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Home , Big Wing, Dowding system, Hugh Dowding, Strait of Dover

Their Finest

HourBy John T. Correll

he , which Germany would have consolidated its began 75 years ago this month, domination of Europe. Had Britain been was the single most important unable to continue the fi ght, the United engagement of World War II. If States would not likely have entered the the British had lost, the conse- European war. Even if it did, there would quences would have been catastrophic. have been no bases in Britain from which TAt best, Britain would have had to to conduct a bombing offensive against seek a peace settlement with Germany Germany or launch a D-Day invasion of on Hitler’s terms, which would have Europe. been severe. would Without an Atlantic front siphoning most likely have been replaced as Prime off forces and resources, Germany may— Minister by the Foreign Secretary, Lord or may not—have been able to defeat the An RAF Spitfire chases a Bf 109 during a dogfight in the Battle of Halifax, or former Prime Minister David Soviet Union. Conversely, if the Soviets Britain, in this painting by Ivan Berry- Lloyd George. Both of them thought defeated Germany, there would be nothing man. negotiation with Germany was inevitable. to impede their march further west. Hitler 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 From an original painting by Ivan Berryman, courtesy of Cranston Fine Arts

The British were expected to lose the Battle of Britain. Fortunately, Winston Churchill and the RAF thought otherwise.

might well have won World War II—and fast-moving German army, supported by its own dominions and empire, Britain if he did not, Stalin would have. panzers and Stuka dive bombers, over- stood alone. When the Battle of Britain began in whelmed the Netherlands and Belgium in Churchill, 65, had served in Parliament July 1940, the British were not expected a matter of days. surrendered on and various Cabinet positions for 40 years. to win. That they did win was primarily June 22. Britain was fortunate to extract He was First Lord of the Admiralty at the attributable to the strength and character its retreating expeditionary forces from beginning of and again in of Winston Churchill and the Royal Air the beaches at . 1939. In time, he would be recognized Force—and to critical mistakes by Hitler The United States was not yet in as one of Britain’s greatest leaders, but and the Luftwaffe. the war, nor was Russia. Only seven that was still to come. In May 1940, the percent of Americans were willing to Conservative Party turned to him—in BRITAIN STOOD ALONE go to war on the side of the British. The desperation and with considerable re- In the summer of 1940, Britain’s situ- Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact luctance—to replace the hapless Neville ation was grim. In less than two months, of 1939 was still in effect, not broken Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Many Germany had conquered most of western until Germany invaded the Soviet Union of his colleagues and much of the ruling Europe from Norway to the Pyrenees. The in June 1941. Except for the support of class disliked Churchill and distrusted AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 31 him as reckless, belligerent, and drawn to adventure and romanticism. Appeasement and defeatism were strong in the British Foreign Office. Af- ter Dunkirk, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Britain had lost. He inquired through Italian intermediar- ies what Hitler’s terms for peace with Britain would be. David Lloyd George, Prime Minister from 1916 to 1922, also believed it was futile to fight.

Clockwise from top: Contrails left by British and German aircraft after a dogfight during the Battle of Britain. . The leader of Fighter Command was bril- liant and capable but cold and aloof. His detractors worked constantly to oust him from command. Prime Minister Winston Churchill flashes the iconic “V” for victory sign. Surrounded by defeatists and appeasers, Churchill convinced the British to stand reso- lutely against the threat of a German invasion. 32 / July 2015 A Hurricane circles overhead as a Heinkel He 111 sinks into the water near the British islands of Scilly in this painting by Berryman.

