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Marxism As Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth*

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Marxism As Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth* MARXISM AS SCIENCE: HISTORICAL CHALLENGES AND THEORETICAL GROWTH* &HAEL BURAWOY University of California,Berkeley Thispaper examinesMarxism's claim to be a science. Thefirst part considerspossible models of science and argues that the most coherent is Imre Lakatos's methodology of scientiBc research programs. In his conception scientific knowledge grows on the basis of a hard core ofpostulates which are protectedfrom refutation by the development of a series of auxiliary theories. Such a research program is progressive rather than degenerating if successive theories are consistent with the core, explain anomalies and make predictions, some of which are realized. In the second part I argue that with some qualijications the history of Marxism -from Marx and Engels, to German Marxism, to Russian Marxism, and finally to Western Marxism-conforms to the model of aprogressive researchprogram. In the thirdpart Iclaim that deviations from the model, such as Soviet Marxism, are due to the breakdown of the reciprocal interaction between Marxism's heuristics and historical challenges. lassical sociology consistently belittled Marxist science have rarely been carefully expli- CMarxism's claim to science (Hughes 1958, cated, let alone subjected to empirical exarnina- Chapter 3). Weber, Durkheim, Pareto, and more tion. That is the task of this essay. This task re- recently, Parsons assailed Marxism for substitut- quires, however, that we first turn to philosophy ing moral passion and Hegelian metaphysics for to clarify the possible meanings of science. scientific reason, for not treating evidence seri- ously, and for failing to adopt thk techniques of SHOmD WE MDIN BY SCIENCE? modem social science. Marxists themselves have battled fiercelv over Marxism's scientific status. "History of science without philosophy of sci- so much so that they are conventionally divided ence is blind" (Lakatos 1978, p. 102). In order to into two opposed camps -scientific Marxists make sense of the history of any purported science who attempt to establish laws of economic de- and to evaluate its scientific status it is necessary velopment in analogy to the laws of the natural to work with a clear conception of science. But sciences, and critical Marxists who deny the ex- which conception of science? Philosophy of sci- istence of any fixed determinism and concen- ence provides us with several models. The first trate on the irrationality of capitalism, the gap part of this essay seeks to demonstrate that Laka- between what is and what could be. Determin- tos's methodology of scientific research programs ism versus voluntarism, science versus revolu- is the most coherent from a philosophical and tion, materialism versus idealism, the old versus logical standpoint. Furthermore, his methodolo- the young Marx, have been enduring antinomies gy has the advantage of providing, indeed de- within Marxism (Gouldner 1980, Chapter 2). manding, the evaluation of a historical sequence However, whether from the perspective of soci- of theories, not just a single theory. All too often ology or within Marxism itself, the critiques of the entirety of Marxism is condemned for the supposed sins of one of its theories -whether of * Direct all correspondence to Michael Burawoy, Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels or whomever -in- Department of Sociology, University of California, stead of considering each as a part of an evolving Berkeley, CA 94720. The ideas in this papel: devel- tradition. oped in graduate courses I have taught on Marxism, on methodology, and on the philosophy of science over Philosophy may provide the models but their the last decade. I should like to thank all the students relevance must be established: "Philosophy of who participated. The paper benefited considerably science without history of science is empty" from the critical and constructive comments of the (Lakatos 1978, p. 102). Philosophers too often editor, the copy editor, five anonymous ASR reviewers appeal to isolated illustrations of scientific and Julia Adams. progress to support their particular conception of American Sociological Review, 1990,Vol. 55 (December:775-793) 775 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW scientific rationality without even attempting se- Theories necessarily precede facts because they rious historical analysis. As we shall see, they determine which facts are relevant. Facts exist frequently practice precisely the opposite of what neither to generate nor even to confii but to they preach -expounding how science should falsify theories. Science proceeds, therefore, not be conducted without examining first how it ac- through a process of securing the best fit or "ex- tually is conducted. This is particularly clear in plaining the greatest variance" but through the philosophers' commentaries on Marxism where refutation of bold conjectures. In Popper's view they assert its nonscientific or pseudoscientific the best theories are the ones that are unlikely to status without studying the relationship