked, are to a greater or lesser extent dependent on the sea for the continued success of their economies and the well-being of their people. This dependence is based on the freedom of nations to use the highways provided by the oceans to ply their trade to all the corners of the earth. This we know. We also know that there has been a noticeable shift of the global center of power towards the Indian and Pacific Ocean – in particular the shift of U.S. attention and resources to the Asia-Pacific region. We see the increased requirement for energy and natural resources and the importance this holds for emerging economies such as India and China. 4 Indeed, a large percentage of Indian trade, including oil, transits through the Gulf of Aden and therefore the safety of maritime trade, via this route, is of national concern for India as it directly impacts their economy – more so for South Africa, an emerging economy where more than 95% of its imports and exports in tonnage pass through its ports. We also note that in the last decade, regional and international actors have developed renewed interests in the southern Atlantic as opposed to the historic North Atlantic focus. Brazil, in particular, has renewed its strategic interest in the South Atlantic and Africa. These trends, in itself, indicate the marked shift in regional dynamics, national interest and strategic focus and so too, the accompanying challenges. Professor Oliver Stuenkel of the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo, Brazil while noting its economic benefits he also highlighted the significant potential BRICS could have in security where it could serve as a platform for managing the challenges to security. 5 He pointed out that the BRICS members have coastlines with the Atlantic Ocean (South Africa and Brazil), the Indian Ocean (India and South Africa), the Pacific (China and Russia) and the Arctic Ocean (Russia), and they are therefore bound to play a key role in the governance of the seas. More importantly, these are vast areas to govern single-handedly. We note that the Navies of both India and China are able to project their forces and are actively doing so, for example, off the Horn of Africa in anti-piracy operations. And, in a bid to strengthen its maritime security, the Brazilian Navy is actively pursuing a military-industrial indigenization strategy which includes the development of a nuclear submarine and Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) ship-building capability. Very recently, Brazil had acquired 3 new OPVs by BAE, the AMAZONAS, APA and ARAGUARI, and will build subsequent vessels locally. Furthermore, we know too that the Russian Navy has been involved in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa. A recent report dated 22 Oct indicates that during the period 2008-2013, the Russian Navy has conducted 19 campaigns that led 148 convoys of some 717 commercial ships through potential pirate threat areas. 6 Therefore, a multilateral relationship which includes the Russian Navy would indeed be mutually beneficial. Taking all of these into account, most notably the capacity of our BRICS partners, it is clear that issues of collective security can and must play a key role going forward. One such “collective” – already well entrenched - is the IBSA grouping incorporating India, Brazil and South Africa – the political leadership of which, in fact, acknowledged that a secure environment can never be achieved by the efforts of a single country. During an interaction between the Chiefs of the respective Navies in 2007, it was decided that a system of regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region needed to be formulated, to combat threats emanating from non-state actors such as those related to terrorism, armed robbery and piracy. The result was the IBSAMAR series of naval exercises – the first of which was held from 5-16 May 2008. These were designed to, among others, facilitate interoperability and compatibility of combat capabilities, enhance readiness for multi-lateral operations, develop and improve doctrine, tactics and operating procedures. 7 Consequently, the South Africa Navy gained entrance to IONS (the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium) which afforded it further access to a host of technological and functional training opportunities. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation with India and Brazil respectively has each had its own benefits for the South African Navy and vice versa, and in many instances, for the region as a whole. In fact, the EXERCISE ATLASUR series with Navies of Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and Uruguay has already become an institution and much has been learned. As an example, plans are far advanced to conduct a West Coast naval exercise concomitant with the next EXERCISE IBSAMAR and ATLASUR which are scheduled to take place in Sep and Oct 2014 respectively. Plans are afoot to invite a number of Navies on the African West Coast to participate. The exercise will be dubbed “EXERCISE ATLANTIC TIDINGS” which will, in turn, foster and expand mutually beneficial relations between, for example, Brazil and Angola. This, we are confident, will facilitate capacity building in the region within the context of its Maritime Security Strategy. 8 At this point I hasten to add that South Africa took the lead in developing a SADC Maritime Security Strategy (MSS) that was endorsed by the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in June 2011 and was supported by the SADC 31st Summit of the Heads of State in Luanda on 9 August 2011. The focus of the strategy is on eliminating piracy in SADC’s Eastern Indian Ocean. Three general lines of military action were identified in the military concept namely; prevent piracy attacks at sea by reducing the vulnerability of the maritime domain to piracy; interrupt and terminate acts of piracy by means consistent with international law and the rights and responsibilities of coastal and flag states. 3 SADC counties viz Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa then took the lead in operationalising the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. The Ministers of Defence from Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania signed the MOU on Maritime Co-operation on 13 December 2011 in Maputo, giving effect to the spirit of the SADC Maritime Security Strategy, as adopted in Luanda. The respective Ministers of Defence adopted the Maritime Co-operation MOU in Dar es Salaam on 14 February 2012. 9 Professor João Paulo Coelho, of the Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Mozambique stated in a recent study: “The regional response of piracy in the two coasts is associated with the strong presence of the South African Navy at sea. The tri-partite agreement between Mozambique (et al) in response to the regional threats … has been seen as a positive response to the threats.” As we speak, the South African Navy frigate SAS ISANDLWANA is handing over to the Offshore Patrol Vessels SAS ISAAC DYOBHA and SAS GALESHEWE where they will continue conducting OPERATION COPPER - anti-piracy operations - in the Mozambican channel. Furthermore, all multilateral naval exercises conducted by the SA Navy, including those with the Navies of BRICS, will in future be aimed at achieving the objectives of the SADC Maritime Security Strategy. An example of this is the last EXERCISE GOODHOPE V, conducted with the German Navy, where the primary focus was on anti-piracy operations. 10 In this regard, the SA Navy, I can confidently announce, is now at a level where it is able to assume the lead in exercises of this nature. When one considers this within the context of the Navies of BRICS however, one is readily able to identify areas of cooperation which contributes to a collective approach and ultimately, control of the seas. The Regional Maritime Domain Awareness Centres, recently established by the SA Navy in Durban and Silvermine immediately springs to mind. This is an area that can be further integrated and developed to provide not only a comprehensive maritime picture for example but also a collective response if required. Examples of these are search and rescue, salvage, pollution control and fishery patrols. CONCLUSION In referring to the Cuban Missile Crisis, President John F.