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US Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy was on the beaches. Thus the British were Baldwin said. “The only defense is in convinced that the Germans would win in the unanticipated position of relying offense.” the impending Battle of Britain. So was on RAF Fighter Command as their first Fighter Command, organized in 1936, American aviator Charles A. Lindbergh, line of defense. was regarded by almost everyone, includ- who had toured Germany as a guest of The , the traditional strength ing the , as secondary in the Luftwaffe. of the island nation, still ranked first among importance to Bomber Command. From Gen. Maxime Weygand, commander the armed forces. The RAF had been a its beginning, Fighter Command was led of the defeated French forces, predicted separate service since 1918, created in by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, an that “in three weeks, will have response to the relentless bombing of outstanding but eccentric officer known her neck wrung like a chicken.” Britain by German Zeppelins in World as “Stuffy” for his cold personality. He Churchill, undaunted, vowed that “we War I. However, its founding father, was stubborn and aloof, and he had no will never surrender” as he rallied the Marshal of the RAF Hugh M. Trenchard, ability to charm his fellow air marshals or nation with a ringing call to arms: “Let built the force around long-range strate- the politicians. Some young airmen saw us, therefore, brace ourselves to our duty gic bombardment. Like many airmen of him as too old, lacking in spirit, and too and so bear ourselves that, if the British his day—including Billy Mitchell in the long away from active flying. Empire and its Commonwealth last for a United States—Trenchard believed that Of greater consequence, “Dowding thousand years, men will still say, ‘This the bomber was the primary instrument was perhaps the one man of consequence was their finest hour.’ ” of airpower. in the —perhaps in the This conviction was reflected in national entire world—who did not believe that E O I EM policy. In 1932, —who the bomber would ‘always get through,’ ” A German invasion of Great Brit- was Prime Minister three times between said historian Michael Korda. ain was contingent on air superiority. the world wars—famously declared that Fighter Command, under the “Dowd- Otherwise, the invasion fleet would be “the bomber will always get through.” ing System,” formed a strong defensive destroyed in the and There was no defense against air attack, screen, supported by stations along AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 the coast that could detect German E Data from British radar sites were fed aircraft as soon as they took off from Several of Hitler’s generals urged him to the Fighter Command operations room at where members bases on the continent. Information to move immediately against Britain to of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force with from the radar sites fed into Dowding’s exploit the stunning victory in France but croupiers’ rakes moved aircraft sym- command and control nerve center he was not ready to do so. The Germans bols on a huge table map to track RAF at Bentley Priory on the outskirts of had taken substantial casualties—includ- and enemy aircraft. . From there, fighter squadrons ing almost 1,500 airplanes—and needed could be scrambled and directed with time to recover. In addition, Hitler was The Germans were about to enter a great economy of force. persuaded by the speculation that Churchill fight for which they were not organized The Air Ministry and the RAF had would be ousted and the new government or equipped. Their successes thus far were been pressing Dowding to retire, but at led by Halifax or Lloyd George. gained in short, fast blitzkrieg (“lightning Churchill’s insistence kept him on dur- Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe moved into war”) assaults in which tanks and Stuka ing the emergency because of his unique position for the attack, deploying air fleets dive bombers opened the way for the knowledge of the air defense system. to northern France and Belgium, backed infantry. In Britain, the tanks and the Dowding believed in careful conserva- up by a third one in Norway. The Luft- ground forces would not be there, and tion of his outnumbered force, employing waffe was the largest and best air force in the Stukas would be starkly vulnerable only as many fighters as he absolutely had Europe, about twice the size of the RAF. to an active air defense. to and preserving the rest for later need. Many of its pilots had been seasoned in The Luftwaffe would have to do the In May 1940, he clashed with Churchill, combat in the Spanish civil war. job alone. The fighter force was strong, who wanted to send more RAF fighters The Luftwaffe was led by Reichs- with the generally to the battle in France, which was nearing marschall Hermann Goering, once a acknowledged to be the best fighter in its end and in which hundreds of British dashing World War I ace who succeeded the world. However, the 109’s range was aircraft had been lost already. the “Red Baron,” Manfred von Rich- limited. Flying from bases in France, it Dowding was mainly successful in tofen, in command of the Flying Circus, had had only about 10 minutes of com- limiting further deployments, but as the but who was now a swaggering, bloated bat endurance over London. The rest British fell back from Dunkirk, Fighter caricature of