Germany Would Have Consolidated Its Domination of Europe. Had Britain Been Unable to Continue the Fight, the United States Would

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Germany Would Have Consolidated Its Domination of Europe. Had Britain Been Unable to Continue the Fight, the United States Would Their Finest HourBy John T. Correll he Battle of Britain, which Germany would have consolidated its began 75 years ago this month, domination of Europe. Had Britain been was the single most important unable to continue the fi ght, the United engagement of World War II. If States would not likely have entered the the British had lost, the conse- European war. Even if it did, there would quences would have been catastrophic. have been no bases in Britain from which TAt best, Britain would have had to to conduct a bombing offensive against seek a peace settlement with Germany Germany or launch a D-Day invasion of on Hitler’s terms, which would have Europe. been severe. Winston Churchill would Without an Atlantic front siphoning most likely have been replaced as Prime off forces and resources, Germany may— Minister by the Foreign Secretary, Lord or may not—have been able to defeat the An RAF Spitfire chases a Luftwaffe Bf 109 during a dogfight in the Battle of Halifax, or former Prime Minister David Soviet Union. Conversely, if the Soviets Britain, in this painting by Ivan Berry- Lloyd George. Both of them thought defeated Germany, there would be nothing man. negotiation with Germany was inevitable. to impede their march further west. Hitler 30 AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 From an original painting by Ivan Berryman, courtesy of Cranston Fine Arts The British were expected to lose the Battle of Britain. Fortunately, Winston Churchill and the RAF thought otherwise. might well have won World War II—and fast-moving German army, supported by its own dominions and empire, Britain if he did not, Stalin would have. panzers and Stuka dive bombers, over- stood alone. When the Battle of Britain began in whelmed the Netherlands and Belgium in Churchill, 65, had served in Parliament July 1940, the British were not expected a matter of days. France surrendered on and various Cabinet positions for 40 years. to win. That they did win was primarily June 22. Britain was fortunate to extract He was First Lord of the Admiralty at the attributable to the strength and character its retreating expeditionary forces from beginning of World War I and again in of Winston Churchill and the Royal Air the beaches at Dunkirk. 1939. In time, he would be recognized Force—and to critical mistakes by Hitler The United States was not yet in as one of Britain’s greatest leaders, but and the Luftwaffe. the war, nor was Russia. Only seven that was still to come. In May 1940, the percent of Americans were willing to Conservative Party turned to him—in BRITAIN STOOD ALONE go to war on the side of the British. The desperation and with considerable re- In the summer of 1940, Britain’s situ- Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact luctance—to replace the hapless Neville ation was grim. In less than two months, of 1939 was still in effect, not broken Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Many Germany had conquered most of western until Germany invaded the Soviet Union of his colleagues and much of the ruling Europe from Norway to the Pyrenees. The in June 1941. Except for the support of class disliked Churchill and distrusted AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 31 him as reckless, belligerent, and drawn to adventure and romanticism. Appeasement and defeatism were strong in the British Foreign Office. Af- ter Dunkirk, the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, believed that Britain had lost. He inquired through Italian intermediar- ies what Hitler’s terms for peace with Britain would be. David Lloyd George, Prime Minister from 1916 to 1922, also believed it was futile to fight. Clockwise from top: Contrails left by British and German aircraft after a dogfight during the Battle of Britain. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding. The leader of Fighter Command was bril- liant and capable but cold and aloof. His detractors worked constantly to oust him from command. Prime Minister Winston Churchill flashes the iconic “V” for victory sign. Surrounded by defeatists and appeasers, Churchill convinced the British to stand reso- lutely against the threat of a German invasion. 