between be true yet "hold up" under sustained attempts at their models of science and the historical growth refutation. of Marxism. Therefore, in the second part of this According to Popper, Marx's original theory essay I examine the history of Marxism in relation of the collapse of capitalism was just such a bold to Lakatos's model of scientific rationality. conjecture and thus scientific, but it was proven This forms the basis for the third and final part false and should therefore be rejected. "Yet in- where I argue that Marxism loses it scientific stead of accepting the refutations the followers character when it denies its own historicity, that of Marx reinterpreted both the theory and the is when Marxism renounces the dialogue between evidence in order to make them aeree. In this its own historically emergent rationality and the way they rescued the theory from refutation; but external historical challenges it confronts. In oth- they did so at the price of adopting a device which er words, Marxism is most successful as a science made them irrefutable. They thus gave a 'con- when there is balanced reciprocity between its ventionalist twist' to the theory; andby this strat- internal and external histories. I try to apply this agem they destroyed its much advertised claim to the challenge to Marxism posed by the demise to scientific status" (Popper 1963, p. 37; see also of "communism" in Eastern Europe and the So- Popper 1945, Chapters 15-21). According to viet Union. But first, I must consider competing Popper, Marxists pursued confirmations of their conceptions of science. theories rather than establishing criteria for their falsiJication.Marxism, like psychoanalysis, could From Induction to Falsificationism not be proven wrong and therefore could not be a true science. Contemporary philosophy of science has moved from normative conceptions that search for the Personal Knowledge method of science, to historically rooted charac- terizations that seek to establish the logical con- As an account of the history of science, Popper's ditions for the growth of knowledge. The early "falsificationism" was as flawed as the "verifica- inductive models of science associated with tionism" it was supposed to replace. Great Hume, Mill and the school of logical positivism breakthroughs have often come when scientists (Nagel and Hempel) insisted that scientific laws have refused to accept refutations, when they have be derived from empirical examinations of the turned an apparent falsification into a brilliant facts. From this point of view, Marxism, rather corroboration of the original theory. From his than responding to the facts, is said to impose examination of science, Polanyi (1958, Chapter itself on the facts. It is ideology, metaphysics, 1) concluded that "data" were never so crucial in religion or moral passion, but not science (Kola- great scientific advances as "verificationism" or kowski 1978, pp.525-6). Durkheim put it blunt- "falsificationism" claimed. In his view, data have ly, "The truth is that the facts and observations often been wrong, ignored, or deceptive, and so assembled by [Marxist] theoreticians anxious to science cannot be reduced to an "objective" pro- document their affirmations are hardly there ex- cess linking theory to data, to a "logic" or "algo- cept to give form to the arguments. The research rithm such as "induction" or "falsification." For studies they made were undertaken to establish a all its empirical controls, science still has an ir- doctrine that they had previously conceived, rather reducible "subjective" core based on personal than the doctrine being the result of research" rather than impersonal knowledge. Science in- ([I8961 1958, p. 8). volves tacit skills which cannot be articulated Popper's conclusions about Marxism were but have to be learned through apprenticeship similar, but were based on a very different con- (Chapter 4). It calls for passions to select what is ception of science. In his view, science is not an vital, to make leaps of imagination and to persuade induction machine which derives laws from facts. others to see the world in a new way (pp. 132- MARXISM AS SCIENCE 74). Polanyi argued that sustaining these skills, world views and as such were incommensurable passions, and commitments is a delicate process. and incompatible. Different paradigms were based It requires a self-regulating community of scien- on different assumptions, posed different ques- tists which is independent of politics (Chapter 7). tions and therefore presented scientists with dif- For Polanyi, Marxism was the enemy of true ferent puzzles. The same data could be interpret- science (pp. 227-45). Marxism preached the sub- ed in different ways, so that facts themselves are ordination of science to society, destroying the relative to the paradigm. Outside the judgment of community which nourished the skills, passions, the scientific community itself - its personal and commitments of personal knowledge. Basing knowledge or tacit skills - there could be no his view on Soviet Marxism as the prototype of single set of criteria for progress that would estab- all Marxism, Polanyi claimed that Marxism was lish the superiority of one paradigm over another.
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