himself. Goering and the of the Luftwaffe was overloaded with Command was seriously weakened. If the Luftwaffe boasted that it would take dive bombers. There were no long-range German offensive came at that moment, four days to defeat Fighter Command bombers and the twin-engine medium Dowding told the War Cabinet June 3, in southern England and four weeks bombers, the Junkers 88, Heinkel 111, he could not guarantee air superiority for to finish off the RAF and the British and Dornier 17, were poorly suited for more than 48 hours. aircraft industry. strategic bombardment. AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 The RAF used the lull to full advantage. On the morning of July 10, German “the scales had tilted against Fighter Between June 29 and Aug. 2, the British bombers and fighters pounced on a British Command.” On average, the Luftwaffe produced 322 new Hurricane and Spitfire ship convoy off the coast of , near sent 1,000 airplanes a day. Some RAF fighters, more than replacing those lost the Strait of . Spitfires scrambled pilots scrambled six times a day. Overall in France and offsetting losses in early and shot down some of the Germans. By aircraft losses between Aug. 24 and Sept. engagements in July. afternoon, more than 100 aircraft had been 6 were worse for the Germans (308 vs. On June 19, Fighter Command had drawn into the action. The Luftwaffe lost 273 for the RAF), but more of the Brit- only 520 aircraft ready for operations. 13, the RAF six. The British observe July ish losses were in fighters. Production of By Aug. 9, there were 715, with another 10 as the first day of the Battle of Britain. Hurricanes and Spitfires fell behind the 424 in storage and available within a day. Hitler gave the order on July 16 for the replacement rate. Fighter Command would fight the invasion, dubbed , and battle primarily with its two best aircraft, Goering assured him that the RAF would E RAF A O the Supermarine Spitfire and the Hawker be destroyed in time for it to begin by the Information from the radar sites con- Hurricane. The sleek Spitfire was the target date of Sept. 15. He set Aug. 13 verged at Dowding’s headquarters at equal of the Bf 109 in most regimes of as “Eagle Day,” on which the Luftwaffe Bentley Priory, where the ballroom had combat, and the workhorse Hurricane would open the all-out assault to “wipe been converted into a huge command and was almost as good and could hold its the British air force from the sky” and control center. The battle staff stations own in the fight. clear the way for Sea Lion. were on balconies overlooking a plotting Dowding organized the Fighter Com- The order of battle is difficult to room where Women’s Auxiliary Air Force mand defense into four groups. The larg- quantify precisely. The numbers changed members with headphones used croupiers’ est, covering southeastern England and the approaches to London, “Each of our movements was projected almost faultlessly was 11 , commanded by Air Vice Marshal Keith R. Park, a New Zealander and a fighter on the screens in the British fighter control centers, ace from World War I. To the immediate north was 12 Group, and as a result, Fighter Command was able to direct covering the Midlands and East Anglia, commanded by Air Vice their forces to the more favorable position at the most Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory. The other two groups had lesser propitious time.” roles in southwestern and north- rakes to move blocks representing RAF ern England and in . and enemy aircraft on a large table map The RAF had several important force constantly as a result of losses and replace- of the English coast and the Channel. multipliers: ments. Figures vary according to which “Our planes were already detected I Britain had cracked the high-level units are counted and how many aircraft over the Pas de while they were German “Enigma” code and made good are estimated to be in commission. still assembling and were never allowed use of the intelligence product, called Some aircraft—the German dive bomb- to escape the radar eye,” said Luftwaffe “,” derived from intercepts. ers and the British Defiant and Blen- ace . “Each of our move- At the outbreak of war, both the heim fighters—were of little value. RAF ments was projected almost faultlessly on Luftwaffe and the RAF used 87 octane Bomber Command’s involvement was in the screens in the British fighter control aviation fuel. In March 1940, the RAF strikes on the continent. In August 1940, centers, and as a result, Fighter Com- converted to 100 octane fuel, obtained the critical matchup over mand was able to direct their forces to from the United States. This gave a was some 1,000 German bombers and the more favorable position at the most 30 percent boost in performance to 800 Bf 109s against about 750 British propitious time.” the Rolls Royce Merlin engines in the Spitfires and Hurricane fighters. The brunt of the attack fell on 11 Group Spitfires and Hurricanes. The Luftwaffe Ahead of Eagle Day, the Luftwaffe in the south, where the exceptionally ca- continued to use 87 octane. attacked RAF forward airfields and radar pable Park understood Dowding’s system The Germans had radar before stations but the effort was largely wasted. and executed it flawlessly. Dowding did the British did but never used it to full They tried to bomb the radar towers, which not want to expend his limited resources advantage, nor did they understand how were hard to hit and easy to replace, rather in big fighter battles. His strategy