32 AIR FORCE M agazine / July 2015 A Hurricane circles overhead as a Heinkel He 111 sinks into the water near the British islands of Scilly in this painting by Berryman. F r o m n r i g i n a l a i n t i n g y v a n e r r ym a n , o ur t e s y f r a n s t o n i n e A r t s US Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy was on the beaches. Thus the British were Baldwin said. “The only defense is in convinced that the Germans would win in the unanticipated position of relying offense.” the impending Battle of Britain. So was on RAF Fighter Command as their first Fighter Command, organized in 1936, American aviator Charles A. Lindbergh, line of defense. was regarded by almost everyone, includ- who had toured Germany as a guest of The Royal Navy, the traditional strength ing the Air Ministry, as secondary in the Luftwaffe. of the island nation, still ranked first among importance to Bomber Command. From Gen. Maxime Weygand, commander the armed forces. The RAF had been a its beginning, Fighter Command was led of the defeated French forces, predicted separate service since 1918, created in by Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, an that “in three weeks, England will have response to the relentless bombing of outstanding but eccentric officer known her neck wrung like a chicken.” Britain by German Zeppelins in World as “Stuffy” for his cold personality. He Churchill, undaunted, vowed that “we War I. However, its founding father, was stubborn and aloof, and he had no will never surrender” as he rallied the Marshal of the RAF Hugh M. Trenchard, ability to charm his fellow air marshals or nation with a ringing call to arms: “Let built the force around long-range strate- the politicians. Some young airmen saw us, therefore, brace ourselves to our duty gic bombardment. Like many airmen of him as too old, lacking in spirit, and too and so bear ourselves that, if the British his day—including Billy Mitchell in the long away from active flying. Empire and its Commonwealth last for a United States—Trenchard believed that Of greater consequence, “Dowding thousand years, men will still say, ‘This the bomber was the primary instrument was perhaps the one man of consequence was their finest hour.’ ” of airpower. in the United Kingdom—perhaps in the This conviction was reflected in national entire world—who did not believe that T H E O D I G Y S T EM policy. In 1932, Stanley Baldwin—who the bomber would ‘always get through,’ ” A German invasion of Great Brit- was Prime Minister three times between said historian Michael Korda. ain was contingent on air superiority. the world wars—famously declared that Fighter Command, under the “Dowd- Otherwise, the invasion fleet would be “the bomber will always get through.” ing System,” formed a strong defensive destroyed in the English Channel and There was no defense against air attack, screen, supported by radar stations along AIR FORCE Magazine / July 2015 3 3 the coast that could detect German T H E U L L Data from British radar sites were fed aircraft as soon as they took off from Several of Hitler’s generals urged him to the Fighter Command operations room at Bentley Priory where members bases on the continent. Information to move immediately against Britain to of the Women’s Auxiliary Air Force with from the radar sites fed into Dowding’s exploit the stunning victory in France but croupiers’ rakes moved aircraft sym- command and control nerve center he was not ready to do so. The Germans bols on a huge table map to track RAF at Bentley Priory on the outskirts of had taken substantial casualties—includ- and enemy aircraft. London. From there, fighter squadrons ing almost 1,500 airplanes—and needed could be scrambled and directed with time to recover. In addition, Hitler was The Germans were about to enter a great economy of force. persuaded by the speculation that Churchill fight for which they were not organized The Air Ministry and the RAF had would be ousted and the new government or equipped. Their successes thus far were been pressing Dowding to retire, but at led by Halifax or Lloyd George. gained in short, fast blitzkrieg (“lightning Churchill’s insistence kept him on dur- Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe moved into war”) assaults in which tanks and Stuka ing the emergency because of his unique position for the attack, deploying air fleets dive bombers opened the way for the knowledge of the air defense system. to northern France and Belgium, backed infantry. In Britain, the tanks and the Dowding believed in careful conserva- up by a third one in Norway. The Luft- ground forces would not be there, and tion of his outnumbered force, employing waffe was the largest and best air force in the Stukas would be starkly vulnerable only as many fighters as he absolutely had Europe, about twice the size of the RAF. to an active air defense. to and preserving the rest for later need. Many of its pilots had been seasoned in The Luftwaffe would have to do the In May 1940, he clashed with Churchill, combat in the Spanish civil war. job alone. The fighter force was strong, who wanted to send more RAF fighters The Luftwaffe was led by Reichs- with the Messerschmitt Bf 109 generally to the battle in France, which was nearing marschall Hermann Goering, once a acknowledged to be the best fighter in its end and in which hundreds of British dashing World War I ace who succeeded the world.
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