was pervasively the British had integrated it than the vulnerable radar site buildings to concentrate on the German bomb- for air defense and command and control. where the trained operators were located. ers, which did the real damage. Fighter Bad weather took the edge off Eagle Command engaged the Bf 109s escort- E CRI ICA MA C Day on Aug. 13 but the Luftwaffe struck ing bomber formations but refused to be The Battle of Britain unfolded gradu- with full fury on Aug. 15, launching more drawn into combat by Luftwaffe fighter ally, beginning with German attacks in than 2,000 sorties, the most of any day sweeps. The primary objective was to keep July on shipping in the English Chan- in the Battle of Britain. The Germans the bombers from reaching their targets. nel, intended mainly as bait to lure the claimed to have destroyed 99 RAF aircraft This put Dowding at odds with Air Vice RAF fighters. Dowding was reluctant in the air. In actuality, the RAF lost 34 Marshal William Sholto Douglas, deputy to respond to the provocation with his (two of them on the ground) compared chief of the Air Staff, who believed the scarce fighter resources, but Churchill to 75 lost by the Luftwaffe. important thing was to shoot down as was not about to concede the Channel Late August brought the “desperate many enemy aircraft as possible. “It is to the enemy. days” when, according to Churchill, immaterial in the long run whether the AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 bomber is shot down before or after he concept had support from Dowding’s He ordered reprisal strikes on Berlin, has dropped his bombs,” Douglas said. detractors at RAF headquarters and in which RAF Bomber Command carried Park’s tactic was to employ his fighters the Air Ministry. out the next night. as small units, no larger than squadron Had Dowding and Park made a Hitler, who had not been told about size, hitting the bomber formation again greater effort to get along with their the original mistake by the Luftwaffe, and again. The squadrons could launch colleagues despite the disagreements, was outraged and changed the primary and strike quickly, attack in a target-rich they might have lessened the troubles targeting for German bombers to Lon- environment, and get away fast without that lay ahead, but diplomacy was not don and British cities. The order risk of a major defeat. their style. went into effect Sept. 7. Dowding and Park did not compre- The Germans were running out of At least one Luftwaffe leader, Field hend the dissatisfaction that was brewing time. They could not launch their Sea Marshal Albert Kesselring, agreed with against them in 12 Group to the north, where the ambitious Leigh-Mallory was in command. Park, who was “It is immaterial in the long run whether the bomber is junior to Leigh-Mallory but had more experience in fighters, had shot down before or after he has dropped his bombs,” been chosen for the more important command of 11 Group. “Leigh-Mallory, for his part, resented Lion invasion until the RAF was neu- the change for his own reasons. On the fact that the action and most of the tralized and the Luftwaffe had not been Aug. 25, Kesselring believed the RAF glamour and awards were going to No. able to get it done. After the weather had only 200 fighters left. The bombing 11 Group, and he had come to the conclu- turned in late autumn, a seaborne inva- of London, Kesselring thought, would sion that Dowding’s tactics (and Park’s sion would no longer be possible. force the British to put their remaining strict adherence to them) were in any case fighters in the air, where they could be completely wrong,” said historian Korda. I ER I MI A E destroyed by superior German numbers. Leigh-Mallory made no secret of his As September began, the bombing In fact, Dowding had 233 Spitfires and desire to see Dowding removed from was focused on British airfields and 416 Hurricanes, and the German strategy command. aircraft factories. At that point, the change had taken the pressure off the Egged on by one of his energetic Germans doomed any chance of suc- RAF at a critical time. squadron commanders, , cess with a change in strategy, brought On Sept. 15—later celebrated as Leigh-Mallory became the advocate for on by a combination of mistakes in “”—the Luftwaffe the “Big ” concept, attacking the understanding and judgment. sent 400 bombers and 700 fighters enemy with large RAF fighter forma- On the night of Aug. 24, a Luftwaffe against Britain. Park committed every tions of three to five squadrons led by crew, off course in the dark, dropped fighter he had, and they shot down 56 a single commander. In Park’s opinion, its bombs on London. It was an error of the German airplanes and damaged it would take the too long to in navigation. The target had been others so badly they could not make form up and it would arrive too late to oil storage facilities to the east of the it home. make a difference. Nevertheless, the city, but Churchill did not know that. The RAF lost 28 airplanes. AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 racy is finished in England.” He tried Later that day, Sholto Douglas to deny the quote but the reporter had replaced Dowding as head of Fighter

a witness / y and Kennedy submitted his Command. Leigh-Mallory took over resignation later in the month. 11 Group from Park, who was sent to In December, Churchill recalled Training Command. Weygand’s prediction in June that It was probably time for Dowding to England would have her neck wrung move on, but the handling of it reflected like a chicken. no credit on the Air Ministry or the RAF. “Some chicken,” Churchill said. Churchill acquiesced to the change, but “Some neck.” understood that it was shabby treatment The sustained bombing of British of the men who led the victory in the cities, called “,” continued Battle of Britain. In 1943, Churchill through May 1941, killing 40,000 proposed Dowding for a barony, which civilians and destroying a vast number was approved. He accepted and chose the of buildings for no strategic purpose. title Lord Dowding of Bentley Priory. In December, Hitler ordered the armed forces to prepare for Operation Bar- E FE barossa, the invasion and destruction During the four months of the Battle of the Soviet Union. In another of his of Britain, Fighter Command flew about overblown announcements, Goering 80,000 sorties. Often forgotten, Bomber promised that the Luftwaffe would Command flew 9,180 sorties and was shoot down the Red Air Force “like enough of a threat to keep the Luftwaffe clay pigeons.” from sending as many aircraft across the Channel as it might have otherwise. O I E AR Both sides wildly overestimated the L to r: Air Vice Marshal , com- The men who had directed the number of enemy airplanes they had mander of 11 Group, which took the brunt of RAF victory in the Battle of Britain did shot down. The numbers were adjusted the Luftwaffe attack. He flawlessly executed not last long once it was over. Sholto to more realistic levels after the war, but the “” for air defense. Douglas, Leigh-Mallory, and other differences persist. A recent and credible Squadron Commander Douglas Bader critics had a new complaint: Dowd- estimate is that the British lost 1,547, convinced Air Vice Marshal Trafford Leigh- Mallory of the advantages of the “Big Wing” ing was not doing enough to stop the including 770 Hurricanes and Spitfires formation. He went on to become one of the devastating nighttime bombing as the and 376 bombers. The Luftwaffe lost most famous fighter aces of World War II. Blitz got underway. 1,887, of which 650 were Bf 109s. Ambitious Leigh-Mallory was a ringleader Dowding said the answer was a night The RAF tended to use its Spitfires of the anti-Dowding faction and eventually replaced Park at 11 Group. Air Vice Marshal fighter aircraft. The Bristol Beaufighter against German fighters and its Hur- William Sholto Douglas, deputy chief of the was just coming into service and the ricanes against bombers, but the Hur- Air Staff, disliked and disagreed with Dowd- ground control radar to support it was ricanes got their share of enemy fighters, ing and succeeded him as head of Fighter not yet perfected. Subsequent events too. Hurricane squadrons accounted for Command. would bear him out, but at the time, 55 percent of the total RAF victories, the criticism found considerable ac- the Spitfire squadrons for 43 percent. The Luftwaffe never again came in ceptance. As Churchill said, “Never in the field such strength. The fighting continued “Although Dowding was absolutely of human conflict was so much owed but the realization was setting in that the right, the notion that for the present, by so many to so few,” referring to the Germans had failed to destroy the RAF. nothing could be done about a seri- RAF, but much was owed to Churchill On Sept. 17, Hitler postponed Operation ous military problem was not one that as well. He had no grasp of military Sea Lion until further notice. The British Churchill would have accepted tamely strategy. Throughout World War II, gained strength steadily. The Germans from any senior officer,” said historian he drove his generals and admirals to were unable to surge aircraft production Korda. “He was not about to tell the Brit- despair with his fondness for ideas that and their fighter and bomber strength ish people that they should wait quietly were bold and inspiring but impractical declined by more than a fourth between and patiently until Fighter Command or unsound. However, he was rock solid August and December. eventually received the right equipment on Napoleon’s first principle of war, the Bader got several chances in Septem- and revised its training procedures, while objective. ber to lead Big Wing formations, with in the meantime their homes were being He saw, when others did not, that the mixed results. On the main occasions, the blown up or burned night after night.” objective that mattered was the absolute participating squadrons took too long to On Nov. 25, Dowding got a tele- determination to fight. By sheer force form up and were late in arriving at the phone call from the secretary of state of his will, he carried the British nation battle, just as Park had predicted. for air, Archibald Sinclair, telling him along with him. Thus committed, the The danger of invasion was gone. By to relinquish his command within 24 strategists and military leaders figured British accounting, the Battle of Britain hours. Dowding asked for a reason and out how to get it done. ended Oct. 31. However, not everyone un- was told only that the decision had The first step—and an enormous one— derstood the outcome yet. In an interview been reached. was victory in the Battle of Britain. J with the Boston Globe in November, US Ambassador Kennedy still believed the John T. Correll was editor in chief of for 18 years and is now a con- battle was lost and declared that “democ- tributor. His most recent article, “Gunships on the Trail” appeared in the June issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015